From Rockett v. Eighmy, decided today by Eighth Circuit Judge David Stras, joined by Judges Bobby Shepherd and Jane Kelly:

When Judge Eric Eighmy had courthouse officers lock two children in holding cells because they refused to leave with their mother following a custody hearing, he violated their clearly established Fourth Amendment rights….

Bart Rockett and Kami Ballard divorced in Missouri, but initially stayed together to give their two kids, who were "aspiring stars," a chance to "make it big" in Los Angeles.  The children found some success in the entertainment industry, including appearing on America's Got Talent, but their parents eventually split up.

Ballard filed a petition for sole custody that landed on Judge Eighmy's desk. During a hearing several months later, the children waited outside the courtroom while their parents tried to work it out. They agreed on primary custody for Ballard, with Rockett responsible for them at the beginning of each month and "during TV pilot season."

Once the hearing was over, however, neither child was willing to leave with her. With an argument unfolding in the lobby of the courthouse, Judge Eighmy walked over, introduced himself to the children, and told them to follow him to a conference room. Once there, he informed them that they had no choice but to leave with her. A youth counselor then reinforced the point by telling them that they "ha[d] to listen to the judge." The children would not budge, even after the judge mentioned that the other option was foster care.

Frustrated, Judge Eighmy had the children follow him again, this time to a waiting area in the courthouse's juvenile division. Once there, he told someone to "[k]eep an eye on" them to "make sure they [did not] go anywhere." After disappearing for a few minutes, he led them down a hallway to two holding cells. A second threat to place them in foster care made no difference, so he had a juvenile officer "lock them up." Before they entered the cells, the officer patted them down and ordered them to remove their socks and shoes. Judge Eighmy stood by as the officer locked the doors behind them.

With the children in their separate holding cells, Judge Eighmy took a seat in a nearby office. After what "felt like forever," the officer opened the cell doors for Judge Eighmy, who asked them one more time whether they would leave with their mother. This time, they both nodded yes, so he let them go. From start to finish, the time spent in the holding-cell area was between twenty and forty minutes.

Following these events, Rockett sued in federal district court for, among other things, a violation of the children's Fourth Amendment rights…. [T]he jury awarded the children $5,000 each on their Fourth Amendment claims. From there, the district court declined to reduce the verdict and added $326,637.22 in attorney fees….

The procedural posture is a bit complicated, but the court denied both judicial immunity (based on an earlier panel decision on the issue) and qualified immunity:

Judge Eighmy violated the Fourth Amendment only if he seized the children and did so unreasonably. Locking the children up after the custody hearing was both….

Not every seizure … violates the Fourth Amendment. To the contrary, "[ ]reasonable" ones, like lawful arrests supported by probable cause, do not. But here, Judge Eighmy did not have "probable cause to believe that [the children had] committed" an offense, much less one that justified placing them in a holding cell. Rather, their only misdeed was one every parent knows well: resisting authority. Even in the context of legal-custody proceedings, refusing to leave with a parent is not a jailable offense. Nor were there "exigent circumstances" arising out of danger to themselves or others.

We have no doubt that Judge Eighmy believed he was acting in "good faith," and possibly even in the children's best interests, by detaining them. But good faith in the Fourth Amendment context is about reasonable reliance, either on binding appellate precedent or a warrant issued by a "neutral magistrate." Neither was present here. No case allows a judge to detain children in a holding cell when they refuse to leave with a parent. And a custody plan is no substitute for a warrant. In short, rough justice does not trump the Constitution….

The law in this area was also "clearly established." "[I]t would have been sufficiently clear [to] every reasonable official," Judge Eighmy included, that locking up two children for refusing to follow directions violated the Fourth Amendment. As we put it over a decade and a half ago, long before the events in this case, "[i]t is clearly established that a warrantless arrest, unsupported by probable cause, violates the Fourth Amendment." …

A reasonable judge should have known better. As we said the first time around [i.e., the first time the case went up on appeal], criminal contempt was off the table because the children were neither parties to the custody case nor present inside the courtroom. Nor could the power to punish a party for violating an injunction have provided the justification, given that Judge Eighmy never issued one….

And here's an excerpt from the 2023 decision denying judicial immunity (a separate question from qualified immunity):

Judicial immunity has been around a long time. See Yates v. Lansing (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) ("The doctrine which holds a judge exempt from a civil suit or indictment, for any act done, or omitted to be done by him, sitting as judge, has a deep root in the common law."), aff'd (N.Y. 1811). In England, it served to insulate common-law judges on the King's courts from their rivals on other courts.

