The GSMA board outlined the industry’s connectivity priorities, calling for action on smartphone affordability, online scams and network investment while backing closer international cooperation on future 6G standards.
Following a board meeting in New Delhi, India, the industry association stated that although 97% of the global population live within mobile broadband coverage, 3.4 billion people remain unconnected to mobile internet. The cost of devices remains a significant barrier, with an entry-level internet-enabled handset equivalent to 44% of average monthly income for the poorest 20% of people in low- and middle-income countries.
The GSMA highlighted potential measures to improve affordability including financing schemes, targeted tax cuts and closer cooperation between device makers and memory suppliers.
It also identified scams and fraud as a growing threat, warning that although the mobile industry continues to strengthen network detection and cyber defence tools, “no single sector can tackle the threat alone”. The GSMA noted AI-generated content and deepfakes further add to risks for consumers, public trust and government objectives, calling on the industry to “join forces to counter scams with practical solutions”.
Sustained investment The GSMA also highlighted the need for network investment and supportive policy to accelerate connectivity growth. It found mobile technologies and services generated $6 trillion in economic value in 2025, equivalent to 6.4% of global GDP. This figure is forecast to reach $11.3 trillion by 2030.
In addition, operators are projected to invest $1.2 trillion in capital expenditure between 2025 and 2030 to expand and upgrade networks, with 57% of mobile connections expected to use 5G by the end of the decade.
GSMA director general Vivek Badrinath said the sector’s next priority must be to translate 5G expansion into “meaningful value”, ensuring more people can participate in the digital economy. “This will require sustained investment, enabling policy and collaboration across the wider ecosystem,” he stressed.
Looking ahead, the industry association reiterated its support for global standards and harmonised spectrum as 6G development continues. It highlighted countries representing more than 80% of the world’s population support mobile use of the upper 6GHz band, which could provide the 200MHz to 400MHz channel bandwidths expected to be needed for 6G.
GSMA chair Gopal Vittal said that “by working through global standards and collaborating across markets, we can accelerate innovation, strengthen trust and resilience” as the industry develops the next generation of connectivity.
India’s Adani Enterprises Limited and Apple supplier Jabil signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to form a 50:50 joint venture, tasked with manufacturing AI and data centre equipment in the country.
The JV is the next step on from a deal struck by the duo in June 2026 to form a strategic alliance to develop an AI and data centre infrastructure manufacturing ecosystem.
Once established, the pair stated the venture will supply hyperscalers, neoclouds, data centre operators and enterprises, serving accelerating data centre demand.
The companies cited industry forecasts which project India’s AI capacity will reach between 5 gigawatts to 8 gigawatts by 2030 and more than $50 billion in planned hyperscale spending across data centre, cloud and AI ecosystems.
In total, the pair peg the global market opportunity at more than $3 trillion over the next seven years, driven by investment in AI computing.
The duo will look to cash in on this demand by providing a manufacturing base in the country to serve domestic demand and support exports.
Adani Group, which runs the enterprise division, has made a $100 billion commitment to develop 5 gigawatts of green-energy powered, hyperscale AI-ready data centres by 2035, and the proposed venture adds hardware manufacturing to the group’s presence across infrastructure, energy and logistics.
Jabil makes components for Apple and will use the JV to expand its engineering footprint across India. It reported revenue of $36 billion in fiscal 2026.
Gautam Adani, chairman of Adani Group, said “the AI revolution will demand far more than just breakthroughs in algoritms” and the proposed JV would “help build the physical backbone of the global AI economy”.
After years of delays and missed timelines, Taiwan recently received its first two F-16V (Viper) fighter jets from the US. Despite the arrival of two cutting-edge jets, Taipei’s problems may have just begun.
The two jets are part of a US$8 billion deal for 66 F-16Vs approved in 2019 during US President Donald Trump’s first term.
Taiwan was originally scheduled to receive the first new F-16V Block 70 fighter jets in 2023, but severe production and software-related delays pushed delivery back nearly three years.
Lockheed is expected to deliver all 66 F-16V Block 70 jets by 2028; however, Taiwan is still negotiating with authorities to finish the deliveries by the end of next year.
Taiwan has already upgraded 140 of its F-16A/B Block 20 fighter jets to the advanced F-16V (Viper) standard under the US$4.5 billion modernization initiative, the Peace Phoenix Rising program, completed in December 2023.
When Lockheed Martin delivers the 66 new jets by 2028, the Taiwanese Air Force will have more than 200 F-16 Viper fighter jets, making it the largest Viper-standard fleet in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Challenge
However, this large F-16 Viper fleet will help Taiwan deter China only if the country has experienced, trained pilots to fly them, which seems like a problem right now, as the country is struggling to find new fighter pilots and retain experienced ones.
To tackle fighter pilot shortages, Taiwan’s defense ministry now plans to allow military pilots to serve until age 58.
Under the plan, pilots could serve until they turn 58, up from about 48 for lieutenant colonels and 52 for colonels, extending their current service limits of 26 and 30 years, respectively.
Effectively, lieutenant colonels will get a 10-year extension, and colonels will get a six-year extension.
Taiwan believes a longer service period will attract new talent, help retain experienced fighter pilots, and address chronic pilot shortages in the air force.
The Taiwanese Air Force would also create 72 additional posts for highly qualified lieutenant colonel and colonel pilots with at least 14 years of service, allowing them to keep their rank and focus on flying rather than command or administrative duties.
These 72 additional posts would be outside the regular personnel establishment, meaning they would not take positions from other officers or have to assume command roles.
“Their job would simply be to fly,” Koo said.
They would also help train and mentor younger pilots, he added.
These changes – allowing fighter pilots to serve longer, creating additional posts so that they can focus exclusively on flying, and reducing their administrative and command duties – are meant to retain fighter pilots in the Air Force when many of them are taking voluntary premature retirement to pursue more lucrative and less stressful careers in civilian airlines.
File Image: F-16V
The Executive Yuan in Taipei is currently considering the defense ministry’s proposals.
Defense Minister Wellington Koo Li-hsiung said earlier this week that the arrangement was designed to keep experienced pilots in uniform when many faced a choice between remaining in the military and pursuing longer, potentially more lucrative careers with commercial airlines, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported.
Notably, civilian airline pilots can fly until age 65, giving Air Force fighter pilots a strong incentive to switch while they’re still young.
As mentioned earlier, before the changes, lieutenant colonels in Taiwan could fly fighter jets until age 48 and colonels until age 52, meaning they could fly 13 to 17 years longer in commercial airlines.
Extending their service term until age 58 will narrow this gap considerably.
“If they can serve until 58, the gap with civilian airline pilots, who can fly until 65, will not be that large,” Koo told lawmakers in the parliament.
The plan would still require annual health checks and other regular reviews, the minister said. Officers who failed the tests could no longer continue flying.
He said 57 air force pilots had retired so far this year, broadly in line with previous years but fewer than last year. All had completed the minimum required service period.
Defense Minister Koo also underlined that the post-pandemic expansion in commercial airlines has created a lucrative market for pilots, which is making it difficult for the Air Force to retain its fighter pilots.
As a result, many fighter pilots apply for voluntary premature retirement once they reach the minimum service age (20 years), well before the maximum service period for Air Force pilots: 26 years for lieutenant colonels and 30 years for colonels.
The defense ministry proposals also highlight how air forces worldwide place a higher premium on retaining experienced fighter pilots than on recruiting and training new ones.
Recruiting and training new pilots is expensive, time-consuming, and requires lots of effort and resources.
The defense ministry proposals also highlight that air forces worldwide place a higher premium on retaining experienced fighter pilots than on recruiting and training new ones.
These proposals to retain experienced fighter pilots come even as Taiwan has met its recent targets for recruiting new pilots.
The ministry said pilot recruitment reached 96.2 percent of its target in 2024, 112 percent in 2025, and 98.6 percent in 2026.
It also reported that the air force currently has an 87.8 percent personnel fill rate.
Experienced aviators, however, possess accumulated knowledge of aircraft systems, combat tactics, and operational procedures that newly trained pilots cannot easily replicate.
Retaining experienced fighter pilots is even more pressing, as Taiwan will receive over 60 new F-16V fighter jets in the next two years.
Notably, the Block 70 F-16V is an upgraded variant of the F-16 jets the Republic of China (another name for Taiwan) Air Force (RoCAF) has flown for nearly 30 years.
Taiwan first ordered 150 F-16 jets in the 1990s and received the first Block 20 fighters in April 1997.
It still has nearly 140 of these older F-16 jets, now upgraded to the Viper standard.
As a result, many of Taiwan’s fighter pilots already have years of experience flying these jets. This experience could be invaluable as the country starts integrating new F-16 Viper jets into its air force.
Taiwan plans to assign at least 100 fighter pilots to its fleet of 66 new F-16 Viper jets. The ministry informed that the air force had increased pilot positions and training in preparation for the new aircraft.
The first two of the 66 F-16V Block 70 fighters landed at Chihhang Air Base on October 2.
Koo said 63 of the 66 aircraft had entered production, including six that had reached the flight-test stage.
Another factor putting pressure on the RoCAF is almost daily violations of Taiwanese airspace by China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).
For instance, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported 181 violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ in September alone. Responding to these airspace violations is taking a toll on the RoCAF’s staffing ratio.
These near-daily PLAAF violations mean the RoCAF must keep aircraft and pilots ready at all times.
Asked about pilot fatigue from near-daily PLAAF airspace violations, Air Force Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Lee Ching-jan said the air force had moved away from scrambling fighters to shadow PLA aircraft one-for-one.
Instead, Taiwan was using a combination of fighters already on patrol, naval vessels, and land-based missile systems to monitor and respond to PLA activity, reducing strain on both pilots and aircraft, he added.
It remains to be seen whether Taiwan’s government will accept the proposals and what impact they would have on retaining experienced pilots in the air force.
Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
Malaysia expects to receive its Korean-made FA-50M light combat aircraft on schedule, Defense Minister Khaled Nordin said, with the first jets due this month or next.
“According to the schedule, the aircraft will arrive this month or next month – I will announce the arrival date later. So far, I have not received any information regarding a delay in the delivery of the aircraft,” Khaled told reporters after the launch of the Warriors’ Fund Campaign 2026/2027.
In May 2023, Malaysia signed a nearly $920 million contract with Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) for 18 FA-50 Block 20 light combat aircraft, designated FA-50M, for the Royal Malaysian Air Force.
Earlier, as EurAsian Times reported, India’s LCA Tejas was also competing for a Malaysian fighter-jet contract.
Malaysia, which has long needed to modernize its fast jet fleet, commenced the FLIT-LCA requirement in June 2021.
The country launched the tender to acquire a Lead-In Trainer-Light Combat Aircraft as part of the air force’s Capability 55 plan, released in 2018 and outlining the air force’s objective to achieve an ideal force structure by 2055.
The tender quickly gained traction from several countries, including India. Other contenders included the Turkish Hurjet, China-Pakistan’s JF-17, Russia’s MiG-35, and the Korean FA-50.
The FA-50 and Tejas were the two final shortlisted candidates, with the South Korean aircraft ultimately prevailing. Malaysia selected the FA-50 aircraft over India’s Tejas, with officials citing the Korean jet’s proven service record and combat record as key factors.
Korea Aerospace Industries confirmed in February 2023 that it had secured the Malaysian deal.
Then-Defence Minister Mohamad Hasan said the jet’s service record was the primary consideration. “We cannot take the risk and acquire assets that are still at the prototype stage. Our personnel will use this jet, so safety is in our criteria,” he told a press conference in May 2023, echoing comments made in parliament the previous month.
A Korea Aerospace Industries representative later told Channel News Asia that the Royal Malaysian Air Force viewed the Tejas as lacking an export record, while the FA-50 was already proven in combat.
The Philippine Air Force has used the FA-50, including during the 2017 Marawi campaign, and several regional air forces, including Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, operate it.
Sources at India’s HAL acknowledged the outcome. “We were short-listed for the Malaysian LCA contract. We were hopeful as we were very competitive on several criteria, but unfortunately this has not gone our way,” one source said.
HAL Chairman C.B. Ananthakrishnan reportedly said the company was optimistic after being shortlisted from multiple bidders but had received indications that the order was going to the Korean contender, though it had not yet received formal notification.
KAI and Lockheed Martin jointly developed the supersonic T-50 advanced jet trainer, with the TA-50 as the Lead-in fighter trainer and the FA-50 as a light combat aircraft variant.
The T-50 partly resembles the F-16 Fighting Falcon and is 80% of its size. Development began in the 1990s, funded 70% by the South Korean government, 17% by KAI, and 13% by Lockheed Martin.
The aircraft made its first flight in August 2002 and entered service by February 2005.
KAI and Lockheed Martin pursued a joint international marketing program for the T-50.
The T-50/FA-50 family is operated (or on order) by the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Iraq, Poland, and Malaysia. Total firm orders across the family exceed ~290 airframes, with roughly 220–230 already built or delivered as of late 2026 (around 70 still in production or pending delivery).
FA-50
The T-50 is equipped with a GE F404 engine built under license by Samsung Techwin. GE provides engine kits to Samsung Techwin, which also produces some parts and performs final engine assembly and testing.
The fighter/attack variants are equipped with the Elta EL/M-2032 fire-control radar, the same as the initial LCA MK1. The TA-50 can operate as a full-fledged combat platform with PGMs, air-to-ground weapons, and air-to-air missiles.
The TA-50 can carry pods for reconnaissance, targeting assistance, and electronic warfare. Reconnaissance and electronic warfare variants are also being developed, designated RA-50 and EA-50, respectively.
The TA-50 has an internally mounted three-barrel M61 Vulcan cannon. Wingtip rails can accommodate the AIM-9 Sidewinder missile, and underwing hardpoints can carry a variety of additional weapons.
South Korea is considering arming the FA-50 with a smaller version of the Taurus KEPD 350 missile to give it a 400 km stand-off engagement capability. The aircraft has an internal fuel capacity of 2,655 liters. It can carry 1,710 liters in the three external fuel tanks.
The aircraft has a max take-off weight of 12,300 kg. Its ferry range is 1,851 km, and its thrust-to-weight ratio is 0.96. The seven hardpoints can carry up to 5,400 kg of payload.
