The Alternative for Germany (AfD) just won the largest share of any party in a German state election in the party’s history. Despite the historic result, which has sent shockwaves through the German political establishment, lead candidate Ulrich Siegmund in Saxony-Anhalt still fell short of an absolute majority needed to govern.

That gap, three seats in an 83-member Saxony-Anhalt Landtag, is now the focal point of unfolding drama in the capital city of Magdeburg, where the future direction of the state, and perhaps even of the country, will be decided. AfD has a political mandate and a number of options that could produce dramatic results. Here are three possible scenarios.

An AfD and BSW coalition?

On the preliminary official count, the AfD took 43.8 percent and 39 seats. The threshold for an absolute majority is 42. The BSW scraped in with 5.3 percent and five seats. Together they would have 44. Everyone else together also has 44. Without the BSW, the chamber splits 39–39.

The BSW has already been open that it is willing to pursue a coalition with the AfD, but this is not a comfortable coalition for the AfD.

Siegmund spent the campaign insisting he would not take office without a stable majority of his own. After election night he kept the hard line in one respect and loosened it in another. He still rejected the BSW’s preferred model, a non-partisan minister-president governing with shifting majorities, as messy power politics.

Will an AfD victory turn into defeat?

Siegmund called the offer “nonsense” and said he did not want to give up the AfD’s goals and values in the face of “power games.”

He still said the AfD would not trade away its program for power, but he also said he would extend a hand to anyone prepared to deliver a “fundamental political change,” including, if necessary, individual deputies rather than whole parties.

If that fails?

“In an emergency, there will simply be new elections.,” he said. In such a scenario, he predicts the AfD would score “50 to 55%.”

The question is whether cooperation with the BSW on some level is possible. Sahra Wagenknecht framed the result as a chance for a change of course on energy, Russia sanctions, education, and public broadcasting. State-level BSW figures say they will not join a “firewall” coalition against the AfD. They also say they will not elect Siegmund. Their offer is a third way, involving a new leader both parties can agree on, plus issue-by-issue majorities that could include the AfD.

However, the BSW is already hinting they may be willing to give up even more for an AfD government.

BSW’s lead candidate, Thomas Schulze, suggested that in the third ballot for minister-president, the BSW may abstain from the vote, which in theory, could let Siegmund through to become the state leader.

What the BSW would obtain in return remains to be seen.

However, despite the differences between the AfD and BSW, the two parties have much in common. The overlap involves a strict crackdown on migration, tackling energy costs, shifting policy on Ukraine, and hostility to the public broadcasters.

At the same time, BSW politicians have already flagged education policy and parts of the AfD’s economic and social agenda as unacceptable. A formal coalition was ruled out by Wagenknecht before the vote. What remains is only a quasi gray zone where both parties can exist together a vote a time.

For Siegmund, the political costs of that gray zone are obvious. He ran as the man who would reshape the state standing alone. Accepting a non-AfD premier, or even a minority premiership propped up only with the support of Wagenknecht’s left-wing party, would look like the opposite. However, stepping back from the deal would leave his party out of the halls of power once again.

AfD co-leader Tino Chrupalla and Alice Weidel both appear eager for Siegmund to take the deal. Chrupalla has already talked up the possibility of a minority government that would seek majorities case by case.

Peel off CDU MPs?

Siegmund’s second option may prove even more explosive for German politics. He spoke of not working with parties, but with individuals from the parties. He suggested individual deputies could “support an AfD government.” Some in the AfD’s federal circle even talk about CDU members crossing the floor to the AfD camp, and there are even suggestions that some MPs may defect.

If any CDU politician defected to the AfD, there would be a national firestorm. While if only one vote was needed, this might be in the realm of possibility, but finding three such MPs may prove a very tall order. The CDU has tried to build the firewall into its DNA, and if three CDU members helped bring the AfD to power in a state, it may be enough to collapse the federal government and end the chancellorship of Friedrich Merz.

Germany: Anti-immigration AfD party reaches record days before pivotal state election

Regardless of whether the AfD can peel off three CDU votes, the pressure on the party is tremendous after it collapsed to a mere 17.2 percent, effectively halving its support. The CDU is almost assured to continue facing a political reckoning in the future, which means the dam may break at some point, and CDU politicians may be more and more willing to jump ship to the AfD.

A repeat election possible?

An anti-AfD government is mathematically possible but politically? It would be a total mess.

It would need the CDU, SPD, Greens, Left, and BSW — five parties, two of which spent the campaign treating each other as the problem. The CDU already ruled out coalitions with both the AfD and the Left Party. The BSW campaigned to push the CDU out, with Wagenknecht also calling another firewall coalition an affront to voters.

That does not mean it cannot be attempted, and it very well might be, even despite the potential consequences for all the parties involved. If that project forms and then staggers, Siegmund’s threat of new elections stops being a far-fetched scenario. A second vote in such a scenario could indeed catapult the AfD above the 50 percent mark.

Procedurally, the clock is already running, as the new Landtag must convene by Oct. 6. The strongest group proposes the Landtag president in the first round. The minister-president is elected by secret ballot, with no fixed deadline once nominations begin. While the first ballot requires a majority of all votes, in the final round, a simple majority of votes cast can suffice to elect a new minister-president.

As far as the best outcome for the AfD, it is hard to argue against CDU defectors handing the AfD the keys to victory. It would allow the AfD to take control with a like-minded party on paper while sparking a major crisis for the ruling CDU.

However, remaining outside government also comes with plenty of bonuses, and as Remix News previously wrote, avoids serious pitfalls that the federal government and even the EU can put up against an AfD government.

Despite falling short of an absolute majority, the AfD appears to be in the driver’s seat.

