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Bad Air Day: Drone Strikes on Yandex Set to Push Russia Below Kazakhstan in the AI Race

By: ak
14 October 2026 at 08:41

The “forced digital detox” delivered by Ukraine’s Armed Forces has hit the most profitable part of Yandex’s business: search and AI. The long-term fallout from the attacks on the company’s data centers has yet to be assessed, but supercomputing experts consulted by T-invariant are confident that all three of its supercomputers — Chervonenkis, Lyapunov, and Galushkin — were badly damaged by fire and smoke. Soot and ash may have reached the machines’ microelectronics through their direct free-cooling systems, which use outside air. In the best case, cleaning them will take many months; in the worst, Yandex will have to buy new, extremely scarce NVIDIA chips or their equivalents, which will take years. The company owns Russia’s best supercomputers, which, according to its financial reports, had recently become key drivers of its growth. On the eve of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chervonenkis ranked 19th on the global Top500 list of supercomputers, competing with leading systems from the US, China, Japan, and Germany. After the Ukrainian drone strikes, Russia risks falling behind Kazakhstan in the performance of its top supercomputers as early as November.

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All three of Yandex’s supercomputers have been knocked out of service indefinitely by drone strikes on the company’s data centers. The first attack came overnight on October 8 in Sasovo, in the Ryazan region. That site houses Chervonenkis, the IT giant’s flagship machine and the most powerful of Russia’s publicly listed supercomputers, as well as Lyapunov, the third most powerful. The following night, Ukrainian forces struck the data center in Kaluga — Yandex’s largest and one of the biggest in Russia. Overnight on October 11, a data center in Vladimir, home to the Galushkin supercomputer, came under attack.

Four specialists interviewed by T-invariant are confident that the company’s computing capacity has suffered serious damage. In their view, the main reason the equipment was so vulnerable to the drone strikes and the fires that followed is the direct free-cooling system, which cools the equipment with outside air (supply fans push the air through filters, and it then flows through the server racks).

Even if the fire didn’t spread to the supercomputer racks directly, air laden with soot and ash could have reached the server boards, and the finest particles could have settled on the board substrate (a lot also depends on the condition of the filters). Carbon conducts electricity. Because the traces on the boards are packed so densely, these particles can act as conductive “bridges” between contacts, causing widespread short circuits and burning out motherboards. What’s more, combustion byproducts can corrode conductors and contact joints.

Photo: Andriy Kovalenko’s Telegram channel

In the summer of 2026, Yandex announced that it was starting to roll out liquid cooling. “To integrate the technology into existing data centers that operate on free-cooling principles, the company’s engineers developed a specialized solution: sidecars. The sidecars are additional racks fitted with liquid-to-air radiators. They make it possible to introduce liquid cooling without large-scale, costly renovation of the buildings. The hybrid of air and liquid systems provides efficient thermal management for high-load racks and speeds up the adaptation of the infrastructure to the needs of internal services and external partners,” the company said. However, according to the experts interviewed by T-invariant, although liquid-cooled components fare better in a fire, the company is unlikely to have finished this retrofit at all of its data centers.

One of the experts, who works at a global AI tech giant, was skeptical of the technology Yandex uses to cool its supercomputers. “Nobody in their right mind has used free cooling for ages,” the source told T-invariant. Most operators rely on liquid cooling systems (which is what NVIDIA uses), and, less often, on immersion cooling.

According to the specialists, cleaning smoke, soot, and grime off the supercomputers’ components could take up to six months. And if parts need to be replaced — including expensive and, above all, scarce NVIDIA chips or their equivalents — getting the machines fully back up and running could take one to two years.

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Yandex has not commented on the condition of its supercomputers after the attacks. T-invariant asked leading Russian supercomputing specialists — both those working in Russia and those who left to work for global AI giants — for a detailed assessment of the situation and of all the threats and challenges facing Yandex (all of them asked to remain anonymous).

Why the Fate of the Supercomputers Matters Most

The strike on Russia’s IT leader had a digital blast radius far beyond its data centers. For more than a week now, Russian users have been dealing with outages in services run by Yandex’s many cloud customers and other B2B clients. They have also been hit by outages in Yandex’s own services — above all, Yandex Disk and Yandex Pay. The Russian internet is flooded with videos from users who have lost access, possibly only temporarily, to their data or their money.

T-INVARIANT BACKGROUND

How Many B2B Clients Depend on Yandex’s Services

According to the company’s financial results for Q2 2026, Yandex Cloud’s total client base grew to 64,000. AI and information security services remain the key growth drivers: they are already used by 37% and 53% of large clients, respectively — up 10 and 9 percentage points from a year earlier. Consumption of commercial tokens via the API on the Yandex AI Studio platform reached 398 billion tokens in Q2 2026 — double the figure for the first quarter and 70% more than in all of 2025. Yandex 360, the company’s cloud office suite, keeps growing: it now has more than 117 million users and 185,000 organizations. At the end of Q2 2026, Yandex 360 had a total of 8.9 million paid accounts, 2.4 million of them at large companies.

Yet the main problem for Yandex itself after Ukraine’s strikes on its data centers is the partial or total loss of computing capacity. And there are at least two reasons why. Yes, the disabled data centers will weigh on Yandex’s market capitalization, but something else matters more: these problems could stall the development of its AI, on which the company’s core business depends, for months or even years.

After the first drone strikes on Yandex’s data centers on October 8 and 9, many investors remained cautiously optimistic about the company: the cloud accounts for only a small share of revenue, and workloads can be redistributed among data centers. The share price dipped by a few percent at the time. The third attack, and the likelihood of further Ukrainian drone raids, made financial forecasts gloomier.

Yandex does not break out AI figures in its financial reports, so one has to go by the Search and AI Services segment. It has the highest adjusted EBITDA margin of all the segments Yandex reports. In Q2 2026, that margin was 46.3%, and for the first half of the year, 44.8% (by comparison, the City Services segment had a margin of 16%, and the contribution of the entire B2B segment, including Yandex Cloud, is far smaller than that of search and AI). The Search and AI Services segment also generated the largest adjusted EBITDA in absolute terms.

The reports also show that AI is already making a measurable contribution to advertising revenue growth: according to the company, its ARGUS recommendation technology accounted for almost half of that growth in Q2 2026. And although Yandex doesn’t disclose the profitability of its AI products separately, its reports make clear just how important AI is to the company’s financial health.

Financial performance of Yandex’s key segments

“Yandex remains one of the world’s first companies to expand its experiments with AI-based promotion formats for businesses — in Alice AI, both within Yandex Search and on its own website and app. These formats take a fundamentally new approach to audience targeting. The algorithms take into account not only the query but the entire context of the conversation with Alice AI. This makes it possible to identify a user’s potential interest even before they formulate a specific query. Promotion on AI surfaces is already showing measurable results: the cost of customer acquisition is comparable to that of promotion in Search. In chats with Alice AI, the ad system has already displayed ads from more than 460,000 advertisers — three-quarters of all advertisers on the platform. Alice AI remains the most popular AI assistant among Russians. In the second quarter, the number of weekly users who turn to Alice AI for tasks and conversation grew 39% quarter over quarter to 33.2 million. The number of monthly active Stations with Alice [Yandex’s smart speakers — T-invariant] rose 31% year over year to 22.5 million. More and more users own multiple devices: the number of people who own two or more Stations grew 44% to 4.7 million,” Yandex’s report states.

Clearly, the main risk concerns AI. It is these three supercomputers at two data centers that power the development of the company’s neural networks and other parts of its AI ecosystem. If the computing capacity has to be shut down so the equipment can be cleaned after the fire and smoke, the infrastructure behind almost half of the growth in ad revenue will sit idle for months. If the supercomputers are damaged even partially, development will be set back by years. First, sanctions restrict deliveries of NVIDIA A100 accelerators to Russia. Getting around them is extremely expensive and difficult, as shown by the cloak-and-dagger operation to build MSU-270, a closely guarded supercomputer at Moscow State University (see T-invariant’s investigation). Second, there is a global shortage of cutting-edge NVIDIA chips: orders are booked two to three years in advance, as confirmed by a T-invariant source at NVIDIA and by another specialist at a global AI giant who asked that the company not be named.

As a result, the development of YandexGPT and Alice AI is effectively on hold indefinitely — even as demand for them is growing explosively: according to Yandex B2B Tech data cited by the financial portal Finam, token consumption in Yandex AI Studio grew 18-fold year over year in the first half of 2026. Yandex’s service status page currently lists Yandex AI Studio as unavailable.

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Why Yandex’s Data Centers Weren’t Ready for War

“Yandex built its data centers and its supercomputers in peacetime, for peacetime. Everything was designed for normal life; it never even crossed anyone’s mind that drones would come crashing through the roof. The Ryazan, Kaluga, and Vladimir regions don’t get earthquakes or other natural disasters, so nobody even thought about investing in physical protection for the buildings,” explains one of the supercomputing industry experts T-invariant spoke to.

Yandex’s public descriptions of its infrastructure (in particular, a post the company published in 2020) reveal the logic behind its design: low energy consumption, redundant power, simple and cheap cooling, and the ability to shift workloads between sites.

According to a BBC source, Yandex regularly practiced taking one data center offline and shifting its load to the others. But the successive loss of several large sites was probably never rehearsed. The BBC’s source also says that Yandex’s services may have treated two separate buildings in Vladimir as backups for each other: losing both at once was considered impossible.

“In Russia, data centers are usually built as fairly basic ‘boxes’: no serious walls, no fencing, nothing like that, almost no liquid cooling, no sophisticated fire suppression systems — even though advanced technologies exist, including Russian-made ones. All of that is considered insane capex by Russian business standards. Nobody could afford it. On top of that, there’s the extreme centralization. About 70–80% of all data centers are located around Moscow and St. Petersburg,” explains the supercomputing expert.

The Chervonenkis supercomputer at Yandex’s data center in Sasovo. Photo: Yandex

The first public calls in Russia to improve data center security came literally a couple of days before the first attacks. The BBC cites examples: “One of the main tasks now is how to move computing capacity, how to move all the useful IT load out of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the Moscow region somewhere farther away… somewhere beyond the Urals, where, fortunately, things aren’t landing yet,” Deputy Minister of Digital Development Yevgeny Filatov said on October 6 at the Digital Solutions forum. And on the evening of October 7 (a few hours before the first attack), RBC published a report that representatives of the IT industry and the Ministry of Digital Development were discussing the possibility of placing AI data centers in “friendly countries” [the Russian government’s term for countries that have not imposed sanctions on Russia — T-invariant].

The BBC also points out that by then Russian forces had already been striking data centers in Ukraine. From September 23 to 28, they damaged at least six such facilities. The attacks left people without internet access and disrupted TV broadcasts. The Russian Ministry of Defense even posted an image on its social media channels that read “Digital detox… by force.” As early as October 4, two days before Filatov’s remarks, Volodymyr Zelensky warned of retaliatory strikes: “Do they really think we won’t respond?”

Other striking examples — in every sense of the word — emerged in 2026, showing that data centers are among the top-priority targets in wartime. Civilian data centers were also hit by drones and missiles during the conflict between the US and Iran. Amazon’s data centers in Bahrain and the UAE were attacked several times after Washington launched its bombing campaign against Iran. Amazon advised customers to move their data to sites outside the region, since there was no telling when the facilities would be back online. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also threatened to completely destroy OpenAI’s Stargate data center in Abu Dhabi.

“In Germany, I took a close look at the Leibniz Supercomputing Centre near Munich. It’s a windowless cube with a moat around it, so nobody can ram it with a car. The entrance is a small suspension bridge. The cube itself is essentially a building within a building, a Faraday cage [an example of architectural radio-frequency shielding — T-invariant]. So they’ve literally put serious physical and other protective measures in place. And that supercomputer ranked below Yandex’s Chervonenkis on the Top500. Still, the Germans invested very seriously in protection. That kind of protection won’t stop ballistic missiles, but against drones it works just fine. We also know of incredible underground data centers in Norway and Finland. Then there’s Alibaba’s supercomputing center in China. Almost all the Top500 leaders don’t skimp on capex; they install sophisticated liquid or immersion cooling systems. Russia’s IT leaders cut corners on all of it,” the expert explains.

T-INVARIANT BACKGROUND

In Norway, Lefdal Mine Datacenter houses its data halls in a former mine, about 700 meters in from the entrance to the mountain. It combines a sheltered location with cooling by cold fjord water. Some of the supporting infrastructure, including the generators, remains above ground.

The Finnish data center The Rock, located in the Pori area, uses nine tunnel halls originally carved out for military use. The underground facility, covering about 8,500 square meters, combines the natural protection of solid bedrock with segmentation into security zones and specialized engineering infrastructure, including direct liquid cooling.

Who Ultimately Gets the “Forced Digital Detox”

Of Russia’s six largest supercomputers, only the two belonging to the banking giant Sber are located at a site relatively well protected from drone attacks. Christofari and Christofari Neo are housed in Skolkovo, which has better air defense coverage. GROM, the supercomputer owned by the telecom operator MTS, is in Lytkarino, outside Moscow. Yandex’s remaining data centers are also in the Moscow region, in Mytishchi and Ivanteyevka. All of these towns near Moscow regularly come under massive Ukrainian drone raids.

“Restoring supercomputers of this caliber just isn’t going to happen, not now and not anytime soon. And it’s not even about having the money. The main problem isn’t even sanctions, it’s the shortage of chips and other components: there’s a huge waiting list for them worldwide. That said, gray- and black-market imports are very costly, too. So things are pretty Sucksovo these days [a pun on Sasovo, the town where Yandex’s flagship data center was hit, and the Russian slang verb sosat’, ‘to suck’ — T-invariant],” says a supercomputing specialist who spoke with T-invariant.

The next update of the global Top500 list of supercomputers will be published in November. Chervonenkis currently ranks 101st, and Kazakhstan’s Alem.Cloud is 104th (Kazakhstan’s second machine is 122nd, ahead of all of Russia’s other supercomputers). The experts T-invariant spoke to have no doubt that Ukraine’s retaliatory “forced digital detox” will push Russia’s leading supercomputers below Kazakhstan’s on the Top500 as early as this fall. Competing with the US, China, and Japan is out of the question altogether: Russia already lags behind them by two orders of magnitude.

As T-invariant reported earlier, the Netherlands is among the countries ahead of Russia on the Top500 list. Two machines registered to the Netherlands belong to Nebius, the company led by Yandex co-founder and former CEO Arkady Volozh: ISEG (which ranked 16th when it debuted) and ISEG2, with a combined peak performance of about 425 petaflops. According to the government’s Concept for the Development of Mathematical Sciences through 2036, Russia’s five machines on the Top500 together deliver less than 100 petaflops of peak performance. In other words, Arkady Volozh’s company alone has more computing power than all of Russia’s Top500 systems combined.

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The post Bad Air Day: Drone Strikes on Yandex Set to Push Russia Below Kazakhstan in the AI Race appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

A Bird That Wouldn’t Migrate: How Ornithologist Sofia Rosenfeld Was Sentenced to Three and a Half Years in a Penal Colony for Two Donations

By: ak
12 October 2026 at 08:00

Sofia Rosenfeld has spent her life studying Arctic birds: traveling on expeditions to the Far North, following flocks of geese in a seaplane, and fighting to protect rare species. Now one of Russia’s leading ornithologists, a Doctor of Sciences in Biology, has been sentenced to three and a half years in a penal colony — for two 1,000-ruble donations to the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK). Rosenfeld partially admitted guilt: she explained that she had been unable to cancel the recurring payments because she was on an expedition without communications. T-invariant explains why the scientist refused to leave Russia, how the trial unfolded, and what Russian science stands to lose.

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Fifty-year-old Sofia Rosenfeld was taken into custody in the courtroom of Moscow’s Gagarinsky District Court. The scientist was accused of financing an “extremist” organization over two transfers of 1,000 rubles each, sent to the Anti-Corruption Foundation in August and September 2021. The FBK was designated an extremist organization in August 2021, after which donations to the foundation began to be treated as possible financing of extremist activity. The charge carries a range of penalties, from a fine and forced labor to three to eight years in prison.

Prosecutors asked for Rosenfeld to be sentenced to five years in a penal colony. She admitted guilt only in part: “I categorically reject the idea that, first, I share extremist views and, second, that I acted with criminal intent. When I decided to start supporting the FBK, I was motivated solely by the desire to fight corruption. I believe any public support in that struggle is needed. Even in my own work, in scientific research and conservation, I have seen the monstrous forms this evil can take. And it seemed to me that any help in fighting corruption was a good thing.”

Rosenfeld acknowledged that she had signed up for recurring donations to the FBK. When the foundation was designated an extremist organization, she was on a lengthy scientific expedition without communications; as soon as she returned, she canceled the subscription. Her lawyers submitted to the case file a letter in which Rosenfeld asked the foundation to stop the monthly payments. The court was not persuaded.

“They Put On Quite a Show”

Rosenfeld learned that a criminal case had been opened against her on December 5, 2025, shortly after returning from Israel, where she had been visiting her father.

“She was here with me in Israel. Sometime in the twenties of November, she went back to Moscow. Literally the next day, or the day after, they came to search her home and made her sign an undertaking not to leave. They did leave her passports, though — they just made copies,” Sofia’s father, Boris Rosenfeld, tells T-invariant.

During the search, law enforcement officers seized her phone and two laptops. Then came months of waiting. Rosenfeld continued to work and go on expeditions.

“The first hearing was scheduled six months later. But the witness did not show up, so it was postponed. The next one was postponed too. Then they read out the charges. Everything was very pleasant on the surface. Nice young women read the indictment; the wonderful investigator kept calling to ask how things were going, how her health was, what was new. It all seemed more or less decent. Nothing suggested that anything terrible was about to happen. Although I think everything had been decided long before. They put on quite a show,” recalls Sergei (name changed), a friend of Sofia Rosenfeld.

Bolvanskaya Bay, Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Whooper swan, 2017. Photo: Sofia Rosenfeld’s archive

Before every hearing, Rosenfeld packed a bag in case she was taken into custody directly from the courtroom.

“She knew a real prison term was possible. But she thought a fine or forced labor was much more likely. Her lawyers thought so too. That was their mistake. I assume there are general instructions for cases like these. Recently, this has already been the third case in which women were given actual prison terms,” Boris Rosenfeld says.

“Of course there was stress. But for some reason we went into the final hearing feeling fairly relaxed. Just before that, they had even allowed her to go on an expedition beyond the Arctic Circle, to the Polar Urals, to tag musk oxen. Television did a report about her. She only got back on October 2,” Sergei says.

“The last time we spoke was a few weeks ago. She wasn’t making any plans; she was simply waiting to see what would happen next. The hearings came one after another, and she arrived at each one with her bag packed. But they kept being postponed. The last one ended with her being put in handcuffs,” Rosenfeld’s friend and former university classmate, science journalist Ilya Kolmanovsky, tells T-invariant.

According to Rosenfeld’s friends, the court was unhappy that she had admitted guilt only in part.

“The judge and the prosecutor were extremely unhappy that Sonya had only partially admitted guilt. Her situation was this: she is a field biologist and spends six months or more at a time on expeditions. Most of them are in the Far North, under field conditions, with only satellite communications. She had all the evidence showing that when the FBK was designated an extremist organization, she was away on an official expedition — the institute had confirmed it. But none of that mattered to the court. Her lawyer even asked: why is she the one being blamed? The banks processed the transfers while knowing that these payments had been deemed criminal, even though they are perfectly capable of blocking unwanted or suspicious transactions and routinely do so in other cases. Why are there no questions for the bank? The judge simply let that pass. You could see that long statements irritated him. It looked as though none of the defense arguments had any bearing on his decision: the instruction had already been given, and the circumstances of the case did not interest him,” says Anna (name changed), a friend of Sofia Rosenfeld.

“If she had admitted guilt in full, they might have knocked a couple of months off. There were three sentences like that this week. Before this, they had left women alone. I think now everyone is trying to prove their loyalty. I can see no other reason for such terrifying sentences, literally over ‘three ears of grain,’” Sergei says.

Rosenfeld is currently being held at Moscow’s Pechatniki pretrial detention center. She was not allowed to take her packed bag from the courthouse, so at first she was left without her personal belongings.

“Geese Are My Thing”

Sofia Rosenfeld is a Doctor of Sciences in Biology and a senior research fellow at the Russian Bird Ringing Centre of the Severtsov Institute of Ecology and Evolution of the Russian Academy of Sciences. She is one of the best-known specialists in Arctic waterfowl.

Rosenfeld has said that she knew she would become a biologist when she was five. She grew up in Moscow: her father, Boris Rosenfeld, is a mathematician; her mother was an engineer; and her grandfather, Iosif Rosenfeld, was an academician and a Doctor of Sciences in Chemistry. Sonya attended a French-language specialist school. In the late 1980s, the family moved to Israel, but a year and a half later, 15-year-old Sofia returned to Moscow.

“I did not think I had the right to keep a 15-year-old person somewhere by force. When we were leaving, she said she did not want to go. And really, why should she leave? Everything was fine: she had friends at school, and it was a good French school. Why the hell are you going anywhere at all? You have everything: an apartment, a car, jobs. I worked at the Academy of Sciences. And I told her: ‘Listen, we can’t leave you here alone. But if you want to come back, I won’t stand in your way.’ I promised her that. And a year and a half later she really did return. Of course we were worried, especially during the coup attempt. It was 1991. Yes, those were lively times. But afterward everything was fine,” Boris Rosenfeld recalls.

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“Her parents persuaded her to go for at least a year, just to see what life there was like. She went. And a year later she packed a suitcase and said, ‘I’m leaving. I don’t want to abandon my country at a difficult time.’ She came back, finished school, and entered the biology department. She is an extraordinarily determined person,” Anna says.

In Moscow, Sofia lived with her grandmother and aunt and, by her own account, was constantly bringing animals home. In addition to a dog, the apartment housed snakes, frogs, fish, and birds. In 1993, Rosenfeld enrolled in the biology faculty at Moscow State University, specializing in zoology.

“We met in our first year. I heard about her before I saw her: people in our cohort said there was an unusually remarkable person studying with us. It was obvious that there were students, and then there was someone you could already tell was a scientist. For her, science was a deep practice, a form of service,” Ilya Kolmanovsky recalls.

At university, Rosenfeld became interested in photography: she wanted to photograph birds in the Arctic. She also played guitar, studied languages, and competed professionally in show jumping. But Arctic birds had been her main passion since her student years.

“Geese are my thing. These birds amazed me because their social behavior is unique. Geese are like people. All geese, brants, and swans are monogamous; their pairs remain together for many years, sometimes for life. Young birds always make their first migration with their parents, who show them where to fly. Those family ties can also last for years,” she once explained.

Rosenfeld began going on field placements in the Arctic while she was still a student.

“She was the master of those immense open spaces, where there is not a single person for thousands of kilometers. She could go somewhere in Kazakhstan and sleep in a tent when it was minus 16 at night in spring. And then see 15,000 geese through binoculars that no one before her had seen. Make a discovery — find out that a huge population stops there during migration. She is a figure of enormous stature. From the first day, it was clear that she was dealing with something extraordinarily significant. And that is what inspires such deep respect in anyone who comes into contact with her,” Kolmanovsky says.

In 1998, Rosenfeld began postgraduate study at the Severtsov Institute of Ecology and Evolution of the Russian Academy of Sciences, where she has worked ever since. Her main research areas are the ecology and migration of waterfowl, as well as the conservation of migratory birds. During migration, birds travel tens of thousands of kilometers and cross the borders of countries with different conservation laws.

Since 2016, Rosenfeld and her colleagues have literally followed bird flocks in a homemade seaplane, photographing and counting them. The light aircraft can fly at roughly the same speed as the birds and can take off from and land on water, ice, and small clearings. The resulting data allow scientists to estimate population sizes, identify threats to their survival, and develop recommendations for the protection of migratory species.

Homemade Sterkh-S1 seaplane in Meduza Bay on the Taymyr Peninsula. Photo: Sofia Rosenfeld’s archive

“Sonya devoted her whole life to migratory birds. She literally flew after them in an airplane. She is an enormous expert in this field. That is the kind of person she is. There was no point talking politics with her. Of course she understood everything — all the terrible injustice around her. But her priority was migratory birds. That is what she lives for, and she can talk about nature for hours,” Andrei Rostovtsev, a friend of Sofia Rosenfeld’s father and co-founder of the independent online community Dissernet, tells T-invariant.

“She is a very well-known biologist. She worked on joint projects in the United States and Canada, and French researchers took part in her expeditions. She gave talks at all the most important conferences in her field. Sonya is devoted to wildlife conservation; she is a real patriot, not a fake one. She fought to keep every rare animal species in the Red Data Book and to remove exemptions from hunting laws. In the end, she managed to convince the State Duma that she was right. She is an extraordinary fighter,” Anna says.

Rosenfeld was the first to introduce systematic monitoring of migratory birds. Previously, their numbers had been estimated approximately: researchers counted individuals in a particular area and then extrapolated the figure to the whole territory. Accurate counts, however, are essential both for studying the spatial ecology of species and for preserving their populations, explains Alexandra Panyutina, a research fellow at Tel Aviv University’s School of Zoology: “Suppose you have a major gathering site for migratory birds on an ocean coast, and it is a key site. If something is disrupted there, it will affect bird populations across many countries, over an enormous area. Disrupting migration routes and stopover sites changes the distribution and abundance of a species. That is why research in this field is extremely important.”

Waterfowl are a difficult group to study: they are hunted, which affects population size and reproduction. Many species also live in remote northern regions where fieldwork is difficult.

“There is a strong Russian group working on shorebirds. And there are the people we used to call the ‘goose people.’ That’s it. Sonya is the intellectual architect of all this work on waterfowl. A person at her level cannot be replaced. She is the one who designs the research; the concept of the entire project exists in her head. You cannot replace her with a robot. Scientific niches do not automatically fill themselves when someone drops out. And an education alone is not enough — you have to understand the current realities of a specific problem and know who is doing what around you. And of course, in three and a half years no one will fill that niche,” Panyutina says.

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Sofia Rosenfeld had major plans for the coming months: filming a documentary titled Geese of Russia and working on an atlas of geese.

“It is a complete atlas, with descriptions, illustrations, and maps. Every species of goose found in Russia is supposed to be included. She left us all her contacts. We have to finish this work without her,” Sergei explains.

“You Can’t Study Geese from Prison”

Rosenfeld’s friends and colleagues say she categorically refused to leave Russia.

“There are things on which she is absolutely unbending. Leaving is one of them. For her it was completely non-negotiable. She understood all the risks, but nothing was more frightening than leaving and ending up unable to return to the subject of her research. Her science cannot be done anywhere else, because the species she studies live only in the Russian Arctic,” Kolmanovsky says.

Alexandra Panyutina tried more than once to speak to Rosenfeld about leaving Russia, but Rosenfeld avoided the subject.

“To me, the situation looked completely clear from the start. But throughout all this time I never managed to talk to her about it. She was very afraid of a provocation. Especially because her lawyers were telling her the outlook was optimistic: she was only under a travel restriction, and she was a woman and a Doctor of Sciences,” Panyutina says.

According to Panyutina, serious research on waterfowl migration can now be carried out in Russia and Canada.

“Until fairly recently, you could work freely in Russia. In most other countries, that is not the case. Scientists are hemmed in by restrictions on every side — any work requires an incredible number of permits, licenses, and special funding tied to specific tasks. And moving to another country is almost always a huge step down for a scientist. Here you are a leading specialist; there, broadly speaking, you are nobody. You start out as an assistant in someone else’s lab. No one is going to give you a laboratory from scratch. It is very difficult to earn the chance to conduct your own research. But then again, you can’t exactly study geese from prison either,” Panyutina emphasizes.

The administration of the Severtsov Institute of Ecology and Evolution of the Russian Academy of Sciences has not commented on Sofia Rosenfeld’s sentence.

“They gave her a good character reference in court. But after the sentence they decided that saving their own skin came first. I think, of course, they will fire her. How could they not, if she is not showing up for work? They will. Maybe they will wait for the appeal,” Boris Rosenfeld says.

Alexandra Panyutina does not have high hopes for the appeal. In her view, Rosenfeld’s case is far from the last example of the political persecution of scientists.

“Fortunately, the FSB has not come for biologists yet. In physics, things are already very bad. I do not know a single sane person who would choose to work on hypersonics today. You would have to be suicidal. In Sonya’s case, we cannot speak of her being persecuted as a scientist. We are talking about the persecution of a citizen who cares about the fate of her country. More than that, she became a victim of circumstances in the purest sense. When the FBK was banned, she was on a remote expedition without communications and physically could not only not cancel the donations — she could not even learn that they had been prohibited. As soon as she returned, she canceled all the payments. In other words, she did not violate the law currently in force in the Russian Federation. There is some hope that on appeal the court will take into account the major scientific significance of Sofia’s work and her important role in the Russian Academy of Sciences,” Panyutina says.

“It seems to me that today this state is devouring everything living, inside and out. The regime sees a threat in people who can put two and two together and are fairly uncompromising about it. Scientists have things they value above everything else: science, nature, geese, zoology. Many people can compromise; scientists can be extraordinarily stubborn in that respect. What will happen to Russian science next? I think its future is what the late ayatollah called a ‘jihad of knowledge’ — when every scientist must prove their usefulness to the Islamic Revolution in its struggle against the West. Now every scientist, every field of science, has to prove its usefulness in the war Russia has declared on civilization,” Kolmanovsky says.

According to Haaretz, Israel declined to intervene in Rosenfeld’s case, even though she holds an Israeli passport. After she was charged, she sought assistance from the Israeli Embassy in Moscow, but was told that the Israeli authorities could not intervene in decisions by Russian law enforcement because she also holds Russian citizenship.

The post A Bird That Wouldn’t Migrate: How Ornithologist Sofia Rosenfeld Was Sentenced to Three and a Half Years in a Penal Colony for Two Donations appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

The Millennium Puzzle: The Navier–Stokes Equations and the Unsettling September of 2026

By: ak
29 September 2026 at 10:02

September brought a flurry of developments in the use of AI in mathematics. The biggest, though far from the only one, was OpenAI’s publication of a solution to the Millennium Prize Problem concerning the Navier–Stokes equations. The announcement set off a heated debate about AI’s impact on the future of science. T-invariant looks at OpenAI’s result and the events that followed it (spoiler: mathematics has changed, and it was AI that changed it).

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On September 8, OpenAI published a press release titled “On the Navier–Stokes Millennium Prize Problem.” It announced that an internal company model (not yet released and more powerful than GPT-6 Astra) had solved one of the Millennium Prize Problems posed by the Clay Mathematics Institute in 2000. OpenAI’s proof was linked right below the headline: a paper in conventional mathematical notation and a formal proof in the Lean language. The company said it would not claim the Clay Institute’s $1 million prize.

The press release refers to work on the Euler equations (a problem closely related to the Navier–Stokes problem; more on it below) by mathematicians Levent Alpöge (an Anthropic employee) and Tristan Buckmaster (a professor of mathematics at New York University). OpenAI acknowledged that it turned its attention to the Navier–Stokes problem on September 1, after hearing rumors that two Millennium Problems had been solved. Building on a theory that mathematicians had developed over nearly two centuries, OpenAI then solved the Millennium Problem in 88 hours using 10,000 agents. Another 17 hours went into formalizing the proof in Lean, which confirmed that it was correct.

The image shows a local incompressible flow. Orange indicates faster angular rotation, turquoise slower rotation. The circulation speed depends on the radius. The trajectories show inward spiraling motion and axial stretching. Illustration: OpenAI

OpenAI’s result drew enormous attention, not only from mathematicians but from the broader public. Today, nearly every educated person has heard of the Clay Prize. That’s not because non-specialists have a deep grasp of the Millennium Problems, but because of the scandal surrounding the first problem on the Clay list to be solved (there are seven in all): the Poincaré conjecture. In 2010, the $1 million prize was awarded to Grigori Perelman, who turned it down. Perelman explained that he disagreed with the decision to give the award to him alone: in his view, the American mathematician Richard Hamilton had contributed just as much to the proof. So no one received the Clay Prize that time. It looks like no one will collect the prize for the second Millennium Problem either.

The other reason for the extraordinary buzz around OpenAI’s proof is far more topical. All sorts of people are asking: “If AI can really solve problems of incredible difficulty at the very frontier of mathematics, does that mean artificial intelligence has beaten humans — and that first programmers and now even top-tier mathematicians are no longer needed?” To begin answering that question, we need at least a rough idea of what the Navier–Stokes equations are and what kind of solution OpenAI found.

A Cup of Tea and the Navier–Stokes Equations

Picture an ordinary cup of tea. You pick up a teaspoon and start stirring. If you move the spoon in circles, a funnel (a vortex) forms in the cup. Stop stirring, and the funnel quickly smooths out. Let’s use this simple example to formulate the Navier–Stokes problem.

The spoon is an external force acting on the liquid. As long as you keep stirring (the external force is acting), the funnel holds; if you take the spoon out (the force drops to zero), the funnel keeps spinning for a while under its own momentum and then smooths out. What smooths it out is internal friction, or viscosity. Different liquids have different viscosities: water, for instance, is far less viscous than honey. In honey, it is harder to produce even a small funnel (you need to apply a large external force).

The Navier–Stokes equations are essentially Newton’s second law for an incompressible viscous fluid. The French mathematician Claude-Louis Navier proposed the first version of the equations back in 1822 — more than 200 years ago. The most convincing derivation was given by the British mathematician George Stokes in an 1845 paper. The Navier–Stokes equations worked beautifully, and they still do. But mathematicians are always interested in limits: when does a model start to break down? Newtonian mechanics, for example, starts to “glitch” in applications as familiar as the navigation app on your phone. The model has to be rebuilt, or GPS won’t work. Today’s navigation systems account for both the satellites’ velocity and the difference in gravity between the Earth’s surface and orbit; here, it is not Newton’s laws that apply, but relativity (both special and general).

For the Navier–Stokes equations, the limit of applicability is the possibility of a “blowup”: can the fluid’s velocity become “infinite” in finite time under a finite external force? That would mean the model breaks down under such conditions. This is the Millennium Problem.

OpenAI says: yes, it can. We’ll begin our discussion of the problem with the Euler equations. They describe an ideal incompressible fluid — that is, a fluid with no viscosity. If you stir such a fluid with a spoon, the funnel will never smooth out (here we ignore friction against the walls of the cup). There are two problems for the Euler equations: one with an external force and one without.

These problems ask the same question as the Navier–Stokes problem: can you stir the tea so cleverly that the funnel behaves in a completely unusual way — speeding up until its rotation becomes infinitely fast? It all began with a solution to the Euler equations with external forcing. Alpöge and Buckmaster reported that they had solved this problem. They showed that the force acting on an ideal fluid can be chosen so that the fluid “blows up”: the vortex reaches infinite speed even though both the applied force and the time are finite. Buckmaster used an internal Anthropic model to find the solution, but for the previous two months he had been working with OpenAI Codex. This is what raised suspicions that OpenAI had “peeked” at the solution, though the company insists nothing of the sort happened. But by the company’s own admission, the rumor that a solution to one of the open problems on the Clay Institute’s list (no one knew which) might have been found was what set things in motion: a huge multi-agent system was launched, with AI agents working intensively alongside a team of OpenAI mathematicians and engineers.

At first, the team tried to tackle every variant of every open Millennium Problem at once, along with simpler related problems. The first to give way was the Euler problem without external forcing. Can the initial conditions (the velocity distribution) be chosen so that even after we take the spoon out of the cup, the vortex keeps spinning up on its own until it reaches infinite speed? One group of agents solved this Euler problem: they found an ingenious initial velocity distribution such that, even after the external force stopped acting (we took the spoon out), the vortex spun up to infinite speed. Once this very hard problem was solved, all resources were thrown at the Navier–Stokes equations — which, unlike the Euler equations, describe a viscous fluid. Finding a force that, in finite time, produces a vortex with infinite speed in a viscous fluid is much harder: viscosity smooths the vortex out and damps it.

OpenAI was deliberately going after the Millennium Problem itself: the Navier–Stokes equations with an external force and viscosity. These are, in fact, perfectly normal physical conditions — but the solution it found was, to put it mildly, “abnormal.” OpenAI did solve the Millennium Problem, fair and square, but mathematicians had hoped for something different from the proof. They expected not an elaborate counterexample, but a deeper understanding of turbulence. Many were disappointed.

Under the terms of the Millennium Problem, the external force acting on the fluid must be “infinitely smooth” (the function itself and all its derivatives must be differentiable). OpenAI’s agents assembled this force literally piece by piece, like a jigsaw puzzle. The pieces were fitted together so precisely that they stretched and twisted the vortex; each piece depended on scale, and together they formed an infinitely smooth forcing. Mathematicians had tried many times to solve this problem, but no human can hold in their head, let alone write down, a vast number of different conditions that constantly have to be readjusted. The AI agents pulled it off.

But one more version of the Millennium Problem remains: the Navier–Stokes equations without an external force. What happens then? Can you set a viscous fluid spinning, take the spoon out, and simply watch the vortex accelerate to infinite speed? (Recall that for an ideal fluid, the AI agents did solve this problem.) Mathematicians expected the solution with external forcing to provide a clue to this even harder problem. But the unforced Navier–Stokes problem has held out. It remains open to this day.

