Astana is looking for more ways to move its oil. Russia, its principal export outlet, is rife with disruptions. Damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) Black Sea terminal in November 2025 suppressed exports into early 2026, while the recent July attacks on tankers threatened roughly 1.5 million barrels per day, writes Joseph Shumunov.

The vulnerability would not be so enormous if 80% of Kazakh oil exports did not move through the CPC terminal near Novorossiysk.  But is Kazakhstan merely searching for emergency alternatives amid instability? Or is this a transformation it has been preparing for? The answer is consequential: Kazakhstan is attempting a wholesale upgrade of its oil-export strategy, one befitting a rising regional power. It is moving from rational efficiency toward strategic resilience, from accepting routes toward shaping them, and from concentrated dependence toward managed interdependence.

Although the CPC will remain dominant through 2030, Astana is seeking greater control over the risks, partnerships and infrastructure connecting its oil to international markets. From rational efficiency to strategic resilience The CPC transports Kazakh oil, particularly from Tengiz, to global markets, making it the most commercially attractive route. When it was created in 1992, a fledgling independent Kazakhstan was looking to enter international energy markets. The CPC was the rational choice. It, for instance, transported up to 1.3 million barrels per day back in 2021; avoided the additional loading, shipping and crossing costs of a Trans-Caspian route; and its 1,510-kilometer pipeline, according to area studies analyst Ilya Roubanis, would be extremely difficult to replicate. Astana selected efficiency while adjusting to a new geopolitical environment. Contrast this with Azerbaijan. According to Ken Moriyasu, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, Azerbaijan chose the expensive option.

The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline through Georgia and Türkiye required what he called an “insurance premium for strategic autonomy” to avoid dependence on competing producers. Kazakhstan captured the CPC’s immediate savings but accepted greater concentration risk. The stakes will rise alongside production. The KazEnergy 2023 National Energy Report anticipated high output from Tengiz, Kashagan and Karachaganak, with national production potentially reaching 105 million tons. Higher output requires dependable market access; otherwise, its advantage can be undermined by one constrained route.

The lesson is simple: the cheapest route is not necessarily the least costly once the consequences of interruption are included. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev affirmed as much in 2024: “With unprecedented international turbulence, the priority is to further diversify export routes.” Diversification, however, requires more than identifying alternatives. It requires Kazakhstan to help shape the infrastructure and partnerships behind them.

From route-taker to route-shaper
As a landlocked, post-Soviet producer, Kazakhstan has historically been constrained by existing pipelines and neighboring states. Its role was simple: produce oil and insert it into available routes. But Kazakhstan does not have to remain a route-taker. Although it cannot independently control its export geography, it can shape the terms on which that geography operates. It can negotiate access to multiple corridors, invest in tankers, coordinate with transit states and treat infrastructure as an instrument of foreign policy. Nowhere is Kazakhstan assuming this route-shaper role more clearly than in the Caspian. Tokayev identified the Trans-Caspian route as a “priority” in 2022.

KazMunayGas and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR subsequently agreed to transport approximately 1.5 million tons annually through BTC, while Kazakhstan added the Caspian’s Taraz and Liwa tankers to its fleet, each with an 8,000-tonne capacity. This gradual Caspianization continues. KazTransOil supplied 155,000 tons of Kazakh oil to BTC through Aktau in July, an 11.5% increase over the previous year. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan plans to transport 2.2 million tons through BTC in 2026. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have also discussed using the idle Baku–Supsa pipeline for between three million and five million tons of Kazakh crude. But this role has limits. According to Andy Kuchins, a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest, major expansion would require high capital expenditure, long-term purchase commitments and several years of construction.

Oil majors like ExxonMobil and BP are “more reluctant now as compared to the 1990s” to finance large projects in remote markets. The direction is nevertheless clear: Kazakhstan is moving from accepting the routes geography provides toward assembling the infrastructure and partnerships it needs. It is not yet a fully fledged route-shaper, but it is steadily behaving like one—using new routes not to eliminate dependence, but to distribute it more strategically. From concentrated dependence to managed interdependence Every export option depends on another state, infrastructure operator, or external market.

