The Commission has just confirmed that it is suspending certain payments under Cohesion funding and the European Regional Development Fund to the Czech Prime Minister’s company Agrofert, due to the apparent conflict of interest surrounding Andrej Babiš' (pictured) role as PM and his business holdings. The Czech Prime Minister is the owner of the massive agribusiness, for which he set up a ‘trust’ ahead of becoming Prime Minister for the second time. The Greens/EFA Group have long highlighted the conflict of interests surrounding the Czech Prime Minister.
Daniel Freund MEP, Greens/EFA Group Coordinator in the Budgetary Control Committee said: “The Commission has recognized that Czech PM Andrej Babiš is likely in conflict of interest and we applaud that the Commission has finally taken action here. It is totally unacceptable for a prime minister to be negotiating the EU’s next long term budget, when he decides how large a chunk of that money could end up in his own pockets. The trust fund that Babiš set up in no way is enough to prevent a conflict of interest and it’s welcome that the Commission has acknowledged this. “However, the Czech people should not have to suffer due to the dodgy dealings of their prime minister. It is time that the Commission and Council forces Czechia to ensure that Babiš is not involved in any negotiations around the EU’s long term budget, which may benefit him or his family directly. Either Babiš is head of Agrofert or he’s Czech PM, he can’t have it both ways.”
Markéta Gregorová, Greens/EFA MEP and Czech Pirate Member of the Committee on International Trade said: “I am glad that the European Commission has finally started addressing Andrej Babiš’ conflict of interest, as it promised in its response to my inquiry. This confirms that we were right to raise the alarm: Babiš has not resolved his conflict of interest, and, frankly, he never genuinely intended to do so. The Commission must now ensure that the rules are enforced and that European taxpayers’ money is protected from any misuse.”
The EU will not be able to take on tech juggernauts like the US and China if it relies solely on Berlin, Paris, Amsterdam and Stockholm. It must start treating Eastern Europe as a strategic partner if it wants to become a global technological power, writes Cristian Gherasim.
The image of a global superpower is no longer synonymous with swarms of soldiers armed to the teeth. Modern wars are fought as much online as they are on the battlefield. Nations that will have a say in tomorrow’s world now must keep innovation might at the top of their priorities.
Draghi’s warnings
The 2024 report by former ECB president Mario Draghi on EU’s economic competitiveness included warnings directed at Europe’s tech ambitions. Mario Draghi’s report highlights the need to grow digital connectivity and reduce the gaps between Europe and the world’s tech powerhouses.
The European Union has been in a less than flattering position, even when it comes to the most basic infrastructure. A few years back, the European Court of Auditors said EU members should step up efforts to deploy 5G, given how the next big leap in mobile networking has been lagging in some member states. Though improvements have been made, there is still a long way to go. The Commission reacted with its Competitiveness Compass – which places tech infrastructure as the cornerstone of future economic development.
In order to meet the digital target for 2030, Brussels needs to revamp the old infrastructure and, more importantly, create a better and newer one.
Eastern Europe’s ignored strength
Rich countries no longer hold the monopoly over connectivity and innovation. Eastern Europe – though economically not yet on par with its Western counterparts - has put technology front and center, building its communication infrastructure at great speed.
Romania demonstrates that top connectivity is not limited to Europe’s Western economies. Today, almost nine in ten Romanian households have internet. The country ranks high among the world’s fastest countries for broadband speeds, according to Ookla. Over a ten year period (2025 versus 2015), Romania saw a 28% increase in household access to the internet. The country is becoming one of Europe’s most vital internet hubs, which also explains Romania’s growing importance as a cybersecurity player on the continent. Romania hosts the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre, crucial to Europe’s defense. Countries in Eastern Europe have gained significant firsthand expertise in dealing with such threats.
Further north, Estonia is also a clear example of Eastern Europe’s technological influence. The country built one of Europe’s most advanced digital public sectors, whose technological clout far exceeds its population size and geography. Estonia offers the rest of the European Union valuable lessons in digital government, cybersecurity and online public services.
Poland – a former Warsaw Pact member - gives yet another example of Eastern Europe’s growing technological influence. Poland has been tackling hate speech and disinformation on the internet and with the help of its AI companies it has aggressively been monitoring social media content.
The country is positioning itself as Central and Eastern Europe’s leading AI hub, investing heavily in the tech sector. The Polish digital economy market is currently estimated to be around 40 billion EUR and expected to develop exponentially over the coming years.
Digital Networks Act
Strength lies in unity, hence a unified telecom market would help Europe grow its tech influence relative to that of China and the US. This unified EU digital market should unmistakably include the Eastern European nations. The Digital Networks Act looks to reduce market fragmentation, encourage fiber and 5G investment. It remains to be seen whether Europe’s nations can form a single digital market.
That is where the Digital Decade comes in. The program is set up by the European Union to improve digital skills, upgrade digital infrastructure and get more businesses and public services online. If the EU is to build a unified digital market, investments and the decision making process should not exclude Eastern Europe.
Europe needs to learn how to pool resources from every member state just as much as it needs to unify its regulations and make long term infrastructure investments a must.
Cybersecurity and digital sovereignty
The past few years have shown that making Europe digitally strong is a matter of security and survival. Mobile communications, fiber networks and data centers are now seen as essential infrastructure, alongside energy grids and transport networks.
Cyber attackers have been targeting Europe’s critical infrastructure. Countries on the eastern flank of EU and NATO such as Romania have become important digital security actors. Sitting in Russia’s crosshairs, their resilient communication infrastructure is now essential for Europe’s wider defense.
Eastern Europe brings not only cybersecurity expertise to the table, but also infrastructure and human resources that will help the EU compete globally.
Digital sovereignty should not bring about isolation. Europe needs to keep on working with the US on matters of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence instead of being at odds with each other. At the same time, the EU should be strengthening its own infrastructure, investing heavily in research and development and creating a single digital market.
Europe’s digital future will not be built exclusively in Western Europe. It will also be built in Bucharest, Warsaw, Tallinn and across EU’s eastern frontier.
If Brussels is indeed serious about closing the gap with the US and China, it can’t leave its eastern member states out. Romania and Eastern Europe are no longer part of Europe's digital periphery, and their infrastructure is there to prove it. Now what they need is a seat at the table.
Saxony-Anhalt has returned 43.8% of the vote for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in its state election. The result puts the party within reach of forming what would be the first state government run by the far-right in the history of the German federal republic.
The AfD has no executive experience and its Saxony-Anhalt branch is riven with tensions and splits. A chaotic state government could deter voters elsewhere from backing such parties. But if the AfD manages to govern halfway coherently, it will have the chance to pick fights with authorities in both Berlin and Brussels, and significant leeway to try out policies that could later be applied elsewhere. This might then embolden the radical right elsewhere in Europe.
Meanwhile the result increases the pressure on Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s centrist federal coalition. Already before the Saxony-Anhalt election, splits were widening between eastern and western branches of his Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), and between him and his conservative party base. The result exacerbates these and, in turn, increases the chance that Merz will be too distracted and constrained by domestic politics to provide European leadership.
With France, Italy, Poland and Spain all entering election seasons, a Germany riven by internal drama cannot be the anchor that Europe needs.
