​Three Charlotte cops have resigned and three more are facing termination after a Flock probe uncovered a text chain littered with racist messages, religious and sexual bias and a reported competition over who could arrest the most black people.

The group chat came to light after Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) officer Seth Elliott was caught using Flock's database to out an undercover cop to his drug dealer friend, which sparked an investigation by the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (NCSBI).

When questioned by the NCSBI, Elliott, who has since resigned, admitted he ran the plate but denied knowing that it belonged to an undercover officer. He told agents that his friend had reached out to ask if Elliott could help identify a strange person hanging out around his father's business, so Elliott ran the plate through Flock's database.​ According to reporting from the Watauga Democrat, the NCSBI arrested Elliott in July and charged him with " illegally accessing a government computer, a Class 1 misdemeanor."

During its investigation into Elliott, the NCSBI downloaded data from his phone, which it turned over to the CMPD, where a subsequent review uncovered the racist text thread. ​According to anonymous sources who spoke to Charlotte's WBTV, the group chat included "numerous uses of the 'n-word' related to use of force and discharging firearms at black residents," and a competition to see who could arrest the most black people. In one text reportedly written by a member of the group, an officer said, "Our texts sound like a clan [sic] rally," according to a message reviewed by WCNC Charlotte, a local NBC affiliate. At a press conference on Thursday, CMPD Police Chief Estella Patterson said that an independent chain-of-command board unanimously voted for the officers' termination. Three have already resigned and the other three she "hopes to refer to as former employees."

The fallout won't end there. Every case these officers touched could now be called into question, and for good reason. In Giglio v. United States (1972), the Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors must disclose information that could undermine the credibility of a government witness or law enforcement officer. Mecklenburg County District Attorney Spencer Merriweather will have to examine the messages and determine whether their word as witnesses can still be trusted. Depending on his decision, this could lead to dropped cases and challenges to prior convictions.

Defense attorney Tim Emery weighed in, telling WBTV that the officers' "credibility is severely questioned and compromised," and that the district attorney's office should consider halting cases in which the officers were heavily involved.

Police abuse of Flock and other automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) is not new. The Institute for Justice, a libertarian public interest law firm, has cataloged over 200 instances of ALPR abuse at the hands of the police since 2018. In the last year alone, officers have been caught using ALPRs for everything from pursuing personal grudges to stalking exes and romantic interests. This time, the victim of Flock misuse was an undercover officer rather than a civilian.

The post 3 Charlotte Cops Resign After Group Chat Reveals Competition To Arrest the Most Black People appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From U.S. v. California, decided yesterday by Ninth Circuit Judge Mark Bennett, joined by Judges Jacqueline Nguyen and Daniel Collins:

Section 10 [of the California "No Vigilantes Act"] requires any non-uniformed "federal law enforcement officer" operating in California, with narrow exceptions, to "visibly display identification" while performing federal law enforcement duties. Officers who violate the law may be criminally prosecuted by the State.

We previously granted the United States's motion for an injunction pending appeal. As before, we conclude that … § 10 of the No Vigilantes Act attempts [in violation of the Supremacy Clause] to directly regulate the United States in its performance of governmental functions, and Congress has not authorized such regulation. Indeed, we conclude that the United States is certain to succeed….

"[U]nder the intergovernmental immunity component of the Supremacy Clause to the United States Constitution, states may not directly regulate the Federal Government's operations or property." "It is of the very essence of supremacy," the Supreme Court has emphasized, "to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influence." To that end, "states have no power" to "in any manner control[ ] the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government." And "where 'Congress does not affirmatively declare its instrumentalities or property subject to regulation,' 'the federal function must be left free' of regulation" by the States.

Intergovernmental immunity "prohibit[s] state laws that either 'regulat[e] the United States directly or discriminat[e] against the Federal Government or those with whom it deals' (e.g., contractors)." A direct regulation is one that "lays hold of" federal officers "in their specific attempt to obey orders and requires qualifications in addition to those that the [federal] Government has pronounced sufficient." It imposes conditions upon "a function of government," and it regulates "the right to carry on the business" of the federal government. Put another way, a direct regulation regulates the government qua government; it controls how the government conducts specifically governmental functions.

The Supremacy Clause prohibits States from directly regulating federal operations even when regulating state operations in the same manner…. "[E]ven the most unquestionable and most universally applicable of state laws, such as those concerning murder, will not be allowed to control the conduct of a marshal of the United States acting under and in pursuance of the laws of the United States." … And critically, "Supreme Court case law compels the rejection of a de minimis exception to the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity." So "[a] state or local law that directly regulates the conduct of the federal government or discriminates against it is invalid, even if it is no more restrictive than federal law."

In sum, if a state law directly regulates the governmental conduct of the United States without congressional authorization, it is void irrespective of whether the regulated activities are essential to federal functions or operations, and irrespective of the degree to which the state law interferes with such functions or operations….

