British parliamentarians, former ministers, researchers and security experts gathered at the House of Lords in London for the sixth TRENDS Annual Forum on Political Islam, focusing on Muslim Brotherhood networks in Europe, education, funding and digital influence.

The London meeting opened the first part of the forum, organized by TRENDS Global and TRENDS Research & Advisory. Proceedings will continue on September 10 at the French Senate in Paris, with a focus on legislative responses and cooperation between European and partner countries.

Opening the event, Dr. Mohammed Abdullah Al Ali, Chairman of Trends Group, argued that political Islamist movements operate across borders and can exploit the openness of democratic societies to build influence in education, media, business and the digital sphere. He stressed the distinction between Islam as a religion and Islamism as a political ideology seeking power and influence.

Dr. Khalifa Mubarak Al Dhaheri, Director of Mohammed Bin Zayed University for Humanities, focused on Britain, describing it as a longstanding centre for individuals and networks associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. He said the organization should not be treated as representative of Muslims in Britain or elsewhere in Europe and warned that ideological loyalties placed above citizenship can create “societies within societies.”

From Education to Funding

The first session examined the Brotherhood’s ideological structures and its influence on education and younger generations. Participants also discussed the Gaza Children’s Village, established in July 2025 by Palestinian-American neurosurgeon Dr. David Hassan in cooperation with IMPACT-se, as an alternative educational model to counter incitement and extremism.

The second session turned to legislation, prevention and enforcement. Lord Walney, who moderated the discussion, urged a review of existing legal tools and warned of a “blind spot” allowing some networks and think tanks to penetrate charities and the education sector. He also advocated greater intelligence sharing and international cooperation.

Baroness Foster of Oxton addressed financial oversight, arguing for tighter scrutiny of charities, their funding and tax benefits. Former MP Daniel Kawczynski urged the Home Office to respond to parliamentary demands to ban the Muslim Brotherhood and designate it as a terrorist organization. Lady Olga Maitland warned that “soft extremism” and structures targeting young people require updated legislation.

Matthew J. Leavitt of the Labour Party described the Brotherhood as a “multi-headed beast” and urged Britain to examine evidence gathered in Austria, Germany and France. Major Jason Olson, a U.S. Navy officer and former counter-extremism official, argued that prevention should begin in schools.

Markus Sheff, CEO of IMPACT-se, identified education as the first line of defence against digital extremism, advocating critical thinking and digital literacy in school curricula.

Pressure for a UK Response

Sir Oliver Dowden, former Deputy Prime Minister and Chair of the UK-UAE Parliamentary Friendship Group, addressed the Brotherhood and its links to extremism, noting growing attention to the issue among British parliamentarians and the need for institutions to better assess potential threats to the United Kingdom.

Tom Wilson, Chairman of the Counter Extremism Group, and Dr. Alan Mendoza, Executive Director of the Henry Jackson Society, highlighted the legal and media difficulties involved in exposing front organizations. They announced the “Ban the Brotherhood” campaign and proposed using parliamentary privilege to bring evidence into the public domain.

Professor Andrew Davies of the University of Birmingham advocated carefully targeted bans on organizations that threaten social cohesion and religious pluralism. Professor David Abrahams, Senior Adviser at the Arab Global Network and former Deputy Chairman of RUSI, described political Islam as an “existential threat” while stressing the need to protect religious freedom and pluralism.

Alessandro Bertoldi, Executive Director of Italy’s Milton Friedman Institute, questioned whether a ban alone would be sufficient without confronting the Brotherhood’s operational tools. He also raised the need to monitor the use of artificial intelligence to spread its messaging.

Phil Rosenberg, President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, advocated an international alliance against extremist ideology, noting that Muslims themselves are among its largest victims. Imam Mohammed Tawhidi, counter-extremism adviser at TRENDS, described the Brotherhood as the “parent company” of organizations including al-Qaeda, ISIS and Hamas, while stressing that the vast majority of Western Muslims reject this approach.

Measuring the Brotherhood’s Reach

TRENDS researcher Hamad Al Hosani argued that the Brotherhood increasingly operates through flexible networks and community institutions able to exploit democratic freedoms. Any response, he said, should protect national security without collectively stigmatizing Muslim communities.

Badriya Al Riyami presented figures from the 2025 Global Brotherhood Power Index. Europe ranked fourth at 17.0%, behind the Americas at 24.8%, Asia at 22.5% and Africa at 20.2%. She described Europe as an important political and media base for the organization.

Participants recommended moving beyond procedural bans by addressing networks and ideological structures, strengthening educational programs and improving capabilities to track extremist content spread through digital platforms and artificial intelligence. Citizenship and tolerance education were identified as key preventive tools.

The meeting drew a broad parliamentary and political audience, including Richard Tice, Sir Robert John Blackman, Baroness Deech, Baroness Foster of Oxton, Nadhim Zahawi, Lord Howard of Lympne, Lord Austin of Dudley, Lord Eric Pickles, Sir Michael Ellis and Sir Oliver Dowden.

Journalists attending included Marcus Donaldson of GB News, Camilla Turner of the Sunday Telegraph and Natalie Lisbona of the Daily Mail.

The forum now moves from Westminster to the French Senate, where its second part will examine legislative responses, research cooperation and measures to counter Brotherhood-linked networks while protecting religious freedom and equal citizenship.

The European Commission wants to cut the EU’s public procurement rulebook from around 900 pages to 200, in a sweeping reform that aims to simplify tendering while giving governments greater scope to favour European economic and security interests, writes Catherine Feore.

Executive Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné held up the existing body of rules alongside its much slimmer replacement, to illustrate his point. 

