The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) will provide a long-term loan of up to 102 billion tenge (US$224.2 million) to Alatau Zharyk Company (AZhC) to modernize its electricity distribution infrastructure and expand digitalization, writes Dana Omirgazy.
The financing will help AZhC, a regional electricity distribution company supplying around 4 million people and around 50,000 commercial consumers in Almaty and the region, procure automated metering and telemechanic equipment and upgrade its low- and medium-voltage electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure, the bank’s press service reported on Sept. 7. The project is part of Kazakhstan’s National Project for the Modernization of Energy and Utility Sectors (MEKS), a government-led program to modernize heat, electricity, water supply and sewerage networks and facilities.
The EBRD-supported investment will further digitize AZhC by installing smart meters at substations and piloting smart grid technologies. It will also strengthen the company’s cybersecurity and support related efforts at Samruk-Energy, AZhC’s parent company. The modernization is expected to generate annual electricity savings of approximately 22 gigawatt-hours (GWh) and reduce annual CO2 emissions by around 12,000 tons. It is also expected to support renewable energy growth in the Almaty Region.
As part of the five-year enhanced partnership framework between Kazakhstan and the EBRD, the project will also support Alatau city’s development by reconstructing the Zhetygen electricity substation and an associated 110-kilovolt (kV) transmission line. The EBRD has invested almost $13.6 billion in Kazakhstan through 358 projects, making the country the largest and longest-running recipient of EBRD investment in Central Asia.
Kazakhstan is developing Alatau City near Almaty as a new regional centre for manufacturing, logistics, technology and finance. Its investment pipeline has expanded to 67 projects worth nearly $6.9 billion, with the potential to create around 55,000 jobs. Projects involving PepsiCo, Sunny Paper, Mars Petcare KZ and several logistics companies are already at different stages of implementation. The project is supported by a special legal regime, but experts say its long-term success will depend on sustained investment, effective governance and the development of a competitive economic ecosystem.
https://astanatimes.com/2026/09/alatau-city-can-kazakhstan-build-regional-economic-hub-from-scratch
Astana is looking for more ways to move its oil. Russia, its principal export outlet, is rife with disruptions. Damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) Black Sea terminal in November 2025 suppressed exports into early 2026, while the recent July attacks on tankers threatened roughly 1.5 million barrels per day, writes Joseph Shumunov.
The vulnerability would not be so enormous if 80% of Kazakh oil exports did not move through the CPC terminal near Novorossiysk. But is Kazakhstan merely searching for emergency alternatives amid instability? Or is this a transformation it has been preparing for? The answer is consequential: Kazakhstan is attempting a wholesale upgrade of its oil-export strategy, one befitting a rising regional power. It is moving from rational efficiency toward strategic resilience, from accepting routes toward shaping them, and from concentrated dependence toward managed interdependence.
Although the CPC will remain dominant through 2030, Astana is seeking greater control over the risks, partnerships and infrastructure connecting its oil to international markets. From rational efficiency to strategic resilience The CPC transports Kazakh oil, particularly from Tengiz, to global markets, making it the most commercially attractive route. When it was created in 1992, a fledgling independent Kazakhstan was looking to enter international energy markets. The CPC was the rational choice. It, for instance, transported up to 1.3 million barrels per day back in 2021; avoided the additional loading, shipping and crossing costs of a Trans-Caspian route; and its 1,510-kilometer pipeline, according to area studies analyst Ilya Roubanis, would be extremely difficult to replicate. Astana selected efficiency while adjusting to a new geopolitical environment. Contrast this with Azerbaijan. According to Ken Moriyasu, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, Azerbaijan chose the expensive option.
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline through Georgia and Türkiye required what he called an “insurance premium for strategic autonomy” to avoid dependence on competing producers. Kazakhstan captured the CPC’s immediate savings but accepted greater concentration risk. The stakes will rise alongside production. The KazEnergy 2023 National Energy Report anticipated high output from Tengiz, Kashagan and Karachaganak, with national production potentially reaching 105 million tons. Higher output requires dependable market access; otherwise, its advantage can be undermined by one constrained route.
The lesson is simple: the cheapest route is not necessarily the least costly once the consequences of interruption are included. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev affirmed as much in 2024: “With unprecedented international turbulence, the priority is to further diversify export routes.” Diversification, however, requires more than identifying alternatives. It requires Kazakhstan to help shape the infrastructure and partnerships behind them.
From route-taker to route-shaper
As a landlocked, post-Soviet producer, Kazakhstan has historically been constrained by existing pipelines and neighboring states. Its role was simple: produce oil and insert it into available routes. But Kazakhstan does not have to remain a route-taker. Although it cannot independently control its export geography, it can shape the terms on which that geography operates. It can negotiate access to multiple corridors, invest in tankers, coordinate with transit states and treat infrastructure as an instrument of foreign policy. Nowhere is Kazakhstan assuming this route-shaper role more clearly than in the Caspian. Tokayev identified the Trans-Caspian route as a “priority” in 2022.
KazMunayGas and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR subsequently agreed to transport approximately 1.5 million tons annually through BTC, while Kazakhstan added the Caspian’s Taraz and Liwa tankers to its fleet, each with an 8,000-tonne capacity. This gradual Caspianization continues. KazTransOil supplied 155,000 tons of Kazakh oil to BTC through Aktau in July, an 11.5% increase over the previous year. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan plans to transport 2.2 million tons through BTC in 2026. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have also discussed using the idle Baku–Supsa pipeline for between three million and five million tons of Kazakh crude. But this role has limits. According to Andy Kuchins, a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest, major expansion would require high capital expenditure, long-term purchase commitments and several years of construction.
Oil majors like ExxonMobil and BP are “more reluctant now as compared to the 1990s” to finance large projects in remote markets. The direction is nevertheless clear: Kazakhstan is moving from accepting the routes geography provides toward assembling the infrastructure and partnerships it needs. It is not yet a fully fledged route-shaper, but it is steadily behaving like one—using new routes not to eliminate dependence, but to distribute it more strategically. From concentrated dependence to managed interdependence Every export option depends on another state, infrastructure operator, or external market.
Self-reliance is not realistic. Kuchins nevertheless argues that Astana can “reduce concentration of its dependence on Russia.” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy reported 73.4 million tons of oil exports during the first eleven months of 2025. Separately reported full-year route data show 64.8 million tons transported through the CPC, 9.3 million through Atyrau–Samara, 3.5 million through Aktau, 1.1 million through Atasu–Alashankou toward China, and approximately 100,000 by rail. Of the 78.8 million tons accounted for in this route-level data, approximately 94% moved through the two Russian corridors. Kazakhstan therefore possesses several export routes, but its portfolio remains highly asymmetrical. Herein lies its greatest oil-policy shift: managed interdependence.
This means distributing export relationships so that no transit state possesses overwhelming influence over Kazakhstan’s market access. Each direction performs a different function. And at the moment, Kazakhstan is assessing four directions—some mainstay, some new. The Russian route The CPC will remain dominant because it offers unmatched capacity, established infrastructure and lower costs. Kuchins and Roubanis expect structural dependence to persist through 2030. Following the Tengiz expansion, Kazakhstan may become more dependent on the CPC in the short term even as its long-term strategy diversifies.
Diversification does not require abandoning the CPC; it requires making an interruption less damaging. The Trans-Caspian route BTC could absorb Kazakh crude as Azerbaijani production declines, while Baku–Supsa could provide another outlet. Neither would match CPC volumes, but together they would widen access to global buyers. Europe also has a stake in this. The European Union imported 52.4 million tons of Kazakh crude just in 2024, making Kazakhstan its third-largest external supplier. If Europe wants westward diversification, it must help make projects bankable through financing and long-term commitments. Brussels and its partners are therefore mobilizing 10 billion euros to improve transport connections with Central Asia. According to Roubanis, “building ties with the region in the short run is necessary for the EU’s long-term positioning.”
The push indicates that Trans-Caspian connectivity is not just a Kazakh interest, but one shared by the whole region. The Chinese route China may offer the easiest immediately available opportunity to reduce dependence on Russia. The Kazakhstan–China pipeline transported 19.5 million tons in 2025, but that included domestic deliveries and Russian transit. Direct Kazakh crude exports through Atasu–Alashankou were planned to be 1 million tons in 2025, compared to the more than 11 million tons per year flowing with non-Kazakh suppliers. China remains a credible expansion market and willing financier. Yet the fastest way to reduce Russian dependence could deepen dependence on China. Moriyasu similarly argues that Kazakhstan does not want to exchange one concentrated dependency for another.
