The Commission has just confirmed that it is suspending certain payments under Cohesion funding and the European Regional Development Fund to the Czech Prime Minister’s company Agrofert, due to the apparent conflict of interest surrounding Andrej Babiš' (pictured) role as PM and his business holdings. The Czech Prime Minister is the owner of the massive agribusiness, for which he set up a ‘trust’ ahead of becoming Prime Minister for the second time. The Greens/EFA Group have long highlighted the conflict of interests surrounding the Czech Prime Minister.  

Daniel Freund MEP, Greens/EFA Group Coordinator in the Budgetary Control Committee said:  “The Commission has recognized that Czech PM Andrej Babiš is likely in conflict of interest and we applaud that the Commission has finally taken action here. It is totally unacceptable for a prime minister to be negotiating the EU’s next long term budget, when he decides how large a chunk of that money could end up in his own pockets. The trust fund that Babiš set up in no way is enough to prevent a conflict of interest and it’s welcome that the Commission has acknowledged this.  “However, the Czech people should not have to suffer due to the dodgy dealings of their prime minister. It is time that the Commission and Council forces Czechia to ensure that Babiš is not involved in any negotiations around the EU’s long term budget, which may benefit him or his family directly. Either Babiš is head of Agrofert or he’s Czech PM, he can’t have it both ways.” 

Markéta Gregorová, Greens/EFA MEP and Czech Pirate Member of the Committee on International Trade said: “I am glad that the European Commission has finally started addressing Andrej Babiš’ conflict of interest, as it promised in its response to my inquiry. This confirms that we were right to raise the alarm: Babiš has not resolved his conflict of interest, and, frankly, he never genuinely intended to do so. The Commission must now ensure that the rules are enforced and that European taxpayers’ money is protected from any misuse.”

The EU will not be able to take on tech juggernauts like the US and China if it relies solely on Berlin, Paris, Amsterdam and Stockholm. It must start treating Eastern Europe as a strategic partner if it wants to become a global technological power, writes Cristian Gherasim.

The image of a global superpower is no longer synonymous with swarms of soldiers armed to the teeth. Modern wars are fought as much online as they are on the battlefield. Nations that will have a say in tomorrow’s world now must keep innovation might at the top of their priorities.

Draghi’s warnings

The 2024 report by former ECB president Mario Draghi on EU’s economic competitiveness included warnings directed at Europe’s tech ambitions. Mario Draghi’s report highlights the need to grow digital connectivity and reduce the gaps between Europe and the world’s tech powerhouses.

The European Union has been in a less than flattering position, even when it comes to the most basic infrastructure. A few years back, the European Court of Auditors said EU members should step up efforts to deploy 5G, given how the next big leap in mobile networking has been lagging in some member states. Though improvements have been made, there is still a long way to go. The Commission reacted with its Competitiveness Compass – which places tech infrastructure as the cornerstone of future economic development.

In order to meet the digital target for 2030, Brussels needs to revamp the old infrastructure and, more importantly, create a better and newer one.

Eastern Europe’s ignored strength

Rich countries no longer hold the monopoly over connectivity and innovation. Eastern Europe – though economically not yet on par with its Western counterparts - has put technology front and center, building its communication infrastructure at great speed.

Romania demonstrates that top connectivity is not limited to Europe’s Western economies. Today, almost nine in ten Romanian households have internet. The country ranks high among the world’s fastest countries for broadband speeds, according to Ookla. Over a ten year period (2025 versus 2015), Romania saw a 28% increase in household access to the internet. The country is becoming one of Europe’s most vital internet hubs, which also explains Romania’s growing importance as a cybersecurity player on the continent. Romania hosts the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre, crucial to Europe’s defense. Countries in Eastern Europe have gained significant firsthand expertise in dealing with such threats.

Further north, Estonia is also a clear example of Eastern Europe’s technological influence. The country built one of Europe’s most advanced digital public sectors, whose technological clout far exceeds its population size and geography. Estonia offers the rest of the European Union valuable lessons in digital government, cybersecurity and online public services.

Poland – a former Warsaw Pact member - gives yet another example of Eastern Europe’s growing technological influence. Poland has been tackling hate speech and disinformation on the internet and with the help of its AI companies it has aggressively been monitoring social media content.

