Tanzanian small-scale farmers’ organizations and civil society groups are raising concerns over the proposed East African Community (EAC) Seed and Plant Varieties Bill of 2025, warning that the legislation could marginalize farmer-managed seed systems unless specific protections and exemptions are introduced.
In a submission to public hearings on the proposed bill, the Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima (MVIWATA) called for the legislation to explicitly recognize and protect farmer-managed seed systems (FMSS), arguing that the current draft is largely designed around commercial and certified seed systems.
MVIWATA, established in 1993, which has more than 500,000 smallholder farmer members across Tanzania, has previously participated in discussions on seed legislation and harmonization at both national and regional levels, including the earlier draft EAC Seed and Plant Varieties Bill of 2018.
The organization says the 2025 draft is an improvement over the 2018 version, but argues that gaps remain, particularly regarding the recognition of farmer-managed seed systems and the rights of farmers to save, use, exchange, share, and sell their own seed.
According to MVIWATA, the draft bill is primarily oriented towards commercial seed, with requirements such as registration, certification, variety release, and quality assurance. The organization warns that applying these requirements broadly could inadvertently place farmer-managed seed systems under the same regulatory framework as commercial seed.
MVIWATA says this is particularly problematic because farmer-managed seed systems are a major source of seed for farmers in Tanzania and across East Africa.
The organization maintains that farmer seed systems should instead be explicitly excluded from commercial seed regulations, including formal registration, certification, variety release, and other requirements designed for commercial seed. It proposes the development of alternative, farmer-centered, and community-led mechanisms at the national level.
Sabrina Masinjila, senior program officer at the Society for International Development (SID), told BreakThrough News the concerns raised by MVIWATA were driven by the continued lack of policy recognition of farmer-managed seed systems at both national and regional levels.
She said the concern was also heightened by the possibility that legislation regulating commercial seed systems could contain provisions that inadvertently affect farmers’ traditional practices, including the sale and exchange of seed.
“The aim for seeking changes was to ensure that farmer seed and systems are exempted from any regulation including registration, certification and variety release that apply to commercial seed,” Masinjila said.
But she stressed that simply exempting farmer seed from regulation would not be enough.
“Exemptions are not sufficient as farmer seed systems still need enough support for their continued development, maintenance, conservation and protection,” she said.
According to Masinjila, the push is therefore for the bill to go beyond exemptions and create policy space for an alternative framework that can support farmer seed systems.
“We sought to establish not just clauses that exempt small-scale farmers from the Bill but also clauses that will start to provide opportunities to develop an alternative framework for farmer seed systems which will ensure they are conserved, maintained, protected and even supported for multiplication and distribution,” she said.
Such a framework, she argued, would have wider implications for agroecology, agricultural biodiversity, climate resilience, dietary diversity and nutrition.
MVIWATA makes a similar argument in its submission, saying farmer-managed seed systems play an important role in food security, nutrition, biodiversity conservation, and farmers’ livelihoods. The organization says recognition should not mean forcing farmer seed into the same regulatory system as commercial seed, but should acknowledge the contribution of farmers to the conservation and development of genetic resources.
The debate is also closely linked to farmers’ rights under international agreements. MVIWATA points to the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), particularly Article 9, which addresses Farmers’ Rights. Its submission also cites the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas (UNDROP), including provisions relating to farmers’ rights to seed.
MVIWATA argues that the EAC Bill should therefore be aligned with these commitments and explicitly recognize farmers’ rights to save, use, reuse, conserve, multiply, develop, exchange, share, and sell farmer-managed seed.
The organization has proposed that the bill state explicitly that it applies to commercial seed systems and does not prohibit or restrict the saving, use, exchange, sharing, or reuse of farmer seed and non-commercial varieties.
Masinjila said the protection of farmers’ rights was inseparable from the wider discussion around seed regulation.
Adding that clauses should be included to protect farmers’ rights as recognized under the ITPGRFA and UNDROP, where access to and control over seed is connected to broader human rights.
“Without these changes, small-scale farmers and their seed system will continue to be neglected, marginalized and criminalized. And this is why we needed to intervene,” she said.
The current debate is not entirely new. MVIWATA says it was strongly involved in discussions around the 2018 draft EAC Seed and Plant Varieties Bill, raising concerns about several provisions. The organization says its review of the 2025 version found improvements compared with the earlier draft.
Masinjila said one difference is that the previous bill contained provisions that were compliant with the 1991 Act of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), a plant variety protection regime that civil society and farmer organizations have criticized for being restrictive of farmers’ rights.
“The previous bill contained clauses that were compliant to UPOV 1991. A restrictive Plant Variety Protection regime which has been rejected by CSOs and farmer organizations globally as it undermines farmers rights,” she said.
However, she said concerns around regional harmonization remain under the current EAC Bill, particularly because legislation at EAC level is legally binding on partner states.
MVIWATA also warns that a binding regional framework could reduce the ability of individual countries to develop alternative approaches for farmer seed systems.
The organization is calling for the explicit recognition of farmer-managed seed systems, it has also proposed that farmer varieties should not be subjected to mandatory commercial registration or certification, while alternative mechanisms should be developed in consultation with smallholder farmers, pastoralists, and farming communities.
On seed marketing, MVIWATA wants the bill to make clear that farmers can sell and exchange farmer varieties at the national level and facilitate limited cross-border seed exchange among farmers within the EAC.
The organization is also seeking safeguards against the appropriation of farmers’ genetic resources, including requirements for the disclosure of origin, as well as free, prior, and informed consent from communities. Lastly, they want benefit-sharing agreements where genetic resources are acquired from farming communities.
The enlargement of BRICS presents Africa with a wider field of economic possibilities by bringing the continent into closer relationship with some of the world’s largest markets, important sources of development finance and countries possessing substantial capabilities in manufacturing, energy, infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and advanced technologies. At a time when international economic relations are becoming increasingly fragmented, this wider range of relationships gives African countries greater room for maneuver.
But a wider choice of trading partners, financiers, and technological partners will mean considerably less if Africa continues to export raw materials, import sophisticated technologies, and occupy the lower reaches of global value chains, because the destination of our commodities may become more diversified without fundamentally altering our position in the international division of labor. It is not the direction of extraction that has ever been the problem, but its structure.
This should therefore be the central African question about BRICS as it enters its third decade: how do we use this changing configuration of economic relationships to build productive power on the continent? The measure of Africa’s engagement with BRICS cannot simply be the increase in trade, investment or infrastructure finance, but must increasingly be whether these relationships enable African economies to convert their minerals, energy resources, labor, knowledge and expanding continental market into greater productive, technological and institutional capability.
Africa’s experience gives this question particular historical significance. The continent has been deeply integrated into the world economy for centuries, but largely through an economic structure in which minerals and agricultural commodities traveled enormous distances while much of the processing, manufacturing, technology, and financial value associated with them accumulated elsewhere. That structure remains recognizable in economies that export crude oil while importing refined petroleum products, export mineral ores while importing machinery and manufactured components and export agricultural commodities while importing processed goods derived from the same productive base.
