And there we have it: yet another proposed date for parliamentary elections in Serbia. This time, according to President Aleksandar Vučić, they may take place on either 18 or 25 October, writes Helena Ivanov.

But, this is not the first date the President has suggested. Earlier this year, July was among the possibilities mentioned – which, obviously, did not happen. In June, Vučić went considerably further, announcing that he would remain President for only a few more weeks, after which he would resign and support the ruling Serbian Progressive Party, potentially as its candidate for Prime Minister. More than a few weeks have since passed, and he remains President.

In the meantime, October, November, December and even January 2027 have all been suggested at various points in the never-ending discussion over when Serbia will actually go to the polls.

And then, a few days ago, speaking to the Radio Television of Serbia, the country’s public broadcaster, Vučić claimed that he had finally made his decision: parliamentary elections would take place on either 18 or 25 October. Even this supposedly final announcement, of course, still leaves us with two dates.

A foreign reader may reasonably wonder why there has been so much drama over when, exactly, Serbia will hold its next elections. But domestically, this constant pushing back of the date has raised eyebrows for another reason: Vučić has historically been anything but reluctant to call an election.

Since the Serbian Progressive Party came to power in 2012, Serbia has held four rounds of snap parliamentary elections: in 2014, 2016, 2022 and 2023. Snap elections have, in other words, become quite regular in Serbia’s political life.

Vučić repeatedly used them at times of political pressure. When the country entered a crisis, or when protests threatened to gain momentum, an election offered an opportunity to reset the political landscape. Most recently, after the two mass shootings in May 2023 triggered months of large anti-government protests, Serbia went to early parliamentary elections that December. Vučić’s coalition won, and the protest movement gradually lost momentum.

The political logic was relatively straightforward. Each electoral victory allowed Vučić to present the result as renewed democratic legitimacy and, in practice, helped kill the momentum from the streets.

This time, however, things have been different.

The student-led protests that began following the collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy in November 2024 grew into something far more durable than previous protest movements. More importantly, they eventually transformed from a protest movement into one that is openly demanding political change. Since May 2025, students have explicitly called for snap elections.

Unlike previous waves of protest, this one did not simply disappear after several weeks or months. It survived for well over a year, repeatedly bringing enormous numbers of people onto the streets across Serbia. For example, on 15^th March 2025, it is estimated that as many as 350,000 people attended the protest in Belgrade, making it the largest protest in Serbia’s contemporary political history.

The students have also stated that they intend to contest the election through a list of 250 MP candidates. Crucially, these candidates are not expected to be the students themselves. Rather, the movement has been selecting people it considers capable of representing its demands, while deliberately distancing itself from both the existing opposition and the ruling establishment. As of today, the names of those on the list remain unknown, with students stating that the list will only become public when the elections are officially called.

And yet, despite his previous willingness to resort to elections to end the protests, Vučić spent more than a year refusing to give the students precisely what they were asking for.

That reversal inevitably produced speculation that, unlike on previous occasions, the President was no longer quite as confident that an election would resolve the crisis in his favour. Vučić himself has never said anything to suggest that he fears losing, and he continues to project confidence in his party’s prospects. But he has also never offered a particularly convincing reason for why a political leader who once reached for snap elections so readily became so reluctant to call one all of a sudden.

This is ultimately why the endless discussion over dates matters. The question is not whether Serbia votes on 18^th October, 25^th October or some later date. It is why elections, once one of Vučić’s favourite tools for consolidating power, suddenly became something he appeared determined to postpone for as long as possible.

There is one potential, and relatively simple answer: he needed time to get his ducks in order, weaken the protests’ momentum, and try to win the public back before going to the polls. And indeed, while Vučić has been reluctant to formally call elections, he has certainly not been reluctant to campaign. Quite the opposite. For months, he has been campaigning in full gear.

He has toured Serbia, met citizens, announced new projects and attempted to address some of the voters’ grievances. He has promised another package of direct financial assistance, including the possibility of cash payments to all adult citizens. In July, Vučić also launched the Ko si bre ti? [Who The Hell Do You Think You Are?] portal, through which citizens can anonymously report public officials for corruption, abuse of office, or unlawful behaviour.

The political purpose is not particularly difficult to understand. The message is that Vučić has heard the public, that he understands why people are angry, and that he will fix the very problems that brought people onto the streets in the first place.

Moreover, by launching the portal, Vučić has reinforced the message that citizens’ grievances are not his fault, but that of other officials whom he intends to hold accountable.

Of course, Vučić’s campaign has also been accompanied by sustained media attacks against the students and virtually anyone associated with the movement, aimed at discrediting the protesters, their demands and, increasingly, their very ability to govern the country.