The FA-50 can carry more internal fuel, and the engine could be either the Eurojet EJ200 or the General Electric F414, providing up to 25% more thrust. Other AESA radars, such as Raytheon’s AN/APG-79 and Northrop Grumman’s AN/APG-83, are options for future production.
In January 2019, KAI began developing an improved FA-50 known as the Block 10 and Block 20 upgrades. The Block 20 adds munitions such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM. Raytheon PhantomStrike and Northrop Grumman AN/APG-83 were being considered as the future AESA radars.
MBDA has offered to integrate the Meteor and ASRAAM medium- and short-range air-to-air missiles on FA-50 and future KF-X fighter jets.
The T-50/FA-50 lost several competitions or was blocked from sales. The UK arms embargo on British components, such as the ejection seat, thwarted Argentina’s interest. Israel and Singapore instead chose the Italian M-346. Taiwan developed its own T-5 Brave Eagle based on its F-CK-1 fighter. The US chose Boeing’s T-7 and also blocked a proposed sale to Uzbekistan, citing concerns that the technology could reach Russia.
Thailand’s Queen Suthida flew a solo sortie in the Royal Thai Air Force’s Saab JAS 39C Gripen fighter jet, becoming the first Thai female Gripen pilot and the first reigning Queen anywhere in the world to fly a modern combat jet solo.
Without an instructor or a co-pilot in the back seat, Thailand’s Queen Suthida took off from a military airbase in southern Surat Thani on October 8, 2026.
For about 41 minutes, the Queen of Thailand owned the air even as King Maha Vajiralongkorn waited with flowers and a golden patch, an honorary Swedish insignia for those who have flown the aircraft.
Local media reported that the flight marked the culmination of extensive simulator training at the base and about 10 hours in a two-seat JAS39D Gripen. However, she was already a pilot before she began training on the Gripen-C, which forms the cornerstone of the RTAF.
On May 13, 2010, the Queen made her flying debut aboard a Cessna T-41D belonging to Fleet 604 at Wing 6 in Bangkok. Since then, she has amassed 1,188.48 flight hours in various aircraft, including the Cessna T-41, CT-4E Airtrainer, Pilatus PC-9, Mooney M20M, Piper PA-34 Seneca, Boeing 737-400, Boeing 737-800, and a twin-seater Gripen-D.
In the past, the Queen has reportedly served as the king’s co-pilot on both domestic and overseas flights while performing royal duties. The royal duo even successfully landed a royal aircraft at Paro Airport in Bhutan in April 2015, widely regarded as one of the world’s hardest airports for pilots.
Notably, only a few precedents exist of royalty or heads of state flying aircraft beyond performing duties. However, a few notable examples exist.
Thailand’s Queen Suthida made her first solo flight in a single-seat JAS 39C Gripen (Via X)
The Spanish Crown Princess Leonor, for instance, flew her first solo flight in December 2025, piloting a Pilatus PC-21 turboprop trainer. She reportedly concluded her air force training with a joint flight alongside her father, King Felipe VI, with both piloting separate Pilatus PC-21 training aircraft.
Some reports also say she flew in an F-5 fighter jet with an instructor.
Meanwhile, Princess Salma bint Abdullah of Jordan, daughter of King Abdullah II, became the first woman in the Jordanian Armed Forces to complete fixed-wing pilot training and receive her wings in 2020.
She even joined the kingdom’s royal air force in providing humanitarian aid to the war-torn Gaza Strip after Israel launched a devastating bombing campaign on the enclave following the October 7 attack by Hamas.
Interestingly, the Jordanian princess comes from a long line of pilots trained to fly both civilian and military aircraft. Jordan’s current leader, King Abdullah II, qualified as a pilot of a Cobra attack helicopter and other types during his military career. He is also purportedly known for his hands-on involvement with the Royal Jordanian Air Force, which operates F-16 AM/BM fighter jets based at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base.
King Abdullah II’s father, King Hussein, was also a highly skilled pilot who flew a variety of military and civilian aircraft, including the De Havilland Vampire and the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, Lockheed L-1011 TriStar, and Boeing 737, to name a few.
In one instance, the king, flying an unarmed, twin-engine De Havilland Dove prop airplane, was intercepted by two Soviet-built Syrian MiG-17 fighter jets but managed to get away using low-level maneuvers, as documented in several reports.
Britain’s King Charles III earned his Royal Air Force (RAF) wings in 1971 after completing jet pilot training at RAF Cranwell in Lincolnshire. He trained as a fast-jet pilot on the BAC Jet Provost, but unverified reports suggest he also flew a Hawk and some helicopters. Similarly, King Felipe of Spain trained across the services and flew with the Spanish Air Force, including the Pilatus PC-21 turboprop trainer and the Dassault Falcon 900B.
Meanwhile, former US President George H.W. Bush was a combat-decorated WWII naval aviator. He performed 58 combat flights throughout the war and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for valor after the Japanese shot down his torpedo plane on September 2, 1944. He later flew the Convair F-102A Delta Dagger supersonic interceptor jet while serving in the Texas Air National Guard between 1970 and 1973.
Some civilian heads of state have also flown in military aircraft purely for the love of the game, though they did not pilot them themselves.
For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin flew in the pilot seat of a modernized nuclear-capable Tu-160M “White Swan” supersonic strategic bomber during a 30-minute flight departing from the Kazan Aviation Plant in 2024. Before this, he flew the previous model of the Tu-160 bomber in August 2005. Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi flew in the cockpit of the Tejas LCA, though only as a passenger.
File Image: TU-160M
The Thai Queen, however, has achieved a milestone no other reigning queen in the world has, thereby registering her name in the annals of history.
This development may also boost the popularity of the Gripen, a Swedish-origin jet that forms the backbone of the RTAF alongside the F-16s.
Thailand’s Gripen
Thailand ordered the Gripen C/D fighter jets in 2008, with the first batch comprising six aircraft arriving at Wing 7 in Surat Thani in February 2011.
In 2015, the Thai Gripen-C/D overpowered the Chinese J-11 aircraft during Exercise Falcon Strike 2015. During the first two days of the war game, the J-11s shot down 16 Gripens in a visual-range battle without taking any losses. But the Gripens completely annihilated the J-11s during beyond-visual-range engagements, as the EurAsian Times explained earlier.
Gripen C flown by Queen Suthida on the runway (Via X)
The aircraft were deployed for combat as hostilities broke out with Cambodia last year.
On July 26, 2025, as shelling intensified near the Phu Ma Kua ridge and the ancient Ta Muen Thom temple, the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) deployed its Gripen C/D fighters in a targeted strike against Cambodian artillery positions—marking the combat debut of the type not just within the RTAF but anywhere in the world since the jet became operational.
The RTAF is now upgrading by acquiring the Gripen-E/F, the most advanced aircraft in the Gripen family.
In August 2025, Thailand approved buying a dozen Saab Gripen-E fighter jets instead of the American Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70/72, which was also on offer.
The newly purchased Gripen-E variant will replace the aging F-16s and integrate into the RTA’s existing SAAB Gripen jets.
Whether the Queen will join the Gripen-E’s cockpit as a solo pilot remains to be seen.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
The best victory is “winning without shedding a drop of blood” is an ancient Chinese proverb attributed to Sun Tzu’s ‘The Art of War,’ written nearly 2,500 years ago.
In 2026, that old strategy has a new rendering: ‘Learning without Bleeding.’
China is treating the Russia-Ukraine War as a “living textbook” for adapting the war-fighting strategy of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), learning drone warfare, and systematically converting battlefield lessons into PLA training, procurement, and force design without having to fight itself.
According to a recent paper by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), China is running the most systematic effort of any outside power to convert lessons from the war in Ukraine into military advantage, absorbing the errors of both sides.
“Chinese analysts are explicit about the value of Russia’s war against Ukraine” and are adopting the war’s lessons into policy debates, weapons procurement, and military doctrine at a breakneck pace.
Analysts in Beijing are describing 2024 as “year one of world drone war,” when the two sides fielded enough drones to show the contours of the new mechanized battlefield.
For the study, the authors reviewed more than 90 Chinese-language sources published over more than four years, from July 2022 to August 2026.
These Chinese-language sources include PLA outlets, defense journals, university research papers, peer-reviewed journals, and research institutions linked to defense industries.
The authors of these Chinese papers include participants in the military learning system. They include researchers at PLA universities and academies, engineers at defense industrial design institutes, civilian academics working alongside numbered military units, and military acquisition organizations that turn battlefield lessons into requirements and procurement.
The study highlights how China is adopting lessons from the war in Ukraine at a breakneck pace.
It finds that “Chinese analysts pick up new battlefield techniques within an average of four months, but turning them into hardware, training, and force structure takes a year or more.”
Essentially, within four months of a new weapon system or war-fighting doctrine/strategy being introduced on the battlefield in Ukraine, Chinese analysts take note and start discussing it in their research papers.
However, filtering these lessons into Chinese military structure, procurement, and industrial production takes nearly a year.
For instance, Sea drones appeared in the war in Ukraine by September 2022, and by November, Chinese analysts were discussing these new weapon systems in their research papers.
Similarly, Fiber-Optic Drones first appeared on the battlefield in Ukraine in March 2024, and Chinese research papers began discussing them that same month. By March 2025, PLA units were already training with Fiber-Optic Drones.
Interceptor drones appeared in the war in Ukraine in February 2024; Chinese analysts noted them by July 2025, and PLA units began training on such interceptor drones by October 2026.
These instances show how quickly Chinese analysts note new weapons systems in the war in Ukraine, followed by PLA units adopting them within a year.
China’s lessons learned fall into two broad areas: offensive capabilities and defensive capabilities.
China copies offensive techniques from Russia, whose army resembles the PLA’s and whose fixes have been tested in combat.
China derives defensive requirements from Ukraine’s attacks and builds them into hardware. Beijing believes that if China goes to war with any Western power, it will face attacks similar to those Russia faced.
However, both offensive and defensive lessons are primarily derived from drone warfare.
Meanwhile, industrial lessons flow into a manufacturing base that already leads the world.
Offensive Learnings in Drone Warfare From the Russian Army
Among offensive techniques, Beijing’s most important lesson is economic.
In March 2025, the PLA Daily treated the claim as settled fact: a single reconnaissance-strike drone costs less than 1 percent of a modern fighter while achieving more than 90 percent of its battlefield coverage.
According to the study, while these figures are rough, the Central Military Commission’s newspaper takes them at face value.
Chinese analysts noted that in 2014, both Ukraine and Russia purchased and used more than a million drones. The Chinese Naval Academy estimated that this amounted to an average of two drones hovering over each soldier deployed on the front line.
The second lesson from drone warfare that China internalized is speed.
File Image
According to the National Defense University’s Joint Operations College, Russian forces can strike a detected target within three to five minutes—compared to hours in earlier wars
Researchers at a PLA unit attribute this to Russia’s reconnaissance-strike complex, in which a low-cost reconnaissance drone pushed deep into the enemy rear serves as the observer and guides another drone’s strike, with Orlan-10s cueing Kub and Lancet loitering munitions.
The copying target is not any single platform but rather the connection between them: drones wired directly into artillery and command networks.
For China, the drone warfare’s third critical lesson is overcommunication and connectivity.
Chinese analysts treat electronic warfare as the deciding factor in the drone war, recording heavy losses on both sides to jamming and countermeasures.
They have also noted with interest Russia’s fiber-optic first-person-view (FPV) drone steered through a thin cable, which is immune to jamming.
The PLA Dailyflagged the shift in May 2024, weeks after the fiber-optic drone’s operational debut, and by April 2025, state media were weighing its trade-offs in detail. In the same month, China Central Television (CCTV) showed a People’s Armed Police unit in Yunnan training with FPV drones and researching fiber-optic models.
Defensive Learnings in Drone Warfare From the Ukrainian Army
While China has tried to internalize Russia’s offensive drone warfare techniques, Beijing has paid even more attention to some of the drone warfare techniques adopted by Ukraine.
Beijing believes that in the event of a military conflict with the West, it could face similar attacks as Russia faces from Ukraine in the ongoing war.
Chinese analysts were especially alarmed by two attacks from Ukraine: first, the use of sea drones for attacking Russian ships, warships, harbors, and bridges.
In the journal of the state shipbuilder’s underwater-warfare institute, a team from the Naval University of Engineering tallied repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian ships, ports, and the Kerch Bridge and found more than 10 large naval vessels damaged.
They concluded that a systematized sea-drone offensive could be met effectively only with counter–sea–drone equipment that also fights as a system.
Another researcher proposed countering suicide boats with interceptor swarms, in skirmishes devoid of humans entirely.
Another Ukrainian attack that caught China’s attention and alarmed it was Operation Spider’s Web.
On June 1, 2025, Ukraine attacked Russia’s strategic bombers, deep inside its territory, by using FPV drones launched from within Russia.
Chinese Foreign Ministry’s magazine estimated Russian losses at 11 strategic bombers and identified the raid’s novelty in being launched from inside Russia, at close range.
A photo of a FPV-drone-struck military plane Tu-95 at Russia’s Olenya airbase during the attack. Credits AFU.
The PLA’s training system answered within four and a half months.
In an October 2025 exercise, a brigade defended against a drone attack team of more than 20 operators, using detection gear that locates drones by their radio emissions and matches them against a catalog of more than 800 commercial models, paving a path for Chinese response to a Spider’s Web–style drone infiltration.
Chinese analysts also concluded that a successful drone interception strategy must account for the economics of interception.
According to a Global Times analysis of Ukraine’s interceptor drones, “the cost of procuring one man-portable air-defense missile buys several hundred air-defense FPV drones.”
Therefore, Chinese analysts concluded that the best weapon against a drone is another drone.
China also concluded that if it is attacked, it will be attacked by drones en masse, and therefore it must defend itself against thousands of drones.
In this respect, China has also noted Russia’s defense strategy.
A 2026 review from a Chinese state aerospace design institute recorded that Russia “has built in combat a counter-drone equipment system of electronic jamming first, firepower interception as the backstop, and self-defense interception as the supplement.”
