A Ukrainian citizen, Vadym Y., was detained in the German state of Brandenburg on suspicion of spying for Russia, Germany’s federal prosecutor’s office said.
According to investigators, the suspect had been in contact with Russian intelligence services through an intermediary since no later than July 2025. Prosecutors believe he collected military intelligence, including information on the production of armored vehicles, ammunition, and explosives, as well as on personnel and military facilities in areas intended to ensure the security of NATO’s eastern flank.
Some of this information was publicly available, while other information was obtained from representatives of the European defense industry.
The court is expected to consider a motion to place the suspect in pretrial detention on October 23.
According to a report by Der Spiegel, the suspect is 53 years old. The outlet’s sources said he had “shown interest” in the Bundeswehr’s 45th Tank Brigade, which is planned to be fully stationed in Lithuania in 2027.
At Meduza, we are committed to transparency about our use of artificial intelligence in the newsroom. The story you’re reading was written by one of our living, breathing journalists and translated from Russian using an AI model configured to follow our strict editorial standards. This translation process is the result of extensive testing and refinements to ensure our English-language coverage is timely and accurate. A Meduza editor reviews every draft before publication.
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Shortly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, poet and writer Linor Goralik founded the Resistance and Opposition Arts Review (ROAR), a literary almanac featuring antiwar essays, poetry, audio works, and artwork. A few months later, she launched News 26 (Novosti 26), an independent media outlet for teenagers in Russia. Meduza spoke with Goralik about how both projects have managed to operate during the war. The interview was conducted in English by journalist Sarah Chatta and translated into Russian by journalist Ksenia Mironova as part of a Pulitzer Center-supported series on efforts to resist literary censorship in Russia.
The following interview has been lightly edited and abridged for length and clarity.
— Tell me about ROAR.
— ROAR is an almanac that’s published bimonthly online. We try to be a space for voices that speak freely against the Russian regime and against the war in Ukraine. And this is horrible. We shouldn’t exist. We’re a magazine that wants to shut down. We want to stop. When we began, we thought that it would run for two or three issues, and now we’re on issue 22. [ROAR has since released issue 24.] It’s exhausting.
— How is your work different from, say, the Soviet dissident publication A Chronicle of Current Events(“Khronika”)?
— It’s very different from Khronika. And I know this for sure because I once interviewed its founder, Natalya Gorbanevskaya. Khronika’s main focus was informing people about repressions. There are now so many of our colleagues [doing that work]. We, and others, try to do the literary work.
— The Kremlin didn’t start censoring literature in Russia immediately after the full-scale invasion. What made you realize so early on that a project like ROAR was needed?
— I was told that it was a stupid idea. But it was in the air. It was very clear to me that this was going to happen. It was very clear that people who wanted to speak out against the war, those who wanted to write against the war, would not be safe in Russia. It was absolutely obvious that they needed a safe place to speak.
— What’s the submission process like?
— It is very simple. We have an email address. I look at submissions every other day and decide what’s good and what’s not, and that’s it. We have a team, but the decision about whether to publish a piece in the almanac is mine.
— How do you decide?
— Intuitively. My decision is based on two things: what seems to me to be of high literary quality and what seems to me to be an important political message. That’s it.
— Can you tell me more about your team?
— At its peak, ROAR had about 200 people, not including authors. The team includes editors, translators, and proofreaders. Not all 200 people work on every issue, but dozens of people work on each one.
— How many members of your team live in Russia?
— I don’t know, because the team manages itself. I do nothing. I choose the submissions, and I put them in a database. Our editor-in-chief and my very close friend, Maria, takes it from there and edits them. Then she distributes the work among other editors and proofreaders. As soon as a piece is ready, the editors and proofreaders put it in the database, and the layout team starts putting it on the site.
At the same time, the English team starts translating the texts. The head of the English team, Maya, finds translators for each piece. As soon as the translators finish a piece, she passes it to the editors, then to the proofreaders, and then to the layout team. They put it on the site. Then all I do is push the “publish” button.