The Fields Medalists’ Statement

On September 11 (three days after OpenAI’s press release), a group of Fields Medalists (the Fields Medal is the most prestigious award in mathematics) signed an open letter titled “A Severe Misalignment of AI in Mathematics.”. To date, 28 people have signed it. Among them are leading authorities from every generation: the patriarch Pierre Deligne (who received the medal in 1978), Terence Tao (2006), and rising stars Peter Scholze (2018) and Maryna Viazovska (2022). Six mathematicians trained in the Soviet and Russian mathematical school also signed: Vladimir Drinfeld, Maxim Kontsevich, Grigory Margulis, Andrei Okounkov, Stanislav Smirnov, and Efim Zelmanov (none of whom works in Russia today). The 28 signatories make up more than half of all living Fields Medalists. A collective statement like this is unprecedented.

What alarmed them? The laureates’ manifesto identifies several threats. The first and most important: AI companies are using famous problems as benchmarks. Their message is: look what we can do — buy our tokens, and you can do it too. But the goal of mathematics is not a “true/false” answer plus a thousand pages of unreadable proof code, even if that code is correct. Mathematics seeks to understand the world, and answers like these are more likely to close off paths than to deliver new understanding. Second, with results being published in such a rush, questions of authorship and plagiarism are bound to arise. The prospect of machines being trained on their conjectures and ideas is pushing mathematicians to hide their results: they are afraid to discuss ideas on social media and won’t even present unfinished work at conferences. And that is very bad: science is a collective enterprise. Third, mathematics lives through its students, who grow by solving hard problems. If a neural network does this quickly and incomprehensibly, the human chain of passing on knowledge and training new scientists will simply break.

But here’s the question: can this process be stopped, and should it be? Opinions differ.

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On September 21, an advisory group on the use of AI in mathematics was set up at the Institute for Advanced Study in collaboration with OpenAI. It includes nine prominent mathematicians, among them Fields Medalists Timothy Gowers, Edward Witten, and — rather surprisingly — Martin Hairer, who had signed the “Severe Misalignment” letter along with his colleagues. In effect, there is no hard line between mathematicians who are betting on AI methods and those who hold more traditional views. Terence Tao is a vivid example: he is trying to slow AI companies down a little, while also making extensive use of AI methods in his own work.

How to Read 166 Pages of Unreadable Text Overnight

On September 4, Anthropic issued a press release announcing: “We are sharing the first complete computer-checked proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem. Claude worked largely autonomously over 11 days to write the proof in the Lean programming language.” Claude wrote Lean programs to check a proof that built on the Wiles–Taylor result. And Lean confirmed that the proof was correct. In fact, for mathematics, this result may be even more important than the puzzle OpenAI put together. You no longer have to take the author’s word for it, rely on authority and collective consensus, or check every step yourself. Let Lean do it.

Here’s a historical example. Vladimir Arnold recalled getting to know the eminent mathematician René Thom (Fields Medalist, 1958): “And indeed, in 1965 it was Thom I became closest friends with. The only trouble was that I simply could not understand his theorem from the paper ‘Topological Models in Biology,’ where he laid the foundations of catastrophe theory. For a couple of decades, Thom gave me the same perfectly clear answer to my questions about this theorem: ‘There will always be fools to find proofs for our theorems.’ In the end, I asked my graduate student B. A. Khesin to sort the matter out, and he discovered that the theorem Thom had announced many decades earlier was false. Specifically, Thom claimed that the number of ‘elementary catastrophes’ … is seven (for the four parameters of our space-time). It turned out, however, that this ‘number of Thom’s catastrophes’ cannot be less than 13 (and, what’s more, no one knows to this day whether their number is even finite, or whether there are infinitely many different catastrophes).”

For “a couple of decades,” no “fool” turned up to check René Thom’s result. And this is not an isolated case. Today, Lean could handle such a task — and it certainly wouldn’t need “a couple of decades.”

It would be completely unfair to say that OpenAI “didn’t do anything — it just unleashed a swarm of agents on the problem.” OpenAI’s mathematicians and engineers conducted a huge orchestra of AI agents that searched for those very puzzle pieces, formulated hypotheses, checked them with Lean, discarded the false ones, used the correct ones — and all the while communicated both with each other and with humans. Setting up a system like that and getting it to work is an outstanding achievement.

On September 17, three mathematicians who are well-known experts on the Navier–Stokes equations published a paper that placed OpenAI’s proof within the broader development of fluid dynamics. Peter Constantin, Mihaela Ignatova, and Vlad Vicol proved that the type of blowup OpenAI constructed is impossible when there is no forcing (or when the forcing is analytic). Whether a blowup of some other form is possible is still unknown, but the way OpenAI assembled its puzzle won’t work there.

But perhaps even more interesting than the result is how the mathematicians worked. They had nine days to prepare and release the preprint. And it isn’t a short preprint, either: 34 pages. Of course, they had a great deal of prior work to draw on, but the speed is simply astonishing. In the paper itself, they describe how it came together.

The mathematicians used publicly available versions of Claude (Opus 5 and Fable 5.1 in Claude Code) and ChatGPT (Sol and Astra in Codex). They write: “By far the heaviest use of these AI systems was in deciphering the statements of the OpenAI paper. Claude and ChatGPT were used to analyze that manuscript, and over the course of several interactive sessions the main properties of the solutions in the OpenAI construction were extracted… These properties were subsequently cross-checked against the publicly available PDF version of and the Lean code released by OpenAI.”

Once the mathematicians understood what OpenAI had done, they turned to their own work. First, they gave the AI agents their published papers and handed them a draft of the new paper containing the main theorem. Claude and ChatGPT were used to turn this draft into a manuscript with complete proofs of every statement. The text was then reworked in Claude Code under the authors’ direct guidance and supervision; this process involved not only stylistic editing but also checking every mathematical calculation. The mathematicians write: “Every suggestion, computation, and reference produced by the AI systems was independently verified and, where necessary, corrected or reformulated by the authors, who take full responsibility for the manuscript as it is presently written.”

Doing all this work without AI in such a short time would have been impossible. The 166-page paper written by OpenAI’s agents really is unreadable — but unreadable for humans; for AI, it is a perfectly accessible text. In other words, human mathematicians were not cut out of writing the paper. On the contrary, their work sped up many times over.

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Vladimir Voevodsky’s Program

In 2012, Fields Medalist Vladimir Voevodsky said in an interview: “Pure mathematics works with models of a high level of abstraction and low complexity (mathematicians like to call this low complexity elegance). Applied mathematics works with models that are more concrete but highly complex (many variables, equations, and so on). Interesting applications of the ideas of modern pure mathematics most likely lie in the domain of high abstraction and high complexity. This domain is practically inaccessible today, largely because of the human brain’s limited ability to work with such models. Once we learn to use computers to work with abstract mathematical objects, this problem will gradually fade into the background, and interesting applications of the ideas of today’s abstract mathematics will emerge.”

The 166-page proof built by 10,000 agents falls squarely within that domain of “high abstraction and high complexity” the human brain cannot handle. Yet Peter Constantin and his colleagues managed it with the help of AI. In the same interview, Voevodsky estimated how long it would take to formalize his own proof of the Milnor conjecture in the Coq system as it existed in 2012: about 3–4 years. Formalizing OpenAI’s proof took 17 hours.

In 2012, Voevodsky’s words sounded like science fiction. Today, this is routine work. His intuition was absolutely right, and one can only regret that Voevodsky did not live to see his program come to life.

The Unsettling September of 2026

September 2026 will be remembered by more than just mathematicians. Something profoundly important happened in those few short weeks. For now, it is hard even to gauge the consequences. But a few things can be said.

René Thom brushed it off: “There will always be fools to find proofs for our theorems.” September 2026 showed that such “fools” have indeed turned up — and they work faster and more reliably than humans: they find a construction in 88 hours and verify it in 17. But Thom had good reason to be confident: he was looking not for proofs, but for understanding. And this is where machines cannot yet replace humans. Constantin, Ignatova, and Vicol needed just nine days to figure out what OpenAI’s 166-page puzzle really is and where its limits lie. Perhaps this is what the new mathematics will look like: machines find and verify, humans understand.

Before September 2026, mathematicians asked: will AI be able to solve the great problems? Now the question is different: will humans always be able to understand those solutions? For now, they can — but with AI’s help, too.

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The post The Millennium Puzzle: The Navier–Stokes Equations and the Unsettling September of 2026 appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

Natalia Berloff and Mikhail Epstein are the new George Gamow award laureates

By: ak
13 October 2026 at 03:00

In accordance with the Regulations of the George Gamow® Award, established by the Russian American Science Association (RASA-America) in honor of the distinguished Russian American physicist Professor Georgy Antonovich Gamow (1904–1968), and to recognize members of the Russian-speaking scientific diaspora for outstanding achievements widely acknowledged by the scientific community, the 2026 G.A. Gamow Prize is awarded to Natalia Berloff and Mikhail N. Epstein.

Natalia Berloff, professor at the Cambridge University “For her groundbreaking contributions to quantum hydrodynamics and physics-inspired computing, and for her extraordinary breadth of interdisciplinary research connecting fundamental theoretical advances with experimental realizability and technological potential across the logistics, fintech, pharmaceutical, and data management sectors.”

Mikhail Epstein, professor at Emory University “For his pioneering contributions to the study of Russian postmodernism and conceptualism, significant advances in the philosophy and literary theory, construction of alternative concepts and propositions to multiple symbolic systems and theoretical models; and for his role as a public intellectual and advocate for the humanities and their transformative potential, articulating a vision of scholarship as a creative and forward-looking process.” 

“Gamow wrote that “it took less than an hour to make the atoms”. Nature solved an enormous many-body problem in an hour without executing a single instruction: the physics was the algorithm. Physics-inspired computing takes this literally. We write a hard optimization problem as the energy of a network of interacting spins, build that network out of real physics, condensates, coupled lasers, oscillators, and let it relax toward its lowest-energy state. Reading off that state reads off a solution: what a digital computer does by search, the hardware does by simply evolving. I thank the RASA and the Award Committee for this recognition, and I hope it draws more physicists, mathematicians and engineers into the question of how to make physics compute,” notes Natalia Berloff.

“The Gamow Award holds special significance for me. George Gamow embodied the kind of intellectual daring that bridges disciplines and crosses borders—a physicist whose thought ranged from the origins of the universe to the code of life, and who never lost the playful curiosity that makes science kin to the humanities. I see this award as a sign that the boundary between the sciences and the humanities is becoming ever more permeable—and that the humanities, no less than the sciences, can be a creative and world-transforming force,” Mikhail Epstein added.

Natalia Berloff is Professor of Applied Mathematics at the University of Cambridge’s Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics and a Fellow of Jesus College. Born in Orenburg, she graduated from Lomonosov Moscow State University and received her Ph.D. from Florida State University. After research and faculty positions at the University of California, Los Angeles, she joined Cambridge in 2002. She has been Director of Photonics at Skoltech (2013-2016) and a visiting researcher at Microsoft (2021-2023). Berloff’s research concerns coherence in non-equilibrium quantum systems: superfluids and Bose-Einstein condensates of atoms, excitons and polaritons. Her group was among the first to propose polariton condensates and other optical systems as physical simulators and optimizers, and now develops physics-inspired computing, from Ising and XY machines to neuromorphic architectures and analog platforms for artificial intelligence. Her honors include an NIH/NHGRI Career Development Award and the Pilkington Prize. She leads the π-computing group, co-directs the UK Multidisciplinary Neuromorphic Center (NeuroSYNC) and chairs the American Physical Society’s Committee on International Freedom of Scientists.

Mikhail N. Epstein is a Russian-American philosopher, cultural theorist, and literary scholar—one of the founding theorists of Russian postmodernism. The unifying impulse of his work is the expansion of the thinkable: where scholarship usually describes what exists, Epstein constructs alternatives to prevailing theories and sign systems—possible philosophies, new disciplines, genres, concepts, and words. His work has given rise to the philosophy of the possible, transculture, and the transformative humanities—scholarship as a creative, world-changing force. In recent years he has been developing a philosophy of artificial intelligence as a new stage in the evolution of thought.

Educated at Moscow State University, Epstein moved to the United States in 1990. He is Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor Emeritus of Cultural Theory and Russian Literature at Emory University. He is the author of 50 books and numerous articles, translated into 26 languages. His honors include the Andrei Bely Prize (1991), the Liberty Prize (New York, 2000), and the MLA Scaglione Prize for the best book in Slavic studies (2023).

The award ceremony will take place as part of the 17th annual conference of the Russian American Science Association (RASA), which will take place on November 7-8,2026, at the Simpson Querrey Biomedical Research Center, Northwestern University (Chicago, Illinois) and will honor Andrei Sakharov – a brilliant physicist, Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and an enduring symbol of intellectual courage and integrity.

The RASA award has been established in 2015 in memory of Georgy Antonovich Gamow, an outstanding representative of the scientific diaspora, an influential Soviet and American theoretical physicist, astrophysicist and popularizer of science. Chemist Anna Krylov and historian Mikhail Yampolsky are its 2025’s laureates.

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Access Restricted: What Russia’s Concept for the Development of Mathematics through 2036 chooses not to see

By: ak
5 October 2026 at 09:39

Russian mathematics is losing ground, scientists are leaving, and international ties are fraying — yet the government’s new Concept for the Development of Mathematical Sciences through 2036 presents all of this almost as a force of nature. The number of researchers has “declined,” access to global science has been “restricted,” and the country’s competitive edge is at risk of being “lost.” Who restricted what, where the scientists went, and why Russia is losing influence, the document hardly explains. T-invariant read the Concept and found a striking picture: global mathematics appears in it as something like a warehouse to which access must be “ensured” — preferably along with additional funding.

On September 24, 2026, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed Directive No. 2631-r approving the Concept for the Development of Mathematical Sciences in the Russian Federation through 2030 and in the Long Term through 2036 (the Concept). The full text of the document is available here. At a meeting with his deputy prime ministers on September 28, Mishustin explained that the document is meant to “ensure the active application of fundamental research in high-priority, high-tech fields.” In his words, this “will open up additional opportunities not only for industry, medicine, and agriculture, but also for energy, aircraft manufacturing, and the space industry.” Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko has been put in charge of overseeing its implementation.

The Concept’s stated goal is “to achieve and strengthen Russia’s position in the mathematical sciences in order to ensure the state’s technological leadership, competitiveness, independence, and security.”

The Concept runs to about twenty pages. It opens with reflections on the role of mathematics in the world, then describes the “current state of affairs” and the tools for achieving its objectives. The main tool is the Program of Fundamental Scientific Research in the Russian Federation for the Long Term (2021–2030), adopted on December 31, 2020, and substantially amended on December 25, 2025 (the Program). In addition, a network of international and regional mathematical centers is expected to play an important role in developing mathematics. The document closes with a table of four indicators under two scenarios: a target scenario and a conservative one.

Negative Growth

If the Concept is to be believed, mathematics in Russia is developing quite normally. There are, admittedly, a few difficulties: “At the same time, unfavorable trends have persisted… In 2020–2024, the number of researchers in the group of scientific specialties 1.1, ‘Mathematics and Mechanics,’ fell by 24.3 percent, including a 20.3 percent drop among holders of advanced degrees. In research training, the share of graduates who defended dissertations among all graduates of PhD programs in field group 01.00.00, ‘Mathematics and Mechanics,’ rose in 2020–2022 (from 10.6 to 17.9 percent), but this growth gave way to a decline in 2023–2024 (to 11.2 percent).”

Apparently, something happened in 2022 that made PhD graduates far less likely to defend their dissertations. But the authors of the Concept have an answer: “The trends described are caused by a combination of factors, including the low level of material support and social guarantees for graduate students, scientists, and faculty, which does not match their actual workload and adversely affects both the quality of teaching and research activity. In addition, access is restricted to scientific and technical information in mathematics and related sciences contained in international citation and analytics databases, including scientific monographs, analytical reviews, and other sources of information.”

The answer is simple: raise salaries and “ensure access.” If such measures were enough to advance Russian mathematics, then it really would be in fine shape. But the Concept warns that unless something changes now, “within the next 10 years the Russian Federation will lose its competitive advantage in training research and teaching personnel in mathematics.” The conservative scenario shows a gradual contraction: mathematicians’ share of all researchers falls from 2.8 percent in 2026 to 1.8 percent by 2036. The Concept admits that unless the salary problem is solved and access is “ensured,” Russian mathematics will shrink by more than a third. So the government had better hurry.

History of Mathematics: The Unwritten Chapters

The Concept includes a section on the glorious traditions of Soviet mathematics. It mentions the November 13, 1986, resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR Council of Ministers On Strengthening Research in Mathematics and Its Applications and Improving the Working and Living Conditions of Scientists. According to the authors of the Concept, implementing this resolution “contributed to steady progress” that has allowed Russia “to maintain world leadership in a number of areas of mathematical research to this day.” True, some problems did arise, but they were successfully overcome: “The Soviet school of mathematics held leading positions in the main areas of the mathematical sciences. The socioeconomic and political upheavals of the late 1980s and the 1990s led to an outflow of scientific personnel abroad and into other sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation managed to preserve its high potential and global competitiveness in mathematics and related sciences.”

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Anyone who remembers the late 1980s will read this with a bitter smile. Three or four years after the 1986 resolution was adopted, the largest exodus of mathematicians in the country’s history began. Many of those who had made the Soviet school of mathematics famous left for Princeton, Berkeley, Paris, Bonn, and Tel Aviv. Today, every Fields Medalist who came out of the Soviet school — Grigory Margulis, Vladimir Drinfeld, Efim Zelmanov, Maxim Kontsevich, Andrei Okounkov, and Stanislav Smirnov — works abroad. The only Fields Medalist who stayed in Russia, Grigori Perelman (awarded in 2006), has not published any new work in twenty years.

The second historical episode is just as telling. The Concept cites as an example Kolmogorov’s 1957 theorem on representing continuous functions of several variables as superpositions of functions of one variable and addition. According to the Concept’s authors, the theorem “created the theoretical foundation for the effectiveness of neural network architecture.” That is a gross exaggeration. Together with Arnold’s result, Kolmogorov’s theorem settled Hilbert’s 13th problem — a remarkable achievement, but one only indirectly related to neural networks. The real theoretical grounding for neural networks comes from entirely different theorems that appeared much later, in the 1980s. Interest in Kolmogorov’s construction revived only in 2024 with the emergence of the KAN neural network architecture, and its practical value is still an open question.

Yet Soviet and Russian science has made genuine contributions to machine learning. These include Vapnik–Chervonenkis theory and Nesterov’s accelerated method, both widely used in today’s neural networks. Vladimir Vapnik and Yurii Nesterov are both still working — but not in Russia. In 2024, Vapnik received RASA-America’s George Gamow Award. Nesterov, a professor at the University of Louvain, received the Gauss Prize this summer and delivered a special plenary lecture at the International Congress of Mathematicians. Their contributions to machine learning are beyond dispute. Yet for some reason, the Concept points to a decades-old result by Kolmogorov.

Invisible Supercomputers

The section on supercomputers is a frank admission of how far behind Russia has fallen. The best academic machine named in the Concept, Lomonosov-2, no longer appears in the current TOP500 list (as of June 23, 2026). The document says Lomonosov-2 ranks 451st, but that stopped being true long ago: all of the TOP500 data it cites are from 2025 or even earlier and do not reflect the list as it stands today. All of the Russian machines on the TOP500 belong to private companies — Yandex and Sber. The most powerful of them, Chervonenkis, has a peak performance of 29.4 petaflops (ranked 101st). The Concept speaks of the need to develop “Russian computing resources based on open hardware architectures.” This can be read as an admission that modern Nvidia processors are hard to come by in Russia: they are not supplied legally, and gray-market channels are unreliable and cannot meet demand.

The Lomonosov-2 supercomputer. Photo: hi-tech.mail.ru

Among the countries ahead of Russia on the TOP500 list (Russia has slipped to the bottom of the top 20) is the Netherlands. Listed under the Netherlands are two machines owned by Nebius, the company led by former Yandex head Arkady Volozh: ISEG and ISEG2, with a combined peak performance of about 425 petaflops. By the Concept’s own figures, the five Russian machines on the TOP500 together deliver less than 100 petaflops of peak performance. In other words, Arkady Volozh’s company alone has more computing power than all of Russia’s TOP500 systems combined.

[[socialnetworks]]

The TOP500 is a list of machines (and not all of them, only those whose developers have submitted their systems) ranked by high-precision performance on the Linpack benchmark. It is a good “yardstick” for comparing computing power for climate modeling or numerical solutions to fluid dynamics problems. Neural networks, which the Concept’s authors keep bringing up, run today on low-precision arithmetic, and for such computations the same GPUs deliver orders of magnitude more operations. AI workloads are handled by other machines. The world’s largest AI clusters, owned by xAI, Meta, OpenAI, or Google, do not appear on the TOP500, and neither do the largest Chinese AI clusters. The document invokes the AI race to justify developing Russian supercomputers, but it talks about machines that are only indirectly relevant to that race: they were not built for it.

Among the priority problems listed in the Program is this one: “Differential equations are essential for modeling all physical, technical, or biological processes, from celestial motion to bridge design and interactions between neurons. The central problem in this field remains the global existence of smooth solutions to the three-dimensional Navier–Stokes system, which describes the motion of a viscous Newtonian fluid and underlies fluid dynamics. It is also one of the ‘Millennium Prize Problems.’” A team of mathematicians, engineers, and AI agents working on an AI cluster owned by OpenAI has proved the opposite: rather than existing globally, a solution can “blow up” even under a smooth external force. This was a huge step forward in the study of the Navier–Stokes equations. Yet the Concept didn’t even notice these machines (after all, they aren’t on the TOP500): it cares only about classical supercomputers traditionally used for mathematical modeling, and today that is no longer enough.

Just Give Us Access

Several times, almost word for word, the Concept repeats the same formula: Russian scientists must be guaranteed “access… to scientific and technical information… contained in international citation and analytics databases.” Once, it says that this access is “restricted.” By whom, when, and why it was “restricted” is never specified.

But on the whole, mathematicians don’t suffer much from this “restricted access.” Many results are published open access, preprints are posted on arxiv.org, and authors upload their papers (and even monographs) to academic social networks. Colleagues working in the same area also rarely refuse to share their papers with one another.

What Russian mathematicians really do need is legal “access” — but not to papers. Vladimir Arnold wrote: “Mathematics is a part of physics. Physics is an experimental science, a part of natural science. Mathematics is the part of physics where experiments are cheap.” One can argue about whether mathematics is part of physics, but the claim that mathematical experiments are cheap no longer holds up: they simply aren’t. What’s more, with the rise of neural networks, mathematics is becoming a very expensive science. The 88 hours of work by 10,000 AI agents searching for a solution to the Navier–Stokes equations, plus another 17 hours spent verifying the results, cost OpenAI (by its own estimate) millions of dollars. And that was just one problem, albeit a great one. This is the kind of “access” Russian mathematicians lack. Russia has no “sovereign” AI clusters comparable in power to OpenAI’s machines — and, as the work of Arkady Volozh’s Nebius shows, it would have them, were it not for the events the Concept never mentions.

The Concept portrays global science as a warehouse to which “access must be ensured,” rather than as a community to take part in: publishing in top journals, attending conferences, working with leading mathematicians from other countries. Yet this is precisely where Russian mathematicians face their biggest problems: they can’t pay open-access publication fees, their coauthors have scattered around the world, a Russian affiliation makes things awkward, and traveling to a conference is risky.

As one of its development tools, the Concept names a network of mathematical centers, above all four “world-class international mathematical centers”: the Steklov Mathematical Institute, the Moscow Center for Fundamental and Applied Mathematics, the Euler International Mathematical Institute in St. Petersburg, and the “mathematical center in Akademgorodok” (oddly, not capitalized as a proper name). There is nothing “international” about how these centers are described today. Their mission, according to the Concept’s authors, is “to promote the interests of the Russian school of mathematics worldwide,” not to engage in active collaboration.

The Russian Academy of Sciences is mentioned in the Concept many times and is given a separate section on its “role in the development of the mathematical and related sciences.” There, the Academy is described in the present tense and exclusively with active verbs: it “develops,” “takes into account,” “participates,” “carries out.” Among the Concept’s objectives is “scaling up the system of scientific and methodological guidance” — in other words, expanding the powers of the Academy itself. Universities are barely mentioned.

Yet three of the four “world-class centers” are consortia with universities. The Moscow center includes Moscow State University (its Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics, Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics, and Research Computing Center) together with two institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Euler Institute’s lead institution is St. Petersburg State University. The Akademgorodok center brings together the Sobolev Institute of Mathematics and Novosibirsk State University. The document lists the centers but carefully “erases” any mention of universities, even when a university is the lead institution.

An Unenviable Share

All four of the Concept’s target indicators are shares: mathematicians as a share of all researchers, the same share for computer science, and two ratios of dissertation defenses to the number of students admitted to PhD programs. There is not a single absolute number, and no quality indicators either. Perhaps the Concept’s authors mean that some absolute numbers and quality indicators (including the percentage of publications in White List journals [Russia’s official list of recognized academic journals — T-invariant]) can be found in the Program, but that should have been stated explicitly.

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Shares have a well-known property: they grow not only when the numerator goes up, but also when the denominator goes down. Cut the number of physicists and chemists, and the share of mathematicians will “grow” even if not a single mathematician has been added. The share can rise even as the number of mathematicians falls, as long as everyone else is declining faster. A document that promises “accelerated development” has chosen a metric by which the shrinking of science can look like a success for mathematics.

Mathematics, meanwhile, has a “yardstick” that can’t be gamed by cutting chemists: the number of invited speakers at the International Congress of Mathematicians. At the 2026 congress in Philadelphia, according to our count based on the official list, there were three sectional talks with a Russian affiliation and not a single plenary.

In 2022, the International Congress of Mathematicians was supposed to take place in St. Petersburg. Many Russian mathematicians were involved in preparing it, and the bid had been championed by Fields Medalists Stanislav Smirnov and Andrei Okounkov, who were then actively working in Russia. But the congress was relocated and held online. Smirnov and Okounkov removed their Russian affiliations from the congress materials. Even so, HSE University and the Steklov Institute fielded five speakers, two of them plenary. In addition, Nikolai Andreev received the Leelavati Prize for popularizing mathematics, and there were invited speakers from St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk. Overall, Russian mathematics was well represented at the congress. But four years have passed, and a lot has changed.

How many Russian mathematicians were invited to the 2026 congress but declined is unknown: the International Mathematical Union does not publish refusals. But consider the climate in which Russian scientists were deciding whether to attend. Since 2022, Article 275.1 of the Russian Criminal Code has made “confidential cooperation” with a foreign state or organization a crime. To bring charges under this article, it is enough to establish the mere fact of contact. According to data from Mediazona, 82 people had been convicted under this article by fall 2025. On January 26, 2026, half a year before the congress, Deputy Minister of Science and Higher Education Konstantin Mogilevsky sent out a letter. It advised scientists to “carefully assess the nature of events for possible politicization,” to weigh the “advisability of participating” in events held in “unfriendly” countries [Russia’s official term for states that have imposed sanctions on it — T-invariant], and to inform the ministry. The 2026 congress was held in the United States. In a climate like this, you’d think long and hard before accepting even an invitation as prestigious as speaking at the International Congress of Mathematicians.

The Concept does contain some things that are unquestionably right. It calls for a “decent salary” for mathematicians and teachers, and for stipends that let graduate students study and do research “without having to take” side jobs. It acknowledges the shortage of math teachers and identifies math circles and olympiads as the core of the tradition, to be made accessible regardless of family income. Any mathematician would sign on to that. But young mathematicians don’t leave the country just for the pay. They go where they can publish freely, attend conferences, work with the best people in their field, and not worry about what an email exchange or a meeting with a coauthor from another country might cost them.

Impersonal Sentences

The strongest impression the Concept leaves is not any particular figure or error, but the document’s style. The number of researchers has “declined.” Access is “restricted.” The competitive advantage may be “lost.” All of this just happens on its own, like fog rolling in or the weather turning bad. The Concept contains no war, no sanctions, no post-2022 emigration, no criminal cases, no relocated 2022 International Congress of Mathematicians. There is only a “combination of factors,” chief among them low salaries.

It is impossible to believe that the document’s authors are unaware of all this. It is equally clear that a 2026 government Concept cannot name the causes, and impersonal phrasing makes it possible to ask for money by blaming “bad weather.” The document records the decline but leaves out what caused it. And so it seems as though the decline can be fought with higher salaries, stipends, and new Kolmogorov prizes. But that won’t work.

T-invariant has been keeping its Chronicles of the Persecution of Scientists for three years now. Instead of studying in Paris, the young and gifted Leonid Katz is sitting in pretrial detention. Azat Miftakhov, instead of talking with colleagues at international conferences, is writing his study of Chui’s conjecture in a prison in Dimitrovgrad. Andrey Dymov, an associate professor in the Faculty of Mathematics at HSE University who was named best teacher in 2022 and 2024–2025, is now awaiting transfer to a penal colony to serve a three-and-a-half-year sentence instead of teaching students. Distinguished Professor Mikhail Volkov has been dismissed from the department where he had worked for half a century and ordered to pay a fine. The Concept is deeply worried about Russia falling behind in supercomputing, yet Sergei Abramov, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a leading expert in parallel computing, has been barred from working, ordered to pay a fine, and stripped of his civil rights, and he waits for hours for his own pension to be released from his own account so that he doesn’t starve. These are far from all the mathematicians in our files. It is no surprise that their names are absent from the Concept. What is strange is that it reads as if their names were absent from its authors’ memory as well. And yet its authors are mathematicians, too. Some of them are even real ones.

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Chronicle of the Persecution of Scientists No. 37

By: ak
1 October 2026 at 04:09

T-invariant presents the latest regular report Chronicle of the Persecution of Scientists No. 37, dated September 30, 2026. The Russian government has approved the Concept for the Development of Mathematical Sciences through 2036. One of the key issues the Concept highlights is restricted access to international scientific and technical information. Below, we briefly comment on what access to foreign journals looks like today and what is at stake.

Update, October 5, 2026: Our full commentary on the Concept for the Development of Mathematical Sciences through 2036 is available here.

In this Chronicle, we will say a few words about how this “restricted access” has less to do with science than with the repressive policies of a state that interferes with scientists’ normal work.

Mathematics has always been — and still is — one indivisible whole. There is no such thing as “sovereign” or “national” mathematics. Any attempt at isolation inevitably leads to rapid decline. Mathematicians in Russia need to read the work of mathematicians in America and Europe. But the reverse is also true: even during the Cold War, Western mathematicians tried to keep up their collaboration with Soviet colleagues, and the major Soviet mathematical journals were translated into English.

In the internet age, one would think nothing could stop scientists from sharing their knowledge and results. Yet since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022, the situation has grown increasingly difficult. The dialogue is breaking down.

As T-invariant reported, starting January 1, 2027, Pleiades Publishing, which works with Springer Nature, will stop producing English-language versions of 108 Russian academic journals. According to the Pleiades catalog, these include Doklady Mathematics, Mathematical Notes, and Proceedings of the Steklov Institute of Mathematics. It is unclear who will translate these journals or whether they will remain indexed in international databases. Meanwhile, the English versions of Sbornik: Mathematics, Izvestiya: Mathematics, and Russian Mathematical Surveys, published jointly with the London Mathematical Society, were suspended back in 2022.

Many Russian mathematicians are fluent in English and could, in principle, submit their papers directly to international journals. But the sanctions policies of many publishers, combined with the policies of the Russian authorities, make this difficult and even risky (T-invariant examined this situation in detail in “Black Mark in the ‘White List’”).

T-invariant has written about the “Yaroslavl admins,” who were fined in cases brought by the FSB. Here is a quick recap. Website administrators at as many as four universities in Yaroslavl were fined. The cases were initiated by the FSB Directorate for the Yaroslavl Region. The university employees were accused of hosting on their websites materials and dissertations in which FSB officers had found references to publications linked to “undesirable” organizations [foreign and international organizations banned in Russia; any involvement with them is punishable by law — T-invariant]. The case against Yaroslav Renin centered on a dissertation that cited Yale University, which has been declared “undesirable.” The Prosecutor General’s Office has also declared Stanford University, the University of California, Berkeley, and Tufts University undesirable. All of these universities have strong math departments. Some very serious mathematicians work there. And they publish papers.

Suppose the calls in the Concept for the Development of Mathematical Sciences through 2036 are heeded, and Russian scientists gain official access to the work of their colleagues at Yale. What are they supposed to do with that access? They won’t even be able to cite a single paper.

The situation is deeply alarming for Russian mathematicians: Russian journals and papers are becoming inaccessible in the West, while citing Western ones is becoming extremely risky. Say you cite a perfectly permissible journal today — one affiliated with Princeton University, for instance — and tomorrow the Prosecutor General’s Office declares Princeton “undesirable.” Your paper, or even your dissertation, will then have to be either rewritten or simply thrown in the trash. Why take that risk? Better to play it safe and not cite these potentially dangerous Western journals — or, better still, not read them at all.

New Cards

Tatyana Kudryavtseva

September 10, 2026. Tatyana Kudryavtseva, a professor at Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, was forced to resign after 30 years at the university over old Instagram posts containing “extremist symbols” [e.g., a photo of graffiti depicting Alexei Navalny — T-invariant]. She announced this on her page on the Russian social network VKontakte.

Tatiana Tatarinova

September 4, 2026. Russia’s Ministry of Justice added bioinformatics professor Tatiana Tatarinova to its register of foreign agents. According to the ministry, Tatarinova spread false information about decisions by the Russian authorities and about Russia’s electoral system, and also collaborated with foreign agents and distributed their materials, RBC reports.

Igor Zaitsev

July 31, 2026. Igor Zaitsev was detained on criminal charges of financing extremist activity, according to the Interior Ministry’s Main Directorate and the FSB Directorate for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region. The scientist faces up to eight years in prison, RBC reports.

Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences (FLAS)

August 29, 2026. The Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences in Montenegro has been added to the list of undesirable organizations on the Ministry of Justice website, T-invariant reports.

Updates

Nikolai Zyuzev

September 16, 2026. The Supreme Court of the Komi Republic [a region in northwestern Russia — T-invariant] sentenced Nikolai Zyuzev to seven years in a strict-regime penal colony in a case over developing a “project directed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation,” Mediazona reports. Zyuzev allegedly received more than €2 million from 12 organizations, including Germany’s Hanns Seidel Foundation and the German Council on Foreign Relations. “Zyuzev fully admitted his guilt in the crime he was charged with and exposed the other individuals involved,” the FSB press release states. FSB officials claim that Zyuzev was convicted of high treason (Article 275 of the Russian Criminal Code). Yet a year ago, he was detained and sent to a pretrial detention center on charges of confidential cooperation with foreigners (Article 275.1 of the Criminal Code).

Pavel Syutkin

September 15, 2026. Moscow’s Zyuzinsky District Court sentenced Pavel Syutkin to six years in a general-regime penal colony for spreading military “fakes” [i.e., “knowingly false information” about the Russian army — T-invariant], a Mediazona correspondent in the courtroom reports. The trial was held behind closed doors. Prosecutors had sought an eight-year sentence.

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

September 4, 2026. Moscow’s Gagarinsky District Court fined Ekaterina Zhuravskaya in an administrative case over ties to an “undesirable” organization, Mediazona reports. The case was brought over links she posted on X (formerly Twitter) to materials from Deutsche Welle, The Insider, Radio Liberty, TV Rain, and Meduza — seven posts in total, published between December 2024 and May 2026.

Misha Verbitsky

September 3, 2026. Misha Verbitsky was dismissed from IMPA, the Brazilian institute where he worked, over his LiveJournal posts, T-invariant reports. The editors have obtained the letter notifying him of the decision. It does not specify which posts led to his dismissal.

Vasilina Orlova

August 19, 2026. The Interior Ministry put Vasilina Orlova on its wanted list, Mediazona reports.

Her entry in the Interior Ministry’s database states that she is wanted under a criminal statute. It had not previously been reported that a criminal case had been opened against her. In 2024, Orlova was fined on an administrative charge of participating in the activities of an “undesirable” organization. The charge stemmed from the anthropologist’s online participation in the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum, held in Tokyo in 2023.

The post Chronicle of the Persecution of Scientists No. 37 appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

An Expedition to Prison: Why Philosopher Nikolay Zyuzev Was Sentenced to Seven Years

By: ak
28 September 2026 at 10:18

The Supreme Court of the Komi Republic has sentenced philosopher Nikolay Zyuzev to seven years in a strict-regime penal colony on treason charges. Zyuzev, who holds both Russian and Canadian citizenship, is one of the best-known scholars of the legacy of the Russian-American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin. He left Russia after the war began, but in the summer of 2025 he returned to his native village in Komi [a republic in northwestern Russia — T-invariant], where he was arrested. According to the FSB, the scholar was training leaders of national liberation movements among Russia’s small Indigenous peoples and receiving funding for his project from foreign organizations. T-invariant looks at what Zyuzev worked on, why he kept coming back to Russia, and what his friends and colleagues make of the treason charges.

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A Classic Liberal

In the summer of 2025, philosophy professor Nikolay Zyuzev traveled from Europe to his native village of Podyelsk in Komi to visit relatives. And then he vanished.

“After the war started, he left Russia, just like I did. Sometimes he came to see me in Europe. I was expecting him again in the fall of 2025. But that summer he went to Russia, even though we begged him not to. There was no way he wasn’t going — his relatives were waiting for him. I guess he figured he’d get away with it, that they wouldn’t touch him. He left. And one day he just stopped responding,” Zyuzev’s friend and former student Alexander (his name has been changed at his request) told T-invariant.

For about a month, there was no word from him. His relatives refused to talk, and his acquaintances had no idea what had happened to him.
“I started sounding the alarm. Mutual friends said he was probably off fishing in his village again. Then one night I snapped, grabbed my laptop, and did a little investigating. On a Komi court website, I found a record showing that his pretrial detention had been extended. So it turned out they’d taken him even earlier, sometime around the middle of the summer,” Alexander says.