Beijing also noted that Russia was forced to pull its strategic bombers back about 6,000 kilometers to the Chukotka Peninsula and deploy retractable protective nets.
The study noted how quickly these studies are being adopted into hardware.
At the Zhuhai air show in November 2024, the counter-drone systems of the state electronics, ordnance, and aerospace groups dominated Chinese coverage, led by CETC’s Tianqiong, NORINCO’s Hurricane 3000 microwave weapon, and CASIC’s LW-60 laser.
The September 2025 military parade put counter-drone missile-gun systems, high-energy lasers, and high-power microwave weapons on state display.
In late July 2026, CCTV aired footage of an army drone crew putting a missile into a fast boat maneuvering at sea, and in August the army flew armed KVD002 drones against sea drone targets in exercises.
China has also learned that in a war of attrition, production wins.
For Chinese analysts, a drone war is won by the side that can build more, and no country builds more drones than China. So here, China only needs to build on its advantages.
China also recognizes Starlink’s importance in the Ukraine War and has concluded that low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite constellations will play a decisive role in any future war. China is therefore working to build its own LEO satellite constellations.
The CSIS study concludes that China is learning from and implementing lessons from the Ukraine War faster than any other country.
As Russia and Ukraine fight a ‘war of attrition,’ China could be the biggest winner.
Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
After claiming it intercepted foreign aircraft on two separate occasions last year, China has made another major claim: a “foreign warship” lost power while pursuing a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) Type 055 destroyer, seemingly an indirect reference to the USS Benfold.
Zhang Jun, a captain on the PLA Navy’s Type 055 “Zunyi” destroyer, said a foreign warship lost power while his warship, engaged in a routine training exercise at the time, the Chinese state-owned publication Global Times claimed.
Speaking on China Central Television (CCTV), the officer said the destroyer had multiple encounters with foreign warships and aircraft during the exercise.
“During that mission, we were conducting routine training exercises when a foreign warship began tracking our ship. As we sailed at high speed, the foreign vessel had to match our speed. While we were in a standoff, its power and electricity all suddenly went out, its radar stopped emitting, and its navigation lights went dark,” Zhang said. “This lasted for nearly half an hour. But our equipment and our crew had no problems at all,” he added.
When asked whether the engagement made him nervous, the Chinese officer said, “Why should I be nervous? I was definitely not nervous. As long as you are within range of my missiles, I can definitely destroy you.”
The officer stopped short of providing more details, including the time and place of the encounter and the name of the foreign warship. However, the claims appear aimed at the US Navy warship USS Benfold, which apparently lost power and was stranded in the South China Sea in July 2026, as previously reported by the EurAsian Times.
“On July 24, 2026, while conducting routine operations in the Indo-Pacific, Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65) reported an engineering casualty involving its generators, causing a loss of power,” Navy Cmdr. Matthew Comer, spokesperson for the 7th Fleet, said in a statement to USNI News in August 2026.
“There were no injuries to the crew, who demonstrated resilience, grit, professionalism and unwavering steadiness in their response,” he added.
The incident reportedly occurred while the USS Benfold was engaged in routine operations in the Indo-Pacific as part of the USS George Washington carrier strike group (CSG).
After the power loss, the guided-missile destroyer reportedly drifted for four days and was supplied by other ships in the South China Sea, which China claims as its sovereign territory and where frequent standoffs occur between Beijing and other forces.
The Seventh Fleet spokesperson did not mention a high-speed pursuit of a Chinese vessel or any engagement between the US carrier strike group and PLA Navy warships, although these encounters are not uncommon in the region.
USS Benfold-Wikipedia
When asked whether China’s claimed scenario is plausible, Indian Navy veteran and commentator Rear Admiral Girish Kumar Garg (retd) told the EurAsian Times, “For an Arleigh Burke-class ship, high-speed propulsion has nothing to do with total power loss. Complete power failure can happen if all onboard power generators fail or the power distribution system malfunctions. Although rare, it is not impossible.”
Further, when probed about potential reasons for the complete power loss, Rear Admiral Garg said, “Can be many reasons- fuel contamination can be a major cause. Power overload due to too many systems operating and loaded on the running generators can also cause them to trip. However, generally, if all onboard power generators are running and connected, then they cater for full ship’s electrical load plus some extra load margin.”
The USS Benfold power loss incident was not the first of its kind. Earlier, the USS Higgins had an “engineering casualty” in its electrical system in May 2026, which caused it to lose power and propulsion for many hours in the Indo-Pacific area. No chase of another vessel had occurred at the time.
Nonetheless, state media and Chinese experts used the opportunity and their purported claims to highlight the enviable capabilities of the PLAN’s Type 055 warships.
Chinese military expert Shi Hong told the Global Times that the Type 055 is considered the world’s best large destroyer in terms of comprehensive capabilities. Meanwhile, Xu Yi, another crew member on the ship that was involved in the purported encounter, said, “We have a powerful offensive and defensive system. In the future, we will definitely conduct operations externally in formation. In fact, we have already begun integrating multiple formations and exploring what makes for the best combination.”
Some pro-PLA observers on social media widely amplified the Chinese claims, aligning with similar previous instances.
However, Beijing deliberately makes specific claims while avoiding direct naming of the foreign assets to avoid a diplomatic response and to eliminate the possibility of a counter-narrative from official sources and a potential bilateral tussle.
Chinese Military Keeps Confronting Foreign Assets
In the past few years, China has claimed to have intercepted and expelled unidentified foreign aircraft from the same region on multiple occasions.
Last year, Chinese state media, CCTV, released a video on June 29 showing two J-16 fighter jets—considered the cornerstone of the PLA Air Force’s interception efforts—being dispatched to warn and drive out a “foreign aircraft” that allegedly breached China’s territorial sea boundary.
“The foreign aircraft flew over at a low altitude, not very disciplined, almost at a vertical 90 degrees, breaching our territorial sea line,” air force aviation brigade member Zhang Zhanfang stated on the broadcast at the time.
The Chinese media did not disclose the exact date or location of the incident, making it challenging to identify the foreign aircraft in question.
Later that year, Global Times reported on a documentary shown on CCTV in October 2025, in which a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) pilot from the special mission aircraft formation claimed he could simultaneously lock two foreign stealth fighter jets while flying the J-16 fighter jet and force both jets to withdraw.
“They headed straight toward our two aircraft. Their intention was very clear—it was a provocation. With our backs to the territorial sea line, we had to intercept them,” Li Chao, a pilot from the People’s Liberation Army’s Western Theatre Command, said while recounting the incident that allegedly took place during a coastal training exercise in 2024.
Although the Chinese did not disclose which foreign stealth aircraft it was referring to, only two aircraft fit the description: the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II of the US Air Force (USAF).
Both aircraft are frequently deployed in the Indo-Pacific for training, war exercises, and other operational missions, as the EurAsian Times noted in a detailed report published at the time.
Washington did not acknowledge the claim, but the incident drew a wide debate over whether a 4.5th-generation jet could intercept US fifth-generation stealth fighters.
Separately, US and Chinese ships have had sporadic encounters in international waters, as the US Navy conducts regular FONOPs (Freedom of Navigation Operations) in the region.
Earlier this year, in January 2026, reports noted that a Chinese warship, CNS Taiyuan, encountered a foreign warship during “a long-range training exercise” in undisclosed waters. The report said the foreign ship meant to provoke the Chinese crew, but the crew instead followed orders and drove the vessel away.
Similarly, in January 2025, reports noted that China had claimed that its navy “drove away” a “foreign warship that attempted to spy on its Shandong aircraft carrier during a long-distance training mission. At the time, a Chinese sailor attached to the Type 055 destroyer CNS Yan’an crew said a foreign warship attempted to engage in “illegal reconnaissance” and infiltrate a formation led by the carrier during a routine training mission.
In June 2023, a US destroyer, USS Chung-Hoon, had a close encounter with a Chinese warship in the Taiwan Strait. The US Navy alleged that the Chinese ship executed an “unsafe” maneuver, crossed the US ship’s path, and forced it to slow down to avoid a collision.
Another significant incident occurred in 2018 when a Chinese warship came dangerously close to the USS Decatur in the South China Sea. The US Navy described the action as “unsafe and unprofessional.
Despite a thaw in ties between Chinese and US leaders, the fight over Indo-Pacific dominance continues.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
Indonesia is awaiting the first batch of Chinese J-10C multi-role fighter jets in the first half of next year, according to new reports.
Once and if the aircraft arrive, the Indonesian Air Force could become the first in the world to operate both the Chinese J-10C and the French Dassault Rafale jets.
Indonesia could receive its first Chengdu J-10CE fighter jets in six months, Republika Online, a local Indonesian news outlet, reported. Citing informed sources, the report claimed the first delivery could take place as early as April 2027, although the number of jets to be delivered is currently unknown.
So far, neither the Chinese nor the Indonesian side has officially confirmed it. EurAsian Times has reached out to Indonesian authorities and awaits a response.
However, Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Mohamad Tonny Harjono urged the public to “just wait” for the arrival of the Chinese Vigorous Dragons, according to Republika Online, suggesting a purchase may have been made.
Notably, the reports come a year after the Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin confirmed in October 2025 that the country would soon buy the jets from China as part of its military modernization drive.
“They will be flying over Jakarta soon,” Sjafrie said, without providing further details. Separately, Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa had confirmed that his ministry had approved a $9 billion budget to purchase the Chinese aircraft, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.
File Image: J-10C
Interestingly, Indonesia communicated the decision to buy the aircraft months after its J-10C fighters made their combat debut against the Indian Air Force in an intense four-day conflict in May 2025.
At the time, Pakistan claimed to have downed multiple Indian fighters, including the Rafale, using long-range PL-15 air-to-air missiles launched from the J-10C. India, in turn, claimed to have downed multiple Pakistani jets, including JF-17s and F-16s, but the list did not include China-supplied J-10Cs.
The Rafale shootdown claims, although unverified and not officially accepted by India or Dassault Aviation, were blown out of proportion and amplified by Beijing to promote the J-10C in the international market. French intelligence officials even accused Beijing of running an anti-Rafale campaign to discredit the Rafale jets.
China offered Indonesia a “battle-tested” J-10C less than a month after the May 2025 Indo-Pakistan conflict, according to Indonesia’s Deputy Defense Minister Donny Ermawan Taufanto. By then, only Pakistan had acquired the combat jet, even though Beijing positioned it as an affordable alternative to the F-16, Rafale, and Eurofighter Typhoon.
If reports are to be believed, Indonesia is on track to become the third buyer of the type after Pakistan and Uzbekistan. The latter released footage of its newly acquired J-10CE fighter jets on August 28, 2026, as part of the country’s Independence Day celebrations. In a state broadcast, at least six J-10CE fighters were shown flying in formation, approaching the runway, and receiving a water-cannon salute.
Bangladesh has been exploring the purchase of China’s J-10CE fighter jet to modernize its aging Air Force since 2024.
Separately. China is also reportedly trying to sell the aircraft to Azerbaijan. Last month, it displayed a full-scale J-10CE mock-up in Azerbaijani markings at the sixth Azerbaijan International Defense Exhibition (ADEX-2026), in what appeared to be a targeted appeal.
J-10C & Rafale To Fly Together?
There is no doubt that J-10CE has drawn significant international attention after the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Armed with PL-15 missiles, the J-10CE’s beyond-visual-range air warfare capabilities are impressive.
Meanwhile, Jakarta is undertaking a massive modernization drive to replace aging aircraft like its US-made F-16A/Bs and Russian Su-27 and Su-30 fighters.
As part of this effort, Jakarta signed a contract for 42 Dassault Rafale F4 fighters from France in 2022, and the first of these jets were delivered earlier this year. In addition, the Southeast Asian country signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) to acquire additional Rafale fighters during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit in May 2025.
Indonesia also signed a contract to acquire 48 KAAN fighter jets from Turkey in July 2025, covering extensive collaboration in manufacturing, technology transfer, and engineering.
Rafale fighter jet. Credits: NATO.
Beyond these acquisitions, Indonesia had also committed to co-developing the KF-21, but reportedly abandoned those plans in June this year after a “comprehensive evaluation” of the program’s effectiveness, technology transfer, economic value, and internal defense requirements.
Nonetheless, it would still buy the South Korean jets.
It is currently unclear how the Indonesian government would finance these varied fighter jet acquisitions amid budgetary constraints, and whether buying J-10Cs would mean Jakarta would not place an additional order for French Rafale jets.
If Indonesia goes ahead and acquires J-10C jets, it would be an interesting development because the two aircraft are often compared as rival 4.5-generation multirole fighters in the export market. Both jets use a delta-canard configuration, feature advanced AESA radars, modern electronic warfare suites, and beyond-visual-range missile capability.
However, China is pitching the jets as more cost-effective alternatives with little to no strings attached.
An early delivery of Chinese jets could temporarily strengthen Indonesia’s air combat posture while the Rafale fleet builds up. However, acquiring the J-10C may come with its own risks, particularly those of operating a diverse fleet. Analysts like Nitin J Ticku, who also serves as editor of EurAsian Times, wrote in an article that a mixed fleet could become a logistical nightmare for Jakarta.
Meanwhile, Chinese experts argue that buying weapons from multiple sources would be a smart move to safeguard Indonesia’s interests rather than ‘putting all eggs in one basket.’
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
Washington has sent two contradictory signals on Taiwan in the last few days. Whether these signals reflect strategic ambiguity or strategic confusion in the coming days has become a matter of debate among the strategic experts.
On the one hand, Trump is holding back a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan, pre-approved by the U.S. Congress, despite a bipartisan group of senators explicitly urging him to “formally notify . But the U.S. President has described his decision to pause as a “very good negotiating chip” for his talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Whether that worked in his summit meeting with Xi last week in Washington is not known. But Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo confirmed yesterday (October 6) that he has “not heard” of any new sale being cleared, even in smaller chunks.
On the other hand, the Pentagon is seemingly doing the opposite of this pause.
According to reports, the U.S. Department of Defense will station two representatives on a long-term basis inside Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense headquarters in Taipei from 2026 to 2028.
One official will come from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD-Policy] — the office that writes U.S. national security and defense strategy. The second will come from the Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA] — a federally funded think tank that does mathematical modeling for war games and combat capability assessment.
