An Emmy-winning North Carolina television news producer accused of stalking his former wife allegedly climbed through a second-story bathroom window, tracked her movements and repeatedly appeared near her home before she obtained a domestic violence protective order.
Randall Saunders Kerr, 55, was arrested Oct. 20 and charged with felony stalking and misdemeanor violation of a domestic violence protective order after allegedly driving near the home of his former wife, longtime WRAL anchor Lynda Loveland, multiple times a day.
Court records obtained by Fox News Digital, including an arrest warrant and a December 2025 complaint, detail months of alleged harassment that left Loveland fearing for her safety.
"I'm scared I'm going to wake up one night and see him standing there in my room," Loveland wrote in the complaint.
The October arrest warrant alleges Kerr drove within 300 yards of Loveland's home "multiple times daily" between Oct. 13 and Oct. 18, including along a street behind the property.
Loveland filed for protection in Wake County District Court on Dec. 19, 2025, accusing Kerr of monitoring her movements, contacting her against her wishes and repeatedly appearing near her home after their separation.
In a timeline attached to the complaint, Loveland claimed Kerr searched through her personal belongings, monitored her text messages and emails and used shared technology to track her location.
She alleged Kerr sent as many as 30 unwanted text messages a day after moving out of their home in August 2025.
Loveland also claimed she discovered an upstairs bathroom window open in October 2025 and later questioned Kerr, who allegedly admitted using a ladder to enter through the second-story window because he needed to use the bathroom.
She said she changed the locks, checked her doors and windows and eventually purchased pepper spray because she feared Kerr might enter the home.
A Wake County judge granted Loveland an emergency domestic violence protective order Dec. 19, 2025, barring Kerr from contacting or harassing her and requiring him to stay at least 300 yards away.
The court subsequently entered a consent protective order Jan. 27, 2026, signed by both parties and approved by District Court Judge Rhonda Young.
The order prohibited Kerr from contacting Loveland and generally required him to remain at least 300 yards away, with a limited exception for events involving their adult children. It also barred him from possessing or purchasing firearms.
The consent order was entered without findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning the underlying allegations.
Separate divorce records obtained by Fox News Digital show Kerr and Loveland's marriage was formally dissolved Oct. 9, just four days before the alleged stalking began.
The couple married in April 2001 and separated in August 2025 after more than two decades together. They have three adult children, court records show.
Loveland filed for divorce in August 2026, seeking to end the marriage after more than a year of separation and restore her maiden name, Lynda Lee Loveland.
Separate court records show the former couple had also been involved in a dispute over their marital home, with Kerr claiming in December 2025 that Loveland changed the locks after he moved out.
The two later reached an agreement over the division of marital property, with a Wake County judge approving a consent order in August 2026.
Kerr is a longtime investigative producer at Raleigh-based WRAL and was among three station employees honored with a regional Emmy Award in 2016 for a report titled "Swatting," Capitol Broadcasting, the station's parent company, announced at the time.
Following his arrest, a Wake County magistrate initially ordered Kerr held without release under North Carolina's domestic violence pretrial release law.
A separate order issued Oct. 21 barred him from contacting Loveland and required him to comply with the existing protective order.
WRAL previously reported on Kerr's arrest and the protective order obtained by his former wife. Fox News Digital reached out to the station for additional comment on Kerr's current employment status but did not receive a response.
An attorney who represented Loveland in her divorce proceedings was also contacted for comment, while an attorney representing Kerr in the criminal case could not immediately be identified.
“If Donald Trump defies court orders because the Supreme Court said he cannot be prosecuted for actions he takes as president, could those people who carry out his illegal requests be prosecuted or fined even though they are acting on his orders?” — Kit Read
Hi Kit,
Maybe.
The Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling in Trump v. United States only dealt directly with criminal immunity for presidents, holding that they have at least presumptive immunity for all official acts, as well as absolute immunity for acts within their “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional authority.
What all that means in practice hasn’t been fully fleshed out. It would take a follow-up case to clarify the ruling’s limits, and it’s unclear if or when such a case will come.
At any rate, the court focused on presidents in that ruling. It did not grant immunity to aides acting on the president’s behalf.
Yet, while arguments have been made against subordinate immunity, it’s technically an open question that the justices haven’t decided one way or the other.
So the answer to your question at the moment is: maybe.
But you might wonder: What could the argument be for immunizing presidential underlings?
One scholarly account argued that the logic of the immunity ruling “renders the President’s subordinates absolutely immune for a potentially broad range of official acts, even if those acts are otherwise unlawful.” That’s because if the president has complete power over executing the law, then, the argument goes, subordinate actions that implement that power are lawful, as opposed to being unlawful but immune from prosecution.
As with clarifying the immunity ruling’s limits as it applies to presidents, whether the Supreme Court will decide the subordinate immunity question depends on the court taking an appeal that raises that issue in the future. And as with presidential immunity itself, there is no clear candidate for an appeal the court would take to answer that question.
Either way, if a president wants to ensure that any of his henchmen won’t be federally prosecuted, he could always pardon them.
A southern Michigan school district has voted to restrict participation in girls' sports to biological females, approving a new policy in a 4-2 school board vote amid the ongoing national debate over transgender athletes competing in women's and girls' athletics.
"The Board of Education approved a new policy with a vote of 4 yes and 2 no with one board member absent," Andrew Shaw, superintendent of Monroe Public Schools, told Fox News Digital in an email Wednesday.
"As the superintendent it is my role to implement the policies established by the Board of Education," he added. "The policy that was approved is for Monroe Public Schools only and does not impact any visiting school."
