10K More U.S. Troops Deploy as Trump Weighs New Iran Strikes /Suliaman Ahmed
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 3, 2026

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 3, 2026

RT | October 2, 2026
Yemen’s Houthis have denied targeting a power station in the city of Medina. A Saudi-led coalition earlier accused the militant group of targeting the facility supplying power to the Prophet’s Mosque – one of the holiest sites in the Muslim world.
A senior Houthi official branded the accusation a “lie” aimed at tarnishing the group’s image and reinforcing similar claims made by the coalition in the past.
On Thursday, the Saudi coalition’s spokesman, Major General Turki al-Maliki, accused the Yemeni militants of striking the Taibah electricity distribution station in Medina earlier this week in what he called a “cowardly terrorist act” and a part of an alleged broader campaign by the Houthis to “target the Two Holy Mosques.”
In mid-September, Saudi Arabia accused the Houthis of launching a drone towards the holy city of Mecca. The unmanned aerial vehicle was intercepted and destroyed, it added. The Yemeni movement’s leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, dismissed that claim as a “heinous lie” in a televised address at the time, claiming Riyadh was “weaponizing lies” to advance its own agenda.
The developments have sparked concerns in Türkiye and Pakistan, which signed a joint defense agreement with Saudi Arabia in August. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly last week, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called any “threat to the sanctity” of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina a “red line that must never be crossed.”
Ankara denounced this week’s alleged Medina attack. “Any attack targeting the sanctity, peace, and security of the Two Holy Mosques is an unacceptable affront directed at the shared sensitivities of the entire Islamic world,” the Turkish government spokesman, Burhanettin Duran, said on X on Friday. He vowed that Türkiye “will continue to stand by Saudi Arabia.”
The developments come amid the continued escalation between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. Riyadh has backed Yemen’s internationally recognized government against the Houthis since intervening in the country’s civil war in 2015.
Large-scale fighting largely subsided after a UN-brokered truce in 2022, but the conflict erupted again this summer after an airport in the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital of Sanaa was bombed to prevent a returning Houthi delegation that had flown to Iran from landing.

Il Patto della Mecca è un segno di solidarietà, non di guerra. La Turchia lo sa bene: lo Yemen è la “tomba dei turchi”.
Il Patto della Mecca è messo alla prova
Il 19 settembre 2026, ai microfoni dell’emittente turca NTV, il ministro degli Esteri Hakan Fidan ha pronunciato una frase insieme misurata e densa di conseguenze. L’Arabia Saudita, sotto il fuoco degli Houthi, «potrebbe avere alcune necessità militari, soprattutto su questioni tecniche», e la Turchia «non avrebbe problemi a soddisfarle». Nessuna dichiarazione di guerra, nessun contingente annunciato. Eppure, per la prima volta, il Patto della Mecca — l’alleanza difensiva che lega Riyadh, Ankara e Islamabad — veniva evocato come strumento operativo e non come architettura sulla carta. La domanda che circola nei commenti più mordaci è se Ankara stia per ripetere l’errore che due volte le costò carissimo: mettere piede negli altopiani dello Yemen. La risposta seria è più interessante della provocazione, e va nella direzione opposta.
L’accordo firmato alla Mecca il 7 agosto 2026 da Mohammed bin Salman, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan e Shehbaz Sharif è modellato sull’articolo 5 della NATO: un attacco armato contro uno dei tre è un attacco contro tutti. Il fronte che oggi lo sollecita è yemenita. Dal luglio 2026, dopo aver dichiarato il blocco dei porti sauditi e dello Stretto di Bab al-Mandab, gli Houthi hanno colpito ripetutamente il territorio del Regno, fino agli attacchi su Riyadh e sull’impianto Aramco di Yanbu. È il prolungamento, sul versante saudita, della guerra più ampia aperta dai raid statunitensi e israeliani sullo Yemen.
Il dato che conta, però, è la distanza fra il linguaggio del trattato e la postura reale dei suoi membri. Fidan offre sostegno «tecnico», non truppe. Islamabad precisa che nessuna reazione militare è in discussione e che agirà «quando sarà il momento». Washington, dal canto suo, ha respinto le richieste saudite di appoggio diretto. Tutti invocano la solidarietà; nessuno impegna forze sul terreno. Quella reticenza condivisa non è timidezza diplomatica: è il vero oggetto dell’analisi.