The program is called the “Taiwan-US Defense Ministry Joint Cooperation Assessment,” with a total budget of NT$471 million [$14.8 million], including NT$152.5 million this year for personnel, consultancy, travel, data collection, and even interpretation for classified-level meetings.
This would mark the first time U.S. defense officials are permanently embedded inside Taiwan’s military headquarters, shifting cooperation away from traditional channels managed through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Washington’s de facto embassy.
The military relationship between the United States and Taiwan is highly integrated yet formally unofficial. It is governed by the legal framework of the “U.S. Taiwan Relations Act” (TRA), which Congress passed on April 10, 1979.
Congress enacted it immediately after the U.S. formally terminated its previous “Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan)” to officially recognize “the People’s Republic of China (PRC)” in Beijing.
Rather than abandoning Taiwan, Congress designed the TRA as a legal framework to ensure that “robust, unofficial security, commercial, and cultural ties” continue uninterrupted.
In short, the TRA provides a domestic legal workaround for treating Taiwan as a country without formal diplomatic recognition. However, under it, the U.S. is also obligated to maintain Taiwan’s capacity to resist force or coercion in general and the forcible annexation by the PRC in particular.
Over the years, U.S. personnel have served in Taiwan as trainers and advisers. Hundreds of active-duty U.S. military advisors—often colloquially referred to locally as “English teachers” to maintain a low profile—are routinely deployed across Taiwan.
U.S. military observers are present within Taiwan’s annual “Han Kuang live-fire military exercises”. They actively guide Taiwan’s defense strategy toward decentralized command, logistics, and real-world combat readiness.
Taiwanese fighter pilots undergo advanced combat training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona.
The US remains Taiwan’s primary foreign weapons supplier, with a total backlog of orders nearing $20 billion.
In fact, Taiwan received its first new batch of two advanced Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70 fighter jets on October 2. This was part of an $8 billion deal approved in 2019 for 66 new-build F-16 Block 70 jets, with the remaining 64 aircraft scheduled for future delivery. out of a 66-aircraft fleet on order.
A newly purchased F-16V Block 70 fighter jet lands at Chi-hang Air Base in Taitung on October 2, 2026. Taiwan received its first two US-made F-16V fighter jets as the island democracy upgrades its military capabilities to deter a potential Chinese attack. The warplanes are part of an $8 billion deal for 66 F-16Vs approved during U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term and scheduled for delivery this year. (Photo by CHENG Yu-chen / AFP)
However, all these coordination efforts between Washington and Taipei are usually routed through the AIT intermediary, as the U.S. adheres to its One China” policy. In that sense, the new proposal to station Pentagon personnel directly inside the Taiwanese Defense Ministry represents a shift from this historical status quo.
The new arrangement puts Americans directly into the core of Taiwan’s defense policymaking, including policy coordination, Han Kuang exercise planning, asymmetric warfare doctrine, and major weapons procurement evaluations, it is said.
Of course, the U.S. routinely sends military and civilian defense officials to work directly inside the defense ministries of partner and allied nations. Established by the Pentagon in 2009, the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program specifically trains and deploys high-performing senior U.S. Department of Defense civilians.
These advisors are embedded in partner-nation defense ministries to support institutional capacity building, strategy, financial management, and logistics.
The U.S. also actively deploys specialized defense consultants directly to the defense ministries of nations looking to transition away from historical adversaries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, and various Balkan nations looking to exit Moscow’s orbit.
The U.S. has a long history of embedding liaison officers in allied countries. For example, it has a Joint Political-Military Group in Israel that embeds officers in missile-defense cooperation for Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and now Iron Beam. But American officials do not operate inside the Kirya (Israel’s defense headquarters).
Similarly, despite 54,000 US personnel stationed in Japan, no U.S. officer sits inside Japan’s Ministry of Defense to assess combat capability.
Perhaps in NATO countries and South Korea, U.S. military officials are believed to sit together often.
There are also “Offices of Defense Cooperation” (ODC), or United States Military Groups, which are technically attached to the local U.S. Embassy for diplomatic protection. These teams provide security assistance and work in routine, day-to-day coordination with host ministry personnel.
However, what makes the proposed U.S. officials sitting directly within Taiwan’s military headquarters unique is that Taiwan is not an ally of America in the strict sense, as the U.S. lacks formal diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, and these officials will bypass the traditional AIT.
Of course, multiple reports in recent years have claimed that U.S. special forces are permanently stationed in Taiwan to assist its 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion special operations force, though Washington has officially denied it. The same has been the case with the speculations about the coming and going of U.S. military personnel from the Army Special Operations Command base in Taoyuan.
U.S. President Donald Trump (L) poses for photos with China’s President Xi Jinping during a visit to Zhongnanhai Garden in Beijing on May 15, 2026. (Photo by Evan Vucci / POOL / AFP)
How will Beijing React?
At the time of writing, Beijing had not issued an official reaction, possibly because Taiwanese media outlets only recently brought details of this long-term Pentagon deployment to light. It has not been declared officially.
But it goes without saying that Beijing would be “certain to protest” and could respond “with expanded exercises and intimidation”, according to Zivon Wang, a military analyst at the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies in Taipei.
He expects U.S. personnel not to wear uniforms at the Ministry of National Defense because it could be interpreted as a more formalized US-Taiwan military relationship and might further provoke Beijing.
Incidentally, China has made more air and naval incursions across the median line in the Taiwan Strait since 2022. Although Chinese military aircraft had occasionally crossed the median line (established informally in 1954) in the past, the practice became significantly more frequent from 2022, particularly after Nancy Pelosi (then Speaker of the House of Representatives) visited Taiwan in August that year. What had once been an informal but largely respected buffer increasingly became a zone of routine Chinese military activity.
Therefore, it remains to be seen whether China will respond to the Pentagon’s proposed deployment with loud exercises.
It may also remain silent, as nothing is official yet and Trump has his “negotiating chip” of holding back Taiwan’s military package.
Trump’s admirers often see his unpredictability as useful in negotiations with an adversary, because the other side cannot be sure how far he is willing to go.
But his critics argue that his unpredictability becomes counterproductive when allies cannot distinguish a negotiating threat from a real change in American policy.
It remains to be seen who will prove to be right in the case of Taiwan.
Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
Chunghwa Telecom lined up an unusual deal to use drones to transport blood, in turn offering insight into how unmanned aerial vehicle connectivity (UAV) could be used to advance smart healthcare.
The Taiwanese operator signed a memorandum of understanding with the New Taipei City Fire Department covering transport of blood supplies for emergency medical uses.
Chunghwa Telecom stated the pair plan trials “along the northern coast and mountainous areas” to see if the drones can “improve the efficiency of medical resource allocation”.
The operator’s New Taipei Operations Office is handling its side of the commitment, which involves providing mobile and fixed network connectivity, establishing smart cold chain systems and evaluating technical aspects.
Chunghwa Telecom also agreed to handle the integration of UAVs and various flight-related elements including monitoring the blood drones as they fly, planning their routes and securing the necessary airspace.
It explained the companies hope to provide more reliable blood supplies during emergency situations, particularly in remote or mountainous areas. Longer term, the pair hope to establish standard operating procedures and boost the links between the UAV set-up and existing emergency service systems.
Chunghwa Telecom pitched the work as a practical example of collaboration “between government, healthcare and technology”, which could broaden the use of smart logistics by emergency and medical service providers.
China has displayed a full-scale J-10CE mock-up in Azerbaijani markings at the sixth Azerbaijan International Defense Exhibition (ADEX-2026), which opened at the Baku Expo Center on September 30.
China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC), which represents Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), made its debut at ADEX this year by bringing a range of advanced aviation equipment, including the J-10CE fighter jet, L-15A advanced trainer aircraft, Y-20 transport aircraft, Z-20 helicopter, and Wing Loong drones.
Notably, this comes days after photos of a full-scale J-10CE (Vigorous Dragons) mock-up displayed at ADEX 2026 surfaced on social media, showing Azerbaijan’s national flag markings.
Whether this display leads to a sale of J-10C jets remains to be seen, but analysts see it as a potential pathway.
Azerbaijan has not hinted whether it wants to buy the J-10CE. However, reports of its interest in the aircraft have circulated since the Azerbaijani Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Namig Islamzade, was photographed examining the aircraft during the Zhuhai Air Show in China in November 2024, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.
Azerbaijan Air Force already operates the JF-17 Block III fighter produced jointly by China and Pakistan. If Azerbaijan goes ahead and acquires the aircraft, it would become the third country to acquire the J-10C after Pakistan and Uzbekistan, and the second country in the world to operate both the JF-17 and the J-10C after Pakistan.
The J-10CE fighter jet is among a range of Chinese-made aircraft being showcased at ADEX 2026 (Via China Military Bugle on X)
China, for one, has been pushing the J-10CE in the export market by emphasizing that the aircraft has been tested in combat. Pakistan deployed the J-10CE against India during the May 2025 conflict and claimed to have downed multiple Indian Air Force aircraft, including the Rafale, using the long-range PL-15 air-to-air missiles.
IAF called them “Manohar Kahaniya” or Pulp Fiction tales and, in turn, claimed downing nearly a dozen PAF warplanes, including F-16s and JF-17s.
China has positioned itself as a reliable non-Western arms supplier to countries looking to modernize their militaries while reducing reliance on Russia.
Azerbaijan’s existing experience with Chinese avionics, sensors and weapons systems—gained through its JF-17 Block III fleet—could make the J-10CE an attractive option. Chinese experts have presented the more capable J-10CE as a natural high-end complement in a high-low mix, better suited to complex missions than the lighter JF-17.
Coupled with Azerbaijan’s recent acquisition of the Chinese HQ-9BE long-range air-defense system, a J-10CE purchase would integrate Chinese platforms into a cohesive combat architecture for Baku’s forces.
Baku has been considering replacing aging Soviet-era MiG-29s and Su-25s and bolstering its overall military posture to counter Armenia. This could potentially create a perfect opportunity for China’s state export machinery.
Armenia, an arch-nemesis of Azerbaijan, meanwhile, maintains a very limited fighter jet inventory. The bulk of the Armenian Air Force consists of a small number of Su-25 Frogfoots, many of which it lost in the war with Azerbaijan in 2020. It also has older Su-25s and just four Su-30SMs.
Previous reports indicated that Armenia has been in talks with India to acquire 8–12 Su-30MKI multirole fighter jets, in a package variously estimated at $2.5–3 billion, though neither government has confirmed a contract.
Meanwhile, Armenia has emerged as one of the most important buyers of Indian arms, having acquired the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher, the Akash surface-to-air missile system, Swathi weapon-locating radars, ATAGS 155 mm towed howitzers, and the MArG 155 wheeled artillery system.
J-10C
The J-10C is a single-engine, 4.5-generation delta-canard multirole fighter. Its export version, the J-10CE, uses the indigenous Shenyang WS-10 turbofan and carries an AESA radar and an infrared search-and-track sensor. It can be armed with the PL-10, a short-range missile with an imaging-infrared seeker, and the longer-range PL-15.
File Image: J-10C
It also has a glass cockpit, an electronic-warfare suite, beyond-visual-range engagement and precision strike, with in-flight refueling on configured aircraft. A targeting pod supports laser- and satellite-guided munitions. Chinese media often liken it to later F-16s; like the F-16, it uses fly-by-wire to control an unstable airframe.
Chinese state media say the J-10CE will continue to be upgraded for export. Designer Li Jun told China Daily it can be tailored for air superiority or strike, with optional payloads, and that its AESA radar and network-centric systems outperform older mechanically scanned setups. Claims of gallium-nitride radar upgrades, radar-absorbing coatings and engine changes remain unverified.
“The J-10CE can adapt to customers’ needs, including air superiority and strike against ground targets, and can be customized based on the environments and mission requirements of different users. We can also offer optional payload packages to clients,” Li said, making a direct appeal to countries looking to upgrade their fleets.
“The aircraft’s avionics system has received a generational upgrade. Its Active Electronically Scanned Array radar system can rapidly detect and track targets, far outperforming traditional mechanically scanned radars,” Li stated. “The jet boasts powerful features, including network-centric cooperative combat, beyond visual range multiple target engagement in intense electromagnetic scenarios, and multimodal precision strikes. It can also prevail in medium- and low-altitude dogfights,” he added.
However, these reports could not be independently verified.
Despite a coordinated export campaign, the J-10CE has had limited success in the export market.
Countries like Bangladesh and Indonesia have both expressed interest in the jet, but it has not culminated in a deal. Moreover, Egypt recently decided to procure additional Rafale jets (it was also pitched the J-10C).
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
The recent summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping may have projected an image of renewed engagement; however, while two Presidents negotiated above the surface, their navies were preparing for a contest in which nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) could play a decisive role.
The strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing seems to be moving on a very different track—especially under the waters of the Indo-Pacific.
At the moment, the United States may have a substantial lead in the number of SSNs, technology, and operational experience, but China is rapidly catching up by expanding its undersea capabilities.
In its quest to narrow the gap with the US, China has entered a race for undersea advantage across the Indo-Pacific, which could shape deterrence, sea control, and the strategic balance of power for decades to come.
For maritime domination, both SSNs and SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) play critical roles.
SSBNs primarily provide nuclear deterrence by ensuring a credible second-strike capability, whereas SSNs are essentially designed to conduct hunter-killer missions, including tracking and, if necessary, engaging adversary SSBNs, as well as escorting carrier strike groups (CSGs) for sea control missions.
As Korean scholar Dongkeun Lee points out, in the context of the Indo-Pacific, SSN operations can be broadly classified into two primary missions: (1) countering SSBN capabilities and (2) escorting CSGs. The former is closely associated with nuclear deterrence, whereas the latter reflects the traditional sea power function of controlling and protecting key sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
Both missions are particularly important in this part of the world as its principal flashpoints, including the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait, are all maritime domains. Maintaining credible naval capabilities, therefore, is essential to advancing both deterrence and broader strategic objectives in the region.
Incidentally, around one-third of global shipping traverses the South China Sea. The maritime gateways here are critical not only for China but also for Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.