The country is positioning itself as Central and Eastern Europe’s leading AI hub, investing heavily in the tech sector. The Polish digital economy market is currently estimated to be around 40 billion EUR and expected to develop exponentially over the coming years.

Digital Networks Act

Strength lies in unity, hence a unified telecom market would help Europe grow its tech influence relative to that of China and the US. This unified EU digital market should unmistakably include the Eastern European nations. The Digital Networks Act looks to reduce market fragmentation, encourage fiber and 5G investment. It remains to be seen whether Europe’s nations can form a single digital market.

That is where the Digital Decade comes in. The program is set up by the European Union to improve digital skills, upgrade digital infrastructure and get more businesses and public services online. If the EU is to build a unified digital market, investments and the decision making process should not exclude Eastern Europe.

Europe needs to learn how to pool resources from every member state just as much as it needs to unify its regulations and make long term infrastructure investments a must.

Cybersecurity and digital sovereignty

The past few years have shown that making Europe digitally strong is a matter of security and survival. Mobile communications, fiber networks and data centers are now seen as essential infrastructure, alongside energy grids and transport networks.

Cyber attackers have been targeting Europe’s critical infrastructure. Countries on the eastern flank of EU and NATO such as Romania have become important digital security actors. Sitting in Russia’s crosshairs, their resilient communication infrastructure is now essential for Europe’s wider defense.

Eastern Europe brings not only cybersecurity expertise to the table, but also infrastructure and human resources that will help the EU compete globally.

Digital sovereignty should not bring about isolation. Europe needs to keep on working with the US on matters of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence instead of being at odds with each other. At the same time, the EU should be strengthening its own infrastructure, investing heavily in research and development and creating a single digital market.

Europe’s digital future will not be built exclusively in Western Europe. It will also be built in Bucharest, Warsaw, Tallinn and across EU’s eastern frontier.

If Brussels is indeed serious about closing the gap with the US and China, it can’t leave its eastern member states out. Romania and Eastern Europe are no longer part of Europe's digital periphery, and their infrastructure is there to prove it. Now what they need is a seat at the table.

Sovereign wealth is typically measured by the size of reserves that allow a country to weather periods of crisis. However, for future generations, it is not only the amount left in financial accounts that matters. Of equal importance is the state of the country they inherit alongside these savings: the quality of its schools and hospitals, the condition of utility networks, roads, energy, and other core infrastructure.

For Kazakhstan, this question holds special significance. Revenues from natural resources enable the country to build a substantial financial cushion. The National Fund accumulates a portion of commodity revenues and serves two primary functions: a savings function aimed at preserving assets for future generations, and a stabilization function designed to reduce the state budget's vulnerability to fluctuations in global commodity markets. It should be noted that by mid-2026, the fund's foreign-currency assets reached $65.5 billion. (1)

Sovereign wealth operates differently

There is no single global model for managing sovereign wealth funds. States strike different balances between intergenerational savings, fiscal stabilization, and deploying accumulated capital for development. However, international experience demonstrates that these goals are not inherently contradictory.

Norway adheres to one of the most disciplined models of sovereign wealth management. Its fiscal rule aligns withdrawals with the expected real return of the Government Pension Fund, while preserving the flexibility to use fiscal policy in response to major economic shocks. (2)

The stabilization function is even more pronounced in Chile. Funds from the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund have been drawn upon repeatedly during periods of economic stress. In 2009, withdrawals reached nearly $9.28 billion, with significant funds also deployed in 2019–2021. (3)

Other countries also utilize commodity revenues not only as a source of long-term savings, but as a catalyst for economic development. The experience of Kuwait is illustrative, where these responsibilities are divided between the Future Generations Fund, focused on preserving capital for future generations, and the General Reserve Fund, whose investment portfolio encompasses energy, industry, transport and logistics, healthcare, and infrastructure. This model allows Kuwait to preserve a portion of national wealth for upcoming generations while transforming another portion into assets that expand the country's economic potential today and build the foundation for long-term growth. (4)

Azerbaijan, whose sovereign wealth origins closely mirror Kazakhstan's, has utilized resources from the State Oil Fund to finance major projects of national importance, including the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, the Oguz–Gabala–Baku water supply system, and equity participation in major oil and gas transport initiatives. (5)

None of these models can be mechanically copied by another country. Together, however, they demonstrate that sovereign wealth management does not boil down to a binary choice between "saving" and "spending." What matters far more is the form in which national capital can deliver the greatest long-term return for the nation.