— Who reads ROAR?
— We have about 2,500 subscribers on our Telegram channel, but we have zero understanding of who’s reading us because of VPNs. So, mainly, we work in the dark.
I wrote an article once about the 2011-2012 protests. I did maybe 25 or 30 interviews, and one of the things people kept repeating was that one of the most important things they did — beyond the protesting itself — was showing that people who protest exist.
That’s why events like the Berlin Bebelplatz festival are extremely important. They help people see that they’re not working in the dark. It boosts morale.
— You mentioned interviewing Soviet dissident Natalya Gorbanevskaya. Did that conversation help you when you were creating ROAR?
— It wasn’t only talking to Natalya, it was the whole history of the Soviet dissident movement. They were publishing almanacs. They were publishing magazines. It was like a basic instinct. The moment you can’t speak freely — do it.
But I didn’t do it for literature. I didn’t do it for authors, and I didn’t do it for the texts. I did it for me, because I had this feeling that I had to do something. Many of us felt extremely helpless. We felt enraged. We felt horrified. And this was an attempt to do something. I did it for myself.
— A few months after launching ROAR, you created a media outlet for teenagers in Russia called News 26. How did you come up with the name?
— I’m a marketing consultant by profession, so I wanted it to be very simple and recognizable. As for the number, I just chose it randomly, but we have two explanations we give when people ask. One is that in 2022, the oldest members of our audience, the 16-year-olds, would be able to vote in 2026. Another is that 12 plus 14 is 26 — and our target audience was 12- to 14-year-olds. But it has nothing to do with reality.
— Do these publications generate any revenue?
— Zero. They don’t make any money at all. All these years, it was volunteer work. Then, last year, we received our first grant for News 26. I wouldn’t tell you how much the News 26 team gets, because it’s very little. But they get something. We received our second grant this year, also small, but very significant for us, and we are very grateful. At least we have some resources now.
— Do you know if people in Russia read News 26?
—They most definitely do. Telegram is [de facto] banned, but they keep reading it and writing to us.
We have about 5,500 subscribers on Telegram, but that means nothing. It could be a readership of 10,000, it could be a readership of 1,000. We see that every post is read by about 2,000 people, and our TikTok videos sometimes reach 50,000 views. But again, today it’s 50,000. Tomorrow it’s 1,000. We never know. And now, with the widespread use of VPNs, we see nothing.
We have an anonymous bot on Telegram, and people write letters to us there. Every day starts with the thought: “Please no letters, please no letters,” because those letters are very scary.
— What makes them so scary?
— They’re letters from children who read News 26. We have a volunteer psychologist who helps us answer the letters and navigate complex issues.
For example, a teenage girl living in a small town near the border with Ukraine wrote that if the war came to her home, she planned to run away and hide because she didn’t think the adults would protect her.
I went to Katya, our volunteer psychologist, and I asked her, “Is this person stable?” And she said, “The scariest thing is that this letter is completely rational. The person analyzed the situation, understood the circumstances, and made a decision. She asked for help.” It was horrifying.
You can’t take too long to respond, because they feel abandoned. So you have hours, maybe days. And I thought maybe we could write two things. First, being alone on the streets is the worst thing for a teenage girl to do during a war. Second, I thought that what this girl needed was some feeling of control over what’s happening in her life. So I suggested some self-defense lessons. And I was dying of fear that she would never reply, but she did. She said that she thought it was a great idea.
— How many letters do you receive?
— Not many. Maybe two a month. Maybe three a month. But I’m afraid of these letters. Sometimes [the teenagers] write just to write: “I hate everything. I hate Putin. I want to donate to Ukraine — how do I do this?” or “I’m gay. I know that I live in hell, and I will live in hell for years. I will never hold my lover’s hand in public, and I’m writing to you just because I have to say it somewhere.”
Parents also write to us to tell us how much [News 26] means because it becomes a part of the conversation in the family. There are also some people who tell us that this is the only news that they can read, because it’s very simple, clear, calm.