“These here are the European rules which currently govern public procurement in Europe: 900 pages,” he said. “And this is what we are proposing today… down to 200 pages.”

The proposed Public Procurement Act would replace three EU procurement directives with a single regulation, with a view to simplifying procurement provisions spread across 26 sectoral laws and cutting the number of procedures from five to three.

The Commission estimates the changes could save businesses and public authorities €650 million a year in administrative costs.

The reform matters because of Europe’s massive purchasing power involved. EU public procurement exceeds €2.5 trillion annually, around 15% of EU GDP, covering everything from trains and hospitals to energy infrastructure, schools and IT systems.

From lowest price to strategic purchasing

The proposal is not just about cutting red tape. Brussels wants governments to use their purchasing power more strategically.

The Best Price-Quality Ratio would become the standard method for awarding contracts, with quality normally accounting for at least 30% of the assessment and 50% for labour-intensive contracts. Authorities could consider environmental and social performance, innovation, security and resilience alongside price.

The commitment to a so-called European preference has been tempered by the EU’s international commitments, but access can be restricted when a country doesn’t reciprocate market access. Restrictions could also be imposed where reliance on foreign suppliers creates security-of-supply dependencies or threatens EU economic security.

“European public money should, wherever possible, create jobs, investment and opportunities in Europe rather than filling the order books of our competitors,” Séjourné said.

Five procurement procedures would become three: open, dynamic and innovation procedures. Each would allow negotiation between buyers and bidders.

The Commission also plans an integrated EU digital procurement marketplace connecting national e-procurement platforms. A company registered through one connected system should be able to bid elsewhere in Europe without repeatedly submitting the same documentation. This is intended to reduce bureaucracy and tackle one of the current system's weaknesses: too little competition, particularly from SMEs and companies bidding across borders.

National, regional and local priorities may appreciate this flexibility in theory, but constrained budgets often mean that price will remain the bottom line for many. This legislation offers greater freedom in determining needs, but it remains to be seen what its impact will be.

PHOTO CREDIT: European Commission Executive Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné says the rules reduced from 900 pages to 200 pages © European Union

A European Parliament compromise on reforming the EU’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) has opened a politically sensitive dispute over whether entire industries should be excluded from sustainable investment — with fossil fuels offered a conditional transition route while tobacco remains outside.

The revision of the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation, better known as SFDR, is emerging as a key political battleground over the future boundaries of sustainable finance in the European Union.

Although formally concerned with disclosure requirements and the categorisation of financial products, the dispute now goes considerably further. At stake is a fundamental question: should entire sectors be excluded from sustainable and transition finance because of the nature of their business, or should companies be judged primarily on their actual environmental performance, investment plans and capacity to transition?

That distinction has potentially significant consequences for companies, investors and access to capital.

The file is currently under consideration in the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, ECON, where a compromise has been reached between political groups ahead of the committee vote.

Under the emerging agreement, sectoral exclusions remain within the proposed framework. Tobacco cultivation and production, as well as controversial weapons, remain outside the relevant sustainable investment categories.

Fossil-fuel companies, however, have been given a potential route into the proposed transition category where specified conditions are met.

The result is an unusual regulatory distinction.

An oil or gas company may potentially demonstrate that it is directing sufficient capital towards sustainable activities and implementing a credible emissions transition. A tobacco business, however substantial its environmental improvements, would remain excluded because of the sector in which it operates.

Crucially, however, the EPP’s decision not to challenge the tobacco exclusion should not be read as an endorsement of blanket sectoral exclusions.

Markus Ferber, the EPP’s ECON coordinator, has told EU Reporter that the decision was driven by parliamentary arithmetic and the need to assemble a stable majority for the overall compromise.

In other words, the EPP did not abandon its reservations about blanket exclusions because it had become convinced that such exclusions were the right policy. It accepted the compromise because, in Ferber’s assessment, there was no realistic parliamentary majority for an alternative amendment that would have created a performance-based pathway for tobacco.

That distinction is politically important.

It means the tobacco exclusion survives not because the EPP has embraced the principle behind it, but because the group concluded that challenging it would jeopardise the broader compromise.

Ferber: transition should matter more than sector

Ferber made clear that his underlying policy position remains strongly performance-based.

“Per se, EPP does not like blanket sectoral exclusions, but unfortunately it is not only the EPP’s position that determines the final outcome of negotiations and we had to strike compromises with other political groups to achieve a stable majority,” he told EU Reporter.

Asked whether sustainable-finance rules should judge companies according to the sector in which they operate or according to their measurable environmental progress, Ferber was unequivocal.

“In my view, the objective should be to finance the transition,” he said. “Hence, environmental performance and credible transition plans should matter more than the sector.”

That comment goes to the heart of the controversy surrounding tobacco.

The sector remains excluded irrespective of whether individual companies reduce emissions, restructure production, invest in Taxonomy-aligned activities or adopt measurable transition plans.

Fossil-fuel companies, by contrast, are being offered a conditional route into the transition category.

The tobacco exclusion survived because of the numbers

Ferber’s most significant intervention concerns why the EPP did not attempt to overturn the tobacco exclusion through an alternative compromise amendment.

Asked directly why he was not tabling such an amendment, despite previously opposing blanket exclusions affecting tobacco, Ferber replied:

“We have assessed all options for a stable majority in the Parliament and were not convinced that tabling alternative compromises would yield such a majority.”

That answer makes the political calculus unusually clear.

The tobacco exclusion was not retained because Ferber or the EPP ECON leadership had positively embraced the underlying principle. It remained because the EPP judged that there were insufficient votes to replace it while preserving the wider agreement.

The distinction matters because it changes the interpretation of the compromise.

