As of October, Russia has up to 700 ballistic and several thousand cruise missiles in reserve, and its 2026 state order for Geran-type drones and decoys such as the Gerbera exceeded 100,000 units, Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) told NV in figures the outlet published on 20 October. The missile stocks are roughly the same as HUR reported to NV in July, the outlet found.

Ukraine enters the heating season facing what it says is a Russian plan to hit 60 infrastructure sites this winter. HUR’s figures suggest Russia has the weapons for it, even after its fall mass strikes. In June, HUR said Russia could fire up to 100 ballistic missiles a month while keeping its stocks steady. Its drone output, meanwhile, is shifting to jets that are harder to shoot down.

Russia produces 110 ballistic missiles a month

Russia can make more than 200 missiles a month, 110 of them ballistic, HUR said. About 115 of its ballistic missiles are Iskander-Ms, with production of up to 65 a month. A modernized Iskander with a projected range of 550 to 700 km is in development.

At the same time, Russia holds up to 400 S-300PM and S-400 air defense missiles adapted to strike ground targets, and makes about 40 a month. Meanwhile, Kinzhal production has been temporarily paused over poor accuracy, and the capacity has gone to conventional ballistic missiles.

Most new Kalibrs go into reserve

Russia plans to make more than 80 Kh-101 cruise missiles a month and is exceeding that, though defects in releasing them from aircraft have sent some batches back to the factories.

Russia has more than 450 Kalibrs and makes about 29 a month. Because Ukrainian air defense downs them effectively, Russia sends most new ones to its strategic reserve and to equip its fleets, HUR said. It also holds more than 600 Oniks anti-ship missiles, upgraded for ground strikes, and more than 120 Zircons.

Russia now assembles 4,000 jet drones a month

Russia holds a reserve of about 6,200 Gerans and makes about 10,000 drones a month. Its main production hub is the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan.

Since summer, Russia has shifted toward turbojet drones. “The reason is the saturation of Ukraine’s Air Force with mobile fire groups that shoot down low-speed targets en masse,” HUR said. Russia now assembles about 4,000 jet drones a month, mostly Geran-4s and Geran-5s, which fly at 400 to 500 km/h. It also makes about 2,000 cheaper propeller-driven Geran-2s, which HUR said are used to wear down air defense and locate air defense positions.

The commander of an interceptor battalion in Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps said his unit destroyed several thousand Russian aerial targets during Operation Vivaldi, ArmyInform, the Defense Ministry’s news agency, reported on 21 October.

Operation Vivaldi is a Ukrainian counteroffensive north of Lyman in Donetsk Oblast, where the 3rd Army Corps has reported liberating settlements. In its third phase, Ukrainian forces reclaimed five settlements and expanded their gains to 176 square kilometers. Strikes on Russian logistics and electronic warfare likely neutralized Russia’s drone defenses before Ukraine sent in armor, the Institute for the Study of War assessed.

The commander, who uses the callsign “Betsyk,” leads the interceptor battalion of the 1030th Anti-Aircraft Missile-Artillery Regiment “Aquila,” part of the 3rd Army Corps. He said Russian forces deployed large numbers of reconnaissance drones to locate Ukrainian positions after the corps began advancing.

Betsyk named Zala, Orlan, Supercam, Merlin, and Knyaz Veshchiy Oleg among the reconnaissance drones used by Russian forces.

Russia also brought in reinforcements and units operating strike drones, including first-person-view (FPV) quadcopters, Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones, and Lancet crews, he said. At one stage, Russian forces deployed crews from their Rubicon drone unit to disrupt the advance, but the move did not change the situation.

Betsyk said his battalion’s work deprived Russian forces of the ability to strike Ukrainian troops and track their movements.

Jet-powered Shaheds: speed is the main challenge

The regiment also works against Russian strike drones heading for targets behind the front line. Betsyk said interceptor crews had destroyed some jet-powered drones, but not in significant numbers.

The main difficulty is speed, he said. Interceptor drones need to reach 500–600 km/h to intercept Russian jet-powered attack drones, according to Betsyk.