So we do this project because we believe it helps some people in some way. For us, that’s enough. We don’t have this ambition to save thousands. We hope to help even five people.
Russia and Ukraine conducted another exchange of fallen soldiers’ bodies, the Russian business news outlet RBC and BelTA reported.
The exchange took place at the Novaya Guta checkpoint in Belarus, where Russia returned 252 bodies to Ukraine and Ukraine handed over 25 fallen soldiers’ bodies to Russia.
Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War confirmed the exchange.
It was the first such exchange in more than a month. The two sides last swapped bodies of fallen soldiers on September 17, when Russia handed over 252 and Ukraine handed over 23.
The two sides last exchanged prisoners of war in August, when 10 POWs returned to Russia and Russia handed over to Ukraine 10 civilians who had been detained in Belarus for legal violations.
At Meduza, we are committed to transparency about our use of artificial intelligence in the newsroom. The story you’re reading was written by one of our living, breathing journalists and translated from Russian using an AI model configured to follow our strict editorial standards. This translation process is the result of extensive testing and refinements to ensure our English-language coverage is timely and accurate. A Meduza editor reviews every draft before publication.
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Nikita Gorelov, the mayor of the town of Sosnovka and a graduate of the presidential personnel program “Time of Heroes” for participants in the war against Ukraine, was dismissed, he announced on his Telegram channel.
Gorelov was mobilized to fight in the war against Ukraine in September 2022. He served two years as a sniper, after which, on the recommendation of the Kirov region’s governor, he received an offer to head Sosnovka, the independent Russian news outlet Verstka reported. In October 2024, he took office as mayor and soon began accusing “crooks from previous administrations” of corruption. By December, he had already received orders to return to the front.
The order angered local residents, who held a public rally in Sosnovka in his support. 4,000 people signed a petition backing him. In the end, Gorelov kept his post, but the Kremlin called his case the “most unsuccessful” example of appointing a war participant to a leadership position.
Gorelov’s final dismissal was formally the result of a local government reform. In November 2025, authorities in the Kirov region passed a law abolishing municipal districts and creating new districts in their place, and Sosnovka, a town of about 8,400 people, lost its own administration as a result. Deputies in the newly formed Vyatskiye Polyany municipal district decided to remove Gorelov from office.
Gorelov said he had been under pressure for two years and that officials had now decided to get rid of him “quietly.” As mayor, he secured a criminal case against the city council speaker over violations in the construction of housing for resettled residents and collected signatures opposing the local government reform.
Gorelov accused regional authorities of using war participants for their own PR. “In essence, they use us like toy soldiers for hype, and then write us off,” he wrote.
At Meduza, we are committed to transparency about our use of artificial intelligence in the newsroom. The story you’re reading was written by one of our living, breathing journalists and translated from Russian using an AI model configured to follow our strict editorial standards. This translation process is the result of extensive testing and refinements to ensure our English-language coverage is timely and accurate. A Meduza editor reviews every draft before publication.
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General Alexander Chayko at a Navy Day parade in Vladivostok, July 30, 2017
President Trump has repeatedly promised to end the Russia–Ukraine war within 24 hours, though peace talks have made little substantive progress so far. Just as often, he returns to a story about the early days of the full-scale invasion — tweaking a minor detail each time — describing Russian tanks that were advancing on Kyiv but got stuck in the mud.
During a conversation with reporters at the White House on October 20, Trump repeated the story again, this time focusing on one Russian general.
A stupid general for Russia, a very stupid gentleman. They had a thousand tanks riding up a concrete highway. They would have been in Ukraine in four hours, going maximum tank speed, which is 48 miles an hour, to be exact. Nothing to stop them. The war would have been over in one day. And this very stupid general — I have no idea who he is. I doubt he’s still with us. I doubt he’s still living. He decided to hang a right onto the farmland and then take a left and go up to Kyiv, rather than staying on the highway — the concrete highway, perfectly good highway — where they were doing very nicely. It would have been three and a half, four hours, and the whole war would have ended. He ended up getting stuck in the mud.