Bold action is needed both in Berlin and beyond Germany. Talk of a party ban is too late and would anyway be unlikely to quell the underlying discontent felt by AfD voters. Action by the federal authorities against stand-out extremists in the party, and its funding streams, is both more realistic and more likely to keep its voters open to persuasion.
Meanwhile the CDU/CSU needs to make a strategic decision about what sort of party it wants to be; including where it will and will not cooperate with parties outside the traditional mainstream. Germany’s other pro-European parties also need to marshal a better answer to the radical right: substantive policies proving that they are on the side of ordinary people rather than powerful interests (Piotr Buras, Jeremy Cliffe and Susi Dennison have made concrete suggestions along these lines where climate policy is concerned.)
Other European capitals should curb their expectations of German leadership and nurture broader sources of impetus, including the new E6 group of major EU economies and the “coalition of the willing” on Ukraine. Merz, for example, is now even less likely to achieve a breakthrough on the EU’s 2028-2034 budget negotiations or on EU accession talks. Other European leaders, including European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, will need to depend less on him to advance ambitious proposals. European diplomats in Berlin should think hard about how to sell their ideas into a more distracted and inward-looking government.
Saxony-Anhalt is a small and demographically unrepresentative German state, with an atypically old and homogeneous population of 2.1m out of a national total of 83.5m. Nevertheless, its election result has reverberated through European capitals.
The vote on September 6th gives the AfD 39 seats, three short of a majority, requiring the party to seek support either from the left-conservative Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) or the right flank of the CDU in order to govern. The only alternative would be a government supported (at least passively) by all five of the other parties, including the socialist Left party, cooperation with which is anathema to the CDU. The development comes as Merz’s fragile “grand coalition” is struggling to pass reforms aimed at reviving Germany’s stagnant economy.
Two upcoming state elections on September 20th—in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and in Berlin—could further dent his authority. It is possible, though not currently probable, that he will be forced out as chancellor in the coming months. The obvious frontrunner to replace Merz is Hendrik Wüst, the premier of North Rhine-Westphalia, but his moderate politics may not fit the polarised mood.
Sovereign wealth is typically measured by the size of reserves that allow a country to weather periods of crisis. However, for future generations, it is not only the amount left in financial accounts that matters. Of equal importance is the state of the country they inherit alongside these savings: the quality of its schools and hospitals, the condition of utility networks, roads, energy, and other core infrastructure.
For Kazakhstan, this question holds special significance. Revenues from natural resources enable the country to build a substantial financial cushion. The National Fund accumulates a portion of commodity revenues and serves two primary functions: a savings function aimed at preserving assets for future generations, and a stabilization function designed to reduce the state budget's vulnerability to fluctuations in global commodity markets. It should be noted that by mid-2026, the fund's foreign-currency assets reached $65.5 billion. (1)
Sovereign wealth operates differently
There is no single global model for managing sovereign wealth funds. States strike different balances between intergenerational savings, fiscal stabilization, and deploying accumulated capital for development. However, international experience demonstrates that these goals are not inherently contradictory.
Norway adheres to one of the most disciplined models of sovereign wealth management. Its fiscal rule aligns withdrawals with the expected real return of the Government Pension Fund, while preserving the flexibility to use fiscal policy in response to major economic shocks. (2)
The stabilization function is even more pronounced in Chile. Funds from the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund have been drawn upon repeatedly during periods of economic stress. In 2009, withdrawals reached nearly $9.28 billion, with significant funds also deployed in 2019–2021. (3)
Other countries also utilize commodity revenues not only as a source of long-term savings, but as a catalyst for economic development. The experience of Kuwait is illustrative, where these responsibilities are divided between the Future Generations Fund, focused on preserving capital for future generations, and the General Reserve Fund, whose investment portfolio encompasses energy, industry, transport and logistics, healthcare, and infrastructure. This model allows Kuwait to preserve a portion of national wealth for upcoming generations while transforming another portion into assets that expand the country's economic potential today and build the foundation for long-term growth. (4)
Azerbaijan, whose sovereign wealth origins closely mirror Kazakhstan's, has utilized resources from the State Oil Fund to finance major projects of national importance, including the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, the Oguz–Gabala–Baku water supply system, and equity participation in major oil and gas transport initiatives. (5)
None of these models can be mechanically copied by another country. Together, however, they demonstrate that sovereign wealth management does not boil down to a binary choice between "saving" and "spending." What matters far more is the form in which national capital can deliver the greatest long-term return for the nation.
From financial capital to national capital
Savings from the National Fund are already being utilized directly in the interests of future generations. Since 2024, Kazakhstan has operated the "National Fund for Children" program: every young citizen of Kazakhstan is annually allocated a portion of the fund's investment income, and upon reaching 18 years of age, the accumulated funds can be used for education or housing improvement. This program has already entered the phase of practical asset utilization. Between February 2024 and August 1, 2026, payouts were received by more than 338,000 young Kazakhstanis, totaling approximately $67.8 million. Meanwhile, the funds belonging to minors remain within the National Fund's assets and continue to be invested until they reach adulthood. (6)
At the same time, Kazakhstan faces a challenge familiar to many economies that have accumulated significant revenues from natural resources: what portion of national wealth should remain in financial assets, and what portion makes sense to convert into capital working domestically.
Soon, Kazakhstan plans to deploy a portion of the National Fund's assets to finance major infrastructure projects of nationwide significance. In 2027, over $4 billion is planned for these purposes, followed by slightly over $3 billion annually in 2028 and 2029 (7).
According to several experts, the economic rationale for such a decision extends beyond mere financing. When funds are directed into long-term social and engineering infrastructure, national wealth does not disappear. The form in which it exists simply changes.
Money allocated to current consumption expires alongside the budget cycle. A school, hospital, utility network, road, or energy facility remains in the economy and operates for decades.
This is precisely why infrastructure investments differ fundamentally from covering operational expenses. A portion of financial capital is effectively transformed into physical and human capital within the country.
Such an approach yields economic benefits right from the project implementation stage. Construction generates demand for materials, equipment, transport, design, and installation work, providing orders for domestic enterprises and creating added value within the country. Once facilities are operational, another, far more sustained effect begins. Modernizing heating and water supply systems increases their reliability, reduces losses, and diminishes the need for costly emergency repairs. Roads enhance regional connectivity. Energy infrastructure removes bottlenecks for expanding existing production and launching new industrial capacity.
Investments in healthcare and education occupy a special place. Modern hospitals, clinics, and educational institutions represent both social infrastructure and direct investments in human capital. The accessibility of medical care, public health status, quality of education, and workforce qualifications are directly tied to labor productivity and the long-term potential of the economy. All social infrastructure is as much an element of national capital as transport or energy infrastructure, and its returns and effectiveness extend far beyond the construction timeline of any individual project.
The cost of deferred development
Utilizing accumulated capital carries an opportunity cost. However, delaying investments carries an opportunity cost as well. Insufficient capacity of transport networks, energy shortages, worn-out utility systems, and a deficit of schools or medical facilities impose costs today. The longer modernization is postponed, the longer the economy and population bear these costs.