For now, the regiment mainly uses conventional air-defense systems against these targets: self-propelled anti-aircraft systems, surface-to-air missile systems, and portable surface-to-air missile systems. Betsyk said these systems were historically designed to engage jet-powered targets.

He compared the current challenge with the early use of piston-powered Shaheds. Those drones initially posed a serious threat but later became easier for Ukrainian air defenses to counter. Russia has largely stopped using piston-powered Shaheds on most fronts since summer, he said, but continues to use piston-powered Gerbera drones, which are relatively cheap and can partly exhaust Ukrainian air defenses. The main drones Russian forces use now are jet-powered Shaheds, he said.

Betsyk expects Russian forces to adapt if Ukraine fields effective interceptors against jet-powered drones. They will seek ways to evade the interceptors, increase speed, improve navigation, and change their tactics, he said. However, he added that the battalion had not observed a major evolution so far and did not expect the drones’ speed to double.

What the corps says Vivaldi achieved

Separately, 3rd Army Corps commander Andrii Biletskyi said Ukrainian forces retook 277 square kilometers and 16 settlements during Operation Vivaldi, Ukrainska Pravda reported. Biletskyi also said Russian losses exceeded 8,000 personnel, according to ArmyInform. These figures are Ukrainian claims and have not been independently verified.

Elon Musk ordered the speed cap on Starshield, the military version of SpaceX’s Starlink network that Ukraine’s drones rely on, The Wall Street Journal reported on 20 October. Earlier, Musk said that such limits are decided by the US military and “ultimately POTUS.” Speaking to reporters in Eau Claire, Wisconsin, on 20 October, according to WSJ, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said, “We haven’t made any directives or anything like that,” CBS News reported.

For a week, no one with a hand on the system said the decision was theirs. Musk pointed to the US military and the president, and Trump said he did not know who it was. Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials said the cap has hampered the drones they use to intercept Russian Shaheds and to strike Russian forces in occupied territory. Kyiv says the cap remains in place, and at about 160 km/h it makes intercepting jet-powered drones and missiles that fly about twice as fast virtually impossible.

Musk spoke with administration officials, including Trump, before the cap, a source says

Musk capped the speeds at which Ukrainian hardware could stay connected to the network, people familiar with the matter told WSJ. The slowdown, which began on 14 October, left some of Ukraine’s strike and interceptor drones virtually useless, WSJ said.

WSJ’s sources differ on Trump’s role. Some US officials said Musk acted on his own and that Trump did not specifically order any retribution against Ukraine. One person said Musk spoke with several senior administration officials, Trump among them, before imposing the cap. Two people said Musk and Trump discussed the decision by phone soon after the slowdown became public.

During the uproar, SpaceX representatives called White House counterparts. They asked for a shared message that the company and the administration had coordinated before Musk’s directive, the people said. The White House ran an informal inquiry into who ordered the slowdown, WSJ said.

Musk held several conversations with administration officials before the order to understand the president’s thinking, CBS reported, citing sources. He dislikes his company being seen as profiting from the war, and it is unclear how his order was carried out, CBS said.

Musk pointed at the US military over Ukraine’s satellite limits. Now a US official says the administration had nothing to do with them

Hegseth points to Starlink’s terms of service

Hegseth said the US had not pulled anything back. He said Starlink “has the option” to make decisions under its terms of service, and that from the Pentagon’s view nothing had changed, CBS reported.

Speaking to reporters as he left the White House on 16 October, Trump said he did not think either he or Musk was responsible, The Telegraph reported. On 19 October, he said, “I don’t know who it was, but I’d like to find out.”

Last week, a bipartisan group of senators asked the Pentagon’s inspector general to investigate whether officials “directed” or “authorized” changes to Starlink and Starshield services and intelligence sharing affecting Ukraine.

Earlier reports pointed at the White House

On 15 October, Reuters reported that the order came from inside the White House. The officials said Pentagon leaders received a message that the Starshield service for Ukraine’s military needed to be slowed, but did not say who made the decision or who carried it out. A senior US official said “No such request was ever made by the president.”