BBC Russia fact-checked Trump’s claim. According to the outlet, Colonel General Alexander Chayko led Russia’s advance on Kyiv from Belarus in February 2022, and the offensive’s failure had nothing to do with any decision by him to turn off the road.
Ukrainian forces stopped the advance on Kyiv. On February 26, 2022, Ukraine’s military blew up a bridge over the Irpin River on the outskirts of the capital, then destroyed the Kozarovychi dam when Russian forces tried to go around the obstruction. Ukrainian forces also destroyed a column of Russian armored vehicles in Bucha. As the Russian army’s losses mounted, its command brought in reinforcements from Belarus.
After the failed advance, Russian military command removed Chayko as commander and sent him to lead the Russian contingent in Syria. He stayed there until June 2025, a tenure that spanned the coup that forced President Bashar al-Assad to flee to Moscow.
None of this hurt the general’s career, BBC Russia said. He returned to Moscow, became deputy chief of the General Staff, and was later promoted to commander of Russia’s Aerospace Forces.
In August 2026, General Chayko did indeed nearly die: an explosion occurred near the Balzi Rossi restaurant in Moscow, where he was celebrating his 55th birthday and his promotion to the new post. Five people were killed, including Chayko’s son-in-law, and 19 others were injured. Chayko himself was unharmed.
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The Ukrainian command is trying to stop the Russian offensive — the decisive push in the battle for Donbas — on the approaches to the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk urban area. To do this, it has created two operational groupings, both led by veterans of the Azov Brigade: the “Center” grouping, tasked with holding Sloviansk, is commanded by Andriy Biletsky (former commander of the 3rd Army Corps), while the Azov grouping guarding the approaches to Kramatorsk is commanded by Denys Prokopenko (former commander of the 12th National Guard Brigade, which was reconstituted after the 2022 capture of its forces in Mariupol in 2022). Biletsky’s troops have already distinguished themselves with a successful offensive: they pushed Russia’s 20th Army back across the Siverskyi Donets north of Sloviansk, and are now trying to drive back the forces advancing on the city from the east and south. Prokopenko’s task is harder: he took up his new post in the midst of a fresh Russian breakthrough between Dobropillia and Kramatorsk. In this sector, Ukrainian forces are dealing with a full-blown crisis — possibly more serious than the one caused by the Russian breakthrough in the same area 14 months ago. Russian troops have already cut the Dobropillia-Kramatorsk road, are storming the first city, and are pushing toward the outskirts of the second.
Dobropillia
Russia’s Defense Ministry said its forces had fully captured Dobropillia and released several videos of Russian assault troops in the city as evidence. Some of the footage shows clear signs of AI processing (a practice that is becoming more common), though other clips appear genuine. Ukrainian forces, meanwhile, have published videos of their own strikes on Russian forces in Dobropillia.
Troops advancing from the south have reached the city center, while forces attacking from the east have reached the northern outskirts via the village of Hannivka. A third group is advancing between Dobropillia and the Pokrovsk–Dnipro road, threatening to outflank the entire area from the west. The apparent goal is to drive a wedge between the “Azov” group in Dobropillia and the forces defending the eastern part of the Dnipropetrovsk region, in the area around Mezhova.
North of the Pokrovsk–Dnipro road, Russian forces have reached Hulive, while to the south they have captured Serhiivka.
The main danger, though, comes from a Russian breakthrough east of Dobropillia. Russian command has moved additional forces there from the eastern part of the Zaporizhzhia region and repeated, on a much larger scale, a maneuver that failed last year: a large grouping has pushed through to the Dobropillia–Kramatorsk road and now threatens to break through to Kramatorsk’s southwestern outskirts. Russian forces have retaken Kucheriv Yar and part of the large village of Zolotyi Kolodiaz — the same settlements where a Ukrainian counterattack in August 2025, reinforced by large forces redeployed from the Sumy region, halted the well-known Dobropillia breakthrough. Both sides have simultaneously published videos meant to prove they control Zolotyi Kolodiaz, so it remains unclear which side holds the village. Russian forces, however, have already managed to get behind its Ukrainian defenders near Petrivka. Russian forces earlier reached Novoandriivka on the road to Druzhkivka farther east, raising a real threat of a breakthrough directly to Kramatorsk’s southeastern outskirts.
