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U.S. vs China’s Aircraft Carriers: New Report Shows How America Can Turn the Tables on “World’s Largest” Navy

6 August 2026 at 17:03

For decades, the US has maintained an unassailable lead in aircraft carriers.

The US currently operates 11 flattops, all of them nuclear-powered. China is a distant second with three aircraft carriers, none of them nuclear-powered.

The US operates roughly half of the world’s true aircraft carriers. However, for years, the security analysts in Washington have been wargaming for a nightmarish scenario.

What if the US’s carrier fleet is not a force multiplier, but a strategic vulnerability? Or, to put it another way, can Beijing sink the US Navy’s aircraft carriers?

These questions have assumed significance ever since China claimed to have developed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), the DF‑21D and DF‑26B, also known as “carrier-killers.”

These ASBMs are part of China’s broader A2/AD (Anti-Access and Area Denial) architecture intended to push U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) beyond the first island chain.

In the last decade, several wargames, research studies, think‑tank reports, and opinion columns have wondered whether carriers are becoming obsolete, the new battleships – large, complex, and expensive systems – but vulnerable to cheap, long‑range missiles.

But a new Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) research paper has flipped the script: if US carriers are vulnerable, why can’t Washington also hold China’s new carriers at risk?

Are Aircraft Carriers Becoming Obsolete? 

In 2023, the South China Morning Post reported that researchers at North University of China claimed that it took an average of only 24 hypersonic missiles to sink the USS Gerald R. Ford and its five escort ships across 20 simulated battles.

From an economic point of view, that would imply that for every $1 China spends on new classes of low-cost hypersonic missiles, it could destroy $10,858.59 worth of U.S. capital ships.

A British study published in 2024 found that their carriers – the HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales – were similarly at risk.

Not just think tanks, even senior US government figures have expressed similar fears.

US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said in a recent podcast interview: In wargames against China, ‘We lose every time.”

The secretary went further, linking US defeat to the vulnerability of aircraft carriers: “We know what our real capability [is]…If our whole power projection platform is aircraft carriers and the ability to project power that way strategically around the globe . . . and if 15 hypersonic missiles can take out our 10 aircraft carriers in the first 20 minutes of a conflict, what
does that look like?”

But if US carriers are so vulnerable, why can’t Washington bring China’s expanding carrier fleet within its firing range?

China’s Expanding Carrier Fleet

After the US, China has the world’s second-largest carrier fleet.

Beijing currently operates a fleet of three aircraft carriers. China launched its third carrier, Fujian (Type 003), an 80,000‑ton supercarrier capable of launching a mix of over 50 fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, and key enablers such as KJ-600 airborne early warning and control aircraft.

China also launched Sichuan (Type 076), a 40,000‑ton amphibious assault ship also suspected of serving as a drone carrier capable of using an electromagnetic (EM) catapult to launch GJ-11 stealth unmanned combat aircraft.

A fourth carrier (Type 004) is undergoing construction. Satellite imagery suggests that this will likely be China’s largest and first nuclear-powered carrier.

Fujian-China
The Fujian is more technically advanced than the other Chinese carriers.

China plans to construct six additional aircraft carriers by 2035, bringing its total carrier force up to nine, according to the Department of War (DOW).

China’s growing carrier fleet is a force multiplier; however, it could also become a strategic vulnerability.

The Vulnerability of the US Aircraft Carriers

China recognized early that the US ability to project force globally rests on its fleet of 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. It also recognized that it would be decades before it could match Washington in carrier fleet strength.

Therefore, China focused its energy on developing weapons systems that could negate the US advantage and developed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs).

Recent pieces have argued that Chinese hypersonic and ballistic missiles, supported by an increasingly sophisticated space‑ and AI‑enabled “kill web,” could force US and allied carriers so far offshore that their air wings become operationally irrelevant.

For example, the YJ-21 is a Chinese air-launched medium-range ballistic missile specifically designed to strike high-value assets such as carriers. This missile can be launched from fighters and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and uses redundant guidance systems that make it difficult to jam; a variant can be fired from Type 055 destroyers, though this may have been the YJ-20.