The court record didn’t say why Zyuzev had been detained. In September 2025, the website of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic posted a notice that a criminal case had been opened against the scholar under Article 275.1 of the Russian Criminal Code, “Confidential cooperation with a foreign state or an international or foreign organization.” As Komi Daily reported, investigators searched Zyuzev’s house in the village of Podyelsk, in the Kortkerossky District, in the summer of 2025.

Zyuzev spent more than a year in pretrial detention. According to Alexander, his cell had a refrigerator, and he was taken out for an hour-long walk every day. In his free time, he read books from the prison library and solved chess problems. At the same time, Alexander says, the scholar went through bouts of depression brought on by loneliness and uncertainty. On June 10, 2026, Zyuzev marked his 70th birthday in his cell.

“We write to each other — I’ve gotten five letters so far. He’s in a fighting mood, though one letter was pretty sad. He jokingly calls his imprisonment a cultural-studies expedition to pretrial detention,” Alexander says.

His friends still can’t understand why the scholar decided to go back to Russia. His former colleague, journalist Nikolai Vokuev, has a guess: “I suspect he thought nobody was particularly interested in him and that he could spend the summer in his village. Besides, he’d frankly grown tired of other countries. He complained that he didn’t like the climate in Canada and that things there generally weren’t much to his liking. So he went to do some fishing and spend the summer in his village. And yet back in 2020, he was the one who strongly urged me to leave Russia — he said you can’t stay here. And then he went back himself. I don’t understand why he did it. After all his English-language publications, where he openly condemned the war and the regime’s policies in general, how could he take a risk like that? And whether he was even aware of the risk, I can’t say.”

Nikolay Zyuzev holds a Doctor of Sciences degree in philosophy [Russia’s higher doctorate, above the Candidate of Sciences — T-invariant]. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he taught at the Komi State Pedagogical Institute, Syktyvkar State University, and Ukhta State Technical University, where he chaired the philosophy department. Much of Zyuzev’s scholarship is devoted to the legacy of the Russian-American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin. Like Zyuzev, Sorokin was ethnically Komi. After the 1917 revolution, he opposed Bolshevik policies, and in 1922 he was expelled from the country. Sorokin later moved to the United States and founded Harvard University’s sociology department. Zyuzev wrote both his Candidate and Doctor of Sciences dissertations on Sorokin’s legacy and published several books about him. Two of them, Pitirim Aleksandrovich Sorokin and Pitirim Sorokin: Teachings and Life, came out in Syktyvkar in 2019.

Nikolay Zyuzev’s books on Pitirim Sorokin. Source: ESKOM publishing house website

In 2005–2006, Zyuzev was a visiting professor at Harvard University, where he gathered material for his book Pitirim Sorokin’s Roller Coaster. “In America, Sorokin started almost from scratch and fairly quickly ended up at Harvard — and that ‘roller coaster’ is exactly what Nikolay Zyuzev studied,” Alexei, a historian who specializes in the history of the Russian scholarly emigration, told T-invariant (his last name is withheld at his request).

In 2009, Zyuzev moved to Canada, where he taught at Massey College at the University of Toronto, and in 2015 he became a Canadian citizen. That same year, he returned to Komi and resumed teaching at Syktyvkar University.

“Nikolay was my professor when I was doing my master’s at Syktyvkar State University. An amazing teacher, one of those people who make you want to learn — he got me hooked on the humanities right away. His liberal views were close to mine — a classic liberal,” Alexander recalls.

The FSB’s Show-and-Tell Video

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Zyuzev left the country. Even so, he kept returning to his native village of Podyelsk from time to time. According to people who know him, Zyuzev missed home and the chance to teach in his native language.
“Nikolay speaks, teaches, and writes beautifully in English — he has no problems with it whatsoever. But I know from my own experience, having lived in Germany for more than 30 years: you can feel completely at ease in a foreign language, like a fish in water. And yet that cozy, at-home feeling you get when you speak your native language may simply not be there in another language,” Gasan Guseinov, a professor at the Free University [founded in 2020 by academics forced out of Russian universities — T-invariant] and a Doctor of Sciences in philology, told T-invariant. “Pitirim Sorokin reflected on his emigration, wrote a great deal about it, and was a bilingual Komi-Russian person. And although he was completely integrated into American life, he never became trilingual, even though he wrote in English. Nikolay sensed this. On the one hand, it’s a very personal topic, and on the other, a politically charged one these days.”

On September 16, 2026, news broke that the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic had sentenced Zyuzev to seven years in a strict-regime penal colony. By then, the charge had been reclassified as high treason. Media outlets cited the FSB’s Public Relations Center, which said the scholar had been “training leaders of movements for the liberation of Russia’s small peoples and developing a project directed against Russia’s sovereignty,” with funding from foreign foundations and organizations designated as undesirable in Russia. According to the FSB, the defendant pleaded guilty. In a video released by the FSB, Zyuzev says he originally planned to create an educational website for teaching the humanities, but European sponsors showed no interest in the project. What interested them far more, Zyuzev said in the FSB video, was “spreading false information about what is happening in Russia, inciting interethnic hatred, criticizing the policies of the Russian authorities, and destabilizing Russia as a whole by developing national movements.”

“In the video, he mentions that he wanted to do an educational project — we corresponded about that too, but it didn’t work out. What he says after that is obviously a script written by ‘Comrade Major’ [a sardonic nickname for a security-service officer — T-invariant]. Those aren’t his words, you can tell — all that stuff about him supposedly wanting to destabilize the country and so on. That’s just not how he puts things,” Vokuev says.

According to the FSB, Zyuzev received a total of €2 million from 12 foreign organizations. They reportedly included German, Czech, Swedish, French, and British foundations designated as undesirable in Russia.

“Anyone who knows what life is like for people like us abroad these days understands that the grant amounts attributed to him in the indictment are absolutely astronomical — seven figures, literally the budget of an entire research center. It’s a bit like those confessions from the 1930s about a tunnel that people from Central Asia were supposedly going to dig to India or Japan to hand over secret information about the Soviet state’s defenses. Utterly unbelievable nonsense. And there were lawyers, even defense attorneys, who added all this to the case file, sat through it, and raised no objections,” Alexei notes.

“It’s a show-and-tell video about what great guys we are, what a fine job we’re doing. Here’s this terrible professor, a Canadian citizen: look, he’s got euros, he’s got a Canadian passport, while you’re living here in poverty, and they’re over there in their Canada trying to destroy our great Russia. Somebody’s getting another star on his shoulder boards for this,” Alexander says. “They say he received two million euros. That’s laughable. I wouldn’t call him a poor man, but his finances are clearly not those of someone who’s received two million euros in grants. I don’t buy it.”

Small Peoples Tearing Russia Apart

According to Zyuzev’s colleagues, preserving the languages and cultures of Indigenous peoples has always been important to him.

Nikolay Zyuzev. Photo: Radio Liberty

“His project may have been aimed, roughly speaking, at developing regional identity, supporting the Komi language, supporting small peoples. But to the FSB, that doesn’t sound so impressive. Whereas training separatist squads… Sorry, but that makes it sound like they caught some foreign superspy engaged in subversion. I think that even if the project was about developing national identity and preserving these peoples’ languages and cultures, the FSB simply recut it into its own propaganda,” Alexander says.

According to Nikolai Vokuev, after the full-scale war in Ukraine began, the situation of Indigenous peoples started getting noticeably more attention in Komi.

“When the war started, this became a common theme. A kind of wave took off, a realization that this war is also a war against the Indigenous peoples who live in Russia. In that context, there was a lot of talk about the Buryats, who were being sent to the front en masse. I work for Komi Daily. Once, for an anniversary of the start of the war, we did a story trying to figure out how many people from different Komi municipalities had been killed. And we concluded that, proportionally, more people were sent from the villages where Komi is predominantly spoken. In other words, the war hits Komi speakers wildly out of proportion,” Vokuev notes.

Vokuev suspects that Zyuzev’s interest in the situation of Indigenous peoples may have been one of the reasons he came to the FSB’s attention:

“Here’s the thing — separatism. That’s what the FSB guys love. It’s what lets them build nice careers and show how hard they’re working. They didn’t want to pass up a chance like that. They don’t have to make anything up. Here you go, a case — attempts to break up the country. And their worries probably aren’t groundless. Starting in 2020, people began rethinking their relationship with Moscow. The Shies affair had a big influence on that [mass protests against the construction of a landfill at Shies station in Arkhangelsk Oblast that began in 2018 — T-invariant]. And you could easily hear people arguing that Moscow’s policy is a colonial policy. In the 2010s, that was an extremely marginal view, but after Shies, that’s exactly how people came to see their relationship with Moscow. So I think the FSB sank its tentacles into this for a reason.”

“Komi is going through total Russification, of course. Under the republic’s constitution, we have two state languages — Russian and Komi. But there was a case where a young guy was detained at a rally in support of Navalny, back in what were, relatively speaking, less bloodthirsty times. And he tried to speak Komi in court. The judge answered him pretty rudely, something like: you went to a Russian school, what is this circus? But where else am I supposed to speak Komi, if not in Komi?” Alexander recalls.

Guseinov believes the Zyuzev case poses a threat to all scholars who work on the languages of small peoples.

“When the Soviet Union was being built, the Bolsheviks destroyed the independence of small nations, from Georgia to Tuva. But back then, the official ideology was one of bilingualism: the national language plus Russian. Russian scholars worked on the so-called young written languages. That is, languages were given writing systems, then they got their own writers, some publishing houses, films were made. These languages were built up and even brought back to life. And in nine cases out of ten, this was done artificially — in the sense that the language wouldn’t have survived on its own; it needed help, it needed education. Then the Soviet Union collapsed, and that official doctrine fell apart too. And suddenly, overnight, in 2018, people are told that small languages are of no use to anyone [that year, Russia amended its education law to make the study of the national republics’ languages optional — T-invariant]. And when someone like Nikolay Zyuzev swims against the current and comes back home to educate people, to work on his own language, they throw him in prison for God knows what,” Guseinov notes.

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What May Have Caught the FSB’s Attention

According to Alexei, regional security services began taking an interest in humanities scholars long before the full-scale war in Ukraine: “The first talk I remember about local security officials in the regions actively calling humanities scholars in for ‘chats’ and narrowing their eyes knowingly whenever international research collaboration came up goes back to around 2007–2008. You’d think these were just distant clouds on the horizon, but it had already started: who are you working for, guys, whose money is paying for your publications — come on, let’s just have a little talk. This had been rolling through the regions for a long time and clearly started earlier than in Moscow and St. Petersburg. And it was aimed specifically at humanities scholars — historians, ethnologists, and sociologists.”
Zyuzev had laid out his views on the situation of the Komi people and on relations between Russia’s regions and the federal center in public. In January 2023, the Canadian current affairs magazine Maclean’s published a first-person account by Zyuzev, “I fled Putin’s Russia for Canada. It opened my eyes,” as told to journalist Adnan Khan. The piece also features in the FSB video about the Zyuzev case. In it, the scholar explained why he had left Russia, criticized Vladimir Putin’s policies, and wrote about the war in Chechnya and the murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

“Politkovskaya’s murder was a warning to dissidents, and the crushing of the Chechen uprising was a warning to members of Russia’s Indigenous and ethnic minorities. I was both. I’m from the Komi minority, a Finno-Ugric people whose own republic, with a population of nearly one million, lies 1,000 kilometres northeast of Moscow. The Komi people have a distinct language and culture dating back at least two millennia, but under Putin’s rule, we face cultural and linguistic extinction. Like all of Russia’s nearly two dozen republics and four autonomous districts, the Komi Republic is supposed to have some degree of autonomy; in practice, it has none,” Zyuzev wrote.

In the same essay, Zyuzev recounted that in 2015 he was offered the chance to head a new research center at Syktyvkar State University. By then his daughter was already in her teens, his marriage had fallen apart, and he had failed to find an academic position in Canada — so the scholar decided to go back to Russia. According to him, the center’s mission was to build ties with scholars in Europe, North America, and other parts of the world. “So in the fall of 2021, I approached two friends—one a sociologist and retired politician, the other a linguist studying the Komi language — and brought to them a radical new idea: to establish an online Finno-Ugric University. It would offer high-quality social sciences education to Komi youth, help them think more critically and, importantly, raise awareness about the injustices suffered by the Komi people.” Zyuzev wrote.

According to Zyuzev, businessman Leonid Zilberg invited him to work with the outlet 7×7. After the war began, the project’s team left Russia and relocated to Lithuania. In May 2022, Zyuzev also moved to Vilnius and began looking for funding for the Indigenous Russia Information and Education Center.

“We sense an opportunity in the aftermath of Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine: Indigenous peoples have been disproportionately affected by the war, both on the battlefield and as conscripts to Russia’s army. Minority groups in the republics are waking anew to the threat the Kremlin poses. Our hope is that demands for decolonization will become stronger, and the Kremlin will lose its grip on the republics. There may be a rare window of opportunity now to change the conversation in Russia — one we can’t waste,” Zyuzev argued. In closing, he wrote: “The only way to course-correct now is to repudiate Putin’s vision, and to embrace the diversity and vitality of [Russia’s] many peoples.”

“And the real tragedy is precisely that he, in the grip of a deep love for his homeland, came back to his part of the world to educate and enlighten. And now these brutes are pinning God knows what on him. Because the way they see it: we’ve got our own life here, everything’s under control, we don’t give a damn about this Komi language. And you’re just spoiled rotten. You went off to the West, picked up some ideas there, came back, and now you’re trying to lecture us — well, we’ll put you in your place, you lousy intellectual. It’s a kind of revenge for their own indifference, for their own wretchedness. Nikolay came back to a country that had already turned thoroughly fascist, where it was clear they would do something to him, some vile thing. Living under the rule of law had spoiled him. He couldn’t imagine they could do something like this to him. That’s the kind of naivety it was,” Guseinov emphasizes.

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Zyuzev’s arrest came shortly before searches at Syktyvkar’s Revolt Center, an independent cultural space whose founders included Leonid Zilberg. In the summer of 2025, the center was designated a “foreign agent” and shut down, and one of its founders, Pavel Andreev, was later charged with treason. However, according to Andreev, Zyuzev had no connection to the Revolt Center team and had only spoken at its venue a few times.

Zyuzev’s friends are now trying to draw the international academic community’s attention to his case. “Right now we’re looking for prominent Canadian sociologists and philosophers who could bring the Zyuzev case to the attention of politicians. Maybe, with Canada moving closer to Europe, they’ll take an interest,” Alexander says.

Zyuzev is not the only Russian humanities scholar to receive a long sentence in a criminal case in recent years. Among others, sociologist and political scientistBoris Kagarlitsky, convicted under the law against justifying terrorism, is serving time in a penal colony.

“Quite a few people I know are in prison right now. Boris Kagarlitsky, whom I’ve known since childhood — we lived in the same building. It’s absurd. These are people who are in prison for being smart. That’s the tragedy. It’s the same kind of persecution we saw in the ’30s, the ’40s, and the ’50s: oh, you think you’re too smart — well, here’s what you get. Sociology is a science that makes it possible to improve society. Or to destroy it, if it gets snuffed out. And we’re watching the second process. These cretins don’t even understand what Nikolay Zyuzev’s work is about. They simply don’t understand what intellectual work is for. Because their brains just don’t work. What works are their jaws, which chew people up. And what’s especially painful with Nikolay is that no voice coming from the West, or that could come from there, from Canada, say, will ever reach his jailers’ ears. Maybe there will be some kind of prisoner swaps. There’s no other way he’ll be freed,” Guseinov says.

Alexei also sees the Zyuzev case as a warning to other scholars working on politically sensitive topics:

“Right now, any Tatar, Karelian, or Bashkir historian or ethnologist, say, who back in the 2010s traveled freely to Turkey or Finland, studied figures from the Civil War era and the emigration, and, God forbid, worked with some Germans on sensitive topics like wartime collaborationism, I think, feels like they’re in the crosshairs. For them, the Zyuzev case is an unmistakable signal that anything and everything can be held against them, now and in the future. It seems to me the goal right now is clearly to intimidate scholars. I hope there were no informers involved in the Zyuzev case. But in other fields, unfortunately, they may turn up: self-appointed guardians and pseudo-patriots from within the scholarly community itself.”

“The only thing we can count on is that scholars with an instinct for self-preservation, and people who would like their children to become scholars, will simply leave. Mobility today is completely different from what it was in the 20th century. People are highly mobile and can cross borders relatively easily. And if we prepare for this kind of movement, then young people, at least, can and should be taken out of the Russian Federation — so they can get a normal education and integrate into a more or less humane society,” Guseinov concludes.

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The post An Expedition to Prison: Why Philosopher Nikolay Zyuzev Was Sentenced to Seven Years appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

Statement of the Russian-American Science Association in Support of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

By: ak
30 September 2026 at 10:57

We, the members of the Russian-American Science Association (RASA), strongly condemn the drone attack on the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine which caused serious damage and, according to reports, resulted in casualties.

Even against the background of the years-long and devastating war, an attack on a national academy of sciences is particularly horrifying. We express our solidarity with the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and with our Ukrainian colleagues, and we extend our deepest condolences to the families and colleagues of those who were killed.

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Scientific institutions are part of the shared heritage of humanity. They are places where knowledge is created, preserved, and transmitted across generations and across national borders. 

The international scientific community has a responsibility to uphold the principles of protecting human life, scientific freedom, international cooperation, and respect for institutions devoted to the pursuit of knowledge.

We reaffirm our commitment to the protection of science as a sphere of international cooperation and human progress, even in times of war.

The post Statement of the Russian-American Science Association in Support of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

Simply Out of This World: How Andrei Klepach Made His Way Through the Thorns of Structural and Monetary Factors to the Stars

By: ak
25 August 2026 at 12:32

Andrei Klepach — one of Russia’s leading economists and a high-ranking economic official of the Vladimir Putin era — has published several academic works over the past six years that are packed with cosmist imagery. His drift into “energy-information cosmism” went unnoticed until Klepach was fired as chief economist of the state corporation VEB.RF — after he publicly offered a bleak assessment of Russia’s ability to compete with the West and with Ukraine. T-invariant traced the economist’s academic evolution into a cosmist and looked into the background of his mentor on the road “toward a cosmoplanetary civilization.” It also turned out that, even after Klepach’s dismissal, VEB.RF has no shortage of people developing alternative “theories of everything”: the “wave hypothesis of life,” the idea of a “Fifth Russia,” and a “noosphere economy.”

On the Way to Space-Planetary Civilization is the title [access to eLibrary requires free registration] of a monograph edited by Andrei Klepach and Vitaly Bushuev, who has been Klepach’s regular co-author for the past six years. Bushuev spent many years as a chief research fellow at the Joint Institute for High Temperatures of the Russian Academy of Sciences (JIHT RAS) and, in the 1990s, served as Russia’s deputy minister of energy.

Andrei Klepach. Photo: RIA Novosti

Research into the path toward a cosmoplanetary civilization, carried out by a team of authors from the VEB.RF Institute for Research and Expertise, leading institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, MGIMO University, and other respected academic institutions, may now be cut short: in August 2026, Andrei Klepach was fired from VEB.RF. According to media reports, Klepach was dismissed after a phone call from the Kremlin, following the uproar over a speech in which he described Russia as falling behind across the board. His words that spread most widely were:

We’re losing both the technological and the economic competition globally. And we’re losing it not just to China and the US — in some respects, we’re losing it to Ukraine, however unpleasant that is, even for me… In this war of attrition, we won’t win the competition…

After Klepach’s high-profile dismissal, many economists and business journalists recalled his professional expertise and his constant willingness to comment for the media. Soon, the outlet Sota pointed out that the economist and official, who from 2004 to 2014 served at the Ministry of Economic Development as a department director and then deputy minister, had put out publications speculating that life on Earth was brought by aliens.

After carefully studying Andrei Klepach’s publications, T-invariant concluded that once the COVID pandemic began, the economist — in parallel with his analysis of the structural and monetary factors of Russia’s economic growth, the sovereign economy, and macroeconomics — moved on to a broader level of generalization: together with a new circle of co-authors, he set out “to discern, beyond the current pandemic and military-political apocalypse, the future of our common cosmoplanetary civilization.”

The scale of the project becomes clear from the abstract of the 688-page monograph, published in 2023 by Energiya Publishing House — a now-defunct publisher co-owned by Bushuev, among others. Klepach himself wrote several chapters, the preface, and the conclusion. Two other employees of the VEB.RF Institute for Research and Expertise are also listed among the monograph’s 12 authors. Here is the abstract in full.

The collective monograph of the authors – representatives of various organizations, specialists in various fields of knowledge (economists and energy specialists, information scientists and sociologists) united a common desire to show that the general hype around global warming, the Covid-19 virological pandemic, and the world military – the political crisis in Ukraine, threatening to turn into the 3rd world war of the early 20s of the 21st century, is not an accidental phenomenon, not a “black swan”, but a natural transition from the former material dominant and the dominant of the unipolar world of social development to a new ideological models of eco-socio-humanitarian civilization. At the same time, the transition is considered as a certain regularity of the turbulent (wave) development of history. This periodicity connects cosmic phenomena, known in the ancient Vedic understanding of the world, with the cyclical nature of solar activity and its reflection in the socio-natural and political processes of human society. It is shown that the current reality also corresponds to the next 35th SA [solar activity] cycle, which, by analogy with the previous history, can be called the beginning of the formation of a “new thinking” and a new policy in the field of domestic and international problems of civilizational development. This new discourse is of particular importance for the formation of the pre-election programs of the leading world powers (USA, China and Russia) in the light of the expected renewal of their leadership.

The preface to the monograph was written by Andrei Klepach himself, as indicated in the “Authors” section. We quote it at length, with some cuts. It is the text of the preface that suggests Andrei Klepach at the very least shares all the core ideologemes of his new co-author, Vitaly Bushuev. These include not only Russian cosmism but also “ancient Aryan world-knowledge,” as well as the idea that life was brought to Earth by aliens from the constellation Ursa Major.

The authors, who include economists and energy experts, sociologists and political scientists, have attempted to solve (or at least to formulate in a well-grounded way) the foresight problem of a new post-COVID world of partnership and struggle between civilizations, using methods based on the turbulence of world history, the cyclicity of socio-natural processes and technological innovation, and the unity and commonality of the energy-information laws of the Earth and the Cosmos. The relationship between solar activity cycles and people’s social passionarity (activity) [a concept from Lev Gumilev’s theory of ethnogenesis — T-invariant] takes on special importance in our research… At the same time, we view Russia not as a crossroads between East and West, North and South of the earthly oikoumene, but as a bridge between the Earth and the Cosmos, from which we came and to which we are bound to return.

The structure of this collective monograph (and it is indeed a unified, coherent work rather than a collection of separate authors’ articles) encompasses both a statement of the global challenges facing humanity today on the eve of a new “apocalypse” and the grounding of a new metasystemic scientific and methodological approach to studying humanity’s natural habitat, as well as a figurative, goal-oriented vision of the new world that is being born before our eyes and will tomorrow become our common cosmoplanetary Home — Ecos (from the Greek oikos — house, dwelling place). Here we proceed from the premise that “Russian cosmism” is not our invention, nor even a philosophical term introduced by proponents of Eurasianism at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries, but our ancient Aryan world-knowledge, which has come down to us from the depths of the ages. The myths of many peoples of the world (not only the Slavs and the Aryans) have preserved the legend that people descended to Earth from various constellations of the firmament and brought into our world the common cosmic laws of existence that governed and still govern humanity.

We believe that the cause of the current crisis of human civilization may lie not on Earth but in the Cosmos. For man himself is a product of cosmic evolution, not earthly evolution. It is precisely by looking at our existence from cosmic heights that we can understand the true goals and essence of humanity’s development.

Honored Power Engineer, Energologist, Energy Cosmist

T-invariant analyzed Klepach’s profile on eLibrary and found that a lot has changed in the economist’s academic trajectory since 2020: first, Klepach developed an interest in “cosmoplanetary civilization” and the “energy-information cosmism of Russia”; second, he acquired a regular co-author — the aforementioned Vitaly Bushuev.

Vitaly Bushuev. Photo: Syg.ma

Bushuev is 86. He has more than 60 years of serious work in science and the energy sector behind him. He spent almost 40 years at the Siberian Research Institute of Power Engineering (SibNIIE) of the USSR Ministry of Energy and Electrification, was a People’s Deputy of the USSR serving in the Supreme Soviet, and in the 1990s built a career at the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy. Later, together with his former boss at the ministry, Yuri Shafranik, he founded a private company called the Institute for Energy Strategy. In addition, Bushuev worked for more than 10 years as a chief research fellow at the Joint Institute for High Temperatures (JIHT RAS).

Along the way, Bushuev also found his calling as a poet and writer. Back in 1998, the Moscow Power Engineering Institute (MPEI) published his book Energy Cosmism of Russia, which, in his words, “develops the finest traditions of the luminaries of Russian cosmism.” Over the nearly 30 years since, Bushuev came to the conclusion that his field of knowledge should be called “energology,” and he kept churning out texts on Russia’s energy cosmism, gradually shifting toward “cosmoplanetary development.”

In recent years, Bushuev has also taken up writing for children. His website, for example, features “WORLD-LORE (VEDAS FOR OLDER YOUTHS AND TEENAGERS),” later included in the short story collection The Olympiad of the All-Knowing. It was probably somewhere around this stage that the creative energies of Vitaly Bushuev and Andrei Klepach crossed paths. And Vedic themes, as it later turned out, surfaced in their joint works as well.

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2020. A New Noospheric World-System or a Break with Our Natural Cosmic Roots?

Klepach and Bushuev’s first joint paper was titled “Analysis and Forecast of the Cyclicity of Socio-Natural Phenomena in the First Half of the 21st Century.” According to the abstract, the authors, “drawing on statistics of anomalous socio-natural, political, and economic phenomena collected from various sources, treat all crisis events as manifestations of a certain cyclicity, largely driven by periodic processes of solar activity.” “In this article, the authors not only analyze the rhythm of these events in the past but also, using a specially developed neural model, forecast their cyclical manifestation for the coming period — up to 2030–2050,” the paper states.

The co-authors were Bushuev’s then-colleagues at JIHT RAS: Dmitry Solovyev and Vadim Sokotushchenko. The first pandemic year offered plenty of reasons to worry about the future, but the team of three power engineers turned “energologists” and one economist turned “energologist” also found grounds for optimism. Using cross-wavelet analysis and neural-network modeling (JIHT RAS has a supercomputer called Fisher for such tasks), the authors arrived at the following forecast: “The results of the comparative forecast of solar activity, temperature anomalies, and the US and Russian economies suggest that from 2020 to 2050 a calmer situation is expected both in economic dynamics and in the dynamics of climate change.”

The “Conclusions” section reveals that, at the time of writing, the planet was “at the end of the stagnant 24th cycle, which in 2020 is giving way to the new 25th solar activity cycle, with an expected predominance of a new political cycle in the development of world civilization.” And while the authors generally stuck to the scientific terminology customary for analyzing correlations between numerical series and for mathematical modeling, cosmological imagery creeps into the conclusions:

New global challenges are associated not only with the growth of the Earth’s natural energy activity, geopolitical confrontation, the “bubbles” of the virtual economy, and the transformation of the structure of global energy, but also with the growth of the Earth’s natural energy activity [sic], as well as the influence of the Cosmos, for which the Earth is a sentient grain of sand on the waves of the cosmic ocean. The overlapping and intensification of all these factors point to an impending change in the World-System in the medium term. To what extent is the human mind, embodied in machines, social ties, books, and now digital information systems, capable of adapting to these natural and cosmic changes? Will we create a new, renewed noospheric and cosmic World-System, or will modern civilization follow the path of a widening break with its natural cosmic roots? Finding the answers to these questions is the most important task facing humanity today and the key to its future.

2022. How the Star Ancestors of Russian Hyperborea “Fertilized” the Earth’s Film

The year 2022 disproved the forecast Klepach and his team had made in their 2020 paper about a relatively calm global situation in the new phase of solar activity. Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the confrontation between Russia and Europe, and the coalition of Western countries escalated, and new wars and conflicts broke out in various parts of the world.

In May 2022, Bushuev and Klepach released a text titled “Energy-Information Cosmism of Russia.” Russian civilization, the authors wrote, “occupies not only a special place in the history of Eurasia and the whole world, but also bears clearly pronounced features of a cosmoplanetary world. The hypothesis of the Aryan origin of many peoples of the northern continent (for all the debatable and controversial nature of various racial theories) confirms our special relationship with the cosmos as the ‘ancestral home’ of all russkie (by language) and all rossiyane (by spirit)” [ethnic Russians and citizens of Russia, respectively — T-invariant]. Bushuev and Klepach go on to quote Alexander Tulupov’s book The Clan of the North: Russian Hyperboreans, written in the genre of “Russian fantasy”: “Man traces his roots to his ancestors, but the roots of all that exists lie in the heavens”:

Nature (priroda), kinship unity (rodovoe edinstvo), homeland (rodina) — these are words sharing a common root, reflecting our deep essence, which goes back to the times of Arctida and Hyperborea… this is our earthly oikoumene, our habitat, our Eurasian home, “designed and built” according to cosmoplanetary laws and proportions. And Russia is what has come down to us as an inheritance both from the ancient cosmic settlers and from the pre-pagan tribes.

Another passage from the article is worth quoting — on how, in the authors’ view, this Eurasian Hyperborea came into being:

The earthly oikoumene… was settled by “migrants” from various star systems: the yellow race in Lemuria came from the constellation Leo, the black race in Africa from Sirius, and the white race in the polar expanses of Arctida from the Great Bear. It is no accident that this constellation (hyper — great; bor — bear) became our cosmic symbol, and the entire territory of the settled northern lands came to be called Hyperborea. These “migrants” did not fly to us on physical spaceships; they “fertilized” the Earth’s film holographically (in the form of plasma-like “angels”), giving rise here to a generation of intelligent Aryans. Representatives of the various races have preserved their original cosmic genes, inherited from their stellar progenitors.

Notably, this article was published in the journal Economic Strategies, issued by the autonomous nonprofit Institute for Economic Strategies, which is on the Higher Attestation Commission’s first-category list of peer-reviewed journals [the official Russian register of journals approved for publishing dissertation research — T-invariant]. By the time the article came out, Andrei Klepach had already been chief economist and deputy chairman of VEB.RF for eight years. He was also the academic director and chairman of the board of the VEB.RF Institute.

2025. Galactic Walls and Geotories in Space, Siberia, and the Far East

In recent years, Andrei Klepach has published several articles on the development of territories in Russia and, more broadly, in Eurasia. Among them was an entirely mainstream paper on spatial economics, “Space as a Factor of Economic Development,” which appeared in the Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2025. That same year, several publications came out on so-called “geotories” [a coinage from “geo” and “territory” — T-invariant] (see 1, 2). Klepach borrowed the term from his co-author Bushuev. To mark his 85th birthday, Bushuev released the six-volume series Energy of Russia (2025). In the sixth volume (Energy Cosmism of Russia), he published a chapter titled “Geotories as Earthly Analogues of Cosmic Structures,” in which he laid out a theory of how cosmic processes influence terrestrial phenomena, drawing on the works of the biophysicist and Russian cosmist Alexander Chizhevsky and the poet Velimir Khlebnikov (read it starting on page 393).

The cosmos and its objects, such as galaxies, stars, and planets, are characterized by vortex-like motions and structures. Galactic walls are cosmic structures resembling the interweaving of neurons in the human cerebral cortex. Vortices play an important role in the distribution of energy and matter in space, ensuring dynamic equilibrium and sustainable development. Spiral galaxies rotate in a vortex-like manner — for example, the galaxy M74 in the constellation Pisces, located approximately 30 million light-years (9.2 million parsecs) from Earth. Geotories can be viewed as “vortices” on the Earth’s surface, where natural resources and energy potentials are concentrated and redistributed. Like cosmic vortices, geotories ensure the cyclical use of energy and resources, supporting the economic and social development of the surrounding regions. Geotories play an important role in the infrastructural representation of Eurasia, since they are territories with special conditions for human life and activity. They are often remote and sparsely populated regions where access to energy, transport, and information links is limited.

From the Nooscope to the Noosphere Economy

At least two more people at the VEB.RF Institute for Research and Expertise took part in developing the theory of a “cosmoplanetary civilization.” What’s more, each of them has his own, probably competing, “theory of everything.” Both hold the title of advisor at the Institute.

Oleg Dobrocheev. Photo: Oleg Dobrocheev’s personal website

Oleg Dobrocheev, for one, has spent many years developing a “wave hypothesis of life,” and on top of that he offers his own concept of Russia’s development and a forecast of its future. The theory currently goes by the name “Fifth Russia,” and back in 2006 Dobrocheev published a book of the same title. On his website, Dobrocheev presents himself as a leading research fellow at the National Research Center Kurchatov Institute, lists numerous other titles, and makes a point of noting that he is the author of “seven books, a Calendar of Changes, and more than 200 articles on turbulence, history, and economics.” Most recently, he described his “wave” theory in an article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta in August 2026.

Valeriy Muntiyan. Photo: St. Petersburg State University of Economics website

The other advisor, Valeriy Muntiyan, can’t match Dobrocheev in the scope of his theories but outdoes him in the scope of his career. Muntiyan is from Odesa and is even a corresponding member of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. In Ukraine, he previously served as deputy minister of defense (December 2003–October 2004) and deputy minister of economy (2007–2009; his interview after stepping down can be read here). His main academic affiliation today is the Faculty of World Politics at Moscow State University, where he holds a professorship. In recent years, Muntiyan has been developing a theory of the noosphere economy; for example, two of his articles were included in a book published by Moscow State University in 2022.

The roles Dobrocheev and Muntiyan play at VEB.RF are unclear, whereas Andrei Klepach’s role in shaping Russia’s economic policy was far more visible for many years. In that sense, his drift toward alternative theories is genuinely a matter of public concern. That said, Putin’s entourage has traditionally included plenty of people who subscribe to pseudoscientific theories, among them Kremlin Chief of Staff Anton Vaino with his nooscope and Mikhail Kovalchuk, who has accused the West of creating “service people.”

Klepach (whose h-index in the RSCI core [the core collection of the Russian Science Citation Index — T-invariant] is 10) publishes articles and monographs featuring cosmist and “energological” theories alongside solid expert work in academic journals. And for at least six years, neither his colleagues in the academic community nor the leadership of Russia’s largest state corporation paid any attention to the economist’s drift into cosmism.

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“Andrei Klepach belongs to the group of economists who, from the early 1990s, were critical of the liberal market reforms of that era. Unlike Soviet academicians (such as Leonid Abalkin and a few others), he didn’t try to argue with Yegor Gaidar and the other reformers in the media. He worked with numbers and tried to use data to talk to the people who were actually implementing economic policy,” says Andrei Yakovlev, a visiting researcher at the Free University of Berlin who served for many years as vice rector of HSE University, describing the economist. “In 1998, Klepach briefly became director of the Central Bank’s research department, and then, together with former Central Bank deputy chairman Sergei Aleksashenko, he founded the ‘Development Center’ economic research foundation. For a long time, it was an expert center independent of the state, including financially. It produced a huge amount of analysis that was in demand not only by the government but also by actual businesses. Aleksashenko was always a liberal, while Klepach leaned more toward dirigiste views, with a strong emphasis on structural and industrial policy, but he always considered the role of the private sector very important. And when Herman Gref invited him to the Ministry of Economic Development in 2004, arguing, ‘Well, you keep criticizing us — so come and try to implement your ideas here,’ Klepach joined the civil service precisely for that purpose — to do something for the country. As far as I know, he still commands great respect in industry, including the defense sector, because he really did try to do a lot of useful things. At the same time, he always argued with his bosses and said what he thought. Many people may not have liked that, but he was respected. He left government service in 2014 — the formal order was signed in June 2014, but, as was reported at the time, the decision had been made in March. I think it was connected with Crimea, since Klepach, who dealt extensively with the defense industry, was never a supporter of war. Nevertheless, VEB gave him a prestigious position as deputy chairman and board member. But he was always an awkward person to deal with: when something had to be decided, it was hard to ‘cut a deal’ with him, and so he was later shunted off to do research at the separately created VEB Institute. Klepach understood and spoke about the dead ends of the existing model a very long time ago — before the war and before COVID. And he raised them many times at internal government meetings, at the Nikitsky Club, and at similar expert forums — though never linking them personally to Putin. Still, he believed it was necessary to stay within the system in order to do something for the country — as was once the case with the ‘bourgeois specialists’ or ‘military specialists’ [prerevolutionary experts and former tsarist officers recruited by the Bolsheviks — T-invariant] in the 1920s, who worked for the Soviet government not for the sake of positions but for the sake of the country. It seems to me that his shift in worldview and his fascination with strange theories in recent years may be explained by the fact that understanding the dead ends of Putin’s system, together with the impossibility of doing or influencing anything, is exactly what led him to cosmism. It’s a purely psychological defense mechanism against being unable to change the reality around him.”

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A T-invariant source who knows Klepach well and worked in the Russian government at the same time as he did, though in a different ministry, explains the transformation this way: “He’s basically a nerd, and has been since childhood. But in recent years, a lot of nerds have been stewing in their own juices — they’re not allowed into international [scientific] conferences. Nerds crave depth. But globally — they’re banned. So the nerds drift toward the fringe. The fringe, Dugin, and all that stuff — it becomes the only outlet for thinking people.”