Therefore, the pace of infrastructure development carries clear economic value. If a necessary facility opens today rather than ten years from now, the country gains additional years of its economic and social returns.
Moreover, the social and economic effects of infrastructure are largely inseparable. Reliable utility networks, modern healthcare, education, transport, and energy simultaneously elevate the quality of life and create an environment in which private economic activity can thrive.
A reserve that has already worked
Using the National Fund's resources to address strategic priorities is not a new practice for Kazakhstan. The fund's ability to provide supplementary resources when the economy needs them most has repeatedly served as a key factor in the country's economic resilience.
During the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, $10 billion was directed to stabilize the financial sector, support real estate, small and medium enterprises, and the agribusiness sector (8). In 2015–2017, an additional $9 billion was withdrawn (9). During the pandemic in 2020–2021, transfers from the National Fund helped preserve economic stability and support citizens. Thus, having an accumulated reserve allowed the state to act proactively—promptly directing additional resources where they were required to prevent more severe economic repercussions.
The existence of a large financial reserve enabled Kazakhstan to navigate periods of external shocks with an additional funding source without relying exclusively on current budget revenues.
Today, it is not the principle of using the fund that is changing, but the nature of the task. Previously, accumulated resources primarily served to mitigate the impact of global shocks. Now, a portion of the capital is intended to eliminate infrastructural bottlenecks that could constrain long-term development.
This expands the sovereign fund's role: resources accumulated during favorable periods are used not only after a crisis arises, but also to build assets that enhance the resilience and potential of the economy for years to come.
The account of future generations
Ultimately, the success of this strategy will be measured not by the volume of funds withdrawn from the National Fund, but by the value of the assets created with them and the overall effect they deliver to the economy and citizens.
This fundamentally shifts the evaluation criteria. If a financial asset worth one dollar is transformed into infrastructure that enhances productivity, lowers business costs, elevates human capital quality, and fosters conditions for new private investment over decades, the very structure of national wealth undergoes a qualitative transformation.
Therefore, the central question for the coming years is not whether to utilize National Fund resources, but the quality of the assets Kazakhstan creates in return. For future generations, this exact balance between preserved financial capital and the value of the domestic economy built in its place will stand as the primary legacy of today's decisions.
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Jana Puglierin, senior policy fellow and head of ECFR’s Berlin office, in a World in 30 Minutes Emergency Room episode to discuss the latest in German politics.
The AfD’s win in the small eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt was widely expected, but the scale of the result and the collapse of Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) have still shocked Berlin. For the first time since the second world war, a far-right party is within reach of governing a German Bundesland. Jana unpacks the AfD’s possible paths to power, the pressure on Merz and his grand coalition, and what the result says about the far right’s continued rise in Europe.
Why does an election in a state of two million people matter so much for a country of 84 million? Can the AfD govern without a formal coalition partner, and would CDU lawmakers break the historic “firewall” to make that possible? Why is the party still treated as beyond the pale, even as it leads national polls? And should Europe prepare for a Germany too absorbed in its own crisis to lead?
This episode was recorded on September 7th 2026.
With the British government set to announce new measures targeting Israel’s settlement project, polling by Opinium for ECFR shows that just 18% of UK adults oppose a ban on trade in goods with Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, compared to 46% who back it. Support rises to nearly three quarters—72% versus 28%—when excluding those who did not voice an opinion.
To date, the UK has sanctioned some two dozen organisations and individuals linked to settler violence. It has also excluded settlement goods from the preferential trade tariffs applied to Israeli products, though stopped short of an outright ban. However, settlement expansion is a state-driven project sustained by domestic economic incentives and foreign financial linkages. Rather than focusing only on its most violent manifestation, a settlement trade ban would challenge these underlying drivers.
Last week, foreign secretary Ed Miliband pledged to go further in challenging Israeli actions that are destroying the possibility of a two-state solution, like the recent construction of the “doomsday” E-1 settlement on the outskirts of East Jerusalem. The settlement ban expected to be announced later today also gives practical meaning to the UK’s recognition of Palestine last year—as demanded by Palestinians themselves. Such action by the British government commands broad support across Britain’s political and regional divides, while opposition is limited.
Labour, Liberal Democrat and Green voters decisively favour the proposed ban. It is also strongly supported by voters who have moved away from Labour, many of whom defected to the Green Party amid dissatisfaction with prime minister Keir Starmer’s response to Israeli actions in Gaza and the West Bank. But backing for the measure extends across party lines: Conservative and Reform voters are also more likely to support than oppose it.
The findings cross the Brexit divide too, with supporters clearly outnumbering opponents among both Remain and Leave voters. The same pattern is evident geographically. Support is highest in London and Scotland, closely followed by Northern Ireland, while supporters also outnumber opponents in every English region and in Wales. Indeed, across every political, regional, age and gender group reported in the survey, support exceeds opposition.
The polling also finds that only 16% of British adults consider it antisemitic to target Israeli settlements. Meanwhile, a two-state solution remains by far the most popular outcome for Israel and Palestine with 40% favouring a Palestinian state alongside Israel, compared with 12% who favour a single shared state and just 8% who prefer the status quo of Israel without a Palestinian state.
ECFR’s polling shows a clear public mandate for the UK to take a leadership role in strengthening international efforts against Israel’s settlement project
ECFR’s polling shows a clear public mandate for the UK to take a leadership role in strengthening international efforts against Israel’s settlement project and to defend the viability of a two-state solution. This would build on similar moves by Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain in recent months.
The results also suggest the UK government has the public support to go further: extend the ban to investment and financial services, exclude settlements from all UK agreements with Israel (including the convention for the avoidance of double taxation) and prohibit all British business dealings with settlements (including the purchase of settlement real estate). This should go hand-in-hand with additional sanctions targeting organisations that play an instrumental role in funding and sustaining Israel’s settlement project, such as Ateret Cohanim, the Jewish National Fund’s Himnuta real-estate subsidiary, and the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization.
At the heart of the new UK government’s policy reset should be a collective push with its Western partners to finally implement the International Court of Justice’s 2024 advisory opinion on Israel’s occupation. The court underscored the duty of states to “take steps to prevent trade or investment relations that assist in the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”. To uphold this approach would also help give effect to the 2016 UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which calls on states to distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between Israel and the Palestinian territories it has occupied since 1967.
A settlement trade ban should mark the beginning of a more consequential British policy towards Israeli settlements. The polling shows that British public opinion is supportive. Having recognised Palestine in principle, the UK must now use its economic weight and diplomatic leadership to preserve it in practice.
Six months into the US-Iran war, and as Europe grapples with finding a solution to a crisis that has spread across the region, Iranian activists across the Islamic Republic risked their lives last week by taking part in demonstrations, impromptu parades and acts of disobedience to mark the 62nd anniversary of the founding of Iran’s leading pro-democracy opposition group. What makes this particularly relevant for Brussels is that Europe is examining ways not only to contain the immediate crisis, but also to address the broader question of what political forces inside Iran could ultimately shape the country’s future. Meanwhile, members of the same movement in exile held an election to choose a new occupant of the organisation’s highest office.