American CSGs continue to play a major role in controlling and protecting these critical SLOCs. Consequently, SSNs play an equally crucial role in escorting CSGs. By providing lethal undersea capabilities that can silently target threats across multiple domains, including surface and subsurface targets, SSNs can effectively eliminate threats to aircraft carriers.
The United States permanently deploys an aircraft carrier to the Seventh Fleet, based in Yokosuka, Japan, and it is common for more than one CSG to be present in this region at any given time. SSNs’ presence here serves both to protect US carrier groups and to create the possibility of threatening Chinese nuclear submarines.
Likewise, the PRC is rapidly developing its own CSG capability to counterbalance that of the United States in the South China Sea. China’s Yulin naval base on Hainan Island is an important center for its nuclear submarine forces.
Until recently, the undersea dominance tilted heavily in favor of the US. But the alignments are fast changing.
Though the US Navy still leads with an all-nuclear fleet of 71 active submarines (including 51–53 SSNs/SSGNs), China has now surpassed Russia to command the world’s second-largest nuclear submarine fleet with an estimated 9 to 12 SSNs (such as the Type 093 and Type 093A/093B Shang-class) and 6 SSBNs (Jin-class Type 094), totaling roughly 32 active nuclear submarines across its entire naval forces that operate primarily in the Indo-Pacific region.
People walk past an illustration of a Chinese nuclear submarine at the Military Museum in Beijing on March 3, 2024. (Photo by GREG BAKER / AFP)
In a recent IISS assessment, China launched 10 nuclear-powered submarines between 2021 and 2025, totaling 79,000 tonnes, against America’s 7 boats at 55,000 tonnes. For the first time, China out-built the US in both numbers and tonnage in a five-year window, it is argued.
“Most significantly, this includes the seventh and eighth Type 094 (Jin) nuclear-armed ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), which come as part of the emergence of Beijing’s nuclear triad,” the IISS study says.
It noted that commercially available satellite imagery taken in early 2026 showed six Type 094s in total, spread between the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co (BSHIC) shipyard in Huludao, the 1st Submarine Base at Jianggezhuang, the Xiaopingdao test facility and the 2nd Submarine Base at Yalong Bay on Hainan Island.
“Allowing for additional boats either on deterrence patrol or under cover for refit during this period, it is almost certainly the case that China has launched a seventh and eighth Type-094 in 2024 and 2025, respectively,” the IIISS study concludes.
In addition to the Type 094s, Bohai is also producing nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN) for the People’s Liberation Army, with the study suggesting that nine Type 093B (Shang III) boats have been launched between 2022 and this year, based on commercial satellite imagery of the facility and US government assessments.
Incidentally, in March this year, the US Navy’s intelligence chief, Rear Admiral Mike Brookes, testified before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) that China is undertaking a major shift toward building an all-nuclear submarine fleet as part of a broader effort to strengthen its undersea warfare capabilities and expand blue-water naval power.
According to Brookes, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which operates more than 60 submarines in total, including roughly 50 conventional diesel-electric boats (SSK) and a smaller number of SSNs and SSBNs, is transitioning away from conventional submarines toward a predominantly nuclear construction program to support sustained operations, strategic deterrence and sea-lane interdiction.
Brookes also pointed out that China had expanded submarine production infrastructure across three major shipyards, tripling construction hall capacity and more than doubling production capability to sustain higher output of advanced nuclear boats through the 2030s.
By 2027, China’s submarine force is projected to reach roughly 70 submarines, adding up to six SSGNs, three smaller-class SSNs, and two SSBNs while retiring older Chinese and Russian-built submarines. By 2035, continued expansion could yield up to 80 submarines, with about half nuclear-powered—a major shift in force composition—and projections for the early 2040s include around 20-30 new-class SSGNs and SSBNs.
These platforms will be designed from the keel up for blue-water operations and persistent presence beyond the first island chain, representing an evolution in PLA Navy undersea operational capabilities. China will likely field a more survivable and numerous ballistic missile submarine force equipped with longer-range, more accurate SLBMs, enabling patrols in bastions closer to home waters while holding the US homeland at risk.
A man looks at a submarine during a media tour by the PLA Naval Museum, organized by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ahead of the Defense Ministers’ Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Member States in Qingdao, in eastern China’s Shandong province on June 25, 2025. (Photo by Pedro PARDO / AFP)
Broader deployment of long-range, potentially hypersonic anti-ship and land-attack missiles from undersea platforms is anticipated, along with more sophisticated torpedoes and unmanned vehicles for ISR, mine warfare, and strike missions. Substantial investments in seabed sensors, undersea cables, and unmanned systems will enhance China’s situational awareness while creating vulnerabilities for the US and allies in crisis or conflict.
The Indo-Pacific will remain the PLA Navy’s primary focus, but by 2040 routine submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, Arctic approaches, and possibly the Atlantic are likely, Brookes cautions.
However, as noted above, the US Navy currently has superior acoustic quieting, combat experience, and highly advanced Virginia-class SSNs. But as the EurAsian Times once explained, the US has a backlog of 12 Virginia-class submarines, in addition to three Columbia-class ballistic submarines.
Its production rate of 1.2 per year falls far short of the required 2.33 per year to meet its own needs and those of its allies (under the AUKUS pact, it is supposed to provide at least three Virginia-class submarines to Australia in the early 2030s).
Only three US shipyards can build nuclear-powered attack submarines (Groton, Connecticut; Quonset Point, Rhode Island; and Newport, Virginia). Only two of them are functional at the moment.
While the US defense industrial base is severely strained, China’s naval shipyards are said to be outperforming. With about 9 older Shang I/II boats plus an estimated 16 Type 093B hulls in service, in trials, or under construction, China is said to have the largest SSN series under construction anywhere.
The 093B reportedly features a vertical launch system for 24 YJ-12/YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles and six torpedo tubes, shifting China from torpedo brawls to long-range strike.
In the Indo-Pacific, the undersea race seems to change three fundamentals.
First, the era of uncontested US undersea dominance is over. US SSNs have long hunted Chinese SSBNs inside their bastion, keeping Beijing’s deterrent vulnerable. But now, China can sustain continuous at-sea deterrence patrols from Hainan’s Yalong Bay, protected by surface fleet and seabed sensors. That forces US SSNs to operate closer to Chinese waters, at higher risk, stretching ASW resources thin.
Second, the proliferation of quiet Chinese SSNs with VLS—at least six SSGN hulls launched in the past five years with vertical launch systems that could fire high-speed anti-ship missiles displayed in Beijing—means every US carrier entering the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea now faces a multi-axis underwater missile threat. The carrier’s sanctuary beyond the first island chain, once assumed, is no longer safe.
Third, China’s rapid maritime expansion has fundamentally altered the Indo-Pacific security landscape, prompting Australia and Japan to aggressively build strategic counterweights. Rather than acting in isolation, Canberra and Tokyo have pivoted toward minilateral security alliances, military modernization, and supply chain diversification to offset Beijing’s growing naval dominance.
Australia and Japan, alongside the United States and the Philippines, have formalized a security grouping explicitly designed to counter Beijing’s aggressive maneuvers in the South and East China Seas. This alliance focuses on joint maritime patrols, intelligence sharing, and military interoperability to safeguard freedom of navigation under international law.
Driven by the need to project power across its vast northern approaches, Australia has fundamentally reshaped its defense posture. This is anchored by the AUKUS pact—enabling Australia to acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines—positioning the nation as a formidable southern anchor against Chinese naval projection.
For India, which has no SSNs in service (it previously leased from Russia and now plans indigenous production) and operates only three SSBNs (Arihant, Arighaat, and Aridhaman), the implications are significant.
Against India’s slow naval expansion, Chinese nuclear submarines, including intelligence-gathering vessels, now regularly traverse the Indian Ocean.
Overall, one could say that “the silent service” in the Indo-Pacific is becoming loud.
During the Cold War, the submarine race was primarily fought in the Atlantic. Now, it is shifting to the Indo-Pacific, raising uncertainties over whether it will remain free and open.
Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
Taiwan has received its first F-16V (Viper) fighter jets from the US amid serious tensions with China, which calls the island a ‘renegade province’.
The Vipers are part of an $8 billion deal for 66 F-16Vs approved during US President Donald Trump’s first term.
The two Lockheed Martin F-16 Vipers touched down at Taiwan’s Chihhangair Air Force Base in Taitung. President Lai Ching-te hailed “a major milestone in elevating Taiwan’s air defense capabilities” and thanked Washington for its “long-standing support”.
Former Air Force serviceman Eric Chan, 57, praised the F-16’s advancements over the past three decades and said the fighter jets based in Taitung will “play a very important defensive role” against China.
“The threat from the CCP has always been there, so we definitely need to strengthen our defense capabilities,” Chan told AFP, referring to the Chinese Communist Party.
F-16 vs F-16 Viper
Earlier, as EurAsian Times reported, Taiwan’s first two F-16 Vipers — serials 6727 and 6728 — were on the Pacific ferry to Taitung’s Chihhang Air Base.
Deliveries were expected to begin in 2023, and all 66 warplanes were scheduled to be delivered by the end of 2026. However, supply-line pressures due to COVID-19, followed by Lockheed Martin’s decision to shift the F-16 assembly line from Fort Worth to Greenville, pushed the timeline back.
The jet’s electronic-warfare suite has been a separate problem. The embedded AN/ALQ-254 Viper Shield, built by L3Harris, ran into production bottlenecks because it is built into the fuselage rather than carried as a pod.
Taiwanese reporting in July 2026 said the first Block 70s would be delivered without it, with the suite to be fitted later. An AESA radar without the planned internal jammer makes the aircraft thinner than the one in the brochure, and it is a capability gap, not just a reason the schedule slipped.
Lockheed later started two shifts to prioritize Taiwan’s order to deliver the combat jets. Still, the full 66-jet order is not expected to be delivered before 2028.
When Lockheed Martin delivers the 66 new jets by 2028, the Taiwanese Air Force will have more than 200 F-16 Viper fighter jets, making it the largest Viper-standard fleet in the Indo-Pacific region.
A newly purchased F-16V Block 70 fighter jet lands at Chihhang Air Base in Taitung on October 2, 2026. (Photo by CHENG Yu-chen / AFP)
F-16 vs F-16 Viper
Both the legacy F-16 and the latest F-16V jets share a common airframe shape, a single-engine layout, 9g capability, and basic flight characteristics.
The main differences are in sensors, computers, cockpit, electronic warfare, and modern weapons/data-link integration.
However, the biggest capability jump is perhaps in the radar system.
The legacy F-16A/B jets used the mechanically scanned AN/APG-66 radar. Most F-16C/D (Blocks 25–52) used the mechanically scanned AN/APG-68.
These radars have slower scan rates, more limited multi-target tracking capabilities, and poorer jamming performance.
For the F-16V, however, Lockheed Martin uses Northrop Grumman’s AN/APG-83 SABR AESA radar.
It uses electronic beam steering, supports simultaneous air-to-air and air-to-ground modes, high-resolution SAR mapping, better jamming resistance, and tracks more targets at longer ranges.
Lockheed Martin states it delivers 5th-generation radar capabilities through hardware and software commonality with F-22 and F-35 radars.
“It delivers greater situational awareness, flexibility and quicker all-weather targeting and provides pilots with unprecedented target area detail and digital map displays that can be tailored with slew and zoom features,” said Lockheed Martin in a factsheet about the Block 70/72 jets.
The new Viper standard jets also provide enhanced battlespace awareness.
Block 70/72 features a new high-resolution Center Pedestal Display (CPD), which provides critical tactical imagery to pilots and enables them to take full advantage of AESA and targeting pod data.
The new CPD enables color moving maps, larger and easier-to-manage air-to-air Situation Displays, zoom functionality with the ability to switch information among displays, digital display of Flight Instrument Data, and a color/night helmet-mounted display.
An inside view of the F-16 Viper’s cockpit. Credits: Lockheed Martin.
The F-16V also provides better pilot protection. Lockheed Martin’s Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto GCAS) was purpose-built to prevent deadly crashes and has already saved the lives of multiple pilots and F-16s since the system entered service with the U.S. Air Force in late 2014.
The Auto GCAS is designed to reduce incidents of controlled flight into terrain, or CFIT. According to U.S. Air Force statistics, CFIT incidents account for 26 percent of aircraft losses and a staggering 75 percent of all F-16 pilot fatalities.
The F-16V also provides extended structural capabilities.
The Block 70/72 has an extended structural life to 12,000 hours – more than 50 percent beyond that of previous production F-16 aircraft. The older F-16s had a structural life of around 8,000 hours.
According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16V could serve for 40 years without any major repairs.
The conformal fuel tanks provide increased fuel capacity and range without sacrificing the jet’s aerodynamic performance.
Furthermore, legacy F-16s relied on multiple older computers with limited processing power, whereas the F-16V has a single high-performance Modular Mission Computer (MMC) and a modernized avionics architecture. This gives far higher computing power for sensors, weapons, and data fusion.
The F-16V is certified for a very wide range of modern weapons, such as AIM-120D AMRAAM, AIM-9X, JASSM, JSOW, JDAM variants, and SDB, and uses Link 16, which provides enhanced situational awareness and enables real-time command, control, and tactical data exchange among military aircraft, ships, and ground forces.
They also have greater electrical power, cooling, and data-processing capacity to support the future integration of advanced electronic warfare equipment, weapons, and infrared search-and-track systems.
F-16 Viper. Credits: Lockheed Martin.
Because of all these capabilities, even though both the older F-16 and the latest F-16V share the same airframe design, the F-16V is a much more lethal aircraft.
Modern sensors, avionics, radars, an electronic warfare suite, Link 16, structural improvements, and an improved weapons package and ferry range mean the F-16V is a much more capable jet. That is why operators such as Taiwan, Greece, Bahrain, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Turkey are upgrading their existing F-16 fleets.
According to Su Tzu-yun, a senior analyst at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, the AN/APG-83 radar was designed to detect targets with small radar cross-sections and could “improve the F-16V’s chances of detecting PLA stealth aircraft such as the J-20 and J-35”.
Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
Amid simmering tensions with China, Japan plans to upgrade its F-15J fighter fleet to the “Super Interceptor” variant, while also procuring F-35 Lightning IIs and pursuing a sixth-generation fighter program.