Rather than representing an ideological conversion by the EPP towards sector-based sustainable-finance rules, it represents a tactical concession made in the context of difficult parliamentary mathematics.

Ferber reinforced that point when discussing the wider negotiations.

“I am not enthusiastic about the compromise,” he said, “but it reflects what is politically possible in light of difficult majorities and a rapporteur that has pursued a hard-left line from the beginning.”

The Parliament’s lead rapporteur on the file is Dutch Renew Europe MEP Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy.

Ferber’s description of Gerbrandy’s approach as “hard-left” is his own political characterisation, but his remarks underline how far the SFDR revision has moved beyond a purely technical debate over disclosure rules.

EPP reservations remain

The EPP has repeatedly positioned itself as an opponent of unnecessary blanket exclusions and an advocate of competitiveness, regulatory simplification and performance-based rules.

A number of centre-right amendments tabled during the ECON process sought to remove or narrow the exclusion provisions.

The material submitted to EU Reporter notes that among the amendments tabled in committee, several concerning exclusions were proposed by EPP, ECR and other centre-right lawmakers.

Asked whether significant numbers of EPP members would have preferred the exclusions to be removed or narrowed, Ferber acknowledged that different views existed within the group.

“In a large and diverse political group, you always have different positions to reconcile,” he said.

He added that EPP shadow rapporteur Luděk Niedermayer had “checked back frequently to ensure that he has sufficient backing within our group.

Luděk Niedermayer said "There were different priorities from different political groups and differences are even above different MEPs from same group. The current text reflects the agreement reached as a compromise. 

Asked how much room did the EPP have to negotiate changes to Article 7, and what
concessions did the Group obtain in return for accepting the final package?  he said :

"As with every file, each political group has its own priorities. For the EPP, one of the key
priorities was Article 7, where we managed to secure a text that is acceptable to the Group
and which, in my view, better reflects the nature and purpose of the transition category than
the Commission proposal."

Ferber therefore rejects the suggestion that the final compromise amounts to Niedermayer departing from an agreed EPP line.

Asked directly whether there had been a disagreement between the two men over the treatment of tobacco and sectoral exclusions, he replied:

“No, our shadow rapporteur has faithfully defended the line agreed within our group, but it has always been clear that in compromise negotiations the EPP would not get 100% of its wishes. That is the nature of a compromise.”

Niedermayer said " Maintaining a limited set of exclusions helps preserve the credibility of products marketed as sustainable without extending blanket exclusions more broadly. Furthermore, energy and utility companies are more likely to follow a credible transition pathway than the sectors mentioned above. Consistency between SFDR and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1818 under the Benchmark Regulation is also a strong argument for such an approach.

Tobacco as the test case

The tobacco issue exposes the central philosophical question running through the SFDR revision.

Under a blanket exclusion, the decisive question is: what does this company produce?

Under a performance-based model, the question becomes: what is this company actually doing to transition?

The distinction matters because an automatic exclusion can remove the regulatory benefit of environmental improvement.

A company that reduces emissions, changes production methods, invests heavily in renewable energy or directs substantial capital expenditure towards EU Taxonomy-aligned activities may still receive exactly the same treatment as one making no transition effort at all.

That is the fundamental criticism of blanket exclusions contained in the material examined by EU Reporter.

The fossil-fuel exception makes the question more acute.

If an oil or gas company can potentially qualify for the transition category by demonstrating credible investment and emissions reductions, opponents of the tobacco exclusion ask why businesses in another lawful sector should not at least be permitted to make the same case.

Ferber’s own words strengthen that argument: environmental performance and credible transition plans, he says, should matter more than the sector itself.

Why fossil fuels are treated differently

Ferber nevertheless argued that there is a rationale for distinguishing between some industries.

“One can make an argument that energy companies engaged in fossil fuel projects today are likely to ultimately change their business model towards more sustainable projects, while a controversial weapons manufacturer is likely to still manufacture deadly weapons in the future,” he said.

“So, the transition case is weaker.”

That explanation addresses controversial weapons more directly than tobacco, however.

For tobacco, the unresolved policy question remains whether environmental transition should be assessed separately from the social and health characteristics of the product being manufactured.

That is precisely where the SFDR debate is becoming politically significant.

The issue is no longer merely whether tobacco is socially desirable. It is whether a sustainable-finance regulation should use sector identity as an automatic barrier to recognising environmental transition.

The Green Deal legacy

The controversy also reaches into the EPP’s wider political argument that the EU needs to move away from parts of the regulatory philosophy associated with the previous Commission and the European Green Deal.

Asked whether retaining blanket exclusions amounted to accepting part of that earlier approach, Ferber was sharply critical of the sustainable-finance framework as a whole.

“The whole sustainable finance framework is a legacy product from the previous two terms,” he said.

“In my personal view, it contains some fundamental flaws, that are difficult to change with targeted reviews of individual files.”

“We have done the best we could to fix some mistakes within the SFDR. That does not mean it is perfect. If I was given a blank slate, I would design the framework differently.”

His comments underline the political paradox.

The EPP remains sceptical of the principle behind some sectoral exclusions, yet has accepted a compromise that preserves them.

The explanation, according to its ECON coordinator, is not policy conversion but political necessity.

That is likely to become one of the most important distinctions in the debate as the file moves towards its committee vote and later parliamentary stages.

Two different approaches inside EU sustainable finance?

The controversy also raises questions of regulatory coherence.

The EU Taxonomy measures environmental sustainability using economic indicators including turnover, capital expenditure and operational expenditure associated with qualifying activities.

The SFDR compromise can operate differently by establishing a sectoral gateway before a company’s environmental performance is assessed.

