The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From Berenson v. Gottlieb, decided yesterday by Judges Pierre Leval, Richard Wesley, and Joseph Bianco:

Plaintiff-Appellant Alex Berenson … is an independent journalist and author of a book about the COVID-19 pandemic. Berenson was an active Twitter user during the COVID-19 pandemic, posting about, inter alia, "the public policy response to COVID-19 and the vaccines." See also Appellant's Brief (describing Berenson as "a vocal critic of the public policy response to COVID-19, questioning the underlying evidentiary basis for business and school closures"). Berenson's Twitter follower count rose from approximately 7,000 in January 2020 to more than 229,000 by March 2021. Berenson alleges the existence of a conspiracy by the Biden Administration and Pfizer executives "to pressure Twitter to suspend [his] account and mute his voice as a leading COVID-19 vaccine skeptic." …

In May 2020, Twitter announced that it may append labels or warning messages to tweets related to COVID-19 misinformation. Berenson tweeted that he was "concern[ed] about what the new rules might mean for free speech on [Twitter]." In response, Twitter's Vice President of Global Communications Brandon Borrman contacted Berenson to discuss the new policy.

In December 2020, Twitter announced a new policy with respect to COVID-19 vaccine misinformation, stating that it would start to "remove Tweets which advance harmful or misleading narratives about COVID-19 vaccinations." Berenson contacted Borrman, "looking for assurances that Twitter would continue to allow his reporting on COVID-19 vaccines." Borrman allegedly responded that the "points [Berenson was] raising should not be an issue at all," and that Berenson should reach out if he "r[an] into any issues."

On March 1, 2021, Twitter announced a "five-strike policy" to combat COVID-19 misinformation. Accounts that received strikes were subject to increasing levels of discipline: the first strike resulted in a warning, the second and third strikes each in a 12-hour account lock, the fourth strike in a 7-day account lock, and the fifth or successive strike in permanent suspension. The policy provided that, if a user "believe[s] that [their] account was locked or suspended in error, [the user] can submit an appeal."

The next day, Berenson spoke with Borrman, who allegedly reported that "[Berenson's] name has never come up in the discussions around these policies," and that Borrman would "try to ensure [that Berenson would be] given a heads up before an action is taken, but [that Borrman was] not always made aware of them before they're executed."

Berenson alleges that members of the Biden Administration, [Pfizer Board of Directors member and former FDA Commissioner  Scott] Gottlieb, and [Chief Executive Officer of Pfizer Albert] Bourla repeatedly pressured Twitter to suspend his account, citing tweets that Twitter executives, including CEO Jack Dorsey and general counsel Vijaya Gadde, did not believe constituted violations of Twitter's five-strike policy. Berenson received strikes from Twitter in March, July, and August 2021. His Twitter account was permanently suspended with the fifth strike on August 28, 2021.

Berenson sued, but the court rejected his federal civil rights conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim:

[Section] 1985(3) imposes liability on "two or more persons … [who] conspire … for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." A plaintiff must "show that some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators' action." The Supreme Court has cautioned that Section 1985(3) should not be "interpreted as providing a federal remedy for 'all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others.'" …

The Supreme Court has explained that the term "class":

unquestionably connotes something more than a group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the [Section] 1985(3) defendant disfavors. Otherwise, innumerable tort plaintiffs would be able to assert causes of action under [Section] 1985(3) by simply defining the aggrieved class as those seeking to engage in the activity the defendant has interfered with. This definitional ploy would convert the statute into the "general federal tort law" it was the very purpose of the animus requirement to avoid.

Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic (1993). Religious, gender, and racial discrimination "certainly fulfill[ ] the 'class-based animus' requirement of [Section] 1985(3)." In Keating v. Carey (2d Cir. 1983), we held that political parties are also protected groups under Section 1985(3). More recently, however, we have noted that, "after our decision in Keating, the Supreme Court [in United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 610 v. Scott (1983),] suggested that the scope of [S]ection 1985 might not extend to include discrimination against political groups except where that discrimination was based on racial animus." In any event, apart from political parties, we have made clear that protected classes under Section 1985(3) need to possess "the type of inherited or immutable characteristics sufficient to satisfy the class-based animus requirement."

Here, Berenson asserts that the relevant class here is a "class of Americans who had chosen not to receive a COVID-19 vaccine, a class of which [ ] Berenson is apart [sic]." See also id. (describing the class as "Americans who either had questions about the [COVID-19] vaccine or did not want to be forced to take a shot"). The district court correctly held that Berenson's proposed class does not constitute a class for Section 1985(3) purposes. Instead, this is precisely the kind of class that the Supreme Court cautioned against in Bray—a class composed of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct, i.e., to forgo COVID-19 vaccination, that the defendants allegedly disfavor. To the extent Berenson suggests that the class falls within the ambit of Section 1985 because it "includes a disproportionate number of African-Americans, political conservatives, and evangelical Christians," we are unpersuaded. Even if the composition of the alleged class is accepted as true, we have held that "plaintiffs cannot proceed under a disparate impact theory of liability in … claims brought pursuant to [Section 1985]."

The district court also correctly determined in the alternative that, assuming arguendo that persons not vaccinated against COVID-19 constituted a protected category, Berenson did not sufficiently allege "that the defendants acted with class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." … In Gleason v. McBride (2d Cir. 1989), we affirmed the dismissal of a Section 1985 claim because the plaintiff "[did] not claim discrimination based on his political party affiliation," but rather "alleged only that he was discriminated against because he was a political opponent of the defendants and was extremely vocal in his opposition to [them]."

Here, Berenson alleges that he was "a highly visible obstacle to [the Biden Administration's] efforts," and that "the White House had targeted [him] specifically" as "ground zero for COVID-19 misinformation." Indeed, the FAC is replete with allegations that Berenson, and not a general class of unvaccinated Americans, was specifically targeted. The FAC also indicates that Berenson was a vocal critic of the Biden Administration. Thus, as in Gleason, Berenson's Section 1985 claim must be dismissed because he failed to plausibly allege "that the defendants acted with class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus."

And the court also rejected Berenson's tortious interference with contract claim:

Under New York law, a claim for tortious interference requires "(1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant's knowledge of that contract; (3) the defendant's intentional procurement of the third-party's breach of the contract without justification; (4) actual breach of the contract; and (5) damages resulting therefrom." A claim for tortious interference will not lie if the plaintiff fails to plead an actual breach of the contract.

Here, there was a valid contract between Berenson and Twitter, i.e., Twitter's Terms of Service, which provides that Twitter "may suspend or terminate [a user's] account or cease providing [the user] with all or part of the [contractually defined] Services at any time for any or no reason." Berenson argues that the Terms of Service were modified by Twitter's five-strike policy and by Borrman's "assurances to [Berenson] regarding his posts pursuant to [the five-strike] policy." … [But] neither the five-strike policy nor Borrman's statements to Berenson modified the Terms of Service….

The relevant provision of the Terms of Service is located in the section entitled "Ending These Terms," and provides the means by which a user may terminate the agreement, i.e., "by deactivating [a user's] accounts and discontinuing [a user's] use of [Twitter's] Services," and the circumstances under which Twitter

may suspend or terminate [a user's] account … at any time for any or no reason, including, but not limited to, if [Twitter] reasonably believe[s]: (i) you have violated these Terms or the Twitter Rules and Policies or Periscope Community Guidelines, (ii) you create risk or possible legal exposure for us; (iii) your account should be removed due to unlawful conduct[;] (iv) your account should be removed due to prolonged inactivity; or (v) our provision of the Services to you is no longer commercially viable.

