The signing of the Badr Memorandum of Understanding by Pakistan, Türkiye, Qatar and Indonesia in Doha on Wednesday is the latest manifestation of Middle Eastern states accelerated efforts for diversifying their defense partnerships amid growing doubts about the reliability of existing security arrangements of the region led by the United States.

But, rather than laying the foundations of a new regional security architecture, the proliferation of such agreements is producing a more fractured landscape in which countries are drawing in more partners, pursuing separate strategic interests and accepting varying levels of military commitments.

There could not be a bigger example of how uneven is the process than the agreements being signed up by regional countries themselves.

Badr, for instance, focuses on defense manufacturing, technology transfer, research and development, and training, allowing its participants to pool industrial capabilities without committing themselves to military assistance in the event of an attack.

In contrast the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement, concluded in August by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye, goes considerably further by providing that an attack on one participant will be treated as an attack on all as it builds on a bilateral Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement between Pakistan and KSA signed in Sept 2025.

These are two major agreements in addition to several others being signed or solidified by the countries in the region, but the contrast between Badr and Makkah agreements is telling because these agreements are often taken as evidence of an emerging regional security architecture, although the arrangements differ considerably in their purpose and obligations. Makkah agreement formalises security guarantees between participating countries, while Badr aims to develop industrial capacity.

The momentum behind these regional security initiatives has grown since this year’s US - Israel war with Iran exposed the risks of relying heavily on external protection. For Gulf states in particular, the Iran conflict raised questions about whether existing security partnerships could adequately protect their interests during a major regional confrontation.

Importantly, the response of the affected countries has not been to abandon US, whose military capabilities are still considered indispensable, but to seek additional options through new partnerships, domestic defense production and selective commitments.

Besides the impression of the inadequacy of US security umbrella, this search for greater strategic autonomy also needs to be looked at in the context of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s own Joint Defense Agreement, signed in 2000, which too provides that aggression against one member constitutes aggression against all, yet the bloc has struggled to translate this commitment into an integrated military capability because of differences in equipment, command systems and national priorities.

The hurdles to full operationalisation of Peninsula Shield Force has further exposed the gap between a collective defense principle and the ability to organise a coordinated response.

The newer arrangements that the countries in the region are signing up partly reflect this GCC experience. Therefore, while these countries want enhanced security cooperation, they are also reluctant to surrender the freedom to make independent decisions.

As a result, a network of partnerships is emerging that may complement one another in some areas without actually adding up to a common defense system.

Pakistan’s expanding role illustrates both the opportunities and the limitations of this approach. Its relationship with Saudi Arabia has acquired a more formal security dimension through the 2025 bilateral agreement and the subsequent Makkah framework, while cooperation with Turkiye offers scope for closer military coordination and defense industrial collaboration.

Egypt, another key player in the Arab world, has stayed outside the Makkah framework and has offered defense cooperation to Saudi Arabia, reflecting its interest in protecting its own regional priorities without becoming committed to a wider military confrontation.

Islamabad’s other Gulf relationships, however, remain more limited in scope. Kuwait has strengthened defense cooperation with Pakistan through an upgraded agreement - the Protocol Agreement 2026 - covering training, capacity building and border management, while Bahrain has developed close links with the Pakistani military through the presence of Pakistani personnel in its National Guard and Coast Guard, alongside cooperation in training and logistics. These relationships have provided a basis for continued military engagement but do not carry the mutual defense obligations associated with the Pakistan - KSA partnership.

Ties with UAE have, meanwhile, followed a more complicated course marred by political and financial strains, Islamabad’s closer alignment with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s expanding defense relationship with India. Nevertheless, training, personnel exchanges, counterterrorism activities and joint exercises between the two countries continue.

Qatar has signed a defense industrial cooperation agreement involving Pakistan among others while Oman has maintained selective military ties with Pakistan and Turkiye, simultaneously preserving its wider security relationships and avoiding binding mutual defense commitments, consistent with its preference for neutrality and diplomatic engagement, particularly in relation to Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.

This makes it difficult to describe Pakistan’s growing defense relationships as a unified regional bloc. Moreover, commitments under these agreements vary according to the interests and calculations of individual partners. Islamabad, in this situation, is left to balance closer security ties against its available military resources and the risk of becoming involved in conflicts whose objectives may not coincide with its own.