“At the Ministry of Economic Development, Andrei Klepach was treated with respect. He had a reputation as someone willing to make sensible compromises but not willing to play the ‘yes, sir, whatever you say’ game,” recalls the head of one expert group who worked with Russia’s economic ministries for many years.

“How could such a drift have happened? Technocratic types, IT people, often lack a humanities culture. And the reverse is true too, by the way — humanities people may lack a mathematical culture. And technocrats like that sometimes don’t understand the simplest things in life. Every other one of them has these blind spots. Scratch a technocrat and you’ll find all sorts of surprises,” the T-invariant source reflects. “It’s just that Klepach is a public figure who has been speaking out for decades. Unfortunately, he was unlucky: he publicly waded into a subject he knows nothing about, and the result is fantastical nonsense. That makes you feel sorry both for him and for all of us, because our society hasn’t built barriers to keep such things from being published as ‘scientific findings’ at all, so that they stay in the inner worlds of people who lack competence in these areas and are uncritical about the limits of their own incompetence. It’s astonishing that people with intellect and professional expertise in their own field generate ideas and constructs based on primitive conspiracy theories and magical thinking. Outsiders who aren’t part of their circle can’t even imagine what delusional ideas often get voiced there. And if you express any doubt, they’re more likely to feel sorry for you: you don’t understand simple things — for example, that the cosmos rules us.”

In the source’s view, the Klepach phenomenon isn’t about his fascination with mythological cosmist ideas per se: “it could just as well have been conspiracy theories instead of harmless cosmos.”

“The phenomenon is that technocrats haven’t received a solid education and grounding in the humanities — and there’s no expert barrier to the spread of such texts and ‘ideas.’ Look at Western, especially American, higher education.

“At good universities, the liberal arts principle usually applies to undergraduate programs: students get their specialization but are also required to earn ‘credits’ outside their major. STEM students take humanities and social science courses, while humanities students take natural sciences and math. Klepach did study mathematics, of course, but a bit of critical thinking probably wouldn’t have hurt,” the T-invariant source believes.

What Do the Monograph’s Authors Themselves Say?

At the time of publication, T-invariant had not received comments from either Klepach or Bushuev, but did receive a brief comment from their regular co-author Dmitry Solovyev:

These publications were prepared at V. V. Bushuev’s request. My role was limited to designing the illustrations and technical editing of the text. The principal author of the concept and text of all these publications was V. V. Bushuev. As far as I know, these are popular science publications. Obviously, they are not used in the work of government bodies. I don’t know what A. N. Klepach’s role was; I don’t know him personally, but I think he is not the author of these works either. V. V. Bushuev included him among the co-authors for reasons of his own.

T-invariant has sent inquiries to the personal email addresses of Andrei Klepach and Vitaly Bushuev, as well as to the VEB.RF Institute and the press office of the state corporation VEB.RF, and is awaiting a response.

Update, October 9, 2026. The title and abstract of the monograph On the Way to Space-Planetary Civilization have been replaced with the authors’ own English translations.

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The post Simply Out of This World: How Andrei Klepach Made His Way Through the Thorns of Structural and Monetary Factors to the Stars appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

The Academic Traffic Light. How Russian universities flag “politically unreliable” academics

By: ak
17 September 2026 at 07:13

Research institutes and universities across Russia are keeping blacklists of their own staff. T-invariant has identified two patterns of pressure on scientists and faculty: they are summoned for “conversations” with FSB officers, or they are left without work when an expiring contract is quietly not renewed.

PREVIOUSLY IN T-INVARIANT

Special Academic Operation. How the FSB has pursued the scientists who signed a letter against the war with Ukraine for two years running

The FSB has resumed its pursuit of the scientists who signed an anti-war letter in 2022. Also in the line of fire are staff at universities and research institutes whose names turned up in a data leak of users of Smart Voting [an opposition tactical-voting project run by Alexei Navalny’s team — T-invariant]. According to T-invariant’s reporting, this kind of pressure is most widespread at St. Petersburg State University (SPbU), where the deputy vice-rector for security is Oleg Shaidulin, former head of the political department of the city’s enter “E” [the police anti-extremism directorate — T-invariant].

Several former SPbU employees, all with many years at the university behind them, contacted the editors of T-invariant. Their immediate supervisors, they say, explained the refusal to renew their contracts by pointing to a blacklist. Talk of such a list at the university has been circulating for a long time, and media outlets have already written about it, T-invariant among them.

A faculty member in one of the social science departments, whose three-year contract ran out in 2026, told T-invariant that he had learned back in 2025 that he would be losing his job: “I don’t know what the main reason was. Maybe the letter, maybe other things I’ve done. Most likely it all just added up.”

[[socialnetworks]]

There is also a way off the blacklist at SPbU. “Kropachev’s [the university’s rector] terms are pretty lax. You don’t have to go to the Donbas. You can either donate to the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation [a state fund supporting veterans of the war in Ukraine — T-invariant] or sign on as a lecturer for the Znanie Society [a Soviet-era public-education society revived as a state outreach platform — T-invariant]. Then they forgive you both your Smart Voting registration and your signature on the letter. Though you do have to remove your signature. Unless, of course, there’s something more serious on you, like donations to the ACF [Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation, designated ‘extremist’ in Russia — T-invariant] — that one sends you straight to a penal colony,” says a scientist who turned down the exit route his superiors offered him and ended up out of work. “For now I’m not even trying to find a university job, it’s hopeless. I’ve decided to pause, take stock and wait it out.”

A T-invariant source describes similar refusals to renew contracts at HSE University’s St. Petersburg campus and at the European University at St. Petersburg (EUSP). In one case, a young researcher from one of SPbU’s IT faculties held concurrent appointments at two St. Petersburg universities and lost both: neither contract was renewed.

“My supervisor asked around on my behalf, and he was told the reason was that I’d been added to some internal list of ‘politically unreliable’ employees. It’s an in-house system that people at the university unofficially call the ‘traffic light’: staff are sorted into yellow and red lists. I’m on one of them because I registered on the Smart Voting site in July 2021,” she told T-invariant.

She is not certain there was only one reason: she also signed the scientists’ letter against the war and publicly supported other human rights and activist projects. Even so, she has never been detained and has never faced administrative charges.

Where Were You for Four Years?

The open letter of Russian scientists and science journalists against Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine became the largest public statement ever made by a single professional group: more than 8,500 Russian-speaking scientists around the world publicly condemned Russia’s military aggression. It was only a matter of time before the FSB took an interest. In the winter of 2024, T-invariant described how officers summoned large numbers of signatories for interviews and also worked through the administrations of universities and research institutes. Many scientists were threatened with criminal prosecution; in some cases, charges were actually brought. The vast majority did not withdraw their signatures despite the pressure and the threats. In 2026, the security services resumed their pursuit of signatories across Russia’s regions.

A researcher at a university in the Urals says that because of his signature on the anti-war letter he was called in for a talk with the FSB officer assigned to his university [Russian universities and research institutes have security-service officers assigned to them — T-invariant]: “They asked how I felt about the war in 2022 and how I feel about it now. I gave a vague answer.” In the four years since he signed, he says, the letter had caused him no trouble at all. Removing the signature now, in his view, would be pointless. “The officer handed me a printout from the Wayback Machine dated spring 2022. They had seven people from different universities in my city under investigation — I saw the list of names and affiliations lying on his desk,” the scientist said.

A researcher at a Siberian institute tells a similar story.

“My boss called and said the FSB officer assigned to us wanted to see me, and that a request had come down from Moscow. The man showed up at our institute and started asking: where did I get the link to the letter, who sent it to me, had I forwarded it to anyone else, had I talked about it with anyone, which social networks had I posted it on. That same day they summoned another colleague of mine from the institute — which is how I found out I wasn’t the only one who’d signed. We had a good long talk,” she said.

All of T-invariant’s sources at regional universities said that for more than four years their signatures on the letter had brought no consequences at all — which is why the new wave of FSB interest caught them by surprise.

‘Love Conquers All’

Sometimes the pressure on academics becomes public. In September 2026, it emerged that Tatiana Kudryavtseva, an instructor at Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, had resigned after 30 years there over complaints about her old Instagram posts. The story was reported by Kommersant.

According to Kudryavtseva, she was called in after class by the director of her institute and by the vice-rector for student affairs [a post responsible for students’ moral and ideological upbringing — T-invariant]. She was shown two screenshots from Instagram (owned by Meta, which Russia has designated an extremist organization and banned). “One, a photograph from 2020, showed an image (graffiti) in a St. Petersburg courtyard of a well-known and now deceased politician who has been designated an extremist, a terrorist and so on (years after that photo was taken),” the instructor said (quoted from Kommersant) [the reference is to Alexei Navalny — T-invariant]. The second, dated January 2021, showed Kudryavtseva holding a flashlight in a courtyard on Dumskaya Street, beside an inscription in Latin, Omnia vincit amor (“Love conquers all”) [in early 2021, Navalny’s supporters staged courtyard protests by shining phone flashlights — T-invariant].

The instructor says she was told the posts could be treated as displaying banned symbols, and was warned about a disciplinary committee and possible administrative and criminal liability. Kudryavtseva then handed in her resignation.

“I’m going to miss all of it. And it really stings that someone’s bigotry, someone else’s eagerness to curry favor, and someone else’s unwillingness to lift a finger and look into the situation ended with me being all but thrown out of the university I call home,” Kudryavtseva wrote.

The existence of staff blacklists at pedagogical universities in Moscow and St. Petersburg was described to T-invariant by an employee of one of them. His contract was not renewed, he said, because he “did not pass the security department’s check.” Management made it clear, he added, that with his signature on the anti-war letter he would no longer be able to find a job at any major state university.

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Chronicle of the Persecution of Scientists No. 36

By: ak
31 August 2026 at 05:18

T-invariant is publishing its latest regular report, Chronicle of the Persecution of Scientists No. 36, dated August 31, 2026. Azat Miftakhov has published a paper in the French quarterly La Revue de la filière mathématiques (June–August 2026). The paper was written at the suggestion of French mathematician Bernard Randé, a member of the journal’s editorial board and of the international association Solidarité FreeAzat. Miftakhov completed the work while held in prison in Dimitrovgrad.

Azat Miftakhov’s paper is titled “La conjecture de Chui dans un cadre hilbertien” (“Chui’s Conjecture in a Hilbert Space Setting”). Unfortunately, we have not been able to read it. The paper was not posted on arXiv.org, and the journal itself is available only by subscription. However, The Insider published the first page of Miftakhov’s manuscript, which gives a sense of both the subject of the paper and his approach to the problem.

The problem Miftakhov tackled concerns a variant of Chui’s conjecture. The conjecture came about in 1971, more or less by accident. In a short note, the well-known American mathematician Charles Chui asked how to place N unit point charges on the unit circle so that the average strength of the field they generate inside the disk is as small as possible. More precisely, he asked whether this quantity is bounded below by an absolute constant — one that holds for any number of charges in any arrangement. The answer came a year later: in 1972, Donald Newman published an elegant solution — yes, such a constant exists, and π/18 will do.

The conjecture itself is a remark Chui dropped in that same note. It is plausible, he wrote, that the minimum is attained by the most natural arrangement: the charges placed at the vertices of a regular N-gon. Chui offered no proof and moved on to entirely different things. The conjecture remains unproven to this day.

Even the case of two charges turned out to be hard. The proof was found in 2023 by Fedor Nazarov, a professor at Kent State University in Ohio. He posted his answer on MathOverflow, a forum where mathematicians put questions to one another, and where Nazarov has been answering his colleagues’ questions for many years under the username fedja.

Mathematicians have tried reformulating Chui’s conjecture for Hilbert spaces (that is, spaces equipped with an inner product). In this setting, there has been significant progress. In 2020, Evgeny Abakumov (Gustave Eiffel University, Marne-la-Vallée), Alexander Borichev (Aix-Marseille University), and Konstantin Fedorovskiy (Bauman Moscow State Technical University and St. Petersburg State University) posted an important paper, “Chui’s conjecture in Bergman spaces.” They proved Chui’s conjecture in weighted Bergman spaces for a broad class of weights: the minimum is attained if and only if the charges are evenly spaced. But some cases remained open, and the authors listed them explicitly at the end of the paper.

It was precisely this set of problems that Randé proposed to Miftakhov. The first page of his manuscript opens with the words “Let us assume” and contains the statement of the theorem and the beginning of the proof. He looks at the case where the charges lie strictly inside the disk rather than on the circle itself. And what he proves is not an inequality but an exact equality: the energy of any configuration equals the energy of the regular-polygon configuration plus an explicit nonnegative term that vanishes only when the charges form a regular polygon. If Miftakhov has indeed proved this, then Chui’s claim (for Bergman spaces) follows as a corollary. The original Chui conjecture, however, remains open.

On March 5, 2026, three mathematicians from the St. Petersburg Department of the Steklov Mathematical Institute — Evgueni Doubtsov, Anton Tselishchev, and Ioann Vasilyev — posted the preprint “Weighted Chui’s conjecture.” Their work follows Newman’s line of attack: they generalize his bound to arbitrary positive charges and to spaces of any dimension. At the end of the paper, the authors pose several open questions, the first of which is what happens when the charges lie not on the circle but inside the disk.

On March 6, 2026, Bernard Randé received Miftakhov’s manuscript, in which the charges likewise lie inside the disk. These are different problems, but the setup is the same — and so is the timing.

The Solidarité FreeAzat website writes: “In October 2025, Solidarité FreeAzat, together with the Navalny France team and the organization La Libre Pensée, held an evening in Paris devoted to writing letters in support of Russian political prisoners. Among the participants was Bernard Randé, a mathematician, a former teacher in the preparatory classes at the Lycée Louis-le-Grand, and a member of our association. Instead of an ordinary letter of support, he decided to give Azat what he misses most — a real mathematical problem.”

Getting mathematical formulas into facilities run by the FSIN [Russia’s Federal Penitentiary Service — T-invariant] is a challenge in its own right: such letters often never reach their recipients. A long wait followed, and on March 6, 2026, Bernard Randé received a reply from Azat via Solidarité FreeAzat. The letter opened with the words: “And so your problem, which brightened my days and cost me many hours of sleep, became a breath of fresh air for me. Thank you so much for that!” Attached to the letter were six handwritten pages containing the solution to the problem Randé had posed.

The Solidarité FreeAzat website writes: “Azat worked under exceptionally harsh conditions. Over four months in detention — with no scientific library, no internet access, no chance to discuss mathematics with colleagues, and only a few hours a day with pen and paper — he managed to solve a problem that was open at the time.” Here we have to take their word for it, since we have not yet seen Miftakhov’s paper. Still, the fact that the paper was published is a strong signal in itself.

Averil Aussedat, a member of Solidarité FreeAzat and a postdoctoral researcher in mathematics at the University of Pisa, proposed that her university officially invite Azat to present his result. On July 23, 2026, Azat Miftakhov’s wife, Elena Gorban, received an official letter from the University of Pisa inviting Azat to speak at a research seminar to be held in April 2027. If Miftakhov is not allowed to present his work in Pisa in April 2027, one can only hope that on September 3, 2027, when his latest sentence ends, he will be released and able to engage with colleagues and work under normal conditions.

Chui’s problem has been around for 55 years. Today it is being worked on by Abakumov in Paris, Borichev in Marseille, Fedorovskiy in Moscow, Doubtsov and his colleagues in St. Petersburg, and Nazarov in Ohio. Now one more participant is joining the conversation — from a prison in Dimitrovgrad, from the Polar Owl penal colony [a special-regime prison above the Arctic Circle — T-invariant], in a letter written on FSIN letterhead. Not as an object of pity or a media story, but as a colleague — with a new theorem.

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Sometimes They Don’t Come Back: Stories of Émigré Scientists 35 Years After the Soviet Collapse

By: ak
21 August 2026 at 12:31

Exactly 35 years ago, on August 21, 1991, the coup attempt by the self-proclaimed State Committee on the State of Emergency collapsed. The Soviet Union itself had four more months to live, but after those three days in August, a completely different life began for millions of Soviet citizens. The changes touched everyone, but scientists were among those whose old lives fell apart especially fast — and on the ruins, new ones began to take shape. Institutes were left without money or staff, and entire fields of research lost their funding. Yet at the same time, the borders opened, and it became possible to work at universities and research centers abroad. Some left for a few months and never came back; others emigrated right away. How did these scientists discover the world of Western science? What did they have to go through? What did it cost them? And why did a temporary departure turn out to be permanent for so many of them? T-invariant presents the stories of how they left and the new lives they built.

How to avoid becoming a professor’s mistress, survive impostor syndrome despite your success, and bring Soros to Russia

As told by Tatiana Tatarinova, professor of computational biology at the University of La Verne. She is known for her work in plant genomics and genetics, as well as in medical and population genetics. She holds a black belt in karate and is also a scuba diver, poet, songwriter, and rescuer of stray dogs.

I graduated from MEPhI [Moscow Engineering Physics Institute — T-invariant] in the early ’90s. My mother worked in the defense industry, on radar systems for detecting missiles in flight. Her job was considered prestigious: a huge research institute and plant, NIIDAR, on Preobrazhenskaya Square. But in those years, almost the entire plant was leased out as warehouses and retail space. Out of the whole NIIDAR building, the scientists were left with exactly one floor, just so the institute wouldn’t formally lose its research status; everything else went to offices and banks. It was utter devastation: a hideous, filthy restroom with no water or toilet paper, a hellish stench, and three ladies on the verge of retirement who simply had nowhere else to go. That was the state of virtually all of Russian science back then. Some people, of course, managed to land European grants, but corruption was rampant. Through my work, I once came across a nuclear energy project. I was offered a side gig, and I took it. But they told me point-blank: “We’re putting you down for a salary of $1,000 a month, but you hand two hundred of it back to us in cash.” A kickback! The corruption was absolutely shameless. Naturally, I told them where to go, using every colorful word the Russian language has to offer. There’s no way I could have lived and worked in a system like that.

Back then, though, Western universities were happy to take Russian students: if you were from Russia, you weren’t even asked to take exams or prove your English. Nothing at all was required. You could show a clumsy translation of your diploma certified by the dean’s office, and that was enough to get a full scholarship. It was believed — and perhaps rightly so — that our education, at least at MEPhI and other strong universities, was very good. On top of that, we studied for six years, so when applying to grad school we were competing with people who had only a four-year bachelor’s degree behind them. Naturally, we knew a lot more. We were readily hired to lead recitation sections and lab classes and to grade homework: in terms of preparation, we were two years ahead of the local students. It wasn’t even that our education was “better” — it was just different. We didn’t have the Bologna system yet, and our programs didn’t include general education courses (as in the US) either.

So in our fifth year at MEPhI, a real craze took hold: practically our entire class was writing to American universities, getting several offers each, and picking the best ones. At the same time, I applied for a Soros Foundation fellowship and got it. The fellowship covered a plane ticket to the US and a year of health insurance. But then something pretty wild happened to me. By that time, people were buying passports for foreign travel left and right through shady outfits. I was afraid to do that, since I was a very law-abiding girl. So I went the official route, through MEPhI’s First Department [the security office found at every Soviet institution that handled classified work — T-invariant]. Back then, you needed permission to get an exit visa and a passport. And suddenly MEPhI tells me they won’t let me leave!

I went to the head of the First Department to sort it out. And he says to me: “How can we let you go? What if you start working as a prostitute over there?” I was offended to the core! My mother was an ordinary engineer, my parents had divorced when I was three, and my father had nothing to do with me. For all four years at the institute, I wore the same single pair of jeans and a sweater made of dog hair. And honestly, I reeked of dog, because my mom knitted those sweaters from the fur of our Newfoundland, and that dog was incredibly smelly. So there I am, standing in front of him in that sweater, and he’s holding forth on my “potential” as a prostitute!

Then I thought: What if I went somewhere other than America? I wrote to various places and got an invitation from South Africa. It seemed like a good option: the professor there was originally from Russia, and he wrote directly to our dean’s office asking them to send me to work with him. That did the trick. The First Department couldn’t do anything against a direct official request from a foreign university — they could hardly tell the university I was going to become a prostitute. But when I arrived in South Africa in 1992, it turned out that the professor and I had completely misunderstood each other. After a while, he told me flat out that what he needed wasn’t a Russian grad student but a Russian woman. Absolutely insane! In the end, I switched to another professor, but my entire stipend, which had been paid out of the lecherous professor’s funds, went up in smoke. I had to scrape by on a tiny salary for teaching lab sections, and in the evenings I moonlighted as a singer in a restaurant. I sang there for six months.

Meanwhile, I got in touch with the Soros Foundation, which had earlier given me the fellowship for the ticket to America. I asked whether my fellowship would be reinstated if I moved to the States. They assured me it would. I wrote to the American university in Salt Lake City that I had turned down before and honestly admitted: “I hope your department will take my word for it: I’ve suffered at the hands of an evil regime here and have decided to come to you.” They didn’t really believe me, of course, but they took me anyway.

That’s how I ended up in grad school at the University of Utah. We had a terrific group, including several people from Leningrad Polytechnic. And then I hit a crisis. It probably happens to almost every grad student: I was overwhelmed by impostor syndrome. I felt dumber than everyone around me. It didn’t even help that in my very first year, I managed to publish a paper in one of the most prestigious physics journals. I still considered myself talentless. I was comparing myself with people who had been in grad school for several years and, before that, had worked on the same topic in Russia. Naturally, they knew more than I did. Unfortunately, there was no one around back then to support me and explain this, and I fled back to Russia. I defended my master’s thesis in the US and left.

After returning to Moscow in 1995, I got a job on projects run by the CDC (the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) and the World Health Organization (WHO). I worked as their regional representative. I didn’t find that position right away: first, I spent several months as a secretary for a Turkish businessman. Then he sent me along with his pregnant mistress to see a gynecologist. I was supposed to make sure she got an abortion. I was mad as hell, but the girl simply needed someone to support her. While waiting for the appointment, I got talking with a young woman from an employment agency and told her I didn’t want to work for that a**hole anymore. She gave me her work number and asked me to call in a week. And a new job came through! I was one of the people who helped Alex Goldfarb during George Soros’s visit to Moscow and organized training programs for Russian scientists. We also brought over American research teams to teach our compatriots Western standards in biostatistics and modern disease reporting. There was a joint CDC–WHO project to study tuberculosis. The topic mattered a great deal to America as well. In the US, tuberculosis was found in high concentrations only in poor neighborhoods of New York. So the Americans looked for “Third World” countries where tuberculosis was rampant and studied it there. In Russia, especially in prisons and among the homeless, the epidemiological situation at the time was critical. That was the beginning of the notorious “biolabs” [a nod to the Russian propaganda narrative about secret US biological laboratories — T-invariant].

I organized those projects, but after a while I found myself desperately missing pure science. During one of my business trips to the US, I simply walked into the University of Southern California (USC). The Human Genome Project was underway, and USC scientists were among the pioneers of bioinformatics. I went to their math department and said straight out: “I really want to study with you — please take me.” To my utter astonishment, by the time I got back to Moscow, a letter was already waiting for me with an offer to join their PhD program on a full scholarship. Can you imagine? I just walked in off the street, had a conversation, and they took me. It was pure luck!

That’s where I earned my PhD in applied mathematics, and then I went to work, first at a biotech startup (Ceres, Inc.). When its funding ran out, I returned to academia. I worked at Loyola Marymount University first, then moved to the UK, to the University of South Wales (formerly the University of Glamorgan). After that, in 2012, I came back to the US, spent four years at USC, and then was invited to take an endowed chair at the University of La Verne. There’s practically no equivalent of this position in Russia. It’s when a major foundation earmarks money for a specific professor, and that money pays their salary and funds their research. I was offered the chance to head the Computational Biology Laboratory, which I’ve now been running for nine years. So that’s my path.

I never had much desire to return to Russia. I went back for conferences, and in the early 2000s I had the persistent feeling that Russian science was catastrophically behind. For example, I was once asked to give a lecture on “the latest in science” about a technology that at our American startup we considered routine — outdated, even. Funding was so meager that basic microarray gene expression analysis, which any second-rate university in the States could do, was something few in Russia could afford.

I saw how my colleagues who had stayed in Russia struggled: dreadful working conditions, professors without even their own lab benches, several people crammed into a single office. And how is an experimentalist supposed to work without money for reagents and equipment? Mathematicians can still write formulas at their dachas with nothing but pen and paper. But experimentalists constantly have to humble themselves, beg for pennies, and plead for permission to buy every single consumable.

Things started to improve during the “changing of the guard” between Putin and Medvedev. That’s when Skoltech [the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology, a research university near Moscow founded in 2011 in partnership with MIT — T-invariant] appeared. I was working at USC at the time, and Skoltech representatives came to us trying to persuade faculty to go work in Russia. I went. We organized an international conference on the human genome at Skolkovo, launched joint projects, and I genuinely loved it! I started getting invited on expeditions to study the small indigenous peoples of Siberia, and I began working closely with Russian universities and giving lectures. I became an associate professor at Siberian Federal University (SFU), supervised grad students at the Institute of General Genetics of the Russian Academy of Sciences and at SFU, and lectured and advised thesis students at MIPT [Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology — T-invariant]. It was all wonderful, because back then good money was being allocated under Project 5-100. Universities needed ideas, world-class advisors, and publications — and we delivered all of that. And this whole wonderful story ended in a single day, when the war began. I was fired from everywhere almost instantly, and quietly at that — no one even bothered to tell me. I never received any official paperwork. They just deleted a line on a website, and that was that.

It was actually pretty funny: I was lecturing at MIPT, and after the war started, I made a point of appearing on Zoom with a Ukrainian flag behind me. Word got around to SFU. For some reason, they decided I had been lecturing their students in front of that flag, even though I wasn’t teaching any classes at SFU that semester. Nevertheless, they cooked up a collective complaint on behalf of “offended students” who had supposedly been insulted by the Ukrainian flag in my background. A total circus. I found out I’d been fired by accident: they had been paying me some token base salary, and six months later I simply noticed that the transfers to my Russian bank account had stopped.

A couple of years ago, I went to Moldova and Romania to lecture, and there were lots of students from Ukraine there. They asked me point-blank: “Why did you keep going to Russia and lecturing after 2014?” I told them: “Guys, what kind of neighbor do you want next door? A wild, ignorant one who ‘charges’ water in front of the TV [a reference to late-Soviet televised faith healers who claimed they could imbue water with healing power through the screen — T-invariant], or an educated one who understands how the world works, doesn’t want any war, and shares basic humanist values?” They thought it over and agreed: “Yes, of course, we need educated and kind neighbors.”

That’s why I kept going. It was real, live human contact. Right now there’s an enormous amount of mutual misunderstanding, but I believe that we — the professors who came to Russia with ideas and lectures — simply didn’t finish the job. We should have stepped in sooner, spoken up louder, and pulled Russian education out of the hole it had fallen into. I don’t know whether we could have changed anything on a large scale. But if instead of a handful of enthusiasts there had been a whole army of scientists who cared, maybe no tanks would have rolled into Ukraine.

How to shed the sack in the sack race, bomb your first interview, and still land your dream job

As told by Eugene Koonin, senior investigator at the National Center for Biotechnology Information, part of the National Library of Medicine at the US National Institutes of Health. A renowned expert in evolutionary and computational biology, he has the highest h-index of any scientist of Russian origin: 256.

In the late 1980s, being a passive and not particularly brave person, I didn’t even think about leaving. It was too much hassle: the complicated exit paperwork, trips to district Communist Party committees, and so on. But once those barriers disappeared, conferences started happening right away, contacts emerged, and with them came the idea of going to work for a while somewhere real science was being done. My first serious trip abroad was to the International Congress of Virology in West Berlin in August 1990. It was an interesting time: the Wall was coming down, and you could walk up and chip off a piece as a souvenir. But far more important, I got to meet serious researchers from the US. Because my work involved computer analysis, we managed to do some joint research literally on the spot, without even leaving the poster stand at the congress.

As a result, I was invited to come work with them for four months. I spent the spring of 1991 in Texas, in the middle of nowhere, at a university right in the center of the state. Despite considerable everyday hardships and a lack of money, I liked it. There was meaningful, fairly serious work, cleanliness, order — and lots of good, varied food, which turned out to be affordable even given how poor I was at the time. All of this made a very strong impression on me. The mood around me was optimistic: the Gulf War had just ended in victory.

The access to information was striking, too. This was before the internet. In the Soviet Union, nothing came easy. It was a kind of “sack race”: you could accomplish a lot, but always late and only after overcoming obstacles. American science struck me as the same race, only without the “sack.” Everything happened on time and without needless obstacles. Submitting a paper to a journal was very easy, even though everything was still done the old way, on paper. It was no problem at all to read something published the day before, and your own manuscript could reach the editors the very next day.

Of course, contact with colleagues mattered too. Although on that first trip, my professional networking wasn’t going all that well yet. And not because I couldn’t speak English. As I said, this was the pre-internet era, and building connections beyond your own university wasn’t easy. Still, I got very lucky. During that trip, I came across an announcement in a scientific journal about the launch of a new center for computational biology. It was the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) at the NIH (the US National Institutes of Health). A little later, I read a full-fledged research paper — one of the first published by its staff. The paper was really good; I liked it a lot. And I thought the place seemed tailor-made for me. That impression proved decisive. I overcame my natural shyness and wrote to that very center. I asked some scientific questions, offered my services, and attached my CV. They were immediately interested and invited me for an interview. It went extremely badly for me, because I didn’t know how to give a talk. Had it gone well, they would have offered me a permanent position right away; instead, I got a two-year temporary contract. Still, that was enough to get started.

You can’t go back to the country I left — it simply doesn’t exist anymore. I don’t even consider crossing the Russian border (like other members of the Anti-War Committee, Eugene Koonin faces a criminal case opened against him in Russia. — T-invariant). And, forgive me, but why would I leave a place where I have rewarding, well-supported work and a normal life? For a while, the new Russian regime was relatively “vegetarian” [a Russian expression for a comparatively mild regime — T-invariant] and made some attempts to develop science. The situation during the “Medvedev thaw” wasn’t all bad or hopeless. The megagrants [a government program launched in 2010 to bring leading scientists to Russian universities — T-invariant], for all the system’s flaws, were a decent idea. But I never felt any desire to take part. After Medvedev, though, after that abomination that came to be known as the “castling” [the 2011 Putin–Medvedev job swap, named after the chess move — T-invariant], everything went to hell. Science and everything else.

How to split $1,000 among 30 employees, win a lawsuit against a corporation, and launch a scientific career in the US

As told by Alexander Kabanov, distinguished professor and director of the Center for Nanotechnology in Drug Delivery at the UNC Eshelman School of Pharmacy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and co-director of the Carolina Institute for Nanomedicine. He specializes in the delivery of drugs and other biologically active compounds using polymeric nanomaterials.

I graduated from the Faculty of Chemistry at Moscow State University (MSU) in 1984. By then, the war in Afghanistan was in full swing, and the Soviet Union was gradually heading toward collapse. But apart from Andrei Amalrik, who fifteen years earlier had written his prophetic (and therefore banned in the USSR) essay Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?, few people realized it. I finished my Candidate of Sciences dissertation [the Soviet equivalent of a PhD — T-invariant] extremely fast: I had everything done in a year and a half, and a little over two years in I had already defended. My advisor, Karel Martinek, an outstanding physical chemist and Lenin Prize laureate who by then had already moved to Czechoslovakia, kept pushing me to hurry. After the defense, I wanted to stay at MSU. According to Karel, they were bound to keep me: I had been a Lenin Scholarship recipient both as an undergraduate and in grad school. So I was counting on a junior research fellow position in the Department of Chemical Enzymology, where I had studied.

Unfortunately, just a week before my defense, Ilya Berezin, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences who headed the department and was my main boss, died suddenly. I defended my dissertation successfully, but all of a sudden there was no chance of staying in the department as planned — there was no one left to go to bat for me. At the time, Moscow’s Communist Party boss was Boris Yeltsin, who had just launched an aggressive campaign against cronyism and nepotism. And my father, Viktor Kabanov, was a very well-known scientist who headed another department in the same Faculty of Chemistry. But he and I had firmly agreed that he wouldn’t intervene or put in a word for his son. So, thanks to Yeltsin — and I really should thank him for this — I started looking around, and that shaped the rest of my scientific life.

My father advised me to go see Evgeny Severin. He ran a large institute built partly on the ruins of Lev Piruzyan’s scientific empire. The institute reported to the USSR Ministry of Health and was overseen by the ministry’s Third Main Directorate [its classified division serving the defense and nuclear industries — T-invariant]. They did top-secret work there. It was a restricted-access facility, with KGB men carrying submachine guns at the entrance. But Severin was eager for scientific novelty and international recognition, and he tried to hire young, open-minded people. Interestingly, the KGB didn’t even bother vetting me. They said: “No point checking him out — we know everything about that family.” My father, on the other hand, really had been vetted at the very highest level because of his position and his security clearance. He didn’t work at that institute, but he and Academician Rem Petrov sat on the relevant national scientific council.

So I went to Severin, and he hired me on the spot as a lab head. It turned out that a talented young scientist from the Serbsky Institute [Moscow’s leading center for forensic psychiatry — T-invariant], Vladimir Chekhonin, later a full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, had been using a technique from my undergraduate thesis in his own research. His work was built on a chemical modification of proteins (specifically, antibody fragments) that I had proposed, which allowed them to penetrate directly into the brain. At the time, this looked like a phenomenal breakthrough: delivering drugs across the blood–brain barrier. I didn’t even know about it, but Severin’s institute had already heard. That’s how I became the first — and nearly the only — employee at that institute without a security clearance. It was there that I met the man who would be my closest friend for many years (sadly, he has since passed away): Valera Alakhov.

Valera showed up to our first meeting pretty drunk and several hours late, while I waited patiently for him. I didn’t know then that he’d gotten married the day before — for the second time — which was why he was late. So there we sit: him rumpled and not entirely sober, me all dressed up in my only wool suit and a tie. At first we couldn’t stand each other, but eventually we started working together and became best friends. Valera played an important role in the story of how I left, and in my life in general. And I in his.

Soon, Yuri Kuzyakov, dean of the MSU Faculty of Chemistry, was told that I was leaving for Severin’s institute. Let me stress again that my father and I hadn’t asked for anything. But the faculty had known me since my student days — I was top of my class. With such a legendary father, I simply had no choice. In fact, in all my years of study I got only one B, in military training, because I forgot the words of the military oath. It meant absolutely nothing to me, so I started going around in circles repeating some phrases, and they slapped me with a B. The faculty leadership declared: “We can’t let him go. He was a Lenin Scholarship recipient as a student and in grad school — he’s our number one.” And they immediately created a junior research fellow position for me in the Department of Chemical Enzymology. After Martinek left, the lab was headed by Andrey Levashov (who at the time was still just a Candidate of Sciences). So I became, at the same time, a junior research fellow at the MSU Faculty of Chemistry, where I still had my own grad students, and a half-time lab head at the Institute of Applied Molecular Biology of the USSR Ministry of Health. There, I was immediately put in charge of several people.

The atmosphere at the Health Ministry institute was amazing. I was the youngest lab head; the next youngest, Kolya Porodenko, was only two years older. A whole constellation of talented young people had gathered there, mostly from MSU. They were tackling extremely hard problems, and I was basically told: “Well, go ahead, work on delivery.” So I started working on what would later be called nanomedicine and targeted drug delivery. For about two years, it was all very generously funded. We had all the cutting-edge equipment we could dream of. I had never worked closely with biologists and physicians before, and now they let me loose like a fox in the henhouse (in a good way): whenever an idea came up, we put it into practice right away.

Back then, we came up with things that shaped the field for decades. Nowadays, whenever I’m nominated for something, people always mention that it was in those years that I came up with the idea of using polymeric micelles to deliver drugs to the brain. We did that work together with that same scientist from the Serbsky Institute, Volodya Chekhonin, thanks to whom I ended up at Severin’s. I’m enormously grateful to him. Around the same time, by the way, my father and I came up with polyplexes — complexes of DNA with polycations. Shortly before us, several groups around the world had used a natural polycation, polylysine, linked to protein ligands, to deliver DNA into cells via cell receptors. Without yet knowing about that work, we showed that synthetic polycations can form nanocomplexes with DNA that deliver it into cells and allow it to be expressed there without any receptors at all. Today this is one of the most widely used approaches for delivering nucleic acids into cells, alongside the lipid nanoparticles that underlie modern RNA vaccines. Back then, in the late 1980s, we had a real explosion of discoveries. But because we lacked experience in modern biology and didn’t know how to publish internationally, we ended up in lower-tier journals than these results deserved. If we had been promoting this work in the US, with access to the top journals, it would have been a worldwide triumph. But it was still very cool.

I became head of a department and in 1990 defended my Doctor of Sciences dissertation [Russia’s higher postdoctoral degree — T-invariant], just three years after my Candidate of Sciences. That same year, I went to America for the first time and began traveling abroad in general: the Pasteur Institute in Paris, an AIDS conference in Switzerland, lectures and seminars in Germany… That’s when I realized that people in the West are a lot like us. As a product of the Soviet system, I used to think I could never survive in the capitalist world with its brutal laws of competition. But now I realized: I think I can.

It looked like a bright future lay ahead. I was a laureate of the Lenin Komsomol Prize [a prestigious Soviet award for young scientists — T-invariant], the youngest Doctor of Chemical Sciences in the USSR, and a welcome guest in many academic offices. But the system was coming apart at the seams. Until the very end, I believed I had a duty to stay in my homeland. By the time I defended my doctorate, absolutely everything had vanished from store shelves. In December 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. And shortly before that, Valera Alakhov had gone to Canada on a research fellowship. I don’t know how on earth they let him out, with the pile of security clearances he had — but the security apparatus was already breaking down.