The F-15J is a variant of the F-15 Eagle customized for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF), produced under license, and upgraded over the years.
Japan’s F-15 Japan Super Interceptor program is a major modernization effort to upgrade the fleet with advanced sensors, avionics, electronic warfare systems, and expanded weapons capability.
The program reportedly includes 68 F-15Js modernized under an earlier Multi-Stage Improvement Program (MSIP), but Tokyo is currently focusing its attention on upgrading 20 F-15J aircraft to the F-15JSI standard first.
Japan is pushing its F-15 Japan Super Interceptor (JSI) program with fresh investments in the aircraft’s avionics and support systems, with a revised timeline that extends the deployment of the first 20 aircraft to fiscal year (FY) 2029, Janes reported.
“The original plan called for the completion of modifications to the 20 aircraft by the end of FY 2027. However, in light of the progress of the modification program, deployment completion is now targeted for the end of FY 2029,” a spokesperson for Japan’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA) said.
Notably, Japan has decided to retire older, non-upgraded F-15Js starting in the late 2020s, while keeping the upgraded fleet into the 2030s.
Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) has described the Super Interceptor program as creating a bridge to the 2030s, when the sixth-generation Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) will likely enter service. The F-15JSI will complement Japan’s F-35 fleet. Tokyo’s program covers 147 Lightning IIs — 105 F-35As and 42 F-35Bs — of which dozens have already been delivered, with the rest still on order from the US
Artist’s impression of F-15JSI or Japanese Super Interceptor. (via Twitter)
The upgrade will essentially boost JASDF’s air defenses and strike options against China’s growing military capabilities and assertiveness in the region, which has led to increased engagements between the two sides.
For example, a Chinese J-15 last year locked its fire-control radar on JASDF’s F-15J during an encounter southeast of Okinawa, as the EurAsian Times reported. No shots were fired, but Japan viewed this as a “dangerous act,” as fire-control locks represent the final step in the targeting process before a missile launch.
Notably, Japan’s F-15Js already handle most air defense identification zone (ADIZ) intercepts, and Okinawa-based squadrons alone often account for most scrambles, mostly against Chinese aircraft. The F-15JSI upgrades will improve Japan’s ability to detect, engage, and strike Chinese forces amid rising assertiveness in the East China Sea, around the disputed Senkakus Islands, and near Okinawa, which lies between Japan and Taiwan
The development comes as the US Air Force (USAF) has confirmed that it will deploy its first Boeing F-15EX Eagle II fighter aircraft to Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan, by the end of the year. About 36 Eagle IIs will be stationed at Kadena to replace older fourth-generation US aircraft based in Japan, with an eye on China.
What is the Super Interceptor Program?
Japan originally received about 213 F-15J and twin-seat F-15DJ aircraft and still operates the world’s largest F-15 fleet outside the United States.
Japan initiated the Super Interceptor program in 2019 as the “F-15 capability enhancement” effort. Boeing and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) are jointly undertaking the program through an “integrated partnership,” which will introduce some technologies currently fielded on the F-15EX.
At the heart of the upgrade is replacing the older mechanically scanned AN/APG-63(V)1 radar with the Raytheon AN/APG-82(V)1 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.
The AESA radar offers longer detection ranges, better multi-target tracking, jamming resistance, and improved performance against low-observable or high-speed threats. This system will provide the F-15J a dramatic leap in detection range, resolution, and multi-target tracking. The new radar will also support more sophisticated air-to-ground mapping and targeting modes, enabling the aircraft to perform precision strike missions.
The radar is closely tied to the Advanced Display Core Processor II (ADCP II) mission computer (ADCP II), which processes information from the AESA radar, electronic warfare suite, and other sensors much faster. This will enhance situational awareness and support advanced software architectures that allow for easier future upgrades and integration of new weapons or sensors. Succinctly put, this will turn the aircraft into a far more flexible, networked fighter, capable of sharing data with other platforms.
The JSI upgrade will dramatically improve the F-15J’s electronic warfare with the BAE Systems AN/ALQ-250 Eagle Passive/Active Warning Survivability System, or EPAWSS. This sophisticated electronic warfare suite combines radar warning, electronic support measures, and active jamming capabilities into a single, highly integrated package.
EPAWSS will help the aircraft detect and counter a wide range of modern threats, including advanced surface-to-air missiles and fighter radars.
It will improve the aircraft’s ability to operate closer to contested airspace or survive long enough to launch standoff weapons from safer distances, while working with the AESA radar’s EW features to create a layered defensive capability. This would be particularly critical against China’s growing EW capability, AESA radars, and missile threats.
More importantly, the airframe’s hardpoints and systems are modified to carry a substantially larger missile load than the standard F-15J’s eight missiles, potentially more than double in some configurations.
The aircraft will carry significantly more air-to-air weapons, as well as long-range standoff strike options, allowing the JASDF to strike land or maritime targets from hundreds of kilometers away. The upgraded F-15s will be able to act as “missile trucks,” launching precision strikes against Chinese surface ships, coastal missile batteries, radar sites, or other targets from outside the range of many PLA air defenses, while complementing the stealthy F-35 in combat.
Notably, experts believe that Japan could go to war with China over a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan due to its geographical proximity to the self-ruled islands. The increase in armaments would be particularly useful in that scenario—networked with F-35 aircraft, E-2D Hawkeyes, ground or naval sensors, and US forces, the F-15JSIs could provide volume of fire while stealth assets handle forward roles.
Additionally, the aircraft is expected to receive a host of upgrades to the cockpit, communications, and avionics to modernize the pilot interface and connectivity.
There is also some speculation that the platform will also receive infrared search-and-track technology to enable long-range target identification.
That said, the F-15JSI is not a stealth aircraft and will still face disadvantages against China’s most advanced systems such as the J-20 and future sixth-generation platforms. However, the planned upgrade will transform the F-15J into a more lethal, survivable, and versatile platform tailored to the specific challenges of Chinese air and maritime assertiveness in the region near Japan.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
On 30 September, a Flydubai flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv with 174 people on board, the majority of them Israeli, encountered a dangerous “incident”. Mid-flight, the co-pilot allegedly stabbed the captain, Indian national Smit Machchhar, and may have tried to either crash or hijack the aircraft.
The aircraft plunged thousands of feet in seconds. As per reports, badly wounded Machchhar fought back and physically unlocked the cockpit door. The action has been called heroic, as Israeli passengers and an Emirati crew managed to enter the cockpit and take control of the plane and co-pilot, reportedly from Oman.
Relief pilots on board helped land the plane safely in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was among the first to name Machchhar: “My salute to the Indian pilot Captain Smit Machchhar for his extraordinary bravery. Despite being stabbed and seriously injured, he fought back, resisted, opened the cockpit door, and enabled passengers and crew to overpower the attacker — preventing a catastrophic mid-air disaster. He saved the lives of 174 people, including Israeli citizens and other nationals. I wish Captain Machchhar a speedy and full recovery. He is a true hero.”
Israel’s Foreign Ministry went further, explicitly listing the three nationalities: “This man is a hero. Captain Smit Machchhar, the Indian captain of flydubai Flight 1073, fought back after being stabbed in the cockpit. Despite being severely injured, he managed to unlock the cockpit door — allowing Israeli passengers and the Emirati crew to intervene and save all the passengers. Together, their extraordinary courage saved 174 lives. Indian. Israeli. Emirati. Different nationalities. One extraordinary act of courage. We wish Captain Machchhar a full and speedy recovery.”
Israel’s ambassador to India, Reuven Azar, wrote: “Together with Israeli, Indian and UAE nations, I pray for the life of Captain Smit Machchhar, the experienced and gifted hero Indian pilot of flydubai flight FZ1073. His courage & the courage of other Israeli & Emirati passengers & crew members saved the lives of 180 souls. United against terrorism!”
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi replied in kind: “Captain Smit Machchhar is a HERO. In the face of the gravest danger and despite being seriously injured, he showed immense courage and an unwavering resolve to protect the lives of others. His valour helped save hundreds of lives and avert a great tragedy. India is proud of Captain Machchhar. Praying for his speedy recovery, renewed strength and good health.”
The Embassy of India in Israel added: “A resounding salute to Captain Smit Machchhar, the brave Indian pilot of flight FZ1073! Despite sustaining injuries in an extraordinary and challenging situation, Captain Machchhar displayed remarkable courage, composure and devotion to duty, helping ensure the safety of everyone on board.”
A flydubai Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft is pictured on the tarmac after landing at Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport in Lod on September 30, 2026. A passenger on a rerouted flydubai flight that was bound for Tel Aviv said one of the pilots tried to crash the plane and kill everyone on board, after both pilots were found to be wounded on landing in Saudi Arabia. In the first comment by an official, Israel’s far-right national security minister Itamar Ben Gvir alleged an attempted “terrorist” attack in the incident, in which none of the passengers reported injuries. (Photo by Jack GUEZ / AFP)
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, UAE Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, called his Israeli counterpart Gideon Sa’ar, inquired about the passengers’ safety, expressed wishes for their well-being, and discussed strengthening bilateral relations. Saar later said the two had expressed “mutual determination… to strengthen relations between the countries on all levels and to collaborate against extremist elements seeking to harm security and undermine stability in the region.”
Flydubai described an “altercation” on the flight deck, said on-duty crew traveling as passengers secured the aircraft, and urged against “premature speculation” while investigations continue. The UAE’s General Civil Aviation Authority called it a “security incident.”
US President Donald Trump, after speaking with Netanyahu, called Machchhar a hero who was “in very bad shape” yet managed to open the door and called for help.
Passengers who rushed the cockpit shared firsthand information. Yaniv Hayoun, who later met Netanyahu still wearing a blood-stained shirt, said: “When I went in, I saw the terrorist on the controls, between the two seats. There were no pilots in the seats. I grabbed the terrorist, put him in a hold, and first of all pulled him outside.” He added that he then took the controls: “I watch Air Crash Investigation, Mr Prime Minister.”
Zvika Manes described tying the attacker “with his own zip ties and with the multimedia headphones” and said, “I’m covered in blood. It was insane.” Others spoke of “terrible screams,” a plane that “was simply diving and spinning like crazy,” and the feeling that “September 11 is happening again.” Several credited “miracles” and the Indian captain’s last effort to open the door.
Interestingly, the day before the flight, Netanyahu said Israel had “indications that, ahead of the elections, our enemies will try to attack us,” without naming anyone.
Opposition leader Yair Lapid, after a security briefing that night, said there was “no reason to put the public in a panic” and that security threats should not be used in election messaging.
Security officials told Hebrew media they knew of no specific attack threat.
After Flydubai FZ1073 diverted, Lapid wrote: “Nothing even resembling this morning’s plane incident appeared in the security briefing with the prime minister last night. Nothing similar, nothing reminiscent of it, not even a hint.”
He later called the airport reception “cheap politics” and accused government-aligned voices of hitching “a pathetic ride on heroic Israelis.”
Netanyahu told CNN the warning was “not specifically” about this flight. Asked about Iran, he said it was too early to say and that Israel would join the probe.
Jackson Hinkle, who has about 3.8 million followers, posted the version that drew the widest reach: “Netanyahu expected to lose election. He’s still facing 7 criminal charges. He takes a trip to the UAE this week. He returns to Israel after 6 hour meeting. He warns of terror plot before elections. Iranians respond saying they are not planning attack & Netanyahu is just trying to cancel the elections. 24 hours later flight FZ1073 takes off from UAE to Israel. Attempted hijacking & 9/11-style terrorist attack on flight. Israeli special ops on board thwart attack. Netanyahu immediately convenes security cabinet meeting. All too predictable…”
Max Blumenthal, editor of The Grayzone, wrote: “When Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud ally and Defense Minister Israel Katz instantly blamed jihadist terror for the FlyDubai incident, they drowned out an initial assessment by IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir and his top commanders that ruled out hijacking as the motive behind the altercation… Even Donald Trump is entertaining doubt, proclaiming that the stabber was ‘perhaps a terrorist or a wack job.’ ‘This is the story that I heard. I don’t know if it’s true,’ Trump added… The FlyDubai incident was absolutely fortuitous for Netanyahu… In the midst of his most consequential and likely final campaign for re-election, Netanyahu is essentially taking credit for an Entebbe sequel.”
George Galloway, former British MP, titled a monologue “A false, false flag day” and wrote: “Iran is going to be blamed for what didn’t happen at Fairford and what didn’t become the new 9/11… And bye bye Fly Dubai.” The post pairs the flight with a separate UK incident and treats both as blame aimed at Iran.
James Li, an independent journalist, said: “Jihad terror or false flag? Sticking to just the facts of the FlyDubai attempted hijacking, the biggest red flag that Israel must answer for is how a pilot who has no authorization to fly that airplane was able to thwart multiple layers of security, and bring an axe to boot?”
Kim Iversen: “I’m NOT buying it.”
Daily Iran News, on the passenger who said he learned recovery from a TV series: “If you believe this story, you better get a shrink.”
Fox News posted Netanyahu’s Hannity interview without endorsing a conspiracy reading. Trump’s own line, widely reposted, was: “I don’t know if it’s true, but that’s the story I got from Bibi.”
No one has been able to stop conspiracy theorists and their wild imaginations.
The Flydubai posts began within about an hour of the emergency signal, before Saudi investigators questioned the co-pilot, before the airline described anything beyond an “altercation,” and before the Indian embassy confirmed that Captain Machchhar was in a Tabuk hospital.
Hinkle’s timeline, Iversen’s “I’m NOT buying it,” Galloway’s “false, false flag day,” and thousands of smaller posts did not wait for investigations; they used the election date and Netanyahu’s warning the day before.
Within hours of the 11 September 2001 attacks, posts and later films claimed the US had staged or allowed the hijackings, with many even blaming Israel.
The 2008 Mumbai attacks were called a false flag in parts of the Pakistani press and on social media, despite the gunmen’s admission and the subsequent trial.
The 2019 Pulwama (Kashmir) suicide bombing was described by some Pakistani officials and online accounts as an Indian set-up. After 7 October 2023, a parallel claim held that Israel had known in advance, stood down, or staged the Hamas assault to justify the war in Gaza.