The policy, titled "Girl's Athletic Participation and Facilities Use," addresses participation in girls' athletics and access to facilities. A copy of the proposed policy obtained by Fox News Digital states that participation in girls' athletics at Monroe Public Schools would be restricted to biological females, with eligibility tied to documentation on a student's birth certificate.
The policy reads, "Participation in girl's athletics at Monroe Public Schools shall be restricted to biological females as documented on the birth certificate at the time of birth. Access to and use of girl's athletic facilities (locker rooms) shall follow the same restriction."
The new policy announcement also comes after Briley Lechner, a varsity volleyball player at Monroe High School in Monroe, Michigan, and her father, Sean, filed a federal lawsuit on Oct. 9, announced by the Thomas More Law Center, raising Title IX and constitutional claims against Monroe Public Schools, the Michigan High School Athletic Association and school officials over the alleged incident.
Briley Lechner said she filed a lawsuit after she unknowingly shared a locker room with a transgender athlete.
"What's very scary is that the day that this happened, I had no clue that there was a boy on the other team," Lechner told Fox News Digital in an interview on Oct. 15.
The lawsuit from the Thomas More Law Center "alleges that school officials knowingly concealed from the Monroe High School girls' volleyball team and their parents that the September 9, 2025, match with Ann Arbor's Skyline High School would involve a biological male (transgender female)," according to the legal group.
In a statement, Briley Lechner told Fox News Digital, "Our family loves and respect everyone, regardless of our differences. This has always been about my privacy, my safety, and fair play. Nothing more, nothing less."
She added, "Every female athlete deserves to have her rights respected and protected. Boys do NOT belong in girls’ locker rooms or girls’ sports. Every girl deserves to feel safe, respected, and protected, both in the locker room and on the court. We should NEVER have to fight for that."
Sean Lechner, her father, told Fox News Digital, "The new policy may be watered down, but it's an incremental victory for my daughter and every female athlete. It's shameful it took nearly a year to get here but we still have work to do. Who's to say they can't change it again? Regardless of how some try to twist the narrative, this has ALWAYS been about my daughter's privacy, safety, and fair play. Nothing more, nothing less!"
He continued, "Since our lawsuit was announced, my daughter and I have received even more harassing and threatening messages. But at the heart of everything I'm doing is something simple — being a father, being a parent, and loving my daughter enough to stand beside her when she needs me most."
He added, "To all parents....put aside your differences, bring faith, common sense, and respect back into our homes. Our children are God's most precious gifts. Love them. Cherish them. Protect them. One day, your daughter may look you in the eyes and ask, 'Why didn't you stand up for me when I needed you?' I never want my daughter to ask me that question. I want her to know her father stood beside her and never backed down. No amount of hate or threats will silence us. I will never stop standing up for my daughter."
In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton famously promised that the federal judiciary would have "neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment." The climate lawfare movement has spent the better part of a decade trying to prove Hamilton wrong.
Earlier this month, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Suncor Energy v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, in which Boulder seeks to use Colorado public nuisance law to make two energy companies pay for the effects of global climate change.
A small, well-funded network of climate activists, convinced that drastic action is needed to save the planet and frustrated that their fellow citizens have not voted to dismantle the fossil-fuel industry, have turned to state and local courts after the Supreme Court unanimously shut down federal climate-nuisance suits in 2011’s American Electric Power v. Connecticut. Their strategy rests on a single premise: When the front door of democracy is closed, try the courthouse back door.
But thanks to documents released September 30 by the House Judiciary Committee, we no longer have to guess. One of the movement’s architects put the strategy in writing.
"It seemed to me that without legislative or executive action to address the climate problem, real government action might still be derived from court decisions," Paul Hanle wrote in a May 2022 email. Hanle founded the Environmental Law Institute’s Climate Judiciary Project, which has put at least 140 federal judges through its climate "education" seminars. In the same email, he laid out CJP’s strategy to target "key judges" with seminars, hoping to "make a great difference in the final outcome of cases."
The crown jewel was the judges’ own science manual. In December 2022, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine invited Michael Burger to write the climate chapter of the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, the federal judiciary’s go-to science guide. Burger runs Columbia’s Sabin Center for Climate Change Law and is of counsel at Sher Edling, a firm representing many of the cities and counties suing oil companies. The Federal Judicial Center balked, citing his litigation work.
The next day, Burger told his Sabin Center colleagues, the chapter’s eventual named authors, that he’d "be happy to contribute behind the scenes." Within weeks, one of them was circulating a draft with "Mike’s edits" and revising the legal section in response to his comments. Soon after the manual was published, the FJC withdrew the climate chapter. The National Academies finally followed suit in August.
Why all the stealth? Because climate plaintiffs have a causation problem they cannot solve in the open.
At the Suncor Energy oral argument, Justice Elena Kagan told the oil companies’ lawyer, "Well, you sound like you have a very good causation argument." She meant it as a brush-off; she immediately questioned why causation should matter for preemption.
But Kagan is right: No climate plaintiff has a good causation argument. Greenhouse gases mix globally, and about 90 percent of emissions occur outside the United States. Tying a drought in Boulder to any particular company’s barrels of oil is simply not possible.
That is why the climate lawfare movement needs judges to swallow "extreme event attribution." Boulder’s trial court has already shown what the endgame looks like, declaring, "in a multiple contributor tort case, there is no need to tie specific injuries to the actions of defendants." If you can’t meet the standard, lower it.
This is precisely what the Constitution’s structure exists to prevent: a small minority weaponizing federalism to impose its policy preferences on the entire nation. One county cannot regulate the world. If Boulder prevails, the companies’ lawyer warned, some 90,000 municipalities could make national energy policy through jury awards. Pressed by Justice Clarence Thomas at oral argument, Boulder’s lawyer conceded that "nothing in our theory" prevents suing retailers too.