The material examined by EU Reporter argues that this risks creating two different regulatory philosophies: the Taxonomy assesses measurable activity, while SFDR can exclude by sector identity.

That matters at a time when Brussels has promised simpler and more coherent regulation.

If transition finance is supposed to encourage companies to change behaviour, critics argue that the system needs to explain why measurable transition is sufficient for one sector but irrelevant for another.

Growers and SMEs watch closely

The impact is not confined to multinational tobacco manufacturers.

European tobacco growers and processors have warned MEPs that exclusion from sustainable-finance frameworks could have consequences for agricultural communities and smaller businesses.

Ten thousands of family farms would be potentially affected, alongside thousands of SMEs, many of them located in economically vulnerable agricultural regions.

The broader economic figures advanced by industry organisations should be treated as industry estimates, but the principle being argued by growers is more straightforward.

They are not asking for tobacco automatically to be labelled sustainable.

They are asking to be allowed to demonstrate transition against objective criteria.

In that respect, the fossil-fuel derogation has become politically significant.

If Europe is prepared to recognise transition in one of the world’s most carbon-intensive sectors, tobacco industry stakeholders ask why no equivalent environmental-performance test should exist for their own.

No change expected before the vote

Despite his reservations, Ferber told EU Reporter that he does not expect the compromise to be altered before the ECON vote.

“I do not anticipate any changes to the text that was agreed ahead of the vote,” he said.

The immediate political battle may therefore already have been settled.

But the wider argument is unlikely to disappear.

The SFDR revision was intended to simplify sustainable finance and make it clearer for investors.

Instead, it has exposed a fundamental policy choice over whether sustainable finance should reward measurable transition or exclude entire sectors in advance.

And in the case of tobacco, the EPP’s position is now particularly clear: the exclusion remains not because its ECON leadership endorses blanket sectoral exclusions, but because it concluded that Parliament did not contain the votes necessary to remove it without jeopardising the wider SFDR compromise.

That distinction is now stated in the introduction, given its own section, and repeated in the conclusion, so it becomes the central political takeaway rather than being buried inside the Ferber interview.

The election of Mahnaz Maimanat (pictured) to lead the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran highlights more than three decades of continuous female leadership within one of Iran’s principal organised opposition movements. An important development has taken place within the Iranian democratic opposition. On 6 September, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), the principal organized component of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), elected Mahnaz Maimanat as its new Secretary-General, at the beginning of the organisation’s 62nd year.

The election took place through three successive rounds involving PMOI members in seven countries — France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Albania. In the first round, Maimanat received 56% of the votes, ahead of Badri Pourtabbakh and Narges Azdanlou. The position is for a two-year term and may be renewed by the PMOI’s Central Council. Born in Tehran in 1959, Maimanat has spent most of her adult life in the movement.

She became acquainted with the PMOI as a university student and participated in demonstrations against the Shah’s dictatorship. She joined the organization following the 1979 revolution and went on to assume a succession of senior responsibilities: she became a member of the Executive Committee in 1989, the Leadership Council in 1993, the Central Council in 2014, and co-Secretary-General in 2021. Her personal history also reflects the heavy price paid by many PMOI families under the clerical regime. Her mother, Akhtar Mowlavi, a teacher, was killed by the Revolutionary Guards in 1988.

One of her brothers, Massoud, was executed in Evin Prison at the age of 19 after months of imprisonment and torture. Another brother, Mahmoud, an architecture student, was executed during the 1988 massacre of political prisoners. The significance of the election, however, goes well beyond a change of office-holder. Mahnaz Maimanat is the tenth woman to serve as Secretary-General of the PMOI. Maryam Rajavi became the first woman to hold the organisation’s top leadership position in 1989, and for more than three decades every PMOI Secretary-General has been a woman.

Eight women succeeded Mrs Rajavi before Maimanat. This is particularly significant in the Iranian context. Within the PMOI, women’s leadership is not simply a matter of ceremonial representation or political imagery. Its female Secretaries-General have exercised real executive and organisational authority, often during extraordinarily difficult periods involving clandestine activity inside Iran, severe repression, imprisonment and executions, attacks on PMOI members, displacement from Iraq and the subsequent rebuilding of the organisation.

After assuming responsibility for leading the National Council of Resistance of Iran in 1993, Maryam Rajavi ceased to hold a formal organisational position within the PMOI. Nevertheless, she remains the most prominent political figure of the Iranian Resistance and, for many Iranians, particularly women, has become a symbol of resistance to religious fundamentalism and a pioneer of women’s equality and political leadership. This model of female leadership has also had important consequences inside Iran. Women have increasingly assumed leading responsibilities within the PMOI’s underground Resistance Units, which the movement says have played an active role in successive uprisings against the regime, including the nationwide protests of January 2026.

For young Iranian women confronting compulsory veiling, institutional discrimination and a political system that treats women as second-class citizens, the sight of women exercising genuine authority within an organised opposition movement carries considerable political and cultural significance. It also helps explain the intensity of the attacks directed against the PMOI’s leadership by the Iranian regime and, increasingly, by hardline monarchist circles. Both have devoted considerable efforts to portraying the PMOI, and particularly its female leadership, as illegitimate.

Yet the central issue is that the PMOI remains a highly organised democratic opposition movement with an extensive network inside Iran and therefore represents a serious challenge to the survival of the ruling theocracy. The election of its tenth female Secretary-General should therefore be viewed in a broader perspective. It represents more than three decades of continuous female leadership and constitutes a profound ideological and cultural challenge to Islamic fundamentalism: not simply women demanding equality, but women assuming responsibility, exercising authority and leading an organised struggle against a system built upon their discrimination and subordination.