La lunga storia di vittorie yemenite contro la Turchia
Fra i tre firmatari, la Turchia è l’unico per cui lo Yemen non è un’astrazione strategica ma una ferita di archivio. Gli ottomani vi entrarono due volte, e due volte ne uscirono sconfitti. La prima occupazione data al 1538, dettata dalla necessità di proteggere le rotte del Mar Rosso dai portoghesi e di custodire l’accesso ai luoghi santi. Presero la Tihama e Sanaa, ma l’altopiano zaydita non fu mai domato per intero; dopo quasi un secolo di guerra intermittente, entro il 1635 gli imam qasimidi li avevano espulsi dal paese. Sul primo ciclo, ricordiamo la conquista del 1538, la rifondazione dell’imamato zaydita a opera di al-Mansur al-Qasim (1597) e la completa espulsione ottomana entro il 1635-1636 a opera degli imam qasimidi. La seconda occupazione si consuma tra l’occupazione della Tihama (1849), la presa di Sanaa (1872) e il ritiro definitivo dopo il 1918.
Il ritorno, a metà Ottocento, fu peggiore. L’occupazione della Tihama e la presa di Sanaa, incentivate dall’apertura del Canale di Suez nel 1869 e dal controllo del Mar Rosso, inaugurarono decenni di rivolta permanente. Le sollevazioni dell’imam Yahya resero l’altopiano ingovernabile con la forza, finché il Trattato di Daan del 9 ottobre 1911 ne riconobbe l’autorità sugli zayditi: la registrazione formale di uno stallo che nessuna spedizione riusciva a rompere. Il ritiro definitivo arrivò dopo il 1918. Il bilancio, lungo la seconda occupazione e la campagna della Grande Guerra, si conta in decine di migliaia di caduti; a ucciderli fu più la malattia che la battaglia. Non a caso lo Yemen entrò nel lessico ottomano come «tomba dei turchi», e il cimitero militare di Sanaa ne custodisce ancora l’inventario. Le perdite ottomane in Yemen lungo la seconda occupazione e la campagna dell’Arabia meridionale nella Grande Guerra si contano nell’ordine delle decine di migliaia complessive, con la malattia — non il combattimento — quale causa prevalente, in linea con la mortalità dell’esercito ottomano nel suo insieme. Il cimitero militare turco di Sanaa, restaurato nel 2011, ne conserva la memoria.
Ridurre tutto alla nostalgia neo-ottomana sarebbe però un errore di prospettiva, perché il problema non è ottomano: è geografico e sociale. Lo stesso terreno ha disfatto altri. L’Egitto nasseriano vi si impantanò tra il 1962 e il 1967, in quello che molti chiamarono il suo Vietnam; la coalizione a guida saudita, dal 2015, ha riversato sull’altopiano anni di potenza aerea e denaro senza mai sottometterlo. L’intervento egiziano nella guerra civile nord-yemenita (1962-1967), costato a Nasser un logoramento spesso paragonato a un «Vietnam» arabo, e la coalizione a guida saudita attiva dal 2015 confermano lo stesso esito: potenza di fuoco e risorse ingenti, altopiano mai sottomesso.
La ragione è strutturale. La verticalità del territorio, i villaggi-fortezza, una struttura tribale che assorbe e sopravvive all’occupante, e una tradizione religioso-politica — la dottrina zaydita del dovere di insorgere contro il sovrano ingiusto — che rigenera la resistenza a ogni generazione: sono i fattori che premiano il difensore e dissanguano chi proietta forza dall’esterno. Gli Houthi sono l’ultima incarnazione di questa costante, non un’anomalia. Ed è precisamente per questo che gli attori esterni scelgono il registro navale — il Mar Rosso, Bab al-Mandab, la forza marittima a guida saudita di cui si parla: perché li tiene lontani dalla terra.
Una memoria incancellabile
La provocazione da cui siamo partiti — la Turchia «impaziente» di rivivere la sua disfatta — capovolge dunque la logica dei fatti. La memoria dello Yemen non tenta Ankara: la disciplina. La Turchia di Erdoğan si è proiettata in molti teatri, dalla Siria alla Libia, dal Nord dell’Iraq al Caucaso attraverso l’Azerbaigian, ma sempre dove poteva applicare forza decisiva e circoscritta o agire per procura, mai dentro un’insurrezione d’altopiano priva di via d’uscita. Il fraseggio prudente di Fidan — bisogni «tecnici», patto che «non sostituisce le alleanze esistenti» e semmai «potrà allargarsi» — è il linguaggio di una potenza che vuole il dividendo politico della solidarietà senza la sua ipoteca militare.