At the same time, on the opposite flank of the area overseen by Denys Prokopenko’s group — along the front southeast of Kramatorsk — another Russian grouping continues to advance. It is moving around the northern outskirts of Kostiantynivka and Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, heading generally toward Bilokuzminovka. The terrain there is difficult: Bilokuzminovka is home to a park with cliffs dozens of meters high, backed by a ridge of hills. Even so, Ukrainian forces still have reason to fear a Russian breakthrough toward the airport on Kramatorsk’s southern edge.
East of Bilokuzminovka, Russian forces have resumed their advance along the Bakhmut–Sloviansk highway, aiming to reach Kramatorsk’s northeastern outskirts.
Ukrainian command also faces an additional problem: figuring out the plan behind the Russian offensive in the northern Donbas. Ukraine had previously been confident that Russian forces intended to swing deep around the Kramatorsk–Sloviansk urban area from the west and east, forcing Ukrainian troops to retreat under threat of encirclement while avoiding urban combat. Ukrainian command said the western Russian grouping aimed to reach Barvinkove in the Kharkiv region, while the eastern grouping aimed to reach the confluence of the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers near Izyum. However, it now appears Russian command may have another plan as well (and perhaps not only one): to approach Kramatorsk from several directions at once and begin storming the city itself, whose prewar population was 150,000. In that scenario, the battle for neighboring Sloviansk, whose prewar population exceeded 100,000, would begin at the next stage.
Sloviansk and Lyman
Over several months, Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi eliminated the threat of a breakthrough by Russia’s 20th Combined Arms Army toward the confluence of the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers near Izyum, as well as Russian attempts to cross the Siverskyi Donets near Sviatohirsk.
Andriy Biletsky’s group has finally confirmed, with video evidence, a long-anticipated development: Russia’s 20th Army has abandoned a large area west of the Chornyi Zherebets River and is now trying to organize a defense along its banks between Torske and Zarichne. Ukrainian assault troops are already operating inside Zarichne but have not yet crossed the river.
Russian command’s evident task is to defend not only along the river but also the northern flank of the 25th Combined Arms Army, which continues to control the area west of the Chornyi Zherebets all the way to the outskirts of Lyman. This sector matters even more to Russian forces than the 20th Army’s: beyond hopes of capturing Lyman, the 25th Army is meant to support the flank of another Russian grouping operating on the Siverskyi Donets’s southern bank and advancing directly on Sloviansk.
For now, the 25th Army is holding its territory despite problems on its northern flank near Zarichne and Yampil, and is even trying to advance into Lyman’s residential areas.
Biletsky’s group, meanwhile, is trying to address the Russian advance on the Siverskyi Donets’s southern bank more radically. The commander received reinforcements for this: two brigades that had previously been fighting in the eastern Zaporizhzhia region. Using these forces, Ukraine’s “Center” group launched a counterattack against Russia’s “South” group, which had previously been advancing on Sloviansk from the east.
Ukrainian forces tried to retake Rai-Oleksandrivka from Russian assault troops, who had been infiltrating from there into the town of Mykolaivka, 6 kilometers (4 miles) east of Sloviansk, in recent weeks. Ukrainian units appear to have gained a foothold in central Rai-Oleksandrivka, but Russian forces continue to hold the village’s northern outskirts.
South of Rai-Oleksandrivka, Ukrainian forces have not yet managed to turn the situation around: Russian troops continue to infiltrate between the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas canal and the Bakhmut–Sloviansk road.