The Yara Sluiskil plant, the largest commercial carbon capture and storage (CCS) project in Europe has started its operations in Sluikil, a village in the Zeeland province of the Netherlands.

The CO₂ will be transported by ship and permanently stored under the Norwegian North Sea at the Northern Lights facility, funded by the EU under the Connecting Europe Facility. The industrial ammonia and fertiliser facility is expected to capture and liquefy up to 800 000 tons of CO₂ annually from ammonia production.

This cross-border project is a direct result of the EU-Norway Green Alliance signed in 2023 – a powerful example of the benefits of European cooperation, combining private investment and public support and bringing together industry, the EU, its Member States, and Norway. Today's inauguration ceremony, attended by Commissioner for Climate, Net-Zero and Clean Growth, Wopke Hoekstra, reflected this partnership with the presence of Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten and President and CEO of Yara International, Svein Tore Holsether.

Yara's Sluiskil plant is a strategic investment in Europe's industrial decarbonisation and competitiveness. It is expected to capture and store around 12 million tons of CO₂ over the next 15 years. It will promote the reduction of emissions from energy intensive industries like fertilisers and ammonia. It will foster innovation, the creation of a strong industrial base and the development of this clean technology, as underlined in the Clean Industrial Deal and the recent proposal for the EU Emissions Trading System review. 

In his keynote speech at the opening ceremony, Commissioner Hoekstra (pictured) said:

"Europe needs practical climate solutions that deliver real emissions reductions while strengthening industrial competitiveness. The carbon capture and storage project at Sluiskil shows what is possible when innovation and cross-border cooperation come together. This is exactly the kind of project Europe needs to combine climate ambition with a strong and resilient industrial base."

You can follow the speech of the Commissioner on EBS.

Related links

• Industrial carbon management
• EU-Norway energy co-operation

From illicit production to smuggling, the illicit tobacco trade continues to pose a serious problem for the EU, as it negatively impacts its finances, public health and security, according to a new report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA). Although the European Commission and EU countries have made efforts to combat this global criminal phenomenon, their action is not robust enough. Illicit production across the EU is increasing, smuggling methods are getting more sophisticated, and new tobacco products are on the rise. Against this backdrop, the auditors criticise poor cross-country cooperation, which suffers from persistent gaps and lacks a concerted EU-wide approach.

The illicit tobacco trade has changed significantly in recent years. Organised crime groups have strategically relocated production from Ukraine to the EU in order to shorten supply chains and access consumers more directly. Although smuggling remains a problem, illicit manufacturing sites have been detected in almost all EU countries, and illicit production has grown across the EU. For instance, in a large-scale illicit cigarette production factory in Belgium, each machine was capable of producing around a million cigarettes per hour. In the largest illicit cigarette factory dismantled in Spain, three million packets of counterfeit cigarettes were seized, i.e. 56 times the height of Mount Everest if the cigarettes were stacked horizontally.

“The EU cannot afford to let its fight against the scourge of illicit tobacco go up in smoke,” said Petri Sarvamaa, the ECA Member leading the audit. “If we are serious about safeguarding citizens’ health, wallets and security, the Commission and member states must up their game to fight criminal activity head-on.”

The illicit tobacco trade deprives EU and member state budgets of €13 billion a year, according to the Commission’s estimate. However, this figure should be treated with caution, as it is based on external studies. The fact remains that the Commission lacks a reliable and independent EU-wide estimate of the illicit tobacco market, its structure and its economic impact, e.g. in terms of lost tax revenues. Such data, however, are crucial for determining the magnitude of the problem and designing an effective response. As it stands, the Commission’s reporting is largely based on seizures, and so does not provide a full picture of the situation.

Over the past decade, the EU and its member states have taken measures to combat the illicit tobacco trade. However, EU law is not harmonised, and member states’ efforts are uneven. For example, key production inputs such as raw tobacco and production machinery, and new types of products such as heated tobacco products and liquids for e-cigarettes, are not treated in the same way across the EU. At the same time, the EU regulatory framework gives member states a free hand in choosing counter-measures, thus leading to enforcement gaps that organised crime groups can exploit. In particular, as national control systems and enforcement approaches differ, such as in the definition of offences and the severity of penalties, this can encourage criminal activities to relocate to laxer jurisdictions. Furthermore, EU countries are inconsistent in the way they exchange information.

In the EU, responsibility for combating the illicit tobacco trade is shared between several stakeholders. However, no single entity has a clear coordinating role, meaning that initiatives are fragmented. The auditors thus call on the Commission to assume a more active role in combating the illicit trade in tobacco products.

Background information

Although overall tobacco consumption has continued to fall, the quantity of illicit tobacco products in the EU has risen in recent years. In 2023, the Commission estimated that the quantity of illicit tobacco products was 8.8 % of total cigarette consumption. Excluding cigarettes, the illicit tobacco market amounts to nearly 21 000 tonnes in the EU. According to estimates, these new products make up 13 % of the market value of tobacco products sold in the EU, and attract younger consumers.

Illicit tobacco products are very attractive for organised crime groups due to their high profitability and comparatively low risk (penalties have traditionally been light and detection rates low). Such illegal activity not only provides a significant source of income for criminals but, by offering cheaper tobacco products, also undermines efforts to reduce tobacco consumption. Ultimately, it leads to losses in terms of customs duties, value-added tax and national excise duties.

The audit assesses the effectiveness of the action taken by the Commission and the member states. The auditors carried out field visits in Belgium, Spain, Poland and Romania, and include examples of illicit manufacturing sites in their report. ECA special report 23/2026 “Combating the illicit trade in tobacco in the EU: Fragmented efforts and persistent gaps” is available in 24 EU languages on the ECA website.