The same pattern followed the 2015 Paris attacks, the 2016 Nice truck attack, and, in India, the 2001 Parliament attack. In each case, the theory arrived before any official report.
It appears a false-flag script is always ready when countries like India or Israel are involved. The UAE sits in the same frame: it is a close partner of both, and the Dubai–Tel Aviv route exists only because of that alignment.
Had the aircraft crashed, the same accounts would have lambasted the pilot and run headlines like “Indian Pilot Crashes Emirati Aircraft Full of Israeli Passengers”, to sow discord among the three allies.
Infineon officially opened a $1.4 billion facility in Thailand, a move it pitched as strengthening and diversifying its manufacturing footprint while adding capacity for further growth.
The semiconductor company stated the new backend manufacturing hub was strategically located in the heart of Southeast Asia, reinforcing its ability to serve customers worldwide at a time when demand continues to grow, “driven by digitalisation, electrification and energy transition”.
It has been designed for a phased expansion, with the potential to scale up to five modules, meaning it could become one of the company’s largest backend manufacturing sites over time.
The site will initially open with 30,000sqm of cleanroom space, which can be expanded to 150,000sqm.
Infineon has initially made an investment of $113 million into the site, while the Thailand Board of Investment stated the entire project is worth $1.4 billion.
In total, the site will create 1,000 highly skilled roles, starting with an initial 350 jobs.
The move complements a wider semiconductor drive, with the country aiming to secure around $18 billion in investment within the sector across photonics, power electronics and sensors.
Alexander Gorski, COO at Infineon, said the company was establishing a new hub in the region, which was “surrounded by a fast-growing ecosystem and with excellent access to global logistics”.
Infineon adds Thailand to its global manufacturing footprint, consisting of 13 locations across US, Europe, China and Southeast Asia.
As Japan marks the anniversary of the 1945 atomic bombs, its leaders are pushing for a renewed debate on nuclear weapons in a challenge to the nation’s long-time pacifist stance.
Japan’s constitution renounces offensive military force, and successive governments have maintained a decades-old pledge not to possess nuclear weapons, produce them or permit their introduction into the country.
That commitment is now under pressure as East Asian neighbors — notably China — boost their military capabilities, while doubts persist about the reliability of Tokyo’s biggest security backer, the United States.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has refused to clarify whether she will maintain the stance known as the three non-nuclear principles, and Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi called last month for a “discussion without a taboo” on the subject.
In December, an unnamed senior administration official told local media in an off-the-record session suggesting that Japan should possess nuclear weapons.
The remark was widely reported by major Japanese outlets including national broadcaster NHK and Asahi Shimbun, sparking public criticism.
“If I look at it cynically, I can’t help but think that maybe she really wants to change” Japan’s anti-nuclear commitment, 82-year-old Satoshi Tanaka, a campaigner who survived the 1945 attack on Hiroshima, told AFP.
The country marked the 81st anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing on Thursday and will do the same on Sunday to commemorate the attack on Nagasaki.
The August 1945 assault by the United States killed more than 210,000 people, including many from the effects of radiation exposure.
It remains the only time that atomic weapons have been used in warfare, and was one of the last major acts of World War II.
The Takaichi administration is undertaking a major update of the national defense strategy this year in the face of China’s expanding military ambitions.
The prime minister has already lifted Japan’s self-imposed ban on weapons exports and expanded defense spending, while pushing to amend the constitution.
Those policies have drawn rebukes from China, which accuses Japan of “new militarism” and Takaichi of bending to the whims of the far right.
They have also unnerved survivors of the 1945 bombings, who have long helped shape Japan’s post-war pacifist political culture.
Tanaka, the Hiroshima survivor, expressed frustration that current political leaders like Takaichi are focusing on military capacity at the expense of diplomacy.
“There is so much talk about national security. What about building peace through diplomacy?” he said.
Despite winning the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts, they are debating whether to continue their national association as their members grow older.
As of March, Japan recognized just over 91,000 survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, down from over 164,000 a decade ago. Their average age is 86.7.
US President Donald Trump (R) looks on as Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi speaks in front of US Navy personnel on board the US Navy’s USS George Washington aircraft carrier at the US naval base in Yokosuka on October 28, 2025. (Photo by ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS / AFP)
The Big Worry
The focus has turned firmly towards the future of the non-nuclear principles, which date to 1967.
Takaichi’s supporters argue that the final clause needs to be changed to allow the United States to bring nuclear arms to Japan and ensure regional deterrence.
Hirofumi Yoshimura, head of the Japan Innovation Party, a coalition partner of Takaichi’s government, said the principle deserved discussion in the context of the US-Japan security alliance.
“Of course, we need to work toward building a world without nuclear arms,” Yoshimura told reporters on the anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing.
“But when considering how to ensure the effectiveness of extended nuclear deterrence within the framework of our alliance with the United States, I believe we should…continue to adhere to the principle of ‘neither possessing nor producing’ nuclear weapons,” he said.
“As for ‘not allowing them to be brought in,’ I do think there is some room for discussion on that point.”
Critics argue that Takaichi’s hawkish approach to defense increases the danger for Japan.
After Takaichi attended the annual ceremony in Hiroshima on Thursday, she sat down for a televised meeting with survivors.
When pressed, Takaichi declined to offer clarity on whether she might change the country’s nuclear course.
“Our nation currently adheres to the ‘three non-nuclear principles,'” she said in response to a direct question from Tanaka, without discussing what she might do next.
“That,” Tanaka told AFP on Friday, “only explains the current situation. It says nothing about the future.
Australia is poised to become the first international buyer of the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), one of the US Air Force’s (USAF) best-kept secrets and unarguably its longest-range air-to-air missile.
Speaking at the ongoing multi-national military drills, Exercise Pitch Black, Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said the country will invest “almost” $736 million AUD, or about $518 million USD, to acquire “up to 450” missiles for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).
The missiles would be acquired through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route.
“This announcement is the latest milestone in the delivery of long-range, high‑tech capabilities for our Defense Force,” Marles said in Darwin. “The Albanese government continues to deliver critical capabilities that will allow the ADF to strike at a longer range, deter any adversary, and protect our national interests. It is fitting to make this announcement at Exercise Pitch Black, which is an important demonstration of Australia’s commitment to the peace, stability, and security of our region.”
The AIM-260 is apparently designed to succeed the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), which is already extensively used by the RAAF.
The missile will initially be integrated on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and later fielded on the F-35A and EA-18G Growler, according to the Australian Defense Department. However, there is speculation that the missile may eventually be fitted to the MQ-28 Ghost Bat, which has already test-fired an AIM-120 AMRAAM.
With this acquisition, Australia will officially become the first export customer of the JATM, even before allies like Israel.
Interestingly, the AIM-260 JATM purchase continues a pattern in which Australia serves as an early or exclusive partner for advanced US systems. For example, Canberra was the first international customer for the Super Hornet, the first and the only export customer for the EA-18G Growler, the first international buyer of the AGM-158 JASSM and AGM-158C LRASM long-range missiles, the first non-US customer for the MH-60R military helicopter, and only the second country (after the UK) approved to buy Tomahawk cruise missiles.
Australia is also the only nation outside the United States assembling GMLRS rockets, and one of only two countries (alongside the UK) granted access to highly restricted U.S. nuclear propulsion technology for submarines under AUKUS.
Moreover, the Australian Shadow ministers are proposing the purchase of the B-21 Raider bomber from the US to fill the capability gap until the AUKUS submarines arrive, a possibility first publicly examined by Marles in 2022 and referenced in the 2023 Defense Strategic Review, as previously reported by EurAsian Times.
AIM-260 JATM seen in a US Navy rendering published in 2025
Australia’s official announcement to purchase the AIM-260 JATM once again validates the strength of these strategic ties. “The acquisition of the AIM-260 JATM will provide Air Force platforms with a credible deterrent against airborne targets, complementing existing air-to-air missile capabilities and other surface-based missile capabilities across the Australian Defense Force (ADF). It will also further enhance Australia’s interoperability with the United States,” the Australian Department of Defense said in a statement.
More significantly, though, it marks a major improvement in the RAAF’s combat capacity in the face of China’s growing Indo-Pacific security threat.
AIM-260 JATM
AIM-260 JATM Against China
Although the announcement did not name China, Australian strategic documents and officials consistently identify Beijing’s rapid military expansion as the primary security challenge in the Indo-Pacific.
The 2023 Defense Strategic Review described China’s build-up as “the largest and most ambitious of any country since the end of the Second World War,” conducted “without transparency or reassurance,” and noted that Chinese actions in the South China Sea undermine the rules-based order in ways that affect Australian interests.
Australian leaders have repeatedly flagged China’s coercive behavior in territorial disputes, unsafe intercepts of ships and aircraft, and growing Chinese influence in the South Pacific, which Canberra has historically considered its own sphere of influence.
Experts have also suggested that Australia may get dragged into a US-China conflict in the future. Although Canberra has never officially confirmed that it would join forces with the US military in a military contingency, it hosts several US military facilities that may come under attack by Chinese long-range missiles, as explained in detail by a previous EurAsian Times report.
Although ties between Australia and China have stabilized in recent times, Canberra has committed billions of dollars to acquire advanced, high-tech missiles as part of a broader strategy to safeguard the nation, deter potential adversaries, and defend national interests.
Marles had earlier highlighted that this involves turning Australia into a “porcupine island,” fully armed with deadly weapons to thwart any attacking nation. The acquisition of the AIM-120 JATM aligns with this approach, especially given that China has developed an array of long-range air-to-air missiles in recent years.
The AIM-260 JATM is considered a response to the Chinese PL-15 air-to-air missile. China has purportedly produced and deployed at least 500 J-20 fighter jets, each capable of carrying up to 8 PL-15 missiles that have a range of 200 to 300 kilometers.
Additionally, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing very long-range air-to-air missiles (VLRAAM) that can strike targets. A previous Pentagon report stated that China already has the PL-17 VLRAAM and is working on a more advanced long-range missile, PL-XX or PL-21.
In contrast, the existing AIM-120 AMRAAM in the RAAF arsenal has a range of about 150-160 kilometers, even in its most advanced iteration.
With long-range, greater kinematic performance and improved guidance, the AIM-260 JATM will allow Australian fighters to engage threats earlier and from safer distances. Moreover, it could be integrated on multiple RAAF jets, giving the service a common advanced air-to-air weapon across its main combat aircraft.
The AIM-260 JATM Is Coming
The existence of the AIM-260 JATM was initially confirmed in 2019 during an Air Force Life Cycle Management Center industry conference. Due to its sensitivity, the AIM-260 JATM is classified as a Special Access Program (SAP), and details about the missile remain scarce.
In 2022, General Mark Kelly, the head of the United States Air Force’s Air Combat Command, shared an artist’s concept of the Lockheed Martin F-22 firing an AIM-260 JATM.
More recently, the US Navy publicly revealed the rendering of the missile in February 2025. At the time, experts inferred that it was comparable in appearance to the AIM-120 medium-range air-to-air missile, including in size.
Nonetheless, the AIM-260 appears to have a larger rocket motor section and no mid-body surfaces, unlike the AIM-120.
Although little is known about the covert missile, reports suggest it will be powered by dual-pulse rocket motors or ramjets to increase its range and performance.
Experts anticipate that the AIM-260 will have an advanced multi-mode seeker system that may include infrared imaging and active radar. They claim that the dual-seeker system will improve resilience to electronic warfare countermeasures and increase accuracy.
Like the AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM derivative, the AIM-260 is anticipated to have a two-way datalink. This feature would greatly increase the missile’s efficacy in networked battle by enabling mid-course targeting upgrades or re-targeting.
The missile is intended to keep valuable airborne assets, such as tankers and AEW&C aircraft, safe deep into contested airspace. It would also be designed, according to analysts, to combat stealth aircraft and to operate in disputed areas with heavy electronic jamming, thereby increasing its effectiveness against enemies such as China and Russia.
The US is purportedly advancing work on this missile because the fire-and-forget strike advantage is often decisive in modern combat.
The JATM “is the number-one air-delivered weapon priority for both the Air Force and the Navy, and out-prioritizes other weapon system improvements and modernization efforts on any fielded aircraft,” the USAF earlier stated.
After initially being introduced with the USAF’s Raptor, the missile will eventually be fitted to the F-35 and the Navy’s F/A-18E/F. In fact, the AIM-260 JATM will also likely arm the US Navy’s F-47 sixth-generation combat aircraft, which is currently under development.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
For decades, the US has maintained an unassailable lead in aircraft carriers.
The US currently operates 11 flattops, all of them nuclear-powered. China is a distant second with three aircraft carriers, none of them nuclear-powered.
The US operates roughly half of the world’s true aircraft carriers. However, for years, the security analysts in Washington have been wargaming for a nightmarish scenario.
What if the US’s carrier fleet is not a force multiplier, but a strategic vulnerability? Or, to put it another way, can Beijing sink the US Navy’s aircraft carriers?
These questions have assumed significance ever since China claimed to have developed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), the DF‑21D and DF‑26B, also known as “carrier-killers.”
These ASBMs are part of China’s broader A2/AD (Anti-Access and Area Denial) architecture intended to push U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) beyond the first island chain.
In the last decade, several wargames, research studies, think‑tank reports, and opinion columns have wondered whether carriers are becoming obsolete, the new battleships – large, complex, and expensive systems – but vulnerable to cheap, long‑range missiles.
But a new Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) research paper has flipped the script: if US carriers are vulnerable, why can’t Washington also hold China’s new carriers at risk?
Are Aircraft Carriers Becoming Obsolete?
In 2023, the South China Morning Post reported that researchers at North University of China claimed that it took an average of only 24 hypersonic missiles to sink the USS Gerald R. Ford and its five escort ships across 20 simulated battles.
From an economic point of view, that would imply that for every $1 China spends on new classes of low-cost hypersonic missiles, it could destroy $10,858.59 worth of U.S. capital ships.
A British study published in 2024 found that their carriers – the HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales – were similarly at risk.
Not just think tanks, even senior US government figures have expressed similar fears.
US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said in a recent podcast interview: In wargames against China, ‘We lose every time.”
