Hundreds of Moroccan personnel have undergone training for deployment as part of a multinational stabilisation force in Gaza, according to a Board of Peace official who spoke to The Times of Israel (TOI) on Monday.

Under the Gaza plan envisioned by US President Donald Trump's"Board of Peace" following the October 2025 ceasefire, an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) would be deployed to secure areas following the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The force would also train new Palestinian police units and support the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The plan envisages Hamas stepping down from government and disarming as Israeli forces gradually withdraw from the Strip. However, Israel has refused to leave Gaza, currently occupying close to 70% of the territory and continuing near-daily attacks that have killed more than a thousand Palestinians since the ceasefire was announced.

Hamas has said it was ready to hand over power in Gaza to an interim authority and disarm in line with the ceasefire deal, but says implementation depends on Israel meeting its commitments, including halting attacks and withdrawing its forces.

Morocco, which normalised ties with Israel in 2020, said in February it would join the ISF by deploying police officers and military personnel to Gaza, becoming the first Arab country to publicly announce such a contribution.

While Albania, Kazakhstan and Kosovo have also agreed to contribute troops, Morocco is expected to be the first to put boots on the ground, officials familiar with the Board of Peace's plans told TOI in July.

In comments to the Israeli outlet on Monday, the Board of Peace official said the training of up to 500 personnel began in Morocco around late August. It involved an initial group of officers and instructors, followed by the broader contingent.

The official said the training was conducted by the ISF but could not confirm whether it had been fully completed.

Several initiatives under Trump's ceasefire plan remain on hold because of Israel, the official added. These include the construction of a proposed ISF base near the so-called Yellow Line, which would accommodate around 150 personnel. The Guardian reported last week that Israel was blocking construction of the base, delaying a key part of plans to stabilise and rebuild Gaza.

Israel's genocidal campaign has killed more than 74,000 Palestinians since 7 October 2023, most of them civilians, according to Gaza's health authorities. Thousands more are believed to remain buried beneath the rubble.

Vast tent cities now cover areas where neighbourhoods once stood, while basic services, including healthcare and sanitation, remain largely absent.

Eritrea will not engage with the British Home Office on issues of migrant returns "under threat of punitive action or duress," Yafet Zereou, Head of Diplomatic Affairs at the Eritrean Embassy to the UK, has told The New Arab.

Zereou did, however, say his country would otherwise be willing to work with the Home Office, which is responsible for immigration.

Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood announced on Thursday that the ministry will block all visas for Eritreans if the East African country did not accept the return of Eritreans with no legal right to be in the UK.

Zereou said "the prospect of an Eritrean being granted a UK entry visa is very minimal," which he said was due to strict visa conditions "not just to Eritreans but Africans as a whole."

Mahmood also said in a statement that the Home Office has ended preferential visa processing for VIPs and government officials, and will bar Eritrean diplomats from traveling more than 37 miles outside of London without special permission.

Eritreans were the largest single nationality arriving to the UK in small boats between June 2025 and June 2026, according to Home Office data.

Migration via the English Channel in small boats has become a contentious issue in the UK after a sharp rise in such crossings in recent years. In 2018, 299 people arrived to the UK in small boats. By 2022, that number was around 46,000.

There has been a slight fall in the number of people crossing, with around 41,000 people arriving to the UK in small boats in 2025.

The rise is, in part due to an increase in the number of people on each boat. In 2018, an average of 7 people were in each boat, a figure which rose to 65 people per boat between June 2025 and June 2026.

According to analysis by Full Fact, a total of 162 people died while crossing the Channel in small boats between 2018 and 2025. The Home Office says the vast majority of people crossing claim asylum once they arrive in the UK.

Human Rights Watch has condemned the humanitarian situation in Eritrea, saying the government "subjects its population to widespread repression, including widespread forced labour and conscription."

Eritrea has a policy of indefinite, forced military conscription for everyone aged 18 to 40, which Amnesty International says can amount to slavery. Many people seeking asylum from Eritrea hope to escape such conscription.

UN Special Rapporteur for Eritrea Mohamed Abdelsalam Babiker has warned states against returning asylum seekers to Eritrea due to the risk of persecution if returned.

Zereou for his part said that Eritrea wanted further dialogue with the Home Office before considering the return of asylum seekers.

"The resumption of cooperation in this matter depends entirely on the Home Office’s willingness to engage in meaningful and appropriate discussions on this issue," he told TNA.

However, a Home Office spokesperson said that the UK was still engaging with Eritrea.

"Claims that the UK has shown no interest in constructive dialogue are false," a Home Office spokesperson told The New Arab. "The UK has repeatedly sought to engage with the Eritrean authorities and secure their co-operation on returns, including repeatedly offering to send a Home Office delegation to Asmara to discuss returns co-operation."

Israel has established a new military Space Division to expand its surveillance and warfare capabilities, raising questions about how the technology could be used against Palestinians amid its genocide in Gaza and continuing military occupation of the West Bank.

The Israeli military announced on Monday that Brigadier General "Shin", identified only by his first initial in Hebrew, had been appointed to command the division, which will operate under the military's Planning Directorate.

The new body will oversee space-related military operations, coordinate training and intelligence, and develop capabilities for what Israel increasingly regards as a separate arena of warfare.

The military said the division was established after it concluded that "the space domain has become an active combat domain" and would play an increasingly important role in future conflicts.

Welcoming the announcement on Tuesday, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz described the initiative as part of his ambition to transform the country into a major military space power.

"The goal set for the IDF and the defense establishment is to make Israel one of the world's leading countries in the field of space security," Katz said, describing the project as "Star Wars, made in Israel."

He said Israel wanted the "ability to monitor, defend and attack from space any target across vast areas", arguing that such capabilities would strengthen its military dominance and deter adversaries.

Satellite surveillance and the war on Gaza

However, the expansion also carries significant implications for Palestinians, who have long been subjected to Israel's extensive military surveillance and intelligence operations.

Israel already operates a network of military reconnaissance satellites whose imagery is processed by Unit 9900, a specialised military intelligence formation responsible for visual and geospatial intelligence.

The unit's work includes identifying military targets and providing intelligence to support Israeli operations, including attacks in Gaza.

Its capabilities form part of a broader Israeli intelligence infrastructure that has been deployed during the war on Gaza, where surveillance technologies and digital targeting systems have come under growing scrutiny over their role in attacks that have killed large numbers of Palestinian civilians.

Human rights organisations have raised serious concerns about Israel's use of digital intelligence and automated targeting technologies during the war, including the reliability of information used to identify suspected targets and the risks posed to civilians.

Human Rights Watch warned in 2024 that Israel's reliance on digital targeting tools in Gaza raised concerns about inaccurate data and the potential for unlawful attacks.

Although the precise responsibilities of the new Space Division remain unclear, an expansion of Israel's satellite intelligence capabilities could further strengthen the military's ability to monitor Palestinian territory, track movements and identify potential targets.

Such technology could also be used to monitor roads, border crossings, infrastructure and changes in the urban landscape across Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

There is no confirmation that the new division will directly oversee operations against Palestinians, but its establishment could consolidate capabilities already used by Israel's military intelligence services.

The distinction is significant because satellite surveillance is not merely a means of observing territory. When integrated with military intelligence and targeting systems, it can contribute directly to decisions about where and when strikes are carried out.

Expanding Israel's military reach

Israel has continued to invest heavily in reconnaissance satellites, including its Ofek series, which provide imagery for intelligence gathering and military planning.

Until now, responsibility for space-related operations, including satellite launches and ballistic missile defence, has largely rested with the Israeli Air Force, while Unit 9900 has controlled military intelligence satellites after their deployment.

The Israeli military has not clarified which responsibilities will be transferred to the new division.

According to the military, several projects involving space-based sensors and space warfare capabilities have already been approved over the past year.

A new frontier for warfare

Israel's announcement also reflects intensifying international competition over the militarisation of space, with the US, Russia, China and India developing technologies intended to protect their own satellites or disrupt those operated by adversaries.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit but does not comprehensively prohibit conventional military activities in space.

Israel has also identified Iran's developing space capabilities as a potential threat.

During its conflict with Iran in March, the Israeli military claimed to have destroyed a facility in Tehran involved in military satellite development, alleging that it was also working on technology capable of attacking satellites.

The claims could not be independently verified.

Alongside the Space Division, Israel announced the establishment of a new Robotics Division under its Depth Corps, which conducts operations beyond the country's borders.

Military chief Eyal Zamir has also outlined plans to expand the military's use of unmanned systems and artificial intelligence, reflecting a wider effort to integrate advanced technologies into Israeli warfare.