The post-colonial challenge has therefore never been to trade more but to build the productive capabilities that allow African economies to retain more value from what they produce. Yet this has become more difficult as several economies have experienced premature deindustrialization before manufacturing reached the scale needed to absorb large numbers of workers and sustain productivity growth. Domestic firms are frequently small, supplier networks remain shallow, and the relationship between universities, technical institutions and industry is often weak. Infrastructure still too often reflects the historical logic of moving commodities from sites of extraction to ports rather than connecting African centers of production.
The African Continental Free Trade Area creates the possibility of changing the scale at which we approach some of these problems. A continental market can support forms of industrial specialization that smaller national markets cannot, but the agreement will acquire its full developmental significance only when African firms possess the productive capacity to supply that market. Lowering tariffs creates trade opportunities; it does not by itself produce the firms, electricity, logistics, finance, skills and technical standards required to take advantage of those opportunities.
The emergence of BRICS creates new possibilities within this African project, but it does not guarantee the outcome. Consider the minerals required for the global energy transition. African countries possess significant deposits of manganese, platinum-group metals, cobalt, lithium, and other minerals required for batteries, electric mobility, renewable-energy systems and the wider low-carbon economy. Several BRICS economies already represent substantial sources of demand for these minerals, and their industrial and technological ambitions are likely to further increase that demand. The question is whether it can be structured to support African processing, refining and manufacturing rather than simply accelerating the export of unprocessed ore. For South Africa, this means asking whether its mineral endowments, established industrial base, scientific institutions and engineering capabilities can support new activities in batteries, fuel cells, electric mobility, and renewable-energy equipment. Elsewhere on the continent, mineral extraction can be progressively connected to refining, processing, component manufacturing, engineering services, and technical skills.
Regional integration consequently must become as much an industrial project as a trade project. A viable African battery value chain need not be reproduced inside the borders of a single country. Minerals extracted in one economy can be processed in another, components can be manufactured where industrial capabilities already exist, with assembly occurring close to sufficiently large markets. The strategic objective should be to connect these capabilities across the continent so that regional integration progressively expands the number of African firms, workers, and economies participating in higher-value activities. Regional institutions have recognized this opening. Both SADC and SACU have recently developed strategies to leverage their members’ critical mineral endowments for industrial development rather than raw export, embedding the beneficiation agenda within regional frameworks rather than leaving it to individual countries to negotiate alone. The question for BRICS partners is whether their infrastructure finance can connect regional production rather than reinforcing the extractive economic geography that routes everything to ports.
The experience of Indonesia is instructive in this respect. By restricting the export of unprocessed nickel ore, Indonesia used its resource endowment as an instrument of industrial policy, compelling downstream investment in domestic refining and processing and generating a measurable expansion of manufacturing activity around the minerals sector. The conditions in Indonesia differ from those across African mineral-producing economies, and no single approach transfers without adaptation, but the underlying logic, that a country with significant mineral endowments can use its position in global supply chains to anchor productive capability rather than to service demand, is directly relevant to the African debate. SADC and SACU frameworks enable the collective pursuit of that logic rather than individually, which considerably strengthens the negotiating position of member states.
BRICS cooperation can be brought directly into this developmental space. Its members collectively possess capabilities that African economies require industrial finance, advanced manufacturing, energy technologies, digital systems, agricultural technologies, pharmaceuticals, logistics expertise and large consumer markets. The strategic African objective should therefore be to use these relationships to close specific productive gaps, rather than to approach BRICS principally as another destination for commodities. The test of each partnership is whether it leaves firms stronger, engineers more capable, supplier networks deeper, and regulatory institutions better equipped than before.
This requires developmental statecraft, understood not as a rhetorical commitment to the state’s role in development but as the organized capacity of public institutions to identify productive opportunities, direct finance towards them, negotiate technology partnerships on terms that leave capabilities behind, coordinate the different policy instruments that productive transformation requires, and sustain that effort through the inevitable difficulties of implementation. State capability, in this sense, is the operational form of sovereignty in practice. A government may possess all the formal attributes of sovereign authority whilst systematically lacking the institutional capacity to negotiate effectively with international capital, enforce agreements, direct finance towards developmental ends or build the regulatory knowledge that separates a beneficial technology partnership from another form of dependency.
The infrastructure and technology challenges illustrate the practical implications. Much of Africa’s transport network still reflects an extractive economic geography. The next generation of infrastructure must connect African economies and link transport corridors to processing facilities, industrial parks, energy systems, universities, cities, and regional markets rather than simply moving commodities more efficiently to ports. When an African country acquires sophisticated technology, the relevant question is what remains after the transaction: whether our engineers understand it, whether our universities can teach and improve it, whether domestic firms can enter its supply chains and whether we can progressively adapt it to local circumstances. The developmental value of technology partnerships lies ultimately in the capabilities they leave behind, and state capability is what determines whether those conditions are written into agreements and enforced when partners resist them.
Finance is an equally pressing matter in the African context. Large infrastructure projects can attract BRICS capital, but smaller domestic manufacturers and regional suppliers frequently lack the patient finance required to expand production, meet technical standards, and enter value chains. BRICS financing mechanisms, including the New Development Bank, could make a particularly consequential African contribution by complementing large infrastructure investment with financing for productive enterprises, supplier networks, and industrial projects.
For Africa, these possibilities will not materialize automatically. The continent possesses many of the minerals upon which emerging industries will depend, the youngest population of any continent, enormous renewable-energy potential and a continental market whose importance will grow considerably during this century. But history provides ample evidence that endowments do not, by themselves, produce development, and the responsibilities that follow from this understanding fall primarily on African states rather than on any external partner. BRICS cannot perform these functions on Africa’s behalf, nor should it. What it can do is enlarge the range of instruments available to countries pursuing productive transformation.
Africa, therefore, confronts BRICS with both an opportunity and a test: the opportunity is a wider range of markets, finance, technologies, industrial partners, and development experiences, while the test is whether the continent uses this greater room for maneuver to change its productive structure or merely to diversify the destinations to which its commodities are exported. BRICS can enlarge Africa’s field of possibilities, but it cannot determine what Africa builds within it. The changing international order can give Africa greater room to act, while productive power will determine what we can do with that room.
Busani Ngcaweni is Director of the Centre for Public Policy and African Studies at the Johannesburg Business School, University of Johannesburg.
This article was produced by Globetrotter.
After a 43-day nationwide strike, nurses in Kenya returned to work on Thursday, September 10. Their union finally secured an agreement from the government on September 9, a day after thousands of nurses and midwives from all of Kenya’s 47 counties converged at the Greenpark in the national capital, Nairobi.
From there, they marched to Delta House, headquarters of the Council of Governors (CoG), demanding the implementation of an agreement the government signed nearly a decade ago.
The nearly five-month-long strike in 2017 had ended with both the national and county governments signing a return-to-work agreement, committing to finalize the draft of the agreed Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and implement it within a month.
It was to incorporate measures to address the nurses’ grievances, including, among other things, increases in nursing service allowance, uniform allowance, and risk allowance. The increases were to be staggered annually and completed by 2021.