And it won’t stop with oil companies. The Climate Judiciary Project’s own curriculum for judges shows where this is headed. One module touts "source attribution" studies tracing nearly two-thirds of all carbon dioxide emitted since the 1750s to 90 fossil-fuel and cement producers. Then it turns to the dinner table: "Though its members have not yet been named as defendants in climate change lawsuits, the heavily concentrated industrial animal agriculture industry also has been subjected to source attribution analysis." Note the word "yet."
The module is candid about the point of the exercise. These studies take an alleged problem that could be attributed to "several billion past and present human individuals" and reduce it "to one driven by a few dozen companies," which makes climate change "appear to be more amenable to traditional tort law adjudication." This is regulation by litigation, pure and simple. Punish the companies that supply Americans’ fuel, food and building materials, and every family pays the bill at the pump and the grocery store.
Chief Justice John Roberts cut to the heart of the matter: "Isn’t your suit an attempt to evade those decisions?" He meant the Court’s long line of cases treating interstate air pollution as a matter of federal law, which Justice Brett Kavanaugh had called "a wall of precedent." Kavanaugh then read aloud from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s opinion in AEP: Federal judges "lack the scientific, economic, and technological resources" to set emissions policy. If that is true of federal judges, Kavanaugh asked, doesn’t it apply to "a six-person state jury in Boulder?"
Take it from Ginsburg herself. Greenhouse-gas regulation, she wrote, "cannot be prescribed in a vacuum." It demands weighing environmental benefits against "our Nation’s energy needs and the possibility of economic disruption."
The climate lawfare complex lost at the ballot box. It lost in AEP. So its backers went behind the scenes—into judicial seminars and judges’ own science manual. Enough already. The Supreme Court should shut the courthouse door for good.
The US supreme court has cleared the way for New Hampshire to prohibit student IDs as a form of voter identification ahead of November’s midterm elections.
In a brief unsigned order, justices sided with a Republican National Committee (RNC)-backed appeal on the matter. They cited a longstanding rule that lower federal courts should not “alter election rules” too close to election day.
Supreme Court Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson was the lone public dissenter in a Thursday decision allowing New Hampshire to block the use of student ID cards in the upcoming midterm elections.
Other justices on the court cited the longstanding precedent "that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election," and said that lower courts failed to argue that the specific case in New Hampshire warranted an exception to the tradition. Jackson, however, argued the proximity to an election should not get in the way of properly applying the law.
"I respectfully dissent because — even, and perhaps especially, when an election is looming — I would not disturb a clearly justifiable federal-court order issued to ensure that the public receives accurate information about a State’s electoral processes," she wrote.
The underlying dispute stems from a law signed in April that went into effect in June, striking student ID cards from the list of forms of identification that election officials can accept when an individual requests a ballot. A voting rights group sued New Hampshire on the grounds that the law illegally discriminated against young voters by making it more difficult for them to vote.
New Hampshire Secretary of State David Scanlan then issued guidance saying that student IDs could not be used to establish voter identity, even as supporting evidence under the state's alternative verification procedures. A district judge blocked that portion of the guidance, arguing that it went beyond the scope of the law itself, which only removed student IDs from the list of expressly accepted forms of identification.
Among the supporters of the guidance was the Republican National Committee.
While Jackson was the lone public dissenter, it is possible that other justices dissented as well, but opted not to be named on the court order. During her roughly four years on the Supreme Court, Jackson has broken from the rest of her colleagues in areas such as campaign finance, immigration and congressional map litigation.
In 2023, she was the lone dissenter in an 8-1 ruling allowing a concrete company to sue striking union workers. She also stood alone in a May 2026 decision involving federal prisoners seeking to challenge their convictions through compassionate release.
New Hampshire is holding a handful of close races on Election Day, putting some weight behind the court’s decision. Fox News’ power rankings rate the state’s Senate race as leans Democratic, meaning that liberals have a slight advantage in a race that could decide control of Congress. The state’s governor’s race, meanwhile, is rated as likely going to the GOP.
College students typically favor the Democratic Party, though it is unclear how many voters will be affected by the court ruling, as students who previously relied on their student IDs will now need another accepted form of identification.
Some Democrats, however, believe allowing voters to use student IDs would be a good thing. Texas Democratic Senate nominee James Talarico, for instance, has pushed for such a thing in his state.
A short excerpt from the long opinion in Jackson Fed. of Teachers v. Fitch, decided yesterday by Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry Smith, joined by Judge Kurt Engelhardt:
In April 2025, Mississippi enacted House Bill 1193 (H.B. 1193), a law designed to keep Mississippi public education funds from being spent on diversity, equity, and inclusion ("DEI") initiatives and similar controversial programs. The law prevents government-run institutions from requiring activities such as diversity training or pushing DEI ideology, so defined, in the course of government-funded business.
H.B. 1193 does four main things. First, it prevents educational institutions from mandating DEI programs and diversity trainings in a variety of contexts. Second, it stops public educational institutions from punishing students for their views on DEI. Third, it prohibits regulated institutions from endorsing or promoting DEI through course materials. Finally, it prevents institutions and their educators from otherwise engaging in DEI methods or actions, preventing bad actors from circumventing prohibitions and frustrating its purposes. The statute also creates an administrative process to handle claims that a given educational institution is not in compliance. H.B. 1193 excepts several activities from its sweep, including scholarly work, the activities of students and their groups, and creative engagement.