Public records show that businesses associated with Tavira have undergone changes to their custody operations following regulatory intervention in Dubai and Monaco. Separately, Tavira Monaco is a defendant in English civil proceedings concerning shares provided as collateral for a stock-backed loan.

The civil allegations remain disputed, and the public judgments reviewed for this article do not establish that Tavira knowingly participated in fraud. Neither Tavira nor its founder, Eliot Goodfellow, is charged in the related United States criminal case.

An international financial group

Tavira was founded in London in 2005 as Tavira Securities. It has since expanded into areas including agency brokerage, asset management, corporate broking and custody.

The group has operated through regulated businesses in several jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Monaco, Dubai, Australia and the United States.

Goodfellow remains Tavira Financial Limited’s controlling shareholder. Companies House records state that he owns at least 75 per cent of its shares and voting rights and has the right to appoint or remove directors.

Tavira Financial’s accounts for the year ending 31 March 2025 reported increased revenue alongside a wider annual loss. The accounts also referred to the closure of its contracts-for-difference business and restructuring of its custody activities as the group concentrated on agency brokerage, asset management and corporate broking.

The Salinas civil proceedings

Tavira Monaco is one of six defendants in English civil proceedings brought by Mexican businessman Ricardo Salinas Pliego and Corporacion RBS.

According to the claimants’ case, as summarised in a 2024 High Court judgment, Salinas transferred Grupo Elektra shares worth more than $400 million to two custodians, Weiser Global Capital Markets and Tavira Monaco. The shares were provided as security for loans under a stock-loan agreement concluded in July 2021.

The claimants allege that they entered the transaction after being led to believe that the lender was associated with the prominent American Astor family and that the shares would not be sold unless an event of default occurred.

They further allege that Vladimir Sklarov, who used the name “Gregory Mitchell” in connection with the transaction, caused the shares to be transferred and sold without their authority and used part of the proceeds to fund the loans themselves.

Financial Mail reported in June 2025, citing trading logs reviewed by Salinas’s team, that some of the disputed shares were sold through transactions involving Morgan Stanley, BBVA and Merrill Lynch. The report did not allege that those banks knew of or participated in the alleged fraud. Their appearance in a transaction chain does not, by itself, establish misconduct or knowledge of any underlying dispute.

These remain allegations in continuing civil litigation. In the interlocutory proceedings, the Sklarov defendants maintained that the transaction documents entitled them to trade the collateral and that Salinas’s advisers had been told this. The public decisions reviewed for this article do not amount to a final determination of Tavira Monaco’s liability.

The High Court granted freezing and proprietary injunctions in August 2024. An application by the Sklarov defendants to discharge those injunctions was rejected in October 2024. Later appellate proceedings concerned procedural and evidential issues rather than a final trial of the underlying claims. Tavira Monaco was not involved in the most recent appeal.

Separate US criminal case

A US federal indictment filed on 30 April 2026 and unsealed in May charges Sklarov with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering.

The US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York alleges that Sklarov operated an entity presented as an established stock-backed lender associated with the Astor family. Prosecutors allege that he used aliases and false representations to obtain control of shares worth approximately $450 million.

Sklarov has not been convicted in that case. The charges are allegations, and he is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

The publicly available indictment charges Sklarov, not Tavira Financial, Tavira Monaco, Goodfellow, Morgan Stanley, BBVA or Merrill Lynch. The existence of the criminal case should therefore not be taken as establishing criminal conduct by any of those companies or individuals.

Restrictions in Dubai

On 10 September 2024, the Dubai Financial Services Authority imposed restrictions on Tavira Financial Limited’s Dubai branch.

According to the DFSA public register, the firm was restricted from soliciting or conducting specified regulated financial-services business with new clients. It was also restricted from soliciting or onboarding new clients in connection with financial promotions.

The public register does not state the reason for the restrictions and does not connect them to the Salinas litigation.

Tavira’s accounts subsequently referred to a decision to close the Dubai branch’s custody operation and to restructure custody activities across the group. The DFSA register nevertheless continues to list Tavira Financial as an authorised firm, subject to the published restrictions.

Companies House records show that Goodfellow ceased to be a Tavira Financial director on 13 September 2024, three days after the restrictions were imposed. Neither the DFSA entry nor the Companies House filing gives a reason for his departure or establishes that it was connected to the restrictions or the Salinas proceedings.

Monaco sanction suspended pending challenge

Tavira Monaco has also been the subject of regulatory action.

On 12 February 2026, Monaco’s Commission de Contrôle des Activités Financières ordered the withdrawal of Tavira Monaco’s authorisation after upholding four regulatory breaches.

The published CCAF decision found that the company had failed to submit required accounts, activity reports and auditors’ reports within statutory deadlines. It also found that the company had not continuously maintained two people responsible for its strategic direction and management, had lacked a bank account in its own name with a Monaco credit institution since July 2023, and had lacked sufficient human and technical resources since 2023.

Tavira Monaco challenged the decision. On 21 May 2026, the President of Monaco’s Supreme Court suspended its execution. According to the CCAF’s current case notice, Tavira Monaco’s application to annul the decision remains pending.

The withdrawal decision should therefore not be described as presently effective without also reporting the suspension and continuing challenge.

Questions about custody controls

The Dubai restrictions, restructuring of custody operations and Monaco proceedings raise legitimate questions about governance and operational controls. They do not, by themselves, prove any connection to the alleged misconduct in the Salinas transaction.