The same campaigning effort is visible in foreign policy. Vučić has continued doing what he has always done particularly well: maintaining relationships in virtually every direction and presenting himself domestically as the only figure capable of speaking to everyone.

In May, despite the EU’s pressure not to do so, he went to Moscow for the Victory Day parade. That same month, he travelled to China for a state visit with Xi Jinping. He has repeatedly courted the Trump administration and publicly invited President Donald Trump to Serbia on many occasions. In July, to the surprise of many, the European Commission recommended opening Cluster 3 in Serbia’s EU Accession talks, although the move was ultimately blocked by several member states. And, perhaps most strikingly, in August, Vučić hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Belgrade, despite Serbia refusal to impose sanctions on Moscow. All of this has reinforced one of Vučić’s key messages: that he is the only man capable of keeping Serbia on good terms with Beijing, Washington, Brussels, Moscow and now apparently Kyiv simultaneously and at a geopolitically very complex time.

Taken together, Vučić’s strategy becomes fairly obvious: delay the elections for as long as possible, use the extra time to get a head start on campaigning, and call them only once he believes the political tide has turned sufficiently in his favour. This also gives him a considerable advantage once the official campaign begins, as his opponents will only have a few weeks to catch up with what has effectively been his months-long campaign.

The real test will therefore begin when the elections are finally called. The students have demonstrated that they can mobilise hundreds of thousands of people on the streets. They now have to demonstrate that they can turn that mobilisation into votes and defeat a political veteran who has spent more than a decade perfecting the art of winning elections.

As for Vučić, he is set to find out whether the political instrument he once used so effectively to end protests can still save him from the most persistent protest movement of his rule.

Artificial intelligence is becoming part of the machinery of modern markets. Banks, hedge funds and trading firms are using increasingly sophisticated models to identify opportunities, manage risk and execute trades, writes Amir Naser Hojati.

Most discussion focuses on one question: What happens when an AI model gets something wrong?

I think there is another risk.

What happens when many good models reach the same conclusion at the same time?

After roughly 15 years of trading futures, I have learned that markets often become dangerous not because one participant is wrong, but because too many become convinced of the same thing.

As traders sometimes say: when everyone moves to the same side of the boat, start watching the waterline.

Different models, same trade

Financial institutions may believe they are diversified because they use different models, vendors and strategies.

But those systems may still be learning from similar information: price history, volatility, order flow, economic data and news sentiment. They may also be optimizing toward similar goals.

Different models do not need to be identical to produce the same trade.

Several independent systems can simultaneously decide to reduce the same exposure, buy the same asset or hedge the same risk.

That creates hidden dependence.

A market can appear diversified while many supposedly independent systems are reacting to the same information in similar ways.

The real vulnerability may therefore not be one bad model, but the connection between many good ones.

Markets have seen this before

Crowded trades are nothing new.

Portfolio managers react to the same data. Traders watch the same levels. Risk desks cut exposure when volatility rises.

Technology increases the speed of those reactions. AI may also increase their consistency.

Humans disagree, hesitate or sometimes simply choose to do nothing.

Machines are less likely to disagree unless that behaviour is deliberately built into them.

If many models detect the same deterioration in risk and begin reducing exposure simultaneously, individually rational decisions can produce an irrational market outcome.

Each model may be doing exactly what it was designed to do.

The market can still become unstable.

Historical success can be dangerous

A strategy can perform well for years because market conditions remain broadly familiar.

That history creates confidence.

But markets do not owe us tomorrow because something worked yesterday.

One of the most dangerous moments is not when a model is obviously failing, but when it has accumulated enough successful history that people stop questioning its assumptions.

A calm sea can make almost any captain look skilled.

For AI-driven markets, the important question should therefore not only be:

How accurate is this model?

It should also be:

What assumptions does this model share with everyone else's?

More intelligence is not always more resilience

The usual response to model risk is to add more: more data, more parameters, another model, another control.

But resilience does not always come from adding complexity.

Sometimes it comes from removing exposure.

A system may become safer not because it predicts markets more accurately, but because it knows when conditions are unsuitable for taking risk.

That is one of the hardest lessons to translate from discretionary trading into automation.

Finding a trading signal is relatively easy.

Teaching a machine when a valid signal should be ignored is much harder.

Experienced traders know that a setup can look perfectly good and still not deserve capital. The market may be too crowded, liquidity may be changing, or correlations may be breaking down.

Sometimes the best trade is no trade.

Diversity of behaviour matters

Using several different AI models does not necessarily provide diversification if all of them react to stress in the same way.