From financial capital to national capital

Savings from the National Fund are already being utilized directly in the interests of future generations. Since 2024, Kazakhstan has operated the "National Fund for Children" program: every young citizen of Kazakhstan is annually allocated a portion of the fund's investment income, and upon reaching 18 years of age, the accumulated funds can be used for education or housing improvement. This program has already entered the phase of practical asset utilization. Between February 2024 and August 1, 2026, payouts were received by more than 338,000 young Kazakhstanis, totaling approximately $67.8 million. Meanwhile, the funds belonging to minors remain within the National Fund's assets and continue to be invested until they reach adulthood. (6)

At the same time, Kazakhstan faces a challenge familiar to many economies that have accumulated significant revenues from natural resources: what portion of national wealth should remain in financial assets, and what portion makes sense to convert into capital working domestically.

Soon, Kazakhstan plans to deploy a portion of the National Fund's assets to finance major infrastructure projects of nationwide significance. In 2027, over $4 billion is planned for these purposes, followed by slightly over $3 billion annually in 2028 and 2029 (7).

According to several experts, the economic rationale for such a decision extends beyond mere financing. When funds are directed into long-term social and engineering infrastructure, national wealth does not disappear. The form in which it exists simply changes.

Money allocated to current consumption expires alongside the budget cycle. A school, hospital, utility network, road, or energy facility remains in the economy and operates for decades.

This is precisely why infrastructure investments differ fundamentally from covering operational expenses. A portion of financial capital is effectively transformed into physical and human capital within the country.

Such an approach yields economic benefits right from the project implementation stage. Construction generates demand for materials, equipment, transport, design, and installation work, providing orders for domestic enterprises and creating added value within the country. Once facilities are operational, another, far more sustained effect begins. Modernizing heating and water supply systems increases their reliability, reduces losses, and diminishes the need for costly emergency repairs. Roads enhance regional connectivity. Energy infrastructure removes bottlenecks for expanding existing production and launching new industrial capacity.

Investments in healthcare and education occupy a special place. Modern hospitals, clinics, and educational institutions represent both social infrastructure and direct investments in human capital. The accessibility of medical care, public health status, quality of education, and workforce qualifications are directly tied to labor productivity and the long-term potential of the economy. All social infrastructure is as much an element of national capital as transport or energy infrastructure, and its returns and effectiveness extend far beyond the construction timeline of any individual project.

The cost of deferred development

Utilizing accumulated capital carries an opportunity cost. However, delaying investments carries an opportunity cost as well. Insufficient capacity of transport networks, energy shortages, worn-out utility systems, and a deficit of schools or medical facilities impose costs today. The longer modernization is postponed, the longer the economy and population bear these costs.

Therefore, the pace of infrastructure development carries clear economic value. If a necessary facility opens today rather than ten years from now, the country gains additional years of its economic and social returns.

Moreover, the social and economic effects of infrastructure are largely inseparable. Reliable utility networks, modern healthcare, education, transport, and energy simultaneously elevate the quality of life and create an environment in which private economic activity can thrive.

A reserve that has already worked

Using the National Fund's resources to address strategic priorities is not a new practice for Kazakhstan. The fund's ability to provide supplementary resources when the economy needs them most has repeatedly served as a key factor in the country's economic resilience.

During the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, $10 billion was directed to stabilize the financial sector, support real estate, small and medium enterprises, and the agribusiness sector (8). In 2015–2017, an additional $9 billion was withdrawn (9). During the pandemic in 2020–2021, transfers from the National Fund helped preserve economic stability and support citizens. Thus, having an accumulated reserve allowed the state to act proactively—promptly directing additional resources where they were required to prevent more severe economic repercussions.

The existence of a large financial reserve enabled Kazakhstan to navigate periods of external shocks with an additional funding source without relying exclusively on current budget revenues.

Today, it is not the principle of using the fund that is changing, but the nature of the task. Previously, accumulated resources primarily served to mitigate the impact of global shocks. Now, a portion of the capital is intended to eliminate infrastructural bottlenecks that could constrain long-term development.

This expands the sovereign fund's role: resources accumulated during favorable periods are used not only after a crisis arises, but also to build assets that enhance the resilience and potential of the economy for years to come.