One of the earliest known examples involved a judge who presided over a murder trial. After it ended, he was dragged into a rival court and charged with conspiracy for his role. The prosecution ended, however, when the court recognized that the judge was "immune from prosecution … for [his] judicial act[]." …

As broad as the rule seemed to be, two exceptions narrowed its scope. The first was that judges could still be prosecuted for out-of-court "conspirac[ies]." That is, like any other citizen, judges could be haled into court for any illegal acts they committed outside the courtroom. The second was that, when judges "exceeded their authority" by considering a matter "not within their jurisdiction," their actions were … "without jurisdiction." Acting without "power and authority" eliminated the shield of judicial immunity.

As judicial rivalries began to wane, including in the American colonies, the power-and-authority rationale for judicial immunity did too. The focus shifted to protecting judicial independence: allowing judges "to act upon [their] own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences." See Pierson v. Ray (1967) (explaining that judges "should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound [them] with litigation charging malice or corruption").

Judicial immunity continues to apply today, not only in prosecutions …, but in civil-rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983…. The exceptions remain largely the same too. Judicial immunity can be "overcome in only two sets of circumstances": (1) when a judge takes "nonjudicial actions"; and (2) when the action is judicial, but is done "in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." …

On one end of the spectrum [of judicial action to nonjudicial action], the classic example of a judicial act is "resolving disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of a court." Other related acts qualify too, like holding litigants "in contempt," and issuing "search warrant[s]."

But those acts also have their limits. There is no doubt, for example, that judges can "direct[] police officers to bring counsel in a pending case before the court," but they cannot order the officers to beat them with their nightsticks along the way. Nor can judges wake up one day and decide to spontaneously issue a search warrant against a nosy neighbor or a political rival.

Like these examples, Judge Eighmy's decision to personally escort the kids to jail took what would otherwise be a judicial act too far. Judges have the authority to order an officer or a bailiff to escort an unruly litigant to jail. They can also pull the parties into a conference room to discuss what just happened in court.

Judge Eighmy crossed the line, however, when he personally escorted the kids to jail, stood there while they removed their clothes and belongings, and personally came back an hour later to release them. For one thing, the children were not even present in the courtroom, so he could not hold them in contempt for "[d]isorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior." For another, judges do not do double duty as jailers. So even assuming Judge Eighmy could have ordered someone else to take the kids to jail, he could not put them there himself.

It is no answer that Judge Eighmy believes he was exercising his contempt power. To be sure, absolute immunity is available for judges who hold a litigant in contempt even when they are "not in [their] … robes, … no[r] in the courtroom itself." But here, the children were never parties, they never stepped foot in the courtroom, and Judge Eighmy personally locked them up himself. We have been unable to find any case that extends judicial immunity so far.

Judge Eighmy fares no better with his other argument: that Missouri law allows judges to enforce child-welfare statutes informally. Without question, police officers can take children into custody if they are behaving in a way "injurious to [their] welfare or to the welfare of others." But not judges, who can only order others to "[t]ake charge of children before and after" a juvenile hearing. The point is that judicial immunity is unavailable because what Judge Eighmy did is not "a function normally performed by a judge." …

Thanks to James Creigh for the pointer.

The post No Immunity for Judge Who Locked Children in Holding Cells in Custody Case appeared first on Reason Magazine.

George Anibowei, a U.S. citizen, is a Texas-based immigration attorney with many clients battling the Department of Homeland Security. Border agents have searched his phone at least five times without a warrant as he returned to the United States.

In the first search, agents copied the phone's entire contents, including his confidential communications with clients. The government still has that data, and Anibowei still doesn't know why it was kept or who has seen it. He now leaves his work phone at home when he travels.

On September 29, the Supreme Court asked the federal government to respond to Anibowei's petition, which asks whether the Fourth Amendment lets border agents search the contents of a phone without a warrant. (I'm one of his lawyers.) The government waived its response, expecting the Court would deny the petition without a second look.

But in 2021, the solicitor general told the Court that this very question had produced an "entrenched circuit conflict" of "considerable practical importance." The conflict has only deepened since. Seven federal appeals courts now hold that a warrant is never required to search a phone at the border, while the 4th and 9th Circuits require one in at least some cases. That means one of your constitutional rights currently depends on which airport you fly into.

While circuit courts may disagree, the Supreme Court has already shown the best answer for this question. In Riley v. California (2014), the Court unanimously held that police generally need a warrant to search the phone of someone they arrest. There is an exception for searches incident to arrest, which allows the police to arrest someone without a warrant; that exists to protect officers and preserve evidence. Data can't hurt an officer, and a phone can be secured while police get a warrant. An extension of an old exception to digital data, the court said, "has to rest on its own bottom." Treating a phone like any other container in an arrestee's pockets was like saying "a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon."