The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) was originally established to promote revolution against the hereditary dictatorship of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. But after that revolution came about in 1979, it quickly stood up against the theocratic faction that seized power in its wake and began cultivating a reputation as the primary voice for a democratic alternative to the Islamic Republic. It has since been targeted for annihilation by the regime on several occasions but has invariably rebounded and assumed leading roles in major, collective challenges to the regime’s hold on power.
Those challenges include independent media campaigns, mass protests and an armed assault in February on Tehran’s Motahari Complex, which contains offices belonging to several leading officials and institutions, including that of the supreme leader. That incident threatened to decapitate the regime just days before the United States began the bombing campaign that has left it mired in a grinding war with the Islamic Republic more than six months later.
The PMOI has also been credited with leading roles in each of four successive uprisings that spread across the entire country in 2018, 2019, 2022 and 2026. The last of these, which took place mostly in January, was ruthlessly suppressed, with the death toll reaching into the thousands. This was soon followed by a new escalation in Iran’s world-leading use of the death penalty, particularly against political detainees.
Since the start of the Iranian calendar year in March, 40 such prisoners have been hanged, many of them for participating in the January uprising or for affiliation with the PMOI. The trend has led many of the organisation’s supporters to warn that the regime could be setting the stage for a massacre akin to that which took place in the summer of 1988, primarily targeting the PMOI, when 30,000 political prisoners, the overwhelming majority of them affiliated with the PMOI, were massacred within a few months.
Those warnings, and that history, illustrate the danger that Iranian activists were taking on when they coordinated demonstrations last week with the express purpose of promoting the PMOI. This, in turn, points to the resilience that the Iranian people have demonstrated both in the early days of the Islamic Republic and in recent clashes between protesters and regime authorities.
That resilience is arguably reflected in the PMOI’s choice of Mahnaz Maimanat (pictured) as its new Secretary General on Sunday (6 September). Like most of her colleagues, Maimanat has suffered great personal losses in her fight against the ruling system. Her brother Massoud was killed by firing squad in 1983, and her brother Mahmoud was hanged during the 1988 massacre, the same year that their mother was killed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Since joining the PMOI at the age of 20 in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Maimanat has remained steadfastly committed to the organisation, joining its Leadership Council in 1993 and its Central Council in 2014, before becoming co-Secretary General in 2021. After she secured 56 percent of the votes from fellow members of the Central Council, a statement from the PMOI described Maimanat’s election as a means for the organisation to declare “its firm determination to topple the ruling religious fascism.”
The statement also quoted Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political coalition of which the PMOI is a member organisation, as saying that Maimanat “has combined dynamism and a defiant spirit with an even deeper sense of commitment and responsibility for the freedom of the Iranian people and her homeland.”
Rajavi has been designated by the NCRI to oversee a transition to democratic governance following the mullahs’ overthrow. She has also authored a Ten-Point Plan for Iran’s future in the wake of that transition, guaranteeing free and fair elections, separation of religion from the state, equal rights for women and minorities, and peaceful relations with neighbouring countries and the West, backed by the dismantling of the outgoing regime’s nuclear weapons programme.
In recent years, thousands of lawmakers across Europe and North America, including cross-party members of the European Parliament, have openly endorsed that plan while also recognising the NCRI as a viable, democratic alternative to the current ruling system.
New figures from member states show that businesses are increasingly using the simplified VAT rules for cross-border e-commerce.
New figures from member states show that businesses continue to make increasing use of the simplified VAT rules for online sales. Five years after the EU’s VAT e-commerce rules entered into force, the latest figures also show continued growth in VAT declared through the One Stop Shop (OSS) and Import One Stop Shop (IOSS) schemes.
The VAT e-commerce package, which entered into force on 1 July 2021, marked a major step in modernising the EU VAT framework. Since then, member states have collected more than €125 billion in VAT revenue through the EU’s VAT e-commerce schemes.
In 2025 alone, more than €38 billion in VAT revenue was collected, an increase of 17% compared with the previous year. The number of businesses using the EU’s simplified VAT schemes has also continued to grow. By the end of 2025, more than 193,000 businesses have registered to account for VAT on online sales through the schemes, reflecting the continued uptake of the EU’s VAT reforms, which help simplify VAT compliance, reduce red tape, and ensure VAT collection.
With the continued rapid growth in e-commerce activity and an increasingly digital global marketplace, the EU’s VAT rules for online transactions have continued to evolve to meet the needs of cross-border trade.
As we move into the next phase of reforms under the VAT in the Digital Age (ViDA) package, the EU is on track towards a fairer and more efficient VAT framework.
Following the adoption of the VAT in the Digital Age (ViDA) package in 2025, its phased implementation over the coming years is expected to build further on the success of the e-commerce VAT reforms. By expanding the scope of the OSS to cover more business-to-consumer transactions and introducing a new special scheme for the transfers of own goods, the ViDA package is likely to lead to even greater uptake of the OSS schemes, moving towards a single VAT registration in the EU.
Through a single registration in one member state, the One Stop Shop (OSS) and Import One Stop Shop (IOSS) schemes allow businesses to declare and remit VAT for cross-border sales of goods and services within the EU, as well as for imports of low-value goods.
This report is the latest in a series of annual reports on the application of the e-commerce package and is based on 2025 statistics from member states. It sets out details of the total number of registrations in all three One-Stop Shop (OSS) schemes, namely, the Union OSS, the non-Union OSS and the Import OSS, as of 31 December 2025. It also provides details on the total amount of VAT declared in each of these schemes in 2025. In addition, it describes how these registrations and declaration figures have evolved since the introduction of the VAT e-commerce rules in July 2021.
The EU energy label, as provided for by Regulation (EU) 2017/1369, aims at promoting the uptake of more efficient energy-related products. It aims to help consumers make informed choices by facilitating comparisons of product alternatives with different features. The label focuses on the energy efficiency of the product during the use phase, but can also include other environment-related aspects.
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As families across Nepal face the human toll of one of the country's deadliest floods in decades, the EU is adding to the relief effort led by Nepalese authorities and humanitarian partners. A first EU humanitarian air bridge flight is delivering 82 tonnes of essential supplies, while the European Commission is providing a further €500,000 for response and coordinating further help offered by European countries.
Organized with UNICEF, the Air Bridge flight has landed this morning carrying supplies for nutrition, health, water and sanitation, shelter, education and protection from EU stocks. The additional €500,000 will be channelled through the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' disaster response emergency fund, allowing local teams to cover urgent needs. Separately, through the EU civil protection mechanism, Luxembourg, Germany, Latvia and Norway are sending equipment including life jackets, hygiene and kitchen kits, blankets, medical supplies, protective equipment and emergency energy equipment.
This further assistance builds on the EU response already underway. On 28 August, the Commission allocated €2 million in emergency humanitarian aid, on top of almost €3 million already allocated to Nepal in 2026 for disaster preparedness. EU-funded partners have been providing assistance on the ground, while Copernicus emergency satellite mapping has been activated and the EU Rapid Response and Logistic Coordinators for Asia are deployed.
Crisis Management Commissioner Hadja Lahbib said:
"In a single night, rivers of mud and water swept away what generations had built: homes, schools, entire communities. Nepal has suffered a devastating loss of life, and thousands of families are facing the unimaginable. The grief is only beginning to sink in. Europe stands with the Nepalese people. We are supporting emergency responders and getting emergency aid to those who need it: clean water, medicine for hospitals, shelter for families sleeping in the open, and psychological support for the grieving. European solidarity crosses oceans. We will help Nepal not just survive this tragedy, but rebuild. Stronger and never alone."
