A new report titled “The Hidden Cost of EU Regulation: Why Policy Design Matters for Growth, Competitiveness, and Investment,” published on 14 September, estimates that EU regulations could reduce GDP by €159 billion per year and threaten 419,000 jobs between 2026 and 2030.

Published by the European Policy Innovation Council (EPIC), the report examines the “hidden” costs of European policies. These include not only bureaucratic burdens but also regulatory uncertainty, poorly planned transitions, and overlapping obligations. According to the report, these factors can slow investment, limit innovation, and ultimately undermine the policies’ intended goals.

Europe risks imposing substantial economic costs on itself if a new generation of EU regulation is introduced without greater attention to competitiveness, proportionality and the cumulative burden on businesses, according to a new study from the Brussels-based European Policy Innovation Council (EPIC).

The report, estimates that five major areas of regulation currently facing European policymakers could, under its more restrictive scenarios, be associated with €159 billion in foregone EU GDP each year between 2026 and 2030.

It estimates an accompanying annual investment shortfall of approximately €36 billion, with around 419,000 jobs potentially at risk.

But the report's central argument is not that regulation itself is economically damaging. Rather, it contends that poorly sequenced, insufficiently differentiated or unpredictable regulation can impose costs which more carefully designed policies could avoid.

EPIC calculates that what it calls a "better regulation" approach could make a difference of approximately €125 billion in GDP each year, while supporting around €28 billion more annual investment and improving the projected employment outcome by some 241,000 jobs.

The analysis comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the EU, where improving competitiveness has moved rapidly up the political agenda following Mario Draghi's landmark report on the future of European competitiveness.

EPIC examined artificial intelligence regulation, the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, biotechnology and novel food, and the forthcoming revision of the EU's Tobacco Products Directive (TPD).

TPD emerges as the largest potential shock

The study identifies the TPD revision as potentially the biggest avoidable economic shock, but says smarter regulation could protect growth, investment and public health

EPIC estimates that a highly restrictive approach to the forthcoming TPD revision could be associated with an annual GDP loss of approximately €48 billion, including around €24 billion in lost tax revenues.

The same scenario would put roughly 120,000 jobs at risk and produce an estimated annual investment shortfall of about €11 billion.

By contrast, under EPIC's alternative scenario — based on a more differentiated regulatory treatment of products according to risk and greater emphasis on maintaining legal-market innovation — the organisation calculates an annual GDP gain of €32 billion.

The difference between the two regulatory approaches is therefore almost €80 billion in GDP each year, according to the modelling, alongside an improvement of more than 182,000 jobs and approximately €18 billion in investment.

These are significant numbers, but they require an important qualification.

They are scenario-based projections rather than forecasts of losses which have already occurred or inevitably will occur. EPIC itself stresses that its prospective figures are estimates based on alternative regulatory assumptions and should not be interpreted as guaranteed outcomes.

In the tobacco case in particular, the restrictive scenario assumes a major relocation of manufacturing outside the EU, with only part of wholesale and retail activity retained and some demand migrating into illicit channels. That is a substantial modelling assumption and is central to the scale of the estimated economic impact.

Nevertheless, the study raises a broader policy question which Brussels may find harder to dismiss: whether the economic consequences of the next TPD are being examined with the same intensity as its health objectives.

From COP11 to the next TPD

EPIC bases part of its TPD scenario on measures discussed in connection with the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control's COP11, held in 2025.

The report identifies proposals including flavour restrictions across tobacco and nicotine products, tighter sanctions, additional restrictions affecting newer nicotine and heated tobacco products and possible limitations on particular product components, including filters.

That debate exposed significant disagreements among EU member states.

According to the report, countries including Italy, Greece, Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Portugal and Czechia raised concerns about applying broadly similar restrictions to combustible cigarettes and alternative nicotine products despite differences between product categories.

Those disagreements became sufficiently pronounced that the EU was unable to maintain a common position during important parts of COP11, according to the EPIC analysis.

The significance for Brussels is that decisions taken at an FCTC Conference of the Parties do not automatically become EU law.

However, EPIC argues that COP priorities have historically influenced European tobacco policy and could feed into the Commission's forthcoming revision of the TPD.

The report points in particular to EU-funded tobacco-control initiatives which incorporate FCTC and COP priorities into their work and to a 2025 Council working document which raised a possible cigarette-filter ban.

EPIC therefore warns against what it sees as the potential importation of an international tobacco-control agenda into EU legislation without first undertaking sufficiently detailed economic, enforcement and proportionality assessments.

The illicit-market question

Another significant element in the study is illicit trade.