Letto in chiave multipolare, il Patto della Mecca è un riallineamento sunnita sotto regia saudita-turco-pakistana, una copertura che matura mentre le garanzie statunitensi si mostrano condizionate, ma un trattato di difesa collettiva calibrato sull’articolo 5 incontra il suo limite proprio qui: quel modello risponde all’aggressione di uno Stato attraverso un confine, non possiede una dottrina contro un attore non statale che non si può conquistare e non si lascia dissuadere. È lo scarto tra la grammatica dell’alleanza e la natura dell’avversario.
Sul piano previsionale, e con un orizzonte di dodici mesi: è probabile che il sostegno turco resti tecnico — difesa aerea, sorveglianza, munizioni, consiglieri — anziché tradursi in dispiegamento combattente; è altamente improbabile che Ankara impegni truppe di terra in Yemen.
Gli indicatori che smentirebbero questa lettura sono netti e osservabili: l’arrivo di reparti da combattimento turchi o pakistani, un’attivazione formale della clausola di mutua difesa, il passaggio dall’interdizione navale nel Mar Rosso a operazioni terrestri sull’altopiano. Fino ad allora, il valore del patto sarà di segnale e di deterrenza per associazione, non di strumento contro gli Houthi.
Il cimitero degli imperi, del resto, non ha bisogno di essere riaperto per continuare a funzionare: gli basta essere ricordato.
Al Mayadeen | September 29, 2026
Head of the Political Council of the Iraqi Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Sheikh Ali al-Asadi, criticized Baghdad’s decision to prevent Iranian aircraft from landing at Iraqi airports, stressing that it constitutes compliance with US pressure and warning that popular action could follow if the decision is not reversed.
Speaking to Al Mayadeen, al-Asadi said, “We regret the decision by the Iraqi authorities to prevent Iranian aircraft from landing in Iraq.” He described the decision as “submission to American bullying,” adding, “The Iraqi decision-maker must reconsider it; otherwise there will be popular pressure aimed at changing the decision.”
He said the issue extends beyond Iraqi airports, invoking longstanding ties between Iraq and Iran. “The issue goes beyond airports. There are close relations with Iran, and therefore we must not bow to an irresponsible decision by America,” he said. “Popular options will be the most pressing, and all possibilities are on the table.”
Sheikh al-Asadi attributed growing US influence in Iraq to weaknesses among domestic political actors. “The weakness of the domestic political actor has allowed the American occupation to impose its decisions in Iraq,” he said, adding, “The decision-maker can choose not to implement American decisions, as some countries do.”
He stressed that “the decision must be sovereign and independent politically, economically, and in terms of security,” defining sovereignty as “complete independence, with Iraq being the decision-maker in all aspects of life.
According to Sheikh al-Asadi, “There are personal and partisan interests behind the absence of independence in decision-making.” He also accused Iraq’s political class of adopting contradictory positions toward Washington, slamming duality in the political class: on the one hand, it agrees to American decisions, while on the other, it condemns them.
He added, “The Resistance’s positions have been clear from the beginning, while the Iraqi politicians have ambiguity and complications.”
Iraq’s main problem is corruption
Turning to the issue of weapons and the debate over their regulation, Sheikh al-Asadi said his movement had held discussions with the Coordination Framework and rejected the term “weapons confinement”. “We discussed the matter with the Coordination Framework and rejected the term ‘weapons confinement.’ We established that the term is harmful and changed it to ‘weapons regulation,’” he said. “Iraq’s biggest problem is corruption, not weapons,” he asserted.
“We are in favor of the Dawn Strike against corruption, but we want it to continue. There are clearly identified corrupt figures, and the law must be applied to them,” the Iraqi leader said. He also expressed deep distrust of Washington, saying, “We do not trust the Americans one iota, and they do not keep their word.” He added, “What happened with Iran is the biggest proof that the Americans do not keep their word. They struck Iran during negotiations, and this is proof of their treachery.”
US assassination unit, like Blackwater
Shikh al-Asadi said Iraq should remain free of US interference in its internal affairs. “Iraq must be free, and the American envoy must not interfere in economic, security, or political affairs,” he said. He added that his movement had information about US activities in Iraq, saying, “We have information about all the American movements and about the division they established, which includes Iraqis under their supervision.”
“We know where this division is located and what its duties will be in the coming phase, and all of this is being monitored,” Sheikh al-Asadi warned. He revealed that the goal behind the creation of this division is to carry out assassinations and create discord, saying, “It is like ‘Blackwater’ under another name.”