The five-strike policy is clearly among the "Rules and Policies" that the Terms of Service contemplates. However, the provision makes clear that suspension or termination of an account is not limited to violations of that policy; rather, as noted above, such suspension or termination could be "at any time for any or no reason." …

We reach the same conclusion with respect to Borrman's alleged remarks, which are too vague to modify the Terms of Service. The alleged remarks are: (1) "I think you have some nuanced points that could be helpful as [sic] try to move ahead" and "[w]e're trying to make sure that factual debate finds a way through the emotion, but we're obviously not successful all the time"; (2) "The points you're raising should not be an issue at all…. The policy is designed to allow debate and discussion, but to discourage conspiracy theories, etc. Please let me know if you run into any issues"; and (3) "I will say that your name has never come up in the discussions around these policies…. If it does I will try to ensure you're given a heads up before an action is taken, but I am not always made aware of them before they're executed. If something happens, please let me know," Collectively, even drawing all inferences in Berenson's favor, these remarks suggest at most that Borrman would attempt to notify Berenson of action taken against him—not that no action would be taken against Berenson or that Berenson would necessarily receive advance notice of any action.

At bottom, Twitter's Terms of Service provided that Twitter could suspend Berenson for "any or no reason," and it did so. There was no modification of that contract and Berenson has failed to allege an actual breach of contract. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that Berenson failed to state a tortious interference claim.

{Before the district court and now on appeal, Berenson relies heavily on Berenson v. Twitter, Inc (N.D. Cal. 2022), a decision in a case Berenson initiated against Twitter in December 2021. There, the district court granted in part and denied in part Twitter's motion to dismiss, holding that the five-strike policy and Borrman's "specific and direct assurances to [Berenson] regarding his posts pursuant to that policy" "amount[ed] to a modification of the [Terms of Service]" and that Berenson had plausibly alleged that "Twitter's conduct … modified its contract with [him] and then breached that contract by failing to abide by its own five-strike policy and its specific commitments set forth through [Borrman]." Id. at (emphasis in original). We find that analysis unpersuasive for the reasons stated above.}

The analysis seems correct to me.

James P. Rouhandeh, Michael S. Scheinkman, David B. Toscano, and Luca Marzorati (Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP) represent defendants.

The post COVID Vaccine Skeptic Alex Berenson's Lawsuit over Termination of His Twitter Account Thrown Out appeared first on Reason Magazine.

U.S. v. Santiago, decided Monday by Judge Chad Meredith (E.D. Ky.), involves this Instagram post:

Santiago is being prosecuted for making threatening interstate communications, in two counts, "one regarding the threat to the President, and one regarding the threat to law enforcement officers." The court allowed the prosecution to go forward:

[T]he question of whether Santiago's speech was a "true threat" or political hyperbole is one that must be determined by a jury, not the Court.

Of course, "courts retain the power to remove a true-threat question from the jury's consideration … if the evidence shows that the speech was protected as a matter of law." But the implication to be drawn from the evidence here is disputed and it is not so clear-cut that the Court can decide it as a matter of law. A reasonable jury could find Santiago's statements to be true threats, and so the matter must be presented to a jury. The First Amendment does not say otherwise because it does not even apply if a jury concludes that the statements were true threats….

For most context, see the FBI agent's affidavit accompanying the criminal complaint; an excerpt:

Between January 27, 2026, and March 27, 2026, kadi_skating [allegedly one of Santiago's user ids] sent the following messages to an unidentified user: …

• kadi_skating: "im filled with political violence now." [January 8, 2026]….

• kadi_skating: "death to trump." [March 2, 2026]

• kadi_skating: "death to the American nazi regime." [March 2, 2026].

• kadi_skating: "and the american people NEED to start shooting at the necks, legs, and arms of ICE agents." [March 2, 2026]

• kadi_skatlng: "STUFF A GRENADE IN THEIR AHH AND BLOW IT UP." [March 2, 2026]

• kadi_skating: "LETS GOOOO no one is spared all of ice is going to die by my hands [March 2, 2026]

• kadi_skating: "I wanna kill n*zis bad." [March 23, 2026]

Emily K. Greenfield and James T. Chapman represent the federal government.

The post Prosecution for Threatening to Cut President's Face Off and Feed It to Stray Dogs Can Go to Jury appeared first on Reason Magazine.

I read and much enjoyed—and highly recommend—my Stanford colleague Diego Zambrano's book, How Americans Enforce the Law. He was kind enough to write up for us this post that captures the core of his argument, and I'm delighted to pass it along (though I encourage people to read the whole book):

The headlines are full of stories about a federal government retreating from enforcement. Agencies are dropping investigations, abandoning regulations, shrinking staffs and changing enforcement priorities. One week, the EEOC drops discrimination cases. The next week, the SEC and CFPB wind down investigations into securities fraud and wrongdoing affecting consumers. Critics fear that the Department of Justice's antitrust division will overlook mergers when it is convenient for the administration. And the DOJ has abruptly reduced enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Facing these changes, Americans might worry that a wide range of laws will go unenforced.

But that concern misses something unique about the American system of government. We have never relied only on bureaucrats to enforce our laws.

All the way back to the colonial period, American legislators have repeatedly done something unusual: they have given ordinary people the right to sue alongside government officials. In almost every regulatory area that most Americans care about—be it regulation of wages and hours, environmental pollution, consumer protection, or securities fraud—statutes allow both government officials and private parties to file suit to enforce the law. All of this happens through little-known provisions called "private rights of action," which is just a technical name for a right to sue. Thousands of these provisions build a second enforcement system alongside the bureaucracy, turning employees, consumers, competitors and their lawyers into co-enforcers of public law.

This system of private enforcement of the law is highly unusual. In much of the rest of the world, whenever a government faces a regulatory problem, it typically empowers government officials and bureaucrats to police legal violations. In France, Germany, Japan, and even the UK, legislators are far less likely to let anyone sue over, say, environmental pollution or employment discrimination.

Consider the case of oil spills. In 1989, the United States faced the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the pristine waters of Alaska.  Millions of gallons of oil laid waste to coasts, waters, and fisheries for hundreds of miles. What most Americans don't know is that a decade later, France also faced a catastrophic oil spill, caused by a ship called the Erika. So how did governments react? In the United States, private plaintiffs sued Exxon directly under existing tort and maritime law, eventually winning substantial damages. Congress, meanwhile, enacted a statute called the Oil Pollution Act with a new right-to-sue those responsible for oil spills. By contrast, in France, the oil spill led primarily to a major criminal prosecution and, eventually, to new national and European regulatory measures (including a new bureaucracy called the European Maritime Safety Agency). When France finally adopted a right to sue in 2016, it paled in comparison to the American version.

Why is the United States so different? Part of the answer, as I argue in a new book, is that Americans have always done this. Back in the colonial period, state legislatures adopted what they called "penal statutes," that empowered any person to enforce regulatory statutes and collect a bounty. So when Massachusetts wanted to regulate the storage of gunpowder, it allowed private informers to sue neighbors who stored it improperly. And this model applied across many areas of colonial life: alcohol consumption, trade, taxation, public morals, church attendance, and more. The Founders used the same tool across the board: Thomas Jefferson and James Madison co-wrote Virginia statutes full of penal statutes, and John Adams handled these suits routinely as a colonial lawyer.

The key feature of this system is that even though private parties file suit for their own aims—the employee wants their full wages paid or the consumer wants a refund for a shoddy product—they inevitably enforce the law. And those lawsuits benefit everyone else because employers and manufacturers may change their behavior with respect to other employees and consumers. In that sense, every single plaintiff is a little bureaucrat or, as some courts call them, a "private attorney general."

This system has the added benefit of reducing political disruptions in enforcement. Even though any single administration can change the enforcement priorities of the EEOC, SEC, CFPB, or Department of Justice, the president cannot control thousands of lawyers and their clients. Private enforcement, then, makes enforcement less dependent on what the bureaucracy and president want.

Right. So you might think that when the bureaucracy won't pursue wrongdoing, the obvious solution should always be new rights to sue. Indeed, many news stories decrying a lack of government enforcement immediately call for more private lawsuits.

But there's a problem with that solution. Private enforcement is not tailor-made for every regulatory area. It makes the most sense to empower private parties when the bureaucracy is truly faulty, under-resourced, politically vulnerable, or likely to be captured by regulated entities. When this isn't the case, private enforcement can cause more problems than it solves.