The announcements come as Israel continues to expand its military capabilities despite mounting international scrutiny of its conduct in Gaza and the occupied Palestinian territories.

Israel has established a new military Space Division to expand its surveillance and warfare capabilities, raising questions about how the technology could be used against Palestinians amid its genocide in Gaza and continuing military occupation of the West Bank.

The Israeli military announced on Monday that Brigadier General "Shin", identified only by his first initial in Hebrew, had been appointed to command the division, which will operate under the military's Planning Directorate.

The new body will oversee space-related military operations, coordinate training and intelligence, and develop capabilities for what Israel increasingly regards as a separate arena of warfare.

The military said the division was established after it concluded that "the space domain has become an active combat domain" and would play an increasingly important role in future conflicts.

Welcoming the announcement on Tuesday, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz described the initiative as part of his ambition to transform the country into a major military space power.

"The goal set for the IDF and the defense establishment is to make Israel one of the world's leading countries in the field of space security," Katz said, describing the project as "Star Wars, made in Israel."

He said Israel wanted the "ability to monitor, defend and attack from space any target across vast areas", arguing that such capabilities would strengthen its military dominance and deter adversaries.

Satellite surveillance and the war on Gaza

However, the expansion also carries significant implications for Palestinians, who have long been subjected to Israel's extensive military surveillance and intelligence operations.

Israel already operates a network of military reconnaissance satellites whose imagery is processed by Unit 9900, a specialised military intelligence formation responsible for visual and geospatial intelligence.

The unit's work includes identifying military targets and providing intelligence to support Israeli operations, including attacks in Gaza.

Its capabilities form part of a broader Israeli intelligence infrastructure that has been deployed during the war on Gaza, where surveillance technologies and digital targeting systems have come under growing scrutiny over their role in attacks that have killed large numbers of Palestinian civilians.

Human rights organisations have raised serious concerns about Israel's use of digital intelligence and automated targeting technologies during the war, including the reliability of information used to identify suspected targets and the risks posed to civilians.

Human Rights Watch warned in 2024 that Israel's reliance on digital targeting tools in Gaza raised concerns about inaccurate data and the potential for unlawful attacks.

Although the precise responsibilities of the new Space Division remain unclear, an expansion of Israel's satellite intelligence capabilities could further strengthen the military's ability to monitor Palestinian territory, track movements and identify potential targets.

Such technology could also be used to monitor roads, border crossings, infrastructure and changes in the urban landscape across Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

There is no confirmation that the new division will directly oversee operations against Palestinians, but its establishment could consolidate capabilities already used by Israel's military intelligence services.

The distinction is significant because satellite surveillance is not merely a means of observing territory. When integrated with military intelligence and targeting systems, it can contribute directly to decisions about where and when strikes are carried out.

Expanding Israel's military reach

Israel has continued to invest heavily in reconnaissance satellites, including its Ofek series, which provide imagery for intelligence gathering and military planning.

Until now, responsibility for space-related operations, including satellite launches and ballistic missile defence, has largely rested with the Israeli Air Force, while Unit 9900 has controlled military intelligence satellites after their deployment.

The Israeli military has not clarified which responsibilities will be transferred to the new division.

According to the military, several projects involving space-based sensors and space warfare capabilities have already been approved over the past year.

A new frontier for warfare

Israel's announcement also reflects intensifying international competition over the militarisation of space, with the US, Russia, China and India developing technologies intended to protect their own satellites or disrupt those operated by adversaries.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit but does not comprehensively prohibit conventional military activities in space.

Israel has also identified Iran's developing space capabilities as a potential threat.

During its conflict with Iran in March, the Israeli military claimed to have destroyed a facility in Tehran involved in military satellite development, alleging that it was also working on technology capable of attacking satellites.

The claims could not be independently verified.

Alongside the Space Division, Israel announced the establishment of a new Robotics Division under its Depth Corps, which conducts operations beyond the country's borders.

Military chief Eyal Zamir has also outlined plans to expand the military's use of unmanned systems and artificial intelligence, reflecting a wider effort to integrate advanced technologies into Israeli warfare.

The announcements come as Israel continues to expand its military capabilities despite mounting international scrutiny of its conduct in Gaza and the occupied Palestinian territories.

British and Gulf officials have called on businesses and investors to begin turning a landmark free trade agreement into concrete partnerships without waiting for its formal ratification, as both sides seek to deepen economic ties and expand cooperation beyond traditional trade.

The calls came during the UK-GCC Strategic Dialogue Forum, organised by The Business Year in central London on Tuesday, bringing together senior officials, representatives of Gulf sovereign wealth funds and private sector companies to explore investment opportunities arising from the agreement.

The UK became the first G7 economy to conclude negotiations on a free trade deal with the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on 20 May 2026, when the British government announced that talks had been completed following nearly four years of negotiations that began in June 2022.

However, the agreement has yet to be formally signed and ratified, with both sides still working to finalise and legally verify its text before completing the necessary government and parliamentary procedures.

While the deal is not yet legally in force, officials at the forum stressed that businesses could already begin identifying investment opportunities, building partnerships and preparing projects that could benefit from improved market access once it takes effect.

GCC Secretary-General Jasem Mohamed Albudaiwi described the agreement as a "significant achievement" in relations between Britain and the Gulf states, stressing that its importance extended well beyond the immediate benefits of trade.

Speaking at the forum, Albudaiwi said the agreement would strengthen economic partnerships, support diversification efforts and improve competitiveness across the Gulf economies, which have increasingly sought to reduce their dependence on oil revenues.

"GCC estimates put total investment between the two sides at $643 billion, while bilateral trade reached approximately $70 billion in 2025," he said.

The agreement is expected to eliminate tariffs on more than 90% of GCC exports to the UK, opening new opportunities for businesses and strengthening the Gulf's position as a major economic partner for Britain.

"The deal would support the GCC's wider economic objectives, including greater economic integration, diversification of production, improving the business environment and empowering the private sector," Albudaiwi said.

He highlighted opportunities in developing smart cities, sustainable living and attracting leading international technology companies, alongside cooperation in healthcare, financial technology, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing and clean energy.

These sectors have become increasingly important to Gulf economic transformation plans, as governments seek to attract international expertise, develop new industries and create sources of growth beyond oil and gas.

The GCC chief stressed that the success of the agreement would ultimately be measured not simply by its signing, but by the joint ventures, business partnerships and economic opportunities it generated.

He urged business leaders and investors from both sides to seize the opportunities offered by the agreement and begin translating its provisions into practical projects.

UK pledges support amid regional uncertainty

British Trade Minister Lord Anas Sarwar echoed those calls, urging businesses not to wait until the agreement had been formally signed and ratified before exploring new partnerships.

Addressing the forum, Sarwar acknowledged that the Gulf was experiencing a "nervous time" and a "time of challenge", offering assurances of Britain's continued support for its regional partners.

"It is in difficult times that you know where your friends are," he said, explaining that his first overseas visit as trade minister had been to the Gulf.

Sarwar stressed that the partnership was important to the British government and could contribute to economic growth and improved living standards across the UK.

He described the relationship as being about more than signing an agreement, calling for immediate cooperation across sectors including aviation, security systems, financial services and legal services.

He also highlighted opportunities in artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure, pointing to Britain's research capabilities and the Gulf's access to energy and resources needed to support the expansion of data centres and cloud computing infrastructure.

Such cooperation could allow British companies to contribute technical expertise and specialist services to major Gulf development projects, while creating opportunities for Gulf investors to expand their involvement in Britain's technology and infrastructure sectors.

Sarwar said economic cooperation needed to work in both directions, with Britain seeking not only greater Gulf investment in the UK but also increased British investment and exports into Gulf markets.

He also encouraged businesses to explore joint investments in third countries, arguing that UK-Gulf cooperation should extend beyond bilateral projects.

Lord Mayor of London Alderman Sir Alastair King similarly highlighted the potential for British and Gulf investors to combine their resources and expertise to pursue opportunities in other international markets.

The UK hopes the agreement will encourage larger and more sustained flows of Gulf capital into British infrastructure, property and other strategic sectors, while opening one of the world's most important markets to British exporters.

The emphasis on joint investment also reflects a broader ambition to move beyond conventional trade in goods and services towards longer-term partnerships involving technology, infrastructure development and international projects.

Four years of negotiations

GCC chief negotiator Raja Almarzoqi expressed optimism about the agreement's long-term economic benefits, revealing that negotiators from both sides had held approximately 900 meetings before reaching an agreement.

He said one of the most challenging aspects of the negotiations had been securing a unified position among the GCC's six member states, which have different economic priorities and domestic interests.