The European Commission's emergency response co-ordination centre operates 24/7; it ensures rapid deployment of emergency support and acts as a coordination hub between all EU member states, the 10 additional participating states, the affected country, and civil protection and humanitarian aid experts.
On 4 September, the Commission proposed extending the annual winter closure in the Bay of Biscay into winter 2027 for fishing vessels over eight metres to help prevent catches of common dolphins and other small cetaceans - which are strictly protected species under the EU Habitats Directive. For the fourth consecutive year, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain have requested this closure, making use of the regionalised approach under the common fisheries policy.
The Delegated Act will now be sent to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU for scrutiny before entering into force
As proposed by the group of EU member states, the closure should run for a period of 30 consecutive days, to be taken between 15 January and 27 February 2027. Fishers will be able to notify their preferred closure period to their national authorities.
This proposed new closure aims to increase operational flexibility for the fishing sector and reduce its economic impacts, while protecting dolphins during the period when bycatch risk is higher. This new flexible approach responds to a direct request from the fishing sector to better align the timing of the closure with fishing activities.
In the absence of notification about their preferred dates to their national authorities, fishing vessels will be subject to the fixed closure period running from 22 January until 20 February 2027.
Efforts to reduce common dolphin bycatch should continue, as advised by science and required under the Habitats Directive and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, in line with the EU Biodiversity Strategy and the European Ocean Pact.
Since 2024, fishing closures in the Bay of Biscay have been effective in reducing incidental catches of dolphins. According to a report from the French observatory PELAGIS, dolphin mortality due to incidental catches in 2025 appeared significantly lower than those estimated prior to the closure (2017-2023).
Around 300 EU vessels are expected to be impacted by the proposed closure. Financial compensation is available through the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) or through state aid by member states. The EU offers financial support to fishers to acknowledge their efforts towards marine conservation and to protect their livelihoods, ensuring a sustainable and prosperous future for both ecosystems and fishing communities.
During the selected closure period, vessels - pelagic and demersal trawls, seiners and netters - will be required to remain in port to avoid incidental catches of common dolphins and other small cetaceans. Scientists have identified this period as a high-risk for bycatches (unintentional capture of dolphins during fishing operations).
All cetaceans, including common dolphins, are strictly protected under the Habitats Directive. Member states must establish a system to monitor their incidental capture and killing. Considering the information gathered, they must take further research or conservation measures to ensure that incidental capture and killing does not have a significant negative impact on the species concerned.
The EU Biodiversity strategy for 2030 aims to eliminate or minimise by-catch so as not to threaten the conservation status of protected species. In line with these objectives, the European Ocean Pact sets out the Commission's commitment to support member states in protecting and restoring marine ecosystems.
Winter strandings of dolphins and small cetaceans on the coasts of the Bay of Biscay have been a recurring challenge for the fishing sector and marine ecosystems. Contributing factors to these strandings include incidental catches in fishing nets, natural mortality, diseases, and disorientation.
As part of efforts to reduce interactions between small cetaceans and fishing vessels, the fishing sector and Member States are investing in research and technical trials to develop and test new devices. Ongoing research projects on new devices and interaction with cetaceans include PIFIL, DolphinFree, Licado, Delmoges, iNOVPESCA and VaradaC.
Westminster is the most unaffordable city for local homebuyers, according to a September 2026 real estate report. While home price growth across the UK slowed to 2% a year, a new study by Everest Mortgages looked at the cities where house prices and mortgage requirements are still too high for their own residents. Westminster makes it the most difficult for residents to buy a home, with locals needing to earn over 3 times more than they do currently. Salaries and mortgage requirements don’t match each other the most in England, as the region takes all top 10 spots.Chichester stands out with the lowest local salaries, and full-time workers there earn only £35.2K annually.
For each of 75+ UK cities, the study focused on two key numbers: the salary local workers would need to afford a home versus what they earn now. The first figure was calculated using the average house price without the deposit (15%) and what lenders usually limit for mortgage applications, taken as 4.5 times the salary. The aimed salary is then compared to the actual median salary in the region, highlighting the affordability gaps in the UK housing market. Here’s how the top 10 most unaffordable housing markets for locals.
In Westminster, residents need to earn over 3 times more than they do now to afford a home. This is the largest difference in the country between real income and what lenders are looking for when approving mortgages, and, in raw numbers, it’s a gap of £108K annually. Right now, Westminster workers take home around £52.6K a year if they’re working full time, but with house prices at £854K, they need to triple their earnings. Chichester Chichester is the second most unaffordable market for residents, with local salaries requiring a 2.3 times increase to match the mortgage conditions. In 2026, workers here earn only £35.2K annually, the lowest median salary in the top 10, but the house prices in Chichester are still higher than in Bath, Bristol, or Brighton and Hove.
To pay off a mortgage on a £430K house, residents need to earn £81.2K, more than double their current paychecks. London In third place is London, where the median earnings of £46.4K still need to be more than doubled (x 2.25) to fit the mortgage payment schedule. The average house in London is actually cheaper than one in Westminster or in St Albans, with a price tag of £554K, but local salaries need to reach at least £104.6K, the third-highest required paycheck on the list. St Albans St Albans follows closely, with a 2.14 times salary increase required. Local workers already make the most on the list, bringing home £57.4K, over £10K more than in London, but these salaries are still not enough for a safe mortgage.
With house prices sitting at £651.4K on average, St Albans homebuyers are looking for a salary of £123K. Oxford Oxford also makes the list of the cities where it’s the hardest to buy a home on local salaries. In 2026, the gap between the actual paychecks and what lenders are looking for is £44.9K, which is already more than a median Oxford salary. Currently, the income for one full-time worker amounts to £43.3K annually, so future homebuyers need to look to double their earnings. A housing expert from Everest Mortgages commented on the study: “Many first-time buyers spend years saving a deposit, only to discover their salary still disqualifies them for a mortgage on the property they've been saving toward. Having a big enough deposit is only half the story, and a stable, sufficiently large income is equally important. In Westminster and Chichester, the deposit hurdle is real, but the income gap is the wall most buyers never get over.”
The German government has announced plans to terminate the agreement governing the activities of the Russian House in Berlin and to close Russia’s Consulate General in Bonn by September 18. The German Foreign Office has cited security concerns as the reason for the decision.
The announcement follows the discovery of an unidentified drone carrying explosives near Leipzig Airport. The device was reportedly found in an area close to transport aircraft used in connection with weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Moscow has rejected the allegations, describing them as unsupported by evidence.
Against the backdrop of this latest deterioration in diplomatic relations, three politicians from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) have spoken out in favor of keeping the Russian House open. They argue that the institution should primarily be regarded as a venue for cultural exchange rather than as an arena for political confrontation.
Ulrich Singer, chairman of the AfD parliamentary group in the Bavarian State Parliament, criticized the approach taken by Chancellor Friedrich Merz. In Singer’s view, sanctions are placing an additional burden on the German economy. He also considers the proposed closure of both the Russian House and the consulate in Bonn to be based on allegations of suspected subversive activity that are being used as a pretext.