And in these hard times, I’m running the department Severin used to head. I have three labs under me, about thirty people in total. One day Severin and I are sitting there drinking tea, and he says, matter-of-factly: “Sasha, keep in mind: starting January 1, we won’t have any money at all.” At first I didn’t take it seriously, but sure enough, one day the thirty people working with me were left without a penny.

Shortly before that, in the fall of 1991, Valera wrote to me from Canada that a Canadian businessman of Russian origin named Oleg Romar was coming to Russia. He wanted to adopt two children from an orphanage — a brother and his little sister — and was looking for access to official channels and medical support through our institute. Those were murky times, and Oleg badly needed people he could trust. We met and instantly became friends (we’re still partners today). The first place he brought the adopted children was my apartment. The kids were miserable and frightened; they came from a family of alcoholics. They had been treated horribly since birth. It shook me to the core. Oleg and his wife, Isabella, made a deep impression on me too. They went on to raise the children safe and sound in Canada.

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Of course, Oleg and I also talked about science and my work. Eventually, those conversations gave rise to the Moscow Institute of Biotechnology. Oleg sent money from Canada, and I distributed it among our staff as grants. In 1992, I was splitting roughly $1,000 a month among thirty people. That came to about $30 per person on average, but I weighted each share by the person’s contribution. In those hungry times, it was an incredible, lifesaving supplement to people’s salaries. The idea of attracting Western investment for our discoveries had come up even earlier. In December 1991, on my way home from New York, at Oleg’s insistence, I met with a leading biotech expert, Pradeep Banerjee, who was then working in Manhattan at Coopers & Lybrand Consulting. After talking with me for an hour, Pradeep gave Oleg a glowing assessment of our work. About me, he said: “This guy will find a job anywhere.” Oleg, Valera, and I decided to start a company in Canada. I was supposed to go to Canada for a year to help Valera set up a base lab, while the main research, as we planned at the time, would continue in Moscow.

In the spring of 1993, just before I was due to leave, a severe political crisis erupted in Moscow. Khasbulatov [Ruslan Khasbulatov, then speaker of the Russian parliament — T-invariant] and Yeltsin were going at each other on television, and civil war was in the air. My wife, Tanya, was pregnant. Oleg called me: “Sasha, take Tanya and fly out right now. If she gives birth in Moscow, you won’t be going anywhere.” I walked around that eerie, seething Moscow, went to see my father, and said: “Dad, you know… I think I may never come back here.” My father was very upset, even hurt: “How can that be? We supported you and Valera in everything here, and now you’re not coming back?” Back then I had a silly, grandiose notion stuck in my head. After all, by birth and talent I had been given a great deal. And I believed that if I were going to leave, I had to be the last to go, after everyone else had been saved. But in the end, our daughter Dasha was born in Canada a month after we arrived.

On October 4, 1993, tanks of the Taman Division fired on the House of Soviets, the seat of Russia’s parliament. Photo: ITAR-TASS

We lived very modestly, on the edge of poverty. It turned out that the lab we were setting up had no real money. On top of that, a conflict broke out between Oleg and the board of directors of the Canadian medical association he chaired, which had originally invited us for the project. The conflict wasn’t about us: at its core was the sale of another company the association had created. Enormous sums were at stake, by the standards of that time and even today’s. They tried to use us. In the course of the conflict, representatives of the board came to Valera and me and asked us to testify against Oleg so they could accuse him of a conflict of interest — claiming he had illegally used his position as chairman of the association’s board. In exchange, they offered to hand over, at last, the million dollars that had long been promised for the lab’s work in Canada. We told them where to go. Politely but firmly. And after that, a real war against us began: they declared that everything we had invented belonged to them, tried to strip us of the rights to our own technologies, and tried to block us and Oleg from developing those technologies in North America. It was tough — our own lawyer was apparently working for them. We had no money. But we managed to find another lawyer who agreed to take our case on contingency. His name was Pierre Fournier. He was a tough guy, and when we told him our story, he said our rights had been violated. Within just a few months, he actually won an arbitration on one key issue. But the fight went on.

As things turned out, I was the one who took responsibility for our decisions in this fight. Of course, I consulted Valera on everything. It was a life-or-death battle. There I was with a baby, no salary, living on $100–200 a week in borrowed money. In October 1993, leaving my wife and six-month-old daughter in Montreal, I flew to Moscow on business, right in the middle of that October’s political crisis. I even wrote a poem about that time: “A strange specter is haunting the town, / While all Russia lies cowering, trembling; / Over crowds, a pretender self-crowned / Urges all to advance on the Kremlin.” [a reference to Alexander Rutskoi, whom the parliament had declared acting president — T-invariant]. I thought I wouldn’t be able to get back to Canada. I made it back.

A few months later, my father flies in to see me in Montreal. We’re sitting in the kitchen, we open a bottle of vodka, and I say: “Dad, I’ve made a decision. I’m not going back to Russia. I’m going to look for a professorship in the US.” I was bracing myself for his reaction. And my father exhales: “Sasha, what a relief… I didn’t know how to tell you that you must not, under any circumstances, come back to Russia.” In fact, my father understood where things were heading much earlier than I did, and he accurately predicted what Russia would become today, even though he’s been gone for twenty years now.

But back to the early ’90s. Soon we settled all the litigation, secured good funding, and founded our first pharmaceutical company, Supratek Pharma. It was the world’s first company to begin clinical use of polymeric micelles for delivering anticancer drugs. Valera became its vice president of research, and I became a consultant. Even earlier, I had landed a professorship at the University of Nebraska Medical Center in Omaha and begun my academic career in the US.

The early ’90s were the hardest period of our lives. The stress of the Canadian lawsuit gave me a stomach ulcer, which a few years later nearly killed me: I started bleeding heavily right on a plane over the Atlantic. For ten days I hovered between life and death in a New York hospital. But having gone through that hell — no money, in a foreign country, locked in a legal battle with the association — I realized that I now stood entirely on my own. After all, my father couldn’t help me in any way: not in a Canadian court, not in getting hired by an American university, not in my later career. That sense of independence meant a great deal to me.

After that, things took their natural course. I built a successful career in the US, created the country’s first nanomedicine research center, and organized the first international conference in the field, which has now been running for a quarter century. I’ve trained nearly a hundred grad students and postdocs, and more than twenty of them have become professors. I hope the best is yet to come.

How to make a KGB colonel stand at attention, change American law, and become the first US professor who was still a citizen of the “Evil Empire”

As told by Sergei Mirkin, biologist and endowed professor at Tufts University. He is known for his research on the structure and function of DNA, in particular on how genomic instability caused by repetitive DNA sequences and by collisions between transcription and replication contributes to human genetic diseases. He has received a number of prestigious scientific prizes and awards.

Truth be told, I should never have been allowed out of the Soviet Union. I was completely barred from traveling abroad. That lasted until 1988, when perestroika really picked up speed. And as luck would have it, just before that, Viktor Lyamichev, Maxim Frank-Kamenetskii, and I had discovered a new DNA structure called H-DNA — a form of DNA in which three oligonucleotide strands wind around one another to form a triple helix. We published two high-profile papers in Nature, in 1987 and 1988, and I was first author on one of them. At the time, I didn’t even fully grasp what it meant to be first author on a Nature paper. And at around the same time, thanks to the efforts of our Czech colleague Emil Paleček, I was allowed to go abroad for the first time — to Czechoslovakia.

I worked there at the Institute of Biophysics in Brno. An international conference was taking place at the same time, with lots of American scientists in attendance. It was the first time I’d ever seen Americans in the flesh. As I now realize, many of them were assistant or associate professors — roughly the equivalent of a docent in our system. In other words, they were still a long way from being luminaries of American science. And they all started telling me, “What are you fooling around for? Start looking for a job in America or Europe right now.” I was very surprised, because the Soviet system worked completely differently: a person was born, lived, and died in the same city, joined a lab, and worked there at least until their advisor died. And then, with any luck, they became lab head themselves.

One of these young scientists, Terumi Kohwi-Shigematsu, said, “Why don’t you come work in my lab for a little while and see how everything works?” She arranged an invitation for me through the National Institutes of Health (NIH). At the time, she was working at the La Jolla Cancer Research Foundation, in the northern San Diego suburb of La Jolla. She set up the invitation through the Fogarty International Center, which operated under the NIH umbrella. And in late 1988 or early 1989, the invitation arrived. Keep in mind, the Soviet Union still existed, with its entire bureaucracy intact. The NIH’s partner in the Soviet Union was the Ministry of Health. But I worked within the Academy of Sciences system, at the Institute of Molecular Genetics of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The two were completely separate worlds that had nothing to do with each other. The Ministry of Health minded its own business, and the Academy of Sciences minded its own. Still, I sent my paperwork to the Ministry of Health, asking for permission to travel. Naturally, it got stuck there for good. They must have been baffled: who is this guy, and why is he coming to us if he isn’t even one of ours?

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The paperwork went off — and then silence. A month went by, then two, three, four — nothing. I figured that was that: I wasn’t going anywhere. And then, purely by chance, I ran into a colleague, Victor Koteliansky, at a party with friends. At the time, he was working at the All-Union Cardiology Research Center of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, headed by Academician Yevgeniy Chazov. The center included an institute devoted to basic, largely theoretical research, and that’s where Victor worked. In the course of our conversation, it came out that the director of his institute, Vladimir Smirnov, was collaborating with the director of my institute, Yevgeny Sverdlov. Victor suggested I talk to Sverdlov about my problem with the Ministry of Health. Sverdlov, in turn, advised me to come to the short joint lab meeting he held with Smirnov and bring it up with him there, as if by chance.

So that’s what I did. The whole thing was set up in a very interesting way: first came the talks, then a little tea — although, strictly speaking, what they were drinking wasn’t exactly tea. When it was over, our director, Sverdlov, said to Smirnov, “Vladimir Nikolaevich, here’s the thing — could you help Sergei out?” And Academician Smirnov, as it turned out, remembered me from the seminar run by the famous Soviet mathematician Israel Gelfand. On top of that, Sverdlov was now vouching for me.

It was around four o’clock on a Friday afternoon, and every Soviet office would soon be closing for the weekend. And Smirnov says, “Right, let’s go!” We drive to the ministry in his official car with a flashing light on the roof, and that’s where an incredible story begins — one that’s impossible to believe today. The building was a restricted-access facility, with a guard posted at the entrance.

Smirnov walks up to him and says, “I’m Academician Smirnov; my colleague is with me.” We get past the checkpoint and head straight for the Foreign Relations Department. And I, like every Soviet person, knew perfectly well which agency the people in the foreign departments of restricted institutions actually worked for. Smirnov opens the iron door without knocking. Inside sits a KGB colonel, who snaps to attention the moment he sees the academician. And when Smirnov asks why my paperwork isn’t being processed, the colonel, obviously a seasoned operator, replies, “What do you mean, not processing it? We’re processing it right now, as we speak!” He presses a button, and a lieutenant comes out of the next room. The colonel says to him, “Lieutenant So-and-so, what’s the holdup?” And Smirnov adds, “Hurry it up, because he has to fly to America — to save our country from AIDS!” And right then and there, literally in front of me, they process the paperwork!

That’s how I got permission from the Ministry of Health to go to America on a three-month exchange. This was September 1989. There were a few hiccups: there were hardly any direct flights, and tickets were impossible to get… But somehow I made it, someone met me at the airport, and I started working in Terumi’s lab, where I seriously honed my skills in chemical DNA footprinting. And everyone around me kept insisting, “Find a permanent job.” At first I had only three months; later I managed to extend my stay to six, but that was still far too little time to find a permanent university position. Thanks to Valery Soyfer, who had become a professor at Ohio State University after emigrating from the USSR, I was able to hang on for another four months in a temporary position in his lab.

So I started looking for an assistant professor position. And I had no idea how the American academic system worked — these days I know it inside out. Objectively, my chances weren’t great: I was a complete outsider, and a citizen of the “Evil Empire” to boot — that’s still how the USSR was seen back then. But I did have one advantage: at the time, America was enormously interested in the USSR and in people from there. For the first time, scientists of a normal working age were coming out of Russia, rather than gray-haired academicians. Everyone was insanely curious. I got a great deal of help in my search from Igor Roninson, who had been a year ahead of me in the MSU biology department. Igor emigrated from Russia right after graduating, finished grad school and worked at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and then landed a faculty position at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Without him, of course, everything would have been harder: he went to bat for me, and he was at the height of his fame at the time, having cloned the multidrug resistance gene from cancer cells, so his standing at the university was very high. The position I applied for was a standard one: there was an open search, I came in to give my seminar, other candidates came in… In the end, two candidates — me and Angela Tyner from Princeton — were offered positions at the University of Illinois at Chicago. To be fair, I also had an offer from Oklahoma State University, but Chicago seemed like a far more attractive place to build a life in America.

But then came the final twist in this detective story. I got the offer, the department head sent the paperwork up to the university administration, and it was approved. But this was a public university, and the position was tenure-track. The year was 1990. The USSR still existed. Because the university was public, every position at that level had to be approved by the Board of Trustees. And the board said, “Oh, but he’s a citizen of the ‘Evil Empire.’ We have no precedent for this, except for émigrés or political refugees.” But I hadn’t defected: I had left the country legally. In short, the Board of Trustees dug in its heels: we can’t give a position to a citizen of the Soviet Union. The department head, Richard Davidson — a major scientist, now retired — threw up his hands: “I don’t know what to do.” Davidson was a fairly wealthy man, which isn’t exactly typical for a scientist, and a serious art collector. He lived in a very upscale building in Chicago, right on the lakefront. And living in that same building was Illinois Senator Paul Simon.

So in the middle of all this uncertainty, Richard runs into Paul Simon in the elevator and says, “Listen, we’ve got a problem with a Russian scientist. Is there anything that can be done?” Remember, this was the summer of 1990 — budget season in America: the president sends his proposal to Congress, and that’s exactly when the votes on appropriations bills take place. It all happens amid complicated political bargaining, and senators and representatives tack their own amendments onto the bills, along the lines of “Okay, we’ll vote for this budget, but only on such-and-such a condition.” Simon heard Richard out and said, “No problem. If you vouch that he’s a good scientist and a decent person, I’ll write in an amendment.”

And he added it to the bill — I believe it was actually the defense budget. The amendment said that American universities were allowed to give faculty positions to citizens of the “Evil Empire.” The bill passed and became law. After that, my appointment was finally approved. On July 1, 1990, less than a year after arriving in America, I became an assistant professor at the University of Illinois. A couple of months later, my wife and daughter, whom I hadn’t seen for a whole year, joined me, and our new American life began.

So that’s the story, and both halves of it — the Russian and the American — are equally unbelievable. Just a year later, the Soviet Union collapsed, and hundreds of Russian scientists headed to America and Europe to look for positions. That no longer surprised anyone: the Cold War was over, and the legal obstacles were gone. But my case set a precedent. In 1990, if memory serves, only three people from the USSR got faculty positions in the United States: I became an assistant professor, and two outstanding theoretical physicists, Alexander Polyakov and Alexander Migdal, became full professors at Princeton. Princeton may be a private university, but even there, nobody had known until then whether it was allowed to hire people from the Soviet Union.

When I left, I was driven by two things. First, I wanted to understand what a truly democratic country was like. In that respect, America made a stunning impression on me, above all because people weren’t afraid to say what they thought. I had come from the Soviet Union, where people kept their mouths shut and never discussed anything important over the phone, even with close friends. Perestroika, of course, changed that radically, but my formative experience came from before perestroika. This turned out to be extremely important to me: I realized I wanted my children to grow up in that kind of environment, not in a place where you constantly have to watch what you say and how you say it. And here’s the irony: 36 years have passed. Just yesterday I was talking on WhatsApp with some good friends who stayed in Russia. And they said, “Oh, this isn’t something to discuss over the phone.” Once again, everyone is afraid of being listened to and getting into trouble. In that sense, Russia has come full circle: from wild freedom right back to total unfreedom. People are being jailed for nothing at all, just for talking.

The second reason I left and had no plans to return was that molecular biology in the Soviet Union had never been among the world leaders. This was a direct consequence of the destruction of genetics after the 1948 session of VASKhNIL [the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, where Trofim Lysenko’s pseudoscientific doctrine was declared official and genetics was effectively outlawed — T-invariant], from which Soviet biology never fully recovered. The blow came during the crucial years when molecular biology around the world was advancing at an incredible pace. In Russia, meanwhile, genetics was effectively banned for 20 years — roughly from 1948 to 1968. That gap was never closed. There was some outstanding work here and there, but overall the level simply couldn’t compare with America’s.

I was very curious to test myself: could I succeed in this global system? Which is better: to be a small fish in a very big pond, or a big fish in a very small pond? As it turned out, working in this system gave me a great deal. I built up a wide network of scientific contacts and collaborations. As a result, we did some truly excellent work that simply couldn’t have happened in 1990s Russia — both because of the lack of direct contact with Western colleagues and because Russian science simply had no money. Without false modesty, this was foundational work for a new field of science, and it made my name in America. It was published between 1992 and the early 2000s. And my lab, now at Tufts University, continues to actively develop this field. Over time, beyond science, I became Americanized in general, although I still speak English with a heavy accent. Of course, I haven’t forgotten my Russian, but my mentality has changed. I traveled to Russia many times while that was still possible; I still had both professional and personal ties there. But I never again felt any desire to go back to that life.

As for Putin’s 2000–2008 period, his first “reign,” a lot of things already worried me back then. I understood what was being done and why, because as a matter of principle I distrust people who come out of the KGB. From the very beginning, I thought nothing good was likely to come of it. But at some point it became obvious that Medvedev, although he held the office of president, wasn’t really running the country. And that’s exactly how it turned out: after a single four-year term, Putin returned, and from 2012 on, everything went downhill very fast.

Why did things turn out this way? I don’t know; I’m not a politician, I’m a molecular biologist. The simplest explanation is that perhaps the mentality of a large part of society didn’t measure up to the standards of freedom of the 1990s and early 2000s. On the other hand, I recently watched Pavel Talankin’s documentary Mr. Nobody Against Putin. What makes it so interesting is precisely that it doesn’t show Moscow or St. Petersburg: the filmmaker talks to all kinds of people in the provinces. And among them, there’s only one person who fiercely supports what’s happening in Russia today. The rest aren’t exactly against it — they’re more indifferent. It seems to me that this is the central cause of Russia’s tragedy. Decades of Soviet rule, especially the Stalin era, apparently beat out of people any belief that they could change anything on their own. There were brief flare-ups: the early days of perestroika, when people poured into the streets, at least in the big cities; Bolotnaya Square in 2012; Navalny’s movement. But none of it ever grew into a nationwide movement. Perestroika was driven largely from the top. Navalny’s movement was quickly crushed — also from the top.

I’ve lived in America for 37 years. I rarely go to Russia, and for the last 9–10 years I haven’t been there at all. Maybe all my reasoning is just the musings of an amateur. Here in America, we’re also going through a fairly difficult political period, tied to Trump and the elections. But the US has an independent judiciary that pushes back relatively effectively against his unlawful actions. Neither the Soviet Union nor present-day Russia has an independent judiciary. And without one, there’s nobody to challenge the decisions of the executive branch. Nor are there free elections, as was just demonstrated when the Yabloko party [a veteran liberal opposition party — T-invariant] was removed from the race. That’s a huge difference from the US, where I’m all but certain the upcoming midterms will bring a Democratic victory. How to change the grim situation in Russia, given the absence of democracy and the passivity of most of the population, is completely beyond me. I console myself with the thought that it’s no longer my business: let Russians sort it out themselves.

How to trade one PC for plane tickets to America for the whole family, avoid getting fired for “absenteeism,” and start a new life at a ripe old age

As told by Andrey Kalinichev, a chemical physicist and geochemist, professor, and group leader at Institut Mines-Télécom Atlantique (France). Until 2022, he was a chief research fellow at HSE University’s International Laboratory for Supercomputer Atomistic Modelling and Multi-scale Analysis. He is known for his work on atomistic computer modeling of the structure and properties of geochemical fluids and their interactions with mineral surfaces.

I was born in Orenburg and finished school there. I competed in academic olympiads, including one all-Union olympiad in math. After school, I went to Moscow to apply to MIPT. My entrance exam results weren’t brilliant, but they were perfectly respectable. To this day, I consider the A I got on the oral math exam one of my greatest intellectual achievements. Even so, MIPT didn’t take me. Instead, based on those scores, I was offered admission without any additional exams to the thermal physics department of the Odessa Technological Institute of the Refrigeration Industry. At first, I figured I’d study there for a year and then transfer or try for MIPT again. But in the end, I got my degree in thermal physics engineering in Odessa. People used to joke that engineers would look down on us because we’d never designed anything more complicated than a gearbox, and physicists would look down on us because we hadn’t studied and passed the whole Landau–Lifshitz course, only half of it.

After my fourth year, I landed an internship almost by chance at the Institute of Experimental Mineralogy (IEM) of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Chernogolovka [a science town near Moscow — T-invariant]. Based on how it went, they decided to hire me, which was fairly unusual at the time: I wasn’t from a university in the capital, and my field wasn’t even geology. Still, by the time of job assignments [under the Soviet system, graduates were assigned to mandatory jobs — T-invariant], the dean’s office had an official letter from the USSR Academy of Sciences: “We request that Andrey Kalinichev be assigned to the Institute of Experimental Mineralogy in Chernogolovka as a research trainee.” That’s how I ended up there in the fall of 1979.

I was one of only two or three physicists at our institute, working on what you might call the application of physical methods to geochemistry and experimental mineralogy. I modeled the properties of geochemical fluids at the extremely high temperatures and pressures found deep in the Earth’s crust and mantle.

I’d been fairly active in research since my first year of college. First I modeled heat and mass transfer in cooling systems for electronic equipment, then switched to the thermophysical properties of substances. That work, including my internship at IEM, produced a couple of papers before I even graduated. Within a year of graduating, I had published five papers in what would now be called VAK-listed journals [journals approved by Russia’s Higher Attestation Commission, which oversees academic degrees — T-invariant] — respectable Soviet academic journals that were also published in English translation. In principle, I could have written a dissertation and defended it right away.

But our institute was very small and had never had its own dissertation council. Our staff usually defended in Moscow, either at the MSU Faculty of Geology or at the Academy’s Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry. There, however, I was told that my topic was too far removed from mainstream geology and geochemistry, and besides, I had no formal training in those fields. Chernogolovka also had the Institute of Chemical Physics, which in principle was very close to my area. They studied the properties of matter at high temperatures and pressures in combustion and explosions. But they, too, found my results outside their scope — for the opposite reason: too “geological,” with too little actual physics.

Chernogolovka, though, is a pretty small village where everybody knows everybody. My advisor had a friend, Vladimir Fortov, then a young Doctor of Sciences and later an academician and president of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In my very first year of grad school, at some conference at Medeu [a mountain resort near Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan — T-invariant], my advisor, Kirill Shmulovich, brought me over to Fortov: “Volodya, Andryusha here has such-and-such results on equations of state. Is that enough to defend in chemical physics?” Fortov gave me a skeptical look, scratched the back of his head, and said: “Well, let him calculate the structure and properties of water at high pressures and temperatures using the Monte Carlo method — that would be a solid new physics result, worthy of a defense.” I had never worked with the Monte Carlo method at all — I’d only used other people’s results in my approximations! And there was practically nobody in the USSR to learn it from, especially at a geology institute. I ended up spending another three years writing code from scratch and calculating the properties of what later became popularly known as supercritical water. At the time, I really was one of the first in the world to do this. Finally, in 1986, I defended my Candidate of Sciences dissertation in chemical physics in Chernogolovka. Ever since, I’ve been enormously grateful to Fortov for nudging me toward atomistic computer modeling of materials for all kinds of interesting applications, reaching far beyond purely geochemical ones.

Our institute was fairly advanced for its time. Even in the Soviet era, it had well-developed international academic ties — we corresponded with foreign colleagues and exchanged publications, though very few people could actually travel abroad. After my defense, colleagues advised me to apply for a Humboldt Research Fellowship in West Germany. One of our researchers had just spent a year there on this fellowship and strongly encouraged me to apply too. On top of that, our director was in charge of the Academy’s cooperation programs with West Germany at the time, and he also suggested I give it a try. That mattered back then: on my own, I might not have dared, at least not right away.

So I wrote a research proposal, got the necessary forms from the Academy’s Foreign Relations Department (UVS), filled them out, attached English translations of my papers, collected recommendation letters, and sent everything off to the Humboldt Foundation. Almost a year went by, and in the fall of 1987 I received an official letter from the foundation: my project had been approved, and I could go to West Germany. But by then I had just taken on the translation of a big book for Mir Publishers — a famous Soviet publishing house that put out translations of Western scientific books. A few colleagues and I had agreed to translate a very useful American monograph that had just come out — good for science, and a way to earn some money. I wrote to the Humboldt Foundation explaining the situation and asked them to postpone the start of my fellowship by a year because I had to finish the translation project I’d committed to. And they agreed!

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That turned out to be a stroke of luck, because 1988 was nowhere near as momentous as the year that followed. In August 1989, I finally turned in my part of the translation to the publisher, and in September I left for Germany. I took the train to East Berlin, crossed from East to West Berlin at Friedrichstraße, and spent the night at the famous “Berlin Zoo” station — Berlin Zoologischer Garten. The Berlin Wall fell just a month and a half after I arrived. And a year later, I even managed to chip off a couple of pieces of it myself.

First I spent two months at a language school at the Goethe-Institut in Mannheim, and then I worked in Mainz at the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry. Something funny happened back in Moscow while I was arranging the trip through the Academy of Sciences. The Humboldt Foundation offered to pay for four months of language courses followed by a year of research. Great! But the UVS told me flatly: “No, no, we don’t approve foreign assignments longer than a year for anyone. If you want four months of language, you’ll have only eight months left for science.” I agreed to a compromise: two months of language and ten months of research. Although, once I was in Germany, I asked the foundation to extend the fellowship by almost another year. That’s how my first “Western journey” began in 1989.

The work was fascinating — a dynamic international group, lots of new ideas and colleagues. And then the Berlin Wall came down (Andrey Kalinichev described his memories of that time in detail in the newspaper Troitsky Variant — Nauka. — T-invariant). It also so happened that 1989 was the first year Academy of Sciences employees were officially allowed to take long-term assignments together with their families, including in the West. Before that, the system was very rigid: even if you managed to go abroad for more than six months, either you could come home for a short vacation, or your wife was entitled to visit you for a week at the Academy’s expense — and bringing the children was out of the question. In 1989, Gorbachev lifted these restrictions, and we were able to go as a whole family — my wife, our two kids, and me. The kids were eight and three and a half at the time.

We had a wonderful two years in Germany as a family. Our older daughter had gone to school in Chernogolovka for a couple of years and then spent two years at a German elementary school. The younger one had just started daycare in Chernogolovka and then went to a local kindergarten in Germany. When the fellowship ended, we came back. We could have extended it, but I was already being called back to Chernogolovka. That was 1991. We returned at the very end of May — on the 31st, to be exact. We managed to spend a month’s vacation with relatives in Odessa and came back to Chernogolovka — and then came the coup by the self-proclaimed State Committee on the State of Emergency and everything that went with it.

Around that time, Chernogolovka was beginning to open up to foreigners, and I was asked to look after a Belgian visitor at our institute. Before that, foreigners hadn’t been allowed into Chernogolovka at all — not even into our perfectly peaceful mineralogy institute. Since I was practically the only person at the institute who could speak English more or less fluently, I helped him out and explained what was going on. Naturally, he was badly frightened by the declaration of a state of emergency and utterly bewildered by what was happening in the country, and I tried to calm him down. But on the third day of the coup, I couldn’t stand it anymore: I got myself together and headed to Moscow toward evening. Chernogolovka isn’t that far from Moscow — an hour by bus to Shchyolkovskaya station, then the metro. I naively expected to find people already celebrating the victory over the coup plotters. I got to the White House [the seat of the Russian parliament and the center of resistance to the coup — T-invariant], and they were announcing that it wasn’t over yet: another assault was feared that night, and they were asking everyone who could to stay and keep defending the White House. So I spent that entire third night standing in a fairly dense crowd, until at dawn they announced that Gorbachev had been flown back from Foros [his vacation residence in Crimea, where the plotters had held him under house arrest — T-invariant]. The coup plotters had surrendered. So I got to take part, at least a little.

While I was in Germany, I got to know another Humboldt fellow at the same institute in Mainz, an American from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. He was a bit older than me, but our kids were about the same age. Our families spent time together, and we quickly discovered shared research interests. We even started discussing joint projects while we were both in Mainz but didn’t manage to get much done: I left in May, and he went back to the US in July. Then suddenly, after the coup, sometime in September, I got a long handwritten letter from him — there was no email yet — sent from Urbana to Chernogolovka. He wrote: “Andrey, I hear strange things are happening in the Soviet Union, everything’s falling apart. How are you doing? As it happens, I have some money freed up — my postdoc left early for another job. If you’re interested, you could come on what’s left of the grant. You could work here for a year and meanwhile write new joint proposals on the topic we came up with back in Germany.” I went to my director: “Vilen Andreyevich, I’ve been invited to America.” He threw up his hands: “What do you mean? You just got back from abroad! Let someone else go.” But I was the one being invited! Still, I didn’t want a conflict. The fall of 1991 went by, and the USSR was falling apart before our eyes. In December, the director convened the academic council. He had just returned from the Presidium of the Academy and told us that the Academy’s future was completely uncertain, there was no funding, and nobody knew how we would keep functioning over the next few months. After the meeting, I went up to him again: “Vilen Andreyevich, given the circumstances… I’m not asking for anything — they’re inviting me, and there’s a grant. If anything, my going will save money here.” And he agreed.

But back then, you couldn’t just go out and buy a ticket to America. First, exit visas had either not yet been abolished or were only just being phased out. Second, a private individual simply couldn’t buy tickets to America for rubles — it had to be paid by bank transfer between organizations. And obviously not at the Academy’s expense. All the Academy did was allow a US visa to be put in my official passport, the one we had recently used to travel to Germany. But we still had to get to Urbana, Illinois, somehow…

January 1992. The country had collapsed, but private business was beginning to emerge. Many academic colleagues left their institutes and went into business. They had nothing yet except boundless entrepreneurial enthusiasm. So we struck a deal with some of these former-colleagues-turned-entrepreneurs: I would give their company the computer I had just bought in Germany — a brand-new, fully loaded PC AT 386 — and their little company would pay by bank transfer for Moscow–New York–Moscow plane tickets for my whole family. On paper, it looked as if they were sending us on a yearlong business trip to do “market research.” Personal computers, especially good ones, were in terribly short supply back then and cost a fortune, so it was a perfectly fair deal that benefited both sides.

At the end of February, after two layovers, we finally landed in New York. From there, it took another full day on a Greyhound bus via Chicago to reach Urbana. I spent three productive years as a postdoc in Illinois. It was the only time in my life when I did serious physics experiments with my own hands — we measured the elastic properties of some rather exotic ferroelectric crystals. Meanwhile, on our second try, we got a grant for the project we had started developing back in Mainz. Things were falling into place!

But then Chernogolovka started calling me back again — this time to a different lab, an experimental one I had only collaborated with a little before. At IEM, I had done nothing but computation, molecular modeling. But my experimentalist colleagues in that lab were measuring the very structure of water at high pressures and temperatures that I had been trying to predict. Their setups were one of a kind, but their electronics were old and falling apart.

I should explain that the Humboldt Foundation allows its fellows, at the end of their stay in Germany, to request an additional equipment grant for their home institute so they can continue the research they began in Germany. Fifty thousand Deutsche marks was a pretty decent sum at the time. But for my computer modeling, I simply didn’t need that kind of money: I had bought myself a PC and planned to leave it at that. So I suggested that my experimentalist colleagues take advantage of the opportunity and use Humboldt money to order a new semiconductor detector for their X-ray setup to measure the structure of liquids. They placed the order, but by the time the German embassy and the foundation had approved and processed everything, I had already left for America. They took delivery of the detector themselves. And now the head of the experimental lab was writing to me in America that he’d had a serious falling-out with the director and the lab might be shut down altogether. The director was willing to keep it only if I came back and ran it. It sounded a bit like blackmail. I’m exaggerating and simplifying somewhat, but I still have all the correspondence, so the details could be reconstructed. The idea itself was perfectly sensible and appealing: to bring experimental research on the properties of geochemical fluids and their molecular modeling even closer together in a single lab.

This was 1994. There was no such thing as megagrants in Russia yet; the Soros Foundation was only just getting off the ground. But my wife and I talked it over and decided it was worth accepting the offer and going back. I first flew to Moscow and recruited two grad students to carry on in Urbana with the project that had finally received US funding. And we returned on October 11, 1994 — the very day that went down in history as “Black Tuesday,” when the ruble crashed. I had a knack for turning up at the most “entertaining” moments in history.

Remember my story about the translation fee from Mir Publishers? I turned in my translation in September 1989 and immediately left for Germany for two years. Under the rules, half of the fee was paid on submission and the other half when the book came out. By the time I got back in 1991, inflation had shrunk the first half, sitting in my Sberbank account, to pocket change. Meanwhile, economic hardship had delayed the printing, and by the time the book finally came out in 1993 — in a noticeably smaller print run than originally planned — I was already in America. The second half of the fee was duly transferred, but when I went to collect it in 1994, there was practically nothing left of that either. Still, the book proved useful, and as far as I know, it’s still used to teach students at the MSU Faculty of Geology.

So we were back. The kids went to school in Chernogolovka. All the time we were moving around Germany and America, we hadn’t actually planned to emigrate — these were just temporary contract jobs. Abroad, my wife kept up our older daughter’s Russian and math with Russian textbooks. Thanks to that, she barely fell behind. She rejoined her old classmates in Chernogolovka and four years later graduated with them. Our younger daughter, though, had to start one grade lower. She had already started school in the US and learned to read and write in English before Russian, so her written Russian was a bit shaky. But she caught up quickly.

During those four years in Chernogolovka, from 1994 to 1998, another memorable thing happened. The institute’s deputy director for research fell seriously ill, and an election for a new deputy director was scheduled for the spring of 1996. Two candidates were nominated: one was the institute’s scientific secretary, and the other was a senior research fellow who sometimes stood in for him. The ballots had already been printed, and both candidates had been discussed at length. Then, right before the vote, one of our grand old lab heads stood up and said: “Why are we choosing between only two candidates? Andrey here came back recently and is already a lab head — he’d make an excellent deputy director.” This came as a complete surprise to me, and probably to everyone else on the academic council, but people started seriously discussing the idea. Of course, people at the institute had known me for a long time and thought well of me, but still… Then the deputy director himself, the one stepping down due to illness, stood up and said: “You know, of all the candidates, I think I’d support Andrey too.” Next, one of the original candidates stood up and said: “I agree that Andrey should be added. I’d support him myself.” They literally wrote my name in by hand on the printed ballots — luckily, there weren’t too many of them. In the end, out of 26 council members, 12 unexpectedly voted for me, seven and six respectively voted for the other two candidates, and one ballot was spoiled. My colleagues started congratulating me: hooray, you’ve been elected!

And then — dead silence. One week went by, two, three — nothing happened. Our director was simultaneously the academician-secretary of the RAS Department of Earth Sciences in Moscow and also taught at MSU. He came to Chernogolovka maybe once a week, if that, usually on Mondays. About a month passed. I wasn’t angling for any position myself — they elected me, fine, so be it. I stopped by the director’s office about some routine lab matters during one of his visits to Chernogolovka. We went over the lab’s business, I was about to leave, and then he said: “Oh, Andrey, about the recent election…” And he delivered a line in classic impersonal Soviet bureaucratese: “A decision has been made that your appointment as deputy director is inadvisable.”

How grateful I am to him for that decision now! Though I only realized it many years later. At the time, I was pretty hurt. Not so much by the decision itself as by the fact that nobody had ever discussed it with me, anywhere, in any form whatsoever. Of course, I can only guess whose purposes my appointment was “inadvisable” for back then. But over time, it became perfectly clear to me that the appointment was inadvisable for me as well. Many years later, a member of the institute’s leadership told me that the director had said something along these lines: “Yes, of course, Andrey could have made a good deputy director. But then it would have been a different institute.”

If my appointment as deputy director had been approved, I would almost certainly have stayed in Chernogolovka for good and had less time for actual science. As it was, during the four years I headed the lab, from 1994 to 1998, my colleagues and I managed to win practically every research grant available at the time: two Soros grants, several from the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR), two INTAS grants, and a grant from the American foundation CRDF. By American — or, for that matter, any international — standards, which I knew well by then, these were very modest sums, but for Chernogolovka in those years it was huge money. We were able to supplement staff salaries by $200, which often multiplied their pay several times over! With that money we bought equipment, computers, printers, lasers, fixed things ourselves, and traveled abroad for work.

In 1997, I was invited to a conference in America, and afterward I stayed in Urbana for a week to finish a joint paper. That’s when another professor from the same department asked me to join his new project. He was also a good experimentalist, and his team needed a computer modeling specialist. “We haven’t advertised the position yet, but if you’re interested and willing to take it on, we won’t look for anyone else.” The topic was new to me but very interesting. No especially high temperatures or pressures, but very complex, poorly understood processes in the interactions of multicomponent solutions with mineral surfaces and inside mineral nanopores. And that covers an extremely wide range of both fundamental and applied problems — from basic geochemistry to technologies for radioactive waste disposal, water purification and desalination, the behavior of heavy metals in soil, and even the origin of life on Earth! Plus, working with brilliant experimentalists was, once again, a big bonus.