The border-search exception fails the same test. Those searches exist to collect duties, keep out people who may not enter, and stop contraband. But duties attach to physical goods, not data. And as the legal scholar Orin Kerr has put it, agents "will not find a person smuggled inside a computer hard drive." As for digital contraband, anyone who wants illicit files can carry a clean phone and download them after clearing customs. Suspicionless phone searches burden millions of innocent travelers while barely inconveniencing smugglers.

The appeals courts that disagree mostly cite one another. But the Supreme Court rejected a lopsided lower-court consensus in Riley, and again in Carpenter v. United States (2018). Counting courts is not a constitutional argument.

Defenders of these searches lean on history. In United States v. Ramsey (1977), the Court noted that the first Congress authorized warrantless customs searches in 1789, less than two months before it proposed the Fourth Amendment. True enough. But that statute let officers search ships for hidden dutiable goods. To search a house, store, or other building for the same goods, officers needed a warrant. And nothing in the statute let officers read a traveler's papers.

That distinction was no accident. Customs abuses had helped spark the Revolution. Writs of assistance gave British customs officers blanket authority to search wherever they pleased, which James Otis said placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer." And the founding generation guarded letters especially closely. Benjamin Franklin, as the first postmaster general, made postal workers swear they would not open mail without an express written warrant.

Even Ramsey, the government's favorite border search precedent, respected that distinction. It upheld opening international mail to look for contraband, but the regulations before the court flatly prohibited reading correspondence without a warrant, a point the justices stressed repeatedly. The Court has never held that border agents may read a traveler's papers without a warrant. A phone holds years of correspondence. It deserves at least the same protection the Founders gave a sealed envelope.

Last month, however, the 2nd Circuit joined those courts that have disregarded this tradition. In United States v. Alisigwe, Judge Steven Menashi wrote that agents need no suspicion whatsoever to search a traveler's property at the border, phones included. A border search becomes non-routine, he reasoned, only when it intrudes on the person, as a strip search does. A phone is property, so searching it is routine.

Judge Eunice Lee concurred, agreeing that no warrant was required. But she warned that the majority's rule permits suspicionless searches for any reason, "including political or discriminatory ones."

The Alisigwe majority's premise miscasts the Fourth Amendment. The amendment's text secures "persons, houses, papers, and effects" in a single, unranked list. The abuses that produced the amendment were searches of property, including private papers. Agents may properly physically examine a phone to ensure it's not really a container for smuggling contraband. But reading or viewing its digital contents without a warrant trespasses on a person's papers and effects. The framers protected property because they recognized that human beings are not ghosts: We live in the physical world by exercising our property rights, and so searching our property can reveal much about our lives.

Alisigwe is the latest word from a Court of Appeals, but it contains complications for the constitutional issue. The trial court found that agents had reasonable suspicion, so the no-suspicion holding arguably wasn't needed to decide the case. That suspicion involved a forged passport, which goes to identity and admissibility, the core of border authority. Finally, Alisigwe was a permanent resident, not a citizen, so the government's interest in deciding who may enter was heightened.

Anibowei is simple on each of these counts, which is why one can be hopeful the Supreme Court will take it and address the Fourth Amendment question now. Anibowei is a naturalized citizen, no one suspects him of anything, and he challenges the government's search policies directly rather than seeking suppression of evidence in a criminal case. As the 5th Circuit itself acknowledged, his case "turns squarely and solely" on the warrant question.

The stakes keep growing. In FY 2025, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) searched 55,318 electronic devices, nearly 11 times as many as in 2012—and nearly a quarter of those searches targeted U.S. citizens. According to the directives Anibowei challenges, agents may keep what they find and share it with federal, state, local, and foreign agencies. Investigators have learned to wait for a target to travel and ask CBP to search his phone on the way back in, rather than go to the trouble of demonstrating probable cause to a judge. No wonder universities, bar associations, and press freedom groups now advise travelers to leave their devices at home.

The Founders rebelled against customs officers who could search wherever they pleased and read whatever they found. A rule letting border agents scroll through a citizen's correspondence, photos, and client files without a warrant, or any suspicion at all, revives that power. The Supreme Court should take Anibowei's case. Our papers don't lose Fourth Amendment protections at the border just because they're digital.

The post Are Warrantless Phone Searches at the Border Constitutional? The Supreme Court May Soon Decide. appeared first on Reason Magazine.

by Matt Agorist, The Free Thought Project: (Reclaim The Net) The US government has told a federal appeals court that data collected by Flock Safety cameras is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, because being watched on the road is “a reality of modern life” – and therefore, nobody can expect privacy there. The argument was […]