Singer stressed that for decades the Russian House has provided opportunities for people to learn about the Russian language, culture and history. Any potential violations of the law, he argued, should be investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted through the courts. Suspicions, Singer said, “cannot replace proceedings conducted under the rule of law,” while assessments made by foreign intelligence agencies “must not lead to political prejudgment.”
Precisely because relations between Germany and Russia are strained, Singer believes there should be more dialogue rather than less. In his assessment, dismantling cultural bridges would only deepen the breakdown in communication.
He also called for sanctions to be reviewed, arguing that they should not become an end in themselves. According to Singer, they impose costs on German companies and, when directed against individuals, must comply with the principles of legality, transparency and proportionality.
Singer additionally warned of possible reciprocal measures. Closing the Russian House could have consequences for German cultural institutions operating in Russia, particularly the Goethe-Institut. Commentators cited by klamm.de have noted that the two institutions are connected through a longstanding reciprocal arrangement.
Singer concluded that “the true strength of a state” does not lie in constant escalation but in its ability to prevent wars. In his words, peace is achieved not by closing doors, but by keeping them open.
Andreas Jurca, another AfD member of the Bavarian State Parliament, expressed a similar position. He argues that during a period of worsening relations between Berlin and Moscow, channels for cultural, social and humanitarian exchange are particularly important and should be preserved.
“If such places of encounter disappear, the distance between the two societies will continue to grow,” Jurca said.
He also maintained that allegations concerning possible intelligence activities should be based on evidence that can be verified and publicly scrutinized rather than solely on political assessments. New-facts.eu notes that Jurca’s statements, like those made by Sahra Wagenknecht, represent political assessments rather than the findings of official investigations.
AfD Bundestag member Rainer Rothfuß, who has previously organized so-called “peace trips” to Moscow, also criticized the planned measures. He described the proposed closure of the Russian House and the consulate in Bad Godesberg as “disastrous.”
Rothfuß claimed that “the government is carrying out an agenda dictated by globalists” and is taking steps that, in his view, “were avoided even during the Cold War.”
“Good and peaceful relations between Germany and Russia are in Germany’s interest,” Rothfuß said.
According to him, the AfD has defended this position for years. He also criticized mainstream media outlets, accusing them of contributing to the further “destruction” of German-Russian relations.
Klamm.de and new-facts.eu have also reported criticism voiced by Sahra Wagenknecht. She argues that Merz is intensifying tensions with Russia while failing to demonstrate the same determination in his approach toward Ukraine. In this context, she pointed to the arrests of Ukrainian citizens suspected of involvement in the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines.
“Merz is bringing us ever closer to a war with Russia,” Wagenknecht wrote on her blog.
The future of the Russian House and the Russian consulate in Bonn now rests with the German government and the diplomatic process. Singer, Jurca and Rothfuß are calling for a clear distinction between suspected violations of the law—which, they argue, should be investigated and dealt with through the courts—and cultural channels, which they believe should remain open.
The German government, meanwhile, has linked the planned closures to national-security concerns following the incident near Leipzig. Moscow continues to reject the allegations.
Three features of today’s unordered world are converging to create a devastating food crisis. Russia’s war in Ukraine is disrupting agricultural exports from both countries. The enduring blockage of the Strait of Hormuz is restricting fertiliser shipments. And this year’s El Niño (a sporadic warming of the Pacific Ocean generating widespread knock-on effects elsewhere) could be the most drastic on record, causing widespread droughts. As this year’s United Nations general assembly (UNGA) draws near, global food affordability and availability are at risk, and with them millions of lives and global security.
This looming catastrophe coincides with an absence of political leadership, including in multilateral institutions. As recently as 2022 a coalition of leaders convened by the UN secretary-general, António Guterres, managed to curb a food crisis. Today even that convening power is missing, with potentially more dire consequences. Political leaders face a test: amid war, climate crisis and diplomatic turmoil, is it still possible for groups of states and institutions to confront the direst humanitarian urgencies?
This note argues that a solution could still be found, requiring a comprehensive global effort on several fronts: drought, support for farmers, the Black Sea, the Strait of Hormuz and access to fertiliser. In all of this, Europe should lead.
The emerging calamity
Global food prices are already almost 75% higher than their 1999 lows. Almost 2.2 billion people face food insecurity. The coming trio of threats to food supplies will make that worse.
A “super El Niño” will likely bring heat and drought to southern Africa and significantly reduce food production in south and south-east Asia. It may reduce already falling rates of wheat production—which is expected to fall by 3% globally in 2026-27 (8% in the EU, 12% in Australia and 19% in Argentina)—and drive up rice prices.
Meanwhile the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked. It is the largest single conduit for the nitrogen fertilisers most directly linked to yield and is the export route of about half the global supply of sulphur, a vital component of phosphate fertilisers. Thus, about one third of global seaborne fertilisers cannot reach fields, especially afflicting smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa (where fertiliser prices are highest) and south Asia.
All this may well generate wider ripple effects lasting years. Rising prices and exhausted government subsidies in states like Malawi are deterring fertiliser use, which could depress future production. Historically, El Niño events are associated with protectionism (India has imposed export restrictions hitting countries in south-east Asia), which in turn raises prices, lowers margins and curbs investment in future output.
There are two bright spots among the big global agricultural producers: Ukraine and Russia, which together generate 30% of the world’s wheat exports, 20% of its corn, 60% of its sunflower oil and, from Russia alone, 20% of its fertiliser. But there too war has brought disruption. Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s highly exposed grain and port infrastructure cut the latter’s exports by 75%, and more damage has already been done in August. Ukraine has been striking Russian port facilities and ships in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, taking over 90% of Russia’s grain export capacity offline.
In 2022, a UN- and Turkey-facilitated arrangement mitigated a similar crisis and kept Russian and Ukrainian grain and fertiliser supplies flowing through alternative routes. US and EU agricultural aid in sub-Saharan Africa also helped. In 2026, by contrast, multiple challenges stand in the way of a similar solution. Logistically, war damage to infrastructure and low water levels in the Danube make it harder to get grain out of the region. Diplomatically, the UN is approaching a leadership transition, the US has turned against the organisation, and there is no global focal point for action.
Preventing the worst
European leaders, including those of the UK and Ukraine if it wants, should move fast to convene a coalition of states influential among the combatants in the Iran and Ukraine conflicts (India, China and Turkey especially) and of states especially exposed to this nutritional crisis (states in sub-Saharan Africa and south and south-east Asia). This coalition could draw on arrangements from the 2022 deal, as well as new links between UN agencies and initiatives like the CGIAR agricultural innovation network. It should seek to transcend political and diplomatic tensions, bringing leaders or at least ministers together on the margins of UNGA in the week of September 21st.
The joint initiative should have the following core elements:
Unpalatable—but necessary
This effort would still face a series of obstacles. It would require multiple states to cross their red lines—or at least revisit established policies. There is a good chance that the two wars driving up food prices, in Ukraine and Iran, will escalate in the near future. Russia especially would likely be reluctant. The states most affected are a disparate and often antagonistic group. There is no single capital or organisation capable of appealing to all the decision-makers needed for a comprehensive solution.