Consider, then, the enormous problems that rights to sue pose in the environmental context and in the construction of housing and infrastructure. There, broad rights to challenge government approvals can let private parties oppose the construction of housing, mass transit, green energy, and other projects. Examples of ruinous lawsuits abound. Neighbors in a Maryland suburb—backed for years by a nearby country club—sued to delay the Purple Line light-rail project over concerns for a microscopic organism, while the Sierra Club sued to stop a major Mojave solar energy project over the potential impact to a desert turtle. So even if a city government has approved a project that might benefit thousands of people, a single crank can use a right-to-sue to stop the project. In these settings, rights to sue have contributed to delays and increased costs of housing and infrastructure.

We need a careful approach to rights to sue. Yes, we need more of them in some areas. Especially if the government won't enforce anti-corruption or consumer protection statutes. And yes, in employment law, securities, and antitrust, private enforcement often makes a lot of sense. But this is not necessarily the case in environmental law and construction. There, we need better bureaucracies, not thousands of people with the ability to oppose construction projects for any number of reasons.

When the bureaucracy retreats, Americans should rest assured that private parties will still enforce the law. But that power to enforce the law should be given carefully.

The post "The Three Words That Explain American Government: 'Right to Sue,'" by Stanford Law Prof. Diego Zambrano appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From today's decision by Judge John Sinatra (W.D.N.Y.) in Heeter v. James:

New York enacted a first-of-its-kind law prohibiting law-abiding residents-who are not engaged or employed in an eligible profession-from purchasing body armor for self-defense. New York enacted this legislation "to further strengthen gun laws." New York's body armor legislation, however, violates the Second Amendment….

In D.C. v. Heller (2008), the Court made it clear what the term "Arms" meant when the Second Amendment was ratified. In explaining that "[t]he 18th-century meaning" of the term "Arms" is "no different from the meaning today[,]" the Court quoted multiple dictionaries from the Seventeenth Century. Specifically, "[t]he 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined 'arms' as '[w]eapons of offence, or armour of defence.' 1 Dictionary of the English Language 106 (4th ed.) (reprinted 1978) (hereinafter Johnson). Timothy Cunningham's important 1771 legal dictionary defined 'arms' as 'any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.' 1 A New and Complete Law Dictionary; see also N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1989).'' As a result, this Court is bound by Heller's textual analysis, which demonstrates that the word "arms" included armor at the Nation's founding (as it does today)….

The State submits that, during the Founding Era, armor "had become rare or even entirely obsolete in everyday American English" and "the protective leather gear of th[e] pre-Kevlar era was notoriously ineffective against bullets, meaning civilians did not typically wear such body protection either." This argument runs headlong into the definitions adopted by Heller, nevertheless indicating that the term "arms"—as it was defined in the Founding Era—included defensive body armor that (according to the State) was supposedly rarely utilized in 1791.

Body armor may be used more today than Defendants' understanding of its use in 1791. But it strains credulity to say that an arm that was rarely used during the Founding Era—yet still protected by the Second Amendment per Heller—is no longer protected despite being much more common among Americans today.

Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with Heller's clear statement that the Second Amendment "extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding." While body armor may not have been in common use at the founding—although the commonly understood definition of "arms" included body armor—neither were other arms commonly used for self-defense, such as resolvers, semiautomatic pistols, and stun guns. See Caetano v. Massachusetts (2016) (Alito, J., concurring). The defensive body armor available today is "no more exempt from the Second Amendment's protections, simply because [it was] unknown to the First Congress, than electronic communications are exempt from the First Amendment, or electronic imaging devices are exempt from the Fourth Amendment." …

Even if the definitions put forth by the Supreme Court in Heller are dicta, this Court has an "obligation to accord great deference to Supreme Court dicta," absent a change in the legal landscape. Defendants have not suggested—nor can they—that a change in the legal landscape exists that would require this Court to ignore how Heller defined the term "arms." …

Because Plaintiffs have demonstrated that body armor is an "arm" protected by the Second Amendment, the burden shifts to the State to justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of arms regulation. The State fails to do so….

The State argues that there exists a "centuries-long historical tradition" demonstrating that, "when body armor has been in use, it has been subject to government regulation." Yet, the State is unable to identify a single regulation on body armor post-ratification…. The State contends that its body armor ban is consistent with "English monarchs and parliaments" who "regularly issued laws forbidding or restricting the wearing of armor …." Not only is this analogy irrelevant to the regulation of arms in the United States, but it also ignores the historical reason the right to keep and bear arms is "understood to be an individual right protecting against public and private violence." Accordingly, the Court interprets the English history put forth by the State in light of these principles and articulates that it is not "sufficiently probative" to defend New York's body armor ban….

The State points to the Statute of Northampton for support for its position that there is a long-standing tradition of restricting who can purchase body armor. The law prohibited anyone to "go, nor ride armed by night, nor by day, in fairs markets, nor in the presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their armor to the King and their bodies to prison, at the king's pleasure." Notwithstanding the ink that continues to be spilled over this law, the Supreme Court has stated that "the Statute of Northampton—at least as it was understood during the Middle Ages—has little bearing on the Second Amendment adopted in 1791." N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen (2022)….

The State's analogy to the Statute of Northampton is an attempt to justify its body armor ban by speculating that individuals only wear body armor to terrify the public. Yet, this ignores the reality put forth by Plaintiffs, that the public is more likely to reach for body armor to protect themselves from terrifying circumstances. In Rahimi, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a]n individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment." Here, however, the State is suggesting that a merely broad-based suspicion over the population at large is sufficient to justify a universal ban on the sale and purchase of a specific type of arm. And to the extent that the State analogizes this to prohibiting criminals from purchasing body armor, other statutes already criminalize the use of body armor while committing violent crimes. The State's categorical prohibition of a specific type of arm to law-abiding citizens at large, is untethered from any historical tradition-including the Statute of Northampton….

Nicolas J. Rotsko (Fluet) represents plaintiffs.

The post Body Armor Ban Struck Down by N.Y. Federal Court appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From Judge Stephanos Bibas, joined by Judge Tamika Montgomery-Reeves, in Monday's Holy Trinity Ukrainian Catholic Church v. Township of Collier:

Holy Trinity is a Ukrainian Catholic parish outside Pittsburgh. It practices the Catholic faith, but with rituals and architecture that are distinctively Ukrainian. The parish owns two plots of land. On one of them, in Carnegie, sits a church, where it holds regular liturgies. The other plot, in nearby Collier Township, has been owned by the parish for more than seven decades. That 41-acre plot houses the parish's cemetery and mausoleum but is otherwise mostly wooded.

About three years ago, Holy Trinity's pastor felt called to turn the second plot into a shrine, a pilgrimage destination for faithful to gather from "near and far." The shrine would "honor Mary, the Mother of God, and would pay homage to the sanctity of life." With the help of lawyers, architects, and traffic consultants, Holy Trinity designed the shrine. It envisioned a 13,000-square-foot chapel with gold domes, a bell tower, a museum, a gift shop, and a retreat center.

But the plot is constrained by Collier Township's zoning code. The code divides the township into districts, each of which allows certain types of buildings. The northern, wooded half of the plot lies in a planned-economic-development district, allowing larger projects like business offices, amusement parks, or country clubs. The southern half is in a rural-residential district, allowing farms and single-family homes. Neither district contemplates shrines.

The zoning code is enforced by Collier's five-member Board of Commissioners. The Board has power not only to rezone land or amend the code, but also to approve or deny some building projects, because the code makes some land uses conditional. For instance, the code conditionally allows new churches in rural-residential districts, but only if the Board approves them. In any event, anything as big as Holy Trinity's shrine needs the Board's approval.

To fit the shrine project into the zoning code, Holy Trinity applied to do two things. First, it asked the Board to amend the zoning code to allow planned cultural centers, including the shrine, in economic-development districts. Second, it sought to rezone some of its rural-residential land into economic-development land, to make a larger plot for the shrine. As part of its application, Holy Trinity included sketches of its shrine plus a traffic study showing minimal impact on the surrounding community. After a live hearing with concerned residents, the Board denied Holy Trinity's application, expressing concern about traffic and Holy Trinity's fundraising projections. Some residents, and at least one Board member, were also troubled once they learned that the shrine's message would be pro-life.

