The European Commission says asylum seekers arriving at EU borders are now being screened, but it makes no mention of the independent rights monitors that EU law requires to oversee those procedures, even as spending on border surveillance surges.

“Screening of people arriving illegally and the border procedures are being carried out,” said European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, in a letter addressed to the 27 heads of state and government meeting at an EU summit in Brussels on Thursday (15 October).

An annex to her letter, obtained by EUobserver, highlights broad outstanding issues when it comes to implementing new EU-wide asylum laws that kicked into force this past June.

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Brussels, 15 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Sweden has rejected the latest EU budget proposal, intensifying disagreements among European Union leaders meeting in Brussels over the bloc’s €1.62 trillion spending framework for 2028–2034. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson … Read more

When European Union leaders meet in Brussels later on Thursday (15 October), migration will be high on the agenda. Amid political panic — real and manufactured — over the events in Ceuta this summer, the European Commission has come out with a five-point plan promising more border surveillance and policing, more dodgy deals with countries outside the EU, and more deportations.

It also includes an ominous plan to devise a new “emergency response instrument” that could allow for the total suspension of access to asylum, which is likely to result in summary mass deportations, in situations when third countries are blamed for ‘instrumentalising’ migration movements.

That the idea is even on the table is a measure of how far the EU’s approach to migration has degenerated.

There is a jarring disconnect between commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s insistence on European values and the rules-based order and the willingness to throw the right to asylum out the window. 

It is a short-sighted and dangerous hypocrisy that will harm women, men, and children at EU borders and potentially beyond if it encourages other states to adopt a similar approach.

If a 20-year-old man I interviewed in Ceuta in August were at the summit in Brussels, he might help guide the debate back to the realities of why people flee and seek safety, their needs and aspirations and hopefully toward a policy informed by shared humanity.

A Ceuta story

He told me he escaped from his village in Somalia in November 2024 when the Islamist armed group Al-Shabab attacked it. He went to Libya and spent six months detained in a smuggler’s warehouse in Kufra, where he said he witnessed many deaths from nightly beatings.  He escaped, reached Morocco, and after months of hardship there saw his chance to seek safety on 31 July, when he swam to Ceuta.

It may well be that instrumentalisation played a role, among many other factors, in the arrival of more than 72,000 people there during two days at the end of July.

For many, the decision to cross may have been opportunistic and fuelled by disinformation on social media. Yet that cannot justify violence, summary returns, degrading treatment, or denying access to asylum procedures, in Ceuta or elsewhere.

Among the thousands who have remained in Ceuta are asylum seekers from strife-torn Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Chad, and elsewhere. 

Suspending asylum completely would not only thwart their chances to find protection. It would rupture the EU’s commitment to the rules-based international order in a profound way.

Rupture of rights

The right to seek asylum is embedded in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the related prohibition of refoulement — sending someone to a place where they face serious harm — is a red line through international human rights and refugee law.

The focus on deterrence and externalisation over the past decade – coinciding with the growing influence of the far-right in European politics – has arguably made this previously unthinkable option part of the conversation.

Both Greece (temporarily in 2020 and 2025) and Poland (continuously at its border with Belarus since March 2025) have suspended asylum without significant reaction from the commission or other member states.

The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, fully enacted as of June, undermines the right to asylum in myriad ways. A new Return Regulation portends deportations to third countries despite the documented harm of these kinds of transfers.

The Crisis Regulation, part of the pact, already allows a member state to depart from normal border procedures and curtail important safeguards in a situation of mass arrivals and/or when a third country or hostile non-state actor instrumentalises migration. While the regulation causes concern about potential misuse and unjustified restrictions on access to asylum, it does not allow for wholesale suspension of the right.

I met the young man from Somalia at the height of the humanitarian and rights crisis in Ceuta.

A difficult situation was compounded by recriminations against Spain from other EU countries, exploitation by far-right groups, and neglect and hostility that led to people living on the streets, in the forests, and in makeshift huts on the beach in an apparent effort to compel them to go back to Morocco. It took Spain weeks to begin housing and registering people.

Spain did not invoke the Crisis regulation.  Rather than adding new measures, policymakers should be wrestling with why it didn’t use supposedly tailor-made EU legislation and addressing how mismanagement and a finger-pointing lack of cooperation among EU states create an endless loop of crises that feed xenophobia.