But there was a dilemma: our older daughter had just one year left before finishing school in Russia. Where she would go to college was still up in the air. I needed to talk it over with the family. I asked the Americans to push back the start of my contract by a year so she could finish school in peace. They agreed. My daughter spent the whole year running around to tutors, choosing between the MSU Faculty of Psychology and the Russian State University for the Humanities. But we decided that if we went to America, she could study at the university where I’d be working. Exactly two weeks after her graduation, we flew off to America again. The plan was for just a year at first. Things were going well at the Chernogolovka lab, and my idea was to come over, settle into the new project in Urbana, and then split my time 50/50 between Chernogolovka and Urbana, which had convenient access to much more powerful supercomputers — a big advantage for all the projects, on both sides.

But things didn’t go quite as planned. Our second departure for America came in July 1998. Just a month later, Russia defaulted. The university agreed to take our older daughter only on shaky, provisional terms. Although she had passed the TOEFL back in Moscow, at that point she was essentially just a foreigner with a Russian passport. And foreigners have to apply to a university at least a year before classes begin. As a result, during her first semester she attended classes simply as an auditor. But she did very well on all her exams, and since by then I was officially employed by the University of Illinois, she was allowed to enroll as a regular student, with in-state residency.

Our younger daughter went back to a local school. All in all, life in America was settling down, though I was still officially head of the Laboratory of Physical Research at IEM RAS in Chernogolovka. I regularly wrote plans and reports, managed the grants still running there, and coordinated the team remotely. A year later, my US colleagues and I received very substantial multiyear funding from the US Department of Energy to continue and expand the research I mentioned. After that, I finally asked to be relieved of my duties as head of the Chernogolovka lab and kept on simply as a leading research fellow on extended unpaid leave abroad. They kept me on as a senior research fellow instead, but that didn’t matter: I still sent my plans and reports to Chernogolovka every year, listed my IEM affiliation on all my publications, and took part in joint projects — luckily, computer modeling can be done remotely, from almost anywhere. Around the same time, we decided to apply for green cards after all. In June 2001, we put together and submitted all the paperwork, and two months later came the September 11 attacks, after which processing of all immigration applications in the US was frozen for a long time. Instead of the standard six months, the process dragged on for more than three years. Meanwhile, the grant work was going well, and we were gradually settling into life in Illinois — we even bought a house. But legally, I was still an IEM RAS employee on extended unpaid leave abroad, which I had to renew every year with official permission.

Then, around 2004–2005, the RAS launched yet another wave of dismissals of staff who had been working abroad for long periods — and with the humiliating wording “for absenteeism.” There had been talk like this before, but this time it all looked a little too serious. I found it extremely distasteful. IEM RAS was the only employer listed in my employment record book [the official document recording a person’s work history in Russia — T-invariant], and I absolutely didn’t want to be fired from there for supposed absenteeism. During my next vacation, I went to Chernogolovka and simply resigned of my own accord. That officially ended my career in the Academy of Sciences system.

By then, our entire research group had moved from the University of Illinois to Michigan State University. Our American life was going along as usual: our daughters had grown up, the younger one was finishing college, and the older one had long since started working. Our project with the Department of Energy had been going strong for more than ten years when, out of the blue, I received an offer from Nantes, from the École des Mines de Nantes. To be honest, I had never even considered France as a place to live and work: quite simply, I didn’t know French, and I still don’t speak it very well. But the terms were very tempting, and the problems to be tackled were perfectly tailored to my research interests and to exactly the experience I had built up over the previous 12 years in America. If I had set out to define my ideal research topic myself, I couldn’t have done it any better.

On top of that, several other favorable circumstances lined up. The kids were grown and living on their own. And a few months before the invitation, we had become US citizens. Before that, traveling the world on a Russian passport, even with a US green card, was incredibly difficult because of the endless visa procedures. In 2009, I made about five trips to Europe and Russia without any visa hurdles. Then, in November, I flew to Europe again, this time to Nantes. I gave a seminar talk there, discussed possible joint research with colleagues, and everything really did look, as they say, too good to be true.

My wife and I thought long and hard about the offer; we even flew to Nantes together once more to get a better sense of how we might set up our life in France. We decided it would be a sin to pass up such a rare opportunity. After all, if something in France didn’t work out the way we imagined, we could always just go back to America. So we sold everything we owned in America and flew to France with six suitcases. In our fifties, we started a completely new chapter of our lives. We’ve now been here for sixteen years and have never once regretted it, professionally or personally.

As for my “academic romance” with Russia, it turns out that in my lifetime I left twice and came back twice, but the third time I didn’t come back. At some point, Russia launched its megagrant program, and I was actively courted several times. But under the megagrant rules, a lab head had to spend at least three months a year in Russia. My job in France didn’t allow for that. Later, however, the Higher School of Economics set up international laboratories with more flexible terms as part of Project 5-100 [a government program to boost the global competitiveness of Russian universities — T-invariant]. These required only two months a year of on-site presence. That was still a bit much for me, but we found a solution that worked for everyone. Together with the colleagues who had invited me into the program, whom I had known for many years by then, we applied to set up one of these international labs at HSE and won the competition. And to meet the requirement for time spent in Russia, I agreed to split it evenly with a colleague — another Russian scientist working in the US.

So for five years starting in 2017, I once again had a Russian affiliation, as chief research fellow at the international lab at HSE. We were very productive: I had both master’s and PhD students there. I came to Moscow twice a year, and the rest of the time we talked by video. Fortunately, computer modeling makes that perfectly workable. But of course, after February 24, 2022, I resigned — this time for good, with no going back. We maintain good professional and personal relationships with former colleagues, keep discussing scientific questions, and are wrapping up projects we started earlier, but I no longer find any form of official cooperation with Russian institutions acceptable. You could say this was my third attempt to “return” to Russia, this time as a visiting Western professor. But it didn’t last either.

Do I want to go back to Russia? No, that’s impossible. And more to the point — why would I? The country has been heading into a dead end for many years. That was noticeable a quarter century ago. Back then, though, it seemed that different forces were pulling in different directions, that there was some kind of internal struggle, with the pendulum swinging one way and then the other.

I always followed the situation closely through independent Russian media, whose numbers have shrunk markedly over the years. For instance, I was, and still am, the only foreign-based member of the editorial board of the newspaper Troitsky Variant — Nauka, going back to its founding in 2008. I tried to write columns for it and helped however I could, though I never sought to lecture people working in Russia from abroad — I don’t think I have the right to impose my opinions and judgments on anyone, but I don’t see any point in hiding them, either. Today, that work has naturally shifted to the T-invariant project.

When I agreed in 2017 to take part in the international lab at HSE, it was already after “Krymnash” [“Crimea is ours,” the slogan celebrating Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea — T-invariant]. The events of 2014 were an unambiguous signal to me that the country was plunging into an abyss. It became absolutely clear to me that the point of no return had been passed and completely irreversible processes had been set in motion. Especially after the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) and the way state propaganda started lying about it shamelessly and cynically. Until 2014, it still seemed possible to change things. After that, the slide toward catastrophe, deep internal division, and war began. Science simply can’t survive under such conditions. The priorities of the state and society inevitably shift toward basic survival, and science, especially fundamental science, becomes an unaffordable luxury and is the first to die. And science doesn’t just decline — it’s deliberately strangled. The so-called “RAS reform” of 2013 is a vivid example. And remember how, in 2015, Dmitry Zimin’s Dynasty Foundation was added to the register of “foreign agents”? That was an incredibly sad and shameful episode. From there, things only snowballed. The “foreign agents” list long ago passed the thousand mark, and many of those on it are researchers or faculty at leading universities, including HSE itself. And how many more have been imprisoned for alleged espionage and treason…

One of the reasons I got involved with the international lab at HSE in 2017 was that I wanted to try to push back against these processes myself. At the very least, I didn’t want to remain a bystander; I wanted to see it all with my own eyes. Before that, I had been coming to Russia at most once every couple of years for a week or two. I no longer had any long-term projects back home, and I had long since left my academic institute. I wanted to spend more time in Russia, more often, and to have whatever influence I could. From abroad, catastrophe had long seemed inevitable. In the end, I was only proven right. The disintegration was simply unfolding a bit more slowly than it looked from the outside. But the worst, I’m afraid, is yet to come. We haven’t even seen the worst-case scenario yet.

I remember flying in for a conference in Suzdal in the summer of 2018 and then spending the following week at HSE in Moscow. It was during the World Cup. I took the Lastochka express train from Kursky Station to Vladimir, and the car was packed with foreign fans heading to Nizhny Novgorod. Everywhere there was an atmosphere of tremendous celebration and unexpected international openness. It seemed that HSE was still creating new international labs, new foreign professors were arriving and even being officially hired, and an international supervisory board was up and running. It seemed that different tendencies were competing in the country, and I tried to support the ones I considered constructive and useful. Unfortunately, the people trying to preserve open science and an open society in Russia proved to be critically few. Since I could always compare the Russian news agenda with the American and French ones, I didn’t have many illusions. But there was still hope. It was clear that everything was heading toward the end. Of course, I couldn’t have predicted a full-scale war, but I understood that a profound internal crisis was inevitable. It hasn’t fully broken out yet, but I’m convinced it will very soon.

So I have nowhere to go back to, and no reason to. This fall I’m officially retiring in France, but I’ll keep doing science as a professor emeritus. I still have colleagues in Russia, and we’re finishing papers from earlier joint projects through personal channels. But actually working there… It’s not even a question of money or equipment, but of quality of life, the social environment, the ability to feel like a full-fledged member of society. I have nothing in common, and can have nothing in common, with the society that has taken shape in Russia today.

You know, while working in Germany and America, I kept coming back to Chernogolovka with ideas, projects, and the hope of doing something useful. For example, I proposed: let’s use our experimental institute as a base for small-batch production of unique laboratory equipment, export it, and put the proceeds toward funding fundamental science. I had seen how effectively this model works in the US. And I watched China go down this path in the 1990s. In the thirty-plus years I’ve been working in the West, China has made a fantastic leap — from a deeply backward, semi-artisanal state to a mighty industrial and scientific superpower that competes with America and Europe on equal terms today.

I was convinced that exactly the same scenario could play out in Russia. I would come to Chernogolovka and propose concrete steps, but I kept hitting a brick wall. People were suspicious of my initiatives: they thought I was trying to push someone out of their job or angling for some petty personal perks… And yet there was a time when our institute was even written up in Nature, and Western colleagues quite seriously suggested following our institute’s example (Keeping up with Russians)!

But even then it was obvious that nothing would work without a deep overhaul of how science as a whole is organized. I thought about this a lot back then, wrote articles, and gave interviews. My pieces appeared from the late 1990s through the 2000s in Moscow News, the RFBR Bulletin, and on science websites.

Admittedly, my proposals often seemed too radical and didn’t win broad support. For instance, I said openly that to build truly competitive, world-class science, the staff of inefficient research institutes had to be cut roughly fivefold, with the freed-up resources redirected to creating and supporting strong, globally competitive labs. A reform like that could have been carried out gently and humanely. But it needed to happen at least 20–30 years ago. In the end, it all happened by itself, without any reform — simply through years of the system’s decay. So today there’s no point in reopening that conversation, either scientifically or personally. I no longer see any future for Russia as a country or for Russian science. Not just no good, bright, wonderful future — no future at all. In 1991, I clearly saw a future and came back full of hope, even though the Soviet Union was falling apart before our eyes. In 1994, I also saw prospects — and came back despite hyperinflation, “Black Tuesday,” and all the other delights. Even after 2014, some hope still remained. But not anymore. I see nothing good ahead, and I’m afraid no one has the power to change that anymore. We can try to help and rescue individual people. And that absolutely has to be done! But the country, and the science in it, are beyond saving.

How to leave “until things get better at home,” teach philosophy in an unfamiliar language, and stay in America

As told by Marina Bykova, professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, North Carolina State University, a specialist in German idealism, and editor-in-chief of the international journal Studies in East European Thought; and Andrey Kuznetsov, professor in the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the same university’s College of Engineering, Fellow of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), associate editor of the Journal of Porous Media, and a member of the editorial board of Proceedings of the Royal Society A.

Marina Bykova: I defended both of my dissertations at the Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Philosophy: my Candidate of Sciences dissertation in 1985 and my Doctor of Sciences dissertation in 1993, becoming the youngest Doctor of Sciences in the humanities in Russia. Both were devoted to Hegel: the first to the problem of thinking, the second to subjectivity. Before I left Moscow, where I worked at the Institute of Philosophy, I had published three books. Two of them grew out of my dissertations but were substantially reworked, and I co-authored the third, The Absolute Idea and the Absolute Spirit in Hegel’s Philosophy, with my colleague Andrey Krichevsky. That book was probably the most unusual of the three: the two of us read Hegel in completely different ways. My co-author’s interpretation was strictly theological: he understood the absolute spirit as God. Mine was grounded in a logical paradigm and saw the absolute spirit not as a transcendent God but as the result and highest expression of the inner self-development of the Hegelian concept.

My husband had also defended his Candidate of Sciences dissertation by then and was working at the Mechanical Engineering Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In the nineties, the institute started cutting its employees’ salaries: first by sixty percent, and then it stopped paying them altogether. Officially, this was called a delay in wage payments; it dragged on for nine months. It got to the point where we started selling off our belongings, and that was hard.

Around the same time, the Institute of Philosophy launched a project to publish a bilingual edition of Kant’s works. Two teams were working on it: ours, led by Nelly Motroshilova, and a team in Marburg headed by Burkhard Tuschling. Since I knew Kant, spoke fluent German, and had a good sense of what my Moscow colleagues could do and what they needed, Professor Tuschling invited me to Marburg. There I was offered a university position and the job of coordinating the project; the choice, in essence, was obvious.

Besides, my husband and I could see that his institute’s situation was getting steadily worse: there wasn’t enough money for salaries, or for the equipment without which researchers in his field simply can’t work. I persuaded him to apply for a Humboldt Foundation fellowship. I had received one myself back in 1988 and, as I was told at the time, became the first humanities scholar from Russia in the program. That stay in Germany eventually grew into my Doctor of Sciences dissertation. Later, Andrey became a Humboldt fellow too, and we went to Marburg together: I took up my university position, while he spent four months there studying German, which was part of the fellowship program, and then moved to Bochum, where he worked on a grant. When we left, we had no intention of emigrating or staying in Europe — it felt like we were leaving only for a while, until things got better at home: we’d do some research abroad, get some more training, and come back.

Andrey Kuznetsov: In 1994, I received a postdoctoral fellowship at Ohio State University in Columbus, one of the largest universities in America. Our son was born there, but my position ended when he was two months old, so we went back to Moscow as a family of three.

Marina Bykova: We went back, though, already knowing that Vienna was waiting for us: while in the US, I had received a Lise Meitner Fellowship — the Austrian counterpart of the Humboldt — and Andrey had been invited to spend a year as a postdoc at the Vienna University of Technology. A year later, his contract was extended, while I, as a fellow, found a home at the University of Vienna’s Faculty of Philosophy and the Austrian Academy of Sciences. The money wasn’t much, but the position gave me access to the library and university resources and, most importantly, the chance to work in a German-speaking environment, which felt very comfortable to me after my time in Germany, first as a Humboldt fellow and then on the staff of the University of Marburg. My vocabulary was pretty good; I had written my Candidate of Sciences dissertation working from Hegel’s texts in the original German. And yet, when I first arrived in Germany on the Humboldt program, I couldn’t understand even simple announcements on the train. The passive knowledge of the language we’d been taught just wasn’t enough… But in Cologne, I was soon speaking freely. And naturally, by the time we got to Vienna, I had no language problems at all. We spent three years there, and all that time Andrey was already looking for a position in America.

Marina Bykova and Andrey Kuznetsov (1993). Photo: personal archive

Andrey Kuznetsov: My professorship in America began on January 1, 1998. Things never got better at home: the money never came back to the Mechanical Engineering Research Institute. What’s more, talented scientists started leaving the institute — some emigrated, while others went into industry and never came back.

Marina Bykova: In the meantime, we very nearly moved to Japan for three years: Andrey had received a prestigious postdoctoral fellowship from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, but it was clear there would be nothing for me to do there, since I didn’t know Japanese and had never worked on Eastern philosophy. So when Andrey was offered a professorship, we moved to America — again, with no thought of staying for good. We figured we’d work for a while and then go back, to Russia or to Europe, especially since we still feel European to this day.

The early days were tough: Andrey had a work visa, while I had a spousal visa, which let me stay in the country legally but didn’t give me the right to work, not even temporarily. Fortunately, a year and a half later, Andrey was granted outstanding researcher status, which qualified him for an expedited green card and allowed me to get a work permit as well. So I had a work permit — but no work.

But I got lucky: fellow philosophers who knew me from my publications helped me land a temporary adjunct faculty position at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, teaching an introductory philosophy course. Chapel Hill is 25 miles from our home, and we have no relatives in America, so it wasn’t easy with a small child. But the biggest problem was English. As I mentioned, my first foreign language — and, until I came to the US, my only one — was German. In my first few years in America, I had, of course, picked up some basic English, but it was nowhere near enough to teach in. Imagine being handed a course to teach in, say, Japanese, a language you’ve never studied in your life, with the first lecture three days away. And philosophy isn’t engineering, where you can just write out a formula; it demands a high level of language proficiency.

I walked into every lecture as if I were going to the gallows. I knew what I wanted to say, but I knew it in Russian and German, not in English — the language was completely foreign to me, and for the first few weeks I literally memorized my lectures word for word. I have to give credit to the students, who were remarkably understanding. I warned them right away: “If you don’t understand something, stop me and correct me.” And they did: they corrected me and helped me with my pronunciation, and they were kind about it, but for me it was still torture. That’s how the semester went, and to my surprise, the students gave me the highest possible ratings in their course evaluations. To this day, I can’t understand how or why that happened. Although I did try very hard.

I started my second academic career as an assistant professor, even though by then I already held a Russian Doctor of Sciences degree. I was almost forty, and in effect I had to build my professional life all over again. But I got tenure not after the six years that are standard in the American academic system, but after just three, and three years after that I became a full professor. Andrey and I got tenure in the same year, and even on the same day: that meant not only a permanent position but also a promotion from assistant to associate professor. Our work had been recognized. And that’s when we realized we wouldn’t be going back to Russia: our professional lives were here.

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The post Sometimes They Don’t Come Back: Stories of Émigré Scientists 35 Years After the Soviet Collapse appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

Science After the Break with the West: How War and International Sanctions Reshaped Russian Universities

By: ak
3 September 2026 at 11:30

Since the start of the full-scale war, Russian science has lost key ties with Western universities and research centers. Yet four years of sanctions have not led to a collapse. Instead, Russia rapidly reoriented toward China, other parts of Asia, and the Middle East, while the Kremlin firmly integrated higher education into its system of military priorities. These are the conclusions reached by Olga Orlova, head of T-invariant, in her report Transformation of Science and Education in Russia under Sanctions 2022–2026, which examines changes in Russian academia over the past four years.

The author stresses that what is happening is not simply isolation, but a transition to a dangerous new model. The report examines not only the initial shock of sanctions but also a profound systemic restructuring: total control over international contacts, an accelerated push for “technological sovereignty,” and the subordination of science to the needs of the war economy.

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The break with the West has affected different fields unevenly. The exact and natural sciences, as well as military technologies, have received strong state support and found an alternative partner in China. By contrast, the social sciences and humanities have been devastated. Cut off from the global academic community and international mobility, they have faced enforced isolation and systematic ideological purges.

The result is what the report calls “selective internationalization.” Russia now develops international ties only where they serve the state’s military and strategic interests. The long-term consequences of this pivot are far more dangerous than the sanctions themselves: the country is replacing Western partnerships with near-total dependence on a handful of eastern allies, while the entire academic system is being transformed into an instrument of state security.

You can read the report Transformation of Science and Education in Russia under Sanctions 2022–2026 here.

The post Science After the Break with the West: How War and International Sanctions Reshaped Russian Universities appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

“None of the political parties makes higher education a priority on its agenda”: American higher education through the eyes of a university administrator

By: ak
14 September 2026 at 11:44

Our interviewee today is not allowed to give interviews — under the terms of her employment contract. The senior position she holds at an American university obliges her not to make her political views public and to exercise the utmost caution in public statements. But the changes now taking place at American universities are so far-reaching that she agreed to talk with T-invariant about the serious challenges facing higher education. Her experience as a department chair and dean, and later as a vice president, helps her today to map the critical points in the development of the academic environment: how the new presidential administration is affecting university life, how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has split it, how artificial intelligence is influencing teaching and its administration, what the shrinking of university budgets leads to, and, most importantly, how the very logic by which higher education works has changed.

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The economics of structural deficit

T-invariant: You spent more than ten years in administrative work: first as a department chair, then as a dean, and now as a vice president. What changes have you observed over this time, in funding, in administration, in relationships within the faculty, in university politics?

— The most obvious and the most constant thing: there is less and less money. When I was just starting out as a chair, my institution could end the year with a surplus, and that money made it possible to fund special projects. Now many universities are already approaching a state of structural deficit.

It’s important to understand here that American universities are very different, and their funding is structured differently too. There is, for example, the Carnegie Classification by level of research activity. It currently distinguishes R1, R2, and Research Colleges and Universities. For R1 the threshold is at least $50 million in research spending per year and at least 70 research doctoral degrees; for R2, at least $5 million and 20 research doctoral degrees. The next category begins at $2.5 million in research spending. Five million is quite an attainable sum for a small college: the total budget of such an institution might be, say, around $150 million.

R1s are especially vulnerable right now because of cuts to federal research funding. A significant part of their research budgets comes through the NSF, the NIH, and other federal agencies. When those grants are cut, such universities face very serious budgetary problems.

And a grant brings the university money not only for the research itself. What matters here is overhead: the funds the university receives and uses to maintain its infrastructure and its other operations. This is a very significant part of grant funding, sometimes 50 to 60 percent of the entire grant. So R1s, but also R2s and other research universities, depend very heavily on that money.

As I see it, this process began long ago, around 2001: federal research funding started to shrink gradually. Under Obama it was no longer being cut at the same pace, but it did not return to previous levels and did not grow along with inflation. So the financial pressure on universities built up over years.

I myself never worked at R1 universities. For public universities at the R2 level and below, a different source of money matters: state appropriations, that is, ultimately, tax revenue. These too were either cut or stayed at roughly the same level and completely failed to keep up with inflation. At the same time there is strong political pressure not to raise tuition. And now the number of students is falling as well. Even if enrollment were not declining, with this kind of financial structure we would still find ourselves in a very difficult situation.

T-i: And what changed on other levels, for instance, in the university and administrative environment itself?

— A huge change is online education. This is a separate and very complicated topic. Even before the pandemic there were MOOCs, which exist partly outside the traditional university system. Some universities moved very aggressively in this direction and made online education massive and accessible. Then came the pandemic and the total shift online, and in the last two or three years AI appeared as well, and the interaction between online education and AI has created a completely new set of problems.

But there is a deeper change that I think about a lot. It seems to me that the very model of liberal arts education, which is very specific to the United States, is becoming unsustainable.

For someone who received their education outside the United States, the concept itself looks rather strange at first. American higher education rests on the idea that college education should be formative rather than narrowly preparatory: it should teach people to think critically, write well, understand how the world works, and be civically engaged. This idea is very deeply embedded in the American university system.

Historically, this model grew stronger over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: even institutions that began as teachers’ colleges gradually turned into broad-based universities with courses in history, philosophy, anthropology, literature, political science, theater, and other fields.

But it seems to me that the economic conditions that allowed this model to exist in the United States in the twentieth century have now disappeared.

This model was especially viable as long as the United States had a very strong and well-off middle class in which really only the father of the family earned money. In the popular image of the 1980s and 1990s, a single salary could support a suburban house and a family, while four years of college let a child spend several years exploring history, philosophy, or anthropology without having to answer immediately what income that degree would bring. This kind of economy made possible the idea of education as an extended period of exploration before choosing a career.

Today far fewer families can afford this luxury. A student wants to understand in advance what they will do after graduation. So, especially after the pandemic, career readiness has become a much stronger focus: how to connect a major with a specific career, how to build a career map for a student, how to explain the value of a specialization in history or sociology.

There is another feature of the American system that looks rather unusual to someone from Europe or Asia. In many countries you can enter a professional program right after school and train to become a doctor or a lawyer. In the United States, medicine and law belong to the next level of education: before applying to medical school or law school, you need to earn a bachelor’s degree. So the path to a profession turns out to be much longer.

At the same time, professional schools are usually built into a large university. Few independent teachers’ colleges remain today, and medical schools too are usually part of universities. Even engineering schools, where you can go straight into professional training, frequently exist inside universities that also have departments of history, philosophy, and anthropology. So the American university has to sustain this whole broad structure of liberal arts, even if a significant share of its students come there for a quite specific profession.

T-i: And how is this shift in student demand now affecting the university’s structure?

— In the big cities of the United States dozens of colleges and universities exist side by side, and many have their own departments of history, philosophy, anthropology, literature, political science, and theater. Every department needs students who will major in one of the subjects it offers. When the number of such students falls, the old structure stops being sustainable.

And the problem is broader than just a crisis of the humanities. Until recently, accounting and computer science were considered almost ideal career-oriented fields. Now AI is making even these trajectories less obvious. A university cannot simply replace an “impractical” humanities major with one that is guaranteed to be practical: the labor market changes faster than curricula.

Over the past decades, independent research institutes have also been disappearing. This was especially noticeable in biology: as federal funding was cut, many of them became financially unstable and either closed or were absorbed into universities or hospital systems.

T-i: What consequences has all this had, for teaching loads, for instance?

— Teaching load is fairly complicated, because you usually can’t simply increase it. It is fixed either by university bylaws or, in many public universities, by collective bargaining agreements with unions. Those also set the pay scale. So one of the main ways to save money looks different: when a tenured professor retires, their position is increasingly just not reopened.

It’s important to distinguish between different periods here. In the mid-2010s, universities were already under chronic financial pressure, but there were still plenty of students. In the big cities of the United States there was, at the same time, a large market of people with PhDs in history, philosophy, and other disciplines who were looking for academic work. Universities could hire them as part-timers for individual courses for far less money than tenured professors.

Gradually a whole layer of career adjuncts emerged. An instructor might teach at one university on Tuesday and Thursday, at another on Monday and Wednesday, and offer courses in the fall, spring, and summer. Some accumulated a very heavy load this way and essentially lived on teaching alone. In public systems, with a maximum teaching load and a benefits package, you could even reach a fairly decent annual income, but at the cost of an enormous number of courses and giving up research almost entirely.

For a long time I thought this replacement of full-time faculty with part-timers (what’s called adjunctification) was happening in more or less the same way across the country, because I worked in a big city myself. But then I realized how much this model depends on geography. It works well where there are many universities and many people with doctorates nearby: in the big cities of the United States a person can teach in several places at once and doesn’t have to move for a single course.

In rural America the situation is completely different. If a university is in a small town and needs a specialist, a person with a PhD won’t move there for five thousand dollars a course. There simply isn’t a large enough local market for academic labor. So adjunctification was a very uneven process: in the big university centers it could reach enormous scale, while in many rural areas the model barely worked at all.

And now, in many places, the trend has reversed. There are fewer students, and it is extremely difficult to dismiss faculty on permanent contracts. Moreover, in the United States age discrimination is prohibited, and you can’t simply push older professors toward retirement.

The pandemic changed this situation even more. Everyone learned to teach online, and now an older professor sometimes doesn’t need to come to the university regularly at all. I’ve seen professors well past eighty who calmly log onto Zoom twice a week, teach their usual courses, and continue to receive a full professor’s salary. If there are medical grounds that qualify for an accommodation, they can secure the right to teach remotely. In public universities this sometimes slows the renewal of staff even further.

At expensive private colleges the pressure runs strongly the other way: students are paying in part for the in-person experience and react very negatively if an instructor tries to replace on-campus classes with Zoom sessions. So the ability to move fully to remote teaching depends heavily on the type of university.

As a result, when a budget has to be cut today, the first vulnerable group is now the adjuncts themselves. Some of them built their entire professional life on this work over many years, stopped doing research and publishing, and are now at a serious disadvantage when a tenure-track position opens up somewhere. I’ve seen units where, before the pandemic, adjuncts taught half of all courses, and now only one or two of them are left.

It turns out to be a rather sharp historical reversal. First, chronic underfunding combined with large student numbers encouraged the mass use of adjuncts, especially in big cities. Now enrollment is falling, the tenured faculty remains protected and is aging at the same time, and universities are economizing above all on the very layer of adjunct faculty that they themselves created over the previous decades.

Overcoming inertia

T-i: Is the number of permanent professorial positions still shrinking, then?

— Yes, it is. When a professor retires, it is much easier not to reopen their tenure-track line. That is exactly how the cuts happen: you don’t necessarily have to fire anyone, you can simply leave positions unfilled for years. Hence the aging of the faculty and the gap between disciplines that are still hiring actively and those where the department is gradually shrinking.

In 2022–2023 we had a brief reversal at our college. Thanks to federal stimulus funds and the ability to justify new hiring in terms of social mobility, we managed to hire many new full-time faculty on tenure-track lines, including replacing some of the adjuncts. We argued that students from low-income families, of whom we have many at our university, should also have direct access to full-time faculty who are based at the university, do research, and can properly mentor them. It was a very good period, but then funding tightened again.

T-i: And what is happening with the positions of ordinary staff? Are they being cut too?

— Interesting things are happening here. I’ve long had the sense that computers took over the world, but in a way that makes sense for computers: they made us perform more and more tasks we had not performed before, because it became technically possible to create them. What used to be done in the 1990s with a single paper form now turns into several electronic forms, reports, approval systems, and databases.

Hence a strange effect: software, fast internet, Wi-Fi, platforms, specialists for each system — all of this raises the cost of the university. And you need more people, not fewer. We once thought the internet would reduce paper use; the opposite happened. It’s a similar story with staff. Every automation gives rise to new operations and new duties, and in the end the digital infrastructure itself feeds the budget crisis.

AI so far doesn’t look like an exception. It can automate a particular task, but at the same time it creates new demands for oversight, reporting, training, and academic integrity.

T-i: And what changes have there been in what students want, and in how the university responds?

— Over the last two years I’ve seen a fairly rapid retreat from online education, especially among undergraduates. For my students, online courses were very appealing at first. I worked at a public university where many students come from low-income families and work while studying, so the ability not to come to campus every day solved a real problem for them.

But a contradiction soon became apparent: students want online learning, but many of them simply don’t succeed in an online environment. I had students who logged into class while working a store cash register or sitting at their workplace. Formally they were present, but in practice they couldn’t fully participate. Such students began to fall behind, and many of them eventually dropped out of the university altogether.

So now I see a reverse movement: students themselves more often choose traditional in-person courses. The online format, of course, isn’t going anywhere: it’s too important for working students. But the idea that it by itself solves the problem of access to education turned out to be too optimistic. Access to a course does not yet mean the ability to actually learn.

The arrival of AI has added another problem. In an online environment it becomes ever harder to tell whether a student is really doing the work themselves. AI imitates human text very well, and almost any technical measure we try to use against academic dishonesty can be circumvented. So the return to in-person classes is also connected with a very practical question: how to make sure the student is actually learning.

T-i: What changed after the current federal administration took office?

— There are two obvious shifts. The first is rhetorical: from Washington we increasingly hear the idea that higher education is overrated and that what society really needs is vocational and technical training, short programs, and non-academic online courses.

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The second is a sharp reversal around DEI policy. For the last twenty or thirty years, the development of DEI was one of the central paradigms of the American university. Offices, programs, grants, and strategic plans were built around it; universities sought to increase diversity among students, faculty, and staff.

When I came to American academia from a different educational system, the point of this policy was not self-evident to me. I was strongly influenced by conversations with colleagues and students. One colleague put it this way: if a society has systematically discriminated against a particular group for a very long time, simply declaring formal equality is not enough, becauseeconomic inequality and a culture that has built up over centuries will still remain. Society is better off when social groups are not locked into a social environment where poverty, criminalization, and drug addiction thrive.

Now an almost 180-degree turn has taken place. Programs built around DEI are losing funding and have been outlawed; legal offices are demanding an inventory of anything that might conflict with the new federal rules.

There is no systematic response to these changes yet. There is a lot of confusion, attempts to understand the limits of what’s permissible, and a desire not to attract unnecessary attention. In more liberal states, universities feel some political protection, but even so they are much more careful about what they put in writing.

My own approach to diversity was always fairly moderate: make searches for job candidates and students as broad as possible, avoid labeling, resist stereotypes, and make the university welcoming for staff and students of different backgrounds. But even that isn’t enough. You have to train campus security and support staff so that they don’t begin an interaction with staff or students on the basis of their appearance or accent.

T-i: What changes of recent years do you see in the students themselves?

— The way students communicate has changed. Before the pandemic, instructors complained that students talked to each other too much in class and couldn’t sit still. After the pandemic I sometimes observe almost complete silence. One recruiter asked me: “Why are all your students whispering?” They find interpersonal communication very stressful, but at the same time they crave it. So sometimes effective pedagogy today consists literally in making them talk to each other in an organized way.

T-i: Why does academia, seeing these threats, change so slowly?

— Because academia is structurally conservative, and I don’t mean politics here. Because of financial constraints, universities hired too few young faculty for many years, and the faculty is aging. Curricula are aging too. Articles that were an intellectual revelation for me in graduate school I still want, out of habit, to assign to students, even though they are now twenty or thirty years old.

I often think of the Red Queen from Through the Looking-Glass: “it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place,” which means that to get somewhere you have to run twice as fast. Technology and the labor market change at enormous speed, while curricula and ways of teaching are conservative and dogmatic. That’s why hiring younger and early-career faculty matters not only as a question of fairness in the labor market. It is one of the ways to renew the content of education.

The university and “big” politics

T-i: Is there any political or social force beyond academia that is seriously interested in the development of American higher education?

— My short answer: I don’t see such a force. None of the political parties makes higher education a priority on its agenda. The Democrats have many social programs; among Republicans there is now strong criticism of universities. For governors and Congress, higher education competes for funding with healthcare, transportation, housing programs, support for people with disabilities, environmental projects, schools, and many other areas.

University presidents, of course, lobby governors, Congress, the federal administration. But they aren’t the only ones lobbying; everyone does. From inside the university it seems obvious to us that our funding, specifically, is critically important. From the outside, we are just one of many groups, each of which can present a convincing list of public needs.

Outside the big cities in America, transport and social infrastructure are very weak. Between small towns there may be almost no public transport: train service is infrequent, if it runs at all, the bus network is weak, and without a car it’s hard to reach even the nearest town. You come across poor towns with empty houses and a very limited set of jobs.

That’s exactly why a university there acts as an economic anchor. It brings in hundreds or thousands of students, hires faculty and staff, and around it develop rental housing, cafés, sports facilities, schools for employees’ children, medical services, and cultural events. Often it is the only place in the county where an educated middle class is consistently present. If such a university disappears, it can leave an economic desert behind.

So the question of closing a small public university is at the same time a question of regional policy, even if in university budgets it isn’t called that.

T-i: Then what can universities actually do themselves?

— Public universities retain a strong resource: they can provide high-quality education at a comparatively low price. There is demand for this, and there is a public payoff too. So public universities have a convincing return on investment, ROI: their graduates on average earn more in the labor market, while tuition there is far lower than at expensive private colleges. Our weak point is that we are often bad at telling families and high-school students about this.

We will have to take the demand for career readiness more seriously, work more actively with local communities and schools, and explain better what a university does. Popularizing research is also becoming part of the mission: historians, philosophers, political scientists, and physicists go on YouTube and make short videos explaining their research to a broad audience. Academia long considered such work secondary; now it is becoming a matter of survival.

I don’t really believe that the main survival strategy will emerge from a nationwide or transnational coalition of universities. American institutions are too different: public ones are funded by the states, private ones compete for students, grants, and donors, and there are also religious universities and military academies. It’s useful to meet and talk, but real solutions are usually region-specific.

T-i: Have political conflicts between faculty become sharper in recent years?

— Political differences have always existed and often ran along disciplinary lines: roughly speaking, a finance department might be more Republican, while a sociology department might be very liberal. But in recent years I really have seen extremely sharp conflicts around Israel and Palestine. Sometimes at chairs’ meetings I genuinely feared the argument would come to blows.

As a dean I tried not to show my own political views. So for a while both pro-Israeli and anti-Israeli colleagues were convinced I was on their side, and they took turns coming to my office to complain about one another. In the humanities and social sciences it’s hard to separate a personal position entirely from teaching; it shows in what a person says in class and what they support publicly.

What amazes me most is something else: faculty can mobilize emotionally far more around Middle Eastern politics, which the university can barely influence, than around their own budget and the future of their institution. They merely complain about the lack of funding, but when they discuss the conflict over Israel they’re ready to shout at each other for hours.

T-i: And don’t unions and collective protests give faculty a channel of influence?

— Unions can indeed be active in the fight for funding and contracts, but the protests themselves are often surprisingly small. I went to major rallies in defense of funding for the natural sciences, and each time I was struck by how much smaller the turnout was than I had expected.

There are many reasons for this. A tenured professor has a protected contract, good insurance, a relatively decent salary; the budget crisis isn’t always felt as a matter of life and death. Besides, the bloated bureaucracy keeps people constantly busy with small tasks. On a day off, a person chooses between a rally that probably won’t change anything and their family.

Younger faculty, in my observation, are not necessarily more active than their elders either. Sometimes they are in a much more vulnerable position and are afraid to take risks; sometimes they are simply overloaded. To really understand this, you’d need a separate, sociologically grounded conversation with people about why, on a given day off, they do or don’t go to a protest.