On 16 October, The Telegraph reported, citing four sources, that Musk approached Trump with the idea of the speed limits. One of the sources said Trump agreed.

Analysts and Kyiv say the cap is still in place

Michael Kofman, a war analyst at the Carnegie Endowment, said, according to WSJ, that Ukrainian strike and interceptor drones remain limited to 160 km/h. He said actual connections run below 130 km/h, which still hampers strikes and air defense.

On 20 October, Ukraine’s top diplomat in Washington, Denys Sienik, said Kyiv was still waiting for answers from the Pentagon and SpaceX, WSJ reported.

Two Romanian F-16s shot down two jet-powered Russian Geran attack drones over Romania’s territorial waters near Sulina on the evening of 17 October, Romania’s Defense Ministry said. The ministry released cockpit images of the mission the next day, as NATO allies prepare to discuss Black Sea security at a special session Romania requested.

This comes as Moscow continues its air attacks on Ukraine, while the US is trying to make deals with Russia over its diesel and lift sanctions. Russia keeps striking Ukraine’s energy system and cities, while its drones and suspected saboteurs keep turning up inside NATO, from tankers hit off Romania to a foiled arson attempt at a Starlink site in Lithuania.

Down within minutes

The F-16s took off from the 86th Air Base at Borcea at 17:43 after radar detected a group of air targets about 120 km east of Zmiinyi (Snake) Island, flying southwest, Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported, citing the ministry. The first drone entered Romanian airspace at 17:59 and was shot down at 18:01 southeast of Sulina. The second entered at 18:01 and was downed at 18:05 east of Sulina.

Both were jet-powered attack drones of the Geran family, the ministry said. The Geran is Russia’s version of the Iranian-designed Shahed. When first detected, the drones were about 65 km from the coast of Russian-occupied Crimea and 140 km from the Ukrainian-held shore, and their southwest course may point to Russian origin, Militarnyi calculated.

The ministry posted the cockpit images on 18 October, showing a missile launch and a fireball over the sea. “Targets spotted, identified, engaged and neutralized!” it wrote.

Allies to meet on the Black Sea

A special session of the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s top decision-making body, will discuss defense and deterrence in the Black Sea on 20 October at Romania’s request. Romanian President Nicușor Dan has confirmed that the two tankers that caught fire near Sulina last week were hit by drones, and a NATO military source told Reuters they were Russian.

Romanian radar has logged 54 drone intrusions into the country’s air and sea space since Russia’s full-scale invasion, 35 of them this year, and the military has shot down six such targets in 2026, Defense Ministry data show.

Searches in Poland and Lithuania

Within hours, Poland’s Operational Command said it was checking a possible airspace violation by an unknown object overnight into 18 October. Troops, police, and military police searched for a possible crash site south of Lublin after residents reported the loud sound of a flying object around 02:00, Militarnyi reported.

On the morning of 18 October, an unknown drone entered Lithuania’s airspace and triggered air raid alerts, the country’s crisis management center said. NATO jets accompanied it but could not shoot it down because of bad weather, Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas said. Debris preliminarily identified as drone parts was later found in the village of Juodžioniai in Pasvalys district, and the army said the drone may have entered from the direction of Poland.

Romania moved from escorting Russia’s stray drones to firing on them in July, when its F-16s downed three in 72 hours.

Russia has nearly finished the first section of a new launch site for jet-powered Geran-5 attack drones near the town of Millerovo in Rostov Oblast, anonymous Ukrainian OSINT channel Absolutely Reliable Source reported on 13 October. The channel’s bio says it covers Ukraine’s deep strikes and that its author belongs to a larger, unnamed structure. It says Russia rushed the build to scale up attacks after its September strikes on Kyiv.

The site is meant for the kind of drone Ukraine stops far less often than the older Shaheds. Ukraine downs 55% of jet-powered Shaheds, the class that includes the Geran-5, and more than 90% of the older propeller-driven ones, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 26 September. Russian industry makes about 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month, Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) told Militarnyi in August. A new launch site is how Russia plans to fire more of them, the channel argues.