Real diversification may require different behaviour, not just different architecture.

When should a model refuse to trade?

When should it reduce confidence?

When should it respond more slowly?

And how should it behave when the actions of other models are themselves changing the market?

That matters because financial markets are not ordinary prediction problems.

Predicting the weather does not change the weather.

Predicting a market can change the market because participants act on the prediction.

As more intelligent systems enter that feedback loop, their collective behaviour may become as important as the quality of any individual model.

The next edge may be restraint

Financial institutions will continue building faster and more powerful models.

But I suspect the next competitive advantage will not come only from making machines better at finding trades.

It will also come from making them better at recognizing when everyone else has found the same trade.

Markets have always punished excessive certainty eventually.

AI does not remove that principle. It may simply allow certainty to spread faster.

The smartest trading systems of the next decade may therefore be distinguished not only by how quickly they act, but by something harder to program:

Kknowing when not to join the crowd.

Amir Naser Hojati is a futures trader and fintech entrepreneur with around 15 years of experience in financial markets. His work focuses on algorithmic trading, automated risk management, and AI-driven trading systems.

It is a mistake to respond to antisemitic accusations, writes Fiamma Nirenstein.

Would responding have served any purpose at the time of the racial laws and the deportations? No. The intention is the same: to eliminate the Jews and their independent state, Israel.

There is no point responding to those who claim on social media that organs are removed from children killed by Jews—an accusation that echoes the ancient blood libel of Jews murdering children for their blood.

Nor is there any point arguing with professors who describe an all-powerful “Israeli lobby” controlling Italian politics.

Who is going to reason with the owner of yet another Swiss hotel that expels Israeli tourists? Or with the thugs who beat up a family on the streets of Athens?

Who will argue with United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who, together with the UN General Assembly president, Annalena Baerbock, recently lit a memorial flame for deceased UN personnel, including Imad El Samhouri, a United Nations Relief and Works Agency employee who was also a Hamas terrorist and whose videos invoked death as a shahid?

And who wants to shout themselves hoarse arguing with Hollywood, Turkey, Canada and the rest? Don’t answer them.

In Hollywood, more than 200 figures from the worlds of film, music and culture backed a campaign calling for the release of Marwan Barghouti from an Israeli prison, including actors Benedict Cumberbatch, Mark Ruffalo, Cate Blanchett and Tilda Swinton. They neglect to mention that Barghouti is serving five life sentences after an Israeli court convicted him in 2004 of five murders and involvement in a string of terrorist attacks during the Second Intifada.

We must stop feeling obliged to argue that Jews are good, that Jews are innocent or that Israel has the right to defend itself. Anyone genuinely interested in the evidence can find it. The facts are available to everyone.

The accusations of colonialism, genocide, racism and systematic cruelty directed at Israel are contradicted by history and by evidence that has been documented and quantified.

Consider the United Nations.

In 2025, the U.N. General Assembly adopted 15 resolutions singling out Israel, compared with 11 concerning all other countries in the world combined, six of them concerning Russia.

That disparity illustrates how politics manufactures hatred of Jews.

Antisemitism today is not simply a matter of prejudice or ignorance. It has become a political instrument. It is used to obtain votes, influence, positions, money and power.

The United Nations exploits it in its alignment with the Third World and Islamic blocs. Turkey and Iran exploit it through Islamism. Political movements exploit hatred of Israel while claiming to champion human rights.

In reality, hatred of Israel has become both a substitute for human rights and their graveyard.

That is why explanations are not enough.

What is required is political struggle: criminal complaints where laws are broken, legislation where protections are inadequate and serious scrutiny of the political and financial interests behind campaigns targeting Israel and Jews.

It also means defending the rights that Israel’s enemies so often disregard: the rights of children, women, gays and political dissidents.

It means defending security, of which Israel remains a guardian.

It means reclaiming universities and political parties from ideologies that have transformed hostility toward Israel into an acceptable political creed.

And it means establishing institutional boundaries for businesses, hotels, media organizations and cultural festivals that discriminate against Israelis or legitimize antisemitism.

Italy has even witnessed a general strike directed against Israel. Nor is there any point arguing with those who describe an all-powerful “Israeli lobby” controlling Italian politics, supposedly headed by none other than Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani.

This is no longer merely a debate about foreign policy. It is a political war.

The battle against antisemitism cannot be won by endlessly answering every lie. It must be fought where antisemitism now operates: in politics, institutions, universities, international organizations and culture.

The fight against antisemitism can restore the human rights that have been buried beneath the genocidal slogan: “From the river to the sea.”