Plaintiffs sued, claiming (among other things) that the law violated the First Amendment, but:
The proceedings in the district court were a botch job, to say the least. Judge Henry Wingate issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") enjoining enforcement of H.B. 1193 that contained several factual assertions nowhere to be found in the record, or indeed, in any proceeding of the case. Those included mention of plaintiffs and defendants not in the complaint, supposed "declarations" from non-existent or never-present individuals, false quotations purporting to be taken from the text of H.B. 1193, and several erroneous claims that the law had already led to the demise of apparently fictitious programs.
After this came to light, Judge Wingate replaced the TRO without explaining.
Forging forward despite the bungled TRO, Judge Wingate issued a pre-enforcement preliminary injunction. The various state defendants appeal.
At oral argument in this court, it was discovered that even the "corrected" TRO—which was incorporated by reference into the preliminary injunction order—still contained hallucinated information (namely, a citation to a purported Fourth Circuit case, "Cousins v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk," that does not exist).
This district judge carelessly exercised his Article III power by issuing sloppy edicts based on falsehoods and fabrications. Upon discovering some of these falsehoods, Judge Wingate dug in his heels and claimed that the hallucinated claims had no bearing on its reasoning; he offered no explanation as to why he included such apparently irrelevant material in the original TRO or why the TRO nevertheless was justified in its absence.
Moreover, the district court got the law wrong. The TRO and preliminary injunction order rested on impoverished legal analysis that barely paid lip-service to the precedents of the Supreme Court or this court, seeming at times purposely to misconstrue the law by manipulating the words of statutes and cases, without regard to their texts' meaning as a whole. The district court—or perhaps, being charitable, its AI agent—ignored and manipulated governing law, apparently to satisfy a policy agenda.
Because of the extraordinarily grave errors by the district court, we vacate and remand for assignment to a different district judge. Per the Supreme Court's decision in Moody, we instruct the new judge to conduct proceedings consistent with federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and this circuit….
The original TRO—the one actually issued on July 20, 2025—named as plaintiffs eleven individuals and organizations who had never been party to the case; named as defendants two officials who were not actually sued; claimed, without evidence, that three post-secondary institutions had already cancelled DEI initiatives or programming because of the act; further declared, again without evidence, that staff at another school had been told not to discuss certain topics, including "historical interpretations involving systemic racism"; misquoted H.B. 1193 as applying to "race or sex stereotyping," "race or sex scapegoating," "critical race theory," and "institutional bias," despite none of these terms' appearing in the act's text; and referenced purported declarations of four individuals who do not appear in the record at all and may not even exist….
On July 22, 2025, defendants filed a motion to clarify, pointing out these errors. In response, the court, without explanation, replaced the original TRO with a seemingly corrected version. Though that document was docketed on July 22, it was backdated to July 20. Defendants requested that the original order be restored to the docket to keep the record whole and requested that the court explain the inaccuracies in the original order. The district court denied that motion, claiming the factual inaccuracies were merely "clerical."
In response, U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley accused the district court of using artificial Intelligence ("AI") to prepare the TRO, with the substantive errors' arising from AI-generated hallucinations. Fifteen days later, Judge Wingate admitted the errors, claiming that a law clerk had used AI to assist drafting an earlier version of the TRO that was docketed by mistake. His letter stated that he had removed the original TRO from the docket to avoid confusion and that the errors were clerical, in his view, because they did not relate to "core legal reasoning or the ultimate judgment on the merits" but instead to "failure to confirm the accuracy of certain information."
The seemingly corrected TRO did not explain how or why the factual inaccuracies were not necessary to the reasoning of the original TRO. The merits analysis failed to cite a binding authority from after the year 2000. It claims that H.B. 1193 constitutes viewpoint discrimination, without any analysis whatsoever of a state government's authority to regulate its own speech. And the document did not correct all of the errors: At Fifth Circuit oral argument, it was discovered that the doctored TRO cited to "Cousins v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 503 F.2d 422, 426–27 (4th Cir. 1974)." That case does not even exist; it is an apparent AI hallucination….
Judge Catharina Haynes did not join these parts of the opinion.
There's also some interesting First Amendment analysis in the case, which I hope to blog about later today. (I'm tied up for the next several hours.) Thanks to @WillChamberlain and Glenn Reynolds (Instapundit) for the pointer.
Anthony M. Shults, Justin Lee Matheny, Rex Morris Shannon, III, and Scott G. Stewart represent defendants.
Pinhas Ran allegedly fired toward car after driver, fearing attack, refused baseless demand to show ID and sped off; one bullet lodged itself in passenger's lung, prosecutors say
FIRST ON FOX: A federal timeline provided by officials overseeing unaccompanied migrant children challenges reports that a 1-year-old boy was left to navigate immigration court without counsel, showing that legal service providers intervened to secure representation following an initial hearing.
Addressing media reports highlighting toddlers appearing before immigration judges, Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) Acting Director Angie Salazar and Senior Advisor John Fabbricatore pushed back on headlines alleging systemic gaps in child legal representation, arguing that contractor failures and lack of invoice oversight created the initial court lapses.
"We don't have this big movement where we have a bunch of 1-year-olds who are going to court," Fabbricatore told Fox News Digital.
According to ORR timeline records obtained by Fox News Digital, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers first encountered the 1-year-old boy and his 17-year-old mother near Naco, Arizona, on June 25. The child was accompanied by his mother at all court proceedings.
The critical gap occurred in July under the agency's former contractor, the Acacia Center for Justice, records show.
On July 1, Acacia completed legal orientation and consultation for the mother and child, but failed to file an E28 notice of appearance before the immigration court.
Consequently, during the child's first scheduled court hearing on July 8, no attorney was present — not even as a friend of the court — despite Acacia holding an active federal legal services contract at the time. The federal legal services contract with Acacia officially ended July 31.