Almarzoqi cited studies by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund suggesting that free trade agreements could increase trade between participating countries by 60% to 100% over five to ten years after implementation.

He expressed confidence that the UK-GCC agreement could deliver similar results, although the scale of any increase would depend on how businesses used the opportunities created by the deal.

Kuwait's Trade Minister Abdulaziz Naser Almarzouq also emphasised the importance of economic diversification, saying Gulf countries were seeking high-quality investments capable of supporting sustainable long-term growth.

He described Britain as a strong economic partner and called for existing relations to be expanded through new investment opportunities.

Discussions at the forum also focused on financial markets, investment and the Gulf states' economic transformation strategies, including Oman's efforts to diversify away from an energy-dependent economy.

The free trade agreement is expected to provide British companies with greater long-term access to Gulf markets while giving GCC businesses improved opportunities to expand their activities in the UK.

For businesses, the potential benefits extend beyond tariff reductions to opportunities for new commercial relationships, investment planning and greater participation in sectors targeted for growth by both sides.

However, the agreement's practical benefits will depend on its final provisions, implementation and the extent to which companies are able to take advantage of the new arrangements.

Although the main terms were agreed in May, the final legal text must still be completed and verified before the agreement can be signed. It will then need to undergo the necessary approval procedures in Britain and the GCC states, including parliamentary scrutiny in the UK.

Hours before Lebanon and Israel were due to resume negotiations in the United States, the Israeli military on Tuesday accused the Lebanese army of failing to curb Hezbollah’s activities in southern Lebanon, in what a retired Lebanese brigadier general described to The New Arab as an attempt to heighten tensions ahead of the talks and put Lebanon on the defensive.

The Israeli military accused elements within the Lebanese army of allegedly coordinating with Hezbollah to obstruct the enforcement of security arrangements, reportedly allowing the group to anticipate operations and move weapons out of targeted areas. It said the Lebanese army had also failed to dismantle a Hezbollah military site in the south, despite announcing that it had taken the necessary measures there.

The Israeli military said that the Lebanese army was responsible for ensuring the full implementation of the security arrangements, saying it expected it to take more decisive and effective measures to prevent Hezbollah from maintaining weapons and military infrastructure in southern Lebanon.

The Lebanese army later rejected the claims, describing them as false and accusing Israel of seeking to undermine its credibility and cast doubt on its ability to carry out its responsibilities in southern Lebanon.

Lebanon and Israel are due to hold technical military talks in Tampa, Florida, on Tuesday, resuming discussions after the last round of talks in Rome in early August. An eighth round planned for September in the Italian capital did not take place.

The Lebanese delegation is expected to reiterate its demands for a full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, which continues to come under daily Israeli attack despite a framework agreement signed in June.

Pressure on the Lebanese army

Retired Lebanese Brig. Gen. Bassam Yassin described the Israeli accusations as an attempt to undermine the talks and put the Lebanese army on the defensive.

"The intention is certainly to create tension around the negotiations and put the army in a position where it has to defend itself," Yassin told The New Arab.

He said the Lebanese delegation was expected to focus on technical issues, including the work of the ceasefire monitoring committee, locally known as the mechanism, and demands for an Israeli withdrawal.

The mechanism was established following the November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah.

"All this talk about the army’s failure does not reflect the major successes it achieved south of the Litani River in 2024 and 2025," Yassin said, questioning why the alleged violations had not been raised with the mechanism at the time.

In a statement on Tuesday, the Israeli military said it expected the Lebanese army to take "more decisive and effective action" to prevent Hezbollah from maintaining weapons and military infrastructure in the south.

It alleged that, despite the Lebanese army announcing in December 2025 that it had dealt with a Hezbollah facility in the southern town of Kafra, footage showed members of the group continuing to operate there and attempting to remove weapons from the site months later.

The Israeli military said its forces had subsequently struck and destroyed a truck carrying the weapons. It also accused members of the Lebanese army of coordinating with Hezbollah over enforcement operations, allowing the group to anticipate military activity and move weapons out of targeted areas.

Yassin rejected the suggestion that the Lebanese army was failing to carry out its responsibilities. While the Lebanese government has made dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and disbanding its armed wing in the south a stated objective, he argued that the army could not be expected to forcibly disarm the group while Israeli forces continued to occupy Lebanese territory and carry out attacks.

"Of course, the army is not going to dismantle Hezbollah’s weapons and infrastructure in the south right now. There is an occupation and aggression on your land. Can the army confront civilians and tell them: ‘I want to dismantle your defences’? That is impossible," he said.

Yassin maintained that the army had taken control of every Hezbollah site it had entered following the November 2024 ceasefire, and said Hezbollah had helped it access many of its former positions.

Some sites were empty when the army arrived, while others were discovered by chance or with the help of local residents, he said. Some of the people responsible for those sites had been killed during the 2024 war, he added, meaning information about their locations was no longer available.

Yassin said the Israeli military's publication of footage now was intended to undermine confidence in the Lebanese army and portray it as weak.

"If there is something old [still there], that does not mean the Israelis can release videos now. The intention is to confuse the Lebanese army and portray it as being in a weak position, when that is not the case," he said.

Lebanese army rejects allegations

In a statement shared with footage on X, the army said its units had begun work on a military facility in the southern town of Kafra in December 2025. They continued working there until 16 March 2026, when they suspended operations and evacuated the area at the request of the mechanism, following Israeli threats to strike the site.

The army said it had informed the committee that the operation was incomplete and that military equipment and ammunition remained inside the facility, which was subsequently targeted by an Israeli strike. It added that repeated requests to secure permission to resume work and remove the remaining equipment had been rejected by Israel.

According to the statement, the army resumed its operation on 15 August 2026 in coordination with the mechanism, eventually completing the work and closing the facility on 16 October.

The Lebanese army also disputed the Israeli military's account of the footage showing a truck carrying weapons being struck. It said the video dated back to 3 July 2026 and was filmed in the village of Seddiqin rather than at the Kafra facility.

The army said all the events and measures it described had been documented with the mechanism, adding that Israel's repeated allegations and disinformation campaigns were aimed at damaging the military institution's credibility locally and internationally, particularly amid the ongoing negotiations.

It reiterated its commitment to carrying out its responsibilities and assigned tasks, while accusing Israel of continuing to violate existing understandings.

No progress on pilot zones

The talks are due to take place under US auspices against a backdrop of continued Israeli strikes and demolitions in southern Lebanon and growing concerns in Beirut about the consequences of a possible wider confrontation involving the United States, Israel and Iran.

A US official, in remarks carried by the US embassy in Beirut, said the meeting would be limited to working-level teams and focus exclusively on security issues within the tripartite framework signed by Lebanon and Israel in Washington on 26 June 2026.

Little progress has been made on the initial pilot areas announced under the arrangements this summer. Lebanese military sources told The New Arab that continued Israeli attacks were obstructing the army’s work in the areas and making the return of residents difficult and dangerous.

Beirut also rejects any direct coordination between the Lebanese and Israeli armies, despite pressure from Washington and Tel Aviv. Lebanon continues to pursue the diplomatic track, viewing it as the only viable option to end the conflict.

Fears of a more devastating war

Lebanese official sources told The New Arab that President Joseph Aoun was monitoring developments in the region and feared the consequences of any escalation for Lebanon. They said these concerns had also been raised by international officials and diplomats visiting Beirut, including Arab League Secretary-General Nabil Fahmy, who met Aoun on Monday.

The sources also expressed concern about Hezbollah’s increasingly confrontational position, warning that it could draw Lebanon into another war.

They said Lebanese officials were holding internal consultations through their advisers to convey their concerns and urged all sides to put Lebanon’s interests above external agendas.

The sources added that officials had received warnings that another war could have even more serious consequences than the previous rounds of fighting in October 2023 and March 2026.

Hezbollah and Israel began exchanging fire in October 2023, with the conflict escalating into a full-scale war in September 2024. Fighting resumed on 2 March 2026 following the start of the US-Israel war on Iran.

Although fighting largely subsided in June following the signing of the tripartite framework, Israel has continued attacks and demolitions in its so-called buffer zone in southern Lebanon, occupying strategic sites and destroying Hezbollah tunnels.

Israeli attacks over the past three years have killed 8,596 people and wounded more than 30,660 others, many of them civilians.

As Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza began in 2023, people around the world found different ways to express their solidarity with Palestinians. From wearing the keffiyeh to sharing watermelon emojis, these acts of solidarity took many forms.

For paediatrician Dr Abdul Qader Ismail, it was a poppy-shaped badge.

Alongside his work treating children for the NHS and writing picture books, Dr Abdul created the Palestine poppy badge shortly after Israel's war began in the besieged enclave. The badge gave people a way to show support for Palestinians at a time when expressions of solidarity faced growing scrutiny.