Self-reliance is not realistic. Kuchins nevertheless argues that Astana can “reduce concentration of its dependence on Russia.” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy reported 73.4 million tons of oil exports during the first eleven months of 2025. Separately reported full-year route data show 64.8 million tons transported through the CPC, 9.3 million through Atyrau–Samara, 3.5 million through Aktau, 1.1 million through Atasu–Alashankou toward China, and approximately 100,000 by rail. Of the 78.8 million tons accounted for in this route-level data, approximately 94% moved through the two Russian corridors. Kazakhstan therefore possesses several export routes, but its portfolio remains highly asymmetrical. Herein lies its greatest oil-policy shift: managed interdependence.

This means distributing export relationships so that no transit state possesses overwhelming influence over Kazakhstan’s market access. Each direction performs a different function. And at the moment, Kazakhstan is assessing four directions—some mainstay, some new.  The Russian route The CPC will remain dominant because it offers unmatched capacity, established infrastructure and lower costs. Kuchins and Roubanis expect structural dependence to persist through 2030. Following the Tengiz expansion, Kazakhstan may become more dependent on the CPC in the short term even as its long-term strategy diversifies.

Diversification does not require abandoning the CPC; it requires making an interruption less damaging. The Trans-Caspian route BTC could absorb Kazakh crude as Azerbaijani production declines, while Baku–Supsa could provide another outlet. Neither would match CPC volumes, but together they would widen access to global buyers. Europe also has a stake in this. The European Union imported 52.4 million tons of Kazakh crude just in 2024, making Kazakhstan its third-largest external supplier. If Europe wants westward diversification, it must help make projects bankable through financing and long-term commitments. Brussels and its partners are therefore  mobilizing 10 billion euros to improve transport connections with Central Asia. According to Roubanis, “building ties with the region in the short run is necessary for the EU’s long-term positioning.”

The push indicates that Trans-Caspian connectivity is not just a Kazakh interest, but one shared by the whole region. The Chinese route China may offer the easiest immediately available opportunity to reduce dependence on Russia. The Kazakhstan–China pipeline transported 19.5 million tons in 2025, but that included domestic deliveries and Russian transit. Direct Kazakh crude exports through Atasu–Alashankou were planned to be 1 million tons in 2025, compared to the more than 11 million tons per year flowing with non-Kazakh suppliers. China remains a credible expansion market and willing financier. Yet the fastest way to reduce Russian dependence could deepen dependence on China. Moriyasu similarly argues that Kazakhstan does not want to exchange one concentrated dependency for another.

Unlike the Trans-Caspian route, China provides access to one principal market rather than multiple global buyers. The Southern route A corridor through Iran—possibly toward Pakistan and India—could be compelling but faces formidable political and economic obstacles. But it should not be dismissed altogether. Moriyasu suggests that “Iran offers Central Asia one of its shortest routes to warm-water ports.” Although current geopolitical conditions severely constrain this option, he argues that “infrastructure Kazakhstan builds today will still be operating decades from now. Astana should therefore avoid making long-term infrastructure decisions on the assumption that today’s geopolitical map is permanent.”

The southern route’s present value lies in preserving a long-term option, not in providing a realistic alternative before 2030. From east to west and north to south, Kazakhstan is not moving from dependence to independence. It is moving from one dominant dependency toward a deliberately balanced portfolio of interdependence. A more advanced role, but not autonomy Kazakhstan’s transformation should not be measured by whether the CPC ceases to dominate. By 2030, it will likely remain the principal corridor as Trans-Caspian volumes rise incrementally and eastbound capacity becomes more important amid regional instability and escalation.

The resulting portfolio will be broader, though still asymmetrical. The strategy is itself an upgrade—a threefold one. Resilience is becoming the objective, route-shaping the emerging function, and managed interdependence the organizing principle. Looking forward, Kazakhstan’s strategic upgrade lies not in escaping geography, but in developing the infrastructure, partnerships and political leverage needed to manage geography more effectively.

The author is Joseph Shumunov, a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Topchubashov Center in Baku, Azerbaijan, and a Fellow at Nightingale Intelligence. 

