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A Bab al-Mandab Saga: From Assab to Perim; All Has a Base, None Has a Plan. Part II

The geopolitical aspects of Bab-al-Mandab extends way beyond any narrow view, both historically and contemporarily. So, before the next “maritime security initiative” arrives, ask the 4 main questions the brochure never answers Ethiopia lost its sea, Yemen’s highlands never accepted a master, and this month a Zaydi movement took the strait’s Arabian shore. Every capital […]
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Turkish Drones Are Fueling Conflict in Ethiopia

File image.

Ethiopian government forces have stepped up drone attacks as fighting spreads across Tigray, Amhara and neighboring regions, bringing renewed attention to Turkey’s growing role as a supplier of unmanned aerial systems to the war-torn country.

Reports and imagery point to the presence of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones, although publicly available evidence does not establish which models carried out the individual strikes in the latest offensive.

The latest escalation in Ethiopia has brought the drones into use against both Tigrayan fighters and forces identified as Eritrean.

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, known as ACLED, reported that between 15 and 17 strikes hit Alamata in southern Tigray on September 22, damaging several schools and a hospital. Tigrayan authorities said the attacks killed 14 people and wounded 22, although the breakdown of casualties between civilians and combatants was unknown.

On September 27, ACLED recorded an Ethiopian army drone strike on Tigray TV, a regional broadcaster affiliated with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

The attacks continued into October. On October 7, ACLED reported that Ethiopian National Defense Force units had used drones to attack suspected Eritrean troops traveling by vehicle toward Idaga Hamus in Tigray. The group said further strikes targeted vehicles carrying troops and equipment as the troops withdrew from the Adigrat area on October 8. Witnesses reported destroyed military vehicles and explosions overnight.

The Turkish connection predates the current offensive. In October 2021, Reuters reported that Ethiopia was seeking to acquire Bayraktar TB2 armed drones from Turkish defense company Baykar, amid the previous war between federal forces and the Tigrayan leadership.

The Bayraktar TB2 has a 12-meter wingspan, a maximum takeoff weight of 700 kilograms and an endurance of more than 18 hours, allowing it to conduct surveillance, reconnaissance and precision strikes with guided munitions.

Click to see full-size image. (X)

Subsequent reporting documented the use of Turkish-made drones in Ethiopia. In August 2024, a senior Turkish government official confirmed that Turkey had authorized Ethiopia to use Turkish-made drones, following scrutiny of civilian deaths linked to earlier attacks.

The larger Bayraktar Akıncı has also been linked to Ethiopia’s military aviation infrastructure. Satellite imagery and open-source reporting have drawn attention to drones stationed at Bahir Dar Airport in the Amhara region, where military infrastructure has expanded.

The Bayraktar Akıncı is a twin-engine combat drone with a 20-meter wingspan, a payload capacity of 1,500 kilograms and an operational range of 6,000 kilometers, and it can carry guided bombs, air-to-ground missiles and air-to-air missiles while conducting intelligence and surveillance missions.

However, the presence of Turkish-made drones at the base does not establish that every drone there is operated by Ethiopia. In May 2026, defense publication Janes reported that Sudan’s military had identified a drone operating from Bahir Dar as belonging to the United Arab Emirates, illustrating the complications surrounding foreign-operated drones using Ethiopian facilities.

Click to see full-size image. (X/Planet Labs)

Another Turkish system has surfaced in more recent reports from the battlefield. Baykar unveiled the Sivrisinek publicly in May; the system was developed jointly with Pakistan. In early October, open-source footage circulated online appeared to show Ethiopian federal troops displaying a Baykar Sivrisinek loitering munition, also known as the YIHA-III, reportedly captured from Tigrayan forces. The reported capture has not independently established how the munition reached the Tigrayan side.

The Sivrisinek YIHA-III is a loitering munition with a 20-kilogram warhead, an endurance of more than eight hours in its extended-range configuration and AI-assisted target recognition, enabling it to search for targets and conduct precision attacks without requiring a runway.