So Holy Trinity tried again with a smaller project. It applied to build a modest chapel entirely on its rural-residential land. Though the Board approved the new application, it came with strings attached, limiting bell ringing, the height of the chapel, and who could be remembered at memorial services….

The majority held that Holy Trinity wasn't entitled to a preliminary injunction, because the harm could be repaired by damages (one of the elements of the preliminary injunction inquiry); on this matter, the majority and Judge Paul Matey's dissent had an interesting and complicated debate. But here's a passage as to the facts that struck me as worth noting, even apart from that controversy:

Finally, and most troubling, both community and Board members objected to the shrine's pro-life message. One resident worried that "Father Jason has been very involved in pro life. This is to be a pro life museum … [W]hen you think very political rights, either side, it brings a lot of danger, a lot of protests, as well as costs that could be incurred by the community." Another complained that "the intent of the shrine was a celebration for Roe vs. Wade being overturned … [and] reparation for sin of abortion and counseling, spiritual direction …. this will bring a bunch [of people] potentially for a rally and this could also bring the opposite as well for protest."

Privately, at least one of the Board's members agreed. The day after the hearing, that commissioner forwarded an email about the shrine's pro-life stance to the rest of the Board: "Looks like we might have dodged a bullet last night. The true inten[t] of the shrine" was pro-life and "This could have been a disaster." Another township officer, copied on the email, seemed to affirm those sentiments. Nothing in the record suggests that any other Board member responded and disagreed. And in her deposition, the Board member who wrote the email confirmed that "one of the reasons" that the Board had denied the application was Holy Trinity's pro-life purpose. She also defended denying land-use approval "based on the nature of the religious service to be held in the building."

These objections hint at unconstitutional religious hostility and content-based discrimination, concerns that would be better addressed on a more developed factual record. But at the very least, they strongly suggest that the Board resists ever approving the shrine project. If so, the rezoning denial is effectively absolute, and the "degree" of burden on Holy Trinity is substantial. Plus, the township does not show that denying approval altogether is the least-restrictive means to serve a compelling interest. That is enough to show that Holy Trinity is very likely to prevail on its RLUIPA [Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act] substantial-burden claim….

The post Rezoning Request for Catholic Shrine May Have Been Denied Because of Shrine's "Pro-Life Message" appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From L.R. v. Bd. of Ed. of Jennings School Dist., decided Wednesday by Judge Joshua Divine (E.D. Mo.):

L.R. and her mother, R.S., alleged that after an incident involving L.R.'s father at end-of-school pickup, employees of Jennings School District placed L.R. in an out-of-school virtual learning program that was inferior to regular schooling. According to their complaint, the district employees did not provide L.R. with an explanation of how her conduct justified the suspension, a timeline or consistent standards for returning to in-person classes, or an opportunity to be heard or appeal. Those shortcomings, they argued, violated L.R.'s rights to constitutional and statutory due process as well as a free public education.

Since then, the parties have reached a settlement…. As to the settlement, the Court intends to approve it provided that the plaintiffs file an amended complaint that discloses R.S.'s identity.

[R.S.] argues that disclosing her identity "will effectively disclose L.R.'s identity" too. True, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure presumptively require anonymizing minors by their initials, but there is no similar requirement for parents. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3) (stating that filings must replace "the name of an individual known to be a minor" with "the minor's initials"), with id. 10(a) ("The title of the complaint must name all the parties."). Instead, Rule 10 creates a "strong presumption against allowing parties to use a pseudonym." A party may overcome that presumption "only in those limited circumstances where [the] need for anonymity outweighs countervailing interests in full disclosure."

This case is not one of them. R.S. and L.R. do not share a last name, and R.S. has not established that third parties necessarily will infer L.R.'s identity from her mother's.

Even if third parties would discern L.R.'s identity, the fact that she was suspended from in-person classes after a vaguely described "incident" involving her father is not particularly sensitive…. [O]ne factor to consider [in pseudonymity cases is] whether identifying a party "threaten[s] to reveal information of a sensitive and highly personal nature" …. "[S]ome cases allow parents who are suing on behalf of their minor children to proceed pseudonymously, at least when the case involves highly personal information about the children" …. This case does not involve, for example, sexual assault or coercion of a minor to use drugs.

If anything, there are weighty interests in full disclosure because knowing the identities of the people involved in this case could help third parties assess the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a school policy that has become a topic of public debate across the nation. The school district in this case has been featured in national media on the topic of discipline at issue. See, e.g., Carly Graf, The newest form of school discipline: Kicking kids out of class and into virtual learning, Washington State Standard (Aug. 7, 2023) (explaining how "[s]chool districts across the country, including in Missouri, have begun punishing students by forcing them into online classes"); id. (quoting the "superintendent of Jennings School District in Missouri"). R.S.'s own complaint invokes the surrounding policy debate about virtual learning, including what critics say is a negative effect on students of certain races. Therefore, the Court will deny her motion for leave to proceed anonymously.

The settlement, by the way, was that "[a]lthough the defendants are not required to admit liability, they must remove any mention of the suspension from L.R.'s records, promote her to 8th grade, pay her $40,000 dollars plus $20,000 to her attorneys, and make available a policy that "clearly enshrines due process protections for all students prior to any transfer to virtual learning."

The post Children May Proceed Pseudonymously; May Their Parents? appeared first on Reason Magazine.

I've seen some say yes as to that—as an objection to gun control laws, not as an objection to the man's actions—but I don't think it's quite right.

It's true that Oregon law generally criminalizes gun possession on school property, including by people with concealed carry licenses, if the school board adopts such a no-guns-allowed policy. And apparently the Bend school in which the shooting took place indeed has such a policy.

But Oregon law recognizes a so-called "choice of evils" defense, often called a "necessity" defense, that allows people to violate a wide range of laws if it's genuinely necessary in an emergency:

(1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when:

(a) That conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury; and

(b) The threatened injury is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue.

(2) The necessity and justifiability of conduct under subsection (1) of this section shall not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder.

That means that, even when gun possession is otherwise criminal, it is "not criminal" when it's necessary to avoid imminent serious harm. Indeed, even felons, who are generally barred from possessing guns, may pick up a gun that's physically available to them when it's necessary for imminent self-defense:

We think that the trial judge's conclusion that ORS 161.200 [the choice of evils statute] is inapplicable to the offense of being an ex convict in possession of a firearm is incorrect. The statute contains no such express exception, and we see no justification for implying one. To the contrary, one who has been previously convicted of a felony is just as entitled to defend himself from an imminent threat of injury as is any other private citizen. We hold that the defense is available to those who have been previously convicted of a felony and, in appropriate circumstances, may justify their resort to a weapon which it would otherwise be unlawful for them to possess.

Likewise, a law-abiding gun owner may go into a school where gun possession is otherwise criminal when it's necessary to try to stop a school shooting. (Even in jurisdictions that don't formally recognize a choice-of-evils / necessity defense, the separate doctrines of self-defense or defense of others may provide a defense as to bringing a gun onto school property in such a situation, just as they provide a defense as to using the gun to kill the shooter.) And while in some situations the balancing test in the necessity defense can be vaguer than the somewhat more precise terms of the self-defense defense, carrying a gun into a no-guns zone in order to stop an apparent in-progress school shooting makes for an extraordinarily clear case for the defense.

Nor is this just a matter of prosecutorial discretion. If a prosecutor does file charges in such a situation, the gun owner can raise the defense. And if the evidence is sufficient to potentially trigger the defense (e.g., if the defendant or a witness testifies to facts that a reasonable jury may interpret as sufficing for the defense), then "the state must negate [the defense] beyond a reasonable doubt."

In this respect, the choice-of-evils defense is much like the defense-of-others defense. Killing someone is generally a crime; but the law recognizes that sometimes it's justifiable (in particular, to defend yourself or others against death or other very serious harms), and thus provides a defense-of-others affirmative defense.