At the same time the Gulf states are also pursuing different courses. Saudi Arabia is strengthening its relationships with Pakistan and Turkiye while continuing to rely on Western military capabilities and Egypt and exploring defense industrial cooperation with China.

The UAE, which has not joined either the Makkah or Badr frameworks, has deepened security cooperation with Israel, including in air defense and counter drone capabilities, while maintaining close relationships with US, France and India. Qatar is seeking to expand its defense industrial partnerships through Badr but at the same time retains US military presence at Al Udeid.

Bahrain remains closely aligned with Saudi Arabia and the GCC defense framework, while Kuwait continues to prioritise bilateral military cooperation with Pakistan alongside its substantial security relationship with Washington. Oman’s preference for neutrality and mediation further distinguishes its approach from those seeking more formal security commitments.

The differences are not only confined to the choice of partners, but the states also have divergent assessments of the threat posed by Iran, the role of Israel in regional security and the degree to which they should commit themselves to one another’s defense. Their partnerships are therefore being shaped as much by the need to preserve freedom of action as by the desire to develop collective capabilities.

The new partnerships do not either automatically translate into military independence for regional states, which continue to operate substantial inventories of Western origin aircraft, air defense systems and other advanced platforms that require specialised maintenance, software support, spare parts and replacement munitions. New partners may help diversify procurement and develop local production, but they cannot necessarily replace established suppliers on the required scale.

Moreover, addition of newer systems can also complicate logistics and interoperability unless countries invest in common procedures, training and secure communications.
Defense industrial cooperation presents another challenge and agreements such as Badr will acquire practical significance only if they lead to funded production programs, meaningful technology transfer and capabilities that participating countries can maintain and sustain.

Similarly, the credibility of mutual defense arrangements will depend on whether their members can coordinate intelligence, plan jointly and establish procedures for responding to a crisis.

The number of agreements signed, therefore, is less important than the military capabilities and obligations they actually produce.

For Washington, this proliferation of new defense agreements may apparently look like a challenge, but this should definitely not be seen as it being replaced. US undoubtedly remains deeply embedded in the region through military bases, intelligence cooperation, arms sales and longstanding defense relationships.

The emerging shift may, however, give the regional countries greater bargaining power with established suppliers, particularly as they press for domestic production, technology partnerships and greater control over maintenance and supply chains. To put it simply the emerging arrangements are an attempt to manage the uncertainty created by recent geo-political developments especially the receding US footprint rather than replace the existing system outright.

The central contradiction in the Gulf countries response to the emerging situation, however, is that while these states are seeking greater security through a proliferation of partnerships, they remain unwilling, or unable, to reconcile their differences over the threats they face and the obligations they are prepared to assume.

• At annual counterterrorism dialogue, bloc slams recent attacks in Pakistan
• Talks cover online extremism, terror financing
• Both sides agree to boost cooperation at multilateral forums
• FO cites exploitation of water resources by states, terrorists

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan and the European Union on Thursday expressed shared concern over the security threat emanating from Afghanistan at their annual counterterrorism dialogue.

“Pakistan and the EU expressed concern at the security implications of the situation in Afghanistan”, both Pakistan and EU said in their statements on the 10th round of the Pakistan-EU bilateral counterterrorism dialogue in Islamabad, where the two sides reviewed the evolving terrorism threat landscape and reaffirmed their commitment to combating terrorism in all its forms.

The Afghanistan reference in the statement followed more explicit language in the joint communiqué issued after the eighth Pakistan-EU Stra­tegic Dialogue in Islamabad on June 1.

In that statement, the two sides had expressed “serious concern over the presence of terrorist entities in Afghanistan”, and said that Afghan territory must not be used to threaten or attack other countries, besides calling on the Afghan de facto authorities to take “effective and verifiable action” against all terrorist groups operating in or from Afghanistan.

Although the statements after the counterterrorism dialogue did not repeat those specific demands, its significance lies in the fact that Afghanistan-related security concerns were again acknowledged and this time in the dedicated counterterrorism dialogue, rather than as part of a wider discussion of political and regional affairs.

The reference is, moreover, significant because Pakistan has repeatedly urged international partners to press Afgha­nistan’s Taliban authorities to prevent terrorist groups from using Afghan territory to launch attacks across the border.

The renewed emphasis on Afgha­nistan also follows recent EU engagement with the Taliban authorities.