Unlike the Trans-Caspian route, China provides access to one principal market rather than multiple global buyers. The Southern route A corridor through Iran—possibly toward Pakistan and India—could be compelling but faces formidable political and economic obstacles. But it should not be dismissed altogether. Moriyasu suggests that “Iran offers Central Asia one of its shortest routes to warm-water ports.” Although current geopolitical conditions severely constrain this option, he argues that “infrastructure Kazakhstan builds today will still be operating decades from now. Astana should therefore avoid making long-term infrastructure decisions on the assumption that today’s geopolitical map is permanent.”
The southern route’s present value lies in preserving a long-term option, not in providing a realistic alternative before 2030. From east to west and north to south, Kazakhstan is not moving from dependence to independence. It is moving from one dominant dependency toward a deliberately balanced portfolio of interdependence. A more advanced role, but not autonomy Kazakhstan’s transformation should not be measured by whether the CPC ceases to dominate. By 2030, it will likely remain the principal corridor as Trans-Caspian volumes rise incrementally and eastbound capacity becomes more important amid regional instability and escalation.
The resulting portfolio will be broader, though still asymmetrical. The strategy is itself an upgrade—a threefold one. Resilience is becoming the objective, route-shaping the emerging function, and managed interdependence the organizing principle. Looking forward, Kazakhstan’s strategic upgrade lies not in escaping geography, but in developing the infrastructure, partnerships and political leverage needed to manage geography more effectively.
The author is Joseph Shumunov, a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Topchubashov Center in Baku, Azerbaijan, and a Fellow at Nightingale Intelligence.
President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for deeper practical co-operation between Kazakhstan and BRICS countries in trade, logistics, artificial intelligence, critical minerals and water security, positioning the format as a platform for broader economic ties amid growing geopolitical fragmentation.
Speaking at the BRICS Plus plenary session in New Delhi on Sept. 13, Tokayev said Kazakhstan sees cooperation with the group as an opportunity to expand access to new markets, attract investment, strengthen transport links and advance technological development. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev during the BRICS Plus plenary session in New Delhi on Sept. 13.
Tokayev described the current global environment as an era of “great fragmentation,” a term used in the 2026 Global Peace Index to characterize geopolitical confrontation, rising militarization, weakening multilateral institutions and growing trade barriers. He noted that BRICS, representing nearly half of the world’s population and around 40% of global GDP, has both the capacity and responsibility to help overcome global divisions and deliver concrete results. “Peace and strategic stability are necessary conditions for economic and sustainable development,”
Tokayev said, calling for a shift from the de-escalation of individual conflicts toward long-term stability based on political dialogue and diplomacy. Against this backdrop, Tokayev positioned BRICS as a platform for practical cooperation rather than an alternative to the existing international system.
“As a partner country, Kazakhstan views BRICS as an open platform for practical cooperation that complements the multilateral system with the central role of the United Nations and connects peoples, regions and markets,” he said. He added that Kazakhstan always seeks to find a “common ground on every difficult issue,” describing the approach as consistent with the country’s “balanced, goal-oriented foreign policy.” Anastasia Golyakova, founder of the ThinkBricks YouTube channel, said the approach reflects BRICS’ broader focus on resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability, priorities that have gained greater relevance amid rising geopolitical tensions.
Anastasia Golyakova, founder of the ThinkBricks YouTube channel. said closer cooperation among BRICS members could help address shared challenges while giving partner countries such as Kazakhstan greater access to the bloc’s growing trade, investment and technological opportunities. “BRICS gives much support to each other. So, from this point of view, for Kazakhstan, it’s a prosperous future, in my opinion,” Golyakova told The Astana Times.
Ayanangsha Maitra, an editor and a geopolitics specialist, echoed this view, saying Kazakhstan’s BRICS partnership could open new opportunities for economic cooperation and market access. “Although Kazakhstan is not a full BRICS member, its partnership with the grouping adds value at a time of growing geopolitical tensions and economic uncertainty,” Maitra told The Astana Times.
“BRICS could offer Kazakhstan additional avenues for cooperation with countries beyond its traditional economic and political partners,” he added. Expanding trade and investment The economic dimension of Kazakhstan’s BRICS engagement was central to Tokayev’s address. According to him, trade between Kazakhstan and BRICS members and partners was around $72 billion in 2025. “Having significant industrial, transit and technological potential, we intend to diversify trade, economic and investment ties with all BRICS countries.
As chairman of the Eurasian Economic Union, Kazakhstan supports the expansion of economic cooperation with BRICS and the advancement of work on concluding a free trade agreement with India,” Tokayev said.
Tokayev also called on the New Development Bank, a multilateral development bank established by the group, to consider financing commercially viable projects in BRICS countries, including Kazakhstan.
Maitra identified critical minerals, jewelry, fashion and textiles as areas with potential to expand Kazakhstan-India trade. “Despite Kazakhstan’s relatively modest population of around 20 million, the country has a strong entrepreneurial spirit and growing commercial links with India,” he said, pointing to increasing connectivity between the two countries.
Turning geography into connectivity Transport connectivity was another central element of Tokayev’s vision. “Last year, transit cargo volumes through Kazakhstan approached 40 million tons. Our long-term goal is to increase that figure to 100 million tons annually. Overall, our transit network already handles up to 85% of overland freight between China and Europe,” he said.
As part of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, Kazakhstan serves as a link between Asia and Europe through the Caspian Sea. Tokayev called for greater synergy between the Trans-Caspian route, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the International North-South Transport Corridor. Maitra highlighted that Kazakhstan’s position within the EAEU, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides access to major regional markets. Its participation in the International North-South Transport Corridor adds another layer of connectivity.
“BRICS could expand that network beyond Kazakhstan’s traditional regional partners. The partnership adds another dimension by opening access to markets across a wider group of countries,” he said. AI as a new layer of cooperation AI represents another area where Kazakhstan sees room for practical BRICS cooperation.
Tokayev said Kazakhstan is ready to use its computing infrastructure and national and UN digital centers to expand cooperation in AI and proposed establishing a BRICS Plus Partnership in Artificial Intelligence. The initiative, he said, could connect national AI centers, facilitate access to laboratories and research projects and support the development of multilingual AI solutions.
For Maitra, AI could also become an important area of Kazakhstan-India cooperation because the two countries bring complementary strengths. “India has a strong IT sector and a large pool of software engineers and technology professionals, while Kazakhstan has established connections across the CIS and wider Eurasian markets. That combination could help Indian technology companies reach markets where language and regional expertise remain barriers,” he said. Water security broadens the agenda Tokayev also linked sustainability to one of the country’s longstanding international priorities: water security. He reiterated Kazakhstan’s proposal to establish an International Water Organization as a specialized UN agency, arguing that global water governance remains fragmented and requires stronger international coordination.
“I invite the BRICS member states and partners to join the international consultations initiated by our country,” Tokayev said. Meeting with Narendra Modi On the sidelines of the summit, Tokayev also met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, highlighting India’s growing economic and technological weight and the expanding relationship between the two countries. Modi highlighted the potential for closer ties in high technology and the creative industries, including cooperation between Astana Hub and Hyderabad’s Cyberabad technology ecosystem. He also invited Kazakh representatives, particularly young people, to take part in the WAVES creative industries summit in Mumbai next year. The two leaders also discussed prospects for expanding economic ties between India and the Eurasian Economic Union.
Tokayev said Kazakhstan, as the current chair of the EAEU, supports negotiations on a free trade agreement between the bloc and India and is ready to help advance the process. Tokayev said around 600 companies with Indian capital operate in Kazakhstan, while nearly 150,000 Indian citizens visited the country last year. He also cited the large number of Indian students studying in Kazakhstan and cooperation between Astana and New Delhi within international organizations.
Long constrained by its landlocked geography, Kazakhstan is seeking to turn its position between Europe and Asia into a source of economic and geopolitical leverage. As trade disruptions and competition drive demand for diversified supply chains, Astana is investing in new transport corridors to establish itself as an indispensable transit hub and translate connectivity into diplomatic influence.
The Middle Corridor route
“Transport diplomacy has long been a pillar of economic diplomacy. Today, efficient transport and logistics networks are becoming strategic assets that shape economic competitiveness, and a country’s role in regional economic cooperation,” Head of Research Department of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) Alexey Kuznetsov told The
Astana Times.