The account of future generations

Ultimately, the success of this strategy will be measured not by the volume of funds withdrawn from the National Fund, but by the value of the assets created with them and the overall effect they deliver to the economy and citizens.

This fundamentally shifts the evaluation criteria. If a financial asset worth one dollar is transformed into infrastructure that enhances productivity, lowers business costs, elevates human capital quality, and fosters conditions for new private investment over decades, the very structure of national wealth undergoes a qualitative transformation.

Therefore, the central question for the coming years is not whether to utilize National Fund resources, but the quality of the assets Kazakhstan creates in return. For future generations, this exact balance between preserved financial capital and the value of the domestic economy built in its place will stand as the primary legacy of today's decisions.

1. National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Report to the President dated June 4, 2026: Foreign Currency Assets and Investment Income for 2025.

2. AI-CIO, "Norway to Withdraw Record Amount from Sovereign Wealth Fund": https://www.ai-cio.com/news/norway-withdraw-record-amount-sovereign-wealth-fund/

3. The Market Value of the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF): https://www.hacienda.cl/english/work-areas/international-finance/sovereign-wealth-funds/economic-and-social-stabilization-fund/financial-situation/market-value

4. Kuwait Investment Authority, "Investments" (General Reserve Fund and Future Generations Fund overview): https://www.kia.gov.kw/investments/

5. oilfund.az, State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan - Question and Answer (mandate); naturalgasworld.com, "SOFAZ financing Azerbaijan's share in TANAP project": https://oilfund.az/en/fund/press-room/question-and-answer
   
6. Target Savings Payments under the "National Fund for Children" Program: https://www.enpf.kz/ru/press-center/news/282547/
   
   Foreign-Currency Assets of the National Fund to Increase to USD 70.6 Billion by 2029: https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/economy/press/news/details/1279482?lang=en
   
   Concept of Formation and Use of Resources of the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Decree of the President of RK dated Dec 8, 2016, No. 385): https://cdb.kz/sistema/pravovaya-baza/o-kontseptsii-formirovaniya-i-ispolzovaniya-sredstv-natsionalnogo-fonda-respubliki-kazakhstan/
   
   Concept of Formation and Use of Resources of the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan: https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U1600000385
   

Six months into the US-Iran war, and as Europe grapples with finding a solution to a crisis that has spread across the region, Iranian activists across the Islamic Republic risked their lives last week by taking part in demonstrations, impromptu parades and acts of disobedience to mark the 62nd anniversary of the founding of Iran’s leading pro-democracy opposition group. What makes this particularly relevant for Brussels is that Europe is examining ways not only to contain the immediate crisis, but also to address the broader question of what political forces inside Iran could ultimately shape the country’s future. Meanwhile, members of the same movement in exile held an election to choose a new occupant of the organisation’s highest office.

The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) was originally established to promote revolution against the hereditary dictatorship of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. But after that revolution came about in 1979, it quickly stood up against the theocratic faction that seized power in its wake and began cultivating a reputation as the primary voice for a democratic alternative to the Islamic Republic. It has since been targeted for annihilation by the regime on several occasions but has invariably rebounded and assumed leading roles in major, collective challenges to the regime’s hold on power.

Those challenges include independent media campaigns, mass protests and an armed assault in February on Tehran’s Motahari Complex, which contains offices belonging to several leading officials and institutions, including that of the supreme leader. That incident threatened to decapitate the regime just days before the United States began the bombing campaign that has left it mired in a grinding war with the Islamic Republic more than six months later.

The PMOI has also been credited with leading roles in each of four successive uprisings that spread across the entire country in 2018, 2019, 2022 and 2026. The last of these, which took place mostly in January, was ruthlessly suppressed, with the death toll reaching into the thousands. This was soon followed by a new escalation in Iran’s world-leading use of the death penalty, particularly against political detainees.

Since the start of the Iranian calendar year in March, 40 such prisoners have been hanged, many of them for participating in the January uprising or for affiliation with the PMOI. The trend has led many of the organisation’s supporters to warn that the regime could be setting the stage for a massacre akin to that which took place in the summer of 1988, primarily targeting the PMOI, when 30,000 political prisoners, the overwhelming majority of them affiliated with the PMOI, were massacred within a few months.

Those warnings, and that history, illustrate the danger that Iranian activists were taking on when they coordinated demonstrations last week with the express purpose of promoting the PMOI. This, in turn, points to the resilience that the Iranian people have demonstrated both in the early days of the Islamic Republic and in recent clashes between protesters and regime authorities.