The nurses returned to work after this agreement. However, almost nine years later, the commitments contained in the return-to-work agreement remain unfulfilled, while the CBA it was meant to underpin has never been concluded.
The government refused to increase the risk allowance even when the COVID pandemic was declared in early 2020, by the end of which it had claimed the lives of scores of nurses in Kenya. Those who survived infections in the line of duty had to spend long periods isolated from their families, estranged from their young children and suffering enormous anxiety and stress. But the increased risk allowance promised to them in 2017 remains unfulfilled, even in 2026.
On July 29, nurses downed tools in protest. The strike has since paralyzed health services countrywide. Nonetheless, even as the strike entered its second month, the county governments did not budge. On August 31, the CoG Chairperson Ahmed Abdullahi deemed the 2017 CBA financially unviable.
He dismissed the CBA as one “signed under duress in the run-up to elections in 2017” and “never been implemented,” even as reports raised alarm about rising maternal, neonatal, and perinatal deaths across the country.
“No gun was pointed at the heads of all the signatories of our return to work agreement in 2017,” retorted KNUNM Deputy Secretary General Maurice Opetu, refuting the claim of duress. “It was signed in a very harmonious meeting out of understanding” by both the “levels of government” – the national and counties.
It is the county governors who “have made the nurses work under duress without the CBA. And then working under duress pushed us to call a strike after trying all [these] years to resolve the matter,” he insisted.
The nurses’ struggle for this CBA had begun alongside similar struggles by doctors and clinical officers. The government signed and implemented CBAs for doctors and clinical officers, but refused to do the same for nurses.
“They are saying doctors are few, and clinical officers are few, but we are many, so they do not have that budget,” explained Collin Ajwang, President of the National Nurses Association of Kenya (NNAK).
“This doesn’t make sense because our large number is exactly what has helped hospitals run effectively. We have reduced maternal mortality; we are the ones making sure theatres are running; we cannot be few. We are at dispensaries where there are no doctors. Let them tell us how few they want us to be so that they can pay us this money.”
On the 33rd day of the nurses’ strike, the aviation workers downed tools on August 30. Flights were delayed at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, while operations ground to a halt in at least three other airports. Within two days, the government signed an agreement with the aviation workers’ union, the Daily Nation reported, highlighting the contrast in the government’s handling of the two strike actions.
The “airport is a portal and exit of all serious businesses,” not only from Kenya but from East Africa and the continent as a whole, remarked the KNUNM Secretary General, Seth Panyako. “These people who are in charge of making decisions do business through the airport.” So, the government, he said, cannot afford the airports to “stop even for a minute
This business class can afford to “go to private hospitals. There is an alternative for them.” But national and county governments “really don’t care about the common” masses relying on public hospitals for healthcare, and are suffering as a result of the government’s refusal to fulfill the commitments made in the agreement it had signed, he argued.
A week later, on September 7, doctors gave the government a seven-day ultimatum, warning that they would also go on strike if it did not resolve the dispute with nurses. “Doctors cannot work without nurses. Doctors are now overburdened. We cannot continue like this,” said Davji Atellah, Secretary-General of the Kenya Medical Practitioners Pharmacists Dentists Union (KMPDU).
“In the ICU (Intensive Care Unit), in the wards, in the HDU (High Dependency Unit), only the nurses can offer that type of care,” he explained, insisting that “nursing care is very essential in healthcare.”
A day after the doctors’ warning, nurses marched on the CoG in Nairobi. Union leaders remained camped at the CoG’s headquarters.
Following a day-long closed-door meeting, the government and the union leaders signed a return-to-work agreement on September 9, with the CoG committing to pay Ksh5,000 in uniform allowance and increase the risk allowance from Ksh3,850 to Ksh8,000. The CoG also agreed to implement the pending CBA within 45 days.
“We have finally called off the 43-day strike following a breakthrough in negotiations with the Council of Governors,” Panyako announced. “We therefore call upon all our members to resume duty within the next 25 hours as we give room for the implementation of the agreements reached.”
Announcing the severing of diplomatic ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on Thursday, September 10, Algeria summoned the Emirati envoy and gave him 48 hours to leave the country.
“Algeria has exercised a great deal of restraint and a high sense of responsibility,” despite the increasingly “provocative or hostile actions emanating from” the Gulf power, the North African country’s foreign ministry said in a statement.
“Despite these numerous warnings, the United Arab Emirates continued to persist in these actions, which have reached limits where they can no longer be considered acceptable or tolerable within the framework of relations between two sovereign states, nor remain without a response.”
Later that day, its defense ministry announced that the UAE’s military and civilian aircraft are banned from using Algerian airspace from Friday. The only exemption is for commercial civilian planes, which can continue to fly over Algeria until the existing contract expires at the end of the year.
Algeria had already initiated the termination of the air services agreement with the UAE in February, when President Abdelmadjid Tebboune alleged attempted Emirati interference in its elections.
Multiple Algerian media outlets aligned with the state have reported that the UAE has been supporting the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia (MAK), a separatist group Algeria designated as a terrorist organization in 2021.
Algeria and the UAE also find themselves on opposing sides on several fronts of international relations.
The support for the national liberation struggle of Western Sahara, occupied by Morocco immediately after it won independence from Spanish colonialism, has been a central plank of Algeria’s foreign policy.
In 2021, Algeria severed diplomatic relations with Morocco, accusing it of supporting the MAK in retaliation for Algerian support to the Polisario Front (PF), which is fighting for Western Sahara’s national liberation. But there is no equivalence between the PF and the MAK.
The MAK, which has long had close links to Israel, largely operates from Europe and is based in France, Algeria’s former colonizer. The PF, on the other hand, is fighting for Western Sahara’s liberation, with its military operating in its liberated territory adjoining Algeria. The UN recognizes the PF as the sole representative of the people of Western Sahara, a country it lists among the last few pending decolonization.
Despite funding and arming the Moroccan occupation, the US had not officially recognized Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara until December 2020, when Morocco signed the Abraham Accords to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel.
The first Trump administration, in turn, proclaimed that the US “recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over the entire Western Sahara territory” and went on to open a consulate in Dakhla, a major city in the occupied region.
The UAE was a step ahead, setting a precedent before the American move by opening its consulate on the occupied land in November 2020, a month before Morocco normalized relations with Israel. The UAE had already normalized relations with Israel that September.
In contrast, Algeria refuses to normalize relations with Israel until the Palestinians have secured their statehood. Algerian media often refers to the UAE as an “Israeli vassal”.
Algeria’s diplomatic break was foreseeable since at least July, when President Tebboune said in a thinly veiled reference to the UAE in a televised interview, “Wherever they set foot, blood flows… We want them to stay away, so that blood does not flow in our country.” He gave the example of Mali, Libya and Sudan.
A month later, in August, the UN confirmed that the USD 50 million transferred to the Al Qaeda-affiliated JNIM in the form of ransom helped fuel its attack across Mali. A Reuters investigation identified the UAE as the source of this payment to JNIM. The group has also attacked its neighbors, Burkina Faso and Niger, both of which have followed in Mali’s footsteps by expelling French troops.