EPIC argues that restrictions which significantly reduce the availability of products for which consumer demand continues to exist can transfer trade away from regulated businesses rather than eliminate consumption.

The EC and EU agencies are simultaneously attempting to combat illegal tobacco and nicotine markets, yet, according to EPIC, some regulatory measures could make illegal supply comparatively more attractive.

According to the report, younger consumers are not necessarily insulated from such markets merely because products disappear from legal retail channels, pointing to concerns surrounding illicit e-cigarette distribution and sales through social media.

This is an issue with implications beyond the tobacco industry. Lost legal sales can mean lost VAT and excise revenues, while enforcement costs increase and legitimate retailers face competition from operators which pay neither tax nor compliance costs.

Not an argument for deregulation

Importantly, EPIC does not present its report as a case for abandoning European health, environmental or consumer-protection objectives. Instead, it advocates what it describes as "Stability-by-Design".

The principle is relatively straightforward: policymakers should analyse economic effects, implementation capacity and differences between sectors and technologies before regulatory choices become politically fixed.

It calls for predictable rules, earlier stakeholder involvement, differentiated regulation where risks differ and implementation schedules which take account of infrastructure, supply chains and enforcement capabilities.

It also argues that regulations should increasingly be assessed collectively rather than individually.

Businesses do not experience the TPD, taxation measures, packaging requirements, environmental legislation and other compliance obligations separately. They experience their accumulated cost simultaneously.

For tobacco, this is particularly relevant because the TPD revision is taking place against the backdrop of parallel debates over tobacco excise taxation, packaging and sustainability rules.

The combined economic impact could therefore be greater than examining each initiative separately would suggest.

For the next regulatory wave, it calculates annual GDP impacts of around €48 billion from its restrictive TPD scenario, €24 billion from the AI framework, €42 billion from packaging regulation, €44 billion from CBAM and €1.6 billion from slower biotechnology and novel-food approvals.

The figures will inevitably be debated, particularly because economic models depend heavily on the assumptions placed into them.

But the policy issue raised by the report is harder to reduce to a dispute over individual numbers.

At a time when European leaders are repeatedly warning that the Union must close its productivity and investment gap with the US and China, EPIC is effectively asking whether Brussels subjects the economic consequences of regulation to the same level of scrutiny as the objectives regulation is intended to achieve.

A European Parliament compromise on reforming the EU’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) has opened a politically sensitive dispute over whether entire industries should be excluded from sustainable investment — with fossil fuels offered a conditional transition route while tobacco remains outside.

The revision of the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation, better known as SFDR, is emerging as a key political battleground over the future boundaries of sustainable finance in the European Union.

Although formally concerned with disclosure requirements and the categorisation of financial products, the dispute now goes considerably further. At stake is a fundamental question: should entire sectors be excluded from sustainable and transition finance because of the nature of their business, or should companies be judged primarily on their actual environmental performance, investment plans and capacity to transition?

That distinction has potentially significant consequences for companies, investors and access to capital.

The file is currently under consideration in the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, ECON, where a compromise has been reached between political groups ahead of the committee vote.

Under the emerging agreement, sectoral exclusions remain within the proposed framework. Tobacco cultivation and production, as well as controversial weapons, remain outside the relevant sustainable investment categories.

Fossil-fuel companies, however, have been given a potential route into the proposed transition category where specified conditions are met.

The result is an unusual regulatory distinction.

An oil or gas company may potentially demonstrate that it is directing sufficient capital towards sustainable activities and implementing a credible emissions transition. A tobacco business, however substantial its environmental improvements, would remain excluded because of the sector in which it operates.

Crucially, however, the EPP’s decision not to challenge the tobacco exclusion should not be read as an endorsement of blanket sectoral exclusions.

Markus Ferber, the EPP’s ECON coordinator, has told EU Reporter that the decision was driven by parliamentary arithmetic and the need to assemble a stable majority for the overall compromise.

In other words, the EPP did not abandon its reservations about blanket exclusions because it had become convinced that such exclusions were the right policy. It accepted the compromise because, in Ferber’s assessment, there was no realistic parliamentary majority for an alternative amendment that would have created a performance-based pathway for tobacco.

That distinction is politically important.

It means the tobacco exclusion survives not because the EPP has embraced the principle behind it, but because the group concluded that challenging it would jeopardise the broader compromise.

Ferber: transition should matter more than sector

Ferber made clear that his underlying policy position remains strongly performance-based.