Source: Adapted from CSIS Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of China,” CSIS, last modified March 18, 2026. Credits CSIS.

Combined with older missiles such as the DF-26, colloquially known as “carrier-killers” with a range of up to around 4,000 kilometers (km), and the DF-17, which has a shorter range of up to around 2,500 km but is designed to strike high-value assets and evade US interceptors (e.g., THAAD and Patriot), China has an arsenal of systems capable of hypersonic speeds that can hold carriers at risk up to 2,500 miles away.

A Selection of Chinese Anti-Ship Missile Capabilities. Credits CSIS.

However, the current discussion in Washington often frames carriers as unique to the United States and uniquely vulnerable, while underplaying the fact that China is now building its own large-deck, network‑enabled capital ships that are at least as targetable as the U.S. ships China aims to threaten.

How the U.S. Can Make China’s Carriers Vulnerable?

According to the CSIS paper, Washington could follow a five-pronged strategy to make China’s growing carrier fleet vulnerable.

(1) Subsurface ambush operations: China’s Achilles’ heel at sea remains anti‑submarine warfare (ASW).

“Despite various improvements, PLAN surface ASW, fixed‑wing ASW, and undersea sensing are still patchy compared with U.S. and Japanese capabilities, particularly in noisy littorals and chokepoints,” it said.

A cost‑effective way to threaten China’s carriers is through a layered subsurface screen built around the following assets:

■  U.S. nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) operating at range.

■  Allied diesel-electric submarines from Australia, Japan, South Korea, and potentially the Philippines, including submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion where available.

■  Shared undersea sensing networks and common heavyweight torpedoes, enabling coordinated ambush of PLAN carrier groups in transit corridors rather than near the Chinese coast.

■  Shared unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) capable of both conducting intelligence collection and limited strike missions against PLAN ships.

The key is to turn the “undersea domain into a continuous threat envelope that forces Beijing to invest heavily in escorts, ASW aviation, and fixed sensors simply to move carriers out of its home waters.”

Further, this approach also leverages existing areas of production and operational excellence from various U.S. allies, making implementation faster and cheaper than more novel approaches.

(2) Land-based maritime strike networks: China’s A2/AD system is, in part, a land‑based missile problem. The United States and its regional partners can mirror that logic by building a distributed, multinational anti‑ship missile network on land from Japan through the Philippines and, where politically feasible, into the South Pacific and even around key maritime terrain globally, including the following:

■  U.S. Marine Corps and Army units fielding Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) missile systems, Mid‑Range Capability (i.e., Typhon batteries), and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs) adapted to strike ships and a host of information warfare systems (e.g., cyber, space, electronic warfare, and inform/influence activities) stationed as a
littoral rotational force.

■  Australian, Japanese, and potentially Philippine coastal missile batteries (e.g., upgraded Type 12, BrahMos, and naval strike missiles) integrated into common fire control and ISR architectures.

■  Pre‑negotiated access, dispersal sites, and logistics arrangements to ensure these units can survive Chinese Air Force and Rocket Force (PLAAF/PLARF) strikes and continue to generate maritime fires.

Such a network can threaten PLAN carriers during deployment, not just at the point of conflict.

Moreover, “the mere expectation that upon entering the Philippine Sea, carriers such as the Fujian or Sichuan will face dense, land‑based anti‑ship fires backed by allied ISR raises the perceived risk of using them as front‑line tools of coercion.”

(3) Long-range air and space-enabled fires: The United States and its allies can conduct long-range strikes using a mix of bombers, fighters, and maritime patrol aircraft:

■  U.S. Air Force bombers and Navy aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles, such as LRASM and future hypersonic anti-ship weapons, connected to a complex battle network that both supports the attack and degrades enemy sensors.

■  Allied F‑35 fleets (from Australia, Japan, and South Korea) using low‑observable sensors to contribute to the maritime picture and deliver their own long‑range anti‑ship munitions.

■  A mix of kinetic and non-kinetic attack vectors with a conscious emphasis on mission kills, specifically by degrading flight‑deck operations, destroying aviation fuel and ordnance handling, or disabling key escorts and logistics ships supporting the carrier, rather than only aiming for catastrophic hull loss.