"I wanted to take a symbol that was beloved in the West, given the West's integral role in the suffering and injustice endured by the Palestinian people — from the Nakba, and even before it, to the present day, including the current genocide," Dr Abdul tells The New Arab.

Pinned proudly to his chest as he speaks, the poppy badge features the colours of the Palestine flag. He designed the pin himself, drawing inspiration from other designs he saw online.

For Dr Abdul, the poppy’s associations with remembrance, peace and the human cost of war make it a particularly fitting symbol for Palestine.

"If the poppy is there to remember those who fell in war, those who suffered because of war, and to symbolise peace and an end to violence and injustice, then I think Palestinians, who have suffered immensely, deserve the poppy just as much as anyone else," he adds. 

He stressed that the badge was not intended to provoke division or hostility towards anyone. "It's not meant to be a symbol against anyone. It's not meant to be something that causes division or hate or anything like that," Dr Abdul shares. 

In Britain, the red poppy is closely associated with Remembrance Day, when people honour the service and sacrifice of armed forces members who died in conflict. Over time, it has also become a symbol of national remembrance, and its use in political campaigns has sometimes sparked controversy.

But the poppy's significance extends beyond Britain. Dr Abdul highlighted that it is also a national symbol for Palestinians, arguing that this connection has been forgotten. He also pointed to the tens of thousands of Palestinians who, he said, fought alongside the Allies during the Second World War, as well as the poppy’s longstanding use in pro-Palestine activism.

Backlash from right-wing UK press

Despite Dr Abdul having made the badge in December 2023, it has now caught the attention of right-wing media, who are accusing the doctor of "hijacking" Remembrance Day.

"I suppose like any media outlet, what they want is to publish a juicy story that gets them more readers and more attention and causes anger and debate, and so I suppose that's what media does, isn't it," Dr Abdul says about the backlash. 

He strongly rejected any suggestion that he was anti-Semitic, pointing to his support for Jewish Green Party leader Zack Polanski and his longstanding professional relationships with people of different faiths and backgrounds.

He said he had joined the Green Party specifically because of Polanski's outspoken support for Palestinians and his opposition to conflating anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism.

"Whenever people have tried to show support for Palestine, it's always framed by those who don't like it, that you are somehow a terrorist sympathiser or supporter, that you are anti-Semitic, that you're pro-violence, you're anti-peace," the doctor adds.  

"It's always framed in that way to silence people, to stop them from speaking out, to stop them from showing their support for the Palestinian people, and this is no different than that."

Boost in sales

While he had anticipated some backlash and personal attacks, Dr Abdul was surprised that the badge had attracted attention nearly three years after its creation.

The controversy, however, has had an unexpected consequence — a sharp rise in sales.

"Since these articles have come out… its sales have gone through the roof to the extent that I've actually run out of stock now," the doctor explains, noting that the sales within the last few months had "dried up."

He said the badge has attracted buyers from a wide range of backgrounds, both online and at pro-Palestine events, with interest extending well beyond Muslim and Palestinian communities.

"I can see the names of the people who are buying from me... They are from all kinds of backgrounds," Dr Ismail explains.

"There's a lot of support for this. People like the badge, people like the concept, and people recognise it for what it is: a symbol of peace and a symbol for showing your support for Palestine and the Palestinian people," he added.

Like the books he has written, the badge itself is not-for-profit, with proceeds going toward producing more badges and supporting charities working on the ground in Palestine or educating people about the cause.

Reflecting on the backlash, Dr Abdul acknowledged that anticipating criticism and experiencing it firsthand are two very different things, as he continues to navigate the attention his work has drawn.

"If [right-wing press] didn't want the badge to be sold or known about, they've done the exact opposite by writing articles about it," Dr Abdul concluded. 

Anam Alam is a staff writer at The New Arab. She frequently writes about human rights and social issues, including women's rights and sex education

Follow her on X: @itsanamalam

Local Yemeni authorities on Tuesday raised the death toll from a Houthi strike a day earlier on a military camp belonging to government forces to 73, as fighting between the foes escalates.

It marked the deadliest attack in weeks as fighting between the Iran-backed Houthis and Yemen's internationally recognised, Saudi-supported government rages after the collapse of a years-long truce.

The death toll from Monday's strike on the camp in the energy-rich Shabwa province "increased to 73 martyrs, while search and follow-up efforts are ongoing to discover the fate of 14 missing people", provincial authorities said in a statement.

Local authorities had put the death toll at 53 on Monday, adding that more than 200 others were injured, all new members of the internal security forces who were undergoing training.

Majed al-Nuzaili, spokesperson for the Yemeni armed forces, stated Monday on X that the Houthis targeted Shabwa with three ballistic missiles, and that the attack "struck a training center for personnel of security and police agencies."

Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree later confirmed that the group was responsible for the attack, saying it targeted "Saudi enemy gatherings in Al-Alam camp, which is run by a Saudi officer from the eastern regions".

Shabwa contains major oil and gas fields and is home to the Balhaf liquefied natural gas terminal, the country's largest energy facility and a key economic asset.

A government military source in the province on Monday said the army feared the strikes could pave the way for a ground offensive "similar to what happened in Mokha", the strategic Red Sea port city seized by the Houthis last month.

(AFP)

Qatari and Pakistani officials submitted a new peace proposal to Iran and the US on Tuesday in a bid to prevent further escalation in the Middle East war, sources familiar with the mediation efforts told The New Arab.

The people described the plan as a "middle-ground proposal" that partially meets both sides' demands over Iran's nuclear programme and the release of Tehran's frozen assets. It has received positive responses from both Washington and Tehran, they said.

Pakistan's army chief Asim Munir delivered the proposal to Iranian officials in Tehran on Tuesday, according to the sources, who spoke to TNA on condition of anonymity.

Neither side has shown willingness to compromise over their demands, with the US still insisting Tehran must dismantle its nuclear programme and Iran demanding the immediate release of all its assets frozen abroad.

After agreeing to a temporary ceasefire in June, the two sides were supposed to begin negotiating a comprehensive peace deal covering the nuclear programme and Iran's frozen assets.

But since that truce fell apart the following month, no further negotiations have been held. Tensions have instead ratcheted up further in recent days, with Iran increasing its attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz and Trump threatening to return to war after November's midterm elections.

The sources said that the latest proposal aims to extract minor concessions from both sides in a bid to build confidence for new talks. Under the deal, Iran would agree to a secret, unannounced visit by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect its nuclear sites. In return, the US would allow Tehran to receive the interest generated on its $6 billion of frozen assets held in Qatar.

On Monday, sources familiar with the negotiations told The New Arab that a breakthrough could be announced later this week.

The sources, who also requested anonymity, said efforts were continuing to narrow the differences between the two sides and encourage them to make mutual concessions to prevent the war from resuming.

Qatar and Pakistan are pursuing joint mediation efforts aimed at ending the seven-month regional war. Both countries mediated June's memorandum of understanding that briefly brought the conflict to a halt.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said on Tuesday that Iranian officials would discuss the peace negotiations with Munir.

Munir's visit comes amid mounting tensions over Iran's nuclear programme, the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz and US demands for Tehran to curb its enrichment capabilities.

President Trump and other US officials have issued new threats to restart the war if Iran does not back down, while Iranian officials have said they are ready for renewed conflict. On Saturday, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth warned that Iran would face "destruction" unless it abandoned its nuclear ambitions.

The mediation efforts also coincide with intensifying regional and international diplomatic activity, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Tehran on Monday.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has urged Lebanon's parliament to amend its recently adopted media law, warning that journalists and activists could still face criminal prosecution and imprisonment under provisions restricting freedom of expression.

In a statement issued on Monday, the rights organisation called on lawmakers to adopt amendments proposed by ten MPs on 5 October, which would remove some of the law's most controversial provisions and strengthen protections against prosecutions for peaceful expression.

The media law, adopted in August after 16 years of parliamentary deliberations, introduced significant reforms which authorities say are menat to modernise Lebanon's media sector and strengthen press freedoms.

However, HRW warned that the legislation retains vaguely worded criminal offences that could be exploited by public officials and powerful individuals to silence criticism.

"Given the history of public officials and powerful individuals abusing Lebanon's laws to clamp down on journalists, activists, and artists, parliament should act to prevent further abuse," said Ramzi Kaiss, Lebanon researcher at HRW in a statement.

"No one should face abusive retaliation for peacefully expressing their views, and parliament has a chance to end these abuses right here and now."