Built in weeks, by the channel’s count

The channel’s images from 1 September show no construction at the site. The latest ones show eight prepared positions for launchers and 32 places for preparing drones for launch, the channel wrote. Imagery from the day before its post shows drones being unloaded in one zone, it said.

The channel’s headline says the work took a month. Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi, comparing the channel’s own images from 1 September and 12 October, put it at about six weeks. Both readings rest on the same images, which have not been independently verified.

Built like Tsymbulova

The construction style is very similar to Tsymbulova, Russia’s jet-drone base in Oryol Oblast, the channel wrote. That base has separate positions for storing, preparing, and launching jet drones, Militarnyi said. By late May, less than a month into an expansion of Tsymbulova, Russia was already building 10 more launchers there.

Ukrainian drones have hit Tsymbulova repeatedly, though most of the damage imagery comes from Absolutely Reliable Source. Militarnyi reported strikes on the base’s bunkers and hangars in September. Ukraine’s Defense Forces struck it again overnight on 1 October, damaging two ground shelters and drone preparation areas, Absolutely Reliable Source said. On 10 October, OSINT channel Exilenova+ reported another drone strike there, saying several bunkers, one jet-drone launcher, and a drone storage area were hit.

A Ukrainian Sargan-3000 sea drone shot down a Russian Shahed flying on a mesh radio network, Ukraine's Navy reported on 7 October. Ukrainian sea drones have downed Russian aircraft before, but with missiles. This one used a machine gun.

Russia has been hitting Odesa with air attacks that come in waves with short gaps between them. Guarding the sky over water is harder than over land. Since fall 2025, Russia has also used mesh radio networks to reroute Shaheds mid-flight and dodge Ukrainian air defenses. That leaves Ukraine needing more ways to meet these drones out at sea, before they reach its ports and coast.

A Shahed steered by radio

A mesh-network drone passes its control signals along a chain of radio relays, drone to drone and on to ground antennas. That lets a Russian operator steer it in flight.

In May, Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, then a Defense Ministry adviser, said only about 5% of Shaheds had got through in a recent Russian strike, and predicted that Russia would answer with jet-powered versions and strikes near the border. By July, Ukraine was testing jamming against mesh-controlled jet Shaheds, he said.

The Sargan-3000 fired its Protector remote weapon station, Militarnyi reported. The station is a remotely operated 12.7-mm (50-caliber) machine gun with electro-optical sights. The outlet added that the Sargan-3000 is designed for combat missions far from Ukraine's coast.

Built for the open sea

Ukraine's Navy took the Sargan-3000 into service in April 2026, according to Militarnyi. The drone boat has a combat radius of up to 1,600 km. It moves at 40–55 knots and carries up to 450 kg of payload.

In September, a Sargan-3000 sank a Russian uncrewed boat with machine-gun fire. Militarnyi called it the first battle between uncrewed sea platforms in history. Analyst H.I. Sutton wrote that the boat carried a Protector made by Norway's Kongsberg. That is the same weapon station named in the October shootdown. Sutton added that Russian attack sea drones work closely with Shaheds, which can relay the boats' mesh radio signals.

Kyiv is bolting two Soviet-era missile systems together to knock down Russia's fastest Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones. Ukraine's 156th Maksym Kryvonis Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment has downed about 20 air targets using a Kub launcher firing under the radar and fire control of a Buk unit.

Russia has switched to jet-powered Gerans, faster drones that Ukraine's cheap interceptors struggle to catch, so more of them reach their targets. The damage from Russian strikes is set to reach up to $10 billion this year, according to Ukraine's Economy Ministry.

Meanwhile, Western resupply has thinned too. Deliveries of air defense missiles from partners fell threefold in the first half of 2026 against 2025, even though those partners hold the missiles, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says.

So crews stretch what they have. In the Kub-Buk hybrid, a Kub launcher cannot aim on its own, lacking a radar to light up a target for its missile, according to Militarnyi. A Buk has that radar, so the two fire together, the Kub sending its 3M9 missile where the Buk points. The pairing is possible because both come from the same Soviet design line.