This approach is particularly suited to large military powers such as the United States but can be partially adopted by states with smaller budgets by investing in a limited number of fifth‑generation or advanced fourth‑generation aircraft plus modern anti‑ship missiles.

(4) Cyber-electromagnetic disruption: PLAN CSGs are nodes within a broader battle network. Their combat value depends on complex links to off‑board ISR, satellite navigation, command networks, and electromagnetic attack and defense platforms.

By disrupting the carriers’ connections to this broader network, the United States and its allies can deny the PLAN access to the enablers that make its forces more combat-capable.

Rather than treating ships solely as physical targets, U.S. and allied planners should prioritize EM and cyber operations.

(5) Unmanned swarm and port-denial campaigns: The Ukraine war has shown how even a state with a modest navy can use unmanned surface vessels (USVs), unmanned aerial vehicles, and shore‑based missiles to attrite a larger fleet.

Ukraine has successfully forced Russia to pull major units out of Sevastopol and turned the Black Sea into a contested battlespace.

While the terrain of the Pacific is not identical to the Black Sea, a similar logic can be applied to PLAN carriers, especially in the first island chain.

Swarms of relatively low‑cost USVs and loitering munitions can attack ships in port, logistic hubs, and fixed defenses, driving carriers to relocate to more distant, less convenient bases.

The central idea is to make a carrier’s routine employment around Taiwan, the South China Sea, or beyond the first island chain appear prohibitively risky.

By following these steps, the U.S. and its allies could blunt the advantage of China’s growing carrier fleet.

While China has for years invested in AA/AD vectors to make the U.S. carriers vulnerable, Washington could flip the script and make Beijing’s own carriers equally vulnerable.

  • Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee  News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
  • He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

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North Korea’s Missiles Are Moving West — 120 of Them May Head Toward Ukraine Amid Kyiv’s Plea For Help

6 August 2026 at 12:49

Ukraine is staring down a new and deeply unsettling threat: a possible North Korean missile unit deployment to western Russia amid a lack of anti-ballistic interceptors in its arsenal. 

North Korea is preparing to deploy a missile unit to western Russia, according to a Ukrainian military intelligence official, marking a significant escalation in the conflict.

Andrii Cherniak of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) told Reuters that the deployment involves Russia’s 112th Guards Missile Brigade and about 90 North Korean personnel based in the Voronezh region, which borders Ukraine.

While the exact composition of missiles will be finalized during senior-level talks next month, Pyongyang has already sent a new batch of 40 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles and personnel ​to Russia, the GUR official claimed.

Further, he noted that the unit could eventually field up to 120 short-range ballistic missiles along with six launchers.

An informed source reportedly told Reuters that the United States was aware of the plan but did not provide further details.

Designed to evade missile defenses by flying on a lower, “depressed” trajectory that reduces radar detection, the KN-23—resembling the Russian Iskander—has a range of 800-900 kilometers.

Previous reports indicated that Moscow had allegedly modified the missile to enhance its accuracy.

Meanwhile, the KN-24 has a comparatively shorter range of about 410 kilometers and employs a quasi-ballistic or depressed trajectory with possible in-flight maneuvers, making it harder to intercept.

GUR’s claims could not be officially verified, and the Pentagon has not made a statement acknowledging any such intelligence reports. Nevertheless, the GUR’s assessment comes days after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced Russia used a North Korean missile for a strike on July 30, which killed five members of a family.

Although Russia has previously used North Korean ballistic missiles, the Ukrainian reports hinted that Moscow might have received a fresh supply.

Earlier, Pyongyang had reportedly delivered more than 100 short-range ballistic missiles (primarily KN-23 and KN-24), millions of artillery shells, over 120 long-range self-propelled artillery systems, and more than 120 multiple rocket launch systems. Additionally, it had deployed an estimated 11,000 troops for the Ukraine war, of whom approximately 2,300 were killed in combat.

While the US and NATO are on the ground in Ukraine, studying the realities of modern warfare and using those lessons to develop the next generation of military technology, North Korea, Iran, and China are also closely observing the conflict to refine their own weapons and military doctrines.