The UAE’s supply of arms and mercenaries to the Libyan warlord General Khalifa Haftar, who has been fighting Libya’s UN-recognized government, is also well-documented in multiple UN reports since 2017.
Tebboune’s reference to “blood” flowing from Emirati interference is best demonstrated in war-torn Sudan, where the UAE is funding and arming the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), whose depopulation campaign in El Fasher had all the “hallmarks of genocide”, according to the UN.
He added in the July interview that a “diplomatic break” with the UAE “would have happened long ago.” Algeria, he explained, had refrained only to avoid adding to the already existing divisions in the Arabic-speaking world.
When the break finally came on Thursday, the UAE’s foreign ministry said it hoped that it “will be temporary, in a manner that preserves the fraternal ties between the two brotherly peoples.”
In an apparent reference to the absence of explicitly stated reasons in Algeria’s statement, Anwar Gargash, the diplomatic advisor to the UAE’s president, Mohamed bin Zayed, said, “Diplomatic relations are managed through reason, communication, and clarity of interests, not through puzzles and signals that require decoding.”
He went on to preach that “successful diplomacy is built on clarity of positions, sound management of interests and differences.”
Gargash’s statement “is revealing above all for what it carefully conceals. Not a word about the actions of this arsonist, predatory state, which thrives on chaos wherever it sticks its nose in Yemen, Sudan, the DRC, Somaliland, and elsewhere,” retorted former Algerian diplomat, Amar Belani.
Describing the UAE as a “state that has made other nations’ instability its economic model,” Belani concluded his response, saying: “As for the lesson on ‘reason and clarity of interests’, Abu Dhabi would do better to reserve it for its partners in the Abraham Accords, with whom it shares complicity in the face of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide committed against the Palestinian people.”
This sentiment against the UAE is not limited to the government or the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN), which led Algeria’s liberation struggle against French colonialism and has ruled since, except for a few years in the 1990s.
Mass protests erupted in 2019 against corruption and increasing economic capture by the military elite, strangling an economy already suffering under neoliberal austerity. This movement, known as the Hirak, forced the then president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a veteran of the FLN, to resign.
But even in these protests against the government and the ruling FLN, “Down with the UAE” and “No to the UAE in the country of martyrs”, were among the popular placards and slogans.
With the British government set to announce new measures targeting Israel’s settlement project, polling by Opinium for ECFR shows that just 18% of UK adults oppose a ban on trade in goods with Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, compared to 46% who back it. Support rises to nearly three quarters—72% versus 28%—when excluding those who did not voice an opinion.
To date, the UK has sanctioned some two dozen organisations and individuals linked to settler violence. It has also excluded settlement goods from the preferential trade tariffs applied to Israeli products, though stopped short of an outright ban. However, settlement expansion is a state-driven project sustained by domestic economic incentives and foreign financial linkages. Rather than focusing only on its most violent manifestation, a settlement trade ban would challenge these underlying drivers.
Last week, foreign secretary Ed Miliband pledged to go further in challenging Israeli actions that are destroying the possibility of a two-state solution, like the recent construction of the “doomsday” E-1 settlement on the outskirts of East Jerusalem. The settlement ban expected to be announced later today also gives practical meaning to the UK’s recognition of Palestine last year—as demanded by Palestinians themselves. Such action by the British government commands broad support across Britain’s political and regional divides, while opposition is limited.
Labour, Liberal Democrat and Green voters decisively favour the proposed ban. It is also strongly supported by voters who have moved away from Labour, many of whom defected to the Green Party amid dissatisfaction with prime minister Keir Starmer’s response to Israeli actions in Gaza and the West Bank. But backing for the measure extends across party lines: Conservative and Reform voters are also more likely to support than oppose it.
The findings cross the Brexit divide too, with supporters clearly outnumbering opponents among both Remain and Leave voters. The same pattern is evident geographically. Support is highest in London and Scotland, closely followed by Northern Ireland, while supporters also outnumber opponents in every English region and in Wales. Indeed, across every political, regional, age and gender group reported in the survey, support exceeds opposition.
The polling also finds that only 16% of British adults consider it antisemitic to target Israeli settlements. Meanwhile, a two-state solution remains by far the most popular outcome for Israel and Palestine with 40% favouring a Palestinian state alongside Israel, compared with 12% who favour a single shared state and just 8% who prefer the status quo of Israel without a Palestinian state.
ECFR’s polling shows a clear public mandate for the UK to take a leadership role in strengthening international efforts against Israel’s settlement project
ECFR’s polling shows a clear public mandate for the UK to take a leadership role in strengthening international efforts against Israel’s settlement project and to defend the viability of a two-state solution. This would build on similar moves by Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain in recent months.
The results also suggest the UK government has the public support to go further: extend the ban to investment and financial services, exclude settlements from all UK agreements with Israel (including the convention for the avoidance of double taxation) and prohibit all British business dealings with settlements (including the purchase of settlement real estate). This should go hand-in-hand with additional sanctions targeting organisations that play an instrumental role in funding and sustaining Israel’s settlement project, such as Ateret Cohanim, the Jewish National Fund’s Himnuta real-estate subsidiary, and the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization.
At the heart of the new UK government’s policy reset should be a collective push with its Western partners to finally implement the International Court of Justice’s 2024 advisory opinion on Israel’s occupation. The court underscored the duty of states to “take steps to prevent trade or investment relations that assist in the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”. To uphold this approach would also help give effect to the 2016 UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which calls on states to distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between Israel and the Palestinian territories it has occupied since 1967.
A settlement trade ban should mark the beginning of a more consequential British policy towards Israeli settlements. The polling shows that British public opinion is supportive. Having recognised Palestine in principle, the UK must now use its economic weight and diplomatic leadership to preserve it in practice.
The meeting of the Core Group’s migration ministers, comprising ministers from Denmark, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Greece, concluded in Copenhagen on Friday. Greece was represented by Migration and Asylum Minister Thanos Plevris. According to state-run news agency amna.gr, the ministerial meeting marked an important milestone for European migration policy, with the participating countries advancing […]
The post Migration ministers agree on Return Hubs in third countries appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Ellie Geranmayeh, deputy director of ECFR’s Middle East and North Africa programme, to unpack a volatile new chapter in the confrontation between the United States and Iran. After months of managed escalation, military strikes have resumed and President Donald Trump has launched an ambitious new sanctions package, dubbed an economic “D-Day”, aimed at squeezing Tehran into submission.
Ellie argues that Washington has returned to a familiar strategy of maximum pressure, betting that unprecedented economic isolation and a blockade of Iranian exports will either force the regime to make major concessions or trigger domestic unrest. But Tehran appears determined to hold out, relying on sanctions-evasion networks, regional diplomacy and the belief that the US will struggle to sustain its campaign over the long term. As both sides continue limited military operations while keeping channels for negotiation open, the prospect of a comprehensive deal remains elusive.
The conversation also explores the domestic pressures facing Iran’s leadership, from a shrinking economy and growing public dissatisfaction to the threat of renewed nationwide protests. Mark and Ellie examine whether economic hardship could destabilise the regime, why Iranian leaders remain sceptical of American commitments and how internal politics in both Washington and Tehran are shaping the path ahead.