At the centre of the organisation's concerns is Article 104(b), which criminalises the intentional fabrication and dissemination of false and harmful news, carrying a prison sentence of up to three years.

HRW said the provision's use of vague and undefined terminology, particularly the concept of "harmful news", could allow authorities to continue pursuing criminal proceedings against journalists and other critics.

The organisation also warned that the legislation fails to address several existing provisions in Lebanon's Penal Code and Military Justice Code that criminalise criticism of state institutions and officials.

These include offences involving defamation or insults directed against Lebanon's president, state institutions and army, as well as foreign states and their representatives.

Some offences carry prison sentences of up to two years, while provisions in the Military Justice Code criminalising public disparagement of the army or national flag can result in sentences of up to three years.

HRW said the amendments introduced by MPs earlier this month would repeal Article 104(b) and prevent the relevant provisions of the Penal Code and Military Justice Code from being applied to cases involving media-related or online expression.

They would also restrict the ability of security forces to interrogate and investigate media professionals over expression-related offences, placing those powers under the authority of public prosecutors.

The organisation said Lebanese security agencies had previously subjected journalists and activists to abusive interrogation practices and demonstrated bias when enforcing criminal defamation laws.

Despite its criticism, HRW acknowledged that the new media law represents a significant improvement on Lebanon's previous legal framework.

Among its reforms are the abolition of pretrial detention for expression-related offences committed through media or online platforms, the right to establish online publications without prior state authorisation, and restrictions on military court jurisdiction over media-related offences.

The legislation also strengthens protections for journalists' confidential sources, limits searches and seizures of their electronic equipment, and recognises media workers' rights to organise in unions.

As previously reported by The New Arab, the law introduces new transparency requirements compelling media organisations to disclose their ownership structures, shareholders and funding sources.

These provisions are intended to address longstanding concerns about the influence of political and economic interests over Lebanon's media sector, although their implementation remains a subject of debate.

HRW argued that the proposed amendments would not go far enough on their own, as they would primarily protect expression through media outlets and online platforms.

It called for the complete repeal of criminal defamation and insult provisions across Lebanese legislation, including those governing speech outside the media, with such disputes instead handled through civil courts.

"For years Lebanese civil society has fought for increased protections to the right to freedom of expression and the press," Kaiss said.

"Passing the proposed amendments to the media law would be a breakthrough."

In Paradigm Lost: From Two-State Solution to One-State Reality, Ian Lustick borrows a joke from Woody Allen’s Annie Hall. A man tells his therapist that his brother thinks he is a chicken. Why not have him treated? I would,’ the man replies, ‘but I need the eggs.’

When I interviewed Lustick some years ago, I asked who was still collecting eggs from the two-state solution long after the conditions for it had vanished. He replied: American administrations, the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli government, and what he called the ‘peace process industry’. By that, he meant the international institutions, NGOs, and experts whose careers rest on the promise of a settlement that never materialises.

That joke stayed with me as the West Bank moved to the centre of mainstream media coverage. Journalists have been attacked by settlers on camera. Israeli army commanders and officials have been publicly questioned about settler violence. All of it has unfolded to the sound of an alarm so old it has become part of the furniture: the two-state solution is under threat.

In much of Western politics and media, criticising “extreme settlers” is the cheapest form of criticism there is. One can condemn settler violence, denounce Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, and perhaps blame Benjamin Netanyahu for wrecking the prospects of peace, all without asking more difficult questions about the Israeli state or the support that sustains it.

This kind of criticism leaves room for a comforting assumption: the problem is this government. Remove it and another Israeli partner, ready for peace, may yet appear. With Israelis voting on 27 October, where is that partner?

The leading alternatives to Netanyahu do not fundamentally disagree over settlement or control of the West Bank. Gadi Eisenkot, the former army chief often cast as the man who could lead Israel out of the Netanyahu impasse, has pledged that no Palestinian state will be established under any government he forms.

Naftali Bennett, who now leads Yachad, his joint list with Yair Lapid, once served as director-general of the Yesha Council, the settlers’ umbrella body. He has also proposed annexing Area C, which covers more than 60% of the West Bank. Even Yair Golan, leader of the Democrats and, by Israeli standards, a dove, called talk of a Palestinian state destructive.

Since the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, the settler population has grown from about 250,000 to more than 750,000. Much of this growth occurred during the peace process itself, under governments the world regarded as moderate.

One of the busiest years for settlement construction was 2000, under Ehud Barak. In 2008, while Ehud Olmert was negotiating with Mahmoud Abbas after Annapolis, Israel began building more settlement homes in the West Bank than in any year under his predecessor, Ariel Sharon. Olmert has since found a second career on Western television warning about the consequences of the first.

Most Palestinians stopped waiting for that partner long ago. Experience has taught us that settlement is not a policy of the Israeli system. It is the system. That doesn’t make Israeli politicians the same; they don't all treat every form of violence against Palestinians the same way. But the real disagreements are about how to manage, regulate, and institutionalise that violence, and how much violence can be used before the political and diplomatic bill becomes too high.

In August, when the Housing Ministry opened bidding on some 1,200 homes in E1, the corridor east of Jerusalem that would cut the West Bank in two, Eisenkot objected only to the timing, while calling a Palestinian state a “grave mistake”. He had no quarrel with the map, only the calendar.

When settler violence is presented as the exception, and reduced to the extremism of Netanyahu and his allies, it becomes possible to maintain the image of another Israel, one that is moderate, merely waiting for its turn to govern and resume the peace process.

That is how the promise of two states outlives every fact on the ground. Its political power never rested on its feasibility. It has always lain in the capacity to sustain a particular political fantasy about Israel. That fantasy separates Israel as a political system, to be allied with, from the ‘incidental’ excesses of that state.

Decades of ‘peacemaking’ and billions in funding have entrenched it so deeply that questioning it now seems harder than questioning Israel’s violations themselves.

This fantasy survives through fragmentation. In Gaza, the genocide is treated as an excessive use of otherwise legitimate force. In the West Bank, the violence is treated as an extremist deviation from Israel’s political order, one that an election result could end at any moment.

And inside Israel, abuses against Palestinian citizens are framed as threats to an established democracy. Read the mainstream Western press on each, or listen to European and even American officials, and you could be forgiven for thinking they were describing three different countries.

Perhaps these are the new eggs in Lustick’s joke. The West can go on condemning what it sees, so long as it keeps waiting for an Israel that does not exist. On 27 October, Israelis will vote, and the wait will be renewed, as it has after every election before. Its arrival was never the point. The longer the West keeps waiting for the Israel it imagines, the less it has to deal with the one that is already here.

Izzeddin Araj is a Palestinian journalist and researcher. He is the Executive Director of Al-Araby Al-Jadeed and the former Editor-in-Chief of the Arabic network Ultra Sawt. He holds a PhD in Anthropology from The Graduate Institute, Geneva (IHEID).

Follow Izzeddin on X: @ArajIzzeddin

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@alaraby.co.uk

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

Amnesty International has said Israeli settlers are turning the West Bank's olive harvest season into "a season of horror" for Palestinians after a series of attacks which have targeted European diplomats and an American journalist as well as farmers trying to pick their crops.

The rights group called on states to act against Israeli settlers after the attacks, which recently saw Washington Post photojournalist Heidi Levine injured, with broken ribs and hand injuries which required surgery.

Amnesty said the attack, and another which targeted European diplomats, "offer a glimpse into a reality of relentless aggression against Palestinians."

In a rare condemnation of Israeli settler violence, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee called the attack a "despicable act of terror" in a post on X.

Huckabee also condemned settlers seizing property from Palestinian-Americans in August, but has long been an ardent supporter of Israel.

In September, he blamed "biblical illiteracy" for waning support for Israel among American citizens. He said in an interview with NewsNation that Americans will have a more favourable view of Israel if they "look at the truth."

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said more than 1,600 settler attacks resulting in casualties, property damage or both had been recorded across 275 Palestinian communities by mid-September this year.

Settler attacks were occurring at an average rate of 6.7 a day, up from five a day in 2025, with the violence spreading across an increasingly wide area of the occupied territory.

On Monday, Israeli police made rare arrests of 10 settlers in the West Bank following attacks on Levine, European diplomats, and Palestinians harvesting olives, It rarely prosecutes settlers accused of violent acts and Israeli armed forces often facilitiate settler attacks.

Israeli human rights organisation Yesh Din found that just 3% of the police investigation files it monitored concerning ideologically motivated offences by Israelis against Palestinians between 2005 and 2025 led to full or partial convictions.

Amnesty said in a press release, "States must recognise that settler attacks are not isolated acts, but a central policy of the Israeli state and take concrete measures to respect their obligations under international law."