The civilian toll from the renewed air campaign has heightened concerns about the use of drones in populated areas. Human Rights Watch has previously documented drone strikes that harmed civilians in Amhara, including attacks during the conflict with Fano militias.

In the current round of fighting, ACLED has recorded repeated drone attacks across Tigray, but the available reporting does not establish that Turkish-made drones were responsible for each incident. Still, it is clear that Turkey’s Baykar is emerging as one of the main beneficiaries of the conflict.

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Ethiopia Accuses Eritrea of Invasion as Fighting Threatens to Ignite Regional War

File image.

Ethiopia accused Eritrea of an “all-out invasion” on October 9, reporting that Eritrean troops had advanced deep into its territory as fighting that began in the northern Tigray region spread into neighboring Amhara and Afar.

The allegations came after Ethiopian government forces recaptured the regional capital, Mekelle, in a counteroffensive that failed to end the fighting.

Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos made the accusation in a letter to the United Nations and France’s foreign minister, saying Eritrean forces had advanced as far as 60 kilometers into Ethiopian territory.

Reuters reported further explosions near Adigrat, in northern Tigray, and said suspected Ethiopian drone strikes had targeted Eritrean troops withdrawing from positions near the border.

Eritrea rejected the allegations, describing them as an attempt by Ethiopia to justify aggression. The reported incursion has not been independently confirmed, but it threatens to turn Ethiopia’s renewed internal conflict into a direct confrontation between the neighboring countries.

The latest escalation began on September 23, nearly four years after the November 2022 Pretoria agreement ended a two-year war between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). That conflict killed hundreds of thousands of people and left unresolved disputes over regional authority, security arrangements and the return of displaced residents.

The renewed fighting followed the formation on September 20 of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, a coalition of seven armed opposition groups seeking to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government. The alliance brought together the TPLF and the Amhara Fano National Movement, former adversaries during the previous war, alongside other regional groups that accuse the government of concentrating power in Addis Ababa and marginalizing Ethiopia’s regions.

Whether the groups can sustain coordinated operations remains uncertain because of their geographic separation and longstanding political and territorial differences.

Tensions in Tigray had already intensified over competing claims to regional authority. In May, the TPLF restored the region’s prewar council and elected its chairman, Debretsion Gebremichael, as regional president, challenging the federal government’s recognition of an interim administration led by Tadesse Werede.

Both sides accused each other of violating the Pretoria agreement, while Tigrayan authorities repeatedly alleged that federal forces had conducted drone attacks.

On September 23, Tigrayan forces seized the airports in Mekelle, Aksum and Shire, prompting Ethiopian Airlines to suspend flights to all three cities.

The Tigray regional government said federal forces had attacked the region with drones and heavy artillery the previous day, describing its actions as defensive.

Getachew Reda, a former Tigrayan leader serving as an adviser to Abiy, accused the TPLF of opening additional fronts in Amhara and Afar. The UN and African Union called for restraint and warned that the renewed fighting threatened the 2022 peace agreement.

The initial clashes spread across several areas. In western Tigray, federal and Tigrayan forces fought near the Tekeze River, including around May Gaba and Tselimoy. In Amhara, fighting erupted along the Kobo-Tumuga axis and in the Wag Hemra and North Wello zones, where Tigrayan fighters and Fano forces confronted federal troops and their allies.

Further east, Tigrayan fighters and the Afar-based Ugugomo group fought government-aligned forces in Afar’s Kelbati Rasu zone.

By September 25, flights to Lalibela in Amhara had been suspended as fighting approached the town. Internet disruptions and road closures further restricted communications and movement.

Government forces began recovering territory within days. They retook Sekota in Amhara on September 27 after several days of fighting involving Tigrayan and Fano forces. A drone strike hit the TPLF-affiliated Tigrai TV station in Mekelle that day, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, which monitors political violence.

Click to see full-size image.

Suspected opposition-linked drone attacks subsequently targeted a fuel depot at Kombolcha Airport on September 28 and an Ethiopian Air Force base in Bahir Dar on September 29, extending the fighting to military and logistical facilities beyond the main front.