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is steadily—and increasingly in a semi-official manner—sliding toward a formal division into two separate administrations. Occurring amid a prolonged political deadlock, parliamentary paralysis, and the breakdown of unified state institutions, this constitutional vacuum has created the conditions for a complete paralysis of national governance, writes Halo Hassan Saeed.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), headed by Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, has operated in a caretaker capacity since 2023 following the expiration of its constitutional mandate. This comes after the failure of the winning Kurdish parties from the October 2024 parliamentary elections—principally the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—to form a new government.

De Facto territorial division

The KRG no longer exercises governing authority uniformly across the region. Amid escalating disputes, institution building has stalled, and the Kurdistan Parliament has been unable to perform its legislative or oversight functions for the past three years.

Consequently, two distinct de facto administrations have emerged, each backed by separate financial institutions and security structures:

• KDP Administration: Security, executive, and financial authority concentrated in Erbil and Duhok governorates.

• PUK Administration: Independent administrative and security control over Sulaymaniyah and Halabja governorates.

More than 30 rounds of negotiations between the two major parties have failed to yield a power-sharing compromise. The KDP remains determined to retain both the regional presidency and premiership, alongside the key Ministries of Interior and Natural Resources, and the Kurdistan Region Security Council. The PUK demands an equal power-sharing formula—either the presidency or premiership, alongside the Interior Ministry—or a full 50–50 executive split.

The PUK–New Generation coalition

The political dynamic shifted significantly with the formation of an alliance between the PUK and the New Generation Movement. Combined, the bloc commands 38 out of 100 parliamentary seats, directly challenging the KDP’s 39 seats. With remaining political factions holding 23 seats and refusing to join either bloc, the KDP's attempt to form a majority government has been effectively blocked.

Following the failure of recent domestic mediation led by Salahaddin Bahaaddin, Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the PUK and New Generation leadership—represented by Bafel Talabani and Shaswar Abdulwahid—agreed during a meeting in Sulaymaniyah to move forward with unilateral administration. Under this arrangement, Sulaymaniyah and Halabja will be managed independently of Erbil, utilizing monthly internal revenues to fund stalled public services and investment projects while strengthening political coordination directly in Baghdad.

Socioeconomic fallout

With Western international attention reduced and a lack of active external mediation, ordinary citizens are bearing the brunt of this administrative fracture:

• Economic stagnation: Record-high inflation, sharp fuel price increases, and elevated local taxes and fees.

• Public infrastructure: Severe electricity shortages and deteriorating basic services.

• Commercial contraction: Declining business activity and shrinking employment opportunities for youth.

Strategic implications for European security and policy recommendations

The institutional breakdown in Iraqi Kurdistan is no longer merely an internal political feud; it carries direct implications for European foreign policy and regional stability:

1. Migration risks: Economic paralysis and political hopelessness are creating fresh push factors for young Kurds to seek irregular migration routes toward Western Europe.

2. Energy security: Intra-Kurdish friction jeopardizes energy infrastructure and gas development projects that could otherwise contribute to European supply diversification.

3. Regional stability: A fragmented Kurdistan weakens federal stability in Iraq, creating security vacuums that hostile actors or extremist remnants could exploit.

Why this matters to Europe

The future of the Kurdistan Region is not solely a Kurdish or Iraqi domestic matter. Its institutional stability has direct implications for European interests in Iraq and the wider Middle East.The Kurdistan Region has long served as a relatively stable political and economic partner for European countries, while also playing an important role in regional security, counterterrorism, energy cooperation, trade, and humanitarian affairs. A prolonged division between competing administrations could gradually weaken these functions and create greater uncertainty for European engagement.For Europe, the concern is therefore not simply whether Kurdish political parties can resolve their differences. It is whether the institutional fragmentation of the Kurdistan Region could produce a less predictable partner, weaker governance, and greater instability along one of the Middle East's strategically important corridors.Preventing that outcome is in Europe's own interest. A stable, unified, and institutionally coherent Kurdistan Region provides European governments with a more reliable partner in Iraq and strengthens the broader framework of regional stability.

Halo Hassan Saeed is a Kurdish-Iraqi writer, journalist, and researcher.

The future of a protected wetland in Albania might seem like a local issue. In reality, it is becoming a test of the European Union's credibility, writes Besjana Guri, Albanian Environmental Activist and Founder and Director of Lumi. 