It called on countries "to avoid complicity in Israeli violations and crimes against Palestinians by halting all trade, investment and cooperation that contribute to maintaining the unlawful occupation, apartheid and the ongoing campaign of ethnic cleansing."

American citizen Mohammed Sakat was also attacked by Israeli settlers on Monday.

US-based Muslim rights group CAIR said of the political response to the attack, "Failing to speak out about this and demand accountability is a betrayal of the American people in favour of a foreign state."

They called on the US government to launch an investigation into the attacks on Sakat, Levine, and all other Americans assaulted by Israeli settlers.

In September, the UK, Canada and France announced sanctions against Israeli settlements, which are illlegal under international law, in a joint move.

As rumours of UK sanctions on Israeli settlers spread, Huckabee accused the UK government of "Jew hate," but US official responses to the sanctions after the country's official announcement were notably muted.

Rather than his signature style of fiery, often personal attacks, US President Donald Trump responded to the sanctions saying, "I understand exactly what's going on, but I want to find out why all of a sudden has that happened."

Iraq has imposed restrictions on representatives of Yemen’s Houthi group in Baghdad, banning them from political and media activities amid regional tensions and efforts to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia, sources have told The New Arab (TNA). 

Houthi leaders and officials in Iraq have been instructed not to conduct any media or political “activities” from Iraqi territory, an Iraqi official who requested anonymity told TNA. 

A senior official in the office of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi said the directive imposed a comprehensive ban on members of the group in Iraq holding meetings, organising press conferences and seminars, or moving outside the limits permitted under the country’s residency laws. 

Since 2018, the Houthis have operated an office in Baghdad’s affluent Jadriya neighbourhood, known as the Representation Office of Ansar Allah. It is headed by Abu Idris al-Sharafi, a prominent Houthi representative with ties to Iraq dating back to 2016. 

According to the Iraqi official, the government has designated residences for members of the Houthi representation and required them to provide advance information about their movements within Baghdad and other provinces. 

The official added that the group’s members had been informed of the decision several days earlier.

The directive explicitly prohibits activities conducted from Iraqi territory against Saudi Arabia or other countries in the region, citing the principles of good neighbourliness and non-interference in the affairs of other states enshrined in the Iraqi constitution. 

Houthi leaders have reportedly made several visits in recent months to political officials, as well as commanders from the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and other armed factions in Baghdad and several provinces. Iraq is home to numerous Iran-backed armed groups. 

The Iraqi official said members of the Houthi group could no longer organise political or media activities relating to the ongoing war in Yemen. 

The restrictions come about a week after al-Zaidi visited Saudi Arabia and met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, holding talks on security, political and economic issues. 

During the meeting, al-Zaidi assured the crown prince that Iraq would not allow its territory to be used to launch attacks against Saudi Arabia or other countries in the region, the Iraqi News Agency (INA) reported. 

“Iraq’s firm position is not to allow its territory to be used as a launching pad for any attacks or actions that affect the security of the kingdom and the countries of the region, and to be keen on adhering to the principles of good neighbourliness and respecting the sovereignty of Iraq and brotherly and friendly countries,” al-Zaidi’s office said in a statement cited by INA. 

During the Houthis’ lightning offensive in Yemen last month, Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline was struck by drones - forcing Riyadh to temporarily suspend operations along the export route, which Saudi Arabia uses as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.  

Saudi Arabia said the drones originated in Iraq. 

Baghdad conducted its own investigation and concluded that the strikes had been launched from Iraqi territory, although no group claimed responsibility. 

Speaking to TNA, retired Iraqi Army Colonel Saad al-Jughaifi said the latest restrictions on Houthi representatives were consistent with international pressure to curb support for groups Washington describes as Iran’s regional proxies. 

Al-Jughaifi also disclosed that measures introduced several months ago had restricted prominent members of Lebanon’s Hezbollah armed group and the Houthi movement from accessing Iraq’s financial transfer system, including banks, currency exchange and remittance companies.  

He said restrictions had also affected their access to Iraqi Airways. 

Al-Jughaifi added that the measures were intended to prevent Iraq from facing further financial, economic and political crises resulting from an adverse international classification. 

He said that the Houthis had been hosted in Iraq under the government of Adel Abdul Mahdi in 2018, but their presence had since expanded in terms of personnel, headquarters and offices. Some members had also brought their families to live in Iraq. 

Yemen’s civil war, in which Saudi Arabia has led a military coalition supporting the government since 2015, reignited in September following the collapse of a years-long truce. 

The Houthis have tried to impose a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, targeting its tankers and seizing large stretches of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, a key route for oil exports.  

The conflict has also driven up energy prices, with the Houthis launching repeated missile attacks against the kingdom. 

Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has been targeted 20 times since the beginning of the month, with a recent attack killing 13 people and injuring more than 300.

Neither pro-Netanyahu forces nor Gadi Eisenkot's opposition coalition will win a majority in the Knesset in next week's general election, which is poised to deliver gains for both the far-right and Arab parties, according to an average of polls tracked by The New Arab.

Both blocs are currently on course to win 51 seats in the 120-seat Israeli parliament following the 27 October vote, seven polls conducted over the past week show.

This would put them 10 seats short of the majority needed to form a government.

Parties representing Israel's Palestinian citizens , which include the Joint List and Ra'am, are projected to increase their seats in the Knesset from 10 to 14. This would set them up as potential kingmakers to a new government, weeks after right-wing parties tried to ban them from participating in the election.

Included in the Likud's far-right grouping are the extremist Jewish Power and Religious Zionism parties, and Haredi groups Shas and United Torah Judaism.

Eisenkot's Yashar is leading a disparate coalition of forces that includes the hardline Yisrael Beiteinu, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid's Together, and the liberal Democrats party.

Likud has remained neck and neck with Yashar in the polls for most of the past three months, despite rising scrutiny on the internationally wanted prime minister over security failures on 7 October.

Eisenkot's party is currently projected to be the largest in the Knesset with 22 seats. Likud is in a close second with 21.

Far-right gains

Itamar Ben-Gvir's extremist Jewish Power is expected to make large gains in next week's vote, reflecting the mainstreaming of previously fringe Kahanist ideology among the electorate.

In the 2022 election, the party was only able to make it into the Knesset by forming a joint list with Bezalel Smotrich's Religious Zionism and another small far-right group.

Four years later, it is poised to win eight seats standing on its own, making it the joint fifth-largest party in the assembly.

Anti-Palestinian racism has been at the forefront of Ben-Gvir's election campaign, and he has pledged to ethnically cleanse Gaza and the occupied West Bank and conduct mass executions of Palestinian prisoners.

Already popular among extremist settlers in the West Bank, Jewish Power is trying to make further inroads among increasingly radicalised youth in Israel proper.

Polling shows that the party draws much of its support from younger voters. A third of its supporters at next week's election are expected to be first-time voters.

He has pushed hard for the youth vote with an aggressive social media strategy that has included footage of him participating in the destruction of Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem and a viral AI-generated video of Palestinians entering a concentration camp.

Trump intervention fails to boost Netanyahu

Both the Netanyahu and Eisenkot blocs have received potential boosts in the past 48 hours, with the prime minister winning Donald Trump's endorsement and Benny Gantz's centrist party bowing out of the race.

In a Truth Social post on Saturday, Trump declared his "complete and total endorsement" of Netanyahu, who he called a "great warrior prime minister".

Likud will be hoping that the intervention of the US president – who remains popular inside Israel – will give Netanyahu new momentum in the final days of the campaign.

But according to the most recent poll, the endorsement appears to have failed to tip the balance for Likud.

The survey, conducted for Channel 12 on Monday, put Yashar three seats ahead of Likud on 24 and Eisenkot's bloc on top with 55 seats to the pro-Netanyahu group's 51. The two Palestinian parties had a combined 14 seats.

Meanwhile, Gantz's exit could boost Eisenkot's coalition, with the Blue and White party's moderate voters expected to lean towards an anti-Netanyahu group.

The former defence minister announced on Monday he would be pulling out of the race, with polls showing his party would fail to meet the threshold for entering the Knesset.  

East Jerusalem - On 9 October 2026, two weeks after the right-wing Israeli newspaper Olam Katan reported that the Israeli military would open a section of Route 463 to settler traffic, hundreds marched from the Israeli settlement of Beit El to the settlement of Dolev along the road in celebration.

In recent months, settlers have been protesting in the highway’s vicinity, demanding they use what’s referred to as the “Wallerstein Road”, which Israeli civilians have been barred from since the start of the Second Intifada in 2000.

Their provocative demonstrations often involved waving Israeli flags and hurling stones at Palestinian vehicles, under the Israeli army’s protection.