The post After historic German election, will the AfD rule Saxony-Anhalt? appeared first on Remix News.

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The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are facing fresh accusations of employing chemical weapons in the ongoing conflict against the Rapid Support Forces(RSF), with the latest reports coming from US media outlets, writes Mohsin Osman.

On Saturday (5 September), The New York Times and The Washington Post published dual investigative reports based on leaked intelligence materials. The files include approximately 150 documents, photographs, video clips, and intercepted communications, alongside thousands of text messages retrieved from the phones of Sudanese officers.

The evidence points to an alleged program established in 2024 to manufacture chlorine-based munitions. It details bomb design blueprints, testing operations, and a coordinated cover-up strategy initiated after the plot was uncovered by the United States. The records also outline plans to siphon chlorine gas from a civilian water treatment facility that had originally received the chemical from international aid agencies.

These revelations reignite long-standing allegations of chemical weapons usage that have shadowed SAF leadership since last year, significantly heightening international pressure on the military command.

The United States previously imposed sanctions on Sudan in May 2025 over allegations that the military deployed chemical weapons during the conflict in 2024. The sanctions took effect on July 20, 2025. Authorities in Port Sudan have consistently rejected these accusations, maintaining that they do not produce, stockpile, or use chemical weapons, and emphasizing their adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

A covert programme amid escalating pressure

According to The New York Times, the SAF turned to chemical weapons early in 2024 to break a strategic stalemate, as RSF fighters held firm control over most of the capital, Khartoum.

Leaked records show that Brigadier General Tariq Hussein emerged as a central figure in July 2024, orchestrating the design, planning, and execution of the program. Intercepted messages reveal that Hussein proposed using chlorine to give army forces a tactical edge in the battle for Khartoum. He distributed prototype schematics for an explosive warhead integrated with roughly 33 pounds of chlorine gas, with production commencing that same month.

In messages published by the Times, Hussein noted that the hybrid munitions were designed to maximize lethality—either by shrapnel fragmentation or chlorine gas poisoning—asserting that the explosion would destroy all chemical traces of the attack.

On July 22, an Antonov cargo plane took off from Merowe Airport, roughly 200 miles north of Khartoum, to conduct a test launch. Following the trial, Hussein reported that the experiment was a "100 percent success," attaching a video of a desert explosion and confirming that the munition "hit the target and released the gas."

Brigadier General Amir Idris, identified in records as the supervisor of military drone operations, responded with a single directive: "Top Secret."

Technical hazards and signs of lethality

The communications reveal that the program faced severe technical flaws. Chemical leaks were a recurring issue; on one occasion, workers found dead insects and scorpions on the floor of a hangar after overnight exposure to leaking gas.

The incident underscored the volatile nature of the agent being handled long before it reached the battlefield. Concurrently, the program faced a critical challenge in securing a steady supply of chlorine.

Diverting humanitarian chlorine supplies

According to The New York Times, 20 cylinders of chlorine gas were smuggled across the border from a neighboring country in late August 2024. Hussein calculated that this batch would yield roughly 1,100 bombs.

Hussein subsequently sought internal sources, turning to local civilian infrastructure in violation of international norms. He admitted to sourcing additional chlorine from the Al-Manara water treatment plant in Omdurman—one of the few remaining operational facilities amid the war.

"Al-Manara has some of those cylinders, and we took them from there," Hussein stated in an August 26 voice message to Idris.

The diversion of these supplies carries significant gravity, as the chlorine at the plant was intended for emergency water purification during cholera outbreaks rather than military application.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) confirmed to the Times that it had donated 30 chlorine cylinders to the plant in 2023, while CARE reported delivering 35 cylinders across 2024 and 2025. A UNICEF spokesperson added that the organization supplied chlorine to six treatment plants in Khartoum, including Al-Manara, between 2023 and 2025.

By October 2024, Hussein reported manufacturing approximately 300 chemical munitions, most of which were stored at Merowe Airport.

Earlier in September, Hussein sent a notable message to a colleague stating, "They drank the gas," describing an attack on RSF fighters at the Al-Jaili oil refinery north of Khartoum. This account aligns with claims made by the RSF on September 13, when the paramilitary group issued a statement accusing the army of firing "toxic" missiles at the refinery. Footage circulated online at the time showed men in civilian clothing inside the facility wearing oxygen masks.

Command responsibility and cover-up efforts

The New York Times indicates that the program was likely shuttered once U.S. officials detected its existence and moved to apply targeted sanctions.

Intercepted communications reveal that the head of Sudan’s Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, instructed Hussein to "erase all traces" of the operation. The response back was: "The operation was completed a month ago."

During a subsequent round of measures in June, the U.S. sanctioned Hussein for importing explosives for bomb production, though that specific designation did not explicitly cite chemical weapons.

By that time, Burhan had established an internal committee to investigate the U.S. allegations. According to documents in the file, Hussein himself—the architect of the program—was appointed as an advisor to the panel.

The intelligence indicates that General Burhan was not merely informed after the fact, but was directly involved in overseeing the chemical weapons program. His direct knowledge was a primary factor in the U.S. decision to impose sanctions on him in January 2025.

While proving chemical weapons usage in conflict zones remains complex, arms experts consulted by The New York Times concurred that available evidence strongly points to their deployment in the Sudanese conflict. However, they stressed the necessity of an independent field investigation.

Addressing the findings, the Emergency Lawyers group, a Sudanese legal advocacy organization, issued a statement calling for a transparent international probe. The group urged that "international experts be granted safe, unconditional access to targeted sites, enable the physical examination of munitions fragments and delivery systems, and be permitted to interview witnesses and victims independently and securely."