Likewise, carrying a gun onto school property in Oregon is a crime when the school district forbids it. But the law recognizes that sometimes it's justifiable (in particular, to defend people against a school shooting), and thus provides a choice-of-evils affirmative defense.

Naturally, the operation of the defense depends on the good sense of prosecutors, judges, and juries—just as the operation of the self-defense and defense-of-others defense do. But it's the way our legal system deals, even if at times imperfectly, with situations where an emergency need warrants what would otherwise be illegal action (whether that otherwise illegal action would be murder, as to the shooting itself, or a weapons offense, as to the carrying of a gun onto school property).

Of course, the choice-of-evils defense doesn't work for people who want to carry guns in forbidden places simply to be prepared in case the gun is needed (the usual reason most people who carry guns do so). One can certainly debate whether schools should allow at least some people, such as teachers or other school staff who are trained and licensed, to keep guns on their persons in school.

But even if you think the Oregon law (coupled with Bend's policy) is foolish in generally criminalizing gun licensees' carrying a gun onto school property, it's not so foolish as to criminalizing their carrying a gun onto school property when necessary to stop an in-progress school shooting.

The post Did Oregon Man Who Shot the School Shooter Violate Oregon Law in Carrying Gun onto School Property? appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From Judge Ted Stewart (D. Utah) in U.S. v. Wang, dated Sept. 9 but just docketed today:

Defendant objected to the condition that she notify any intimate partners "about the potential risk she poses" as vague. To avoid any vagueness, the Court imposed the following: "The court requires you to notify any intimate partners that you have been convicted of cyberstalking and pose a risk of stalking and harassment to intimate partners." The Court finds this condition is necessary to protect the public considering Defendant's history of cyberstalking and her relationships with her past victims.

I believe similar conditions are sometimes imposed as to sex offenders, but this is the first time I've seen something like this as to stalkers. (Note that, once a criminal defendant is convicted, the standard for evaluating probation conditions restricting or compelling speech becomes more much government-friendly than would be the case in the absence of such a conviction.) Here's the Justice Department's statement summarizing the case:

A Utah County woman was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment [and thee years of probation] today for cyberstalking two male victims she met on online dating platforms and became obsessed with them….

According to court documents and statements made at Wang's change of plea and sentencing hearings, Wang connected with the victims separately on online dating sites in 2017 and 2018 and became obsessed with each victim. Using multiple accounts, fake names, social media accounts, and phone numbers, she harassed and disparaged them publicly and privately, tagging their friends, family, and employers.

On three separate occasions, Wang reported the victims to the federal Internet Crimes Complaint Center (IC3) claiming she was being harassed and impersonated online by them. Wang reported that they did these things together, even though there is no evidence that the victims had any relation to each other. Wang admitted that she filed the IC3 complaints to get law enforcement to investigate the victims in order to harass and intimidate them.

Wang's crimes against victim 1 and victim 2 are not isolated incidents. Wang engaged in a pattern of stalking behavior in 2013 and was convicted in the state of New York.

The post "The Court Requires Me to Warn You That I Pose a Risk of Stalking and Harassment to Intimate Partners" appeared first on Reason Magazine.

A quiz about three animal-related figures of legal speech (all of which had been mentioned on this blog in years past). Fill in the blanks, and provide the explanation the courts offer:

1. "A red ___ case."
2. "Presumptions may be looked on as the __ of the law."
3. "Judges are not like __."

Note that it's not enough that judges actually aren't like, say, eels; it has to be a preexisting legal phrase.

Give your answers in the comments. No fair peeking, Googling, or Clauding.

The post Beasts of the Law appeared first on Reason Magazine.

That's part of libel plaintiff's argument(filed last week) for subpoenaing defendant's AI queries in Fontainebleau Florida Hotel, LLC v. Botach; the defendant is popularly known as Rabbi Shmuley Boteach. From the introduction:

The Court asked whether Botach's communications with AI platforms fall within the scope of "damages" discovery permitted by ECF No. 261, and specifically how those materials relate to malice and the statutory cap on punitive damages. Precedent from the United States Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit, as well as Florida law, answers that question directly.

Under Fla. Stat. § 768.73(1)(c), the cap on punitive damages lifts entirely where the fact finder determines that "the defendant had a specific intent to harm the claimant" at the time of the injury. As discussed below, legions of cases from trial courts to the Supreme Court hold that post-defamation conduct is probative of whether defamatory statements were made with intent to harm. Specific intent is therefore not background color to the damages trial or damages discovery. Discovery into Botach's intent to harm Plaintiff is damages discovery, and the AI materials are the most direct evidence of that intent.

Botach did not merely publish an errant falsehood on a blog or make a heated statement in a debate. He methodically engineered his attacks—drafting, refining, and iterating for painful effect through the most potent technologies known to humankind. The prompts and chats are his mental state reduced to writing, and they are probative of damages.

And from the defendant's response:

The Court should sustain the objections to the proposed AI-provider subpoenas as drafted and apply the same limits to the overlapping Seventh Request for Production. The issue is whether these demands fall within the scope of "discovery limited to damages." The unresolved punitive amount permits discovery concerning punishment for the adjudicated wrong, not an unrestricted inquiry into Defendant's research or litigation conduct.

The amended complaint already alleges knowing falsity, deliberate fabrication, repeated publication, financial motive, and specific intent to harm. Plaintiff did not pursue AI discovery before the general discovery cutoff. But under the guise of "discovery limited to damages," Plaintiff seeks every responsive AI exchange concerning this litigation, the Hotel, Plaintiff's lawyers, every court order, and the judges. It reaches accounts associated with an expansively defined "Botach," without limiting production to his queries or material used in the actionable publications. The Court should enforce the reopening order before requiring any production and independently preserve substantiated work-product objections.

For more backstory on the case, an excerpt from the long Report and Recommendation issued July 29 by Judge Marty Fulgueira Elfenbein in Fontainebleau Florida Hotel, LLC v. Botach:

This action arises from an encounter between Defendant and then-hotel guest Faiz Akbar … in the lobby of Plaintiff's hotel in December 2024. The Parties sharply dispute the nature of the encounter, who initiated or escalated it, and whether Plaintiff responded appropriately to Defendant's subsequent complaints.

Plaintiff's operative First Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant published false statements concerning the incident and Plaintiff's response to it, including statements that Plaintiff discriminated against Defendant because he is Jewish, knowingly permitted an antisemitic assault to occur on its premises, removed Defendant rather than the alleged aggressor, and refused to cooperate with law enforcement. Based on those allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant for defamation and tortious interference with business relationships.

Defendant filed a Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint asserting claims against Plaintiff and naming Jeffrey Soffer … and Akbar as Third-Party Defendants. Defendant's Counterclaim alleges, among other things, that he was subjected to an antisemitic verbal attack at the hotel, that Plaintiff failed to protect him or adequately cooperate with the ensuing investigation, and that Plaintiff thereafter excluded him from its properties. Defendant asserted claims under federal civil-rights statutes and a claim for tortious interference with business relationships….

The merits of the Parties' competing claims are not directly before the Court in the Motion for Sanctions. Instead, the dispute concerns Defendant's conduct during the litigation, the meaning and scope of the District Court's February 20, 2026 Order …, and whether Defendant's subsequent social-media activity violated that Order in a manner warranting sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) or the Court's inherent authority….

On March 11, 2025, Defendant served a subpoena on the Miami Beach Police Department seeking video footage of the underlying incident that Plaintiff previously provided to the department. The Miami Beach Police Department produced responsive surveillance footage to Defendant's counsel on March 26, 2025, and counsel thereafter transmitted that footage to Defendant. On April 2, 2025, before the entry of a protective order, Defendant posted an excerpt of the surveillance footage to his public Instagram account, which had more than 90,000 followers. On April 7, 2025, the Parties jointly moved for entry of a stipulated protective order governing discovery in this action. The Court entered the Parties' Stipulated Protective Order on April 9, 2025.