But within this adversity dwells a constructive role for European governments. Along with the UN secretary-general, and a core group of middle powers including Brazil, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Mexico and Turkey, they can bring together the states most exposed to the crisis as the core of this new group. Along with partners from across the UN system, such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization, they can amplify those countries’ voices and help marshal the resources needed to make the programme outlined above meaningful.
Besides winning over the most affected states, the next step would be to bring on board those states with influence on combatants in the Ukraine and Iran conflicts. This means especially China and India. The UN secretary-general can play a particularly vital role there. Europeans can also help by appealing to Chinese and Indian claims to speak for developing countries in general. In turn, Brazil, India and South Africa can invoke Russia’s claims to share that mantle, as fellow members of the BRICS formation.
Europeans can also play a crucial role in recruiting Ukraine into the programme—even if the latter’s commitment to any ceasefire would depend on Russia’s position. They could see this anti-hunger coalition also as a way to help rally support for Ukraine in the global south, as the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, did in 2022 with his Grain from Ukraine initiative.
In the Strait of Hormuz, meanwhile, the coalition could present free passage for fertiliser exports as a means of trying out the Omani-Iranian technical plans for opening sea routes. It would present this as a win-win proposition: Iran would get some of its exports to global markets; the US would be supporting its Gulf allies; and both parties and their European interlocutors might see the long-term geopolitical benefits of a stabilising anti-hunger act along these lines (for example, curbing mass migration).
This initiative is intended to be a “no regrets” effort. Even if it takes time for the combatants to join—and it will—supporting farmers and global trade will improve the food situation. Progress in addressing hunger should provide an opportunity to highlight the further contribution that progress in the Black Sea and the Strait of Hormuz could bring. This sense of momentum may bring some or all combatants closer to agreement.
It will take leadership from both the most affected states and from wealthier countries to achieve this defiantly cooperative act in a world of unorder. But its very defiance, its assertion that common action is still possible, makes it all the more valuable.
The Kazakhstani tenge has become the best-performing currency in Asia and Europe in 2026, according to the Financial Times. Since the beginning of the year, it has appreciated by nearly 10% against the US dollar, outperforming all other currencies worldwide except for several currencies of Latin American and African countries. This performance has been underpinned by economic growth driven by the transformation of Kazakhstan’s economic model. The country is rapidly evolving from a commodity-based economy into a financial and technology hub for Central Asia, amid growing inflows of foreign capital.
Growth factor
This year, the key factor behind the tenge’s significant 9.7% appreciation was not oil prices, which have traditionally been associated with Kazakhstan’s economic performance. This time, the appreciation of the Kazakhstani currency was driven by capital inflows, Dmitry Dolgin, Chief Economist for the CIS at ING, told the Financial Times. As of June, foreign investments in tenge-denominated government debt had reached $5 billion, 2.5 times higher than a year earlier, accounting for nearly one-tenth of the total volume of such securities outstanding.
Foreign investors seeking to diversify their portfolios are attracted by high yields — with the base rate at 16.75% — combined with a moderate level of risk, as confirmed by Kazakhstan’s sovereign credit rating. Another factor contributing to increased foreign capital inflows is the easier access for foreign investors to the country’s government debt. In April, the Kazakhstani authorities announced plans to connect local government bonds to the international clearing system Euroclear, and foreign investor activity has increased notably in recent months.
In addition, Kazakhstan expects to be included in the benchmark JPMorgan GBI-EM index of local-currency government bonds of emerging markets. The US bank is also preparing a separate index for frontier markets (a category of emerging markets — ed. note), in which, according to the National Bank, Kazakhstani bonds could account for an 8% share if included.
Foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan
The growth of foreign direct investment is providing additional support for the tenge. In the first quarter, FDI amounted to $6.3 billion. As the Financial Times notes, Kazakhstan is seeking alternative sources of income beyond oil, including by positioning itself as a transit and technology hub for goods moving from China to Europe. To this end, the country is investing heavily in infrastructure, the publication emphasizes.
In recent years, the country’s authorities have implemented reforms aimed at strengthening the national investment ecosystem, including tax, customs and other incentives. As a result, the total gross inflow of foreign direct investment into Kazakhstan from 2021 through 2025 amounted to approximately $114.3 billion. In 2025, the figure reached $20.5 billion, up 14.4% year on year. At the same time, the structure of investment has also changed, with capital increasingly flowing into manufacturing, trade, the financial sector, transportation and the IT industry.
The changes have resulted in record economic growth. In 2025, Kazakhstan’s GDP grew by 6.5%, the highest rate in a decade. Growth continued in the first five months of 2026, reaching 3.7% despite a decline in oil production. Meanwhile, the real sector of the economy grew by 4%, while services expanded by 3.6%, which can be seen as evidence of a qualitative transformation of the economy.
Statistical data illustrate the rapid expansion of the non-resource sector during this period. Construction recorded the strongest performance in 2026, growing by 13.4% in the first five months of the year compared with the same period in 2025. Manufacturing was also among the leaders, increasing by 9%. The highest growth rates were recorded in machinery manufacturing, which expanded by 23.3%, and pharmaceuticals, which grew by 35.2%.
According to the IMF, Kazakhstan’s economy measured at purchasing power parity is expected to reach $993.7 billion in 2026, effectively approaching the psychological milestone of $1 trillion. Over the past decade, this figure has nearly doubled.
Competitive economy
Based on its 2025 results, Kazakhstan ranked among the world’s most competitive economies, taking 34th place out of 69 countries in the IMD World Competitiveness Ranking, ahead of Japan, Kuwait, Portugal, India, Italy and other countries. Kazakhstan was also the only country from the CIS and Central Asia represented in the ranking. Analysts note that the country’s economy is becoming increasingly diversified. Today, manufacturing, logistics, energy infrastructure and investment projects are playing an increasingly important role.
Kazakhstan also ranked 53rd out of 150 countries in the Global Investment Risk & Resilience Index, achieving the highest result among Central Asian countries.
Focus on digitalization
Digitalization is one of Kazakhstan’s strategic priorities. In early June 2026, it was announced that an agreement had been signed with Firebird and Nvidia US companies to build data centers in the so-called “Data Center Valley.” According to Bloomberg, investments in the project could amount to $10 billion.
According to the Ministry of Artificial Intelligence, Kazakhstan’s IT services exports exceeded $1.142 billion in 2025. The sector has been growing at a rapid pace: five years ago, exports of high-tech solutions from Kazakhstan amounted to just $33.5 million. The strategic goal is to increase Kazakhstan’s IT services exports to $5 billion by 2030.
Fintech for export
Kazakhstan is expanding its export potential in the financial sector. In August, the subsidiary of one of the largest fintech holdings operating in Kazakhstan, Freedom, received a brokerage license from the local regulator in Turkey, becoming the first foreign broker in 34 years to obtain such a license. In late July, the company also completed the acquisition of a local bank. According to the holding’s founder, Timur Turlov, the company plans to invest $300 million in the Turkish market to create an integrated digital financial ecosystem built around its brokerage and banking businesses.