The English civil case raises separate, disputed questions about the instructions received by Tavira Monaco, the authority it understood the relevant parties to possess, the movement of the collateral and the custody records maintained during the transaction. Those matters remain for determination in the civil proceedings.

Right of reply

EU Reporter sent Tavira Financial, Tavira Monaco and Eliot Goodfellow a detailed summary of the matters in this article and asked for their responses concerning the civil allegations, regulatory decisions, custody restructuring and Goodfellow’s departure from the board. EU Reporter has received no replies from Tavira Financial, Tavira Monaco and Eliot Goodfellow

EU Reporter also asked Morgan Stanley, BBVA and Bank of America, the parent company of Merrill Lynch, whether they could confirm the reported transactions and whether they wished to comment.  Morgan Stanley replied, saying “no comment”. The others,  BBVA and Bank of America, the parent company of Merrill Lynch, have not replied at all.

The European Commission has approved a €30 million state aid scheme for agricultural, fishery and aquaculture companies facing increased fuel and fertiliser prices due to the Middle East crisis.

The scheme was approved under the Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework (METSAF) adopted by the Commission on 29 April 2026.

The Portuguese scheme

Portugal notified to the Commission a €30 million scheme to support companies active in the primary production of agricultural, fishery and aquaculture products. The scheme, which will run until 31 December 2026, aims to mitigate the impact of the increase in agricultural fuel and fertiliser prices.

The aid will take the form of direct grants. The scheme concerns the grant of a limited amount of aid calibrated on the increase of the prices of fuel and fertilisers with a maximum of €50,000 per company. For the agricultural sector, the aid for fertilisers is based on a fixed amount depending on the number of hectares of agricultural surface and the animals of the company. The aid for fuel costs consists of €0.10 per litre of agricultural or marine diesel consumed from 1 April to 30 June 2026.

The Commission assessed the scheme under EU state aid rules, in particular Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which enables member states to support the development of certain economic activities subject to certain conditions, as well as Sections 1 and 2.1 of the METSAF.

The Commission found that the scheme is in line with the conditions set out in the METSAF. In particular, the aid will be granted based on a scheme with a clear estimated budget and will be provided to temporarily support the development of companies active in the primary production of agricultural, fishery and aquaculture products. The Commission concluded that the scheme is necessary, appropriate and proportionate to facilitate the development of an economic activity and does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.

On this basis, the Commission approved the Portuguese scheme under EU state aid rules.

Find out more 

The three co-rapporteurs, including Renew Europe’s Christophe Grudler (ITRE), outline the priorities in Parliament’s draft report on the Industrial Accelerating Act, (IAA), as they finished their draft report this week. For Liberals and Democrats, the IAA report is seen as pivotal in boosting EU competitiveness and industrial resilience as a response to mounting global insecurity. During the drafting process, MEP Grudler has ensured that European taxpayer money prioritises businesses, jobs, and innovation in the EU, marking a pivotal shift in the EU’s approach to public procurement and economic sovereignty.

Key measures include: - Raising the threshold for Made in Europe and low-carbon products in strategic sectors to 50 percent by 2036, ensuring that public funds support domestic industries and sustainability. - Expanding strategic materials to include plastic for construction, in addition to steel, aluminium, and cement. - Increasing EU content in net-zero technologies, such as wind turbines, solar panels, heat pumps, and nuclear power plants, to strengthen Europe’s industrial capacity and leadership in the green transition.

The era of unconditional openness is over. Renew Europe is pushing for true reciprocity, ensuring that European markets open only to countries that effectively do so in the same conditions. To ensure fairness and prevent loopholes, clear safeguards, including stricter definitions and component requirements that will close the door on circumvention and guarantee that public funds truly benefit European industries, are also introduced.

Christophe Grudler, co-rapporteur on behalf of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), said: “It is time to put an end to a wait-and-see approach and a certain naivety. Facing fierce global competition, we must build and consolidate the value chains of our strategic sectors in Europe: from steel and aluminium to the automotive industry and clean technologies. European taxpayers’ money must be used as a lever to achieve this: to support those who produce, innovate and create jobs here, within the Union. But greater ambition must not mean greater complexity. We are proposing simple, clear and applicable rules, without unnecessary administrative burdens for businesses and local authorities. This is the ambition we are setting out in this draft report. The work begins now: I will fight to ensure that the Accelerator rises to the challenge of the current industrial emergency.”

The Kazakh Government has announced the formation of a pool of 215 investment projects totaling 78.6 billion US dollars, marking the start of a new investment cycle, Qazinform News Agency cites the government’s press service.

Kazakhstan is launching a new investment cycle with a strong focus on manufacturing, deep processing, high-tech industries, and localization.

The country has a three-tier investment attraction system in place, where regions compile priority projects and conduct targeted investor searches.

Fast Track procedures were launched to accelerate approvals along with the National Digital Investment Platform.

The next step is to develop Kazakhstan Investment House on the basis of Kazakh Invest, following a “one-stop shop” principle.

66 investment agreements worth 17.8 trillion tenge in investments have been signed. 

Since early 2026, 25 agreements worth 4.4 trillion tenge were concluded in pharma, energy, metallurgy, agriculture, infrastructure, and healthcare. Capital investment rose to 23.5 trillion tenge, nearly doubling since 2019.

In manufacturing, investments tripled to 3 trillion tenge, now accounting for 12.7% of total investment.

Foreign direct investments reached 20.5 billion US dollars in 2025, up 14.4%, with capital increasingly directed to non-resource sectors like manufacturing, finance, and communications.

173 billion US dollars invested in four new projects to localize 356 medicines and expand domestic production.