Zaporizhzhia region
As noted above, Ukrainian command was forced to redeploy two brigades to the Sloviansk area from the Zaporizhzhia region — more precisely, from the junction of the Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk regions. They had previously been part of a Ukrainian corps that had spent several months advancing on the northern flank of Russia’s “East” group, which in turn had been moving along the front toward the central districts of the Zaporizhzhia region.
To organize this offensive, Ukrainian command had redeployed the 7th Air Assault Corps from the Dobropillia area back in late spring, a move that weakened Ukrainian defenses around the town. There was no choice at the time: after capturing Huliaipole in the winter, Russia’s “East” group was rapidly advancing toward Orikhiv, threatening to collapse Ukrainian defenses in the western districts of the Zaporizhzhia region and the eastern part of the Dnipropetrovsk region.
The 7th Corps’ offensive achieved relatively modest results: the “East” group’s advance on Orikhiv slowed sharply, and Russian command was forced to redeploy forces to its northern flank. However, Ukrainian forces never managed to cut the “East” group’s supply lines or force it to retreat, and Ukrainian command is now being forced to gradually dismantle its strike grouping at the junction of the Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk regions.
Russian forces have also attempted to storm Orikhiv. So far, only forces from the “Dnipro” group are directly involved, since Ukrainian attacks on the northern flank have delayed the “East” group from reaching Orikhiv from the east.
About a month ago, Russian forces captured Novodanylivka south of Orikhiv, as well as the now-famous village of Mala Tokmachka to the east. Airborne forces redeployed to the area from the reserve simultaneously launched an offensive southwest of Orikhiv, reaching Novoandriivka and Novopavlivka.
Ukrainian forces have responded with counterattacks. Russian airborne units reportedly may have been pushed out of Novopavlivka, west of Orikhiv, though there is no visual confirmation yet.
At the same time, east of Orikhiv, Ukrainian forces again attacked Mala Tokmachka from several directions. Published videos show Russian forces holding only part of the village’s center and its southeastern outskirts, including the area around a penal colony whose ruins have already changed hands many times.
The situation around Orikhiv continues to worsen for Ukrainian forces, however: Russia’s “East” group has resumed its offensive on a broad front toward Orikhiv and the Orikhiv–Novomykhailivka road, previously one of the main Ukrainian supply routes in the area.
Troops from the “East” group have already infiltrated Omelnyk, north of Mala Tokmachka and 10 kilometers (6 miles) northeast of Orikhiv. Russian forces are advancing not only on Orikhiv itself and its supply routes, but also on Novomykhailivka to the north.
So far, there are not many Russian assault troops along the Orikhiv–Novomykhailivka road. Ukrainian forces, however, are busy repelling the “Dnipro” group’s attempted storm of the city and apparently lack the strength to dislodge the Russian troops from their positions.
Interactive map
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded to the Russian military’s strikes on Kyiv overnight on October 22.
“Three waves of ballistic missiles have been launched at Kyiv by Russian ‘humanitarians’ since yesterday evening. They used 21 missiles. Unfortunately, numerous sites across the city have been hit and damaged,” he wrote on social media.
Zelensky said the strike came “almost immediately after another round of talks” and that it showed “no real change in [Russia’s] attitude toward everything that is happening.” He called on allies to speed up deliveries of air defense systems to Ukraine and increase sanctions pressure on Moscow.
Russian forces struck Kyiv with drones and ballistic missiles overnight on October 22. One person was killed and more than 20 were injured.
The Ukrainian military, in turn, used drones to strike several regions of Russia overnight after the talks, including Moscow and the Moscow region. Two people were injured in New Moscow.
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European Union officials are searching for someone to represent Europe’s position in negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Politico reported that discussion of candidates intensified after U.S. presidential special envoy Steve Witkoff met with Putin in St. Petersburg on October 21.
“President Putin disregards the European Union as an authority,” Czech President Petr Pavel said in an interview with the Axel Springer Global Reporters’ Network, of which Politico is a part.
“He doesn’t want to talk to [European Commission President] Ursula von der Leyen, he doesn’t talk to [the head of European diplomacy] Kaja Kallas. He stopped talking to other European leaders, including [French President] Emmanuel Macron,” he said.