Freedom already operates in 24 countries worldwide. This year, the company applied for a banking license in France, viewing it as a gateway to the broader European market. The holding currently serves more than 600,000 brokerage clients in Europe and aims to increase that number to 50 million by exporting its ecosystem.
The total number of clients across all companies within the Freedom group stands at 14 million, while the holding’s assets exceed $14 billion and its market capitalization stands at $10 billion. Since Freedom’s listing on Nasdaq in 2019, the value of its shares has increased nearly 13-fold.
Another Kazakhstani fintech giant, Kaspi.kz, is also actively expanding its presence in Turkey. In July, the company announced the completion of a deal to acquire the Turkish subsidiary of Rabobank Dutch group. Earlier, in 2025, Kaspi.kz acquired a controlling stake in Turkish marketplace, Hepsiburada. The company’s shares are also traded on a US stock exchange, underscoring the high level of international confidence in Kazakhstani fintech companies.
Kazakhstan is also actively building its own financial infrastructure, while its stock market ranks among the largest in Eastern Europe. Trading volume on the Astana International Exchange (AIX), which officially began operations just eight years ago, amounted to $2.1 billion in 2025. Since its launch, AIX has facilitated the raising of $12.4 billion in debt and equity capital, while assets under management within the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) exceeded $5.4 billion at the end of 2025.
On the country’s oldest exchange, the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KASE), trading volume in 2025 amounted to KZT 400.8 trillion ($769.1 billion). At the same time, the KASE Index has nearly tripled over the past four years, reaching 7,712.53 points by the end of June 2026. Combined trading volume on the two exchanges increased by nearly 50% in the first half of the year, while equity market capitalization rose by 18.8%.
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are facing fresh accusations of employing chemical weapons in the ongoing conflict against the Rapid Support Forces(RSF), with the latest reports coming from US media outlets, writes Mohsin Osman.
On Saturday (5 September), The New York Times and The Washington Post published dual investigative reports based on leaked intelligence materials. The files include approximately 150 documents, photographs, video clips, and intercepted communications, alongside thousands of text messages retrieved from the phones of Sudanese officers.
The evidence points to an alleged program established in 2024 to manufacture chlorine-based munitions. It details bomb design blueprints, testing operations, and a coordinated cover-up strategy initiated after the plot was uncovered by the United States. The records also outline plans to siphon chlorine gas from a civilian water treatment facility that had originally received the chemical from international aid agencies.
These revelations reignite long-standing allegations of chemical weapons usage that have shadowed SAF leadership since last year, significantly heightening international pressure on the military command.
The United States previously imposed sanctions on Sudan in May 2025 over allegations that the military deployed chemical weapons during the conflict in 2024. The sanctions took effect on July 20, 2025. Authorities in Port Sudan have consistently rejected these accusations, maintaining that they do not produce, stockpile, or use chemical weapons, and emphasizing their adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
A covert programme amid escalating pressure
According to The New York Times, the SAF turned to chemical weapons early in 2024 to break a strategic stalemate, as RSF fighters held firm control over most of the capital, Khartoum.
Leaked records show that Brigadier General Tariq Hussein emerged as a central figure in July 2024, orchestrating the design, planning, and execution of the program. Intercepted messages reveal that Hussein proposed using chlorine to give army forces a tactical edge in the battle for Khartoum. He distributed prototype schematics for an explosive warhead integrated with roughly 33 pounds of chlorine gas, with production commencing that same month.
In messages published by the Times, Hussein noted that the hybrid munitions were designed to maximize lethality—either by shrapnel fragmentation or chlorine gas poisoning—asserting that the explosion would destroy all chemical traces of the attack.
On July 22, an Antonov cargo plane took off from Merowe Airport, roughly 200 miles north of Khartoum, to conduct a test launch. Following the trial, Hussein reported that the experiment was a "100 percent success," attaching a video of a desert explosion and confirming that the munition "hit the target and released the gas."
Brigadier General Amir Idris, identified in records as the supervisor of military drone operations, responded with a single directive: "Top Secret."
Technical hazards and signs of lethality
The communications reveal that the program faced severe technical flaws. Chemical leaks were a recurring issue; on one occasion, workers found dead insects and scorpions on the floor of a hangar after overnight exposure to leaking gas.
The incident underscored the volatile nature of the agent being handled long before it reached the battlefield. Concurrently, the program faced a critical challenge in securing a steady supply of chlorine.
Diverting humanitarian chlorine supplies
According to The New York Times, 20 cylinders of chlorine gas were smuggled across the border from a neighboring country in late August 2024. Hussein calculated that this batch would yield roughly 1,100 bombs.
Hussein subsequently sought internal sources, turning to local civilian infrastructure in violation of international norms. He admitted to sourcing additional chlorine from the Al-Manara water treatment plant in Omdurman—one of the few remaining operational facilities amid the war.
"Al-Manara has some of those cylinders, and we took them from there," Hussein stated in an August 26 voice message to Idris.
The diversion of these supplies carries significant gravity, as the chlorine at the plant was intended for emergency water purification during cholera outbreaks rather than military application.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) confirmed to the Times that it had donated 30 chlorine cylinders to the plant in 2023, while CARE reported delivering 35 cylinders across 2024 and 2025. A UNICEF spokesperson added that the organization supplied chlorine to six treatment plants in Khartoum, including Al-Manara, between 2023 and 2025.
By October 2024, Hussein reported manufacturing approximately 300 chemical munitions, most of which were stored at Merowe Airport.
Earlier in September, Hussein sent a notable message to a colleague stating, "They drank the gas," describing an attack on RSF fighters at the Al-Jaili oil refinery north of Khartoum. This account aligns with claims made by the RSF on September 13, when the paramilitary group issued a statement accusing the army of firing "toxic" missiles at the refinery. Footage circulated online at the time showed men in civilian clothing inside the facility wearing oxygen masks.
Command responsibility and cover-up efforts
The New York Times indicates that the program was likely shuttered once U.S. officials detected its existence and moved to apply targeted sanctions.
Intercepted communications reveal that the head of Sudan’s Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, instructed Hussein to "erase all traces" of the operation. The response back was: "The operation was completed a month ago."
During a subsequent round of measures in June, the U.S. sanctioned Hussein for importing explosives for bomb production, though that specific designation did not explicitly cite chemical weapons.
By that time, Burhan had established an internal committee to investigate the U.S. allegations. According to documents in the file, Hussein himself—the architect of the program—was appointed as an advisor to the panel.
The intelligence indicates that General Burhan was not merely informed after the fact, but was directly involved in overseeing the chemical weapons program. His direct knowledge was a primary factor in the U.S. decision to impose sanctions on him in January 2025.
While proving chemical weapons usage in conflict zones remains complex, arms experts consulted by The New York Times concurred that available evidence strongly points to their deployment in the Sudanese conflict. However, they stressed the necessity of an independent field investigation.
Addressing the findings, the Emergency Lawyers group, a Sudanese legal advocacy organization, issued a statement calling for a transparent international probe. The group urged that "international experts be granted safe, unconditional access to targeted sites, enable the physical examination of munitions fragments and delivery systems, and be permitted to interview witnesses and victims independently and securely."
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