“Per se, EPP does not like blanket sectoral exclusions, but unfortunately it is not only the EPP’s position that determines the final outcome of negotiations and we had to strike compromises with other political groups to achieve a stable majority,” he told EU Reporter.

Asked whether sustainable-finance rules should judge companies according to the sector in which they operate or according to their measurable environmental progress, Ferber was unequivocal.

“In my view, the objective should be to finance the transition,” he said. “Hence, environmental performance and credible transition plans should matter more than the sector.”

That comment goes to the heart of the controversy surrounding tobacco.

The sector remains excluded irrespective of whether individual companies reduce emissions, restructure production, invest in Taxonomy-aligned activities or adopt measurable transition plans.

Fossil-fuel companies, by contrast, are being offered a conditional route into the transition category.

The tobacco exclusion survived because of the numbers

Ferber’s most significant intervention concerns why the EPP did not attempt to overturn the tobacco exclusion through an alternative compromise amendment.

Asked directly why he was not tabling such an amendment, despite previously opposing blanket exclusions affecting tobacco, Ferber replied:

“We have assessed all options for a stable majority in the Parliament and were not convinced that tabling alternative compromises would yield such a majority.”

That answer makes the political calculus unusually clear.

The tobacco exclusion was not retained because Ferber or the EPP ECON leadership had positively embraced the underlying principle. It remained because the EPP judged that there were insufficient votes to replace it while preserving the wider agreement.

The distinction matters because it changes the interpretation of the compromise.

Rather than representing an ideological conversion by the EPP towards sector-based sustainable-finance rules, it represents a tactical concession made in the context of difficult parliamentary mathematics.

Ferber reinforced that point when discussing the wider negotiations.

“I am not enthusiastic about the compromise,” he said, “but it reflects what is politically possible in light of difficult majorities and a rapporteur that has pursued a hard-left line from the beginning.”

The Parliament’s lead rapporteur on the file is Dutch Renew Europe MEP Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy.

Ferber’s description of Gerbrandy’s approach as “hard-left” is his own political characterisation, but his remarks underline how far the SFDR revision has moved beyond a purely technical debate over disclosure rules.

EPP reservations remain

The EPP has repeatedly positioned itself as an opponent of unnecessary blanket exclusions and an advocate of competitiveness, regulatory simplification and performance-based rules.

A number of centre-right amendments tabled during the ECON process sought to remove or narrow the exclusion provisions.

The material submitted to EU Reporter notes that among the amendments tabled in committee, several concerning exclusions were proposed by EPP, ECR and other centre-right lawmakers.

Asked whether significant numbers of EPP members would have preferred the exclusions to be removed or narrowed, Ferber acknowledged that different views existed within the group.

“In a large and diverse political group, you always have different positions to reconcile,” he said.

He added that EPP shadow rapporteur Luděk Niedermayer had “checked back frequently to ensure that he has sufficient backing within our group.

Luděk Niedermayer said "There were different priorities from different political groups and differences are even above different MEPs from same group. The current text reflects the agreement reached as a compromise. 

Asked how much room did the EPP have to negotiate changes to Article 7, and what
concessions did the Group obtain in return for accepting the final package?  he said :

"As with every file, each political group has its own priorities. For the EPP, one of the key
priorities was Article 7, where we managed to secure a text that is acceptable to the Group
and which, in my view, better reflects the nature and purpose of the transition category than
the Commission proposal."

Ferber therefore rejects the suggestion that the final compromise amounts to Niedermayer departing from an agreed EPP line.

Asked directly whether there had been a disagreement between the two men over the treatment of tobacco and sectoral exclusions, he replied:

“No, our shadow rapporteur has faithfully defended the line agreed within our group, but it has always been clear that in compromise negotiations the EPP would not get 100% of its wishes. That is the nature of a compromise.”

Niedermayer said " Maintaining a limited set of exclusions helps preserve the credibility of products marketed as sustainable without extending blanket exclusions more broadly. Furthermore, energy and utility companies are more likely to follow a credible transition pathway than the sectors mentioned above. Consistency between SFDR and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1818 under the Benchmark Regulation is also a strong argument for such an approach.

Tobacco as the test case

The tobacco issue exposes the central philosophical question running through the SFDR revision.

Under a blanket exclusion, the decisive question is: what does this company produce?

Under a performance-based model, the question becomes: what is this company actually doing to transition?

The distinction matters because an automatic exclusion can remove the regulatory benefit of environmental improvement.

A company that reduces emissions, changes production methods, invests heavily in renewable energy or directs substantial capital expenditure towards EU Taxonomy-aligned activities may still receive exactly the same treatment as one making no transition effort at all.