Alexey Kuznetsov, Head of Research Department of the Eurasian Development Bank. Photo credit: The EDB’s press service Located between China, Europe, Russia, Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan is developing railways, roads, ports and logistics hubs while expanding connections along several international transport corridors. The scale of the sector is reflected in recent figures. Kazakhstan transported 540.5 million tons of cargo in January-July, up 0.9% from the same period a year earlier, according to the Bureau of National Statistics.
Cargo turnover increased 1%, while road freight transportation grew 6.2%. Government data shows that transit freight reached 21.7 million tons in January-June, up 24% from 17.5 million tons a year earlier. Building Eurasian connectivity Kazakhstan is seeking to strengthen its role not simply as a transit country but as a major regional connectivity hub. “For Kazakhstan, modern transport, logistics, and warehousing infrastructure are essential for addressing the challenges of a landlocked geography.
"At the same time, the country has become one of Eurasia’s most important transit hubs,” said Kuznetsov. He said international transport and logistics partnerships are central to Kazakhstan’s connectivity diplomacy, positioning the country as an influential player in shaping Eurasia’s regional agenda. According to the EDB’s Transport Projects Observatory, Kazakhstan accounts for 53% of transport corridor investments planned or under implementation in Central Asia through 2035.
“More than $32 billion is expected to be invested in 55 major transport projects, including construction of the Center-West motorway, the Uralsk-Atyrau and Kyzylorda-Saksaulsk roads, and the Moiynty-Kyzylzhar railway. These investments will strengthen East-West and North-South trade routes and further position Kazakhstan as a strategic transport crossroads linking Europe and Asia,” Kuznetsov said. Road construction, reconstruction and repairs cover around 11,000 kilometers nationwide in 2026. Kazakhstan also plans to repair 11,000 kilometers of railway tracks by 2029. International financing is supporting part of the expansion.
In February, the World Bank approved an $846 million guarantee to mobilize $1.41 billion in commercial financing for a major railway connectivity project along Kazakhstan’s section of the Middle Corridor. However, Kuznetsov emphasized that infrastructure alone cannot determine whether a transport route succeeds. “Transport connectivity depends equally on ‘soft infrastructure’: harmonized regulations, efficient border-crossing procedures, coordinated corridor development, and digitalization of transport services and documentation,” he said.
The World Bank estimates cited by Kuznetsov suggest that cutting border delays by 50% through regulatory harmonization and digital solutions could increase exports from Central Asian countries along transport corridors by an average of 18%. For Kazakhstan, this means that the competitiveness of its routes will depend not only on the number of roads, railways and terminals built, but also on how efficiently they operate.
The Middle Corridor and geopolitics At the center of Kazakhstan’s connectivity strategy is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which connects China with Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Europe. For political scientist Tair Naumov, the importance of such routes extends beyond trade. “Investment in transit infrastructure requires a certain level of trust between countries, including confidence in political relations and the security of investments,” Naumov said in an interview with The Astana Times. Once a route becomes operational, however, it can also strengthen those relations by creating greater economic interdependence.
“When countries rely on the same transport routes, their interests become more closely connected. If a corridor becomes important to foreign trade, there is a stronger incentive to maintain stable relations and keep existing agreements in place,” he said. Naumov noted that this interdependence can eventually acquire a security dimension. “If a country becomes an important transit hub, its stability becomes an interest not only for the country itself but also for its neighbors and major trading partners,” he said. Damir Kayumov, PhD, with a bachelor’s degree in economics and law. Damir Kayumov, PhD, with a bachelor’s degree in economics and law, takes a similar view, emphasizing the economic interests created by shared logistics networks.
“Good logistics creates mutual interest between countries. The more participants there are, the safer it becomes. And the more economic ties pass through Kazakhstan, the greater its role in the region,” Kayumov told The Astana Times. The Middle Corridor illustrates this dynamic. While it does not yet account for a dominant share of Kazakhstan’s transit flows, its rapid growth could give it greater strategic importance.
From transit to economic value
For Kazakhstan, stronger economic ties along these routes are only part of the opportunity. The bigger question is how the country can turn growing transit flows into broader economic value at home.
“I would not reduce the transport strategy to transit alone. If a container simply passes through Kazakhstan, the country earns comparatively little. It is much more interesting when logistics centers, warehouses, manufacturing and service companies emerge alongside the route,” Kayumov said. Such an approach would allow Kazakhstan to capture more value from its position in Eurasian supply chains. “Then the transport corridor begins to work for the regions and for our industry. Kazakhstan receives much more income. The service model that develops around the entire flow allows us to earn more and create more jobs,” he said.
Kayumov noted that attracting cargo also requires competitive and predictable routes. Border delays, limited port capacity, container shortages and differences in procedures can increase costs and make a route less attractive to businesses. “A convenient route must be fast, clear and predictable. For business, it matters how long cargo remains at the border, how quickly documents are processed and how much railway capacity is available,” he said. According to Kayumov, digitalization can help address some of these challenges. Electronic document management, for example, can reduce corruption risks while speeding up operations.
TRIPP and the wider connectivity network
The development of new routes beyond Kazakhstan could expand the country’s connectivity options. The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is a proposed transport link through Armenia connecting Azerbaijan proper with its Nakhchivan exclave. Kazakhstan has expressed interest in participating in the project and linking it with the Middle Corridor. “For the Trans-Caspian route, TRIPP provides an additional option for moving cargo after the Caspian Sea toward Türkiye and Europe. The more such branches there are, the more resilient and attractive the entire corridor becomes,” Kayumov said.
For Kazakhstan, the interest is largely pragmatic. As a landlocked country, it needs several reliable routes to major markets. However, Kayumov noted that the project’s value for Kazakhstan would depend on how effectively it is integrated into the country’s existing transport network. “What is more important for us is not formal participation in the project, but its integration with our existing transit hub. This means having unified tariffs, digital borders, digital document management and clear, predictable delivery times,” Kayumov said. “The more reliable routes connect Central Asia with Europe through Kazakhstan, the greater the economic and political value of our geography and our role in connecting different markets,” he added.
From L to R: WCO Secretary General Ian Saunders and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev Photo credit: Akorda.
Kazakhstan is stepping up its partnership with the World Customs Organization (WCO) as part of a broader strategy to strengthen the country’s position as a key Eurasian transit hub. But while digital customs reforms could significantly reduce trade costs and border delays, experts say their long-term economic payoff will ultimately depend on infrastructure, regional coordination and the changing geography of global trade, writes Ayana BirbayevaI.
The topic came into focus during a series of high-level meetings in Astana between President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and WCO Secretary General Ian Saunders on Sept. 8. During the meeting, Tokayev said Kazakhstan is consistently developing a “smart border” model by introducing digital solutions to optimize customs procedures and improve freight transit across Eurasia. Saunders praised Kazakhstan’s progress in customs modernization and its growing role in developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor.
Customs modernization becomes part of a wider logistics strategy
Beyond the diplomatic symbolism, the meetings reflect a longer-term economic objective: transforming Kazakhstan from a transit country into an internationally competitive logistics platform. Speaking in the meeting, Bektenov emphasized that resilient transcontinental trade has become one of the key drivers of Kazakhstan’s economic development. He noted that the WCO’s 2025–2028 strategic plan, Data-Driven Customs for a Connected World, closely aligns with Kazakhstan’s own digital reform agenda.
A central element of that strategy is the rollout of KEDEN, a unified customs system integrating declarations, transit procedures and border controls, alongside the Smart Cargo platform, which combines transport services, electronic permits and cargo tracking into a single digital ecosystem. According to official data, 14.6 million tons of transit cargo passed through Kazakhstan during the first seven months of the year. Freight volumes along the Middle Corridor reached approximately 350,000 tons, with around 24,000 vehicles using the route. Why digital borders matter Farkhad Kassenov, head of the A+ Analytics research center, political scientist and international relations expert, notes that cooperation with the WCO should be viewed not as an isolated initiative but as one stage of Kazakhstan’s much broader transport and logistics strategy.
“Kazakhstan has been systematically synchronizing customs procedures, tariffs and border regulations with the countries participating in the Middle Corridor. This cooperation with the WCO is one of the stages of that much larger project,” Kassenov told The Astana Times. The Middle Corridor has gained strategic importance as trade between China and Europe increasingly seeks alternatives to traditional northern routes passing through Russia. At the same time, Kazakhstan is also positioning itself within the developing North–South corridor, despite temporary disruptions caused by conflicts affecting the Middle East and maritime trade. According to Kassenov, removing bureaucratic barriers may prove almost as valuable as building new infrastructure.