The Protective Order provides that material produced by a nonparty is automatically treated as "Outside Counsel Eyes Only" for thirty days following production without the need for an affirmative designation by a party. The Protective Order further prohibits the use of discovery material for any purpose unrelated to this litigation, including any public, commercial, business, or personal purpose. The Protective Order restricts access to material designated as "Highly Confidential" or "Outside Counsel Eyes Only" to specified persons and does not permit unrestricted public dissemination of such material….

On April 10, 2025, one day after entry of the Protective Order, Defendant again posted the surveillance footage to his social-media accounts. On April 16, 2025, Plaintiff formally designated the materials produced by the Miami Beach Police Department as "Highly Confidential," and Plaintiff's counsel communicated that designation to Defendant's counsel. Defendant's counsel then informed Defendant of the designation, after which Defendant removed the footage. Defendant contemporaneously published a social-media post acknowledging that he was "required under the rules to remove the video."

Notwithstanding his knowledge of the Protective Order and Plaintiff's confidentiality designation, Defendant again posted the surveillance footage on September 17, 2025…. Although Plaintiff requested severe evidentiary and litigation-ending sanctions [over this], the undersigned concluded that those sanctions were not then supported by the record because a lesser sanction had not previously been imposed for the violation. The undersigned instead awarded Plaintiff its reasonable attorney's fees and costs attributable to the sanctions motion and expressly admonished Defendant that the Protective Order was not optional. The undersigned further warned Defendant that any future violation of the Protective Order would be treated with the utmost seriousness, including case-dispositive sanctions.

After further proceedings concerning the amount of the award, the Court ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff $15,000.00 no later than April 26, 2026….

Separate from the Protective Order dispute, the District Court addressed Defendant's social-media activity in connection with pretrial scheduling and discovery matters. On February 10, 2026, Plaintiff moved for an extension of time to take Defendant's deposition and represented that Defendant had repeatedly scheduled and cancelled depositions based on asserted physical limitations while simultaneously publishing social-media content showing him engaged in activities including ice skating, kayaking, and bicycling. The District Court granted Plaintiff additional time to take Defendant's deposition and stated that it was "deeply disturbed by this trend." The District Court cautioned Defendant that sanctions, "potentially including the striking of Defendant's pleadings," would be imposed if the conduct continued….

[In a] February 20 Order, the District Court observed that the communications between the Parties had become "toxic," particularly in light of Defendant's online communications, and agreed with Plaintiff that the time had come for the matter to proceed toward resolution. The District Court stated that it was "deeply disturbed by Defendant's conduct," including his "continued social media attacks aimed at Plaintiff and its counsel" and his attempt to effect service at an address he knew belonged to Soffer's child. The District Court then expressly "DIRECT[ED] Defendant to cease such harassing conduct and social media references to Plaintiff and its counsel during the course of this litigation." …

In the Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiff contends that Defendant continued to publish social-media content referencing Plaintiff, Plaintiff's counsel, and this litigation almost immediately after entry of the February 20 Order. Plaintiff identifies multiple occasions between February 26 and May 28, 2026, on which Defendant allegedly violated the Order. [For more details, see the opinion, but here's one example. -EV] …

The May 24, 2026 social media publications constitute perhaps the most egregious violations of the February 20 Order. To recap, in one video, Defendant alleged that a member of his family was confronted and threatened in Jerusalem by an individual who invoked Plaintiff's counsel. Defendant specifically identified Plaintiff's counsel as the attorney representing the hotel in this action and asserted that this lawsuit was filed to "intimidate and silence him" after he publicly alleged that he had been threatened with murder in an antisemitic attack. Defendant further stated that it "remains unknown whether anyone connected to the ongoing litigation had prior knowledge of, encouraged, or otherwise played any role in the confrontation" and that he "has endured nearly two years of legal and public harassment by [Plaintiff's counsel] and the hotel in an effort to financially and personally destroy him after speaking out about the alleged antisemitic attack."

In the other May 24, 2026 post, Defendant referred to Plaintiff, Soffer, and Plaintiff's counsel, Burstyn, by name, and questioned whether Burstyn appeared in materials associated with Jeffrey Epstein. The post also referenced Burstyn's representation of another client, questioned Burstyn's role in events preceding the death of Virginia Giuffre, criticized Burstyn's representation of Plaintiff, and concluded with an assertion concerning public distrust of attorneys, stating that Plaintiff's counsel "is the reason that 84% of Americans believe that attorneys are scumbags."

These posts did not merely allude to Plaintiff—they expressly identified Plaintiff, Plaintiff's counsel, and the upcoming trial. They therefore violated both components of the District Court's directive. They constituted social-media references to Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel, and they also plainly continued the very social-media attacks that prompted the District Court's intervention. These publications therefore fall squarely within the conduct the District Court sought to halt and cannot reasonably be characterized as compliance with the February 20 Order….

And the Magistrate Judge therefore recommended sanctions against the Defendant:

The totality of the record demonstrates that Defendant willfully chose to disregard a clear judicial command. It is undisputed that Defendant knew of the District Court's February 20 Order. Nevertheless, Defendant continued making prohibited social-media references over approximately three months.

The violations were not confined to a single publication or a single day. Instead, Defendant repeatedly returned to social media to discuss Plaintiff, Plaintiff's counsel, and the pending litigation. That pattern is inconsistent with negligence or misunderstanding….

Further, Defendant knew the significance of an order, the requirement that he comply with an order, even if he disagreed with it, and the consequences for failing to follow an order. Not only has Defendant already been sanctioned for violating an order of this Court, but Defendant was also warned about the potential for graver consequences if he violates any other orders….

Turning to the issue of whether lesser sanctions would suffice, the record contains multiple warnings of escalating specificity. The District Court first warned Defendant on February 10, 2026 that continued misconduct could result in striking Defendant's pleadings. Then, on February 20, 2026, the District Court directed Defendant to cease social-media attacks and references to Plaintiff and its counsel. Less than one week later, the undersigned warned Defendant that Court Orders are not optional, that Defendant could not take matters into his own hands, and that future violations would be treated with the utmost seriousness, including the potential for Rule 37(b)(2)(A) sanctions. Those warnings did not produce compliance. Another admonition would repeat a measure the record has already shown to be ineffective with Defendant.

Further, the Court previously imposed a sanction in the form of a $15,000.00 fee award based on Defendant's knowing violation of the Protective Order. The violations of the February 20 Order followed that ruling and the accompanying admonition…. [T]he prior monetary sanction did not deter Defendant from again disregarding a pretrial directive….

At his deposition, Defendant admitted under oath that his social-media publications were intended to cause Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel to reconsider their conduct and litigation strategy. Consistent with that testimony, Defendant's May 24 and May 28 posts publicly accused Plaintiff of attempting to destroy him through this litigation, attacked Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel personally notwithstanding the Court's directive prohibiting such conduct, and attempted to rally public opinion by requesting "your support" in his trial "Against 'that Hotel' in Miami" where he will "absolutely defeat the antisemitism-deniers."

Defendant therefore used repeated violations of the Court's Order as an extrajudicial litigation tactic designed to influence whether, and under what conditions, Plaintiff continued to prosecute its claims against him. That objective directly implicates the integrity of the judicial process. The pattern of Defendant's repeated, willful violations of the February 20 Order when coupled with his stated intention behind his social-media posts and his history of sanctions and admonitions demonstrate that lesser sanctions will not suffice.

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that striking Defendant's Answer and Affirmative Defenses, dismissing his Counterclaim with prejudice, and entering default judgment as to liability on Plaintiff's well-pleaded claims constitute appropriately tailored remedies that address the institutional harm caused by Defendant's abuse of the judicial process. {This recommendation is not based upon any determination that Defendant's affirmative defenses or Counterclaim lack substantive merit. Rather, it is based upon Defendant's willful violation of this Court's Order, his deliberate use of those violations as a litigation tactic, and the demonstrated inadequacy of lesser sanctions to secure compliance or preserve the integrity of these proceedings.}

With that said, the recommendation of entry of default judgment would not, by itself, establish the amount of Plaintiff's damages. Plaintiff would remain obligated to establish any unliquidated damages through appropriate evidence and further proceedings and Defendant would be able to defend against such damages claims….