North Korean KN-23

Why is Ukraine Alarmed

Russia has been exploiting gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses to launch frequent ballistic and hypersonic missile strikes.

On August 4, Russia conducted a major overnight attack with drones and ballistic missiles that killed 17 people. Ukrainian forces intercepted 98 of 115 drones but failed to shoot down even a single ballistic missile, as recently reported by the EurAsian Times

Having run out of Patriot interceptors, which are the only reliable defense against ballistic missiles, Ukraine is practically left defenseless.

Ukraine has been pleading with its allies to supply more Patriot batteries and interceptors, which remain among the few weapons capable of countering ballistic missile threats such as North Korea’s KN-23 and KN-24 and Russia’s Iskander.

“Ballistic missile interceptors could have saved the lives of those killed today,” Zelenskyy wrote on social media after the August 4 strike. “It is very important that our partners understand that delays in supplying them, or an unwillingness to provide anti-ballistic systems, lead directly to such horrific casualties and destruction.”

Notably, the US has been sending Patriot missiles to Ukraine, among other weapons and munitions—including through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), a new system wherein NATO nations pay for the transfer of weapons from the US. However, recent reports suggest that the US has expended a massive chunk of its own Patriot interceptors in the Ukraine war, eroding any space to make fresh deliveries to Kyiv.

Meanwhile, other NATO allies remain wary of aiding Ukraine with Patriots amid heightened security threats and long production timelines.

The Patriot shortage has allowed Moscow to use ballistic missiles with near impunity, creating a dangerous “window of vulnerability” for Ukraine that will only expand with North Korea’s deployment. In fact, experts fear that the situation will get increasingly challenging as winter approaches, which is when Russia intensifies attacks on Ukraine’s power grids.

The expanding Russia-North Korea partnership also carries broader geopolitical implications for Ukraine after nearly five years of war.

“Kyiv is rattled not because North Korean missiles are more advanced than Russia’s Iskander, but because they signal a deeper, more dangerous geopolitical alignment—and their sheer volume and indiscriminate use are overwhelming Ukraine’s already strained defenses. This isn’t just about weapons—it’s about the normalization of new military collaboration and geopolitical alignment. Russia’s use of North Korean missiles also suggests Pyongyang has replenished Moscow’s arsenal, enabling intensified bombardments as Russia seeks to break Ukrainian morale. For Kyiv, each KN-23/24 impact is both a physical and symbolic blow,” Air Marshal G.S. Bedi (retd) told the EurAsian Times.

Notably, North Korea’s short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) are believed to be less accurate compared to their Russian counterparts. A previous Ukrainian state prosecutor’s report stated that about half of the KN-23s launched by Russia between late December 2023 and late February 2024 veered off course and sometimes exploded midair.

Moreover, strikes launched using these missiles have caused large-scale civilian casualties.

Nonetheless, the deployment of North Korean missiles will give Russia what it needs to overwhelm and batter Ukraine: volume.

This allows Moscow to reserve more precise systems such as the Iskander for high-value targets while using KN-23 and KN-24 missiles against population centers and infrastructure to increase pressure on Kyiv.

Interestingly, during a meeting of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reportedly announced that his country will destroy Russian missile launchers to reduce attacks on Ukrainian cities.

“Our military knows they must destroy the enemy’s launchers to reduce strikes on Ukraine, its critical infrastructure, and civilians. They are working on this and will continue to do so,” Zelenskyy said.

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Elon Musk’s SpaceX Racing to Recover Intact Ship 40 from Indian Ocean After Softest Splashdown Yet

6 August 2026 at 08:16

Days after SpaceX’s Flight 13, the company is actively recovering Ship 40, the upper stage of its Starship vehicle, from the Indian Ocean.

SpaceX completed the test flight of its Starship megarocket on July 24, 2026, following an aborted launch attempt the previous week in which several Super Heavy engines failed to ignite. The test flight—Flight 13—achieved several key milestones before concluding with a controlled splashdown of the upper Starship spacecraft in the Indian Ocean.

After splashdown, Ship 40 has remained afloat for days, as confirmed through satellite imagery, including Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). 