Federal forces captured Alamata in southern Tigray on September 29, opening a route toward Mekelle, and regained Raya Bala on September 30.

Tigrayan forces and Ugugomo fighters had meanwhile held Erebti in Afar and advanced toward Afdeera, raising concerns about disruption to the supply corridor connecting landlocked Ethiopia with the port of Djibouti. Government forces, supported by the Tigray Peace Force, retook Abala, Erebti and Megale in Afar on October 1.

The fighting inflicted a growing toll on civilians and humanitarian operations. Doctors Without Borders reported that hospitals in southern and northwestern Tigray had received more than 420 and 300 patients, respectively, for war-related injuries between September 22 and 25.

The International Committee of the Red Cross evacuated about 161 people from conflict areas to Semera in Afar, including airline employees, federal police assigned to guard regional airports and their families.

On September 30, 19 humanitarian personnel who had been trapped in Tigray reached neighboring Amhara by road after days of disrupted transport and unreliable communications. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk separately expressed alarm over reports of civilian casualties and forced recruitment by the TPLF, including children.

The conflict also intensified Ethiopia’s dispute with Eritrea. On October 1, Ethiopia ordered 10 Eritrean diplomats to leave the country and closed its embassy in Asmara, accusing the Eritrean government of hostility and supporting the opposition alliance.

Addis Ababa has separately accused Sudan and Egypt of backing the coalition, allegations all three countries have denied. Eritrea announced that it was severing diplomatic ties with Ethiopia.

The dispute is unfolding against a longer-running disagreement over access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia became landlocked when Eritrea gained independence in 1993, and Abiy has repeatedly pressed for access to the sea. Eritrea has expressed concern over Ethiopian ambitions involving its ports.

As government forces advanced toward Mekelle, the TPLF’s position weakened. On October 2, ACLED reported that Tigrayan forces had taken Werede, head of the interim regional administration, and two other senior officials to undisclosed locations. Federal forces and their allies recaptured Mekelle’s airport the following day after encircling the city.

The TPLF announced its withdrawal from the regional capital, saying the regional administration would temporarily operate elsewhere. Government-aligned fighters entered Mekelle on October 4, giving the federal government control of the city.

Telecommunications and internet service resumed, but government offices remained closed and residents faced shortages of cash and essential goods.

The loss of Mekelle did not end the fighting. Airstrikes overnight into October 5 killed at least 17 people in Adwa and Sheraro, according to a humanitarian bulletin cited by Reuters. The bulletin did not identify who carried out the attacks.

Fighting continued near the Tekeze River, while federal drone strikes targeted areas in central Tigray where TPLF officials were believed to be sheltering.

Click to see full-size map. (Telegram\rnintel)

On October 7, government forces and their allies regained Wukro, Hagere Selam and Agula, while clashes were reported again near Tselimoy in northwestern Tigray.

The same day, ACLED reported that Eritrean troops had crossed into Tigray through Zalambessa and moved toward Adigrat and Idaga Hamus. The group said suspected Ethiopian military drones subsequently struck Eritrean forces and military vehicles near Idaga Hamus and Qerse Ber.

The Associated Press said it could not independently verify the reported troop movements. Witnesses and sources cited by ACLED identified the soldiers as Eritrean through their uniforms, vehicles and license plates.

Ethiopia’s accusation on October 9 marked the most serious reported extension of the conflict beyond its internal fronts. With federal forces holding Mekelle but fighting continuing across northern Tigray, the unresolved reports of Eritrean troop movements have added a new source of uncertainty to a war already challenging the country’s postwar settlement and regional stability.

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Tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia escalate, as fighting in Tigray intensifies

A new war of words has broken out between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). It comes as renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia pulls the country’s long-running disputes with its neighbors back into the open.