During a visit to Kabul from Oct 12 to 14, EU Special Envoy for Afghanistan Thomas Frellesen expressed concern over the continued presence and cross-border activities of terrorist groups with regional and global reach and urged the Taliban authorities to prevent Afg­han territory from being used by terrorist groups to threaten other countries.

Even though the statements after counterterrorism dialogue and the strategic dialogue did not name any specific terrorist group of concern, Pakistan has consistently identified the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and affiliated groups and Baloch separatist outfits based in Afghanistan as the main threat.

Islamabad has repeatedly deman­ded verifiable action by the Taliban authorities to neutralise these groups and prevent such attacks.

The language used in EU statements, while expressing concern on the terrorism threat from Afghanistan, indicates continuity with the latest dialogue reaffirming common ground between the two sides on the security risks associated with Afghanistan.

The discussions also covered evolving terrorist threats, including the exploitation of cyberspace, information and energy resources.

Pakistan and the EU, the statements noted, exchanged best practices on preventing and countering violent extremism, terrorist financing and radicalisation, with particular attention to the use of cyberspace by terrorists.

In a post on X, the Foreign Office said the dialogue also explored cooperation to counter the exploitation of water resources, besides other reso­urces, by terrorists as well as by states.

The references to water resources and state actors did not appear in the separate official statements issued by Pakistan and the EU.

Published in Dawn, October 23rd, 2026

ISLAMABAD: Iranian leaders have told Pakistan that the United States must take the first steps to rebuild trust, and that the acceptance of Tehran’s seven-point proposal could provide a starting point for renewed negotiations.

The message was conveyed during Chief of Defence Forces and Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir’s visit on Tuesday, where he met with President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Mohsen Rezaei, a representative of Iran’s supreme leader and secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi also accompanied the army chief.

As diplomatic efforts intensified to prevent a resumption of hostilities, Field Marshal Munir’s visit is being viewed as a move to quell escalating regional tensions.

Tehran says acceptance of its 7-point proposal can be starting point for renewed talks with US

The visit came a day after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held talks with Iranian leaders on the conflict and efforts to restore regional stability.

The visit was aimed at conveying messages and exploring whether the Islamabad understanding could still provide a basis for negotiations, but no breakthrough or formal agreement was announced after Tuesday’s meetings.

The discussions also touched on bilateral relations, including a recent disruption in commercial trade across the Pakistan-Iran border. Iranian officials also raised concerns over the closure, while Field Marshal Munir told them that the border closure was temporary and due to technical reasons and that the crossings had reopened on Tuesday.

Importantly, Iranian officials reportedly shared with the field marshal their response to a US proposal, reiterating that Tehran would not make concessions under pressure and that Washington must meet its conditions before trust could be restored.

While there was no official word from Pakistan’s Foreign Office or Inter-Services Public Relations, Iranian media described the response as “clear, serious, and explicit”.

An Iranian source said the visiting Pakistani army chief was told that “Iran has nothing new to say to the Americans” and it was for them to return to Islamabad Memorandum.

Although not many details about President Pezeshkian’s meeting were released to media, in a post that was unrelated to his meeting with Field Marshal Munir, the president said that Iranians may endure hardship, but they will not surrender their land.

Speaker Ghalibaf told Field Marshal Munir that the US could not regain Iran’s trust without fulfilling the seven conditions Tehran had presented during meetings in New York. He said Washington’s past actions, including what Iran considers a violation of the Islamabad understanding, had only deepened its distrust of the US administration.

“Threats and military manoeuvres cannot influence the strategic decisions of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Mr Ghalibaf said, according to an Iranian account of the meeting, adding that it was now up to Washington to take the necessary steps to extricate itself from the conflict.

Mr Rezaei, meanwhile, said Iran would not surrender its enriched nuclear material, describing it as a national asset intended for domestic use. He said Iranian officials were united in their view that negotiations could not proceed without steps by Washington to meet Tehran’s conditions.

The inflexible Iranian response has thrown a challenge for Pakistan, which has sought to revive negotiations between Washington and Tehran after an earlier diplomatic breakthrough failed to produce a lasting settlement.

Islamabad brokered a ceasefire in April and hosted direct talks that led to the signing of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding in June. The agreement outlined steps towards easing the conflict, reopening the Strait of Hormuz and addressing economic and nuclear issues, but the process subsequently stalled after disagreements.

Despite the breakdown of the peace process, Pakistan has continued to offer its good offices to both sides for preventing another round of fighting.

Published in Dawn, October 21st, 2026