Finally, they discuss the wider regional and European implications of the conflict. How are Gulf states positioning themselves between the US and Iran? What risks does the confrontation pose to global shipping through the Strait of Hormuz? And can European governments still play a meaningful diplomatic role as tensions rise and fears grow that the Iran conflict could become increasingly entangled with the war in Ukraine?
This podcast episode was recorded on September 3rd 2026.
Bookshelf
Hillbilly Elegy, by J.D. Vance.
Joël Kyaviro is a professional cyclist from the Democratic Republic of the Congo who has risen above government instability, war, violence, poverty, and Ebola, overcoming every “tack in his path” to become the first rider from the DRC to win a Union Cycliste International race. What’s more, he’s used his success to get the next generation of kids interested in the sport by founding Tumaini Academy, “a cycling program aimed at transcending war by getting Goméen kids on bikes and in school.”
He rolled into the finish zone alone, a full ten seconds ahead, the cushion so big that he was able to victoriously throw his arms in the air. He coasted the last few meters no hands, grinning ear to ear, as his old club president, Charles Guy Makongo, leapt up and down on the sidelines.
Makongo’s sneakers got soaked in the puddles, but he did not care. In the entire 126-year run of the Union Cycliste International, no Congolese rider had ever won a UCI race. On Instagram that night, a picture of Joël ran with a banner header reading, “A historic moment in Congolese cycling.” Posting on an African cycling forum, Makongo proclaimed, “Today’s victory is much more than a sporting result.” It showed, he said, “that talent can flourish even in the most challenging environments.”
The profile of social activism in North Africa is changing. Young people in the region shifted away from demanding regime change after the thwarted hopes of the 2011 Arab uprisings and the 2019 Hirak movement in Algeria. Now, they tend to seek practical improvements in their social and economic conditions rather than wholesale political reform.
Many of these new social movements focus on environmental concerns, and increasingly on the impact of global warming. North Africa is among the regions in the world most affected by climate change. But its countries are also some of the most promising sites for renewable energy generation, given their abundant sunshine and proximity to the European market. Activists have targeted some renewables projects, testifying to a feeling that authorities are failing to ensure energy transitions are fair and meaningful.
These trends in activism in North Africa match a recent turn in European engagement with the region, away from support for political reform and towards socioeconomic issues. This includes cooperation on clean energy projects. But Europeans should bear in mind that cooperation with North African governments on projects that ignore local interests will fall short of the objective of promoting greater opportunity and long-term stability in the region. This underlines the importance of including local businesses and civil society representatives in initiatives from the very start.
The Arab uprisings and Hirak protests were driven in large part by social and economic concerns, and sought a political remedy by calling for a change of government. But hopes for better politics have since foundered across North Africa. The region’s protests and social movements now tend to focus on practical and often locally based demands for a more effective state and better services for communities. The 2025 Gen Z protests in Morocco, for example, began as a response to failings in maternity health care before swelling into wider calls for social justice. The shift to more issue-based activism reflects North Africans’ disappointment in past attempts at political reform as well as long-simmering social tensions. These include anger at poor governance and the strain rapid urbanisation puts on jobs and housing.
The shift to more issue-based activism reflects North Africans’ disappointment in past attempts at political reform as well as long-simmering social tensions
But climate change is also encroaching ever more on North Africans’ quality of life. Historically a water-scarce region, North Africa is now experiencing extreme temperatures, rising sea levels, drought and desertification. Once-fertile agricultural land is becoming barren, and flooding from extreme weather events exacerbates the problems for farmers and food supplies. Climate change is also contributing to power cuts and water shortages, as well as catastrophes from flash floods to wildfires. One opinion poll in 2024 showed that one in six people in North Africa had experienced harm from climate change in the previous two years (or knew somebody who had), and that 71% of North Africans saw it as a threat.
With governments often failing to implement policies to mitigate climate impacts, social movements have adopted an environmental focus. These movements sometimes blend protest with community self-help initiatives, and are often local rather than national. Their less explicitly political nature brings them a measure of tolerance by authorities, as does the fact that the movements often pursue environmental objectives that governments also embrace. But activists still face similar restrictions to all civil society movements in North Africa, at times drawing surveillance and repression.
Such climate-related movements have sprung up across North Africa. In Morocco, a group of Tangier-based NGOs and unions halted a building development that would have involved deforestation, and they now publish an annual report on local environmental issues. Youth for Climate Tunisia trains young people to mobilise on climate issues and organises digital campaigns. The Egyptian group Greenish promotes climate education and capacity building for local communities. Algeria has several community-based groups that work on improving access to water and countering desertification.
Other groups focus on wider environmental concerns. Egypt’s VeryNile pioneered efforts to work with local fishers to collect and recycle plastic pollution from the Nile. In Tunisia, local protests against the impact of phosphate processing in Gabès snowballed after a series of toxic gas leaks in October 2025, becoming a mass movement that continues almost a year later.
But North African social movements also mobilise when green transitions disadvantage local communities and marginalised groups. As North African countries increasingly seek foreign investment in renewable energy projects, some communities worry that land and water resources will be diverted to benefit wealthy elites and foreign investors. In Tunisia, solar projects have aroused local opposition because they take land out of community use and reinforce regional inequalities. In Morocco, solar megaprojects such as the plant in Ouarzazate have prompted anger in nearby communities because of the amount of water they consume.
One thing that unites these disparate movements is that activists seek concrete improvements in quality of life, as well as a bigger role in determining their countries’ futures. This aligns with an increasing sense in Europe that the best way for the EU and member states to promote rights and opportunity in North Africa is through a focus on socioeconomic development.
As the EU’s 2025 Pact for the Mediterranean showed, European policymakers aim to cooperate with North African partners on tangible initiatives that match local government priorities, including in green energy and water management. But the environment-focused social movements should remind European policymakers that working only with governments is not enough to ensure progress on economic and social rights, as I argued in an ECFR policy brief last year. The EU must frame its projects in a way that gives local populations as much agency as possible, by breaking down barriers for small businesses and including civil society in project design and planning.
The EU must also ensure that the projects it supports genuinely offer mutual benefit. In climate policy, the pact’s logic of “a partnership of equals” means European support for renewable energy projects including solar and wind power and the production of green hydrogen. Such projects would then supply clean energy for Europe and promote North African development as well as reduce local energy costs. In turn, greater opportunities and lower prices in the region could help promote the stability that European policymakers also seek.
But not all climate and environmental projects meet these goals—as the local criticisms show. To fulfil the promise of clean energy projects for both sides, Europeans must complement their investment in power generation with other measures to limit environmental trade-offs and to help benefits to flow to local communities. These should include infrastructure development and technology transfer to build up a local clean energy ecosystem. That is the best way for Europe to help ensure that the aspirations expressed in North African environmental movements are met.
Pakistan rallies against South Africa to claim 11th place at the World Cup.
The post Pakistan secures best World Cup finish in 20 years appeared first on BOL News.