That resilience is arguably reflected in the PMOI’s choice of Mahnaz Maimanat (pictured) as its new Secretary General on Sunday (6 September). Like most of her colleagues, Maimanat has suffered great personal losses in her fight against the ruling system. Her brother Massoud was killed by firing squad in 1983, and her brother Mahmoud was hanged during the 1988 massacre, the same year that their mother was killed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Since joining the PMOI at the age of 20 in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Maimanat has remained steadfastly committed to the organisation, joining its Leadership Council in 1993 and its Central Council in 2014, before becoming co-Secretary General in 2021. After she secured 56 percent of the votes from fellow members of the Central Council, a statement from the PMOI described Maimanat’s election as a means for the organisation to declare “its firm determination to topple the ruling religious fascism.”

The statement also quoted Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political coalition of which the PMOI is a member organisation, as saying that Maimanat “has combined dynamism and a defiant spirit with an even deeper sense of commitment and responsibility for the freedom of the Iranian people and her homeland.”

Rajavi has been designated by the NCRI to oversee a transition to democratic governance following the mullahs’ overthrow. She has also authored a Ten-Point Plan for Iran’s future in the wake of that transition, guaranteeing free and fair elections, separation of religion from the state, equal rights for women and minorities, and peaceful relations with neighbouring countries and the West, backed by the dismantling of the outgoing regime’s nuclear weapons programme.

In recent years, thousands of lawmakers across Europe and North America, including cross-party members of the European Parliament, have openly endorsed that plan while also recognising the NCRI as a viable, democratic alternative to the current ruling system.

Commission adopts EU Guidelines on exclusionary abuses of dominance

New figures from member states show that businesses are increasingly using the simplified VAT rules for cross-border e-commerce.

New figures from member states show that businesses continue to make increasing use of the simplified VAT rules for online sales. Five years after the EU’s VAT e-commerce rules entered into force, the latest figures also show continued growth in VAT declared through the One Stop Shop (OSS) and Import One Stop Shop (IOSS) schemes.

The VAT e-commerce package, which entered into force on 1 July 2021, marked a major step in modernising the EU VAT framework. Since then, member states have collected more than €125 billion in VAT revenue through the EU’s VAT e-commerce schemes.

In 2025 alone, more than €38 billion in VAT revenue was collected, an increase of 17% compared with the previous year. The number of businesses using the EU’s simplified VAT schemes has also continued to grow. By the end of 2025, more than 193,000 businesses have registered to account for VAT on online sales through the schemes, reflecting the continued uptake of the EU’s VAT reforms, which help simplify VAT compliance, reduce red tape, and ensure VAT collection. 

E-commerce VAT reform: Progress and future direction

With the continued rapid growth in e-commerce activity and an increasingly digital global marketplace, the EU’s VAT rules for online transactions have continued to evolve to meet the needs of cross-border trade.

As we move into the next phase of reforms under the VAT in the Digital Age (ViDA) package, the EU is on track towards a fairer and more efficient VAT framework.

Following the adoption of the VAT in the Digital Age (ViDA) package in 2025, its phased implementation over the coming years is expected to build further on the success of the e-commerce VAT reforms. By expanding the scope of the OSS to cover more business-to-consumer transactions and introducing a new special scheme for the transfers of own goods, the ViDA package is likely to lead to even greater uptake of the OSS schemes, moving towards a single VAT registration in the EU. 

More information

Through a single registration in one member state, the One Stop Shop (OSS) and Import One Stop Shop (IOSS) schemes allow businesses to declare and remit VAT for cross-border sales of goods and services within the EU, as well as for imports of low-value goods.

This report is the latest in a series of annual reports on the application of the e-commerce package and is based on 2025 statistics from member states. It sets out details of the total number of registrations in all three One-Stop Shop (OSS) schemes, namely, the Union OSS, the non-Union OSS and the Import OSS, as of 31 December 2025. It also provides details on the total amount of VAT declared in each of these schemes in 2025. In addition, it describes how these registrations and declaration figures have evolved since the introduction of the VAT e-commerce rules in July 2021.