 EU leaders should keep sight of the people affected and basic principles at stake. They should reject approaches to migration that so clearly violate fundamental rights and normalise cruelty.

Marine Le Pen has warned that a future French government could oppose further European financing for Ukraine and withhold part of France’s EU budget contribution, bringing the cost of supporting Kyiv into the 2027 presidential contest.

Marine Le Pen has threatened to challenge future European Union funding for Ukraine, warning that France cannot continue underwriting large financial commitments while confronting its own deteriorating public finances. The National Rally leader has also proposed withholding half of France’s contribution to the EU budget, a confrontation that could place Paris at the centre of a major dispute over European spending.

In an interview published on 14 October, Le Pen questioned the EU’s €90 billion support loan for Ukraine, describing France’s estimated €18 billion share as an excessive burden. She also expressed opposition to the proposed €100 billion financing instrument for Ukraine under the Union’s next seven-year budget, covering 2028 to 2034.

Her intervention comes as EU leaders meet in Brussels to negotiate competing financial priorities, including defence, industrial competitiveness, agricultural subsidies and continued assistance to Kyiv. France’s presidential election in 2027 gives the dispute particular significance: a change of government in Paris could alter the position of one of the Union’s principal financial contributors.

Two funding programmes under pressure

The distinction between the existing Ukraine loan and the proposed future instrument is important to the financial consequences of Le Pen’s position.

The €90 billion package, approved earlier this year, supports Ukraine during 2026 and 2027. According to the European Parliament’s latest assessment, €60 billion is allocated to defence and €30 billion to budgetary assistance. Almost €15 billion had been disbursed by 18 September.

The loan is financed through EU borrowing backed by the Union’s budget. Le Pen’s description of an €18 billion French share should therefore not be confused with an immediate payment of that amount by the French Treasury. The financing arrangements involve collective European commitments and potential future liabilities.

EU Today has previously examined Brussels’ efforts to accelerate the release of Ukraine’s financial assistance as Kyiv faces growing military expenditure and pressure on public services.

The second programme concerns financing beyond 2027. Under the European Commission’s budget proposal, up to €100 billion would be available for Ukraine between 2028 and 2034, with the eventual allocation depending on its requirements. The mechanism would support reconstruction, economic stability and preparations for eventual EU membership.

Le Pen’s opposition therefore extends beyond the immediate cost of the war. It challenges the assumption that the EU will remain a major source of Ukrainian financing throughout the next budgetary cycle.

France’s contribution becomes an electoral issue

The National Rally’s position is closely connected to its domestic economic programme.

As EU Today reported on 6 October, Le Pen has proposed €140 billion in public spending reductions by 2032, alongside measures intended to reduce France’s deficit and stabilise its national debt.

Her programme includes limiting France’s net contribution to the EU budget to €5 billion. The latest threat to withhold part of the country’s payments moves that argument from budgetary reform towards a potential institutional confrontation.

EU contributions are legal obligations established under the Union’s financial framework and own-resources arrangements. A French president could oppose a new seven-year budget, which requires unanimous approval by member states, but could not simply cancel existing payment obligations without encountering legal consequences.

Timing will also be decisive. EU governments are attempting to secure a political agreement on the next budget before the end of 2026, ahead of France’s presidential election. An agreement concluded before a change of government in Paris would constrain the options available to Le Pen.

Ukraine policy exposes a wider contradiction

Le Pen’s latest statements also reveal the limits of the National Rally’s changing position towards Moscow.

In September, Le Pen and party president Jordan Bardella condemned Russian interference and hostile actions against French interests, presenting resistance to such pressure as a matter of French sovereignty.

However, their willingness to condemn Moscow’s conduct does not translate into support for maintaining the present scale of financial assistance to Ukraine.

The consequences for Kyiv would be substantial. European assistance finances civilian government operations and defence procurement while Ukraine devotes much of its domestic revenue to resisting Russia’s invasion.

European Economic Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis has warned that Ukraine’s financial requirements for 2027 remain considerable, with Brussels seeking additional contributions from international partners.