Ethiopia’s government has blamed neighboring states for the escalating conflict in the north. The government has accused Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt of backing armed opposition groups, raising fears that the conflict could expand regionally. Birhanu Jula, Ethiopia’s army chief, stated that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front has clearly needed outside support and supplies from Egypt, Sudan, and other foreign powers to sustain its campaign. 

Cairo rejected the claim. Foreign Ministry spokesman Nader Zaki said Egypt’s foreign policy rests on respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of other states and on staying out of their internal affairs, adding that claims to the contrary had no basis in fact. 

Tension over Ethiopia minister’s remarks

The dispute quickly returned to the Nile. On Saturday, Ethiopia’s minister of Water and Energy, Habtamu Itefa, published a social media post, later deleted, comparing the GERD to Egypt’s Aswan High Dam. “Before criticizing Ethiopia, Egypt should explain why it built the Aswan High Dam without Ethiopian consent.”

Cairo responded the same day. A source at the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation called the post “shameful” and said it reflected political confusion.

“Responding to such nonsense and the political confusion reflected in the post would be nothing more than a waste of time,” the source said. The source called the post “a desperate attempt to divert attention from the core dispute: Ethiopia’s continued unilateral actions over its illegal dam, which violate international law.”

Habtamu made the same argument. He said it was shameful to hear Egyptian politicians demand that Ethiopia obtain their consent for dams that do no significant harm, and argued that Egypt had not consulted Ethiopia when it built Aswan. He described Cairo’s insistence on prior consent as an outdated approach rooted in colonial-era arrangements. 

The $5 billion GERD sits on the Blue Nile, about 14 kilometers from the Sudanese border. It is 1.8 kilometers wide and 145 meters tall, with a design capacity of 5,150 megawatts. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed inaugurated it on September 9, 2025. Egypt and Sudan, the downstream states, have long demanded a legally binding agreement on how it is filled and operated. The United States has also stepped back, in a January 2026 letter to President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, US President Donald Trump offered to restart US-led mediation between Egypt and Ethiopia on Nile water-sharing. 

The El Alamein declaration

The leaders of Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia met in El Alamein and issued a joint declaration covering both the Red Sea and the Nile, and among other things. On the question of the Red Sea, the four states affirmed “the principle of freedom of navigation and that the governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states.” 

Regarding the Nile, the declaration emphasized “the importance of respecting international law regarding transboundary rivers including the Nile River particularly the principle of ‘no harm’ and the obligation to cooperate through prior notification, consultation, and consensus.” It also categorically rejected “any unilateral measures that harm the existing water uses of the two downstream Nile states.” The four countries pledged to keep strengthening “consultation and coordination among the four countries and other sisterly African nations.”

“Realities cannot be altered by political rhetoric”

Ethiopia issued its own statement in response to the El Alamein declaration, arguing, “Ethiopia is the source of the Abay River, commonly known as the Blue Nile. Virtually all of the Blue Nile originates in the Ethiopian highlands, and the Abay contributes about 85% of the Nile River’s total flow. Any discussion concerning the utilization and management of the Abay River should be informed by these fundamental realities.”

Insisting that, “Despite changes in political boundaries over time, Ethiopia remains closely connected to the Red Sea, with its nearest border lying barely 30 miles from the coast. Accordingly, any serious discussion of regional maritime affairs and security architecture must account for Ethiopia’s legitimate interests and its enduring connection to the Red Sea.”

It added, “These geographic and historical realities cannot be altered by political rhetoric, coercive measures, or acts of destabilization. Actions taken through proxies or acts of aggression will not change the facts on the ground, nor will they diminish Ethiopia’s legitimate interests, role, and responsibilities in the region.”

Reaffirming that it “stands ready to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and core national interests,” Ethiopia urged regional actors to pursue “constructive dialogue, partnership, and adherence to the principles of good neighborliness rather than confrontation and zero-sum approaches.”

With fighting is spreading in Ethiopia’s north and rival blocs are forming along the Red Sea, the Nile dispute could be tied into a wider regional confrontation.