Section 10 of the No Vigilantes Act expressly applies to federal officers. It controls the conduct of those federal officers in performing law enforcement operations. Section 10 explicitly overrides the federal government's power to determine whether, how, and when to publicly identify its officers. And in so doing, it regulates the manner and conditions under which federal agents can enforce federal law. Again, § 10 defines "law enforcement officer" as including "any federal law enforcement officer." And any non-uniformed federal law enforcement officer "operating in California" "shall visibly display identification that includes their agency and either a name or badge number or both name and badge number when performing their enforcement duties."

These provisions "lay[ ] hold of" federal agencies and officers "in their specific attempt to obey orders and require[ ] qualifications in addition to those that the [federal] Government has pronounced sufficient." As a result, § 10 regulates the performance of "governmental action[s]" which are "carried on by the United States itself"—not merely "persons who [a]re acting for themselves and not for the United States." Indeed, it applies only to law enforcement agencies and their officers, including federal law enforcement agencies and federal law enforcement officers. Section 10 thus directly regulates inherently sovereign functions. Because Congress has not authorized such legislation, it is barred by intergovernmental immunity.

The United States has also shown that "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." Again, § 10 exclusively regulates quintessentially government conduct: law enforcement. So as applied to federal agencies and federal officers carrying out their duties under federal authority, the statute is invalid in all applications. The United States is therefore likely—indeed, certain—to succeed on the merits of its facial challenge to § 10's constitutionality….

California … advances its view that a state statute constitutes an impermissible direct regulation only when the law "impose[s] substantial burdens on federal operations." … The district court applied, and California urges us to adopt, the standard applicable to States' regulation of federal contractors and third-party employers—not the standard that governs direct regulation of the United States's governmental activities.

"Private contractors do not stand on the same footing as the federal government, so states can impose many laws on federal contractors that they could not apply to the federal government itself." But "where, as here, the governmental action is carried on by the United States itself and Congress does not affirmatively declare its instrumentalities or property subject to regulation or taxation, the inherent freedom [from direct regulation] continues." So the burden of the regulation on federal operations, whether substantial or otherwise, is irrelevant because, as discussed, there is no de minimis exception to the United States's immunity from direct regulation.

To be sure, the Supremacy Clause likely does not "bar[ ] all state regulation which may touch the activities of the Federal Government." For example, in Johnson v. Maryland (1920), the Supreme Court suggested that "when the United States has not spoken," States might be able to impose on federal officers "general rules that might affect incidentally the mode of carrying out the[ir] employment—as, for instance, a statute or ordinance regulating the mode of turning at the corners of streets."

But the Court has never relied on that distinction to uphold a State's direct regulation of federal functions performed by federal officers. And unlike traffic laws which, for example, might require a full stop before a right turn, and which regulate conduct that any ordinary citizen could engage in, § 10 applies exclusively to law enforcement officials and exclusively to their performance of law enforcement operations. Thus, § 10 does not just "incidentally" sweep up the conduct of federal officers carrying out their duties. So even if we were to read Johnson as carving out an exception to intergovernmental immunity for laws of general applicability that affect federal operations in incidental ways—an issue that we need not and do not resolve today—such a putative exception would not apply here because § 10 is neither generally applicable nor its effect on federal officers "incidental."

Taking a different tack, California argues that the Supremacy Clause "provides a case-specific defense that confers immunity on federal officers who can show that they held an 'honest and reasonable belief' that the charged conduct was 'necessary in the performance of [their] duty.'" From there, the State contends that the United States's facial challenge must fail because there is no "reason to believe that in all (or nearly all) cases where [§ 10] might apply, the federal officer would be covered by the case-specific defense."

We agree that federal officers are immune from state criminal prosecution under state laws regulating conduct of members of the general public "only when [their] acts are both (1) authorized by the laws of the United States and (2) necessary and proper to the execution of [their] responsibilities." And under this standard, an officer need not "show that his action was in fact necessary or in retrospect justifiable, only that he reasonably thought it to be."

The immunity at issue here, however, belongs to the United States, which enjoys a distinct form of immunity under the Supremacy Clause: intergovernmental immunity. Thus, whether any officer would hold an honest and reasonable belief that the charged conduct was necessary to perform his or her duty is irrelevant to whether the United States, or an agent exercising quintessentially governmental authority of the United States, is entitled to complete and total immunity from regulation of the type embodied in § 10. To reiterate, § 10, by its explicit terms, expressly regulates the conduct of federal officers while those officers are discharging law enforcement duties under federal authority. So an individual officer would be entitled to a Supremacy Clause defense against any prosecution brought under the statute….

Andrew M. Bernie, Mark R. Freeman, Daniel Tenny, and Eric D. McArthur represent the federal government.

The post California Law Generally Requiring Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Display ID Violates Supremacy Clause appeared first on Reason Magazine.