France’s next president will therefore inherit a dispute involving more than the national contribution to Brussels. The decisions taken in Paris could determine whether the EU retains sufficient financial capacity to support Ukraine while financing its own defence, industrial and economic commitments.

For Le Pen, reducing European expenditure offers a potential response to French public debt and voters’ concerns about national spending. For the EU, the same policy could remove a major source of support from Ukraine’s longer-term financing arrangements at a time when European governments are already struggling to agree on their collective obligations.

Main Image: Kremlin.ru

EU leaders gathering in Brussels must reconcile demands for stronger industrial protection, affordable energy and a workable budget while maintaining support for Ukraine.

Europe’s economic vulnerabilities converge in Brussels today as EU leaders confront three closely connected challenges: competition from China, persistently expensive energy and disagreement over the Union’s next long-term budget. Together, they raise a question that successive summits have struggled to answer: can Europe translate its economic weight into a coherent strategy?

The immediate pressure comes from industry. Reuters reports that manufacturers blame rising Chinese exports for factory closures, while governments face mounting anxiety about employment and competitiveness. The political danger is clear. When established parties promise prosperity but communities experience industrial decline, voters become increasingly receptive to those offering simpler, more confrontational answers.

The Commission’s recent agreement with Beijing to limit Chinese hybrid-car imports offers leaders evidence that negotiation can deliver results. Yet one sectoral arrangement cannot settle a much broader dispute. Chemicals, steel and machinery remain sources of concern, demonstrating that Europe’s difficulties extend well beyond its automotive industry.

Europe should nevertheless distinguish between legitimate competition and demonstrably unfair trading practices. A trade deficit alone does not establish wrongdoing. Imported goods can benefit consumers and businesses that depend on affordable components. The stronger case for intervention rests on evidence of subsidies, market distortions or strategic dependencies that leave essential industries dangerously exposed.

Germany’s changing position is therefore significant. Previously a prominent opponent of EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, Berlin now backs Franco-German proposals for stronger action, including measures addressing chemicals and PET packaging plastics. Europe’s largest economy appears increasingly willing to reconsider assumptions that once favoured commercial engagement above confrontation.

That shift could strengthen Brussels’ negotiating position. Beijing has less reason to compromise when European capitals publicly disagree about whether action is necessary. A common approach would make the threat of trade measures more credible. But unity will be tested whenever retaliation threatens particular national industries or commercially influential companies.

Energy presents an equally demanding challenge. According to Reuters, draft summit conclusions seek additional short-term relief and refer to a proposed one-year delay in methane-emissions requirements affecting oil and gas imports. These remain proposals under discussion, rather than measures already agreed by leaders.

Temporary adjustments may ease immediate pressures, but postponing regulation cannot substitute for an energy strategy. European manufacturers need confidence about future costs before committing investment. That requires reliable supplies, stronger electricity networks and faster delivery of additional generating capacity. Repeated emergency interventions leave companies uncertain about the conditions under which they will operate.

Trade protection and energy policy must consequently work together. Raising barriers against imported products will achieve little if European factories remain burdened by uncompetitive operating costs. Equally, cheaper energy cannot compensate indefinitely for unfair competition. Treating these problems separately risks producing expensive measures that fail to address the underlying industrial weakness.

The budget discussion will expose whether governments are prepared to finance their ambitions. The proposed 2028–2034 framework requires unanimity, and Reuters reports that a special summit is planned for late November to pursue agreement. The familiar divide between national contributions and shared expenditure remains difficult to bridge.

Every government can identify European priorities worth supporting. Agreement becomes harder when those priorities require higher contributions, changes to established funding arrangements or reductions elsewhere. A credible settlement must explain which investments genuinely benefit from collective action and how spending will deliver measurable results. Larger totals alone cannot establish strategic seriousness.

Ukraine gives these negotiations an additional urgency. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is expected to join Friday’s discussions, with financing for 2027 among the anticipated subjects. Europe’s ability to sustain assistance will test the durability of commitments repeatedly expressed at summit tables.

Ultimately, this gathering should be judged by whether its decisions reinforce one another. Defending industry, securing affordable energy and funding common commitments are parts of the same task. Europe possesses substantial market power and institutional resources. Its continuing challenge is to combine them effectively, before another round of political assurances gives way to further industrial disappointment.