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Ethiopia at war, the Horn of Africa is set to explode

The failure of international diplomatic efforts to resolve the Ethiopian war is storing up an even bigger disaster for the Horn of Africa.

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War has flared up again in Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous country, in a region near the strategically important Red Sea, which is already boiling with tension.

Hundreds of casualties have been reported in recent days from fighting centered mainly in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray province, but which is also spreading to other parts of the East African country bordering Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and Kenya.

Ethiopia’s central government in the capital, Addis Ababa, accuses regional neighbors Egypt, Sudan, and Eritrea of supporting rebel factions based in Tigray.

The Horn of Africa is already beset with wars in Yemen and Sudan and historic disputes between neighbouring countries over borders and natural resources. The region is an ongoing humanitarian disaster, with millions of people without food and facing displacement. The renewed conflict in Ethiopia could draw in several countries and turn the whole region into a catastrophic war zone.

Ethiopian journalist Mickael Minassie explains the background to the current upsurge in conflict and the danger of a wider international war embroiling several nations.

Minassie says that the Ethiopian civil war that blew up in 2020 between the federal government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front did not really come to an end with the signing of the Pretoria Peace Accord in 2022.

He says the Abiy government continued to wage a low-intensity war against the Tigray region, imposing an economic and food aid blockade on the war-torn territory, thereby intensifying severe humanitarian conditions.

This is why the conflict has resumed, he says. Peace was never implemented. And the “Abiy Ahmed regime” used the peace deal as a cover for continuing to wage war by other means. The recent response of the Tigray region, allied with other Ethiopian rebel groups, is an act of desperation to break from the oppressive conditions imposed by the central government.

He criticises the international community for not upholding the 2022 peace accord and ensuring compliance.

Minassie points to ominous international dimensions of the conflict.  The Ethiopian central government has served as a proxy for the United Arab Emirates by supporting the RSF insurgents in Sudan. The UAE is believed to be financing the Abiy government with military aid and weapons, including drones.

The United States has also recently signed a new regional security deal with the Abiy government. No doubt, to gain greater access to the Red Sea region for strategic advantage against Yemen’s Ansar Allah government, which has imposed a blockade on Israeli and Saudi shipping.

Minassie says that the international community has been silent about the violations committed by the Abiy government, which has emboldened it to continue aggression against the Tigray people.

Russia and China have also given diplomatic support to the Ethiopian central government, according to Minassie. Notably, Ethiopia has gained membership of the BRICS forum, with virtually no criticism from Brasília, Moscow, New Delhi, Beijing, or Pretoria over its lack of implementing the 2022 peace accord.

He says that the international community has turned a blind eye to the conflict in Ethiopia. The death toll among the Tigray population during the 2020-22 phase of the war is estimated by the United Nations at 600,000, which is about 10 per cent of the total. This death toll compares with some 20,000 civilian deaths in the Ukraine war – about 300 times greater. Western media has been saturated with reports on the Ukraine war, especially to portray Russia as the villain. Yet Western media reporting on Ethiopia has been negligible by comparison.

The failure of international diplomatic efforts to resolve the Ethiopian war – a war of genocidal dimension – is storing up an even bigger disaster for the Horn of Africa. The impact on global trade and mass migration portends that Europe, in particular, will suffer immense repercussions.

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The Ethiopia–Tigray Crisis: The Fragile Peace That Failed to Hold

The Pretoria Agreement brought an end to Ethiopia’s devastating Tigray war—but not its underlying disputes. Four years later, renewed fighting and shifting armed alliances are threatening to reopen the conflict. The consequences could extend far beyond Tigray, destabilising the wider Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s fragile post-Pretoria peace is rapidly unravelling as renewed fighting between federal […]
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Why is Italy covering up the expulsion of its ambassador to Ethiopia

In August 2026, the Ethiopian government declared Sam Fabrizi, the Italian ambassador, persona non grata. Rome chose to remain silent. This incident is not merely a diplomatic incident, but a striking example of the new balance of power between Africa and the former colonial powers. It is significant that, on February 13, 2026, Giorgia Meloni […]
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