Pavel said the EU needs to “identify a person or a group of people who would speak for Europe.” These don’t necessarily have to be representatives of EU or NATO leadership, he said, but “simply leaders who would be given a mandate by the others to negotiate.”
Finnish President Alexander Stubb is among those being considered as a potential lead negotiator for the EU. European diplomatic sources told Politico that Stubb has “the best relationship with Trump among EU leaders” cited Finland’s long border with Russia as another factor.
Stubb took part in a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Witkoff in Oslo that preceded Witkoff’s trip to Russia, according to Politico. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also attended that meeting and is being considered as a key negotiator for the EU, Politico said. Another candidate is European Council President António Costa.
Sources told Politico that it is critical for the EU to take part in the negotiations as a single entity rather than through the leaders of its individual member states.
Russian President Vladimir Putin previously said that former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, with whom he maintains a friendly relationship, could serve as a negotiator.
WSJ sources reported a few days ago that Putin had proposed a trilateral meeting between the leaders of the U.S. and China to discuss ending the war between Russia and Ukraine. The outlet said EU representatives were not going to be invited to the meeting.
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Russian forces struck Kyiv overnight on October 22 with drones and ballistic missiles.
In the Dniprovskyi district, the strikes damaged homes and vehicles and set residential and non-residential buildings on fire, Ukraine’s State Emergency Service said. One person was killed and five others, including a child, were injured. In the Darnytskyi district, the strikes damaged transportation infrastructure.
In the Obolonskyi district, two people were injured. In the Pecherskyi district, eight people, including three children, were injured. In the Holosiivskyi district, six people were injured. The strikes also damaged non-residential buildings, ambulances, and a monastery.
Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said the strikes damaged part of the metro system’s infrastructure at the South Bridge. He did not provide further details.
Russia’s Defense Ministry said the strikes in Kyiv hit “Ukrainian military-industrial facilities involved in the production and storage of long- and medium-range cruise missiles and drones, as well as transportation infrastructure sites.”
In the Odesa region, Russian forces struck a food production facility, Ukraine’s public broadcaster Suspilne reported. A fire broke out, destroying the administrative building. No one was injured.
Russia’s Defense Ministry said the strikes targeted “port infrastructure facilities in the Odesa region and vessels used in the interests of Ukraine’s Armed Forces.”
Russia strikes Kyiv with drones and various types of missiles daily. The latest attack, on October 22, came just hours after U.S. presidential envoy Steve Witkoff traveled to St. Petersburg to meet with Vladimir Putin for talks focused on ending the war between Russia and Ukraine.
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Ukrainian forces attacked several Russian regions with drones overnight on October 22, including Moscow and the surrounding Moscow region. In Voronovo, part of the New Moscow area, two people were injured in the strike.
In Serpukhov, outside Moscow, a strike hit the Defense Ministry’s “75 Arsenal” plant, which produces weapons and ammunition, according to the independent Telegram channel Astra. The Ukrainian Telegram channel Exilenova+ said the strike on the Moscow region involved not only drones but also missiles.
Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said 163 drones were shot down as they approached the city since the evening of October 21. In total, he said, 630 Ukrainian drones were headed toward Moscow and the Moscow region, and most of them were destroyed at “distant frontiers.”
Ukrainian drones also struck Lipetsk. Lipetsk Governor Igor Artamonov said the attack damaged windows and facades of private homes and apartment buildings, as well as a clinic, in the regional capital. A man born in 2001 was injured and hospitalized. Astra reported that the strike sparked a fire on the upper floors of a building in the “Atmosfera” residential complex.
Voronezh Governor Alexander Gusev said 44 drones were shot down overnight over the city of Voronezh and the Voronezh region. Local authorities in the Tula region said 70 Ukrainian drones were destroyed overnight. In Voronezh, the attack damaged the roofs and facades of private homes, apartment buildings, and a public facility. In Tula and the Zaoksky district, private homes sustained damage.
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