Following the end of the Acacia contract, the agency transitioned legal service oversight to the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), which officially initiated legal services Aug. 5. During an Aug. 7 appearance, the mother and child were granted additional time to obtain counsel, while USCRI representatives attended subsequent hearings on Aug. 17 and Aug. 28 as a friend of the court.
On Aug. 31, a motion was filed by the friend of the court and mother requesting court-appointed counsel at government expense, which was later denied by the immigration judge.
Progress continued into September as child advocates were officially appointed on Sept. 23, and USCRI filed a formal E28 notice of appearance on Sept. 25 to become the attorney of record. On Sept. 29, USCRI officially represented both mother and child in immigration court. The judge subsequently granted a continuance on Oct. 2, leading into a follow-up hearing scheduled for Friday.
Officials explained that the July breakdowns highlighted the core reason the administration terminated Acacia's multimillion-dollar contract, which was awarded under the Biden administration in November 2023. According to federal contract records on USAspending.gov, the Department of Health and Human Services had awarded the Acacia Center for Justice a $356.3 million bridge contract for legal services for unaccompanied children. Of that total award, more than $236.9 million had been outlaid prior to the contract's dissolution.
The network previously provided counsel to roughly 20,000 migrant children across the U.S., according to its website.
"I knew we were signing off on every invoice that we were receiving for legal services to the tune of $20-plus million sometimes each month," she told Fox News Digital. "So it made no sense to me that legal service providers were saying kids were unrepresented for a lack of funding."
"I tried to understand who was represented before," she added. "I tried to understand what we were paying for under this direct representation, but the invoices we received were completely redacted. There is no way I could ever know exactly what service was provided during the month."
Fox News Digital has reached out to the Acacia Center for Justice for comment. The contract funded a slew of services, including legal screenings, representations and presentations on the rights of migrant children in detention.
Following the dissolution of the Acacia contract, the ORR entered into a $20 million contract with USCRI, which expires Dec. 31.
"So USCRI was showing up in court as a friend of the court to ensure that there was at least somebody present in case Acacia did not show up," Fabbricatore said. "Now, as those cases are being looked at, USCRI is able to go in and actually meet with these children and then represent them in a follow-up hearing. So there may be some hearings where a child shows up, and initially they don't have representation, but USCRI will be there, identify that child, and then be able to move forward in the future as a representative for that child."
Salazar emphasized that ORR officials track which children are represented by which lawyers on specific dates, noting that the agency respects attorney-client privilege.
"The former provider refused to give us those measurables," Fabbricatore said. "They refused to give us the alien registration number so we could determine what cases they were actually representing. They didn't want to give that. They refused to give that, and that was a holdup for us because we needed to know who was actually being represented so we can ensure that every kid at least had their legal orientation and had a legal representative that was talking to them."
Salazar noted that about 2% of migrant children in ORR custody are under the age of 5. Another 85% are ages 13 to 17, with 62% falling into the 16-to-17 bracket.
"What we said to our new grantee (USCRI): ‘We want you in 100% of the hearings where kids in our care are showing up to their immigration hearings,’" she said. "That is happening. I think we're at like 98%."
Fabbricatore added there are currently 1,690 migrant children in ORR custody.
"Under Biden, they had 22,000 in care a day. So it's a very vast difference," he said. "We've been able to lower that census, get kids through the court process quicker, and get them back with their parents if possible."
The U.S. Supreme Court on Thursday allowed New Hampshire officials to reject student IDs as a valid form of identification when voters cast their ballots in next month's midterm elections.
A lower court judge previously found that state officials had improperly gone further than a new law restricting the use of student IDs to obtain a ballot, ruling that officials still had to consider student IDs alongside other evidence when voters lacked other means of verifying their identity.
But the Supreme Court took issue with the judge intervening this close to the elections.
The high court has said orders handed down too close to an election can cause voter confusion, an idea known as the Purcell Principle. The court cited the recent legal back-and-forth over Missouri’s redistricting maps.
"Here, the District Court did not point to anything that would justify deviating from that principle," the majority wrote in its opinion.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented, saying the rule did not apply since the lower court judge was helping ensure the public received accurate information.
"When a federal court determines that material misrepresentations are being made about a State’s election rules, an injunction to prohibit that conduct does not contribute to public confusion, it prevents that very problem," Jackson wrote. "I would not disturb a clearly justifiable federal-court order issued to ensure that the public receives accurate information about a State’s electoral processes," she wrote.
This comes after Gov. Kelly Ayotte signed House Bill 323 into law in April, removing student IDs from the list of identification expressly considered valid for obtaining a ballot. The law took effect June 2. After the law went into effect, New Hampshire Secretary of State David Scanlan issued guidance to election officials about the change, and multiple trainings were held.
"New Hampshire has a responsibility to protect the integrity of its elections and ensure that election laws are applied as written," New Hampshire Attorney General John Formella, a Republican, said in a statement.
"The Supreme Court’s decision is an important victory for our efforts to defend those laws and prevent last-minute court orders from creating uncertainty for voters and election officials. We will continue to defend New Hampshire’s election laws and the safeguards they provide," he continued.
The Supreme Court's decision was not a final ruling on the merits of the case, and the underlying litigation over the law remains ongoing.
Actor Robert De Niro is again on the attack against President Donald Trump, this time pushing the conspiracy theory that the president and the Supreme Court are trying to take away Americans' right to vote.