[T]he Court [also] finds it appropriate to award Plaintiff its reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred as a result of litigating the Motion for Sanctions. The amount should be determined through a separate fee submission with Plaintiff bearing the burden to establish the reasonableness of its counsel's hourly rate along with the reasonableness of the requested fees….

The post "The AI Data Will Provide an Unrivaled View into the Mind of a Defendant …" appeared first on Reason Magazine.

News accounts report that the Bend, Oregon school shooting Thursday was stopped in part by an armed civilian. From the N.Y. Times (Anna Griffin, Aaron West, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs & Chelsia Rose Marcius):

A man in a red pickup truck was driving by and saw the teenager throw his shotgun over the fence and start to climb it, the police said. The driver "verbally confronted" the gunman, who paused to open fire at him, pelting the truck with shots….

Outside, Kaylub Giamanco, a father of two girls at the school, had seen the red pickup get shot while driving by on his lunch break. He swerved onto the sidewalk and ran inside.

He found the gunman wrestling with the teacher who tried to stop him and shot him several times with a .40-caliber handgun that had been legally secured in his truck, the police said. The suspect, who died, was carrying 44 more rounds of ammunition.

Readers might want to know: How often do civilians use guns to help stop shooters who pose ongoing threats to multiple people? (By "civilian," I mean here someone other than a police officer or a security guard; off-duty military members qualify for my purposes.)

Obviously, an exact count is hard to gather, and some cases will be ambiguous. Sometimes, it may not be clear whether the shooter was planning to keep attacking. Sometimes, it may not be clear, at least from press accounts, whether the defender succeeded in stopping the shooter (for instance, by scaring the shooter away). Sometimes a civilian and a security guard or a police officer might step in together. And sometimes news accounts may err. Any count is thus a judgment call, and also likely incomplete because not all incidents make the news.

Still, thanks to a Crime Prevention Research Center spreadsheet, I can say that in 2025 there appeared to have been at least a dozen such incidents. The CPRC report says there were 23; I went through the list, checked the linked news accounts, and tried to exclude ones that seemed just like one-on-one self-defense situations or matters where the defender seemed clearly unsuccessful. (One-on-one self-defense is of course worthy on its own, but it's not what I'm discussing here.) With those exclusions, and trying to be relatively conservative in what I counted, I ended up counting 12 to 14 such incidents in 2025, depending on how you evaluate some of the more ambiguous ones.

Nor does 2025 appear to be unusual. According to the CPRC report, there were roughly the same number of incidents (or in some years, even more) in 2020-2024 as in 2025. I expect that conservative counts for those years would likewise be comparable to my count for 2025.

None of the 2025 defensive gun use incidents were at a school, but gun possession is generally illegal in schools, so it's unsurprising that law-abiding gun owners can rarely stop such shootings. They can of course enter the school after the shooting starts, as the man in the Oregon shooting did, but that involves a higher degree of difficulty.

The 2025 incidents, with the date, state, city (and link to news article), and excerpt from the news article:

This of course doesn't tells us a lot by itself about the debates about gun control and gun rights. But it is a reminder that multiple shootings are indeed sometimes (and not that rarely) stopped by good guys with guns.

The post Civilians Using Guns to Defend Against Multiple Shootings appeared first on Reason Magazine.

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The broader context, from Judge VanDyke's opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc in Whitfield v. Mullin, joined by Judges Patrick Bumatay and Eric Tung; the question Judge VanDyke is confronting is when a Ninth Circuit precedent stops being binding on future panels because it's inconsistent with intervening Supreme Court precedent:

[T]his case illustrates (yet again) a more fundamental problem within our circuit: Miller v. Gammie's improper demand that our own circuit's precedent be privileged over the Supreme Court's more recent instructions unless our precedent is "clearly irreconcilable" with what the Supreme Court has subsequently told us. 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003). This prevents three-judge panels of our court from applying more recent Supreme Court authority whenever it is merely inconsistent with our own. The effect of this rule is both obvious and obviously wrong—we systematically hold the Supreme Court's instructions about the right answer to any number of legal questions in lower regard than our own wrong precedents….

The reality is that our en banc court is often unable or unwilling to fix things at odds with Supreme Court precedent. Sometimes, the obstacle is simply institutional inertia; the costs of en banc review make correction burdensome enough that erroneous precedent persists by default. We are a very busy court, and we can't be expected to take every case en banc that presents a legal issue where subsequent Supreme Court authority is inconsistent with, but not "clearly irreconcilable" with, our own.

But that is not the only problem with Miller's rule. The effect of that inverted rule is especially insidious (and no doubt intentional) when our precedent involves one of the many contested legal questions where our circuit's ideological commitments are at odds with what the Supreme Court has recently told us. In those instances, it is very unlikely a majority of our court would ever vote to take a case en banc to abandon the majority's own preferred doctrinal approach, even after the Supreme Court has undermined its foundation. Judge Reinhardt famously announced the Ninth Circuit's motto: the Supreme Court can't "catch 'em all."

Miller's strictures ensure that the Supreme Court's guidance will, for the most part, be limited in this circuit to only those instances where the Court actually "catches" a specific case—that is, where it actually grants review and issues a binding opinion in that case. And even in that rare instance, Miller ensures that whatever guidance the Supreme Court provides will have little spillover effect beyond the very narrow issue actually decided by the Court in that case. Everything else is not "clearly irreconcilable" (judges and lawyers alike are, after all, pretty good at distinguishing), so three-judge panels of this court that would very much like to follow the Supreme Court's recent guidance can't. And those who would very much like to avoid the Supreme Court's guidance can do so simply by not voting to take a case en banc.

The consequence is perverse. To correct our circuit's many erroneous precedents and ensure litigants can benefit from intervening Supreme Court decisions, the Supreme Court will have to take case after case after case and reverse them all, slowly, over the course of decades, one by one by one, as it has done so many times before.

The Supreme Court should not have to keep trimming the same poison ivy one tiny branch at a time. There are many judges on our circuit who would be glad to do the right thing and apply the Supreme Court's guidance in three-judge panel decisions whenever that guidance is inconsistent with our circuit's own earlier precedents. By overturning Miller in this or some future case, the Supreme Court would remove a perverse rule that entrenches erroneous precedent in this circuit, enabling three-judge panels to help hack away at the overgrowth. Help us help you.

The Supreme Court should take up this case to correct our circuit's erroneous "serious questions" rule [that's the debate in the underlying case, which has to do with the standard for granting preliminary injunctions]. But while it's at it, why not also correct Miller's "clearly irreconcilable" standard? Addressing the former will eliminate one of many legal doctrines in our court that are inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court authority. But also addressing the latter would do much more to conform the Ninth Circuit's law to the Supreme Court's—without the Supreme Court's needing to exhaustively address every single error seriatim.

The post "The Supreme Court Should Not Have to Keep Trimming the Same Poison Ivy One Tiny Branch at a Time" appeared first on Reason Magazine.

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From a press release last month, just posted on Westlaw:

N.C. Detective Agency, a Durham-based security company, will pay $65,231 in compensatory damages and back pay, and take other corrective actions to voluntarily resolve a religious discrimination investigation by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency announced today.

The EEOC's investigation found reasonable cause to believe that an employee requested to be excused from work due to a Muslim religious holiday, but the request was denied. The company was aware of the employee's need for a religious accommodation but did not engage in the legally required interactive process, and instead terminated her in June 2025 when she did not report for duty.

And from another press release two weeks later, also just posted on Westlaw:

Reynolds IGA Foodliner, Inc., owner and operator of a chain of grocery stores, will pay $65,000 and provide other equitable relief to settle a religious discrimination and retaliation lawsuit filed by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency announced today.

According to the suit, shortly after she was hired as a deli clerk at the Piggly Wiggly store in Hazlehurst, Georgia, the employee requested Sundays off to observe her Sabbath. The employee's supervisor denied the request, claiming that, if the store gave the employee Sundays off, it would have to do the same for all other employees. The employee continued to request the accommodation, and the company fired her in January 2025.