“Digitalization can increase the speed of cargo movement by roughly 30% while simultaneously reducing logistics costs. When paperwork is synchronized and businesses use a single digital window, goods spend less time waiting at borders or in dry ports,” he said. Digital gains cannot replace physical infrastructure Yet customs reform alone will not solve every bottleneck. Kassenov notes that the Middle Corridor still faces structural constraints that digital systems cannot eliminate, including different railway gauges between China, Kazakhstan and Europe, as well as the natural limitations of crossing the Caspian Sea. “There are real physical barriers. Different railway gauges require cargo transfers, while navigation across the Caspian is limited during storms and seasonal ice. Digitalization improves efficiency, but it must be accompanied by major investment in transport infrastructure,” he said. Kazakhstan has already begun expanding ports in Aktau and Kuryk, while negotiations continue with Azerbaijan, Türkiye and China on improving rail connectivity across the corridor.
A changing geopolitical map of trade The renewed attention to Kazakhstan’s transit role is also being driven by geopolitical shifts beyond Central Asia. According to Kassenov, growing strategic competition between China and the United States has increased Beijing’s interest in secure overland trade routes. “The Middle Corridor was once viewed as an alternative route. By the end of this decade, it may become one of the principal land connections between East and West,” he said. That evolution creates opportunities extending beyond transit fees. Kazakhstan is seeking to develop domestic manufacturing, processing industries and exports of higher value-added products, including critical minerals and industrial goods, that can move along the same logistics network. A customs dilemma inside the EAEU At the same time, Kazakhstan’s customs policy faces another question that is less visible in discussions about digitalization: whether the existing distribution of import customs duties within the Eurasian Economic Union reflects the current structure of regional trade. Aidar Kurmashev, head of the Asian Studies Department at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, recently highlighted the issue in his Telegram channel.
According to him, under the EAEU system, duties collected on imports from outside the union are distributed among the five member states according to predetermined shares. Kazakhstan’s share is 6.955%, compared with 85.065% for Russia, regardless of where the duties are actually collected. “After 2022, trade flows changed significantly, the role of Kazakhstan in trade with China and other directions of foreign imports increased, while our share remained 6.955%,” Kurmashev wrote. He argued that the issue raises a broader question about whether the formula still corresponds to the current structure of trade within the EAEU. “If Kazakhstan previously benefited from the system, but now has been losing hundreds of billions of tenge for the third consecutive year, perhaps it is time to at least recalculate the economics of the existing mechanism,” Kurmashev said, highlighting that the figures refer specifically to distributed import customs duties and do not include import VAT. Trade routes are changing faster than institutions The EAEU perspective illustrates a broader challenge facing Kazakhstan as it tries to reposition itself within changing Eurasian trade networks.
The geography of imports and transit has shifted since 2022, while Kazakhstan is simultaneously trying to deepen direct trade links with China, expand the Middle Corridor and strengthen its position as a logistics hub between Asia and Europe. That makes customs policy increasingly relevant not only as an administrative function but as an element of economic strategy. Digitalization can make the movement of goods faster and more predictable. International standards can improve interoperability. Infrastructure investment can remove physical bottlenecks. But the economic payoff ultimately depends on whether these elements develop together. As Kassenov put it, the Middle Corridor is moving from being an alternative route from the global lens toward becoming a potentially central Eurasian connection.
The Kazakh Government has announced the formation of a pool of 215 investment projects totaling 78.6 billion US dollars, marking the start of a new investment cycle, Qazinform News Agency cites the government’s press service.
Kazakhstan is launching a new investment cycle with a strong focus on manufacturing, deep processing, high-tech industries, and localization.
The country has a three-tier investment attraction system in place, where regions compile priority projects and conduct targeted investor searches.
Fast Track procedures were launched to accelerate approvals along with the National Digital Investment Platform.
The next step is to develop Kazakhstan Investment House on the basis of Kazakh Invest, following a “one-stop shop” principle.
66 investment agreements worth 17.8 trillion tenge in investments have been signed.
Since early 2026, 25 agreements worth 4.4 trillion tenge were concluded in pharma, energy, metallurgy, agriculture, infrastructure, and healthcare. Capital investment rose to 23.5 trillion tenge, nearly doubling since 2019.
In manufacturing, investments tripled to 3 trillion tenge, now accounting for 12.7% of total investment.
Foreign direct investments reached 20.5 billion US dollars in 2025, up 14.4%, with capital increasingly directed to non-resource sectors like manufacturing, finance, and communications.
173 billion US dollars invested in four new projects to localize 356 medicines and expand domestic production.
To note, agro-industrial projects by Dalian Hesheng Holdings, Fufeng Group, and Tiryaki Agro focus on deep processing of wheat, corn, and legumes for food, pharma, and biotech.
In Ekibastuz, a Data Center Valley is being developed near GRES-1, with 30 billion US dollars in planned investment and energy capacity from 300 MW to 1 GW. The project will integrate infrastructure for cloud services, processing capacities, and AI.
Earlier Qazinform reported Kazakhstan and Germany aim to implement new joint investment and industrial projects.
Government of Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan
Economy
Pharmaceuticals
Agro-industrial complex development
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Investments
Sovereign wealth is typically measured by the size of reserves that allow a country to weather periods of crisis. However, for future generations, it is not only the amount left in financial accounts that matters. Of equal importance is the state of the country they inherit alongside these savings: the quality of its schools and hospitals, the condition of utility networks, roads, energy, and other core infrastructure.
For Kazakhstan, this question holds special significance. Revenues from natural resources enable the country to build a substantial financial cushion. The National Fund accumulates a portion of commodity revenues and serves two primary functions: a savings function aimed at preserving assets for future generations, and a stabilization function designed to reduce the state budget's vulnerability to fluctuations in global commodity markets. It should be noted that by mid-2026, the fund's foreign-currency assets reached $65.5 billion. (1)
Sovereign wealth operates differently
There is no single global model for managing sovereign wealth funds. States strike different balances between intergenerational savings, fiscal stabilization, and deploying accumulated capital for development. However, international experience demonstrates that these goals are not inherently contradictory.
Norway adheres to one of the most disciplined models of sovereign wealth management. Its fiscal rule aligns withdrawals with the expected real return of the Government Pension Fund, while preserving the flexibility to use fiscal policy in response to major economic shocks. (2)
The stabilization function is even more pronounced in Chile. Funds from the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund have been drawn upon repeatedly during periods of economic stress. In 2009, withdrawals reached nearly $9.28 billion, with significant funds also deployed in 2019–2021. (3)
Other countries also utilize commodity revenues not only as a source of long-term savings, but as a catalyst for economic development. The experience of Kuwait is illustrative, where these responsibilities are divided between the Future Generations Fund, focused on preserving capital for future generations, and the General Reserve Fund, whose investment portfolio encompasses energy, industry, transport and logistics, healthcare, and infrastructure. This model allows Kuwait to preserve a portion of national wealth for upcoming generations while transforming another portion into assets that expand the country's economic potential today and build the foundation for long-term growth. (4)
Azerbaijan, whose sovereign wealth origins closely mirror Kazakhstan's, has utilized resources from the State Oil Fund to finance major projects of national importance, including the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, the Oguz–Gabala–Baku water supply system, and equity participation in major oil and gas transport initiatives. (5)
None of these models can be mechanically copied by another country. Together, however, they demonstrate that sovereign wealth management does not boil down to a binary choice between "saving" and "spending." What matters far more is the form in which national capital can deliver the greatest long-term return for the nation.
From financial capital to national capital
Savings from the National Fund are already being utilized directly in the interests of future generations. Since 2024, Kazakhstan has operated the "National Fund for Children" program: every young citizen of Kazakhstan is annually allocated a portion of the fund's investment income, and upon reaching 18 years of age, the accumulated funds can be used for education or housing improvement. This program has already entered the phase of practical asset utilization. Between February 2024 and August 1, 2026, payouts were received by more than 338,000 young Kazakhstanis, totaling approximately $67.8 million. Meanwhile, the funds belonging to minors remain within the National Fund's assets and continue to be invested until they reach adulthood. (6)
At the same time, Kazakhstan faces a challenge familiar to many economies that have accumulated significant revenues from natural resources: what portion of national wealth should remain in financial assets, and what portion makes sense to convert into capital working domestically.