The Supreme Court on Thursday ruled New Hampshire’s top election official can fully stop voters from using their student IDs when showing up to the polls in the midterms — a request backed by the Republican National Committee (RNC). A lower judge ruled officials had improperly gone further than a new state law placing restrictions on…
The Supreme Court on Thursday ruled New Hampshire’s top election official can fully stop voters from using their student IDs when showing up to the polls in the midterms — a request backed by the Republican National Committee (RNC). A lower judge ruled officials had improperly gone further than a new state law placing restrictions on…
A nearly unanimous Supreme Court has granted New Hampshire’s emergency request to block the use of student IDs for voting in the November midterm elections.
The case raised a recurring theme at the high court about the propriety of judgesintervening on the eve of political contests, against the familiar backdrop of GOP-backed voting restrictions purporting to ensure election integrity.
On Thursday, the majority said that the district court judge who ruled against the state failed to justify deviating from the general principle that federal courts shouldn’t alter election rules on the eve of an election. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented, writing she “would not disturb a clearly justifiable federal-court order issued to ensure that the public receives accurate information about a State’s electoral processes.”
The Biden-appointed justice said she wasn’t as sure as the majority that the judge’s action falls under that general noninterference rule, known as the “Purcell principle.” She said the judge was trying to address alleged misinformation rather than change state law.
“When a federal court determines that material misrepresentations are being made about a State’s election rules, an injunction to prohibit that conduct does not contribute to public confusion, it prevents that very problem,” Jackson wrote in her solo dissent.
While New Hampshire’s federal representatives are Democrats, Republicans run the state government. Gov. Kelly Ayotte signed a bill into law this year that prohibits the use of student IDs for voting.
A New Hampshire-based nonprofit called Coalition for Open Democracy sued the state over the law, which the group said needlessly burdens young voters under the guise of trying to solve the “non-existent problem” of nonresident voter fraud.
In a ruling earlier this month, U.S. District Judge Joseph Laplante refused to block the law, called HB 323. But the George W. Bush appointee said related guidance from New Hampshire Secretary of State David Scanlan, a Republican, went too far. Laplante said Scanlan overstepped in barring election officials from considering student IDs even as evidence under a “safety-valve provision” that lets voters prove who they are if they don’t otherwise have a proper photograph.
“The State has offered no independent justification for that broader prohibition,” wrote Laplante, explaining that such justification is needed even for minimal burdens on voting rights. He blocked enforcement of Scanlan’s directive to the extent it “prohibits or discourages election officials from considering student IDs as evidence of voter identity,” and he ordered the secretary of state to issue revised guidance for the midterms.
Laplante declined to halt his ruling, as did an appellate panel over dissent from a Trump-appointed judge. State officials then turned to the justices in Washington, arguing that Laplante’s order risks late-breaking confusion. The Republican National Committee filed an amicus brief supporting the state.
Opposing the state’s emergency application, Open Democracy said granting the application would be the chaos-inducing move. The group noted that Scanlan had already quickly complied with the order to provide revised guidance, and that his website “has told voters since the October 2 Order that supervisors may consider a student ID along with other evidence.”
That guidance is now the status quo, Open Democracy observed. Therefore, it said, granting the state’s application would “reverse the rules for a second time in a month.”
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On December 2, the Supreme Court will consider constitutional challenges to "assault weapon" bans in Connecticut and Cook County, Illinois, that cover widely owned rifles, including the AR-15. As the plaintiffs in those consolidated cases see it, such laws plainly violate the Second Amendment because they prohibit arms in common use for lawful purposes. In briefs filed on Wednesday, Connecticut and Cook County urge the justices to reject that test, saying a weapon's popularity is not dispositive. The relevant question, they say, is whether their rifle restrictions fit a historical tradition of banning "unusually dangerous weapons."
Cook County and Connecticut have the burden of showing that their laws are "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation," the test established by the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. On the face of it, that is a daunting challenge.
In the 2008 case District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court said the Second Amendment protects the right to own "bearable arms" that are "in common use" for "lawful purposes like self-defense." That description indisputably encompasses "AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles," the firearms at issue in these cases. But Heller also recognized "the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons.'" Cook County and Connecticut argue that the rifles they have deemed intolerable fall into that category.
"There is a robust historical tradition of regulating unusually dangerous weapons that
compromise public safety," Cook County says. "Such regulations, which long
predate the founding, have included outright bans and other restrictions on exceptionally dangerous weapons like launcegays, trap guns, Bowie knives, and slung shots."
Cook County argues that its ordinance is "relevantly similar" to those historical restrictions because it targets "exceptionally lethal weapons that are disproportionate to the end of self-defense." AR-15s are "offensive weapons of war designed for maximum lethality and are not customarily used for self-defense," the brief says. "The purpose and operation of the ban is consistent with our Nation's historical tradition and accounts for the exceptional dangerousness of these technologically advanced weapons."
The ban is "an appropriate contemporary restriction implemented by the legislature in response to dramatic technological change and unprecedented societal concern," the brief says. "It is tailored to respond to the particular dangers presented in areas with mass casualty exposure and acute public safety risk."
Connecticut offers a similar argument. One problem with this defense is the premise that "assault weapon" bans focus on "exceptionally lethal weapons." As critics of such laws have been pointing out for decades, the features they target, such as folding stocks, pistol grips, and barrel shrouds, do not affect a rifle's basic operation. With or without them, a rifle fires the same ammunition at the same rate with the same muzzle velocity. And because AR-15s use intermediate-caliber ammunition, they are arguably less lethal than shotguns and many hunting rifles that are not classified as "assault weapons."
Cook County's emphasis on technological developments is also questionable. Constitutional guarantees establish principles that courts routinely apply to technologies that did not exist at the founding. Although the Framers did not have radio, television, or the internet, for example, the First Amendment nevertheless constrains government regulation of those media.