For [over] 100 days, I and thousands of citizens have been protesting unlawful developments in Vjosa-Narta, one of Albania's most important protected landscapes, at a moment when Albania is widely regarded as one of the frontrunners for EU accession.

At these protests, I’ve stood shoulder to shoulder with citizens of all walks of life: scientists, artists, students, local communities, environmental activists and public figures. What might once have been seen as a local conservation issue has become a national conversation about whether safeguards for protected areas will actually be enforced, and whether environmental safeguards mean anything when powerful development interests are involved.

The EU enlargement process works because candidate countries know that membership is earned by meeting clear conditions. Among them is a commitment to uphold environmental laws, protect vulnerable ecosystems and give citizens a meaningful voice in decisions that affect them. Vjosa-Narta is testing whether those principles still carry weight when they collide with major development ambitions.

Albania is widely regarded as a frontrunner for EU membership. If it advances while protected areas are opened up to contested development and environmental safeguards are weakened, the credibility of the enlargement process itself will be called into question.

For those of us who support Albania's European future, that is precisely why developments in Vjosa-Narta must be addressed now, not after irreversible damage has been done.

A test case of environmental safeguards

The protected Vjosa-Narta landscape is formed of wetlands, lagoons, salt marshes, dunes, forests and coastal habitats. It is an important stopover for migratory birds travelling along the Adriatic Flyway, while its wetlands support local livelihoods and help regulate water, store carbon and protect against flooding.

It forms part of the wider Vjosa landscape, which gained international recognition in 2023 when Albania declared the river Europe's first Wild River National Park, following years of campaigning by Albanian activists, local communities and international partners, including outdoor clothing brand Patagonia. For many of us who worked to secure that protection, it demonstrated that environmental leadership and economic ambition do not have to be in conflict.

Yet the debate surrounding Vjosa-Narta is no longer simply about one protected area. It has become a test of whether environmental safeguards can be weakened and developments advanced while a country continues progressing towards EU membership.

The EU has been clear that environmental protection is not an optional extra of accession. Chapter 27, covering environment and climate change, is a significant and technically demanding part of the enlargement process. Candidate countries are expected not only to align their laws with European standards, but to demonstrate that they can implement and enforce them effectively.

Albania’s progress towards meeting these requirements has been undermined by recent setbacks in the legal framework for protected areas. Amendments to Albania's Law on Protected Areas in 2024 significantly weakened environmental safeguards by opening the door to broader tourism and infrastructure development within protected areas. The European Commission and European Parliament have both raised concerns about whether those changes are compatible with EU environmental standards. At the same time, concerns around environmental impact assessments, permitting procedures and public consultation in Vjosa-Narta have turned this protected landscape into a real-world test of whether environmental commitments are being upheld.

Setting the precedent for EU accession

If Albania continues advancing towards membership without resolving these concerns, it risks sending a message that environmental conditionality can be negotiated away when powerful economic interests are at stake.

This sets a worrying precedent for the accession process and the outcome will be watched closely across the Western Balkans, where other countries such as Montenegro and North Macedonia are in accession negotiations. As one of the EU's most advanced candidate countries, Albania is helping to shape expectations of how accession standards are applied in practice.

If concerns around protected areas and environmental assessments can remain unresolved without affecting progress towards membership, future candidate countries may draw their own conclusions about the weight given to environmental commitments.

Wider implications for the bloc

Existing member states must have confidence that new members have been held to the same standards. And citizens must trust that environmental laws cannot simply be set aside when they become inconvenient.

If the EU is seen to tolerate environmental shortcuts during accession, it risks weakening its ability to defend those same standards across the bloc. The issue therefore is not simply whether Albania is meeting its obligations, but whether the EU is prepared to uphold the standards it asks others to meet.

Brussels now faces a choice

As Albania enters the final stages of accession, the EU has an opportunity to demonstrate that environmental commitments have real meaning in practice, not just on paper. Addressing concerns around Vjosa-Narta would send a clear signal that enlargement remains a process built on accountability, implementation and shared standards.

That's not only important for Albania. It's important for the credibility of enlargement itself.