Western missiles in Soviet launchers

The same regiment reaches for a second workaround as Buk missiles run short. Its crews have rewired launchers to fire American RIM-7 interceptors, a Soviet-Western mongrel that troops nicknamed Frankenstein and the US calls FrankenSAM.

The patchwork earns its keep. One crew commander said some of these machines have more than 34 air kills each, and a single launcher has sent up RIM-7s 131 times, Ukrainian troops said.

A layered answer

The hybrids are one thread in a wider web. Ukraine is stitching together a layered defense against the jet-powered Gerans, leaning on electronic jamming, fighter jets, and a new class of homegrown interceptor drones. Each tool has limits, and the newest interceptors still bring down only the occasional jet drone.

The bet now is on numbers. Ukraine aims to build up to 400 interceptor drones a month by the end of October to chase the faster Gerans, Zelenskyy said on 2 October. Until that scale arrives, improvised launchers like the 156th Regiment keep filling the gap.

Ukraine's state railway, Ukrzaliznytsia, has added 18 Kyiv City Express shuttle runs between Vydubychi and Darnytsia for 5–9 October, while the government has begun preparatory work on temporary crossings over the Dnipro River after Russian strikes disrupted bridge traffic. Minister for Restoration, Infrastructure and Transport Mykola Kalashnyk outlined the backup plan in an interview with Suspilne on 3 October.

About 600,000 vehicles cross the Dnipro in Kyiv each day, making the river crossings critical to movement across the capital, Kalashnyk said. Russia's attacks on the Southern and Northern bridges have disrupted traffic, with the Southern Bridge fully closed to cars and metro on 2 October and restrictions introduced on other crossings. The risk of further damage is heightened by Russia's upgraded jet-powered Geran-4, which now carries a specialized warhead designed to cut through bridge structures and power-line supports, according to presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov.

Jams, restrictions, and extra trains

On 6 October, large traffic jams formed between Kyiv's left and right banks, with the heaviest queues on approaches to the Southern Bridge, Obozrevatel reported. The jams followed Russian strikes that cratered the Northern Bridge.

Green-line metro trains resumed carrying passengers between the banks during the yellow threat level on 4 October, Radio Svoboda reported. Under the current restrictions, traffic on the Southern and Podilskyi bridges is stopped in certain directions for at most the first 15 minutes after an air alert begins.

The additional Kyiv City Express shuttles run during the busiest hours, 06:00–09:00 and 16:00–21:00. Together with scheduled suburban and regional trains, they bring the number of peak-hour runs between the banks to up to six, Ukrzaliznytsia said.

Pontoons first, tunnel later

Kalashnyk said the government plans to build several backup crossings over the Dnipro. The sites have already been chosen, and he named a combination of earth embankments and pontoon crossings as measures that can be built quickly. He said construction could take up to three months and that the backup crossings should provide at least 50% of the capacity of the existing bridges. The government is also considering quick-build concrete structures and, in the longer term, a tunnel under the Dnipro, he told Suspilne.

Volodymyr Kreidenko, deputy head of the parliamentary committee on transport and infrastructure and an MP from the Servant of the People party, proposed reversible traffic across the bridges: "in the morning from the left bank to the right, in the evening from the right to the left." He also suggested hubs near the bridges where people could take a bicycle or e-scooter, and passenger ferry crossings, Radio Svoboda reported.

Andrii Koretskyi, an associate professor in the department of bridges, tunnels and hydraulic structures at the National Transport University, cautioned that temporary crossings cannot substitute for a permanent bridge.

"The only alternative to a bridge is a bridge as a permanent structure," he told Radio Svoboda.

He said a tunnel under the Dnipro is technically possible but "not a quick solution at all." He pointed to the scale involved: where the Irpin River requires spanning a few dozen or, in places, a few hundred meters, the Dnipro within Kyiv is "roughly 400 to 1,500 meters" wide.

Russia's jet-powered attack drones could eventually reach 800–900 km/h, and intercepting them will demand new piloting skills—so Ukraine has asked the makers of its interceptor drones to build simulators to train the crews, a senior Air Force officer told a parliamentary commission on 6 October, Suspilne reported.