There are internal conflicts too. The same union can represent both full-time and adjunct faculty, whose interests don’t always coincide. Some unions took very hard positions on Israel, which made some Jewish faculty drift away from them. When yet another political agenda is added to a rally in defense of science, you inevitably push away some of the potential participants.

T-i: Do the political divisions among students look the same?

— In the big cities of the United States, the student body is global. The conflict over Israel and Palestine made student politics very visible for the first time in a long while. The division was palpable and did not disappear in a single academic year.

The reaction to immigration policy, meanwhile, looks different. Vulnerable students are often simply afraid, while part of the local student body can be fairly conservative on immigration. At first glance it’s strange that there is intense campus activism around an international conflict and much less around domestic immigration policy, but these issues probably affect different groups of students.

University leadership in recent years, in my experience, tries to take as neutral a position as possible: not to issue loud political statements, not to invite deliberately provocative speakers, to emphasize academic work. The logic is roughly this: don’t draw unnecessary political attention to the university.

T-i: Did the conflict over Israel and Palestine change the composition of the student body itself?

— In some large urban universities, my impression is that after the sharpest campus conflicts the number of Jewish students declined. Some families preferred quieter private institutions, perceived as more openly pro-Israeli or simply more controlled. I can’t turn my own observations into nationwide statistics, but locally the change was noticeable.

[[socialnetworks]]

T-i: We’ve barely talked about international students. What has changed here?

— In the late 1990s, international students were more often described in the terminology of “attracting talent”: the university brings in strong people from all over the world. Later, for many institutions, this also turned into a business model. International students pay higher tuition, so universities began actively recruiting them and building special support systems.

Now visa restrictions are sharply reducing this flow. For some universities this is both a loss of the international environment and a direct blow to the budget. It’s especially noticeable when a large share of international students historically came from one or two countries, and now, in those countries, visas have suddenly become significantly harder to get.

T-i: Do you think that, with all these constraints and difficulties, the American university is able to preserve the quality of its education and research?

— The future is hard to predict, but I believe in the resilience of the model of affordable, quality public education. Enough people still need it, and the mission of social mobility hasn’t gone anywhere.

About research I’m more anxious. The slowdown didn’t begin yesterday: since the early 2000s, individual research institutes have been closing or being absorbed, and federal funding has been shrinking. It seems to me that the United States is gradually losing part of its technological advantage, including in biology and biomedicine, and increasingly importing technologies and ideas from East Asia and Europe. This is a long trajectory, not a consequence of the policies of this presidential term alone.

In education the consequences are less clear-cut. Professors like to say that students “aren’t what they used to be,” but I’ve had very strong groups even in recent years. They just need to be taught a little differently. If you adapt teaching methods to how they take in information today and interact with each other and with us, you can get good results.

T-i: So it turns out that the principles of tenure and shared governance both protect the university and prevent it from restructuring quickly?

— Yes, there is a constant tension here, but it is built into the system itself. Faculty can unite, object, slow things down, or change decisions. Sometimes they defend what seems to me outdated; sometimes it is precisely they who keep the administration from making a catastrophic decision.

Over my years in university administration, relations between faculty and administration moved in waves between conflict and cooperation. It depends on the financial situation, on personalities, and on the specific issue. I don’t consider the tension itself a defect. A university is built around tensions among competing interests: financial sustainability, academic autonomy, and concern for students’ interests. What matters is that all these opposing interests and views actually help us move forward rather than stand still.

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The post “None of the political parties makes higher education a priority on its agenda”: American higher education through the eyes of a university administrator appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

Ratings for Money: How Slovakia Rewards Scientific Fraud

By: ak
19 August 2026 at 08:47

While Slovak politicians calmly keep their academic degrees for copied theses thanks to convenient loopholes in the law, far less visible violations are taking place inside the universities themselves. Dozens of scholars appear to be linked to purchased authorship, data manipulation, and publications in predatory journals. The Plagiat-Navigator project tried to determine how deeply academic fraud has penetrated Slovak science.

In recent years, Slovakia has faced a series of high-profile academic scandals, mostly connected with plagiarism in the dissertations of senior politicians and officials. In September 2025, a scandal broke out around Pavol Gaspar, director of the Slovak Information Service, the country’s main intelligence and counterintelligence agency. His master’s thesis on corruption, defended in 2011, turned out to have been copied by roughly two thirds from uncited sources. In response to the plagiarism allegations, Gaspar said that his work had passed all the required formal checks as part of the defense procedure, after which he was awarded a master’s degree. That same year, member of parliament Marian Kery, who had previously publicly accused other politicians of plagiarism, was himself caught in a similar violation. His 2004 master’s thesis, “The Image of Man in Pushkin’s Belkin Tales,” copies almost verbatim a thesis defended four years earlier by student Martina Brodnanova.

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In 2020, leading journalists from the newspaper Dennik N carried out a broad review of the theses of the country’s top officials. It turned out that plagiarism had been found in the works of several representatives of the ruling coalition’s upper ranks, including the education minister, the speaker of parliament, and the prime minister. The scandal led the Slovak parliament, at the end of 2020, to pass a law allowing academic degrees to be officially revoked for plagiarism. But a significant loophole remained in the law: it is not retroactive and applies only to works defended after 2020. As a result, all the senior officials whose work was found to contain plagiarism, including the intelligence chief Gaspar and MP Kery mentioned above, kept both their degrees and their positions.

Dissertation scandals involving the country’s first-tier officials and other senior figures are only the visible part of a much larger problem. These high-profile cases received broad public attention thanks to targeted journalistic investigations, but in their shadow remains a significant layer of violations of academic integrity among Slovak scholars, professors, and university lecturers.

Here one should mention Petr Jakubek, a Doctor of Sciences in economics and a member of the governing board of DTI University (Dubnicky technologicky institut). In 2019, he received a Doctor of Sciences diploma after defending a dissertation at Chernihiv Technological University in Ukraine. As later became clear, a substantial part of Jakubek’s dissertation text coincides verbatim with the text of the dissertation of his opponent, Svetlana Natroshvili, defended in Kyiv in 2016. Below is an example of improper borrowing on one page of Jakubek’s dissertation.

But the problem is not only the absence of citations: even if they had been present, they would not have resolved the issue. In the text, Jakubek mechanically replaced the National University of Physical Education and Sport of Ukraine, which appeared in Natroshvili’s work, with Chernihiv Technological University, while leaving all quantitative indicators unchanged.

The practice of defending a dissertation in another country and then having the diploma nostrified at home is widespread in Eastern Europe and across the post-Soviet space.

If dissertation plagiarism in Slovakia is at least partly documented and discussed by journalists, a much larger problem is developing outside public view. It is a system in which a scientific career can be built not on genuine research, but on purchased articles, fabricated data, and artificially inflated indicators.

In May 2026, the major academic online platform Research.com published lists of top researchers based on h-index and citation metrics. In the field of plant science and agronomy, Professor Marian Brestic, one of the highest-ranked Slovak researchers at the Slovak University of Agriculture in Nitra, placed 213th in the world. His colleague, Associate Professor Marek Zivcak, placed 1,511th globally, becoming Slovakia’s second-highest-ranked scientist in the field. As a result, the university took 253rd place worldwide in this scientific area and second place among the seven Slovak universities included in the ranking, losing the top national spot only to Comenius University in Bratislava.

Yet back in 2022, Leonid Schneider, an independent science journalist known for his high-profile investigations into academic ethics, devoted an entire section of his For Better Science issue to Brestic and Zivcak. By that time, these Slovak authors, together with colleagues from Middle Eastern countries, had accumulated nine papers with negative reviews on the post-publication peer review platform PubPeer, some of which had already been retracted. Schneider links this to the purchase of co-authorship on the Asian market — a shadow industry where authorship is sold as a commodity. In some of these publications, experts found distorted phrases and terms, or “tortured phrases”: a characteristic trace of machine paraphrasing used to conceal plagiarism. The image below shows one such example in the journal Microorganisms, on the left, alongside an earlier source text by other authors, on the right, from which the “paraphrase” was made.

Since then, the number of problematic publications has grown. Today, PubPeer lists 34 publications by Professor Brestic with critical comments, some of them co-authored with Associate Professor Zivcak. The reasons for criticism, and in some cases for later retraction, included not only plagiarism or conflicts of interest, but also the substitution of authors at the final stage of publication, after all the reviewers’ questions had already been settled. Such substitutions are considered one of the characteristic signs of papers circulating on the purchased-authorship market.

These scandals, retractions, and exposés, however, have almost no effect on rankings. Even if all the disputed papers by Brestic and Zivcak are officially retracted, their citation counts and h-indexes will remain in the databases. These data are not recalculated retroactively after retractions. Formally, the scholars have already taken their places in the global tables, and no later revelations can dislodge them. A victory in the rankings obtained through paper mills and purchased citations formally remains a victory.

The mechanism of these rankings has a direct financial expression. Under the methodology of Slovakia’s Ministry of Education, every publication that falls within the top 1 percent of the world’s most cited papers automatically brings its author 3,000 euros from the state budget, and the same amount to the university. Thus, an artificially inflated citation index means not only a place in a prestigious ranking, but real money. In such a system, artificial citation inflation acquires a direct financial value: high bibliometric indicators affect not only academic status, but also the distribution of public funds. It is worth noting that Slovakia is not alone here: a similar system of monetary rewards for publications in high-ranking journals has long existed in Russia.

An equally telling case of image manipulation was documented in the work of an associate professor at Comenius University. In a joint 2024 publication in the journal Nano-Micro Letters, Dmitry Medvedev, a professor at Ural Federal University and Doctor of Chemical Sciences, and Martin Motola, an associate professor at Comenius University in Bratislava, together with co-authors from China, manually redrew the scale bar on images of nanoparticles obtained using a scanning electron microscope. The article claimed that the particles under study measured tens of nanometers. The microscope’s technical specifications, however, indicate that the real particle sizes were many times larger (see the image below).

In other words, the scale in the images was simply adjusted to fit the desired result. But that was not the end of the matter. In the same article, experts on PubPeer raised well-founded concerns about other data as well, including graphs. This was not an isolated case: in recent years, experts have identified a whole series of Motola’s papers with problems in the data and in their graphical presentation. The regular appearance of such problems in Motola’s articles can hardly be attributed to simple inattention on the part of the authors.

Publications by scholars from Comenius University also contain direct borrowing of visual materials without references to the original source. A telling example is an article by Professor Peter Mikus and Veronika Mikusova on chitosan nanoparticles, in which some illustrations were copied from an earlier publication by Iranian authors.

In papers where experts identify gross violations of publication ethics, links to Asian paper mills can often be traced. These mills specialize in producing ready-made publications and then distributing them through online platforms.

On the shadow market of paper mills, authorship is not the only thing for sale. Another sought-after commodity is citations. References to one’s own work, like references to the work of others, have long since become a valuable asset. In June 2025, the editor of Chemical Engineering Journal retracted a publication by the aforementioned Associate Professor Motola and his university colleague Muhammad Hanif for artificial citation inflation. Between the original publication and the final version of the article, the number of references to Hanif’s work rose from 2 to 19, and references to Motola’s work from 2 to 10.

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Particular concern is raised by the rapidly spreading practice of publishing review articles under the names of fictitious scholars. The purpose of such works is to introduce numerous citations of articles by people who paid intermediaries on the shadow market for this service into the legitimate scientific record. Thus, the publication portfolio of Beata Gavurova, a professor at the Technical University of Kosice, has raised serious questions among the expert community. “More than 40 scientific articles a year — one every nine days — is a pace that defies rational explanation,” Leonid Schneider notes, following a journalistic investigation published by the Slovak online outlet Dennik N. According to him, dozens of Gavurova’s publications appeared in outlets deemed unreliable or predatory, and some of the journals in which she published have already been removed from scientific databases. At the same time, the researcher’s numerous co-authors represent various Asian countries, which, in the experts’ view, points to the purchase of authorship through networked paper mills.

According to Dennik N, up to one third of papers by Slovak scholars are published in dubious predatory journals.

Yet the external signs of questionable publication behavior are only part of the problem. Gavurova’s own papers contain inconsistencies between the text and graphical data, problems with chemical formulas, and dubious spectra with signals of unnatural shape. Some of these articles have received retracted status.

The next case provides direct evidence of purchased authorship in publications distributed by paper mills. Earlier, the Dissernet community drew attention to the interaction of Slovak researchers with a Moscow company that provided article placement services. A telling example is the case of Boris Sturc, an associate professor at the University of Economics and Business: a preliminary offer posted by this exchange was first documented (see the image below), and later a paper with the title listed in the offer appeared in the International Journal of Criminology and Sociology, with Sturc as first co-author. Analysis shows that this was not a one-off: Sturc’s publication list includes other commercially acquired works as well.

Over time, the shadow academic industry is transforming: centralized exchanges selling papers appear to be losing influence. Their place is being taken by decentralized private intermediaries — individual entrepreneurs, or “paper millers.” Technological progress is helping this shift along: modern AI tools make it possible to fabricate scientific texts in the shortest possible time, without involving large teams of specialists from different fields of science. Offers from “paper millers” are easy to find in open internet channels. Traces of this market can also be found in the publications of Slovak researchers. Below are specific episodes involving Slovak scholars in joint publications offered by “paper millers” from Germany, Ukraine, Montenegro, and Middle Eastern countries.

“Olga Golubnitschaja is the editor-in-chief of EPMA, the European Journal of Predictive, Preventive and Personalized Medicine, and at the same time a co-author of many articles in that journal, which is normal. What is surprising, however, is that for many articles in which she is a co-author, very little time passes between submission and acceptance. In some cases it is only a matter of three to five days. Below are several examples from the past year,” says a review of one article involving her. Such short timelines raise the question of whether full scientific peer review was possible — a process that usually includes selecting independent experts, preparing comments, revising the manuscript by the authors, and reassessing the changes made. Olga Golubnitschaja, a professor at the University of Bonn, often appears as a co-author of problematic papers by Russian and Slovak scholars; some of these works later became the subject of criticism for violations of publication norms.

An expert review of a joint article by authors from Slovakia and Ukraine revealed repeated sections in experimental spectra. Among the co-authors of the article, one figure stands out: Taras Kavetsky, an associate professor at Drohobych Pedagogical University in Ukraine, who was found to have used identical schemes of spectral-data fabrication in other scientific works as well.

[[socialnetworks]]

Stanislav Dudic, a Doctor of Sciences at Comenius University and a specialist in international economics, industrial engineering, trade, and investment, appeared as a co-author of a publication that raised serious questions. The paper, written together with the Montenegrin co-author Velibor Spalevic, concerned a modified copper-containing metal-organic framework, and experts detected signs of artificial modification of experimental data. It is worth noting that a number of works by Spalevic himself, a professor at the University of Montenegro, have also been criticized on the PubPeer forum.

Professor Natalia Krivinska, head of the Department of Information Systems at the Faculty of Management of Comenius University, is a vivid example of how formal co-authorship with dubious partners can undermine trust in a scholar. Her article on combating DDoS attacks, prepared in co-authorship with Saudi colleagues through machine paraphrasing, was retracted. But Professor Krivinska’s problems are not limited to a single publication: in her works, experts have found a whole bouquet of tortured phrases, bibliographies unrelated to the subject of the paper, and even direct borrowing of illustrations, all of which calls into question the quality of her entire academic record.

Another case of questionable scientific practice involves the Institute of Construction and Architecture of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. Its employees, Professor Martin T. Palou and Associate Professor Taher Tawfik, were listed among the co-authors of an international paper with Egyptian and Iraqi colleagues, but a review showed that the images presented in the article had undergone impermissible processing, casting doubt on the reliability of the entire work.

The overwhelming majority of the episodes listed above led to no sanctions against the authors. Journalistic investigations and the volunteer work of experts on PubPeer help reveal problem after problem, but real institutional consequences in Slovakia’s academic sphere are barely visible. Retractions do not affect citation indices, and the law allowing academic degrees to be revoked for plagiarism does not apply to works defended before it came into force. As a result, buyers of authorship keep their positions in rankings and universities.

This is the central paradox. Under the Ministry of Education’s methodology, universities receive 50 percent of the state bonus for each highly ranked publication. This means that, in the race for rankings, the universities themselves become interested parties: the more “outstanding” publications their employees have — even if they were bought on the shadow market — the more public funding the university receives.

At the same time, Slovakia’s system of state funding for science, which generously rewards publications in top-percentile journals, effectively creates a “green corridor” for the shadow market. Cash payments to an author for an article they purchased on the shadow market are resources stolen from science. Public funds intended to develop research instead flow into the pockets of shadow intermediaries.

As long as the academic system continues to measure the quality of science primarily by the number of publications and citations, paper mills will be able to turn manipulation of these indicators into academic status and real money. In the age of AI, when producing texts that look scientific is becoming ever cheaper, the problem of how to evaluate scientific work is only becoming more acute.

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Estonian Academic Solitaire: How AI and Paper Mills Are Undermining Science

By: ak
27 July 2026 at 11:20

Estonia spent years building a reputation as being at the forefront of science, but scandals involving violations of research ethics are becoming increasingly common. Professors sharing authorship with falsifiers; associate professors hiding data behind a “confidential” label; mathematicians publishing “math salad” — all of this reflects today’s challenges: the spread of paper mills and the uncontrolled adoption of AI. Sociologists found that more than 40 percent of Estonian researchers had used “gift” authorship. More in the latest installment of the Plagiat-Navigator project.

In February 2024, the prestigious scientific journal Nature published the article WNT signalling control by KDM5C during development affects cognition. The researchers were trying to understand why mutations in the KDM5C gene cause intellectual disability. The author team brought together researchers from Boston, Oxford, and universities in Australia and China, along with a single Estonian representative from the University of Tartu — Professor Katrin Ounap, a specialist in medical genetics. A year after publication, experts found multiple deliberate manipulations of illustrations in the paper. The figure below shows the same fragments of nerve-cell processes, or dendrites, reused after mirror reflection, 180-degree rotation, and partial retouching. “Such different transformations of individual image fragments are difficult to explain as a simple mistake,” one expert commented. Some images in the paper also bear a striking resemblance to images from earlier publications by other authors.

It turned out that a group of co-authors from Harvard Medical School in Boston, led by Professor Yang Shi, had been using similar methods for at least a decade. In a paper published in early 2016, fragments of dendrite images were likewise copied from another publication and modified through mirroring and scaling.

Professor Ounap’s contribution to the Nature paper was clinical: she provided fibroblast samples from patients. Her co-authorship with the Boston group, however, dates back to 2015. This does not prove that she knew about the falsifications, but in academia co-authorship entails responsibility for the entire content of a paper. The argument that the professor merely supplied biological material does not absolve her of responsibility for the final result fabricated by her colleagues.

While investigations into international publications can drag on for years, within Estonia’s national system universities sometimes demonstrate an ability to act quickly and decisively. The following case is a telling example. In 2013, Andres Menind, an associate professor at the Estonian University of Life Sciences, defended a dissertation on biotechnology for energy production. Soon after the defense, it emerged that the work contained at least three lengthy plagiarized passages, in both the theoretical and research sections. A procedure to revoke his academic degree followed. It was the first case of its kind in the university’s history. The university leadership acted promptly, without delays or bureaucratic evasions. The university did not publish a percentage of textual overlap, stressing that the decision was based on expert assessment of the nature and significance of the borrowings rather than on a formal similarity score exceeding some arbitrary threshold.

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But Estonia’s academic immune system does not always work. In 2002, Valery Korb defended a doctoral dissertation in St. Petersburg that had been copied in its entirety from an earlier work by someone else. Today, the Estonian politician Valery Korb is a member of the supervisory board of Ida-Viru Central Hospital in Kohtla-Jarve. All attempts to strip him of his academic degree have come to nothing.

Manipulation of images in scientific publications often ends in retraction — the formal withdrawal of a paper by a journal. The process is usually slow and can take years. The Nature paper remains under question, but a 2022 publication in Adsorption Science & Technology has already been officially retracted. Its authors included researchers from Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as an Estonian representative, the young University of Tartu scientist Ivar Zekker. The illustration below shows how the same image was used repeatedly, with only its scale, color, and placement changed.

That paper was retracted, as was another publication by Zekker, for serious violations of publication ethics, including nonexistent bibliographic references, unattributed borrowing, and the use of artificial-intelligence tools in preparing the article without disclosing that use, in violation of the journal’s editorial policy. These are not isolated episodes: experts have accumulated concerns about a whole series of Zekker’s papers. In 2021, his publication output increased by dozens of times, while researchers from Middle Eastern countries began appearing among his co-authors with increasing frequency. This pattern often points to the use of paper mills — shadow Asian markets where ready-made papers and fictitious co-authorship are sold.

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In 2023, the University of Tartu conducted and later published an anonymous survey of 354 Estonian researchers. Among other things, they were asked whether they had observed signs of research misconduct in the actions of colleagues. More than 40 percent of respondents said that colleagues had accepted “gift” authorship, while more than 10 percent had witnessed colleagues falsifying data in scientific work. These figures reflect not so much precise statistics as the troubling environment in which Estonian researchers work today.

The University of Tartu is far from the only Estonian research institution where questions have arisen about the reliability of published images. One of the most prominent figures in such cases is Sabarathinam Shanmugam, an associate professor at the Estonian University of Life Sciences. According to the post-publication peer review platform PubPeer, roughly one in five papers involving him has become the subject of critical discussion.

One publication by Shanmugam is especially revealing. Experts found manipulation of figures in the paper. After concerns were raised, the authors replaced the illustrations several times, each time apologizing and attributing what had happened to an “unfortunate mistake.” Yet every new version again contained signs of manipulation. Eventually the exchange reached a dead end: the authors never provided convincing explanations, and discussion of the apparent fakes simply faded away. In a later paper, Shanmugam and his co-authors chose a different defense strategy, stating: The data that has been used are confidential. That position effectively deprived independent researchers of any opportunity to verify the reported results.

The story does not end there. A number of Shanmugam’s publications were later retracted after journal editors discovered that the author list had been replaced at the final stage of preparing the papers for publication. Such author substitution is considered one of the characteristic signs of papers circulating on the purchased-authorship market. While one set of “dealers” pushes a manuscript through the journal with a credible author list, another takes orders from people wishing to buy co-authorship in the almost-published paper. At the final stage, once all reviewers’ questions have been resolved, comes the climax: in the last version of the manuscript, the names of the original authors are quietly replaced, without the editors’ approval, by those who responded to the offer in time and paid. The editor, unaware of the switch, publishes the paper. The newly minted co-authors receive a publication to which they did not contribute a single line and which they most likely never even read.

Finally, Tallinn University and one of its employees, mathematics professor Jorge Eduardo Macias-Diaz, also deserve attention. In recent years, specialists have increasingly encountered papers prepared with generative artificial intelligence. In mathematics, such publications are often betrayed less by stylistic roughness than by gross errors in formulas and proofs. To a non-specialist, the text may look entirely convincing, yet mistakes already appear in the first stages of the calculations, rendering everything that follows meaningless.

Mathematics is an exact science. If the third line of a calculation contains the wrong sign, the final ten pages lose all meaning, no matter how many formulas they contain. The image below shows examples from four relatively recent papers by Macias-Diaz in which such errors appear literally in the opening lines of calculations or theorem proofs.

“Math salad” is the term specialists use for texts that look scientific on the surface because they contain an abundance of formulas and technical terminology, but on closer inspection turn out to be internally contradictory or contain errors that make their conclusions unreliable. Naturally, artificial intelligence is “to blame” for everything: the author simply gave the neural network a task and then copied the result into the paper without even checking it.

A curious manifestation of this practice emerged in a case that went far beyond university offices. Tallinn Administrative Court fined a group of plaintiffs who had cited “authoritative scientific studies” on the harms of clear-cutting in their filings. There was only one problem: both the studies and their authors had been entirely generated by a neural network. The court treated this as fabrication of evidence and fined the plaintiffs.

To conclude, here is a curious case in which nonexistent Estonian researchers appeared not only in materials before a Tallinn court, but also on the pages of scientific journals. In a paper by Chinese authors on estimating fuel-cell parameters using the metaphor-based “Grey Wolf” optimization algorithm, a co-author from Tallinn University of Technology suddenly appeared: Tekle Demsas. Apparently, adding a mysterious Estonian scientist to the author list was meant to give the paper greater weight. The deception did not last long. After checking the author’s credentials, the editors established that no such researcher actually existed. The paper was then retracted.

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Estonia, which spent years building a reputation as being at the forefront of science, is now confronting the underside of the global crisis in academic ethics. The cases involving Ounap, Zekker, Shanmugam, and Macias-Diaz are not merely isolated scandals, but reflections of today’s challenges: the spread of paper mills, the ethics of co-authorship, and the uncontrolled adoption of AI. The results of the University of Tartu survey show that these problems are systemic.

The central problem for Estonian science is not that violations occur, but how institutions respond to them. Universities often prefer to look the other way, outsourcing the role of “academic police” to journal editors, courts, and volunteers on PubPeer. In the twenty-first century, a reputation as a scientific center can no longer be taken for granted. Maintaining zero tolerance for falsification requires daily work. And the sooner Estonian universities recognize that responsibility, the fewer reasons for sarcasm they will leave to those watching them.

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RASA Statement in Support of Professor Tatiana Tatarinova

By: ak
6 September 2026 at 12:25

Russian-American Science Association strongly condemns the decision of the Russian authorities to designate our colleague Tatiana Tatarinova, a distinguished bioinformatics scholar and professor at the University of La Verne, as a “foreign agent.”

Tatiana joins a growing number of Russian-speaking scholars and members of the RASA community who have been subjected to political persecution, intimidation, and restrictions on their academic and civic freedom. These measures have nothing to do with the quality of their scholarship or their professional activities. They are part of a broader campaign to silence independent voices and to suppress international academic ties.

We stand in solidarity with Tatiana and with all our colleagues who continue to face repression for exercising their fundamental rights to think, speak, conduct research, and communicate freely.

RASA will continue to defend academic freedom and to support scholars subjected to political persecution, wherever they are.

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Austin Sarat: “Fear Is My Friend”

By: ak
31 August 2026 at 09:33

What do American professors owe their country when democracy and the rule of law are under threat? Why is it crucial to study law not merely as a craft for practicing lawyers, but as a liberal art—akin to history or religious studies? In what ways does the crisis of the death penalty expose deeper fractures in society? T-Invariant sat down to discuss these questions with Austin Sarat. Over a half-century-long career at a prominent American college, he has pioneered the transformation of legal studies into a vital humanistic discipline, emerging as one of today’s most formidable critics of the abuse of law in America.

ABOUT AUSTIN SARAT

Born in 1947. He holds a B.A. from Providence College (1969), a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin–Madison (1973), and a J.D. from Yale Law School (1988). Since the mid-1970s he has taught at Amherst College, where he holds the William Nelson Cromwell chair as Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science. Sarat is widely regarded as one of the architects of the modern study of law in the humanities. He founded Amherst’s Department of Law, Jurisprudence and Social Thought (1992), co-founded the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities, launched several scholarly book series, and served as president of the Law and Society Association, which named an early-career prize in his honor. He is the author or editor of more than ninety books, chiefly on capital punishment, law and violence, and the cultural life of law, and writes regularly for Verdict, The Contrarian, and Inside Higher Ed.

T-invariant: I would like to start with the 1960s as a formative period of your life.  You finished college in 1969 and then went straight into graduate school at Wisconsin, which at that time was one of the epicenters of the era. What did those years mean for you — as a scholar, as a person, as a public intellectual? What thinkers, what movements, what events shaped you most?

Austin Sarat: Life in college in the 1960s in the United States was complicated, to say the least. Alongside doing the work you were supposed to do, you also had to deal with events in the world which seemed at that time to be quite unspeakably bad — in this case, the war in Vietnam.

I went to a Catholic school, where the college did not want the world to penetrate. When I arrived at Providence College in the 1960s, it had a dress code. It regulated the length of your hair. That was the kind of environment I experienced in college.

I loved my college experience. I fell in love with my teachers and imagined myself at some point doing what they were doing. A couple of them took a special interest in me and really mentored me and wanted me to go on to graduate school and get a PhD. Their ambition was that I should go to Yale to get a PhD. Alas, Yale didn’t want me. So I went to the University of Wisconsin, largely drawn by the presence of Michael Lipsky, who at that time was a leading figure in the study of cities and urban politics. I arrived in Madison in the fall of 1969. 

Madison was the opposite of Providence College. Where Providence College wanted to keep the world at bay, at Madison you couldn’t follow this principle. There were frequent demonstrations. The University’s Arts and Sciences campus was built on a hill and there were frequent demonstrations there. The presence of the National Guard, the use of tear gas — those things marked my experience as a graduate student. Looking back, as bad as the situation was with the war in Vietnam and the political situation, it was for me a time of hope — I thought people like me could make a difference in the academy and maybe in the world. But truth be told, my heart was more in the academy at that point than it was in the world. I loved political science and imagined that my greatest contribution would be from inside the academy, leading the career of a teacher and a scholar.

Amherst College Professor Austin Sarat Celebration of 50 Years Teaching. Photo: from Austin Sarat’s personal archive

T-i: As far as I understand, you came to your study of law “sideways”: you first became a political scientist, and only much later earned your degree in law. How did that background and that path shape the way you see law?

AS: When I did a postdoctoral year at Yale Law School, I saw a broader vision of what the study of law could entail. But I was still very much in the thrall of the way political scientists studied law: they took the blood and flesh off the subject. And I was quite comfortable with that at the time.

I came to Amherst to teach American politics and only had the idea of going to law school a decade after I started to teach. I went off to law school in 1985, and only there my vision broadened and changed.

My intellectual life turned because of an article written by a Yale law professor named Robert Cover. The title of the article was “Violence and the Word.” And from then till now, I’ve been imagining a conversation between myself and that article.

To study law, to be involved with law, is to have an opportunity to confront those two realities: the reality of language and its meanings, and the reality of violence and its uses.

T-i: In some of your courses and publications you say law consists of three components: moral argument, interpretive traditions, and the social organization of violence. For a reader who does not specialize in law, how could you explain how these three elements hold together?

AS: Most legal systems seek to articulate and reflect the moral values and political beliefs of the culture and country in which they are situated. And in most countries, legal disputes are developed on the terrain of arguments about what is right or just in accordance with the law.

But legal systems and legal institutions are not simply philosophical debating societies. Law is always articulated in language — codes, statutes, court decisions, orders. That means both citizens and scholars are called to attend to the way in which words are used and meanings are assigned in the articulation of laws and judgments. And in the United States and in the Anglo-American world, the way in which language is used in law is governed by its own set of rules.

There is no law without the possibility of enforcement. Otherwise, law is like a birthday card: it carries no more weight than a wish or a greeting. What gives law its weight is the deployment of violence. And legal systems deploy violence in a variety of ways. They punish people and authorize others to use violence.

To make sense of the world of law that surrounds us, we have to understand that we’re going to make arguments about what is right and fair. Those arguments should be made in ways that are recognizable to legal officials. We have to speak this language and follow these distinct traditions and to be aware that there is a lot at stake. When the poets are finished with their argument about what things mean, they go home. When the legal arguments are done, people lose their property, liberty, or in some cases even life.

T-i: For many years, the problem of capital punishment has been the focus of your research. Why has it held you for so long? And what do you think about the development of attitudes toward the whole issue in the United States — do you see it as part of a slow abolition, or of entrenchment?

AS: To study capital punishment is to have an opportunity to see the way in which the legal system — in my case, in the United States — seeks to legitimize the right to take the lives of citizens.

When I started to study capital punishment, I was less interested in its survival than in seeing through capital punishment to broader issues in the culture and the society. I thought this practice crystallizes our attitudes toward justice and mercy, our beliefs about deservedness, our horror at the crimes that in theory warrant capital punishment.

Over time, and somewhat to my surprise, I’ve come to live in two different worlds. One is the old world, where I studied the death penalty not to advance the cause of abolition. I am publishing a new book, and that’s not going to help abolish the death penalty.

But then I have this more public side. I write, and I’m now on the board of Massachusetts Citizens Against the Death Penalty.

And I think the practice of capital punishment is a moral horror. The United States is in a period of national reconsideration of capital punishment. I believe that the United States is on the road to abolition of the death penalty. The abolition is not going to come smoothly — there’ll be ups and downs.

But maybe not in my lifetime — certainly not in my lifetime — but in the lifetime of my thirty-year-old son, I would not be surprised if the death penalty died in the United States.

T-i: Why is it so important to study the new methods of capital punishment and to assess them?

AS: For the last several decades, arguments about the death penalty have shifted a little bit away from its morality and toward an examination of the way it works. You can be in favor of the death penalty in the abstract but against executing the innocent or against executing people because of their race or the race of their victim.

It’s my belief that the death penalty system in the United States is broken from beginning to end. Innocent people get convicted and sentenced to death row. You’re more likely to get a death sentence if you kill a white person than if you kill a person of color. Those are, in my view, easier problems than the cruelty of the method itself.

Because in theory the innocent who are condemned are innocent — they’re like you and me, they haven’t done anything — and people who get death sentences because of the race of their victim are clearly the subjects of injustice. But when we’re inside the execution chamber, we’re mostly dealing with people who “deserve to die,” if anyone ever deserves to die. It’s harder — and, in my view, more important — to focus on the fate of the guilty than on the fate of the innocent.

I don’t think there’s any method of execution, or any practice of execution, that can be considered anything other than cruel. I want to focus attention not just on the suffering of the people being condemned, but on the question of who we want to be. The way we punish is as much about those who punish as about those who are punished. What animates the people who do this?

The United States has been on this quest for a method of execution that would be safe, reliable, and humane. I think it’s a fool’s errand. There’s no method of execution that is going to be humane, even if we could find one that is “safe and reliable” — and we haven’t been able to, and we’re not going to be able to.

T-i: You created something unusual at Amherst — one of America’s most selective liberal-arts colleges. The department you founded there, Law, Jurisprudence and Social Thought, was among the first programs anywhere to teach undergraduates to study law as one of the humanities rather than as pre-law training. I know that when the college formally reviewed the program, an outside committee of experts judged it “superior to every other undergraduate program of its kind in the country.” How did the idea first emerge, and who stood with you as you built it?

AS: I’m going to mention Robert Cover again — “Violence and the Word.” I went to law school and had this intellectual revelation with Robert Cover; it was like deciphering the Rosetta Stone. I came back to the college, and soon the Mellon Foundation was soliciting grants from liberal arts colleges under the theme of “fresh combinations.” I picked up the phone and called my colleague Thomas Kearns from the philosophy department. I said, “Tom, we’re a fresh combination. Let’s see whether we can put together a program at the undergraduate level in law that’s the equivalent of studying religion. We have theology schools — that doesn’t mean we don’t teach undergraduates about religion. We have law schools — why can’t we teach undergraduates about law?”

Kearns and I got support through this Mellon initiative. We developed new courses that didn’t fit comfortably in political science or philosophy or history or anywhere else. And we were doing jazz more than symphony, because there were few, if any, models for us. The first course taught was called “The Fate of Law.” We didn’t want to do “legal studies”; we wanted to do what people had done in the study of religion — to study this thing in its social, intellectual, and cultural context.

LJST was founded on a kind of conceit: that we were going to revolutionize the study of law. We were going to set a model, not just for Amherst, but for the world of undergraduate education. We started a book series. I created new professional associations — all inspired by the idea that law is a subject in the liberal arts. And you don’t have to do it our way; you can have your own church. But at least recognize that law is a subject in the liberal arts: you can look into the way moral argument plays out, understand the play of language, confront the reality that people’s lives are on the line.

And our little college was a perfectly hospitable place to do it, because it’s a liberal arts college. It was easy intellectually and hard logistically, because this was not something the college needed to do, and people in political science were very threatened by this; in part, I think, because they thought it was going to kill the discipline of political science — everyone was going to go study law. The program was voted by the faculty in 1992. We did it differently than I think anybody else has ever done. Generally, when you adopt a new program, you first adopt the program and then the program articulates its curriculum. We did the reverse: we had a whole curriculum lined up, so that people knew what they were buying, so to speak, if they voted for the creation of LJST. The curriculum has changed since, but there it was.

T-i: If you were founding this program today, in the current political climate, would you do it differently? 

AS: Throughout most of my career as an intellectual, I have not wanted students to know what I think.

I don’t go in and try to persuade them. If they want to be in favor of the death penalty, then I would leave them to be in favor of the death penalty. But the present moment — the last decade or so in the United States — has occasioned in me a little bit of a rethinking. I still don’t want students to know what I think about most subjects, but I want them to understand the depth of my commitment to democracy and the rule of law.

So, in the face of the current moment — we can disagree about abortion, or environmental policy, or whatever, and that’s fine; I’m not going to tell you what I think about those things. But the ground norm for the work that we do, you and I, is democracy and the rule of law.

The original impulse of LJST was critical of the rule of law — as ideology, as mystification. And it’s a nightmare, in a way, to look back at all the things we wrote, and to hear similar lines now being articulated by the current President of the United States — “Oh, it’s just political.” In fact, just yesterday we were drafting a job description for a visiting professor, and I said, “How about we include in the job description someone who’s interested in the virtues of the rule of law?”

If I were founding it today, the three pillars would still be the same. But I think the orientation would be to a different kind of relationship to the practices of law in the world. Eighty million Americans voted for the current President of the United States knowing who he was. If you’re going to save democracy and the rule of law in the United States, you need to connect those things to what people care about — how they live, how their children live. Otherwise, why should they care?