Soon, Kazakhstan plans to deploy a portion of the National Fund's assets to finance major infrastructure projects of nationwide significance. In 2027, over $4 billion is planned for these purposes, followed by slightly over $3 billion annually in 2028 and 2029 (7).
According to several experts, the economic rationale for such a decision extends beyond mere financing. When funds are directed into long-term social and engineering infrastructure, national wealth does not disappear. The form in which it exists simply changes.
Money allocated to current consumption expires alongside the budget cycle. A school, hospital, utility network, road, or energy facility remains in the economy and operates for decades.
This is precisely why infrastructure investments differ fundamentally from covering operational expenses. A portion of financial capital is effectively transformed into physical and human capital within the country.
Such an approach yields economic benefits right from the project implementation stage. Construction generates demand for materials, equipment, transport, design, and installation work, providing orders for domestic enterprises and creating added value within the country. Once facilities are operational, another, far more sustained effect begins. Modernizing heating and water supply systems increases their reliability, reduces losses, and diminishes the need for costly emergency repairs. Roads enhance regional connectivity. Energy infrastructure removes bottlenecks for expanding existing production and launching new industrial capacity.
Investments in healthcare and education occupy a special place. Modern hospitals, clinics, and educational institutions represent both social infrastructure and direct investments in human capital. The accessibility of medical care, public health status, quality of education, and workforce qualifications are directly tied to labor productivity and the long-term potential of the economy. All social infrastructure is as much an element of national capital as transport or energy infrastructure, and its returns and effectiveness extend far beyond the construction timeline of any individual project.
The cost of deferred development
Utilizing accumulated capital carries an opportunity cost. However, delaying investments carries an opportunity cost as well. Insufficient capacity of transport networks, energy shortages, worn-out utility systems, and a deficit of schools or medical facilities impose costs today. The longer modernization is postponed, the longer the economy and population bear these costs.
Therefore, the pace of infrastructure development carries clear economic value. If a necessary facility opens today rather than ten years from now, the country gains additional years of its economic and social returns.
Moreover, the social and economic effects of infrastructure are largely inseparable. Reliable utility networks, modern healthcare, education, transport, and energy simultaneously elevate the quality of life and create an environment in which private economic activity can thrive.
A reserve that has already worked
Using the National Fund's resources to address strategic priorities is not a new practice for Kazakhstan. The fund's ability to provide supplementary resources when the economy needs them most has repeatedly served as a key factor in the country's economic resilience.
During the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, $10 billion was directed to stabilize the financial sector, support real estate, small and medium enterprises, and the agribusiness sector (8). In 2015–2017, an additional $9 billion was withdrawn (9). During the pandemic in 2020–2021, transfers from the National Fund helped preserve economic stability and support citizens. Thus, having an accumulated reserve allowed the state to act proactively—promptly directing additional resources where they were required to prevent more severe economic repercussions.
The existence of a large financial reserve enabled Kazakhstan to navigate periods of external shocks with an additional funding source without relying exclusively on current budget revenues.
Today, it is not the principle of using the fund that is changing, but the nature of the task. Previously, accumulated resources primarily served to mitigate the impact of global shocks. Now, a portion of the capital is intended to eliminate infrastructural bottlenecks that could constrain long-term development.
This expands the sovereign fund's role: resources accumulated during favorable periods are used not only after a crisis arises, but also to build assets that enhance the resilience and potential of the economy for years to come.
The account of future generations
Ultimately, the success of this strategy will be measured not by the volume of funds withdrawn from the National Fund, but by the value of the assets created with them and the overall effect they deliver to the economy and citizens.
This fundamentally shifts the evaluation criteria. If a financial asset worth one dollar is transformed into infrastructure that enhances productivity, lowers business costs, elevates human capital quality, and fosters conditions for new private investment over decades, the very structure of national wealth undergoes a qualitative transformation.
Therefore, the central question for the coming years is not whether to utilize National Fund resources, but the quality of the assets Kazakhstan creates in return. For future generations, this exact balance between preserved financial capital and the value of the domestic economy built in its place will stand as the primary legacy of today's decisions.
The Kazakhstani tenge has become the best-performing currency in Asia and Europe in 2026, according to the Financial Times. Since the beginning of the year, it has appreciated by nearly 10% against the US dollar, outperforming all other currencies worldwide except for several currencies of Latin American and African countries. This performance has been underpinned by economic growth driven by the transformation of Kazakhstan’s economic model. The country is rapidly evolving from a commodity-based economy into a financial and technology hub for Central Asia, amid growing inflows of foreign capital.
Growth factor
This year, the key factor behind the tenge’s significant 9.7% appreciation was not oil prices, which have traditionally been associated with Kazakhstan’s economic performance. This time, the appreciation of the Kazakhstani currency was driven by capital inflows, Dmitry Dolgin, Chief Economist for the CIS at ING, told the Financial Times. As of June, foreign investments in tenge-denominated government debt had reached $5 billion, 2.5 times higher than a year earlier, accounting for nearly one-tenth of the total volume of such securities outstanding.
Foreign investors seeking to diversify their portfolios are attracted by high yields — with the base rate at 16.75% — combined with a moderate level of risk, as confirmed by Kazakhstan’s sovereign credit rating. Another factor contributing to increased foreign capital inflows is the easier access for foreign investors to the country’s government debt. In April, the Kazakhstani authorities announced plans to connect local government bonds to the international clearing system Euroclear, and foreign investor activity has increased notably in recent months.
In addition, Kazakhstan expects to be included in the benchmark JPMorgan GBI-EM index of local-currency government bonds of emerging markets. The US bank is also preparing a separate index for frontier markets (a category of emerging markets — ed. note), in which, according to the National Bank, Kazakhstani bonds could account for an 8% share if included.
Foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan
The growth of foreign direct investment is providing additional support for the tenge. In the first quarter, FDI amounted to $6.3 billion. As the Financial Times notes, Kazakhstan is seeking alternative sources of income beyond oil, including by positioning itself as a transit and technology hub for goods moving from China to Europe. To this end, the country is investing heavily in infrastructure, the publication emphasizes.
In recent years, the country’s authorities have implemented reforms aimed at strengthening the national investment ecosystem, including tax, customs and other incentives. As a result, the total gross inflow of foreign direct investment into Kazakhstan from 2021 through 2025 amounted to approximately $114.3 billion. In 2025, the figure reached $20.5 billion, up 14.4% year on year. At the same time, the structure of investment has also changed, with capital increasingly flowing into manufacturing, trade, the financial sector, transportation and the IT industry.
The changes have resulted in record economic growth. In 2025, Kazakhstan’s GDP grew by 6.5%, the highest rate in a decade. Growth continued in the first five months of 2026, reaching 3.7% despite a decline in oil production. Meanwhile, the real sector of the economy grew by 4%, while services expanded by 3.6%, which can be seen as evidence of a qualitative transformation of the economy.
Statistical data illustrate the rapid expansion of the non-resource sector during this period. Construction recorded the strongest performance in 2026, growing by 13.4% in the first five months of the year compared with the same period in 2025. Manufacturing was also among the leaders, increasing by 9%. The highest growth rates were recorded in machinery manufacturing, which expanded by 23.3%, and pharmaceuticals, which grew by 35.2%.
According to the IMF, Kazakhstan’s economy measured at purchasing power parity is expected to reach $993.7 billion in 2026, effectively approaching the psychological milestone of $1 trillion. Over the past decade, this figure has nearly doubled.
Competitive economy
Based on its 2025 results, Kazakhstan ranked among the world’s most competitive economies, taking 34th place out of 69 countries in the IMD World Competitiveness Ranking, ahead of Japan, Kuwait, Portugal, India, Italy and other countries. Kazakhstan was also the only country from the CIS and Central Asia represented in the ranking. Analysts note that the country’s economy is becoming increasingly diversified. Today, manufacturing, logistics, energy infrastructure and investment projects are playing an increasingly important role.
Kazakhstan also ranked 53rd out of 150 countries in the Global Investment Risk & Resilience Index, achieving the highest result among Central Asian countries.
Focus on digitalization
Digitalization is one of Kazakhstan’s strategic priorities. In early June 2026, it was announced that an agreement had been signed with Firebird and Nvidia US companies to build data centers in the so-called “Data Center Valley.” According to Bloomberg, investments in the project could amount to $10 billion.