Apparently, African wild dogs enjoy knocking around balls of elephant dung like a football. It’s this playfulness that has endeared them to researchers—but, as Helen Sullivan points out, they have their work cut out for them trying to protect this persecuted big predator. Sullivan follows conservationists in southern Africa who are carefully managing tiny, isolated populations and attempting to introduce genetic diversity. The story of the three sisters who are flown over from Mozambique to be introduced to Waterberg—a South African municipality three hours from Johannesburg—is heart-wrenching. Yet in such a harsh environment, individual tragedies have to be endured while staying focused on the bigger picture: the fragile recovery of the species as a whole.
As we help Greyling and Hlako lift a crate off the pickup, a dusty paw flops out of one corner, and I think of something my uncle says: “You can smell the world in a dog’s paw.” Mooney and I back away, watching from inside a container as Hlako moves the car so that the overheating dog is in the shade. Though it is late afternoon, the temperature is still around 90 degrees.
Hlako and Greyling release the dogs one at a time, opening the crate and waiting until a dog walks, then trots, out. The first is less sure on her feet, the second seems almost normal, until Mooney points out that she would have run much faster from the crate and people had she not still been a bit dozy. The sisters stand together in a grassy area, point their noses in the air, move their satellite-dish ears and lie down under a thorn tree; it has been a long day.
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Hugh Lovatt, senior policy fellow at ECFR, to unpack a turbulent summer in Israel and the Palestinian territories. While Palestinian factions in Gaza have agreed in principle to decommission their weapons , the proposal faces significant obstacles, not least opposition from the Israeli government. Meanwhile settler violence is surging and settlement construction is spreading, redrawing the map faster than any negotiation could.
Hugh explains why a sustainable ceasefire cannot rely on disarmament alone but requires a broader political process that addresses the future governance of Gaza and creates a pathway towards a two-state solution. He also explores why developments in the West Bank could prove just as decisive as those in Gaza, and what role Europe can play in responding to settlement expansion and growing instability.
Against this backdrop, Israelis are preparing to head to the polls on October 27th . Mark and Hugh examine the state of the race, the challenge facing Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister and whether a new government would bring meaningful policy change, or simply a different style of leadership. How much do Gaza and the West Bank matter to Israeli voters? Could an opposition victory create space for greater pragmatism? And what would that mean for Europe’s approach to the conflict?
This podcast episode was recorded on August 24th 2026.
Bookshelf
The Revolutionaries: The Story of the Extremists Who Hijacked the 1970s, by Jason Burke.
Previously operating as NetGuardians, Vyntra has spent a decade helping East African banks fighting financial crime, screening more than two billion transactions annually across the region and expanding its capabilities into broader transaction intelligence.
Vyntra’s presence in East Africa began with its Nairobi operations as NetGuardians in 2016 and has since grown into a Service Excellence Center, supporting banks across the region. The company marked the milestone with a private reception at its Nairobi office, bringing together senior executives from banks across the region and members of the local team. The event also highlighted how the offering has evolved following the 2025 merger, bringing fraud detection, payments compliance, AML transaction monitoring and end-to-end transaction visibility together within one transaction intelligence platform.
East Africa’s payments market has changed significantly over the past decade, driven by the early adoption of mobile-first payments such as M-Pesa. Vyntra’s work in the region has evolved with it, from IT log monitoring and behavioural fraud analytics to broader financial crime and payments capabilities.
Fraud patterns have also changed. Earlier cases often involved internal fraud, while the Covid-19 time period saw a sharp rise in social media scams targeting bank customers. Today, banks across the region face threats including SMS impersonation, fraudulent investment schemes, SIM swaps and organised money mule networks. As fraud has become more organised and regulatory scrutiny has increased, real-time monitoring and stronger financial crime controls have become a greater priority for banks across the region. Kenya’s inclusion on the Financial Action Task Force grey list accelerated that shift, bringing financial crime further into board-level discussions.
In response to these shifts, Vyntra is expanding its capabilities across fraud prevention, AML monitoring and payment operations, including a new case manager, executive dashboard, fraud detection algorithms and frontline case view designed to give teams more context during investigations.
Wycliffe Muma, Director Service Delivery and Country Manager at Vyntra, said: “Ten years in East Africa is an important milestone for us because the business we have built here has grown alongside our customers and the market. The fraud landscape is very different from when we first arrived, and banks are now dealing with faster, more organised threats across more complex payment environments.”
“The merger with Intix was an important part of that evolution. It gave us a much broader view of the transaction journey, which matters when fraud moves across channels, systems and institutions. The anniversary was a chance to recognise the customers and colleagues who have been part of that journey, but also to show how we are continuing to develop the platform around the challenges banks are facing now.”
Joël Winteregg, CEO of Vyntra, added: “Transaction Intelligence in Africa is moving beyond financial crime detection and transaction visibility toward something more fundamental: understanding a bank’s customer identity. That will shape how banks detect risk and respond to increasingly complex financial crime.”
To find out more, please visit: www.vyntra.com
About Vyntra
Vyntra, created from the union of Intix and NetGuardians, is the new global force in AI-powered Transaction Intelligence, combining deep expertise in Financial Crime Prevention and end-to-end visibility, Vyntra equips over 130 financial institutions in 60+ countries with tools to detect fraud, ensure AML compliance, and gain real-time visibility into every transaction risk and respond accordingly.
A ride from Tangier, the largest city in northern Morocco to the Spanish enclave of Ceuta takes less than two hours. The border crossing has its own, sleepier rhythm, quite different from the tourist-driven bustle of Tangier. In Ceuta, traders run their errands, Morocco-based expats make visa runs and Spanish people catch ferries to the mainland. On most days, the border crossing seems almost ordinary. The fences, though menacing and topped with razor wire, are less imposing up close and officers make small talk with the expats waiting to get their visas stamped.
Then there are those days when the routine collapses and Ceuta becomes the center of Europe’s migration debate.
The territory is a geographic and political paradox. Despite falling under Spain’s — and the European Union’s — jurisdiction, it sits on the northern edge of Africa, surrounded by Morocco and separated from the Spanish mainland by the Strait of Gibraltar. It is an entry point to Europe, yet not fully part of the Schengen zone, requiring additional immigration checks for travelers crossing to the mainland.
When more than 60,000 people — mostly Moroccan men and teenagers — rushed into Ceuta (almost doubling the coastal city’s population), the images reverberated across Europe. There seemed to be no dramatic buildup to the incident, nor any obvious explanation why thousands of people chose that day to make their way to Spain.
Europe’s far-right politicians seized the narrative, portraying the influx as an imminent invasion, warning that the men were on their way to “Calais” and “Germany.” Italy temporarily suspended the Schengen free movement regime with Spain, meaning travellers arriving by sea and air would now be subject to border checks. Spain threatened to take “proportional measures” in response and did so at midnight on August 8, when it imposed similar checks for visitors from Italy.
The standoff between European governments — led by socialist Pedro Sánchez in Spain and conservative Giorgia Meloni in Italy — is not simply a test for European border security. Instead, what transpired in Ceuta poses bigger questions about the shifting nature of state sovereignty itself: How are we to understand borders, if they’re shaped by forces beyond the state’s reach?