Notably, SpaceX has been working to bring the upper spaceship back for a controlled landing after flight, eventually recovering and quickly reusing the vehicles, which may significantly reduce launch costs. However, for it to be reused, the ship must survive high-speed atmospheric reentry, flip from a belly-first attitude to a vertical landing orientation, and then perform a precise, powered landing burn. Reliable performance of these steps is essential for catching the vehicle with the launch tower’s mechanical arms, which is the planned path to rapid reuse and dramatically lower costs.

Interestingly, SpaceX had no plans to recover Ship 40. The vehicle, however, successfully completed all of the above steps and achieved an unusually soft splashdown.

Image
File: Landing burn and splashdown of Starship on Flight 13

SpaceX spokesperson Dan Huot stated that Ship 40 demonstrated significant improvement over its predecessors by keeping its engines operating, maintaining control during aggressive reentry, and achieving its softest splashdown to date at the target landing site. Huot described the outcome as a “dream scenario” during the flight livestream.

The landing was soft enough that, unlike earlier prototypes, Ship 40 remained largely intact and afloat rather than sinking or breaking apart. In fact, the post-flight review conducted by SpaceX apparently indicated the landing position and control were precise enough that the tower arms could have theoretically caught it.

New satellite images of Ship 40 just dropped

Story with w/ @ThomasBordeaux7 https://t.co/XvVZz85NLp pic.twitter.com/lcXdgxRJms

— Jackie Wattles (@jackiewattles) August 3, 2026

Initially, a SpaceX recovery ship, named Go Australis, was stationed near the vehicle. However, the effort was joined by two Norwegian tugboats, Normand Ranger and Skimmer Tide, after Musk announced that the company would attempt recovery.

The recovery effort was seen in satellite images from the Colorado-based geospatial intelligence firm Vantor, which showed a small boat positioned near the Starship with a line fastened to its nose, as reported by CNN. MarineTraffic data on August 3 indicated Skimmer Tide and Normand Ranger moving at roughly one knot while broadcasting restricted maneuverability, while Go Australis was en route to Australia on its own.

More recent AIS data as of August 4 confirm that Normand Ranger has Ship 40 under tow (stern-to-aft) with flotation aids fitted near the base to keep the engines clearer of the water, at the time of writing this report.

SpaceX Wants Reusable Upper Spacecraft

SpaceX’s primary ambition for a reusable upper stage is embodied in Starship, the second stage of the Starship/Super Heavy system.

Unlike Falcon 9, where only the first-stage booster is routinely reused and the second stage is expendable, Starship is designed from the outset as a fully reusable orbital vehicle that can serve as a spacecraft for crew, cargo, tanker, and planetary landing roles.

The company’s declared objective is airline-like operations, which should ideally be measured in hours rather than days or weeks. These operations include launch, land, or catch, minimal inspection, refuel, and refly. In fact, Musk has described a long-term vision of flights more than once per hour, with costs potentially falling to a few million dollars, or lower, per flight once rapid full reusability and local propellant production are achieved.

Some of the challenges in achieving this center around a fully reusable orbital heat shield that survives multiple flights with little or no tile replacement, high-cycle engine reliability without significant refurbishment, and precise, reliable Ship catches after orbital reentry.

The company has indicated that solving these problems would enable massive Starlink deployments, large space telescopes, a lunar base, and Mars cargo or crew missions via orbital refueling with tanker Ships. A full reusability of the upper stage or spacecraft is presented as the critical breakthrough for making life multiplanetary.

It is pertinent to note that SpaceX has deliberately flown largely the same suborbital trajectory on successive tests that essentially includes launch from Starbase, hot-stage separation, booster return (initially soft splashdown, later tower-catch attempts), Ship continuing on a high-energy arc, payload or deployment tests, in-space engine relight(s), controlled reentry over the Indian Ocean, and targeted soft splashdown.

This consistent profile allows rapid iteration on the same failure modes and performance envelopes while collecting comparable data.

An important milestone in SpaceX’s efforts to recover and refly every component of the rocket was reached in 2024 when the company successfully guided the Super Heavy rocket booster to a safe landing in the enormous metal arms of its launch tower. However, two Starship spacecraft exploded near islands off the coast of Florida in 2025.