• Read the 2025 Report on the Application of the EU’s VAT E-Commerce Package 
• VAT for e-commerce 
• VAT in the Digital Age 

The EU energy label, as provided for by Regulation (EU) 2017/1369, aims at promoting the uptake of more efficient energy-related products. It aims to help consumers make informed choices by facilitating comparisons of product alternatives with different features. The label focuses on the energy efficiency of the product during the use phase, but can also include other environment-related aspects.

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• Publication details

• Published: 2026
• Corporate author(s): Directorate-General for Energy (European Commission) , Centerdata , Ipsos NV
• Themes: Energy policy
• Subject: computer equipment , consumer information , energy consumption , energy efficiency , EU energy label , EU energy policy , maintenance , product life , regulation (EU)

• Released on EU publications website: 2026-09-03

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As families across Nepal face the human toll of one of the country's deadliest floods in decades, the EU is adding to the relief effort led by Nepalese authorities and humanitarian partners. A first EU humanitarian air bridge flight is delivering 82 tonnes of essential supplies, while the European Commission is providing a further €500,000 for response and coordinating further help offered by European countries.

Organized with UNICEF, the Air Bridge flight has landed this morning carrying supplies for nutrition, health, water and sanitation, shelter, education and protection from EU stocks. The additional €500,000 will be channelled through the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' disaster response emergency fund, allowing local teams to cover urgent needs. Separately, through the EU civil protection mechanism, Luxembourg, Germany, Latvia and Norway are sending equipment including life jackets, hygiene and kitchen kits, blankets, medical supplies, protective equipment and emergency energy equipment.

This further assistance builds on the EU response already underway. On 28 August, the Commission allocated €2 million in emergency humanitarian aid, on top of almost €3 million already allocated to Nepal in 2026 for disaster preparedness. EU-funded partners have been providing assistance on the ground, while Copernicus emergency satellite mapping has been activated and the EU Rapid Response and Logistic Coordinators for Asia are deployed.

Crisis Management Commissioner Hadja Lahbib said: 

"In a single night, rivers of mud and water swept away what generations had built: homes, schools, entire communities. Nepal has suffered a devastating loss of life, and thousands of families are facing the unimaginable. The grief is only beginning to sink in. Europe stands with the Nepalese people. We are supporting emergency responders and getting emergency aid to those who need it: clean water, medicine for hospitals, shelter for families sleeping in the open, and psychological support for the grieving. European solidarity crosses oceans. We will help Nepal not just survive this tragedy, but rebuild. Stronger and never alone."

Background

The European Commission's emergency response co-ordination centre operates 24/7; it ensures rapid deployment of emergency support and acts as a coordination hub between all EU member states, the 10 additional participating states, the affected country, and civil protection and humanitarian aid experts.

On 4 September, the Commission proposed extending the annual winter closure in the Bay of Biscay into winter 2027 for fishing vessels over eight metres to help prevent catches of common dolphins and other small cetaceans - which are strictly protected species under the EU Habitats Directive. For the fourth consecutive year, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain have requested this closure, making use of the regionalised approach under the common fisheries policy. 

The Delegated Act will now be sent to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU for scrutiny before entering into force  

As proposed by the group of EU member states, the closure should run for a period of 30 consecutive days, to be taken between 15 January and 27 February 2027. Fishers will be able to notify their preferred closure period to their national authorities. 

This proposed new closure aims to increase operational flexibility for the fishing sector and reduce its economic impacts, while protecting dolphins during the period when bycatch risk is higher. This new flexible approach responds to a direct request from the fishing sector to better align the timing of the closure with fishing activities. 

In the absence of notification about their preferred dates to their national authorities, fishing vessels will be subject to the fixed closure period running from 22 January until 20 February 2027.   

Efforts to reduce common dolphin bycatch should continue, as advised by science and required under the Habitats Directive and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, in line with the EU Biodiversity Strategy and the European Ocean Pact.  

Success in reducing dolphin mortality   

Since 2024, fishing closures in the Bay of Biscay have been effective in reducing incidental catches of dolphins. According to a report from the French observatory PELAGIS, dolphin mortality due to incidental catches in 2025 appeared significantly lower than those estimated prior to the closure (2017-2023).  

Financial support for fishing vessels  

Around 300 EU vessels are expected to be impacted by the proposed closure. Financial compensation is available through the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) or through state aid by member states. The EU offers financial support to fishers to acknowledge their efforts towards marine conservation and to protect their livelihoods, ensuring a sustainable and prosperous future for both ecosystems and fishing communities.  