Borders are not just lines separating geographic entities. They are systems built on surveillance, diplomatic bargains and digital networks. Ceuta is the place where all three converge. Its borders, already protected by the sea, have been fortified with steel, outsourced through diplomacy and tested by coordinated rumors.
The crossings into the enclave are blocked by a multi-layered barrier of fences and wire. Morocco administers a fence separating it from the neutral area between the two countries. Two fences on the Spanish-controlled territory follow, creating an enclosure monitored by the Spanish Civil Guard. The physical infrastructure is reinforced with motion sensors, thermal and CCTV cameras, maritime communication systems and facial recognition technology.
Even the sea has now been incorporated into the border system. Just three days after the Ceuta border chaos, Spanish authorities installed a 500-metre floating barrier and anchored naval buoys to create another monitored enclosure.
The EU has funded most of the fortifications. The Border Violence Monitoring Network’s report says that since the construction of Ceuta’s border barrier in the 1990s, the EU has spent tens of millions of dollars to make the Spanish-Moroccan frontier more secure, technologically up-to-date and heavily surveilled. With the recent mass crossing, Spain will now receive additional emergency financial aid.
Yet, the architecture of physical surveillance, built and re-built with European money for decades, cannot prevent the human cost of attempting to cross a border. In Ceuta alone, at least 100 people died according to local authorities. “The rationale behind increasing surveillance is that you'll be able to save lives and smash the [people trafficking] gangs, right?” asked Nathan Akehurst, who has written about Ceuta’s border for Jacobin. “Where was that in this case?”
Akehurst’s question touches upon the human-centered rationale for heavy border surveillance. But there is also a political one. It is not only Spain, as a EU member, that receives funds to manage migration. Morocco has received €427 million since 2015, for migration-related expenses, including technology and training. That’s part of Europe’s wider strategy of border externalization, a practice where Europe moves border control beyond its own territory.
The practice has been around for decades, but went into overdrive after 2015, when approximately 1.3 million people, mostly from Syria, came to the continent seeking asylum. Many of them reached Europe through Turkey, prompting the EU to strike a deal with Ankara: €6 billion in funds, visa liberalization and EU-ascension negotiations in exchange for stricter border controls and curbing irregular arrivals to Greece. The EU also agreed to resettle within Europe one Syrian from Turkey for every Syrian returned to Turkey from Greece. But by 2020, when the EU failed to resettle Syrians, Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared he would no longer prevent migrants from crossing Turkey en route to the EU.
“Border externalization is basically paying other countries, but also subjecting them, through a carrot and stick approach, to performing functions that are usually performed by a state itself at their borders,” explained Josephine Solanki from the Transnational Institute, an Amsterdam-based think tank. It leaves space for leaders like Erdoğan, Solanki added, to bargain for influence by turning migrants “into political leverage.”
The cost of outsourcing borders is not just material. It is measured in control that Europe cedes to the foreign governments it relies on for migration policy enforcement.
In Ceuta, migrants claimed local authorities did not stop them from crossing the border. A young Moroccan man told the New York Times a day after the event: “They opened the border and let everyone go by.”
Border outsourcing agreements were made, among others, with authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, where EU funds were used to detain migrants and quell domestic protests, rights organizations say. Alliances with “deeply unreliable and authoritarian actors” in the name of stability, said Nathan Akehurst, “is short-termist, insane and loses Europe any credibility it has left.” These alliances also allow Europe to “shift the blame to the Moroccans, the Eastern Libyans, the Turkish or whoever decides to take advantage of that moment.”
It is yet to be revealed who, if anyone, has taken advantage of the mass crossing into Ceuta. Local and international media have uncovered now-deleted posts that shared tips on routes and equipment for the journey. One of the main networks was called Hrig Sebta network — “Sebta” being the Arabic name of Ceuta and “hrig” being the Maghrebi term for undocumented migrants, literally referencing the burning of identity papers.
In the wake of Ceuta, European ministers pledged to tackle online misinformation to avoid migration crises, but remained cautious when asked about thousands of posts reportedly linked to Russia. Other theories attributed the crossing to Morocco’s tensions with Spain over its closer ties with Algeria, or to Spain’s position on Palestine.
But those rumors, and what appears to be a weeks-long coordinated online campaign behind them, reveal something deeply human that fences can’t deter: movement that is spurred by hopes for a better life.
“[The crossing] would have happened anyway at some point,“ Akehurst argues. “There would have been a crossing because all of the circumstances that generate that are already there before someone with a twitter account throws a match on the fire.”
Yet, let’s pause at the match. It’s not about someone with a social media profile creating chain messages. It is about the ecosystem that can jeopardize borders by creating information flows, turning rumors into perceived opportunities.
Moroccan newspaper TeleQuel already published a report about social media posts amplifying the next hrig — another attempted crossing into Ceuta — on August 15.
When packaged to a hungry audience, rumors carry the currency of truth. They’ve driven migration long before social media was even conceptualized. Now those rumors speed through digital space owned and operated by private companies not prone to accountability and sitting well outside the reach of any single state.
And the EU has understood that for years. “It is necessary to structure the information space, as we have organized in the past the territorial space, the maritime space and the air space,” Thierry Breton, the European Commissioner for Internal Market of the EU said back in 2018. He warned about Big Tech companies treating digital space as a no-man’s-land that they would write rules for.
The no man’s land between Morocco and Spain appears calmer now. But the turmoil of the crossing revealed a new, digital dimension to border governance. Information has always found a way to spread; digital platforms have given it new channels: ones which allow those behind the information to remain faceless, while the information itself passes from screen to screen. It reaches a boiling point, spills over from the digital space and then can be disappeared, even before anyone has had a moment to scroll back.
Sara Kontar
Nadia Beard
Zach Campbell
Lorenzo D'Agostino
The post The manufactured crisis of Ceuta appeared first on Coda Story.
Recycling is no longer just an environmental obligation. It has become a geoeconomic imperative directly linked to Europe’s energy security and industrial competitiveness. The European Commission’s Critical Raw Materials Act reflects this change—it has set an ambitious target to source at least 25% of the EU’s annual consumption of strategic raw materials from recycling by 2030.
Europe, however, is making little progress. A recent European Court of Auditors’ report suggests that seven of 26 energy-transition-related minerals have recycling rates between 1% and 5% in the EU. This means, for example, that Europe is recovering just three tonnes from every 100 tonnes of natural graphite contained in batteries. According to the report, there are another ten minerals that Europe does not recycle at all, including lithium, gallium and silicon metal.
As such, recycling battery materials warrants far more attention. This valuable source of critical minerals could lower the continent’s dependence on Chinese mineral value chains; recycling battery materials is also much quicker than relying on the development of mines elsewhere that produce the same materials. However, fragmentation, red tape and unfavourable economics are hampering Europe’s recycling efforts, in part due to a regulatory framework that still treats battery materials as hazardous waste rather than a source of strategically important minerals.
Europeans need to focus on battery materials regulation with an industrial policy lens and pursue strategic partnerships with African countries to make gains in material recovery.