The secretary went further, linking US defeat to the vulnerability of aircraft carriers: “We know what our real capability [is]…If our whole power projection platform is aircraft carriers and the ability to project power that way strategically around the globe . . . and if 15 hypersonic missiles can take out our 10 aircraft carriers in the first 20 minutes of a conflict, what
does that look like?”
But if US carriers are so vulnerable, why can’t Washington bring China’s expanding carrier fleet within its firing range?
China’s Expanding Carrier Fleet
After the US, China has the world’s second-largest carrier fleet.
Beijing currently operates a fleet of three aircraft carriers. China launched its third carrier, Fujian (Type 003), an 80,000‑ton supercarrier capable of launching a mix of over 50 fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, and key enablers such as KJ-600 airborne early warning and control aircraft.
China also launched Sichuan (Type 076), a 40,000‑ton amphibious assault ship also suspected of serving as a drone carrier capable of using an electromagnetic (EM) catapult to launch GJ-11 stealth unmanned combat aircraft.
A fourth carrier (Type 004) is undergoing construction. Satellite imagery suggests that this will likely be China’s largest and first nuclear-powered carrier.
The Fujian is more technically advanced than the other Chinese carriers.
China plans to construct six additional aircraft carriers by 2035, bringing its total carrier force up to nine, according to the Department of War (DOW).
China’s growing carrier fleet is a force multiplier; however, it could also become a strategic vulnerability.
The Vulnerability of the US Aircraft Carriers
China recognized early that the US ability to project force globally rests on its fleet of 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. It also recognized that it would be decades before it could match Washington in carrier fleet strength.
Therefore, China focused its energy on developing weapons systems that could negate the US advantage and developed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs).
Recent pieces have argued that Chinese hypersonic and ballistic missiles, supported by an increasingly sophisticated space‑ and AI‑enabled “kill web,” could force US and allied carriers so far offshore that their air wings become operationally irrelevant.
For example, the YJ-21 is a Chinese air-launched medium-range ballistic missile specifically designed to strike high-value assets such as carriers. This missile can be launched from fighters and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and uses redundant guidance systems that make it difficult to jam; a variant can be fired from Type 055 destroyers, though this may have been the YJ-20.
Source: Adapted from CSIS Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of China,” CSIS, last modified March 18, 2026. Credits CSIS.
Combined with older missiles such as the DF-26, colloquially known as “carrier-killers” with a range of up to around 4,000 kilometers (km), and the DF-17, which has a shorter range of up to around 2,500 km but is designed to strike high-value assets and evade US interceptors (e.g., THAAD and Patriot), China has an arsenal of systems capable of hypersonic speeds that can hold carriers at risk up to 2,500 miles away.
A Selection of Chinese Anti-Ship Missile Capabilities. Credits CSIS.
However, the current discussion in Washington often frames carriers as unique to the United States and uniquely vulnerable, while underplaying the fact that China is now building its own large-deck, network‑enabled capital ships that are at least as targetable as the U.S. ships China aims to threaten.
How the U.S. Can Make China’s Carriers Vulnerable?
According to the CSIS paper, Washington could follow a five-pronged strategy to make China’s growing carrier fleet vulnerable.
“Despite various improvements, PLAN surface ASW, fixed‑wing ASW, and undersea sensing are still patchy compared with U.S. and Japanese capabilities, particularly in noisy littorals and chokepoints,” it said.
A cost‑effective way to threaten China’s carriers is through a layered subsurface screen built around the following assets:
■ U.S. nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) operating at range.
■ Allied diesel-electric submarines from Australia, Japan, South Korea, and potentially the Philippines, including submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion where available.
■ Shared undersea sensing networks and common heavyweight torpedoes, enabling coordinated ambush of PLAN carrier groups in transit corridors rather than near the Chinese coast.
■ Shared unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) capable of both conducting intelligence collection and limited strike missions against PLAN ships.
The key is to turn the “undersea domain into a continuous threat envelope that forces Beijing to invest heavily in escorts, ASW aviation, and fixed sensors simply to move carriers out of its home waters.”
Further, this approach also leverages existing areas of production and operational excellence from various U.S. allies, making implementation faster and cheaper than more novel approaches.
(2) Land-based maritime strike networks: China’s A2/AD system is, in part, a land‑based missile problem. The United States and its regional partners can mirror that logic by building a distributed, multinational anti‑ship missile network on land from Japan through the Philippines and, where politically feasible, into the South Pacific and even around key maritime terrain globally, including the following:
■ U.S. Marine Corps and Army units fielding Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) missile systems, Mid‑Range Capability (i.e., Typhon batteries), and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs) adapted to strike ships and a host of information warfare systems (e.g., cyber, space, electronic warfare, and inform/influence activities) stationed as a
littoral rotational force.
■ Australian, Japanese, and potentially Philippine coastal missile batteries (e.g., upgraded Type 12, BrahMos, and naval strike missiles) integrated into common fire control and ISR architectures.
■ Pre‑negotiated access, dispersal sites, and logistics arrangements to ensure these units can survive Chinese Air Force and Rocket Force (PLAAF/PLARF) strikes and continue to generate maritime fires.
Such a network can threaten PLAN carriers during deployment, not just at the point of conflict.
Moreover, “the mere expectation that upon entering the Philippine Sea, carriers such as the Fujian or Sichuan will face dense, land‑based anti‑ship fires backed by allied ISR raises the perceived risk of using them as front‑line tools of coercion.”
(3) Long-range air and space-enabled fires: The United States and its allies can conduct long-range strikes using a mix of bombers, fighters, and maritime patrol aircraft:
■ U.S. Air Force bombers and Navy aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles, such as LRASM and future hypersonic anti-ship weapons, connected to a complex battle network that both supports the attack and degrades enemy sensors.
■ Allied F‑35 fleets (from Australia, Japan, and South Korea) using low‑observable sensors to contribute to the maritime picture and deliver their own long‑range anti‑ship munitions.
■ A mix of kinetic and non-kinetic attack vectors with a conscious emphasis on mission kills, specifically by degrading flight‑deck operations, destroying aviation fuel and ordnance handling, or disabling key escorts and logistics ships supporting the carrier, rather than only aiming for catastrophic hull loss.
This approach is particularly suited to large military powers such as the United States but can be partially adopted by states with smaller budgets by investing in a limited number of fifth‑generation or advanced fourth‑generation aircraft plus modern anti‑ship missiles.
(4) Cyber-electromagnetic disruption: PLAN CSGs are nodes within a broader battle network. Their combat value depends on complex links to off‑board ISR, satellite navigation, command networks, and electromagnetic attack and defense platforms.
By disrupting the carriers’ connections to this broader network, the United States and its allies can deny the PLAN access to the enablers that make its forces more combat-capable.
Rather than treating ships solely as physical targets, U.S. and allied planners should prioritize EM and cyber operations.
(5) Unmanned swarm and port-denial campaigns: The Ukraine war has shown how even a state with a modest navy can use unmanned surface vessels (USVs), unmanned aerial vehicles, and shore‑based missiles to attrite a larger fleet.
Ukraine has successfully forced Russia to pull major units out of Sevastopol and turned the Black Sea into a contested battlespace.
While the terrain of the Pacific is not identical to the Black Sea, a similar logic can be applied to PLAN carriers, especially in the first island chain.
Swarms of relatively low‑cost USVs and loitering munitions can attack ships in port, logistic hubs, and fixed defenses, driving carriers to relocate to more distant, less convenient bases.
The central idea is to make a carrier’s routine employment around Taiwan, the South China Sea, or beyond the first island chain appear prohibitively risky.
By following these steps, the U.S. and its allies could blunt the advantage of China’s growing carrier fleet.
While China has for years invested in AA/AD vectors to make the U.S. carriers vulnerable, Washington could flip the script and make Beijing’s own carriers equally vulnerable.
Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
China’s state broadcaster recently released the first footage showing multiple DF-17 hypersonic missiles in a single frame, in what appears to be a deliberate power-projection message. The display comes at a time when hypersonic weapons have proven their lethality and ability to penetrate air defenses in the Ukraine and Iran wars.
On August 3, state-owned CCTV aired video from the PLA documentary series Zhìshèng (“Victory”) featuring at least six DF-17 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) together.
Military affairs expert Zhang Junshe told the Global Times that the display indicates the system has been mass-deployed and is reliably placed on combat duty.
Zhang emphasized that the DF-17 is a vital weapon that can alter the rules of modern air defense warfare, as it can precisely hit adversary forward air defense installations and strategic command targets by leveraging its hypersonic penetration advantage.
Typically, hypersonic weapons are very hard to intercept by conventional missile defense systems due to two main reasons: 1) these weapons travel faster than Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound, equivalent to approximately 100 kilometers (60 miles) per minute; 2) these are highly maneuverable weapons that follow an unpredictable trajectory.
Only a few countries have developed and combat-deployed hypersonic weapons, including China, Russia, and sanctioned countries like Iran and North Korea.
Of these, both Russia and Iran have used these weapons in combat with Ukraine and the United States, respectively.
On its part, Ukraine has intercepted some Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missiles with Patriot batteries.
However, these hypersonic missiles have been wreaking havoc on Ukrainian cities in recent weeks, as earlier reported by the EurAsian Times. Moscow purportedly exploits a gap in its air defense coverage and launches Kinzhal and Tsirkon hypersonic missiles to cause devastation in the embattled country. Additionally, Moscow has struck Ukraine with the Oreshnik hypersonic missile, which Ukraine has been unable to shoot down so far.
Meanwhile, Iran claimed to have fired hypersonic missiles (Fattah-class) on Israeli cities and US military bases across the Middle East during the hostilities earlier this year.
However, independent verification of claimed terminal speeds, maneuver performance, and interception rates remains limited. Previous video footage from Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities showed Iranian missiles dodging as many as 10 interceptor missiles and hitting their targets at hypersonic speeds.
Six DF-17 hypersonic missile launch vehicles of the PLARF appeared together in the same frame in footage broadcast by CCTV (Photo Courtesy of Global Times)
Notably, the latest footage comes more than a month after CCTV published footage of a DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle missile launch in June 2026. At the time, analysts noted that China was sending a deterrence message by emphasizing its strike capability to the United States, particularly amid tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the First Island Chain, and the South China Sea.
The same argument may apply to the latest footage, particularly since the DF-17 is the world’s first medium-range missile to field a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).
China has amassed a variety of deadly hypersonic missiles, including the DF-17, DF-27, YJ-21, and YJ-20. These weapons are part of the formidable Chinese A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) network along its coastline.
Chinese experts believe that even the most advanced missile defenses in the US, including the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defense) and PAC-3 Patriot, are not effective against hypersonic weapons.
“Existing US missile defenses can theoretically intercept some hypersonic weapons in their final stage, but high speed, maneuverability, and stealth make it very difficult,” read a previous Chinese paper titled “Tactical Missile Technology” on the ability of US missile defense systems to intercept hypersonic weapons.
The US and allied forces are developing countermeasures, including improved sensors, the Glide Phase Interceptor, SM-6 variants, and other technologies, but substantial challenges remain in tracking and engaging maneuvering hypersonic vehicles at scale for now.
Chinese experts have noted that the DF-17 is a potent strategic deterrent because it is a conventional, medium-range missile capable of reaching important targets in the first island chain—stretching from the Japanese archipelago through Taiwan to the Philippines—including strategic sites in Japan and other areas.
Chinese experts have previously noted that the missile may reach as far as parts of the Second Island Chain, extending from Japan through Guam, Micronesia, and Palau. They believe that coordinated multi-vehicle salvo launches may play a crucial role in both launch site security and strike effectiveness—compounding the threats faced by the US military forces in the Indo-Pacific region.
DF-17’s Mass Deployment
The DF-17 is China’s first operational road-mobile medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).
With a range of 1,800–2,500 kilometers, it is Beijing’s most operationally mature hypersonic strike system and is widely regarded as capable of penetrating nearly any missile defense network worldwide.
Like ICBMs, hypersonic glide weapons are launched by rockets high into the atmosphere. However, unlike ICBMs, whose warheads rely primarily on gravity once they begin their descent, hypersonic glide weapons dive back toward Earth sooner, then flatten their flight path. They make continuous course corrections to stay on target while traveling at speeds up to 12 times the speed of sound, using onboard navigation systems, making them much harder to detect by the adversary and allowing them to suppress enemy missile defenses at an early stage, clearing the way for follow-on strikes.
China’s DF-17 hypersonic missiles. (Image: China Military Online)
The DF-17 made its public debut in October 2019 at a military parade that marked the 70th anniversary of Communist Party rule in China.
In 2021, the PLA conducted its first known hypersonic test involving the DF-17 glide vehicle, rattling the United States. Later, the Pentagon published the China’s Military Power 2022 report, referring to the DF-17 as a critical threat in the Western Pacific.
“The DF-17 passed several tests successfully and is deployed operationally. While the DF-17 is primarily a conventional platform, it may be equipped with nuclear warheads,” the report added.
Zhang pointed out that the DF-17 can avoid adversary targeting and reconnaissance because it does not depend on fixed launch silos.
Moreover, DF-17’s powerful anti-jamming and precision strike capabilities greatly increase its battlefield survivability and make it well-suited for a variety of complex field combat scenarios, as it is difficult for adversary satellites to detect its operational patterns.
“In addition to a longer vehicle body and more wheels [of the TEL], the biggest change in the DF-17 is the shape of the missile itself. Unlike the cone-shaped warhead we are familiar with from past models, the DF-17’s warhead has undergone significant changes and now features four wings and a tail fin,” Gong Chunyu, a training staff officer from the DF-17 conventional missile formation, was quoted as saying by CCTV earlier.
“This design reflects a more scientific and advanced concept, with the missile capable of flexible and varied flight trajectories and greatly enhanced penetration capabilities,” he added.
It may be noted that China’s public releases of multiple TELs in formation and field launches demonstrate that the system is no longer experimental or small-scale, and it signifies distributed, mobile, ready forces that could hunt US-based targets quickly.
The missile’s range and penetration capability are repeatedly linked to targets in the western Pacific. Analysts interpret this as reinforcing China’s ability to hold at risk U.S. and allied bases, airfields, command nodes, and surface ships in a Taiwan or regional contingency—raising the cost of a US intervention.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
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