More from the second press release:

"Employers cannot deny religious accommodation requests simply for fear of upsetting other employees," said Marcus G. Keegan, regional attorney for the EEOC's Atlanta District. "The EEOC remains committed to enforcing federal anti-discrimination law and protecting employees' rights to religious freedom."

Darrell E. Graham, director of the EEOC's Atlanta District, said, "Employers must thoughtfully consider each request for religious accommodation on an individual, case-by-case basis and otherwise make good-faith efforts to accommodate their employees' religious beliefs. Employers must be aware of their obligations under federal law to provide reasonable religious accommodations absent undue hardship."

Finally, from a third press release from last month (it was published in between the first two, but was again just posted on Westlaw); this one involves a lawsuit and not a settlement:

Blue Bell Creameries, Inc., a Brenham, Texas-based frozen snack manufacturer and distributor with a production facility in Sylacauga, Alabama, unlawfully terminated a Jewish body shop technician soon after he requested a beard‑related religious accommodation, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charged in a lawsuit announced today.

Even supporters of bans on religious discrimination by private employers might debate whether employers should be required to give religious exemptions from generally applicable rules (exemptions that could themselves be seen as discrimination in favor of religious observers). But Congress has indeed mandated such exemptions: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended in 1972, generally requires employers to accommodate religious objectors' requests for exemptions from generally applicable work rules, unless doing so would pose an "undue hardship" for the employer.

That extends to time off for religious holidays: Indeed, the leading recent case on the subject, Groff v. DeJoy, involved a Christian employee's request for an exemption from having to work Sundays. And of course it extends, as it must, to all religions.

The post $65K Settlements with EEOC Over Failure to Accommodate Muslim and Christian Employees' Religious Days Off appeared first on Reason Magazine.

So reports the N.Y. Times (Mark Arsenault) yesterday, discussing former MIT cellular biology professor David Sabatini's victory on the defamation claim (and defendant's loss on her harassment and retaliation counterclaim). More details:

[Sabatini] was forced out of his lab in 2021 after an internal Whitehead [Institute] investigation concluded he had a past sexual relationship with a younger and less experienced colleague, Kristin Knouse, over whom he had a career-influencing role. The investigation also found that his lab had maintained a sexualized atmosphere. Dr. Knouse said that the relationship was coerced.

But Dr. Sabatini denied his lab had an improper atmosphere. He maintained that his relationship with Dr. Knouse had been consensual and that Dr. Knouse had schemed to get him fired and disgraced after he became interested in another woman….

After he was pushed out of M.I.T. and the Whitehead, he had talks with New York University about a job. But N.Y.U. staff members and students protested in the streets against his hiring in 2022, and the university did not hire him.

In 2023, he was hired by the Institute of Organic Chemistry and Biochemistry, in Prague, and later opened a Boston-area branch of that institute….

According to the Boston Globe (Madyline Swearing, Bryan Hecht & Tonya Alanez), "In 2023, New York hedge fund billionaire Bill Ackman and an anonymous donor pledged $25 million over five years to help Sabatini get back into science." The Globe also reports that the jury consisted of "seven women and six men," for whatever that's worth.

Here's an excerpt of what Sabatini alleged (quoting a Massachusetts appellate decision in the case, later reversed as to Knouse's counterclaim by the Massachusetts high court):

Sabatini and Knouse met in 2012. At the time, Sabatini was a tenured member of the department of biology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and ran his own laboratory at Whitehead, a research institute affiliated with MIT that receives funding from private resources such as the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI) and public resources such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH). {As pertinent here, Whitehead and HHMI have a relationship whereby HHMI provides funding for, and in some instances employs, individuals working at Whitehead. At all relevant times, both Whitehead and HHMI employed Sabatini. In addition, NIH provided grants that funded Sabatini's research at Whitehead.}

Knouse was enrolled in an inter-institutional M.D./Ph.D. program at Harvard and MIT, where Sabatini was one of her instructors and served on her thesis committee. While Knouse was a doctoral student, she and Sabatini sometimes socialized.

Then, in 2018, Knouse started a fellowship at Whitehead, and she and Sabatini began a sexual relationship. While the relationship ended in 2019, Knouse sent text messages to Sabatini in January 2020 seeking to rekindle their relationship. Sabatini responded, asking Knouse to stop and stating that he wanted peace and needed space to figure things out.

In early 2020 through the fall of 2020, Knouse began telling colleagues, both at Whitehead and MIT, that Sabatini had sexually harassed her. In October 2020, Knouse reported the alleged sexual harassment to Lehmann. Around that time, Whitehead hired a consultant to conduct a diversity survey at Whitehead. During the survey, some Whitehead employees reported concerns about Sabatini. In response, Whitehead hired the law firm of Hinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP (HAS) to investigate the culture within Sabatini's laboratory. The HAS investigators spoke with Knouse and other members of the Whitehead community. In interviews with the HAS investigators, Knouse repeated her allegations that Sabatini had sexually harassed her.

On August 13, 2021, HAS sent a report to Whitehead finding that Sabatini had committed sexual harassment. Whitehead forwarded the report to MIT and HHMI. On August 19, Whitehead provided Sabatini with a copy of the report. On August 20, Sabatini resigned after learning that Whitehead was about to terminate his employment. {Before Sabatini resigned, his coemployer at Whitehead, HHMI, terminated his employment. MIT placed Sabatini on leave.}

And here's what Knouse alleged (quoting the Massachusetts high court decision); the jury verdict suggests that the jury largely believed Sabatini's story rather than Knouse's:

Sabatini was a laboratory director at the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research (Whitehead) and a tenured professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 2012 when he met Knouse, then a graduate student at Harvard University and MIT. Sabatini was one of Knouse's instructors at MIT and served on her dissertation committee.

During a discussion in 2016 concerning whether Sabatini would endorse Knouse's application for an upcoming fellowship at Whitehead, Sabatini expressed concern that Knouse took herself too seriously and asked Knouse whether she ever had "fun," "fuck[ed] around," or had sex. Knouse responded that she did have fun and quickly left the conversation. Subsequently, Sabatini recommended Knouse for the fellowship and supported her grant application, both of which she secured.

Knouse joined Whitehead as a fellow in 2018. That year, Knouse and Sabatini began a sexual relationship that ended in 2019; thereafter, Sabatini continued to make sexualized comments to her. Knouse asserts that she struggled under this dynamic. Sabatini, whose laboratory was next to Knouse's, was the director of the Whitehead fellows program, and he served as a mentor and reviewer of her work. Knouse feared the potential consequences that losing an influential mentor would have on her career and believed she could not terminate the relationship without professional repercussions. She "began to withdraw from the scientific community" and "experience[d] debilitating feelings of entrapment and hopelessness."

Around this period, the results of a 2020 culture survey of Whitehead "suggested that Sabatini either personally engaged in sexually explicit and inappropriate discussions or fostered an environment that tolerated—or promoted—such inappropriate discussions and that he threatened those who might report his conduct." The survey results "amplified complaints" raised by two women, who had trained in Sabatini's laboratory, and by Knouse, who contemporaneously disclosed to the director that she had felt harassed during her fellowship but, fearing retaliation, did not provide any further details.

In response, Whitehead hired an independent legal team to investigate. The investigators determined, inter alia, that Sabatini had "engaged in and otherwise tolerated sexist and sexualized work discussions with his lab," and that engaging in such discussions "was an implicit part of succeeding in" Sabatini's laboratory. They also concluded that there was a "culture of fear and retaliation" within the laboratory. They reported that Sabatini had "engag[ed] in sexual relations with a Whitehead Fellow" and violated several Whitehead policies, including its sexual harassment policy.

Sabatini resigned from his Whitehead position. MIT announced that it was placing Sabatini on leave to perform its own investigation.

Sabatini's claims against Whitehead had earlier been dismissed (see, e.g., this decision).

Lisa Arrowood, Shayne Kinsella, and Sarah Sousa (Arrowood LLP) represent Sabatini.

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