The campaign’s deliberate repetition of the same suborbital path has allowed SpaceX to treat each flight as a focused engineering experiment rather than a one-off demonstration. 

In line with the comprehensive effort, SpaceX has worked hard to examine Ship 40 at every stage of its journey to and from space.

In fact, it went so far as to postpone liftoff to ensure the weather was clear enough to capture high-resolution images of the spacecraft during launch.

SpaceX has been focusing on the vehicle’s heat shield, a layer of hexagon-shaped ceramic tiles intended to protect Starship from the intense heat spacecraft encounter as they reenter Earth’s atmosphere after reaching orbital velocities exceeding 17,500 miles per hour.  For now, while Musk has acknowledged that the heat shield’s performance has improved, SpaceX still faces significant engineering challenges in determining how to preserve the vehicle undamaged and ready for launch quickly.

No rocket currently in service has an upper stage that can be quickly reused. Following Flight 13’s success, Musk indicated that SpaceX may attempt to return a Starship to dry land or catch it with the tower on a future flight, contingent on data review. The date of the next flight has not been announced.

Even after SpaceX masters the recovery of the upper ship, additional challenges lie ahead, including figuring out how to refuel the vehicle while it sits in orbit. But, for now, things seem to be working out for Elon Musk and his reusable launch system program.

 

 

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China ‘Mass Deploys’ DF-17 Hypersonic Missiles as Iran & Russia Have Shown They’re Hard to Intercept

6 August 2026 at 04:16

China’s state broadcaster recently released the first footage showing multiple DF-17 hypersonic missiles in a single frame, in what appears to be a deliberate power-projection message. The display comes at a time when hypersonic weapons have proven their lethality and ability to penetrate air defenses in the Ukraine and Iran wars.

On August 3, state-owned CCTV aired video from the PLA documentary series Zhìshèng (“Victory”) featuring at least six DF-17 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) together.

Military affairs expert Zhang Junshe told the Global Times that the display indicates the system has been mass-deployed and is reliably placed on combat duty.

Zhang emphasized that the DF-17 is a vital weapon that can alter the rules of modern air defense warfare, as it can precisely hit adversary forward air defense installations and strategic command targets by leveraging its hypersonic penetration advantage.

Typically, hypersonic weapons are very hard to intercept by conventional missile defense systems due to two main reasons: 1) these weapons travel faster than Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound, equivalent to approximately 100 kilometers (60 miles) per minute; 2) these are highly maneuverable weapons that follow an unpredictable trajectory.

Only a few countries have developed and combat-deployed hypersonic weapons, including China, Russia, and sanctioned countries like Iran and North Korea.

Of these, both Russia and Iran have used these weapons in combat with Ukraine and the United States, respectively.

On its part, Ukraine has intercepted some Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missiles with Patriot batteries.

However, these hypersonic missiles have been wreaking havoc on Ukrainian cities in recent weeks, as earlier reported by the EurAsian Times. Moscow purportedly exploits a gap in its air defense coverage and launches Kinzhal and Tsirkon hypersonic missiles to cause devastation in the embattled country. Additionally, Moscow has struck Ukraine with the Oreshnik hypersonic missile, which Ukraine has been unable to shoot down so far.

Meanwhile, Iran claimed to have fired hypersonic missiles (Fattah-class) on Israeli cities and US military bases across the Middle East during the hostilities earlier this year.

However, independent verification of claimed terminal speeds, maneuver performance, and interception rates remains limited. Previous video footage from Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities showed Iranian missiles dodging as many as 10 interceptor missiles and hitting their targets at hypersonic speeds.

Image
Six DF-17 hypersonic missile launch vehicles of the PLARF appeared together in the same frame in footage broadcast by CCTV (Photo Courtesy of Global Times)

Notably, the latest footage comes more than a month after CCTV published footage of a DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle missile launch in June 2026. At the time, analysts noted that China was sending a deterrence message by emphasizing its strike capability to the United States, particularly amid tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the First Island Chain, and the South China Sea.