T-i: In the recent year and a half, you have written a lot about what you call the weaponization of law against the rule of law. Where, for you, is the line between aggressive but still lawful executive action and what you would define as an actual assault on the rule of law? Has the American state already crossed that line?

AS: The answer to your last question is “yes.” We’ve had many powerful executives; we’ve had many presidents who stretched the limits of presidential power. Franklin Roosevelt used the power of the presidency, but I don’t think it was in the name of aggrandizing himself. This one is different. It’s not just that he’s a powerful executive. His conception of politics is messianic. It’s not just that he’s corrupt or egotistical. What’s his slogan? “Make America great again.” What did he say? “I alone can fix it.”

That’s what we must understand: whatever the peculiarities of his psyche, the politics is illiberal because it’s so personalistic. Whenever I talk about Trump, here’s what I try to say: you can call him names, but my guess is that when he looks in the mirror in the morning, he says to himself, “I’m going to save this country. And anything that gets in my way — what do I care about? Law? A few legal niceties? I’m on a mission from God.” And that’s what I think we need to understand.

We — the American academy — have spent too much time patting each other on the back and making sure we were using the right pronouns. We, the American academy, at a time when we are reviled, need to look outside, to try to understand why millions of people say, “I don’t care about any of that; he’s going to reduce inflation,” or “I don’t care about any of that; he’s going to put a stop to political correctness.”

I used to criticize public intellectuals for fancying themselves of some significance. Now, every day when I come into the office, what I’m likely to do is write something that has no audience in the academy. Every week for the last year and a half I’ve organized a protest — we stand on the corner and stand up for democracy. I’ve organized a network of alumni called the “Stand Up for Democracy Network.” I’ve organized things on campus and helped create a student organization called “Amherst Students for Democracy.”

Students from Amherst College at a rally in support of democracy. Photo: Alejandra Chavez-Flores / The Amherst Student

I don’t write, or demonstrate, or organize, imagining that I’m going to convert the hardcore Trump supporters. I don’t have time to do that. When I was complaining, “Oh, I’m not converting anybody,” one of my former students said, “You don’t understand how much it means to people who are on the front lines that people like you are writing.” I regard my writing as cheering on my side. I regard my writing as bearing witness. I regard my public activity as exemplifying what someone can do when they are terrified all the time. Fear is my friend, and it gets me out on the street — not because I’m courageous, and not because I think they care about me, but because if I don’t stand up, who will?

T-i: At this moment, what is the role of a scholar of law? What can such an expert do to help prevent the abuse of law?

AS: As an expert, I can claim the attention of legislators developing legislation. I can claim the attention of judges, if I’m asked to testify. When I write something for the public, I can do it as an expert: I know these things, and I want to tell you these things. But the real question is: what is the demand for my expertise, and to whom am I lending it? As a person who thinks for a living, do I see things that others might not see, or see them differently than others might?

I think our obligation emerges from our privilege — to be an intellectual, to be able to teach and write. I regard that as a privilege; I just mean, I’m glad I have a job. And with privilege, according to John Kennedy when he spoke at Amherst College in 1963, comes responsibility.

I tell everybody that if you ask the following question — namely, “What will work? What will work to preserve the rule of law? What will work to preserve a constitution?” — it’s the wrong question, because no one knows what will work.

Nevertheless, we need to do three things. The first thing we as citizens and residents of the United States need to do is put out the fire, in whatever way we can: demonstrate, protest, write, organize. The second thing is that we need to commit ourselves to a program of reform that is really oriented to dealing with the despair among large segments of the population.

Go to the emergency room at a public hospital and wait for seven hours. Call your cell phone provider and try to get decent service. Go to Stop & Shop and pick up feta cheese and look at the price: “It’s ten dollars?” Do I need to be an expert to know about those experiences? No, I don’t. Even if you can put out the fire, it’s only going to reignite if we don’t attend to the desperation that leads people to say, “I’ll choose him.”

The third thing is that we need to practice what I call thinking democratically. It means that I should tell the truth as I know it, but I need to tell it in a way that can be heard by someone who doesn’t already agree with me. It’s not enough to say, “You’re a racist, you’re a sexist” — nobody’s mind is going to be changed. To think democratically, you must speak less and listen more. American democracy in many ways failed long before Trump. Trump is a symptom.

You must be curious. You must practice empathy before judgment. You can do that alone; you don’t need to be part of a movement to do it. We not only need to rebuild the infrastructure of democracy — we need to rebuild a culture of democracy.

I’m committed to a program of reform when the time comes — and that will mean people like me live a little less well, so that others can live a little better.

T-i: What’s happening to American higher education under Trump’s presidency, in your view?

AS: American higher education was in trouble long before Donald Trump came on the scene. Now, to talk about American higher education is to talk about apples and oranges and tomatoes and broccoli — the community colleges, the state universities, the research universities; it’s a different thing in each case. What I know best is Amherst College and similar liberal arts colleges.

Amherst College. Photo: amherst.edu

In many ways, places like Amherst had lost their way, but they didn’t know it. If you wanted to talk about racism, Amherst was a fine place for you, long before Trump. If you wanted to denounce capitalism, Amherst was a fine place for you, long before Trump. If you wanted to talk about the white working class, Amherst was not such a fine place for you — because you’d have to look long and hard for people who cared about the white working class.

American higher education, even small colleges, is hierarchical. Colleges and universities in the United States were much more collegial than they are now. I’m not talking about a golden age when everything was great, but let’s be honest — teaching is undervalued in most places. You want to get a job offer? No one’s going to give you a job because you’re a terrific teacher. They’re going to give you a job because you wrote something. That’s fine, but it speaks to a certain kind of values.

So, we were ripe for the picking. And then Trump comes along. What could be better to have as a target? His brand of politics is so interesting, because he targets the powerless — immigrants — and the powerful — he goes after law firms and prestigious universities. What he’s done to American higher education is both dreadful and a kind of slap in the face that may have helped higher education in the United States.

The horrors are unspeakable. But before Trump, if I asked most of my colleagues to explain the difference between academic freedom and freedom of speech, they could not do it. Now, at least, there’s a conversation about what academic freedom is and how to protect it. My hope is that out of the crisis will come something good — a renewal, a regeneration, a recommitment, a recentering of values. How’s that for optimism?

T-i: What can be done, at both the national and the local level, to minimize this harm?

AS: We need alliances, not enclaves.

I’ll give you an example. I was very involved in getting the college to add something to its commitment to academic freedom. The commitment to academic freedom has been, in effect, “The institution won’t punish me.” I said, “That’s fine, but I’m not worried about the institution. I’m worried about threats from the outside.” And the college changed its statement on academic freedom.

It’s the same thing as we think about rebuilding democracy. If you say, “Oh yes, we’re the pure, we’re the just, we’re the righteous.” Why should anybody come to the rescue of American higher education if the attitude is, “Well, what have you done for me?” The next thing I wanted to do was to get the faculty to vote on a democracy resolution. It’s not that we stand for something only when it benefits us. Democracy is essential to education, but our commitment to standing up for democracy is not just so that we’ll live more comfortably. The more that all of us can be seen to be committed to things that don’t just benefit us, the better off we’ll be.

T-i: Why do you think the motivation toward building alliances is still so low?

AS: In the United States this has been going on for a decade, and many people are just beaten down. Others are afraid. Others just want to turn off the noise and take their kids to the skating rink or the library. We know the way this works, and Trump has been pretty good at it. It’s like when your roof is leaking — but it’s leaking from nineteen different places. You put a bucket over here, and then it leaks over there: you are tired of moving your bucket around the house.

I think politics at this moment requires navigating between fear and faith: fear in what I see, faith in what I cannot yet see.

The post Austin Sarat: “Fear Is My Friend” appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

New “Undesirables”: Why the Pentagon Is Restricting Cooperation with Moscow State University and Higher School of Economics

By: ak
24 August 2026 at 07:34

On July 23, the U.S. Department of Defense published a new list of organizations that, according to its assessment, pose a threat to U.S. national security or are engaged in problematic activity. The list includes Moscow State University, Bauman Moscow State Technical University, the Higher School of Economics, Ural Federal University, and numerous other universities and research institutes. The Pentagon believes that these organizations may aim to steal American intellectual property, research data, technologies, and scientific innovations. The Department therefore urges American universities, research institutes, and individual scholars receiving Department of Defense funding not to collaborate with them in any way, exchange data, or provide financial support. Notably, this list is not identical to existing U.S. sanctions lists (read more: “Scientific Front: Who in Russian Science Ended Up Under Western Sanctions — and Why”) and it appeared at a time when, according to Reuters, the U.S. administration has significantly reduced efforts to enforce sanctions against Russia. T-invariant explores what this new policy means for American and Russian academia, how it differs from sanctions law, and who is likely to be affected. 

T-INVARIANT BRIEFING

The restrictions certainly apply to:

  • Researchers affiliated with the listed organizations and working in physics, chemistry, biology, engineering, technology, and defense-related fields.
  • American universities and colleges receiving funding from the U.S. Department of Defense.

They are highly likely to affect:

  • All employees of listed institutions, regardless of their academic discipline.
  • Students of the listed universities when applying to conferences or submitting articles to journals affiliated with American universities or companies.
  • Universities, colleges, research institutes, think tanks, and other organizations worldwide that receive funding from the U.S. government.

The restrictions might affect:

  • Students and graduates of these institutions when applying to American universities.
  • Universities in third countries participating in projects funded by the U.S. government.
  • Researchers at other universities and institutes in Russia, Iran, and China.

The list was issued as an implementation of Section 1286 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2019. The NDAA is a law that is issued every year and that determines the structure and budget of the U.S. military, including troop numbers, defense spending, modernization programs, and other issues. However, alongside military provisions, Congress also includes neighboring measures, such as foreign policy objectives, and funding allocation. The 2019 NDAA received broad bipartisan support and was signed by President Donald Trump. Compared with previous versions, it increased the military budget, while shifting America’s strategic focus in foreign policy away from counterterrorism toward long-term competition with China and Russia, with considerably greater emphasis on China. This legislation was especially discussed in the media due to the restrictions of Section 889 targeting Chinese technology companies such as Huawei and ZTE.

As part of the same great power competition strategy, Congress included provisions designed to protect American academic research from foreign influence and intellectual property theft. Section 1286, which received the updated list of “problematic organizations,” is titled Initiative to support protection of national security academic researchers from undue influence and other security threats and it specifically addresses universities conducting defense and technology research. Although Congress passes a new NDAA every year, the Pentagon continues updating the same list of the Section 1286 of NDAA 2019 because the 2019 law explicitly requires the Department of Defense to revise it on a regular basis. The July 23 publication is therefore not a new law, but the latest update of an existing mechanism. Being published every year, these updates all have special emphasis, relevant for the moment. For instance, the 2025 version is primarily aimed at preventing foreign influence over research sponsored by the Department of Defense. 

Such activities as funding sanctioned organizations, or exchanging data, were already prohibited by sanctions laws. Also, scholars employed by those organizations could not participate in conferences, or get published in the leading journals if they maintained formal affiliations. There are three fundamental points of difference between the new Pentagon list and sanctions: who is affected, who enforces the law, and what the consequences of violations are. 

Who is affected?

Previous sanctions and earlier lists (such as the 2023 Section 1286 list) targeted a relatively small number of universities involved mainly in military technology development or, in Russia’s case, in promoting state propaganda. Moreover, the restrictions were generally limited to individual representatives or to specific institutes. Before the new list appeared, the largest Russian research center to be included in such restrictions in its entirety was Skolkovo, which was added in 2023 – and in that case, it was hardly surprising.

This time, however, the Pentagon included 13 Russian universities as whole bodies,  and those were not only institutions specializing in engineering, physics, and biology, but also several major multidisciplinary universities, including Moscow State University (MSU), the Higher School of Economics (HSE), and Ural Federal University (UrFU). Several of China’s leading multidisciplinary universities, including Fudan University and Shanghai Jiao Tong University, were also added. HSE employees, speaking on condition of anonymity, told T-invariant  that until now they had been able to collaborate with Western universities as private researchers without listing their affiliation, they participated in conferences online and sometimes even in person, conducted joint research, and published articles.

HSE Rector Nikita Anisimov meeting students from Luhansk State University participating in the “special military operation.” Photo: Telegram channel “Вышка для своих (HSE for the Our Own).”

However, the wording of the new document makes it possible to extend the restrictions to employees of the listed organizations themselves. This means that concealing one’s institutional affiliation and presenting oneself as an independent researcher may no longer be sufficient to circumvent the restrictions: any collaboration between American researchers and scholars who are simply employed by universities on the list falls under Pentagon restrictions. Moreover, even though most organizations on the list conduct research in physics, technology, and such, the policy could affect physicians, historians, and even scholars of the Swahili language.

Who enforces the restrictions?

Another noteworthy aspect is that these measures operate through the National Defense Authorization Act, meaning they are administered by the Department of Defense, unlike the traditional sanctions system. Sanctions are often described as decisions made by the U.S. government as a whole, but departments matter. In reality, Sanctions legislation is passed through Congress or came in force by a presidential decree, and enforcement is typically carried out by either the Treasury Department or the Department of Commerce. But this list is neither a sanction imposed for specific actions, nor a punishment for participating in war or violating the law. Instead, it is presented as a preventive measure designed to protect American research and technology from national security threats. Meanwhile, the official sanctions lists themselves do not receive any updates, and President Trump has repeatedly signaled a willingness to improve relations with leaders of countries that remain under U.S. sanctions. 

The Department of Defense is publishing this update because it is legally required to. At the same time, it does not provide any specific evidence demonstrating that every organization included is “engaging in activities that threaten U.S. national security interests.” The use of national security and foreign influence concerns as justifications for government intervention in science, media, and business is all too familiar from the Russian experience and feels rather unsettling. That is why it is important to understand what this policy means not only for Russian science, but also for American academia.

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After taking office, President Trump began exerting significant pressure on American universities. His primary targets were campus protests and the promotion of woke ideas concerning equality and the rights of gender, racial, and sexual minorities. The principal tool was the threat of cutting off federal funding. Yet even during Trump’s first presidency, the administration had already started intervening in universities through the concerns of espionage, and in 2018, the Department of Justice launched the China Initiative. According to the MIT Technology Review, the effectiveness of the initiative is highly questionable, partly because the Department of Justice never clearly explained its concrete objectives beyond broad references to protecting American technology and combating espionage. It also failed to clarify the criteria used to initiate investigations. Information about many cases never appeared on official government websites, some records were removed following media inquiries and requests for comment, and only about one quarter of the cases received actual convictions. Moreover, many prosecutions had no obvious connection to national security. This precedent is especially significant in light of the new Section 1286 list, as a precedent. As follows from the name of the programme, approximately 90% of those prosecuted under China Initiative were scholars of Chinese origin, and members of Asian diasporas were subjected to disproportionate scrutiny by law enforcement. MIT Technology Review argues that one of the initiative’s most damaging consequences was the brain drain of highly qualified researchers from the United States. Scientists and scholars were leaving because of the discrimination and pressure from the law enforcement, and it became harmful for the American science itself.

Participants in the Stop Anti-Asian Racism & China Bashing rally in Washington, D.C., March 27, 2021. Photo: Elvert Barnes / Flickr.

During President Biden’s administration, the espionage agenda receded somewhat into the background, but it reemerged, as Trump took office again. On March 26, 2026, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce heard reports on the activities of foreign intelligence services on university campuses. Once again, the discussion focused primarily on alleged espionage involving Chinese students, the recruitment of American students on campus, and cases in which researchers were drawn into projects without being informed on the true purpose of the research. It is worth noting that in his opening remarks, the committee chair emphasized that international collaborations should benefit America rather than its rivals. This idea contradicts the traditional understanding of academia as a transnational space for free exchange of knowledge. International conferences, academic and cultural exchanges, collaborative research, and multinational projects have advanced and benefited science worldwide for decades. As with the China Initiative, extending the logic of national security into universities and scientific research challenges this principle and contributes to the isolation of American science.

At the same time, it would be wrong to deny that espionage, foreign interference in academia and business, and theft of American intellectual property do exist. Roughly one quarter of China Initiative prosecutions ended in convictions, and over the past year, several cases have emerged involving Chinese intelligence agents infiltrating American academic institutions. But these cases differ in one respect, crucial for the NDAA 2019 list: the spies concealed their connections to Chinese universities, military structures, or intelligence agencies. They would typically enter the United States as students, visiting researchers, fellows, or even professors while hiding their institutional ties. They transferred research data and intelligence to the Chinese government, smuggled research materials into or out of the country – it seems that Ksenia Petrova was detained because of this atmosphere of heightened suspicion within academia.

There were also cases of recruiting American students and professors, but it generally happened through malign foreign talent recruitment programs, in which American researchers participated without being informed who would ultimately receive the results of their work or for what purpose. The 2024 version of the Pentagon list was specifically aimed at preventing this practice.

An even more common instrument of espionage has been cyberattacks, like the case reported recently by The Insider. In this case, Microsoft uncovered a scheme that allowed hackers to gain access to data from every device connected to compromised hotel Wi-Fi networks during academic conferences.

Journalist Roman Dobrokhotov described the method for the TVRain channel: “When you try to log in, your credentials get stolen. In the worst case scenario, you’re prompted to download software or click ‘OK’ or ‘YES,’ and a real spyware virus gets onto your laptop. It steals all your passwords and captures everything you type on the keyboard. If a conference has a thousand participants, it is enough just for two or three people to download the malware for the operation to succeed.” According to The Insider, “the group primarily targets governments, diplomatic missions, NGOs, and IT companies in the United States and Europe in order to collect intelligence supporting Russian foreign policy.” 

All of these espionage cases share an important point: every time, the perpetrators concealed the affiliations with the organizations they were truly working for, they frequently used false documents, or even operated remotely. This raises a doubt as to the effectiveness of a ban on cooperation with specific universities. Such a policy is unlikely to counter the methods actually used to steal research data.

How grave are the consequences?

The third major difference between this list and sanctions packages lies in the mechanism of the restrictions: the Department of Defense does not put a ban on the activities of the listed organizations, but it is restricting its own ability to fund them. The universities included in the list, their employees, or American scholars – none of them will face prosecution by law enforcement. However, the Pentagon restricts its ability to provide funding to universities, institutes, or individual researchers who continue collaborating with listed organizations or their employees, or who use their equipment.

At first glance, it might seem that losing such a niche source of funding would hardly affect fields unrelated to the military. For instance, professor of Russian literature Oleg Lekmanov, who taught at Princeton University, expressed precisely this view: “As I see it, this is not relevant to the humanities, because no one from the military sector offers us funding in the first place.” However, the Pentagon has numerous programs and foundations that finance research, and not only in fields related to defense, but also in biology, psychology, medicine, linguistics, the social sciences, and area studies. For instance, Natalia Korbo, a former targeting analyst for the U.S. State Department Economic Bureau, confirmed to T-invariant that the Department of Defense supports an exceptionally broad range of projects, particularly in STEM – science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.

Moreover, funding extends well beyond STEM disciplines. For example, the Minerva Initiative distributes long- and short-term grants for research intended to help the Department of Defense better understand future challenges and prepare for them. Thus, the participating projects cover a range of disciplines. According to Science, Minerva allocated $24.8 million in 2024 alone to projects involving artificial intelligence, climate change, and migration. Yet, the Science reports that the initiative had already begun drastically reducing its funding, even for projects that appeared directly relevant to defense interests. Among those unexpectedly terminated were studies examining the factors that motivate military personnel to remain in service and the conditions that prevent the collapse of international alliances. And now, it might become even more difficult to obtain Pentagon funding, since applicants will have to demonstrate that no member of a project is affiliated with any organization on the list of “the undesirables.”

Apart from research, the Department of Defense provides funding for educational purposes. It awards scholarships to undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral students studying languages and regions considered “critical to America’s security,” and it sponsors academic centers devoted to these fields.

Judging by the Trump administration’s foreign-policy priorities, particular attention is currently being drawn to South America and the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Russia remain areas of strategic interest as well. Consequently, the publication of the NDAA 2019 list will affect not only researchers in biochemistry, physics, engineering, and technology, but potentially also scholars studying Latin American music or Chinese dance if their academic center receives Pentagon funding.

Moreover, it is unclear whether the funding will be lost only by a project or an institute who maintains ties with a banned organization, or the research of the whole university will be considered compromised in case one body continues collaborations. It is entirely possible that if even one department within a university depends on Department of Defense funding, restrictions on collaboration with listed organizations could apply to the university as a whole.

Furthermore, the preamble to the document contains another provision that may substantially broaden its practical impact. Formally, the list applies only to Department of Defense grants, scholarships, contracts, and other financial support. However, it also warns that cooperation with listed organizations may negatively impact scholars’ eligibility for federal funding. And that is a much more serious prospect. The U.S. federal government finances roughly half of all research and maintenance expenditures at American universities and colleges. Federal money also supports countless scholarships, research grants, and academic conferences. In this light, universities will hardly risk losing access to federal funding, even if the document merely warns of possible consequences rather than imposing an explicit prohibition.

Denis Simon. Photo: CCG Update — Center for China and Globalization.

Denis Simon, Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington, argues that the U.S. government has effectively stopped distinguishing between leading civilian universities and institutions engaged in security-related research. He also believes American organizations will most likely interpret the conditions of the NDAA 2019 list very broadly. Simon further suggests that universities may begin limiting interaction not only with the organizations explicitly named on the list, but also with other research institutes in Russia, China, and Iran.

A similar concern is expressed by Evgeny Roshchin, Visiting Fellow at the Center for Global Policy of the SAIS School of Advanced International Studies: “On the one hand, the document concerns the research funded through Department of Defense grants. On the other hand, the disciplinary boundaries are not specified. That means it could apply to virtually any field of research, including economics, if it is financed through Pentagon grants. Researchers applying for federal grant competitions will also have to disclose all of their connections with people affiliated with organizations on the list. The existence of such connections may reduce their chances of receiving funding. I believe this will become the main deterrent. Of course, everything will depend on how the rules are applied, but the policy could seriously damage academic cooperation, because some researchers might choose to abandon perfectly legitimate collaborations simply to avoid the risk.”

According to research data, international collaboration is a significant driver of scientific progress. Natalia Korbo believes that while some restrictions are understandable, a blanket prohibition is deeply misguided:

“I understand the logic behind banning joint research in fields like bioengineering or physics, although spies are smart enough not to be affiliated with problematic institutions. But prohibiting all collaboration is simply foolish. It will harm both American science and scientific research worldwide. The restrictions will absolutely affect cultural studies as well. Even the closure of the Confucius Institutes had negative consequences for Americans themselves. Yes, those institutes promoted the Chinese government’s propaganda, but in most American cities they were also the only places where people could learn Chinese. These kinds of bans, like the TikTok ban, are often poorly thought out and produce enormous collateral damage.”

A similar view is shared by Anton Kapustin, professor of physics at the California Institute of Technology: “First, I believe these are serious restrictions, and they extend well beyond defense-related research. Originally, they applied only to projects sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. But similar restrictions have since been introduced for grants from the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, and other agencies. In practice, they now affect almost all federal grants. Second, the list of proscribed entities grows every year. Now it includes MIPT, HSE, and Moscow State University. If a student has co-authored publications with researchers from these institutions, any American university will think twice before admitting that student to a PhD program, because it will most likely be unable to pay their stipend using federal grant money. There are still many uncertainties, of course, but I think universities will prefer to be overcautious. And obtaining visas will also become more difficult for such students. So the consequences could be very serious.”

Anton Kapustin. Photo: Simons Foundation.

Thus, for Russian researchers, the publication of the list may result in profound professional difficulties. But how capable are these restrictions of protecting American interests? And is the loss of cooperation with Russian, Iranian, and Chinese colleagues truly significant for U.S. science?

Entrepreneur Oleg Tinkov argued in an interview with journalist Mikhail Fishman on TV Rain,  that Russian universities continue to produce exceptionally strong specialists: “Whatever we may say about Putin’s Russia, or Russia in general, its universities and education – especially in mathematics, computer science, physics, and chemistry – remain exceptionally strong, even compared with the United States. I still think Russian education firmly belongs among the world’s top five, and specialists from Russia are highly valued.”

Academic collaborations with China seem to be even more important for American science. Over the past decade, Chinese science has dramatically strengthened its global position. China ranks second in the world in the number of scientific publications. In 2024, for the first time, Chinese researchers published more papers in leading natural science journals than American scientists did, exceeding the US by 17%. Niccolò Pisani et al. emphasize that China’s success has been driven largely by international collaboration and sustained government investment. Consequently, the restriction of scientific cooperation with China can also have an objective of slowing China’s scientific progress. But such a strategy is likely to have limited effectiveness as long as other leading countries continue collaborating with Chinese researchers. Meanwhile, American science itself risks losing specialists and forfeiting one of its greatest competitive advantages: participation in the global scientific community.

As Denis Simon argues, “the policy is likely to accelerate the fragmentation of the US-China scientific relationship, including in fields that have traditionally relied on open exchanges and multinational research teams. It could also limit US researchers’ access to some of the world’s most productive scientific institutions.” Simon also questions whether the policy is genuinely capable of slowing China’s scientific development.

The publication of the 2025 Section 1286 list may therefore substantially limit cooperation between American researchers and colleagues from Russia, Iran, and China. Although at first glance, the restrictions appear to apply only to defense-related research, they are likely to affect a much broader range of academic disciplines. The precedent of prosecuting cases unrelated to security topics, set by the China Initiative, demonstrated that a program announced with narrow security objectives could, in practice, be applied much more broadly. Meanwhile, the threat of losing Pentagon funding and risk of losing eligibility for other forms of federal support are sufficiently serious that many universities are likely to abandon collaborations with listed institutions simply to avoid the risk. The inclusion of major civilian universities such as Moscow State University and the Higher School of Economics potentially affects thousands of scholars who have no connection to military research. It will be harder if possible to participate in American conferences, conduct joint research, or publish in academic journals, even if they present themselves as independent researchers and do not list their institutional affiliation. Even the students from these universities, even though the restrictions do not formally prohibit them from applying to American colleges or universities, may face indirect consequences if institutions, fearing the loss of federal funding, begin extending these restrictions to graduates of listed universities as well. The policy may also affect universities outside the United States that are closely integrated into the American academic system, particularly those receiving U.S. funding. Such institutions may likewise begin limiting cooperation with researchers affiliated with organizations on the list.

Ultimately, the measures intended to protect American science may not only create serious obstacles for researchers from Russia, China, and Iran, but they may also undermine one of the fundamental strengths of American academia itself – international collaboration and the free exchange of knowledge.

The post New “Undesirables”: Why the Pentagon Is Restricting Cooperation with Moscow State University and Higher School of Economics appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

“Are You Alive?” Talking Plants, Purchased Papers, and Repression: What Is Happening to Serbian Science

By: ak
15 July 2026 at 10:42

In recent years, Serbia has appeared more and more often in news stories about violations of research ethics: plagiarism in the dissertations of high-ranking officials, purchased authorship, mass retractions of publications, dubious international collaborations, and studies verging on scientific curiosities. And also — mass political persecution of scholars and university teachers. Are these episodes accidental, or are they manifestations of one and the same problem? Plagiat-Navigator tried to make sense of the situation.

Any account of the current situation with academic misconduct in Serbia has to begin with the story of the doctoral dissertation of Sinisa Mali, then the mayor of Belgrade and now the country’s first deputy prime minister. After “terrible plagiarism” was found in his work, the familiar bureaucratic game began: academic bodies dragged out a decision for years. But in the end, under public pressure and in the face of irrefutable evidence, the ethics committee of the University of Belgrade did annul his doctoral degree. By that time, Mali had already become finance minister. Soon afterward, Serbia’s Constitutional Court overturned the university’s decision. Apparently having lost faith in his own country’s academic system, Mali — by then Serbia’s first deputy prime minister — went to defend a new dissertation… in Slovakia. The Serbian authorities immediately recognized the Slovak diploma. The saga has been going on for more than a decade, and it is not over yet. But it has already become a textbook example of how political weight can cast doubt on the very idea of academic integrity.

Sinisa Mali. Photo: Vreme

Not all stories about plagiarism in the work of Serbian officials end well. Filip Svarm, editor-in-chief of the weekly Vreme, and journalist Nemanja Rujevic, who published the investigation “Anatomy of a Dissertation,” were less fortunate. Former politician Jelena Trivan, now CEO of Serbia’s largest mobile operator and the subject of that investigation, sued the journalists at the end of 2024 and won 80,000 dinars for an infringement of her honor, dignity, and business reputation. At the same time, the court did not question the fact of the borrowings themselves. It concluded, however, that only specialists have the right to classify a scholarly work as plagiarism, while journalists do not have such authority.

University of Belgrade professor Aleksandar Kavcic called what was happening “a war of laypeople against scientists”: a country where ignorance is celebrated and ministers are people who “like to wave around purchased and plagiarized diplomas.”

Plagiarism in Serbia’s academic environment is not limited to politicians’ dissertations. The buying and selling of scientific publications is an even more acute problem. This may be why Professor Kavcic, speaking of colleagues in the field, diplomatically noted that the difference between a real scientist and someone who has acquired knowledge “third hand” is enormous.

Plagiat-Navigator has already written about such “third hands” — the Moscow exchange trading in scientific publications and authorship slots — in the article “Hirsch Index at Market Rate.” One of the figures in that story was Marko Milojevic, a professor at Singidunum University in Belgrade. The case concerned two publications in international scientific journals in which Milojevic purchased authorship in 2021 through the Moscow exchange. A closer analysis shows that, in at least six publications, Professor Milojevic shares authorship with Russian colleagues who regularly use the services of the Moscow firm.

Yet the Moscow trail is only the tip of the iceberg. Following a global trend, Serbian scholars have recently shifted from the Russian market to the more powerful and influential Asian markets for fake publications. In a recent study of retracted papers with Iranian affiliations in computer science, the authors concluded that Serbia ranks among the leaders in the number of jointly published questionable papers, second only to Malaysia. This is hardly surprising: the “paper mill” from the Iranian city of Ardabil, exposed in 2023, also worked actively with Serbian colleagues. The result was the mass retraction of 31 papers in Genetika, the official journal of the Serbian Genetics Society, which lost its impact factor because of “compromised” peer review and citation manipulation.

Manipulation of peer review, authorship, and citation in publications by Serbian scholars has been observed not only in Genetika. Several examples of such papers, retracted from various journals for this reason, are shown below. It should be noted that Russian scientists also appeared as co-authors alongside their Serbian colleagues in these papers.

The compromising of publication procedures is only one item in a long list of dishonest practices used to pull the wool over the eyes of journal reviewers and editors.

Consider another characteristic example: in 2024, experts found numerous distortions of established scientific expressions — so-called tortured phrases — in a paper by Professor Nebojsa Bacanin, vice-rector for research at Belgrade’s Singidunum University. This is a clear sign that the authors were trying to evade plagiarism-detection systems using automated paraphrasing. But, as often happens, the software malfunctioned: it paraphrased the text while leaving abbreviations unchanged, so that they no longer matched their expansions. For example, instead of convolutional neural network (CNN), the text produced the meaningless phrase convolutional brain organization (CNN). Such blunders are the calling card of texts written not by scientists but by algorithms. Incidentally, another paper by Vice-Rector Bacanin was found to contain numerous manipulations with irrelevant bibliographic references.

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The problem, however, is not only how the articles are written, but also how their number is artificially inflated. The inflation of publication activity in Serbian science does not do without a zoo — and what follows is not a figure of speech. The use of metaheuristics inspired by animal behavior is a frequently used method for artificially increasing the number of publications. Many such algorithms are described extremely superficially, while their novelty and applicability to a wide range of tasks raise serious doubts. In most cases, the proposed method differs little from long-known algorithms, and its supposed originality comes down to a new metaphor and fresh terminology. A significant share of such works are merely minor modifications of the well-known Particle Swarm Optimization method.

A telling example: in a 2026 paper by scientists from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Serbia, the authors took an interest in the behavior of the spider-tailed horned viper and applied this metaphor to photovoltaic water-pumping systems. It sounds like science fiction, but it is a real publication in a scientific journal. Notably, among the co-authors of the paper we once again find the already familiar Professor Bacanin, vice-rector of Singidunum University.

Nor is the story free of image manipulation. In a joint Iranian-Italian article whose authors include a single representative of Serbia — University of Belgrade professor Jelena Popovic-Djordjevic — experts found telltale traces of Photoshop, the same techniques that have surfaced more than once in similar scandals.

Jelena Popovic-Djordjevic. Photo: ResearchGate

It is worth noting that since 2020 Popovic-Djordjevic has been a constant co-author of Sina Moghaddam, an Iranian specialist in medicinal plants. The scheme is transparent: the participation of European scientists helps Asian authors break into prestigious journals. At the same time, the real contribution of the Western colleagues to the research is often minimal. Their role is reduced to status presence — a kind of “wedding general” at an academic wedding. Until 2020, this honorary function in Moghaddam’s publications was performed by a researcher from Greece. The outcome was entirely predictable: nine of their joint papers have already been retracted, and they have received scathing criticism on Retraction Watch. Now the baton has passed to Popovic-Djordjevic.

It should be added that image manipulation in her papers is not only an Iranian specialty. In a paper signed by ten employees of the University of Belgrade, a curious fact emerged: an image previously used to illustrate liver samples migrated unchanged into a new article — this time as an illustration of kidney samples. The authors were not at a loss: they apologized for an “unfortunate error” and corrected the article.

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The roots of this tradition of errors, however, run deeper. Back in 2003, one of the co-authors of the aforementioned paper about the liver — now a professor at the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Belgrade, and then a researcher at Queen Mary University of London — Zoran Todorovic, together with his British colleague Christoph Thiemermann, published a paper in which experts also found image manipulation, again involving liver samples. In response to puzzled questions from reviewers, Professor Thiemermann replied with lethal directness: the results of the study, by his own admission, “may not be reliable.” Since then, more than 80 negative PubPeer comments have accumulated on his papers, 15 of which have ultimately been retracted. Techniques honed at a British university, it seems, proved useful in Belgrade twenty years later.

One reliable sign of dishonest publication activity is a sharp rise in the number of papers co-authored with representatives of countries in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, around 2021–2022. In such papers, authorship is often shared by researchers from a good dozen countries — a kind of academic international, assembled by chance around a single publication.

The graph above shows the distribution of the number of papers by Serbian authors co-authored with colleagues from Asia and Africa, depending on the number of co-authoring countries. By a large margin, the leaders in the number of papers are two mathematicians from the University of Belgrade: Professors Dragan Pamucar and Vladimir Simic. The sharp surge in their publication activity falls precisely at the beginning of the 2020s. And if experts find elementary mathematical errors in their papers, there is nothing surprising about it: at a productivity rate of three papers a week, it is simply impossible not to make mistakes. PubPeer has already accumulated claims against a hundred of their publications in international journals, ten of which have now been officially retracted. It seems that in this case quantity really did turn into quality.

To conclude this theme, let us talk a little with plants — yes, yes, do not be surprised. Scientists from Slovenia, Serbia (the universities in Nis and Belgrade), and the University of Pristina decided to find out together whether plants are capable of talking to people in their own language. To do this, they attached a polygraph to the stem of a potted flower and asked the plant questions: “Are you alive?”, “Do you have consciousness?”, “Does it hurt?” The plant was interrogated using a radioactive source of a uranium isotope. The answers obtained were decoded with the help of AI, which translated them into Serbian. To avoid suffering from radiation themselves, the authors of the study used a homemade orgonite — a bioenergetic shield that transforms negative energy into positive energy.

The researchers’ first important discovery was observing how the experimental “vegetable” — this is exactly how they familiarly referred to the potted plant under study — sweated and changed its pulse and breathing rate. All of this was recorded using a polygraph. As a result, the Balkan scientists concluded that plants can be engaged in a rational dialogue in their own language. The results of the study were published in a scientific journal devoted to issues of… acupuncture.

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Behind all these scandalous stories, it should not be forgotten that the majority of Serbian scientists and university teachers are honest professionals who have nothing to do with plagiarism, purchased papers, or other manipulations. The events of the past two years have clearly confirmed this: many of them proved willing to risk their own careers in defense of academic freedoms and democratic principles.

The mass student protests that began in Serbia in November 2024 after the collapse of a canopy at the railway station in Novi Sad quickly grew into a nationwide movement against corruption and political pressure on state institutions. Universities became one of the main centers of protest activity: lecturers openly supported the students, while rectors and deans refused to obstruct university blockades. In response, the authorities and pro-government media launched a campaign against the academic community.

Political pressure was not limited to public attacks. At a number of universities, teachers who spoke out in support of students faced refusals to reappoint them, dismissals, and delays in career advancement. The best-known case was that of Jelena Kleut, a professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Novi Sad, who lost her job after twenty years of teaching; she herself called what happened a political reprisal. These actions by the Serbian authorities, aimed at suppressing academic freedoms, attracted the attention of international organizations: the European Parliament and the human rights network Scholars at Risk documented an escalation of threats against Serbian scholars, publishing reports on a systemic crisis of freedom of speech.

All these stories are elements of a single ecosystem in which formal indicators replace real science, violations meet no serious resistance, and universities and courts sometimes side with the violators. Politicians themselves, by their own example, have demonstrated for decades that academic integrity is worth nothing if you have power. With this signal, they have been corroding the academic community for years, setting “their own” careerists against those who refused to play their game. It would be a mistake to think that the entire academic community has resigned itself to this state of affairs. But, unfortunately, for now the dialogue between the former and the latter looks more like a conversation with plants.

The post “Are You Alive?” Talking Plants, Purchased Papers, and Repression: What Is Happening to Serbian Science appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.

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