He added, “The American movement is suspicious, and they have security companies that entered to compensate for the American military withdrawal.”
Al-Nujaba rejects political participation under current system
Sheikh al-Asadi said Nujaba had no decision to participate in Iraq’s political process. “We in Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba have no decision to engage in the political process, and we are not convinced by the way it is being managed,” he said.
On the issue of weapons, he told Al Mayadeen, “The conditions for handing over weapons are ending the American occupation and all foreign presence, including the Turkish presence.”
He added that the Peshmerga should fall under the command of Iraq’s commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and warned that “the separatist factions are one of Iraq’s problems, and whenever Resistance intervention is necessary, we will intervene in every inch of Iraqi territory.”
Sheikh al-Asadi further argued that the continuation of armed resistance was linked to the circumstances that justify it: “The resistance has its justifications for resistance, and when these justifications end, so does resistance,” reminding that the justifications do not end with the mere withdrawal of the remaining foreign troops in the country.
Iraq’s leadership must use its leverage
Al-Nujaba’s top official said Iraq’s political leadership must understand the country’s sources of strength and leverage and use them to advance its independence and sovereignty.
Speaking about Iraq’s leadership, Sheikh al-Asadi said he believed the current political figure in question “wants to serve the public interest and do the required work,” describing him as someone who is acting “based on his Shia identity, if I may put it that way.” However, he said the figure is “new to politics” and lacks advisors genuinely committed to helping him succeed.
“Unfortunately, he does not have advisors who are genuinely committed to making his experience successful. Rather, his advisors are concerned with making themselves successful,” Sheikh al-Asadi said.
He stressed that the advisors attempt to influence the political leadership based on what they receive from Washington, adding, “They do not want to help him become a successful figure who can lead during this stage and perhaps the next stage.”
“Whoever leads Iraq must understand what Iraq truly is and what the cards of strength and leverage in Iraq are,” he said. He questioned the interests of foreign powers in Iraq, asking, “Who needs Iraq? Does Europe not need Iraq? Does Turkey not need Iraq?”
Sheikh al-Asadi also pointed to the Development Road project, asking, “Doesn’t the Development Road that they are talking about need Iraq?”
“All of these are leverage cards a political actor can use to achieve what he wants,” he said. “He can even use the cards held by the Resistance factions as leverage. We are offering him this card and telling him: Use us for the sake of serving Iraq.”
Al-Asadi says US sought to persuade factions to give up weapons
According to Sheikh al-Asadi, several US allies had contacted his movement seeking a truce. “Many of America’s allies sent us messages asking for a truce, including the American chargé d’affaires who “tried to contact us through one of the politicians and asked to meet with us.”
He also said US officials had offered projects and incentives in exchange for abandoning strategic weapons. “The Americans offered projects and incentives on condition that we give up our strategic weapons that reach Israel, but we rejected them,” the Iraqi official said. He warned that US pressure would continue even if armed factions surrendered their weapons, saying, “American pressure does not stop at any point. Even if the factions hand over their weapons, they will move on to the Popular Mobilization Forces and then to the Defense Ministry.”
He concluded by highlighting that Washington had sought for years to alter the leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces. “The main American project for years has sought to change the leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces and dilute it, but the religious authority and some politicians rejected that,” Sheikh al-Asadi said.


Al Mayadeen | September 26, 2026
International flights from Iran to several destinations remain operational despite the expansion of US sanctions targeting the country’s aviation sector, according to Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport.
The airport said Saturday that flights to Turkey, Malaysia, China, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Afghanistan were continuing according to their previously announced schedules.
The announcement comes as Washington escalates economic pressure on Iran and seeks to restrict the ability of Iranian airlines to maintain international operations.
Iranian flights continue despite sanctions
Imam Khomeini International Airport said that, aside from flights already canceled, no additional cancellations had been announced.
The canceled services include flights involving the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Oman, and Georgia.
The airport also said it was working to restore suspended air connections as soon as possible.
The continued operation of several international routes comes despite growing restrictions on Iranian aviation following a new round of US sanctions announced on September 8.
The measures have affected Iranian airlines as well as companies and intermediaries involved in providing services to the country’s aviation sector.
Recent reporting indicates that Iranian carriers have continued operating some international services despite the sanctions, including flights to China, Turkey, Thailand, and Afghanistan.
US measures target Iran’s aviation sector
The US Treasury Department announced sanctions on September 8 against 36 targets linked to Iran’s aviation sector, including 27 Iranian airlines. Washington described the measures as an effort to target what it considers Iran’s remaining unsanctioned carriers and the networks supporting them.