Russia keeps modifying its jet Shaheds faster than Ukraine can field the drones meant to catch them, and Kyiv is now preparing crews for speeds its interceptors have never faced—a sign the air war is shifting from a contest of volume to one of raw speed.

The speed Russia hasn't reached yet

Colonel Yurii Cherevashenko, deputy commander of Ukraine's Air Force, told the commission that Russia's jet drones fly at around 600 km/h today but could eventually reach 800–900 km/h—speeds he said have not been recorded so far. That range sits near the cruising speed of a commercial airliner.

Intercepting such targets will take specific piloting skills, Cherevashenko said. When an interceptor and its target move at roughly the same speed, he noted, the pilot barely perceives the difference in their speeds. To train for that, Ukrainian interceptor-drone makers have been tasked with building simulators where crews can practice against high-speed targets.

Where Ukraine stands now

Ukraine already downs 85% to 90% of Russia's slower, propeller-driven drones, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said, but the jet models remain a tougher problem—Ukrainian interceptors scored their reportedly first kill of a jet-powered Shahed in November 2025. In a 28 September evening address, Zelenskyy put the jet-drone interception rate at about 57%, lower than required. Days later, he said Ukraine is testing five interceptor-drone models and could be producing about 400 of one of them by the end of October. Asked when jet-drone interceptors would arrive at the scale needed, Cherevashenko answered: "Not before the end of November."

Ukraine has found the US component in a Russian jet-powered drone targeting civilians, supermarkets, medical warehouses, and bridges. According to its Defense Intelligence, the new weapon contains a PNI5GA magneto-inductive sensor made by the US company PNI Sensor.

The US-made navigation component adds to evidence that Western technology continues to appear in Russia's strike drones. HUR had already identified US-made chips in the Geran-4 in May, but the newly reported PNI5GA is a navigation sensor in a modified version of the drone that Institute for the Study of War (ISW) says Russia may seek to field ahead of winter.

A Russian engine replaces the Chinese one

Russia has also replaced the drone's Chinese-made Telefly turbojet engine with a Russian-made equivalent produced in Alabuga. Russia is using the Alabuga zone to bring more of its drone production home rather than importing Iranian or Chinese parts, according to the ISW.

"The remaining electronic units and components are unchanged and identical to those used in previous Geran UAVs," HUR said.

What the warhead is built to cut

The modified drone also carries a specialized KRSN warhead designed to cut through bridge structures and power-line supports. Presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov described the warhead on 30 September, saying it consists of a 40-kilogram main charge and four strike modules. Its warhead is meant to destroy hardened targets made of steel and concrete and to damage cable-stayed bridges.

Russia has stepped up strikes on Kyiv's Northern and Southern bridges across the Dnipro in recent days with such drones.

However, Russia may try to field more resilient and more dangerous versions of its strike drones before Ukraine has effective countermeasures in place. Russia could use them to degrade Ukraine's energy infrastructure and logistics ahead of a winter strike campaign that it said will very likely be brutal.

Russia keeps upgrading its jet-powered drones, and Ukraine's electronic warfare is racing to keep up. Kyiv has set extra tasks for its military and manufacturers to scale up the most effective electronic warfare approaches, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said after a meeting of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff on electronic warfare and infrastructure protection.

Russia keeps modifying its jet-powered Shaheds to beat each new Ukrainian defense, and Ukraine's answers have to keep pace. The race is tight: from 1 to 26 September, air defenses downed only 55 percent of the 2,730 new jet-powered drones, against 90% of the slower ones.

Hidden relays blunt Kyiv's jammers

Jamming has to improve because Russia keeps finding new ways around it. On 3 October, presidential adviser Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov said someone had installed Russian MESH radio repeaters in Kyiv, a short control channel that guides Shahed drones onto their targets. As long as they are there, he said, closing the city with electronic warfare will not be effective.

"As long as online control of drones exists, not only the bridges but the air defense assets will be under threat," Flash stressed.