To note, agro-industrial projects by Dalian Hesheng Holdings, Fufeng Group, and Tiryaki Agro focus on deep processing of wheat, corn, and legumes for food, pharma, and biotech.

In Ekibastuz, a Data Center Valley is being developed near GRES-1, with 30 billion US dollars in planned investment and energy capacity from 300 MW to 1 GW. The project will integrate infrastructure for cloud services, processing capacities, and AI.

Earlier Qazinform reported Kazakhstan and Germany aim to implement new joint investment and industrial projects.

Government of Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan
Economy
Pharmaceuticals
Agro-industrial complex development
Wheat
Digital Kazakhstan
Energy
Investments

On her visit to Nuuk, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced a €200 million Global Gateway Partnership Package, to be invested in and with Greenland this year and the next. The EU, Greenland and Denmark have also reinforced their partnership with a new Joint Declaration, signed in Nuuk by the President, Premier of Greenland Jens-Frederik Nielsen and Prime Minister of Denmark Mette Frederiksen.

President von der Leyen said: “Greenland can count on the EU. That was my message during my last visit. Today, I am back to deliver the real results of our close cooperation. With a new EU-Greenland Partnership package, worth €200 million. This will create new opportunities and a strong and engaged EU in both Greenland and the Arctic. Because Greenland is a strategic ally and a trusted friend.”

The Declaration and the investment package deepen the EU-Greenland cooperation across the board – from traditional areas, such as education and fisheries, to better satellite and cable connectivity, hydropower and critical raw materials. The package also focuses on investments that improve everyday life in the country: better housing, sustainable tourism and stronger support for small businesses.

• A renewed Joint Declaration between the EU, Greenland and Denmark

The EU, Greenland and Denmark co-signed a new Joint Declaration on relations between the EU and Greenland to strengthen the common investment agenda, political dialogue and people-to-people exchanges, reaffirming a partnership grounded in shared values and interests.

Building on the previous Declaration from 2015, the new Joint Declaration recognizes Greenland's growing strategic importance and further strengthens and expands the partnership in areas of mutual interest. These include, among others, education and training, infrastructure development, sustainable raw materials, clean energy production, digital connectivity, sustainable tourism, housing, research and innovation, civil protection, resilience and security, fisheries, environment and climate action.

• A new Global Gateway Partnership Package

 The EU is mobilising a partnership package of €200 million for investments in Greenland. It will create new economic opportunities for the local population, while contributing to a sustainable, prosperous and peaceful Arctic region. A first set of Global Gateway projects in several priority sectors have already been agreed with Greenland, and we are working together on exploring a number of new investments:

Digital connectivity

• Through the Enhanced Satellite Connectivity project for Greenland, the EU is partnering with Tusass to support the expansion of satellite capacities across Greenland through European providers over the next five years. This will improve the reliability, speed and resilience of digital connections, benefiting remote settlements, schools and businesses.
• This builds on the EU's ongoing support for the strengthening of digital connectivity on Greenland's west coast.
• In parallel, the EU is supporting feasibility work to assess whether data centres could become a viable opportunity for Greenland as the necessary energy and digital infrastructure develops.

Sustainable raw materials

• The EU and Greenland will advance sustainable mining projects with a link to the European industry. Support will be provided through technical analysis and investor matchmaking and will contribute to stronger and more integrated and resilient value chains. This will build up on successful existing investments, such as the one in the Malmbjerg mining project.
• The GreenRoc's Amitsoq graphite project is another concrete example of this mutually beneficial partnership. As an EU Strategic Project under the Critical Raw Materials Act, it shows the potential for integrated Greenland–EU value chains, strengthening security of supply and supporting investment.

Sustainable energy

• The EU will support a programme led by Greenland's national energy utility company, Nukissiorfiit, to modernise and decarbonise energy supply in remote settlements. Through the deployment of hybrid renewable energy systems in towns and settlements, the programme will strengthen the reliability of electricity supply while expanding the use of renewable energy.
• The EU and Greenland are also exploring support for the expansion of the Buksefjord hydropower plant, Greenland's main hydropower facility, to respond to rising electricity demand in Nuuk.

Capacity building

• The EU will support the Government of Greenland in strengthening its institutional capacity through the establishment of a Programme Management Unit, to ensure effective delivery of relevant policy priorities as well as EU-backed programmes under the EU-Greenland Partnership.

Jobs and quality of life

• The EU and Greenland agreed to use the remaining funding to advance preparations for several additional programmes in priority areas, notably tourism and housing.
• Sustainable tourism has been identified as one of the most immediate and promising opportunities for economic diversification, private sector development and job creation across Greenland.
• Housing is also essential to address Greenland's ageing housing stock, improve public health and the conditions for sustainable growth.

Background

Greenland is the largest recipient of EU support per capita among the Overseas Countries and Territories. The EU has earmarked €225 million for the period 2021-2027, with 90% dedicated to education and 10% to green growth. The Commission has proposed €530 million for Greenland under the next Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, more than doubling the current level of support.

The EU's partnership with Greenland is also underpinned by the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement. As a central pillar of Greenland's economy and a key area of cooperation, the EU provides €17.3 million to Greenland each year under the current fisheries protocol, including €3.2 million to support its national strategy for sustainable fisheries. The Agreement promotes the sustainable management of fish stocks, strengthens fisheries governance and contributes to economic stability in coastal communities. (will be available shortly)

In addition, Greenland remains eligible for EU horizontal programmes, such as Horizon Europe, the Connecting Europe Facility, Erasmus+, Creative Europe and InvestEU.

For more information

Statement by President von der Leyen

Greenland partnership

Greenland and the EU – Creating opportunities together

Factsheet on EU-Greenland Partnership

Joint Declaration