According to the Ministry of Artificial Intelligence, Kazakhstan’s IT services exports exceeded $1.142 billion in 2025. The sector has been growing at a rapid pace: five years ago, exports of high-tech solutions from Kazakhstan amounted to just $33.5 million. The strategic goal is to increase Kazakhstan’s IT services exports to $5 billion by 2030.
Fintech for export
Kazakhstan is expanding its export potential in the financial sector. In August, the subsidiary of one of the largest fintech holdings operating in Kazakhstan, Freedom, received a brokerage license from the local regulator in Turkey, becoming the first foreign broker in 34 years to obtain such a license. In late July, the company also completed the acquisition of a local bank. According to the holding’s founder, Timur Turlov, the company plans to invest $300 million in the Turkish market to create an integrated digital financial ecosystem built around its brokerage and banking businesses.
Freedom already operates in 24 countries worldwide. This year, the company applied for a banking license in France, viewing it as a gateway to the broader European market. The holding currently serves more than 600,000 brokerage clients in Europe and aims to increase that number to 50 million by exporting its ecosystem.
The total number of clients across all companies within the Freedom group stands at 14 million, while the holding’s assets exceed $14 billion and its market capitalization stands at $10 billion. Since Freedom’s listing on Nasdaq in 2019, the value of its shares has increased nearly 13-fold.
Another Kazakhstani fintech giant, Kaspi.kz, is also actively expanding its presence in Turkey. In July, the company announced the completion of a deal to acquire the Turkish subsidiary of Rabobank Dutch group. Earlier, in 2025, Kaspi.kz acquired a controlling stake in Turkish marketplace, Hepsiburada. The company’s shares are also traded on a US stock exchange, underscoring the high level of international confidence in Kazakhstani fintech companies.
Kazakhstan is also actively building its own financial infrastructure, while its stock market ranks among the largest in Eastern Europe. Trading volume on the Astana International Exchange (AIX), which officially began operations just eight years ago, amounted to $2.1 billion in 2025. Since its launch, AIX has facilitated the raising of $12.4 billion in debt and equity capital, while assets under management within the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) exceeded $5.4 billion at the end of 2025.
On the country’s oldest exchange, the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KASE), trading volume in 2025 amounted to KZT 400.8 trillion ($769.1 billion). At the same time, the KASE Index has nearly tripled over the past four years, reaching 7,712.53 points by the end of June 2026. Combined trading volume on the two exchanges increased by nearly 50% in the first half of the year, while equity market capitalization rose by 18.8%.
Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has called on nuclear-armed states to engage in negotiations and accelerate efforts to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force, reaffirming Kazakhstan’s commitment to the global anti-nuclear movement, Qazinform News Agency cites Akorda.
Tokayev made the remarks in a statement marking the International Day against Nuclear Tests, established by the UN General Assembly at Kazakhstan’s initiative.
The president noted that exactly 35 years ago, amid a difficult international situation, Kazakhstan closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. For decades, the testing ground caused irreversible damage to people’s health and the environment, leaving a painful legacy for the Kazakh people, he said.
“Thirty-five years later, this date will serve as a reminder to all humanity of the tragic consequences of nuclear tests and as a call to prevent them from ever happening again,” Tokayev said.
He also highlighted Kazakhstan’s decision to voluntarily give up the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal following the country’s independence.
“By voluntarily renouncing the fourth-largest nuclear arsenal on the planet, Kazakhstan made a historic choice in favor of peace, security and sustainable development. This decision fulfilled the aspirations of the people of Kazakhstan and demonstrated our state’s responsibility for the fate of future generations,” Tokayev said.
According to the president, Kazakhstan’s commitment to peace and friendship with all states, enshrined in the preamble of the country’s new Constitution, remains an unwavering principle of its foreign policy.
“Our country’s position as one of the leaders of the global anti-nuclear movement remains unchanged. We call for negotiations among nuclear powers, the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and decisive multilateral action to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons use,” Tokayev said.
The president also stressed that nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful and constructive purposes.
He noted that the Kazakhstani people had firmly supported the country’s course toward developing nuclear energy in a nationwide referendum, laying a solid foundation for Kazakhstan’s economic, scientific and technological progress for decades to come.
Tokayev said this strategic choice forms an important part of the country’s transformation and opens a new stage in its sustainable development. He added that large-scale reforms across all areas of public life are aimed at building a Just, Progressive and Clean Kazakhstan.
“I am confident that together we will achieve this ambitious goal,” the president concluded.
Earlier, Qazinform reported President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had offered condolences over passing Norway’s King Harald V.
Kazakhstan is preparing to take part in the 2027 Smithsonian Folklife Festival, where it will showcase the country’s traditions, music, crafts and other elements of its cultural heritage, Qazinform News Agency reports, citing the Kazakh Ministry of Culture and Information.
The preparations were discussed at a meeting between Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Information, Aida Balayeva, Smithsonian Institution Festival Curator, Rebecca Fenton, and Southwest Folklife Alliance Co-Founder, Bryan Rafael Falcon.
The sides also discussed the participation of Kazakhstan’s ethno-folk group HasSak in a festival in Tucson, as well as plans for the group to hold a concert in Washington.
Preparations for the 2027 Smithsonian Folklife Festival are part of broader efforts to expand cultural cooperation between Kazakhstan and the Smithsonian Institution. The sides expressed confidence that their cooperation would gain new momentum and move beyond individual cultural initiatives toward long-term projects.
Qazinform News Agency previously reported that Kazakhstan proposed expanding bilateral cultural exchanges and hosting US Culture Days in the country.
According to him, Kazakhstan initially planned to maintain last year's production level of 99.5 million tons and approach the 100 million-ton mark.
"With the attacks in January and the continued attacks in June and July, we lost approximately 3.5 million tons. TCO shareholders decided not to conduct a major overhaul and postponed it until next year," Akkenzhenov said at a government briefing.
The ministry also decided to postpone planned maintenance at NCOC fields until next year.
"We planned to produce 98 million tons, but the adjusted plan is now 96 million tons. Production losses resulting from the attacks on the CPC will amount to 3.5 million tons," the minister clarified.
In July, the CPC was targeted in a series of drone attacks. On July 17, drones struck the oil tanker Nordic Zenith.
On July 19, two tankers carrying Kazakh oil were targeted in separate attacks.
Following the attacks, oil loading operations at the CPC terminal were suspended. The Ministry of Energy said that such attacks on civilian critical energy infrastructure facilities were unacceptable.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also condemned drone attacks on vessels transporting oil via the CPC.
On July 23, the Ministry of Energy announced a temporary suspension of oil loading at the CPC marine terminal and a reduction in oil production in Kazakhstan.
On July 27, the CPC resumed oil intake from shippers and loading operations at its marine terminal in the port of Novorossiysk.
On July 30, the CPC reported new attacks targeting two tankers, following which oil loading operations were suspended again.
Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has used the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek and a wide-ranging interview with China’s Xinhua news agency to set out a closely connected vision of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy — combining deeper economic and technological cooperation with China with a broader commitment to multilateralism, Eurasian connectivity and reform of global institutions.
Speaking as leaders gathered in Bishkek for the 26th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and its SCO Plus format, Tokayev presented Kazakhstan as both a committed regional partner and an increasingly active “middle power” seeking to bridge geopolitical divisions.
His summit remarks were reinforced by an exclusive written interview with Xinhua, published on 1 September, in which the Kazakh leader described relations with China as being at an “unprecedentedly high level” and said Astana intended to continue strengthening what the two countries describe as an “eternal comprehensive strategic partnership”.
Taken together, the two interventions offer a clear picture of Kazakhstan’s current diplomatic strategy: maintain close relations with its major neighbours, promote trade routes linking Asia with Europe, embrace technological cooperation and at the same time argue for international relations based on dialogue rather than confrontation.
In his Xinhua interview, Tokayev stressed that Kazakhstan-China relations now extend well beyond traditional energy and commodity ties.
Cooperation encompasses trade, investment, transport, industrial production, agriculture, digitalisation, healthcare, science, education and culture, he said. China is now Kazakhstan’s largest foreign trading partner, while transport and logistics have assumed an increasingly strategic role.
Kazakhstan occupies a central geographical position between China and European markets, and Tokayev argued that the country was working with China to transform that location into a modern Eurasian transport and logistics network.
He specifically highlighted the Belt and Road Initiative, new railway construction, dry ports, logistics terminals and modernisation of border infrastructure.
Central to this strategy is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor, which links China with Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus and onward towards European markets.