That is the fundamental criticism of blanket exclusions contained in the material examined by EU Reporter.

The fossil-fuel exception makes the question more acute.

If an oil or gas company can potentially qualify for the transition category by demonstrating credible investment and emissions reductions, opponents of the tobacco exclusion ask why businesses in another lawful sector should not at least be permitted to make the same case.

Ferber’s own words strengthen that argument: environmental performance and credible transition plans, he says, should matter more than the sector itself.

Why fossil fuels are treated differently

Ferber nevertheless argued that there is a rationale for distinguishing between some industries.

“One can make an argument that energy companies engaged in fossil fuel projects today are likely to ultimately change their business model towards more sustainable projects, while a controversial weapons manufacturer is likely to still manufacture deadly weapons in the future,” he said.

“So, the transition case is weaker.”

That explanation addresses controversial weapons more directly than tobacco, however.

For tobacco, the unresolved policy question remains whether environmental transition should be assessed separately from the social and health characteristics of the product being manufactured.

That is precisely where the SFDR debate is becoming politically significant.

The issue is no longer merely whether tobacco is socially desirable. It is whether a sustainable-finance regulation should use sector identity as an automatic barrier to recognising environmental transition.

The Green Deal legacy

The controversy also reaches into the EPP’s wider political argument that the EU needs to move away from parts of the regulatory philosophy associated with the previous Commission and the European Green Deal.

Asked whether retaining blanket exclusions amounted to accepting part of that earlier approach, Ferber was sharply critical of the sustainable-finance framework as a whole.

“The whole sustainable finance framework is a legacy product from the previous two terms,” he said.

“In my personal view, it contains some fundamental flaws, that are difficult to change with targeted reviews of individual files.”

“We have done the best we could to fix some mistakes within the SFDR. That does not mean it is perfect. If I was given a blank slate, I would design the framework differently.”

His comments underline the political paradox.

The EPP remains sceptical of the principle behind some sectoral exclusions, yet has accepted a compromise that preserves them.

The explanation, according to its ECON coordinator, is not policy conversion but political necessity.

That is likely to become one of the most important distinctions in the debate as the file moves towards its committee vote and later parliamentary stages.

Two different approaches inside EU sustainable finance?

The controversy also raises questions of regulatory coherence.

The EU Taxonomy measures environmental sustainability using economic indicators including turnover, capital expenditure and operational expenditure associated with qualifying activities.

The SFDR compromise can operate differently by establishing a sectoral gateway before a company’s environmental performance is assessed.

The material examined by EU Reporter argues that this risks creating two different regulatory philosophies: the Taxonomy assesses measurable activity, while SFDR can exclude by sector identity.

That matters at a time when Brussels has promised simpler and more coherent regulation.

If transition finance is supposed to encourage companies to change behaviour, critics argue that the system needs to explain why measurable transition is sufficient for one sector but irrelevant for another.

Growers and SMEs watch closely

The impact is not confined to multinational tobacco manufacturers.

European tobacco growers and processors have warned MEPs that exclusion from sustainable-finance frameworks could have consequences for agricultural communities and smaller businesses.

Ten thousands of family farms would be potentially affected, alongside thousands of SMEs, many of them located in economically vulnerable agricultural regions.

The broader economic figures advanced by industry organisations should be treated as industry estimates, but the principle being argued by growers is more straightforward.

They are not asking for tobacco automatically to be labelled sustainable.

They are asking to be allowed to demonstrate transition against objective criteria.

In that respect, the fossil-fuel derogation has become politically significant.

If Europe is prepared to recognise transition in one of the world’s most carbon-intensive sectors, tobacco industry stakeholders ask why no equivalent environmental-performance test should exist for their own.

No change expected before the vote

Despite his reservations, Ferber told EU Reporter that he does not expect the compromise to be altered before the ECON vote.

“I do not anticipate any changes to the text that was agreed ahead of the vote,” he said.

The immediate political battle may therefore already have been settled.

But the wider argument is unlikely to disappear.

The SFDR revision was intended to simplify sustainable finance and make it clearer for investors.

Instead, it has exposed a fundamental policy choice over whether sustainable finance should reward measurable transition or exclude entire sectors in advance.

And in the case of tobacco, the EPP’s position is now particularly clear: the exclusion remains not because its ECON leadership endorses blanket sectoral exclusions, but because it concluded that Parliament did not contain the votes necessary to remove it without jeopardising the wider SFDR compromise.

That distinction is now stated in the introduction, given its own section, and repeated in the conclusion, so it becomes the central political takeaway rather than being buried inside the Ferber interview.