And the pressure from settlers worked. “The decision in principle has been made, and the IDF [Israeli military] has already begun preparations for the opening of the highway,” head of the Mateh Binyamin Settlement Council, Israel Ganz, said in an interview with Olam Katan.

Israel’s military spokesperson confirmed the news, saying, "The IDF is working to put in place special security arrangements for future travel on the route."

Named after Pinchas Wallerstein, a founder of the settler movement, the 10-kilometre stretch of road runs from al-Bireh and Jalazone refugee camp in the east to the Palestinian village of Ein Qiniya in the west.

Wallerstein, then-head of the Mateh Binyamin Settlement Council, carved out the road without official permits in 1994. Six years later, the army shuttered it to both Israelis and Palestinians when the Second Intifada began.

Gradually, Palestinians gained access to the road again, which passes through Ramallah’s northern area and connects the city to seven Palestinian towns, a university, a school, a major hospital, and a sewage treatment plant.

Opening the road to settlers means isolating eight villages and two large residential neighbourhoods (totalling tens of thousands of Palestinians) in the north from the rest of Ramallah-Al-Bireh, according to the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) Wall and Settlement Resistance Commission.

In turn, these residents will be forced to use a different route near the Jalazone refugee camp, which is already severely congested and cannot accommodate more traffic.

“Ramallah will be cut off from all its surrounding villages. Not just its villages, but also the other cities in the north that are coming to Ramallah, [which] mostly use this road,” Jamal Juma, coordinator of the Popular Campaign to Resist the Wall and Settlements, told The New Arab. “It's blocking Ramallah totally.”

Juma explained that in addition to fragmenting Ramallah, Israel’s military presence will increase in the area with the army erecting checkpoints, watchtowers, and fences along the highway. He also warned that Bedouin communities in proximity to the road could be expelled.

“The settlers are the spearhead of Israeli plans in the West Bank,” Juma said. “It's a very strong message that there will be no Palestinian place without settlements and that [Israeli] sovereignty is over every single inch of the West Bank,” he added.

“And it's a message to the Palestinian Authority, saying you have no future whatsoever, as you think and as you were promised by the Oslo agreements.”

Violating the Oslo Accords

The road in question is located mostly in Area B, with some small sections crossing through Area C and two smaller sections crossing into Area A.

Upon the signing of the second agreement of the Oslo Accords in 1995, the peace deal meant to establish a Palestinian state, the West Bank was divided into Areas A, B, and C.

Area A is governed fully by the Palestinian Authority (PA), the governmental body created under Oslo, and Area B is split - with the PA taking administrative responsibility and the Israeli army handling security affairs. Area C, the majority of the West Bank, is under full Israeli military control.

Most of Area A comprises major Palestinian cities, like Ramallah, where the PA headquarters are located.

“Ramallah is the most important urban centre of the PA. This is the city where the administrations are concentrated, and this is the most important city in the West Bank, in terms of administration,” Dror Etkes, founder of Kerem Navot, an Israeli NGO monitoring land policies in the West Bank, told The New Arab.

“So if the settlers have been successful in splitting it, planting facts on the ground, and connecting the settlements north and east of Ramallah with the settlements west of Ramallah, that would be a major achievement in this direction of dissolving the Oslo agreement.”

In recent years, the Israeli state has increasingly adopted new measures seen as eroding the PA’s power in the West Bank.

Following the Israeli army’s mass displacement campaign of Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nur Shams refugee camps, the army established a permanent military base next to Jenin refugee camp (in Area A) as well as five other outposts and is planning to set up more.

The military has also confiscated land in Area A to build settler roads, and Israel’s Security Cabinet granted the Civil Administration, the military body implementing Israeli civilian policy in the West Bank, enforcement powers related to the environment, water, and archaeology in Areas A and B.

The Civil Administration also stripped the municipalities of Hebron and Bethlehem of planning and construction responsibilities related to the Israeli settlement inside Hebron and Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem.

Those in government aren’t shy about their motives, either. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has repeatedly called to dismantle the PA, most recently advocating for a war against the West Bank, stating that Israel must “do there what we did in Gaza, to dismantle the Palestinian Authority, which is a terror authority”.

As the Israeli state reneges on its obligations as part of the Oslo Accords, Israeli settlers are encroaching further into PA territory.

Since 2024, settlers have built 32 outposts, settler encampments established without Israeli government permission, inside Area B, and at least three in Area A. The goal seems clear to Etkes: Israeli settlers and the state are working together to unravel the Oslo Accords.

“More and more initiatives starting from the settlers and going up to the military, and of course, by the politicians who are supporting them in order to bring about the collapse of the Oslo agreement and to cancel the geopolitical categories of Oslo - A, B, C,” Etkes said.

“That’s all part of a bigger plan to force Palestinians into very, very small enclaves to eventually force them out of the country.”

The PA was meant to be an interim self-government that would phase out in five years and transition into full Palestinian self-governance over the West Bank. That never materialised, and instead what we are seeing today is the Oslo process in reverse.

Settler takeover, not only of Palestinian land, but also of infrastructure, is integral to that process.

Settlers aren’t just calling for access to 'Wallerstein Road', but also the Beitunia bypass road, or Road 4437, which Israelis have also been barred from using since the Second Intifada.

According to Olam Katan, settler access to that road has also been approved, although no official statement has been released yet. The Israeli army did not respond to The New Arab requests for verification at the time of writing.

These highways aren’t the first Palestinian roads settlers have encroached on, however. Roughly a decade ago, settlers from the Negohot settlement near Hebron gained access to an unnamed road running through Areas A and B in the southern West Bank, Etkes said.

“The road partially became a settlers-only road, especially since October 7th. They completely blocked parts of this road to Palestinians,” Etkes said.

“So this is not the first road which Israel is opening. There is already a precedent that the settlers have been able to establish.”

Jessica Buxbaum is a Jerusalem-based journalist covering Palestine and Israel. Her work has been featured in Middle East Eye, The National, and Gulf News

Follow her on Twitter: @jess_buxbaum

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

An unannounced meeting was held between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth in southern Israel on Monday, US news site Axios reported.

The meeting took place at Ovda airbase in the Negev desert, where US fighter jets and refuelling aircraft are stationed, two sources familiar with the matter told Axios.

Hegseth has since confirmed that the secret trip took place. Other than saying he had met with US troops, he gave no further details.

"It was an honour to visit our warfighters in @CENTCOM today. The best of our country, on a historic mission. Godspeed," he wrote on X.

Netanyahu flew to the airbase from Israel’s main airport, Ben Gurion, by private plane rather than helicopter, which Israeli news outlet Ynet described as unusual. Ynet also said the meeting was "unusually" long.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz and National Security Adviser Shmuel Ben-Ezra also attended the meeting, according to Axios and Israel’s Channel 12.

Earlier reports in Israeli media suggested that officials from the United Arab Emirates were also present, but Israeli news outlet i24NEWS later reported that no Emirati officials had attended.

Reports of Hegseth’s trip emerged a day after US President Donald Trump endorsed Netanyahu in Israel’s 27 October election. The visit also comes amid heightened US-Israel tensions with Iran and growing concerns about a possible resumption of war.

The US and Israel began striking Iran on 28 February, immediately drawing much of the region into a wider conflict that has left thousands of people dead and rattled the global economy amid disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab.

Oil- and gas-rich Gulf states have come under repeated Iranian attack. The ongoing conflict between Yemen’s Houthi rebels and Saudi Arabia has become another major front in the wider war.

On Monday, senior sources familiar with mediation efforts told The New Arab that a breakthrough in US-Iran talks was expected to be announced this week, as Qatar and Pakistan continued diplomatic efforts to prevent a renewed war. However, the prospect of an agreement remained highly uncertain, with Tehran refusing to make concessions on its nuclear programme and support for its allied groups across the region.

Tehran has warned that it would retaliate forcefully if Washington and Tel Aviv resumed their attacks.

Earlier this month, Hegseth told reporters: "Iran will never, under any circumstances, possess a nuclear weapon. President Trump is absolutely determined and resolved to ensure they do not obtain one. They will not get it."

He warned that Iran had the option of complying with US demands or, as he put it, "learning the hard way."

As military operations between the United States and Iran seem to subside, a war of competing narratives is emerging, and opposing claims over the Strait of Hormuz are creating potentially misleading and profound consequences.

On the one hand, Iran declares that the Strait is shut down, while allowing a limited number of ships and vessels to gain safe, yet reportedly paid, passage through its territorial waters. The United States, meanwhile, continues to insist that the Strait is open and that free, unobstructed navigation is guaranteed. President Trump has gone further, declaring the Strait of Hormuz to be US territory.