Sanctions aim at the supply chain

Beyond the jamming task, the Staff turned to where Russia gets the parts for those drones. Defense Intelligence reported on Russia's technological priorities for this year and next, and on supplies of critical components and equipment for its weapons production, Zelenskyy said.

New sanctions packages will follow, with Defense Intelligence due to send proposals to the Ukrainian government and the National Security and Defense Council, and Ukraine is working to align its sanctions with partners' jurisdictions.

The Staff also set the main tasks for supplying Ukrainian forces with long-range drones next year.

"The main criterion is that we must be able to respond in kind to Russian strikes," Zelenskyy emphasized.

Those parts, and the drones built from them, keep changing

In August, Intelligence Deputy Chief Vadym Skibitskyi said Russia remained fully dependent on Chinese turbojets for the Geran-4 and Geran-5, each costing about $35,000 to $40,000.

However, two months later, Ukraine reported the Geran-4 had received a locally built engine and a new optical navigation system. Kyiv has to stay attuned to changes to keep pace with the technology race, and so far, it is still trying to catch up rather than get ahead.

Russian troops were taking selfies beside a jet-powered Shahed launcher when a Ukrainian drone hit them. A Ukrainian drone attacked a pickup truck converted to launch Russian Shahed drones in the Donetsk airport area while its crew prepared to fire a jet-powered Geran-4, according to video from the Cursed Empire drone unit of the 100th Separate Mechanized Brigade that volunteer Serhii Sternenko published on 6 October.

Three Russian soldiers struck a pose by their drone launcher near Donetsk airport

It was their last selfie. Ukrainian drones hit the crew moments later as they prepared to fire a jet-powered Geran-4
Serhii Sternenko pic.twitter.com/ri9bNztW5y

— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) October 6, 2026

Russia launches Shahed drones, including jet-powered ones, from pickup trucks and fixed launchers, and the ruined Donetsk airport, about 50 kilometers from the front line, is one of its drone bases. In September, Oboronka outlet counted that in general, Russia has at least 63 launchers at its drone bases, which are built to survive strikes.

The video shows three carefree Russian soldiers next to a pickup fitted with a launch frame.

"That was their last photo shoot," Sternenko noted, commenting on the hit on the soldiers.

The primary target

Earlier, an officer of the 1st Separate Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces, call sign “Falco,” explained that the primary goal of strikes on drone bases is to disrupt Russia's ability to launch drones.

This is done by destroying launchers and storage facilities, as well as creating an aerial threat over the drone base. Such attacks can delay drone launches indefinitely, while the destruction of infrastructure can reduce the overall number of drones launched.

But the "jewel" of anti-drone port operations is the military staff

Although these facilities are important targets, the Unmanned Systems Forces have another priority: drone operators.

“The most difficult and, at the same time, the most valuable target is the operator. They don’t stay near the launchers for long,” Falco said.

By taking out drone operators, Ukraine inflicts losses on a scarce resource. There are already relatively few of them, and Russia will have to spend additional money and time training new crews.

The air war between Russia and Ukraine has evolved constantly since the start of the conflict. The latest example is Russia’s deployment of a new type of long-range, jet-powered drone, which is having a significant effect on Ukraine’s ability to defend its cities against aerial attack. In an interview on September 14, Ukrainian Air Force […]

The post Russia’s jet-powered drones mark a deadly evolution in Ukraine war appeared first on Asia Times.

A Russian jet-powered drone struck the National Academy of Sciences in central Kyiv during the working day. Hours earlier, the Kremlin said Ukraine was now “paying the price” for its attacks on Russia. The combination provides a stark indication of how Moscow is framing its continuing air campaign.

Russia did not simply launch another attack on Kyiv on Monday. A jet-powered drone hit a building of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in the centre of the capital while people were at work inside.

At least one person was confirmed killed at the site, while Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said 19 people were injured across the capital during the day’s attacks. Fire engulfed part of the Academy building as rescuers used ladders to reach people trapped inside. Elsewhere in Kyiv, a pharmaceutical company, petrol stations and a medical facility were hit. In Dnipro, three people were killed when a drone struck a business centre during working hours.