Tokayev described making the route more competitive as a shared priority, pointing to “smart customs”, digital documentation, interconnected information systems and automated border procedures as necessary elements in reducing transit times.
That message closely reflected his position at the SCO summit, where Kazakhstan again offered to help develop transport initiatives throughout the organisation and called attention to the potential integration of the Belt and Road Initiative, Middle Corridor, North-South Corridor and routes connecting Central and South Asia.
For the European Union, which has increasingly sought alternative and resilient connections with Central Asia and China, the development of the Middle Corridor gives Kazakhstan an importance that extends considerably beyond the size of its domestic economy.
Tokayev also placed technology and artificial intelligence near the centre of the emerging Kazakhstan-China relationship.
China's position in AI, robotics, digital technology, new energy and advanced manufacturing complements Kazakhstan's own ambition to accelerate its digital transformation, he argued.
Kazakhstan has declared 2026 its Year of Digitalisation and Artificial Intelligence, and Tokayev referred to meetings with leading Chinese technology companies during his recent participation in the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai.
He said there was mutual interest in projects involving the digital economy, intelligent manufacturing, e-commerce, research and skills development.
The subject moved seamlessly from the bilateral interview into Tokayev's multilateral message in Bishkek.
Addressing the SCO Plus meeting, he warned that global stability increasingly depends upon the responsible development of artificial intelligence and called for universal rules capable of encouraging innovation while preventing uncontrolled use and narrowing the digital divide.
Kazakhstan is also establishing an Asia-Pacific digital solutions centre in Almaty under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, which Tokayev said should help developing countries gain access to technological expertise.
In his Xinhua interview he went further, arguing that AI should ultimately serve humanity as a whole and that countries should have equitable access to technology, knowledge and computing resources. Kazakhstan was among the founding participants this year in a new international AI cooperation initiative launched in Shanghai.
Underlying both the interview and Tokayev's summit speech was a wider political argument.
The Kazakh president portrayed the SCO not simply as an economic or security grouping but as a potential model for cooperation between states with different political systems and interests.
In Bishkek, he said the organisation's principles of equality and consensus had become a “gold standard” for multilateral cooperation. He proposed that core SCO principles should ultimately be reflected in a UN General Assembly resolution linked to the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace.
The formulation is consistent with Kazakhstan's long-standing attempt to avoid being drawn exclusively into competing geopolitical camps.
Tokayev reiterated that Kazakhstan would maintain what he described as a balanced, constructive and peaceful foreign policy, while arguing that the international order should move away from the “cult of force and confrontation” towards collective responsibility and long-term cooperation.
In his interview with Xinhua, he similarly said Kazakhstan and China shared support for the central role of the United Nations, international law, mediation, multilateralism and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
One of the more significant elements of Tokayev's Bishkek intervention was his argument that responsible middle powers should have greater influence within global governance.
With tensions between major powers putting pressure on existing international institutions, Tokayev suggested countries such as Kazakhstan could facilitate dialogue between competing centres of power and help develop collective solutions.
“Kazakhstan is ready to actively contribute to this process,” he told the summit.
At the same time, he resisted suggestions that shortcomings within the United Nations justified weakening the organisation.
Despite criticism of the UN, Tokayev said there was no viable alternative to it. Kazakhstan's position, he argued, was that the UN should remain at the centre of the international system and that its Charter should continue to provide the universal foundation of international law.
The President called for closer interaction between the UN and regional organisations such as the SCO, stronger preventive diplomacy and greater emphasis on peaceful settlement of disputes.
Tokayev also used the summit to promote another issue of growing importance to Central Asia: water.
Climate pressures, population growth and competing demands on shared water resources make the issue increasingly important to Kazakhstan and neighbouring states.
Tokayev proposed creating an International Water Organisation under UN auspices, arguing that although numerous UN bodies deal with water, no universal intergovernmental organisation currently has a comprehensive mandate.
He also proposed an SCO Water Problems Analysis Centre as a regional complement to such a global organisation.
The proposal fits into Kazakhstan's broader effort to move environmental and resource-security questions higher up the international agenda.
Perhaps the strongest thread connecting Tokayev's interview with his SCO appearance is Kazakhstan's determination to turn geography into diplomatic and economic influence.
Astana is simultaneously strengthening its relationship with Beijing, maintaining important relationships with Russia and other neighbours, developing transport corridors towards Europe, expanding cooperation with Western partners and presenting itself as an advocate of multilateral diplomacy.
Tokayev's description of relations with China therefore carries a wider meaning.
He quoted a Kazakh proverb in the Xinhua interview: “Those travelling the same road share a common destiny.”
Yet the message emerging from Bishkek suggests Kazakhstan sees that road not as one running exclusively eastwards towards China, but as part of a much larger network connecting East and West.
As competition between the world's major powers becomes more pronounced, Kazakhstan is attempting to position itself at the centre of those connections — geographically through trade and transport corridors, technologically through digital cooperation, and diplomatically through its advocacy of multilateralism.
For Europe, that makes developments in Kazakhstan-China relations increasingly relevant. The more successfully Kazakhstan develops the Middle Corridor and other east-west transport links, the more the country becomes not simply a Central Asian partner but a strategic gateway connecting European and Asian economies.
And that, ultimately, appears to be the common theme running through Tokayev's words both to Xinhua and to the leaders assembled at the SCO summit: Kazakhstan believes its future influence will come not from choosing between competing blocs, but from connecting them.
Adilet wins 110 seats in the 145-member Kurultai, while four smaller parties share the remaining 35, writes Georgi Gotev.
Kazakhstan’s Central Election Commission announced final results on 25 August confirming a decisive victory for the Adilet party in the country’s first elections to the new unicameral Kurultai. Adilet won 71.17 percent of the vote and 110 of the 145 seats, establishing a dominant position in the legislature created under the constitution that took effect on 1 July.
Adilet is the recently formed pro-presidential party in Kazakhstan created months before the elections as the successor after the long-ruling Amanat party dissolved into it.
Final figures show 9,351,539 ballots cast from an electoral roll of 12,623,289, for a turnout of 74.08 percent. Five parties cleared the 5 percent threshold required for representation:
Adilet: 6,528,948 votes (71.17 percent) — 110 seats
Auyl People’s Democratic Patriotic Party: 574,621 votes (6.26 percent) — 10 seats
Respublica: 509,631 votes (5.56 percent) — 9 seats
Aq Zhol Democratic Party: 478,083 votes (5.21 percent) — 8 seats
Nationwide Social Democratic Party: 469,058 votes (5.11 percent) — 8 seats
The People’s Party of Kazakhstan (3.11 percent) and Baytaq Green Party (1.07 percent) fell short. A further 2.51 percent of voters chose the “against all” option.
The Kurultai replaces the former bicameral parliament and is elected entirely by proportional representation from party lists in a single nationwide constituency. The 23 August vote was the first parliamentary election held under the new constitutional framework approved in a March referendum.
President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has signed a decree convening the inaugural session of the Kurultai for 28 August at 11 a.m. The opening will formally launch the work of the new 145-member legislature and mark the next stage in implementing the institutional changes introduced by the constitution.
Once the Kurultai begins its work, the sitting government is required to resign. Under the new rules, the president will nominate a candidate for prime minister after consultations with the party factions represented in the chamber. The appointed prime minister then has ten days to propose the structure and composition of the cabinet; ministers are appointed by the president following further consultations with the Kurultai.
The constitution also creates the office of vice president. Tokayev has indicated that an appointment — “a well-known person you all know” — would be announced within days of the election and must receive Kurultai approval within two months of the first session. The vice president may not serve as a lawmaker or belong to a political party and would assume presidential powers if the head of state leaves office early.
At an expert discussion organised by the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (KazISS) on 24 August, analysts said the vote raises the stakes for political parties, the functioning of the new parliament, and Kazakhstan’s positioning amid growing geopolitical interest in Central Asia.
KazISS Director Zhandos Shaimardanov highlighted the combination of high turnout and a dominant party alongside four smaller ones as features likely to shape the legislature. “The task now is to understand how this electoral choice will translate into the work of the new Kurultai, its legislative priorities and the parties’ day-to-day activities,” he said.
Italian Asia expert Domenico Palmieri stressed that the election itself is only the beginning. The real test of the institutional reform will come in the months ahead as deputies begin legislating. He noted the relatively high turnout compared with many European countries and described the voting process as technically smooth.