The Belgian federal government has nominated Hans Kluge (pictured) for the position of Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO).

“I am very honoured by the trust Belgium has placed in me and am grateful for the opportunity to take on this important responsibility,” Kluge said on X. “Serving the WHO has been the greatest privilege of my professional life.”

Kluge has served as WHO Regional Director for Europe since 2020 and began a second term in February 2025. Under WHO rules, he will step aside as WHO/Europe Director while campaigning for the role, a process that involves lobbying member states, NGOs and the organisation's largest funders.

Tried and tested
After qualifying as a doctor in Belgium, he began his international career with Médecins Sans Frontières in conflict settings in Liberia and Somalia. He subsequently coordinated tuberculosis programmes in Siberian prisons and across the former Soviet Union.

Kluge joined WHO in 1999, initially working on tuberculosis and HIV in...

Kazakhstan plans to turn two of the world’s largest undeveloped tungsten deposits into the country’s first full-cycle tungsten operation, requiring ore to be processed domestically rather than exported as raw material as Astana seeks to capture more value from its critical mineral reserves, writes Assel Satubaldina.

The Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty deposits are being developed by a venture between US-based Cove Capital, which holds a 70% stake, and Kazakhstan’s state mining company Tau-Ken Samruk, with 30%. Cove Capital is expected to provide at least $1.1 billion in financing as well as processing technology and access to international markets. The agreement was signed in November 2025 during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Washington DC.

The partners formalized the investment in February, signing a package of transaction documents, including a sale and purchase agreement and a shareholders’ agreement, for the critical minerals project. The mines are located in the Shet district of the Karagandy Region, close to transport and transport and energy communications. Karagandy, the region’s administrative center, is around 130 kilometers from the deposits.  “The Northern Katpar project involves establishing a full production cycle in Kazakhstan, from ore mining and beneficiation to metallurgical processing, based on the Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty deposits. This is the first project of its kind to be implemented in Kazakhstan,” Tau-Ken Samruk told The Astana Times. Its planned output includes ammonium paratungstate, or APT, a key processed product in the tungsten supply chain.

The agreement envisages processing all extracted ore domestically and producing higher-value tungsten products in Kazakhstan. 

The timeline

The project is currently in the Definitive Feasibility Study (DFS) phase, meaning its final production capacity, economics and launch date have yet to be determined. “This work will confirm and optimize the existing feasibility studies, and refine the project’s economic and technical indicators, as well as its mineral resources and reserves. As part of the project’s implementation, preparatory and technical work is scheduled to begin on-site, including topographic surveying, the construction of temporary access roads and fencing, the preparation of drilling sites, the opening of a field office, and other related activities,” said Tau-Ken. 

The definitive feasibility study, which began in July, is expected to be completed before the end of 2027, Cove Kaz Capital told The Astana Times.  “The principal objective of this stage is to finalize the overall mine plan, define the parameters of the processing facilities and prepare the project for a Final Investment Decision, as well as for detailed due diligence by prospective financing partners,” the company’s CEO Dominic Heaton told The Astana Times. The company said physical activity has commenced at the site in July, including surveying, access road and drill pad preparation, and establishment of field facilities. 

Untapped potential 

The two deposits are considered among the world’s biggest undeveloped tungsten deposits. Together, the deposits contain an estimated 410,000 metric tons of tungsten trioxide reserves under JORC standards, while total resources are estimated at 1.4 million tons, according to previous studies cited by Tau-Ken.  Cove Capital said a key distinction is between mineral resources and mineral reserves.  “The current figure represents JORC-compliant [JORC refers to an internationally recognized reporting standard used to classify and publicly report mineral exploration results, mineral resources and ore reserves] mineral resources, while the ongoing DFS [Definitive Feasibility Study] will further update the geological and technical data and optimize the development plan for the deposits,” said Heaton.

“Based on existing studies, Northern Katpar has the potential to support production of approximately 5,000 metric tons per annum, while Upper Kairakty has the potential to contribute approximately 7,000 metric tons per annum. Combined production of approximately  12,000 tons per year would be equivalent to roughly 15% of current global tungsten mine production,” Heaton explained. The company is also developing the Akbulak rare earth project in the Kostanai Region with Qazgeology national geological exploration company. 

The financing Under the agreement, the U.S. partner is expected to provide at least $1.1 billion in financing, introduce modern processing and beneficiation technologies, build a complex of production facilities and develop international sales channels for the output. The partners formalized the investment in February, signing a package of transaction documents. Photo credit sk.kz “The approximately $1.1 billion figure represents the current estimate of the total investment required to develop Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty, including the associated mining and processing infrastructure. It does not mean that the full amount has already been financed, committed or deployed,” said Heaton.