The sanctions form part of a broader US campaign to restrict Iran’s access to international financial and commercial networks.
The measures have also placed pressure on foreign companies providing Iranian carriers with fuel, ground handling, aircraft-related services, and other forms of support.
The consequences, however, have varied by country. While some governments and companies have restricted Iranian aviation connections, other countries have continued to facilitate flights.
Iraq restrictions trigger backlash
In Iraq, the suspension of Iranian flights, particularly through Najaf International Airport, has triggered criticism from official, political, factional, and religious quarters.
Several Iraqi parties and figures have called for the decision to be reversed and rejected what they described as US pressure on Baghdad.
The Iraqi government is also moving toward dialogue with Washington in an effort to secure an exemption that would allow air links with Iran to resume.
Ali Akbar Velayati, international affairs advisor to Iran’s Leader, said the restrictions on Iranian flights were part of an effort by Iran’s enemies to compensate for their battlefield defeat by attempting to dismantle the “unity of the fronts” from within.
The Iranian Ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al-Sadegh, further told Iran’s ISNA news agency that a new decision surrounding Iranian flights to Iraq is likely to be announced soon.
He added that Iran is in contact with Iraqi officials and proposals on the matter have been submitted.
Al-e Sadegh noted that roughly 12,000 to 13,000 people travel between Iraq and Iran via Iranian airlines.
China maintains air links with Iran
China has maintained its opposition to unilateral US sanctions and continued to receive Iranian flights.
Flight-tracking data cited in recent reports showed Iranian services continuing to operate to Chinese destinations after the latest US measures took effect.
The continued connections with China also reflect the broader geopolitical divide over Washington’s unilateral sanctions policy, with Beijing maintaining economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran despite US pressure.


Al Mayadeen | September 25, 2026
Turkey’s Parliament is expected to consider the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan next month, Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmus told reporters on Friday, as the three countries move to establish mechanisms for implementing the pact.
Kurtulmus said the agreement has not yet been submitted to Parliament for ratification and is expected to be formally presented once lawmakers return from recess next month. He added that international agreements require parliamentary approval to enter into force in Turkey, while meetings currently being held under the agreement remain preparatory.
Turkey prepares to ratify Mecca defense agreement
Kurtulmus made the remarks to reporters in Ankara, confirming that the agreement has yet to reach Parliament despite ongoing coordination among Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad.
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement was signed on August 7 by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Mecca.
The agreement states that an armed attack against any one of the three countries would be regarded as an attack against all three, while providing for expanded defense cooperation and collective deterrence.
The pact is therefore moving from its initial political agreement toward institutional and legal implementation, with parliamentary approval constituting a key step for Turkey.
When asked about the claim that the Mecca agreement was against Iran, Kurtulmus denied the allegation and stated that the main source of the region’s problems was “Israel” and its aggressive policies.
He reminded parliamentarians that “Israel” launched multiple attacks on numerous nations without question as part of its hostile policies, and explained that the balance of power has completely changed following the US-Israeli war on Iran.
“We propose that the countries in the region increase their cooperation to establish and secure their own security,” he said. “We absolutely do not, and should never, view the Mecca Agreement as an agreement against Iran. The Mecca Agreement, and perhaps even its expansion to include Iran and other regional countries, should become an agreement that ensures the security of the regional countries and, more broadly, the Islamic world.”
Kurtulmus added that the agreement was not formed as a threat to any country as it’s an agreement for the promotion of unity, solidarity, and security of the region.
“It is still in its initial stages and is not yet fully formed,” he said. “We hope that with the participation of other regional countries, it will become a much stronger agreement.”
Saudi Arabia calls for military coordination
The development comes as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan prepare for an urgent meeting of their military chiefs, amid Saudi Arabia’s aggression on Yemen.
Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry announced Friday that the chiefs of staff of the three countries would meet to discuss ways to support the Kingdom under the terms of the Mecca agreement.
The announcement followed a meeting in New York between Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. The Saudi statement did not specify when the military chiefs would meet or what form potential support could take.
Pact moves toward institutionalization
The three countries have already begun establishing mechanisms to implement the agreement.
At a Strategic Political and Defense Committee meeting in Istanbul on August 31, the three sides agreed to establish a secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Pakistani secretary-general for three years.
They also agreed to strengthen military capabilities through joint activities, defense-industry cooperation, technology development, and production.






Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said after the first session that work was underway on a roadmap for other countries.
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