The same argument may apply to the latest footage, particularly since the DF-17 is the world’s first medium-range missile to field a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

China has amassed a variety of deadly hypersonic missiles, including the DF-17, DF-27, YJ-21, and YJ-20. These weapons are part of the formidable Chinese A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) network along its coastline.

Chinese experts believe that even the most advanced missile defenses in the US, including the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defense) and PAC-3 Patriot, are not effective against hypersonic weapons.

“Existing US missile defenses can theoretically intercept some hypersonic weapons in their final stage, but high speed, maneuverability, and stealth make it very difficult,” read a previous Chinese paper titled “Tactical Missile Technology” on the ability of US missile defense systems to intercept hypersonic weapons.

The US and allied forces are developing countermeasures, including improved sensors, the Glide Phase Interceptor, SM-6 variants, and other technologies, but substantial challenges remain in tracking and engaging maneuvering hypersonic vehicles at scale for now.

Chinese experts have noted that the DF-17 is a potent strategic deterrent because it is a conventional, medium-range missile capable of reaching important targets in the first island chain—stretching from the Japanese archipelago through Taiwan to the Philippines—including strategic sites in Japan and other areas.

Chinese experts have previously noted that the missile may reach as far as parts of the Second Island Chain, extending from Japan through Guam, Micronesia, and Palau. They believe that coordinated multi-vehicle salvo launches may play a crucial role in both launch site security and strike effectiveness—compounding the threats faced by the US military forces in the Indo-Pacific region.

DF-17’s Mass Deployment

The DF-17 is China’s first operational road-mobile medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

With a range of 1,800–2,500 kilometers, it is Beijing’s most operationally mature hypersonic strike system and is widely regarded as capable of penetrating nearly any missile defense network worldwide.

Like ICBMs, hypersonic glide weapons are launched by rockets high into the atmosphere. However, unlike ICBMs, whose warheads rely primarily on gravity once they begin their descent, hypersonic glide weapons dive back toward Earth sooner, then flatten their flight path. They make continuous course corrections to stay on target while traveling at speeds up to 12 times the speed of sound, using onboard navigation systems, making them much harder to detect by the adversary and allowing them to suppress enemy missile defenses at an early stage, clearing the way for follow-on strikes.

DF-17
China’s DF-17 hypersonic missiles. (Image: China Military Online)

The DF-17 made its public debut in October 2019 at a military parade that marked the 70th anniversary of Communist Party rule in China.

In 2021, the PLA conducted its first known hypersonic test involving the DF-17 glide vehicle, rattling the United States. Later, the Pentagon published the China’s Military Power 2022 report, referring to the DF-17 as a critical threat in the Western Pacific.

“The DF-17 passed several tests successfully and is deployed operationally. While the DF-17 is primarily a conventional platform, it may be equipped with nuclear warheads,” the report added.

Zhang pointed out that the DF-17 can avoid adversary targeting and reconnaissance because it does not depend on fixed launch silos.

Moreover, DF-17’s powerful anti-jamming and precision strike capabilities greatly increase its battlefield survivability and make it well-suited for a variety of complex field combat scenarios, as it is difficult for adversary satellites to detect its operational patterns.

“In addition to a longer vehicle body and more wheels [of the TEL], the biggest change in the DF-17 is the shape of the missile itself. Unlike the cone-shaped warhead we are familiar with from past models, the DF-17’s warhead has undergone significant changes and now features four wings and a tail fin,” Gong Chunyu, a training staff officer from the DF-17 conventional missile formation, was quoted as saying by CCTV earlier. 

“This design reflects a more scientific and advanced concept, with the missile capable of flexible and varied flight trajectories and greatly enhanced penetration capabilities,” he added.

It may be noted that China’s public releases of multiple TELs in formation and field launches demonstrate that the system is no longer experimental or small-scale, and it signifies distributed, mobile, ready forces that could hunt US-based targets quickly.

The missile’s range and penetration capability are repeatedly linked to targets in the western Pacific. Analysts interpret this as reinforcing China’s ability to hold at risk U.S. and allied bases, airfields, command nodes, and surface ships in a Taiwan or regional contingency—raising the cost of a US intervention.

 

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