More specifically, Heller rejected the idea that modern weapons are not covered by the Second Amendment by recognizing a constitutional right to own semiautomatic pistols. The Supreme Court said "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding." The Court confirmed that point in the 2016 case Caetano v. Massachusetts, which involved a state ban on stun guns.
Cook County also asserts that AR-15s are not suitable for self-defense, a claim that would be hotly contested by many owners of such rifles, who commonly report using them for that purpose. "Plaintiffs have shown that AR-15s are well-adapted for self-defense," U.S. District Judge Peter Sheridan wrote in 2024, when he reluctantly concluded that New Jersey's AR-15 ban was inconsistent with Heller while expressing his dismay at that result. "Evidence has been presented to the Court that the build of the AR-15 makes it well-suited to self-defense because it is 'light weight, [has] very mild recoil, and [has] good ergonomics'; it is a weapon which is 'well suited to younger shooters, female shooters, and other shooters of smaller stature.'"
Sheridan added that "the AR-15's design features—including the effectiveness of its cartridge for self-defense use and its better continuity of fire when used with available magazines—make the AR-15 a good choice for self-defense." And he noted that "the AR-15 has been used recently in several, relatively high-profile self-defense events in Florida, Illinois, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma."
Cook County and Connecticut are also wrong in suggesting that self-defense is the only "lawful purpose" that matters. While Heller emphasized the use of handguns "in defense of hearth and home," it did not say that was the full extent of the Second Amendment right. To the contrary, the phrase "lawful purposes like self-defense" implies that the right extends to other uses, such as hunting, pest control, and target shooting. The decision explicitly mentioned hunting as a "reason Americans valued the ancient right."
The briefs are misleading in another way that may prove decisive. They conflate "dangerous and unusual" with "unusually dangerous," which is not the same thing.
During the 19th century, state legislators restricted (and sometimes banned) weapons such as Bowie knives, spears, sword canes, slungshots, and brass knuckles. But the historical evidence suggests those weapons were not targeted simply because they were "unusually dangerous." Legislators were also concerned about how the weapons were typically used.
Solicitor General D. John Sauer, who filed a brief supporting the challenges to the AR-15 bans, notes that the 19th-century laws targeted weapons associated with "duels, brawls, and other criminal activities." And in reviewing those laws, state courts distinguished between arms favored by criminals and arms commonly used for lawful purposes.
In 1871, for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that legislators could ban weapons that were "not usual" but could not ban "the usual arms of the citizen." The top courts of Texas, Arkansas, West Virginia, North Carolina, and Michigan concurred that the right to arms encompassed weapons commonly owned by law-abiding people, including rifles.
AR-15s and similar rifles readily pass that common-use test. In January, the National Shooting Sports Foundation, the gun industry's trade association, reported that Americans own more than 32 million "modern sporting rifles," its preferred term for the models covered by "assault weapon" bans. Survey data suggest that somewhere between 16 million and 25 million Americans have owned AR-15-style rifles. Last year, a unanimous Supreme Court described the AR-15 as "the most popular rifle in the country."
According to Cook County and Connecticut, however, none of that matters. "Once it is established that a regulation pursues a legitimate public safety objective in a permissible manner, raw ownership numbers cannot immunize a firearm from regulation," Cook County says. It argues that opponents of its ordinance have misconstrued the significance of the common-use test and misunderstood how it interacts with Bruen.
"When the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct," the Supreme Court said in Bruen. "To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's 'unqualified command.'"
The common-use question, Cook County argues, figures only in the first Bruen step: "the inquiry whether the weapon at issue is one 'the Second Amendment protects.'" But even if ownership of AR-15s is covered by "the Second Amendment's plain text," it says, that does not resolve the question of whether they can be banned, which depends on the historical analysis required by the second step of the Bruen test.
"This Court's decision in Bruen confirms that the Second Amendment's step-two inquiry does not insulate popularly owned firearms from regulation," the brief says. In Bruen, it was "undisputed" that "handguns are weapons 'in common use' today for self-defense," including "outside the home." But "instead of being the end of this Court's inquiry, that observation was just the beginning." The decision also included an "extended analysis" of the historical laws that New York cited to justify its "proper cause" requirement for carry permits. "If lawful common use alone were enough to forbid regulation," Cook County argues, "there would have been no need to engage in that careful and prolonged analysis."
The question in Bruen was not whether the Second Amendment precludes "regulation." It was whether New York's specific approach, which required residents to demonstrate a "special need" before they were allowed to exercise the right to bear arms, was consistent with the historical tradition. That is why the Court considered (and rejected) the purported historical analogs that New York offered.
Cook County conflates requirements for carry permits, the issue in Bruen, with an outright ban on ownership, the policy it is defending. Connecticut likewise blurs the distinction between carry restrictions and complete prohibition.
"The Bowie knife was 'widely carried by Americans of all stripes,' including 'upstanding citizens and villains' alike," Connecticut's brief says. "The widespread use of Bowie knives and other weapons for lawful purposes did not prevent dozens of States from restricting those weapons." But those laws generally restricted or banned public carry. They rarely made it illegal to acquire or possess a Bowie knife, which is the approach that Connecticut and Cook County have taken with AR-15s.
That policy is hard to reconcile with Heller. I will quote Sheridan again, since his comments made it clear that he would have preferred to uphold New Jersey's AR-15 ban. Under Heller, he said, "a categorical ban on a class of weapons commonly used for self-defense is unlawful." Given "the Supreme Court's clear direction on this point," he concluded, New Jersey's law "is unconstitutional" as applied to "the Colt AR-15 for use for self-defense in the home."