Beyond these competing claims, however, lies a compelling reality. Satellite imagery and marine tracking applications undeniably show that traffic across this Strait is very limited, with navigation now operating at only a fraction of its normal level before 28 February 2026. Contrary to US claims, the severely restricted passage of commercial ships across the Strait has clearly affected the global energy market, driving a surge in oil prices.

As this narrow passage becomes congested with military fleets, tankers, and other vessels, and as international interest grows, new realities are unfolding. Reported bilateral discussions between the two coastal states bordering the Strait, Oman and Iran, have reached a critical stage, defining new routes for vessels into and out of the strait. The bilateral discussions, meticulously followed by the US and the mediators, Pakistan and Qatar, is said to introduce new realities which did not exist before the US-Israeli attacks on Iran last February.

The Maritime Security Group's open-source analysis indicates that Iran seeks a role in overseeing inbound, and possibly outbound, maritime traffic through the Strait. Tehran is reportedly demanding new arrangements concerning vessels carrying military articles that could be used in military operations against Iran. If these reports prove accurate, they would mark the beginning of a fundamental shift in how access, navigation, and security are managed in the Strait of Hormuz.

Yet, even a successful conclusion of bilateral discussions with Oman would not guarantee the reopening of the Strait. Iranian officials have stressed that reopening the Strait of Hormuz is not contingent on the successful conclusion of these talks. Rather, Tehran views US adherence to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) bilaterally signed with Iran as a precondition for a sustainable resumption of navigation across Hormuz. In particular, Iran is calling for swift implementation of the MOU provisions on the cessation of hostilities, the lifting of the blockade, and the easing of sanctions. This distinction is critical.

The Oman-Iran discussions may address the mechanics of navigation through the Strait, but Tehran appears to be linking the sustainability of that navigation to a much broader political and security framework.

Those familiar with Iran’s nuclear negotiations will realise the magnitude and the level of concession Tehran has made on the nuclear front. A closer look at the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding reveals that Iran has committed itself to halting uranium enrichment, down-blending its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and imposing a moratorium on nuclear fuel cycle activities.

Amid growing speculation of a rift with Iran’s leadership, these concessions may have prompted hard-line elements, already dissatisfied with the MOU's terms, to seek to renegotiate Article 5, which addresses the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. This is consistent to a great extent with repeated statements by Iranian officials that the “Hormuz card” is more valuable than possessing nuclear weapons; To the Iranian mindset, the strategic leverage offered by the Strait is the perfect compensation to Iran’s concession in the nuclear file.

All this suggests that the Strait of Hormuz may not return soon to pre-war conditions. For Iran, Hormuz is not simply a waterway; it is now the “guarantor”, a part of its broader strategic equation involving sovereignty, deterrence and gaining lasting leverage.

For Oman, known for its balanced relations and tradition of diplomatic mediation, this Gulf state finds itself in a peculiar yet potentially advantageous position at the forefront of emerging regional arrangements.

Other GCC states may be the greatest losers from these evolving dynamics and arrangements. Obviously, GCC states have to face the new reality that Iran is not simply a neighbour, but a “gatekeeper for Hormuz”. Given GCC economies’ heavy dependence on maritime trade and energy exports, we may soon see GCC plans for alternative routes to export/import oil and commodities. This contingency planning would profoundly affect oil prices and markets.

For the United States, a key player facing an equally difficult calculation in the region, there is a fundamental interest in keeping international navigation open across Hormuz, alongside a recognition that military pressure would backfire.

Russia, meanwhile, remains in a comfortable position, benefiting from US exemption from oil sanctions, which allows it to sell its oil to international markets. The longer the crisis in Hormuz, the greater the benefit for Russian energy exports.

For China, the calculation is different. As one of the world's largest energy consumers, Beijing has a strong interest in restoring predictable navigation through Hormuz while exploring mechanisms to evade sanctions.

Regardless of these positions, the critical question is not simply whether the Strait becomes open. It is whether regional actors can build a mechanism that keeps Hormuz open, rather than using it as an instrument of pressure.

Ayman Khalil is a Senior Researcher at the Arab Institute for Security Studies. A physicist by training and holds a Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Reading University (UK).  He is the coordinator of the "Missile Capabilities Platform" and “Nuclear Forum”, the only specialized forum in the Arab world that promotes policy and public dialogue in CBRN and delivery vehicles.

Fadel Kaseb is a Senior Researcher and Lecturer at the Arab Institute for Security Studies. He possess strong academic qualification with a Diploma focused in  policy and strategy from U.S Naval War college and a diploma from UK's joint staff college. He has vast experience  in Defence and security studies, with a Master degree from the University of London/King's College. Brigadier retired Kaseb has specific interest in joint military operations, future and strategic foresight. Fadel Kaseb and Ayman Khalil are both coordinators of the Maritime Security Group, a Norwegian sponsored initiative.

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

US Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib has called for the arrest of an Israeli military commander accused of involvement in the killing of five-year-old Palestinian girl Hind Rajab in Gaza, after a human rights organisation revealed that he was visiting the US.

Tlaib made the demand on Monday after the Hind Rajab Foundation (HRF) filed an urgent request with the US Department of Justice seeking the investigation, arrest and prosecution of Sean Glass, a former commander in Israel's 52nd Armoured Battalion.

The foundation alleges that Glass commanded the unit responsible for opening fire on the vehicle carrying Hind and her relatives in Gaza City on 29 January 2024.

"As a party to the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions, our government is obligated to arrest and investigate him for these war crimes and acts of genocide," Tlaib wrote on social media.

The foundation said its investigation placed Glass and soldiers from his "Vampire Empire" Company within a few hundred metres of Hind's vehicle during the attack, saying that he most likely gave the order to open fire.

It said the evidence included geolocation analysis and documentation of the unit's movements, alongside statements made by Glass about his military operations in Gaza.

The allegations against Glass have not been established in court.

Hind was travelling with relatives through Gaza City when their car came under Israeli fire. Six-year-old cousin Layan Hamadeh contacted the Palestinian Red Crescent Society for help before she was killed.

Hind subsequently spoke to emergency dispatchers, pleading for someone to rescue her as she remained trapped in the vehicle, surrounded by the bodies of her relatives.

The recordings of her desperate calls for help provoked international outrage.

An ambulance dispatched to rescue Hind was also attacked, killing two Palestinian paramedics. Hind's body and those of the rescuers were discovered days later.

An investigation by the research group Forensic Architecture subsequently found no evidence of the Israeli account of the incident, which claimed that there was an exchange of fire with Palestinian fighters.

The killing became one of the most widely recognised symbols of the suffering of Palestinian children during Israel's genocide in Gaza.

Wider allegations against Israeli commander

The Hind Rajab Foundation also accuses Glass of involvement in other military operations across Gaza, including the assault on Al-Shifa Hospital, the destruction of the headquarters of the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA, and the devastation of residential neighbourhoods.

It alleges that his company participated in the seizure and destruction of the Rafah Crossing, which connects Gaza with Egypt.

According to the foundation, Glass publicly celebrated the destruction carried out by his unit, including in statements describing the devastation of areas his soldiers had been ordered to enter.

The organisation said it had previously submitted material concerning Glass and other Israeli soldiers to the International Criminal Court, alongside complaints to national judicial authorities.

Its latest action seeks to establish whether US authorities will pursue allegations against an Israeli military officer present on American territory.

Polish explosives manufacturer faces legal challenge

The demand for Glass's arrest comes as the Hind Rajab Foundation pursues a separate legal challenge in Poland over the alleged supply of explosives used in Israel's military campaign in Gaza.

On Monday, the foundation, alongside the International Federation for Human Rights and the European Legal Support Centre, announced an appeal against a Warsaw prosecutor's decision to dismiss a criminal complaint targeting representatives of Polish explosives manufacturer Nitro-Chem.

The original complaint, filed in June, alleges that the state-owned company supplied TNT used in the manufacture of American bombs subsequently transferred to Israel, potentially implicating its representatives in international crimes committed against Palestinians.

The organisations argue that Nitro-Chem's commercial relationships with US arms manufacturers, as well as its direct sales to Israeli defence companies, warranted a criminal investigation.

They are asking the Warsaw Regional Court to review the dismissal and examine whether company representatives could bear criminal responsibility for supplying materials allegedly used in war crimes and genocide.

The allegations against Nitro-Chem representatives have not been established in court.

The two cases reflect the foundation's expanding efforts to pursue accountability not only against Israeli military personnel accused of atrocities in Gaza, but also against companies and individuals allegedly involved in supplying the weapons used during the genocide.