Political scientist Andrey Kazantsev cautioned against reading the strong participation solely as enthusiasm for party politics. In a period of international uncertainty, many voters appeared more concerned with the country’s overall direction and the future for their families. Because deputies are now elected exclusively from party lists, parties face greater responsibility for translating public expectations into concrete policy. “The demand is high. Now the parties have to provide the supply side,” he said.
Ken Moriyasu of the Hudson Institute placed the transition in a wider regional and global context. Interest in Central Asia has risen in both Washington and Beijing as the United States seeks to diversify critical mineral supplies away from China and Beijing looks to overland Eurasian routes less vulnerable to maritime disruption. “Both China and the U.S. are trying to escape each other, and they’re meeting each other in Central Asia,” Moriyasu observed. Greater clarity and stability in Kazakhstan’s domestic institutions, he argued, could strengthen Astana’s ability to maintain its multi-vector foreign policy and contribute to gradual regional consolidation.
With final results certified and the first session scheduled for 28 August, attention turns to the practical launch of the new system: formation of the government, the appointment of a vice president, and the early legislative agenda of a chamber in which one party holds a commanding majority while four others retain a formal presence.
The high turnout and orderly conduct of the vote have been widely noted. Whether the new Kurultai delivers more responsive and effective governance – and how the dominant Adilet faction works with the smaller parties – will determine if the constitutional redesign of 2026 translates into lasting political change.
Thirty-five years after Kazakhstan closed one of the most notorious nuclear weapons testing grounds in history, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has used the anniversary to deliver a pointed message to the world’s nuclear powers: resume dialogue, strengthen arms control and ensure that nuclear testing never returns.
At a time when the international security order is under growing pressure and some of the agreements that helped contain nuclear rivalry after the Cold War have weakened, Kazakhstan is seeking to turn its own traumatic nuclear history into a renewed diplomatic argument for disarmament.
Marking the International Day against Nuclear Tests on 29 August, Tokayev called on nuclear-armed states to return to negotiations and urged the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, or CTBT.
“Our country’s position as one of the leaders of the global anti-nuclear movement remains unchanged,” Tokayev said, according to Kazakhstan's presidential administration.
He called for negotiations between nuclear powers and “decisive multilateral action to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons use”.
For Kazakhstan, the date carries significance far beyond diplomatic symbolism.
On 29 August 1991, the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in north-eastern Kazakhstan was closed. It had been the Soviet Union's principal nuclear weapons testing ground and the location of 456 nuclear tests between 1949 and 1989, including atmospheric and underground detonations.
The consequences extended far beyond the perimeter of the test site. The United Nations has estimated that nearly 1.5 million people were affected by nuclear testing, while extensive areas were contaminated by radiation.
That history gives Kazakhstan a distinctive voice in the international nuclear debate.
Tokayev described the closure of Semipalatinsk as a warning that should continue to resonate worldwide.
“Thirty-five years later, this date will serve as a reminder to all humanity of the tragic consequences of nuclear tests and as a call to prevent them from ever happening again,” he said.
Kazakhstan's argument is strengthened by another remarkable chapter of its post-Soviet history.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, Kazakhstan found itself with a huge nuclear weapons infrastructure on its territory. Rather than retain the capability, the newly independent country chose to relinquish the weapons and establish itself internationally as a non-nuclear state.
Tokayev described that decision as a deliberate choice in favour of peace and long-term security.
“By voluntarily renouncing the fourth-largest nuclear arsenal on the planet, Kazakhstan made a historic choice in favor of peace, security and sustainable development,” he said.
It has subsequently made nuclear non-proliferation one of the defining elements of its foreign policy.
Kazakhstan was also responsible for proposing the creation of the International Day against Nuclear Tests, an initiative unanimously supported by the UN General Assembly. The first international observance took place in 2010.
This history matters because Tokayev's appeal comes at an increasingly uncertain moment for nuclear arms control.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was opened for signature in 1996 with a simple but profound objective: to prohibit nuclear test explosions anywhere in the world.
Thirty years later, however, the treaty has still not formally entered into force.
The CTBT currently has 188 signatories and 179 ratifications, demonstrating overwhelming international support. But its provisions require ratification by a specified group of 44 states possessing nuclear technology when the treaty was negotiated before it can become legally binding.
Nine of those states have yet to ratify: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and the United States.
India, North Korea and Pakistan have not signed it.
Russia had ratified the treaty but revoked its ratification in November 2023. China and the United States signed it in 1996 but have never completed ratification.
The treaty nevertheless represents one of the more successful international norms of the post-Cold War period.
More than 2,000 nuclear tests were carried out during the five decades before the CTBT opened for signature. Since 1996, nuclear tests have occurred on only ten occasions, according to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, and North Korea is the only country to have conducted nuclear explosive tests during the 21st century.
Tokayev's warning is therefore also a defence of a system that has largely succeeded in suppressing nuclear testing — but whose legal foundations remain incomplete.
There is another important dimension to Kazakhstan's position.
Tokayev's opposition to nuclear weapons does not translate into opposition to nuclear technology.
On the contrary, Kazakhstan is now moving towards the development of civilian nuclear power. Tokayev emphasised that nuclear energy should be used for “exclusively peaceful and constructive purposes”, presenting civilian nuclear development as compatible with the country's anti-nuclear weapons philosophy.
Kazakhstan is already an important part of Europe's nuclear energy supply chain. According to the Euratom Supply Agency, Kazakhstan supplied 20.31% of the natural uranium delivered to EU utilities in 2025, making it the EU's second-largest source after Canada.
The connection became even more politically significant during Tokayev's visit to Brussels in June.
Following meetings with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 23 June 2026, the EU and Kazakhstan specifically identified energy security as an area for deeper strategic cooperation.
Their joint statement recognised Kazakhstan as an important supplier of oil and uranium to Europe and highlighted the potential for increased cooperation in both renewable energy and civil nuclear energy.
It is simultaneously one of the world's most prominent advocates of nuclear disarmament and one of the most important suppliers of the raw material on which civilian nuclear power depends.
Rather than regarding those positions as contradictory, Astana's policy is increasingly built around distinguishing sharply between the destructive and peaceful uses of atomic technology.
For the European Union, Tokayev's intervention is therefore not an abstract diplomatic message from a distant Central Asian state.
Kazakhstan has become increasingly significant to Europe's efforts to diversify energy supplies and strategic raw materials, particularly as Brussels attempts to reduce potentially dangerous dependencies.
During Tokayev's June visit to Brussels, European and Kazakh leaders agreed to deepen their strategic partnership in critical raw materials, transport, digitalisation and emerging technologies. They also reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
It shares a vast border with Russia and another with China, while simultaneously developing closer political and economic relationships with the European Union and maintaining partnerships with the United States and other Western countries.
That makes Astana one of a relatively small number of governments able to maintain meaningful dialogue across increasingly divided geopolitical blocs.
In an era when communication between major powers has become more difficult, that may make Kazakhstan's diplomatic role increasingly relevant.
The ruins of Semipalatinsk remain a stark physical reminder of what the nuclear arms race once meant.
Between 1949 and 1989, explosions equivalent collectively to thousands of Hiroshima-sized bombs were detonated at the site, according to UN documentation. Communities surrounding the testing ground were exposed to radioactive fallout whose health and environmental effects endured long after the final explosion.
Kazakhstan has sought to transform that legacy from one of victimhood into one of diplomacy.
Semipalatinsk's closure was followed by the relinquishment of nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan's participation in the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and its persistent advocacy of nuclear disarmament.
The political assumptions that allowed the world to move progressively away from nuclear testing after the Cold War cannot simply be taken for granted.
The CTBT is now 30 years old and still awaits entry into force. Relations between the major nuclear powers are deeply strained. Nuclear weapons have again assumed a conspicuous place in geopolitical confrontation.
Against that background, Kazakhstan's argument has an unusual moral force.
Few countries have experienced nuclear testing on the scale Kazakhstan did. Fewer still subsequently possessed nuclear weapons and voluntarily relinquished them.
Thirty-five years after the gates of Semipalatinsk were closed, Tokayev is effectively asking the world's nuclear powers to remember why they were closed in the first place.
The message from Astana is straightforward: nuclear deterrence may remain part of international politics, but nuclear testing does not have to be — and dialogue between nuclear powers is more essential when relations are deteriorating, not less.
For Europe, confronting war on its eastern frontier while simultaneously reconsidering energy security and strategic autonomy, that is a message worth hearing.
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