Last July, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit agreed and went further, extending that conclusion to "the full class of semi-automatic rifles" banned in New Jersey. "Together, Heller and Bruen teach that bans or broad prohibitions on possessing or carrying of a class of weapons in common use for lawful purposes fail to find support in our Nation's tradition of firearm regulation," Judge Arianna Freeman, a Joe Biden appointee, wrote in the majority opinion. "That principle resolves our inquiry here."
To beat back the challenges to their laws, Connecticut and Cook County will have to persuade the justices that the 3rd Circuit's understanding of Heller and Bruen is wrong, meaning they are free to ban firearms in common use for lawful purposes. That seems like a tall order, and Cook County's position is especially puzzling. According to its brief, the fact that a weapon is covered by the Second Amendment does not mean Americans have a right to possess it. The more you think about that claim, the less sense it makes.
On November 3, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in a case that asks whether Colorado has unlawfully discriminated against a religious preschool because the school is barred from participating in the state's universal preschool program due to its refusal to accept LGBTQ families. In addition to involving multiple hot-button political and cultural issues, the case also has big implications for the future of federal antidiscrimination law.
St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy is not about a state law that directly prohibits a religious preschool from operating. Rather, at issue here is a government requirement that any preschool that wants to participate in the state's universal preschool program, and receive the public benefits that follow, must first satisfy various criteria, including that "each preschool provider provide eligible children an equal opportunity to enroll and receive preschool services regardless of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, lack of housing, income level, or disability."
According to the Catholic preschools overseen by the Archdiocese of Denver, however, complying with that rule would force the schools to violate their religious beliefs. "It is undisputed that these preschools would otherwise be eligible [universal preschool] providers," the schools told the Supreme Court. "They are excluded solely because of their religious exercise—namely, their religious practices of ensuring that all enrolling families are supportive of the Catholic Church's teachings on sex and marriage and of treating enrolled four-year-olds in accordance with their biological sex."
These schools can point to a pair of recent Supreme Court precedents that will very likely count in their favor. In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020), the Court held that if a state provides educational subsidies that help parents send their children to private schools, the state "cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious." Then, in Carson v. Makin (2022), the Court held that Maine's tuition assistance program violated the Constitution by excluding private schools that offered "sectarian" education. "A State's antiestablishment interest," the decision said, "does not justify enactments that exclude some members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise."
I would expect the outcome of St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy to follow in this same general pattern and hold something to the effect that when a state provides an educational public benefit, it must make some sort of accommodation for the religious views of the recipients.
In Other Legal News
Justice Elena Kagan made news a few months back when she defended her conservative colleagues on the Supreme Court from the oft-heard charge that they are totally in the tank for President Donald Trump. "I don't see this as a court that is just like, 'We're just going to rubber stamp what the current administration does.' You know, quite the opposite," Kagan said. "I think that that is a bad rap." In support of her argument, Kagan pointed to the fact that the Supreme Court had recently ruled against Trump on the two big issues that Trump himself valued the most: tariffs and birthright citizenship.
Kagan was in the news again on Tuesday, this time because she publicly blasted those same conservative colleagues for issuing decisions on voting rights and political gerrymandering that, in Kagan's words, have produced "a democracy that does not work as well as it should." According to Kagan, the Court's conservative majority "has kind of blinded itself to the very deleterious effects of their rulings on how the political system works."
Does this mean that Kagan has now stopped defending the conservative justices from the pro-Trump charge? Not at all. In fact, as The New York Timesput it, "she reiterated her defense of the conservative-dominated bench from a July appearance and said it was a 'bum rap' to suggest the court had been too deferential to Mr. Trump."
I don't know about you, but I find Kagan to be a refreshing public figure in these simplistic, partisan times. She is a staunch legal liberal with clearly stated objections to what the Supreme Court's conservative majority is getting up to, yet she refuses to be associated with the laziest progressive attacks on the Court. How many people of comparable public stature these days are willing to call out the shortcomings of their own side?
The battle to save the global court and its capacity to enforce accountability for the most heinous crimes is one struggle with many fronts, writes Marjorie Cohn.
The U.S. Supreme Court has denied an emergency petition from the Trump administration, which sought a stay on a lower court’s injunction on a policy that would have denied gender-affirming care to federally incarcerated transgender people.
That policy was implemented by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) after President Donald Trump signed an executive order in January 2025 that denied the existence of transgender people. The order also directed federal agencies to take steps that would be consistent with that view, and included specific instructions for the BOP.
“The Attorney General shall ensure that the Bureau of Prisons revises its policies concerning medical care to be consistent with this order, and shall ensure that no Federal funds are expended for any medical procedure, treatment, or drug for the purpose of conforming an inmate’s appearance to that of the opposite sex,” the order reads.
After the BOP conformed to the order, a group of incarcerated trans people who had been receiving gender-affirming care sued the administration. The group is being represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which argued that their Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment were being infringed upon.
A federal judge agreed, and, in August, ordered the policy to be blocked. The Trump administration challenged that finding, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld it, prompting Solicitor General John Sauer to submit an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court.
The court has regularly ruled against transgender people, allowing state bans on trans athletes’ participation in sports, ruling in favor of a ban on transgender people in the military, and upholding state laws that bar gender-affirming care for trans children and teens. Yet on Wednesday, the court denied the Trump administration’s request.
“The application for stay presented to The Chief Justice and by him referred to the Court is denied,” the order read, giving no further explanation. Two justices for the court — Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas — would have granted the Trump administration’s request for a stay, the document said.
Around 1,000 federally incarcerated trans people have also been diagnosed with gender dysphoria. The ruling means these individuals can continue receiving gender-affirming care while they remain in federal prisons or jails and the case moves forward in the lower courts.
The Supreme Court on Wednesday refused to let the Trump administration gradually end transgender-related medical services for prison inmates who want to be treated as members of the opposite sex.
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