Ukraine now builds far more weapons than it can afford to buy. A year ago, it promised to sell the surplus abroad and turn the proceeds back into its own army. However, 12 months later, that promise has barely materialized: a state fee of up to 30% is pricing Ukrainian arms out of foreign markets, and no one can say how much the army has actually gained, said Ihor Fedirko, executive director of the Ukrainian Council of Armorers.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the resumption of controlled weapons exports in October 2025, resting it on four promises: 1) sell what Ukraine makes beyond its own needs, 2) channel part of the proceeds into a special fund for the army, 3) open export offices in Europe and the US, and 4) establish joint ventures abroad.

The surplus is real: Ukraine's defense output is projected to reach $55 billion in 2026, far beyond what the state can finance. A year on, Fedirko checked each promise in turn.

1) Export of surpluses: rules that strangle businesses

On 1 July 2026, the government approved rules for controlled arms exports. They shortened the maximum application review period from 90 to 30 days, but also introduced an export fee: 20% for finished products and technologies, and 30% for components. For finished products exported under the special procedure, the contract value must be at least $334,000.

In September, the Ukrainian Council of Armorers, together with other associations, proposed a zero rate, no advance collection of the fee, refunds for deals that fall through, and simplified test shipments. The industry was promised that its amendments would be taken into account and that the resolution would be rewritten.

Even in early October, however, the rules still needed work. According to Fedirko, the new mechanism has effectively not started working. Whether it can bring in additional funds for defense depends on how acceptable the export terms are to manufacturers.

Fedirko says, though, that judging by current decisions, the state intends to keep the export fee.

“The industry is ready to discuss its contribution to defense financing. But the rate must be economically justified,” he says.

2) Procurement for the Ukrainian military: balance is only being established

He adds that the Ukrainian Council of Armorers intends to push for a rate significantly lower than 20%, one that would let companies fulfill contracts and invest in production.

With such high rates, Fedirko says, the competitiveness of Ukrainian weapons on foreign markets is in question, as is the ability to send even small test batches to potential buyers.

“The fundamental requirement is post-payment: after the contract has actually been fulfilled and the manufacturer has been paid. A company should not pay the state in advance a share of income it has not yet received,” he says.

He added that, given all this, the real export figures remain unclear, as does how much exports have actually brought the military.

“The military and manufacturers must feel the benefit of exports. I sincerely hope that next year will bring much better results,” he says.

In addition, on 12 October, the Ukrainian Parliament passed bill No. 15400 in the first reading. It provides for crediting the export fee to a special fund directed to the Ministry of Defense: 50% for the procurement, modernization, and repair of weapons and equipment, and 50% for the pay of Armed Forces personnel.

The bill has not yet been adopted, but Fedirko says he expects “final adoption and launch of the mechanism.”

3) Export offices: offices in Germany and Denmark

On 3 November, the Ukrainian government named the first cities for export offices: Berlin and Copenhagen. On 15 December, it again spoke of preparing an office in Berlin. In reality, Fedirko says he does not know the office’s status, and it likewise remains unclear how companies can apply to it and how many contracts it has helped close.

4) Joint ventures abroad: There are concrete results in this area

According to Fedirko, eight joint ventures have been created, five of which are already supplying products to Ukraine. He stresses that this is the result of work by Ukrainian companies, foreign partners and the state, and that it deserves recognition.

As early as February 2026, the authorities spoke of plans to create ten joint ventures in Europe within a year. At the same time, they announced Quantum Frontline Industries in Germany, with a planned annual capacity of 10,000 drones for Kyiv.

Beyond the number of ventures and deliveries, however, it is important to understand how other manufacturers can join the Build with Ukraine program.

“Who accepts applications, by what criteria are decisions made, and what support does a company receive?” Fedirko asks.

In other words, joint ventures are already delivering results, but the rules of participation and the state support mechanism must be clear to companies that want to develop production abroad.