Recovered minerals from Europe’s waste—including end-of-life electric vehicle (EV) batteries, wind turbines, industrial parts and electrical wiring—are insufficient to meet all of Europe’s mineral needs. However, they can substitute for a share of primary minerals from mining, which would help Europeans derisk from Chinese mineral supply chains far quicker than new mines can come into production.
Europe will have relatively significant EV battery feedstock for recycling in coming years. Europeans were early adopters of EVs and European countries are global leaders in terms of EV sales as a share of total car sales: in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, for example, EVs account for 58%, 56% and 48% of passenger-vehicle sales respectively, while fully electric vehicles comprise 22.6% of cars registered in the EU. High EV adoption means Europe should have a solid supply of EV battery feedstock for recycling facilities, provided it keeps this within the EU for recycling.
In March 2025, the EU re-classified “black mass” (the shredded EV battery waste processed to recover critical minerals) and end-of-life lithium-based, nickel-based and zinc-based batteries as “hazardous waste”. Black mass is important because it contains valuable critical minerals; if Europeans can process this within its borders, it can feed recovered minerals into European industry. This new classification prohibits export of black mass to non-OECD countries, while requiring that shipments within the EU and the OECD have prior notification and consent from the import, export and transit countries involved.
Europe currently exports around 80% of its black mass for refining elsewhere, mostly in Asia; South Korea’s OECD status and cheap recycling capacities make it a key destination, for example. The reclassification of black mass raises bureaucratic barriers to exporting out of the EU, contributing to efforts to prevent recycling feedstock leaking out. However, black mass is now more difficult to move within Europe, too, which makes aggregating feedstock for recycling within the EU a challenge. While Europe has some battery shredding (or pre-treatment) capacity to produce black mass, its refining capacity to recover minerals from black mass has lagged significantly.
Although forecasts suggest that Europe will slightly raise its material-recovery capacity in the coming years, it remains a minor player. China’s dominant share in global battery recycling capacity for the shredding and material recovery stages, which exceeded 80% in 2025, is set to continue.
Recent analysis estimates that the costs of hydrometallurgical recycling for nickel manganese cobalt (NMC) and lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries are respectively 70% and 67% higher in France than in China due to higher labour, energy, environmental compliance, dismantling and transport costs in Europe. China’s scale of feedstock—domestic supply of end-of-life batteries, scrap metal from the local automobile industry, and imported batteries and black mass—has further lowered their recycling costs.
The EU can take three clear steps to increase recycling black mass in Europe.
First, Europeans should implement stricter export restrictions on black mass and batteries to fully close off exports and retain the products for material recovery domestically.[1] The US took this position in July 2026, with President Donald Trump empowering federal officials to block exports of end-of-life batteries and electronic waste to contain these products for recycling within the US.
Second, Europeans need to urgently build more recycling capacity to refine black mass: Europe’s hydrometallurgical recycling capacity is less than 3,000 tonnes, which is around one-sixtieth of China’s. Estimates suggest that Europe needs the capacity to recycle 120,000–135,000 tonnes of black mass per year by 2030.
Third—and perhaps most challenging—Europeans need to ensure recycling in Europe becomes more economically viable. Failing this, tough export restrictions will lead to battery waste being stockpiled rather than recycled.
To achieve the above, Europeans need to develop new financing mechanisms—such as building recycling costs into the purchase price of products and using public finance to help offset recyclers’ higher costs in Europe—to make recycling more economically viable. This would be particularly timely as battery technology shifts from NMC to LFP batteries: since the latter are comprised of less valuable minerals, recyclers earn less from the sale of recovered minerals, necessitating support for project viability.
The provision of public finance, preferably at both the EU and member-state level, would help in the development of new technologies and processes that lower recycling costs by reducing energy requirements and improving recovery rates. Patent filings in battery recycling are growing significantly, with 2026 figures showing a 103% growth in filings (adjusted for lag). China leads in patent applications, although US and European companies—notably Belgium’s Umicore—are also active. To make Europe more globally competitive in recycling, Europe must increase its investments in innovation using public finance support.
Europeans also need to establish a strong domestic value chain. European battery recyclers, such as Germany’s Cylib and Tozero and Norway’s Hydrovolt, should identify and establish commercial agreements with EU-based offtakers for the minerals they recover—after all, if Europe has to export recovered minerals outside its borders for want of domestic offtakers, gains in recycling will be for nothing. Specifically, this requires European industry that uses recovered minerals (alongside primary source minerals from mining) to refine precursor cathode active material (pCAM) and cathode active material (CAM) stages for EV batteries.
Europeans should also look internationally to ensure recycling can feasibly reduce existing mineral supply chain dependencies. The EU needs to tap into other recycling feedstock markets and diversify its mineral supply chains by establishing recycling partnerships with OECD and non-OECD countries.
Indeed, the EU has explicitly included recycling within the remit of some strategic partnerships on critical minerals that it has signed with partner countries, including several African countries such as Namibia. By locating recycling and mineral-processing facilities in African countries, they can tackle the cost disadvantages Europeans face with regard to energy, land and labour costs on home soil. Namibia and Kenya are ideal partners: both have transport corridors and port infrastructure that make them well positioned to aggregate regional battery and electronic waste (e-waste); they can harness their abundant renewable energy resources can power material recovery facilities.
EU-Africa cooperation on recycling would also be advantageous to African countries. Joint operations create jobs, expand African mineral processing capabilities and link African mineral supply chains with European industry. Africa-based recycling facilities could also manage the growing quantity of end-of-life batteries and e-waste generated by African countries, notably from solar panels, energy-storage batteries and EV batteries from smaller two- and three-wheeler vehicles.
Sub-Saharan Africa’s projected growth in stationary storage capacity alone is significant: following current market trends, it will expand dramatically by 2030, with a storage capacity increase from 11 GWh to 83 GWh. If the region achieves universal access to electricity (SDG7), demand could more than double that, reaching a storage capacity of 190 GWh.
More recycling facilities are required to handle Africa’s growing volume of end-of-life battery feedstock. This presents an opportunity for growth both in Africa-based recycling, and in Africa-Europe recycling cooperation. However, this is not straightforward. Africa-Europe recycling partnerships need to invest in formalising supply chains for collection and storage; they need to build facilities for shredding batteries and e-waste; and they need to ensure that they can refine black mass to recover valuable materials. They would also need to develop the workforce skills and local-firm capabilities needed for efficient, environmentally-sound operations throughout the supply chain.
For African countries like Namibia and Kenya, such cooperation creates jobs and builds recycling capacity and expertise while integrating African mineral industrialisation into EU mineral supply chains. Recycling operations could also serve as anchor customers for increasing electricity generation and transmission investments in African countries, while local populations also benefit from improved electricity availability. Additionally, recycling in African countries helps address the continent’s growing e-waste management challenges.
For Europe, the increased recovery of critical minerals both domestically and through recycling partnerships with African countries offers greater supply chain diversification, access to minerals from non-OECD black mass and de-risking from Chinese mineral supply chains. All of this will happen faster than if Europeans continue to rely on global mine development. Europeans need to extend their strategic thinking beyond their borders, advancing recycling cooperation through critical minerals partnerships.
[1] Interview with a representative of a mineral analytics company, February 19th, 2026.
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