The physical destruction was accompanied by unusually explicit language from Moscow.

Asked on Monday how recent Ukrainian attacks on Russia had affected prospects for negotiations, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov replied: “Ukraine will have to pay a price for the actions that have taken place in recent months. This is what is happening now.”

The statement was not made by a television propagandist or military blogger. It came from Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, in response to a question about Moscow’s position on negotiations.

That places the latest attacks in a different context. Russia is not presenting its military campaign solely in terms of destroying Ukrainian military capability. The Kremlin is publicly describing what is happening as a price Ukraine must pay.

The timing is difficult to separate from the scenes in central Kyiv.

Russia’s Defence Ministry later said its forces had struck fuel and telecommunications infrastructure in Kyiv, several data centres, cargo vessels bound for Ukrainian ports and a ship-repair facility. It did not identify the National Academy of Sciences as a military target. Reuters said it could not independently verify the ministry’s claims.

Nor does the fact that the Academy was hit, by itself, establish whether Russian commanders specifically selected that building as the intended target. That requires evidence about targeting orders which is not presently available.

But the legal difference between military and civilian objects is straightforward.

International humanitarian law permits attacks on military objectives. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, an object must make an effective contribution to military action and its destruction must offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances at the time. Civilian objects may not be directly attacked.

A defence factory can plainly meet that test. Fuel infrastructure can become a military objective depending on how it is being used, although it does not automatically lose civilian protection merely because it contributes to the wider economy.

Ukraine has increasingly attacked Russian oil installations and defence production. EU Today reported last week on a large Ukrainian drone operation against Moscow that struck the Kapotnya oil refinery and a logistics complex, part of Kyiv’s campaign against infrastructure it says sustains Russia’s war effort.

A national scientific academy starts from a very different position. Unless a specific military use can be demonstrated, it is a civilian institution.

This is why Peskov’s choice of words deserves particular attention.

He did not say merely that Russia was attempting to destroy Ukrainian weapons, command centres or military production. He spoke of Ukraine having to “pay a price”. The statement was made while explaining the consequences of Ukrainian actions for Moscow’s approach to negotiations.

That is the language of coercion.

It also comes as Russia changes the technology used in its campaign against Ukrainian cities. Russian forces have increasingly deployed faster jet-powered drones against Kyiv and other urban centres. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said at the weekend that Ukraine was intercepting only slightly more than half of these weapons — substantially below the interception rate achieved against older propeller-driven drones.

EU Today has previously examined the pressure these faster Russian drones are placing on Ukraine’s air-defence network. Their speed reduces reaction times and makes attacks on major cities more difficult to stop.

The result is increasingly visible away from the front.

Earlier this month, another Russian attack on Kyiv damaged residential buildings, a school, medical facilities and commercial premises, killing three people. That September 8 barrage followed a brief pause associated with diplomatic activity.

Monday’s strike on the Academy adds another element. The institution is not simply another office block. The National Academy of Sciences is one of Ukraine’s central scientific institutions and has existed, in different forms, since 1918. A burning Academy building in the centre of Kyiv therefore inevitably carries significance beyond the physical damage itself, irrespective of whether symbolism formed part of the targeting decision.

International humanitarian law also prohibits acts or threats of violence whose primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population. Establishing such a purpose in any individual attack requires evidence. The broader prohibition, however, is important when a government publicly couples continuing strikes with language about making the population of an adversary state “pay a price”.

This is also relevant to European governments assessing repeated Russian references to negotiations.

Moscow’s military campaign and its diplomatic language cannot be treated as entirely separate tracks when the Kremlin itself connects them. Peskov was asked about peace negotiations and answered by describing the price Ukraine was being made to pay.

The question raised by Monday’s events is therefore larger than why one drone hit one building in Kyiv.

It is what Russia expects continuing attacks on Ukrainian cities, businesses and civilian institutions to achieve politically.

If their function is partly to raise the cost of resistance until Ukraine accepts terms it would otherwise reject, then the air campaign is also an instrument of negotiation by coercion.

The burning Academy of Sciences provides an unusually stark image of what that policy looks like on the ground.