Russia's latest jet-propelled Geran-4 and Geran-5 one-way attack drones fly at 500 km/h or more, nearly three times as fast as an older, propeller-driven Geran-2.

That's too fast for many of Ukraine's air defenses. In particular, the inexpensive interceptor drones that Ukrainian forces deploy by the thousand.

Russia launched more than 2,700 jet Gerans at Ukraine in September, and Ukraine is shooting down only about 55% of them, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The speed disparity is a big part of the problem.

Ukrainian forces are scrambling for new defenses against the speedy Gerans. Among the best is actually a Ukrainian take on the Geran-4 and Geran-5: a fast, jet-propelled one-way attack drone that the Ukrainians have modified for air-to-air use.

Against jet drones, the air-to-air Bars have a hit rate of around 30%, Zelensky said during a joint press conference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Kyiv on 4 October. "The Bars have shown positive results," Zelensky said. "They currently have the highest percentage. Others are also catching up."

In July, Ukraine and Germany agreed to jointly produce Bars, with Germany financing the first phase. Ukraine has reportedly been launching Bars at targets on the ground since at least the summer of 2025. But it was only recently that clear photos and videos of the drones have circulated.

Over the weekend, Ukraine’s 1021st Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Brigade released footage of one jet drone hunting another. Observers identified the interceptor as a Bars and its target as a Geran-5. After launching from an elevated ramp with help from a rocket booster, the drone's operator—seeing what the drone saw through a front-facing infrared camera—steered the drone toward the Russian drone, possibly destroying it.

Exactly how the operator controlled the Bars—whether by satellite or mesh radio or some other command and control system—is unclear. Equally unclear: what kind of warhead a Bars would employ in the air-to-air role. Many smaller interceptor drones lack warheads. Instead, they simply slam directly into their targets, wrecking them in the collision.

Ukraine’s 1021st Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Brigade has released the first footage of the Ukrainian Bars jet-powered drone in its interceptor configuration engaging a Russian Geran-5 drone. https://t.co/FRBKZQR9lF pic.twitter.com/njPJWXsDwo

— Special Kherson Cat (@bayraktar_1love) October 17, 2026

Mystery drone

Bars isn't small. It likely packs an explosive warhead. Potentially one that the operator can remotely trigger when the interceptor passes near its target.

Bars is adaptable. Its maker has reworked it from a 22-kg warhead and a 700-km range to a 60-kg warhead and a stated range of more than 1,000 km, and a heavier variant can carry a 105-kg warhead.

In the air-to-air interceptor role, long range is terribly important but speed is everything. There's an obvious way for the Ukrainians to boost the Bars' speed from its reported 700 km/h top speed to potentially even faster. They could shrink the drone's warhead and its fuel load, making it lighter in order to make it faster.

That may explain how a Bars can chase down a Geran-5 even as the Russians, by one Ukrainian analyst's estimate, try to push the Geran-5 toward 700 km/h or more.

Cost is important, too. Russia churns out Gerans for an estimated $100,000 or so per drone. The cheaper the drone, the more copies the Russians can fling at Ukrainian cities. If it takes three or more interceptor drones to take down each of those 2,700 jet Gerans, Ukraine may need to deploy 8,000 to 10,000 interceptors a month.

Ukraine already builds more than 2,000 Bars a month, its maker says, but mostly in strike versions. How many go to air defense, and how much each costs, isn't public.

The supply of small jet engines could be a constraint. “Engines are a key element; we really import them in large quantities,” Zelensky said in an interview with Financial Times. "There are also domestically produced engines, but there are not enough of them.” A Ukrainian-made engine for Bars passed final tests in September.

Belgium has announced it will accelerate the delivery of surplus Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters to Ukraine. Instead of delivering three flyable F-16s before the end of the year, Brussels will ship 10.

It's unclear how many will be flyable. Previously, Belgian officials explained the first seven secondhand F-16s would include just three airworthy examples. The other four would be broken down for spare parts.