At this stage, Cove Kaz Capital Group has financed the acquisition of its 70% controlling stake in Northern Katpar, along with site preparation, drilling and work related to the definitive feasibility study.  “An important component of the prospective financing structure is the interest expressed by U.S. government-backed financial institutions. The Export-Import Bank of the United States has issued a Letter of Interest for financing of up to $900 million, while the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation has issued a Letter of Interest for up to $700 million, including project financing and development support,” Heaton explained.  Potential financing could reach $1.6 billion, but the figure remains indicative rather than committed, Heaton added.

The amounts represent expressions of interest from prospective lenders, with the final financing package still contingent on completion of the definitive feasibility study, lender due diligence and a final investment decision.

Why it matters

What this project illustrates is that Kazakhstan is betting on higher-value domestic processing rather than remaining primarily a supplier of raw tungsten ore or concentrate. Cove Capital said it seeks to create an integrated domestic value chain in Kazakhstan, spanning mining, beneficiation and downstream chemical processing.  “The principal benchmark product currently planned for the Kazakhstan refinery is ammonium paratungstate, or APT, a high-purity intermediate product that is the internationally recognized benchmark product of the tungsten industry.

The project may also have the potential to produce other tungsten compounds depending on the final technical configuration,” Heaton explained.  Deeper processing would allow Kazakhstan to retain more of the value generated from its tungsten resources rather than exporting mainly ore or concentrate.  “APT is subsequently used to produce tungsten oxides and powders, tungsten carbide, hard metals and other specialized materials used across advanced manufacturing, high-technology and defense-related industries,” said Heaton. Kazakhstan launched the Boguty facility, its first tungsten project, in 2024 in the Almaty Region.

Global tungsten dynamics

According to the US Geological Survey, tungsten is a strategically important metal used primarily in tungsten carbide for mining, construction and metalworking, as well as in electronics, aerospace, high-performance alloys and defense applications. Its combination of hardness, heat resistance and high density makes it difficult to substitute in many industrial uses. Tungsten is relatively scarce in the Earth’s crust, ranking 57th among chemical elements by abundance. Its wide industrial use stems from a combination of distinctive properties. No other known metal matches tungsten in heat resistance, and its boiling point is close to the temperature at the Sun’s surface.

China has remained the world’s leading producer, importer and consumer of tungsten concentrates.  The project is advancing at a time when tungsten is taking an increasingly greater geopolitical importance as the U.S. and other economies seek to diversify critical mineral supply chains away from China. Beijing tightened controls on exports of selected tungsten products and related technologies in February 2025, adding pressure to already concentrated global supply chains.

The restrictions, alongside growing demand and trade tensions, helped push tungsten prices sharply higher in 2025. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, throughout 2025, prices went up from $266 to $551 per metric ton unit for 65% concentrate and from $331 to $675 per metric ton unit for APT. “At the same time, the strategic importance of secure and diversified critical mineral supply chains is growing rapidly. The United States, the G7 and other advanced economies are actively seeking to reduce reliance on highly concentrated sources of supply and support the development of alternative supply chains. Tungsten is one of the critical minerals receiving particular attention in this context,” said Heaton.

Kazakhstan is emerging as a potential alternative supplier. Production began at the Boguty tungsten deposit in the Almaty Region in 2024, operated by Aral Kegen, a subsidiary of China’s Jiaxin International Resources Investment. The project with Cove Capital is also emerging as part of a broader build-out of Kazakhstan’s tungsten industry, with additional deposits moving toward development. The country’s total tungsten trioxide reserves are estimated at more than two million metric tons. Esil-Mining, owned by Britain’s Resources Enterprise Limited, plans to begin developing the Aksoran deposit in northern Kazakhstan in 2027, with production targeted for 2028. 

The planned development of Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty would take the country further downstream by combining extraction with domestic processing rather than exporting raw material. “More broadly, our strategy is to build a portfolio of critical mineral assets in Kazakhstan and Central Asia supported by domestic processing and refining capacity,” said Heaton. He emphasized this ambition is supported by the country’s substantial mineral resource base, a mature mining sector, extensive geological data and established industrial infrastructure. “Just as importantly, Kazakhstan is increasingly focused on moving beyond the extraction and export of raw materials toward higher-value processing and manufacturing,” he added. The project illustrates Kazakhstan’s broader effort to extract more economic value from its mineral wealth by pairing foreign capital with domestic processing. But major questions, including production capacity, final economics and the start of commercial output, remain unresolved while the venture completes its definitive feasibility study.