Measures to reduce incidental catches  

During the selected closure period, vessels - pelagic and demersal trawls, seiners and netters - will be required to remain in port to avoid incidental catches of common dolphins and other small cetaceans. Scientists have identified this period as a high-risk for bycatches (unintentional capture of dolphins during fishing operations).  

Background  

All cetaceans, including common dolphins, are strictly protected under the Habitats Directive. Member states must establish a system to monitor their incidental capture and killing. Considering the information gathered, they must take further research or conservation measures to ensure that incidental capture and killing does not have a significant negative impact on the species concerned.   

The EU Biodiversity strategy for 2030 aims to eliminate or minimise by-catch so as not to threaten the conservation status of protected species. In line with these objectives, the European Ocean Pact sets out the Commission's commitment to support member states in protecting and restoring marine ecosystems. 

Winter strandings of dolphins and small cetaceans on the coasts of the Bay of Biscay have been a recurring challenge for the fishing sector and marine ecosystems. Contributing factors to these strandings include incidental catches in fishing nets, natural mortality, diseases, and disorientation.  

As part of efforts to reduce interactions between small cetaceans and fishing vessels, the fishing sector and Member States are investing in research and technical trials to develop and test new devices. Ongoing research projects on new devices and interaction with cetaceans include PIFIL, DolphinFree, Licado, Delmoges, iNOVPESCA and VaradaC. 

Westminster is the most unaffordable city for local homebuyers, according to a September 2026 real estate report. While home price growth across the UK slowed to 2% a year, a new study by Everest Mortgages looked at the cities where house prices and mortgage requirements are still too high for their own residents. Westminster makes it the most difficult for residents to buy a home, with locals needing to earn over 3 times more than they do currently. Salaries and mortgage requirements don’t match each other the most in England, as the region takes all top 10 spots.Chichester stands out with the lowest local salaries, and full-time workers there earn only £35.2K annually.

For each of 75+ UK cities, the study focused on two key numbers: the salary local workers would need to afford a home versus what they earn now. The first figure was calculated using the average house price without the deposit (15%) and what lenders usually limit for mortgage applications, taken as 4.5 times the salary. The aimed salary is then compared to the actual median salary in the region, highlighting the affordability gaps in the UK housing market. Here’s how the top 10 most unaffordable housing markets for locals.

In Westminster, residents need to earn over 3 times more than they do now to afford a home. This is the largest difference in the country between real income and what lenders are looking for when approving mortgages, and, in raw numbers, it’s a gap of £108K annually. Right now, Westminster workers take home around £52.6K a year if they’re working full time, but with house prices at £854K, they need to triple their earnings. Chichester Chichester is the second most unaffordable market for residents, with local salaries requiring a 2.3 times increase to match the mortgage conditions. In 2026, workers here earn only £35.2K annually, the lowest median salary in the top 10, but the house prices in Chichester are still higher than in Bath, Bristol, or Brighton and Hove.

To pay off a mortgage on a £430K house, residents need to earn £81.2K, more than double their current paychecks. London In third place is London, where the median earnings of £46.4K still need to be more than doubled (x 2.25) to fit the mortgage payment schedule. The average house in London is actually cheaper than one in Westminster or in St Albans, with a price tag of £554K, but local salaries need to reach at least £104.6K, the third-highest required paycheck on the list. St Albans St Albans follows closely, with a 2.14 times salary increase required. Local workers already make the most on the list, bringing home £57.4K, over £10K more than in London, but these salaries are still not enough for a safe mortgage.

With house prices sitting at £651.4K on average, St Albans homebuyers are looking for a salary of £123K. Oxford Oxford also makes the list of the cities where it’s the hardest to buy a home on local salaries. In 2026, the gap between the actual paychecks and what lenders are looking for is £44.9K, which is already more than a median Oxford salary. Currently, the income for one full-time worker amounts to £43.3K annually, so future homebuyers need to look to double their earnings. A housing expert from Everest Mortgages commented on the study: “Many first-time buyers spend years saving a deposit, only to discover their salary still disqualifies them for a mortgage on the property they've been saving toward. Having a big enough deposit is only half the story, and a stable, sufficiently large income is equally important. In Westminster and Chichester, the deposit hurdle is real, but the income gap is the wall most buyers never get over.”