It's good news for Ukraine, but hardly cause for nationwide celebration. The handful of flyable F-16s that should arrive in the coming two months could make good recent F-16 losses. But those shipping-soon Belgian F-16s won't actually grow Ukraine's F-16 fleet by much, if at all.

The dozens of supersonic F-16s in action in Ukraine fly often and fight hard. They shoot down Russian drones and cruise missiles, tangle with Russian warplanes, and lob precision glide bombs at Russian forces on the ground. Russia launched about 2,000 jet-powered drones at Ukraine in September, up from some 350 in June, and F-16s are among the few weapons fast enough to catch them, the Wall Street Journal's editorial board noted. Every 300 flying hours, each jet must go abroad for a lengthy inspection.

The main constraint on the pace of F-16 sorties, besides maintenance demands and the availability of trained pilots, is munitions: running low or out of air-to-air missiles and glide bombs, the F-16s routinely aim their 20-mm guns at Russian targets. But even 20-mm ammunition sometimes runs low.

The busy F-16s and their equally busy pilots need reinforcement. But reinforcements are slow coming. Belgium is only slightly accelerating its F-16 shipments amid reports it will eventually give Ukraine all 53 F-16s it's gradually retiring as new Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighters arrive to re-equip the Belgian air force.

Further complicating the picture, Norway's six F-16s, promised in 2023, were still being refurbished in Belgium this spring. Some arrived there in pieces.

Yes, Ukraine got 24 fight-ready F-16s from the Netherlands and most of the 19 Denmark promised. But it's lost five of those jets since 2024. And others are so worn out from relentless flying that they're badly in need of maintenance. The Belgian firm Sabena, which services Ukrainian F-16s, has struggled to keep up, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said about half of the jets spend long stretches abroad for repairs. That slows the return of repaired planes and further squeezes the front-line force.

One wing, too few jets

Donor	F-16s promised	Reached Ukraine	Status
Netherlands	24	24	Complete
Denmark	19	At least 12	Further deliveries due
Norway	6	0	Being refurbished in Belgium
Belgium	53	0	10 by end of 2026, the last in 2029
Total	About 100	At least 36, five since lost	Fewer than 40 in service

In short, it's possible the Ukrainian air force's 107th Aviation Wing, its sole F-16 unit, has fewer than 40 ready-to-fight F-16s. Those 53 Belgian F-16s will help grow the wing, but piecemeal. Ukraine should expect a handful of operational jets from Belgium this year. Under a schedule from May, the last 27, half the total, may not arrive until 2029.

To be clear, additional F-16s support the 107th Aviation Wing. The Netherlands sold 18 of its old F-16s to Romania for a token price in order to equip a training squadron, funded by a consortium of Ukraine's allies, that feeds trained pilots to the 107th Aviation Wing. But these 18 jets aren't available for front-line use. They don't even legally belong to Ukraine.

The delays in supplies of combat-ready F-16s matter because the Ukrainian air force is under stress. Its last few dozen ex-Soviet warplanes, including Mikoyan MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, are even older and wearier than the ex-European F-16s are. And they've suffered staggering losses in the air and on the ground in nearly 56 months of hard fighting in the wider war.

The air force does have a few ex-French Dassault Mirage 2000s that are at least as capable as the F-16s, but France has donated only a handful of the supersonic jets—and one has crashed. Any further supplies of Mirage 2000s could be complicated by the French presidential election in April 2027. The leading far-right and far-left parties are both friendly toward Russia and hostile to Ukraine.

Some relief is coming, although not quickly. Sweden has pledged 16 surplus JAS-39C/D Gripen fighters to the Ukrainian war effort; the first of these could arrive early next year. Later on, Ukraine also plans to buy 20 newer JAS-39E/Fs. Kyiv has also negotiated to purchase 16 new Rafale fighters from Paris, but the soonest these could arrive is 2028.

For now, F-16s are the main solution to Ukraine's air defense problems. Kyiv surely wishes it had more of them, sooner.