Washington has sent two contradictory signals on Taiwan in the last few days. Whether these signals reflect strategic ambiguity or strategic confusion in the coming days has become a matter of debate among the strategic experts.

On the one hand, Trump is holding back a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan, pre-approved by the U.S. Congress, despite a bipartisan group of senators explicitly urging him to “formally notify . But the U.S. President has described his decision to pause as a “very good negotiating chip” for his talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Whether that worked in his summit meeting with Xi last week in Washington is not known. But Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo confirmed yesterday (October 6) that he has “not heard” of any new sale being cleared, even in smaller chunks.

On the other hand,  the Pentagon is seemingly doing the opposite of this pause.

According to reports, the U.S. Department of Defense will station two representatives on a long-term basis inside Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense headquarters in Taipei from 2026 to 2028.

One official will come from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD-Policy] — the office that writes U.S. national security and defense strategy. The second will come from the Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA] — a federally funded think tank that does mathematical modeling for war games and combat capability assessment.

The program is called the “Taiwan-US Defense Ministry Joint Cooperation Assessment,” with a total budget of NT$471 million [$14.8 million], including NT$152.5 million this year for personnel, consultancy, travel, data collection, and even interpretation for classified-level meetings.

If confirmed, this will be unprecedented.

This would mark the first time U.S. defense officials are permanently embedded inside Taiwan’s military headquarters, shifting cooperation away from traditional channels managed through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Washington’s de facto embassy.

The military relationship between the United States and Taiwan is highly integrated yet formally unofficial. It is governed by the legal framework of the “U.S. Taiwan Relations Act” (TRA), which Congress passed on April 10, 1979.

Congress enacted it immediately after the U.S. formally terminated its previous “Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan)” to officially recognize “the People’s Republic of China (PRC)” in Beijing.

Rather than abandoning Taiwan, Congress designed the TRA as a legal framework to ensure that “robust, unofficial security, commercial, and cultural ties” continue uninterrupted.

In short, the TRA provides a domestic legal workaround for treating Taiwan as a country without formal diplomatic recognition. However, under it, the U.S. is also obligated to maintain Taiwan’s capacity to resist force or coercion in general and the forcible annexation by the PRC in particular.

Over the years, U.S. personnel have served in Taiwan as trainers and advisers. Hundreds of active-duty U.S. military advisors—often colloquially referred to locally as “English teachers” to maintain a low profile—are routinely deployed across Taiwan.

U.S. military observers are present within Taiwan’s annual “Han Kuang live-fire military exercises”. They actively guide Taiwan’s defense strategy toward decentralized command, logistics, and real-world combat readiness.

Taiwanese fighter pilots undergo advanced combat training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona.

The US remains Taiwan’s primary foreign weapons supplier, with a total backlog of orders nearing $20 billion.

In fact, Taiwan received its first new batch of two advanced Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70 fighter jets on October 2.  This was part of an $8 billion deal approved in 2019 for 66 new-build F-16 Block 70 jets, with the remaining 64 aircraft scheduled for future delivery.  out of a 66-aircraft fleet on order.

However, all these coordination efforts between Washington and Taipei are usually routed through the AIT intermediary, as the U.S. adheres to its  One China” policy. In that sense, the new proposal to station Pentagon personnel directly inside the Taiwanese Defense Ministry represents a shift from this historical status quo.

The new arrangement puts Americans directly into the core of Taiwan’s defense policymaking, including policy coordination, Han Kuang exercise planning, asymmetric warfare doctrine, and major weapons procurement evaluations, it is said.

Of course, the U.S. routinely sends military and civilian defense officials to work directly inside the defense ministries of partner and allied nations. Established by the Pentagon in 2009, the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program specifically trains and deploys high-performing senior U.S. Department of Defense civilians.

These advisors are embedded in partner-nation defense ministries to support institutional capacity building, strategy, financial management, and logistics.

The U.S. also actively deploys specialized defense consultants directly to the defense ministries of nations looking to transition away from historical adversaries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, and various Balkan nations looking to exit Moscow’s orbit.

The U.S. has a long history of embedding liaison officers in allied countries. For example, it has a Joint Political-Military Group in Israel that embeds officers in missile-defense cooperation for Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and now Iron Beam. But American officials do not operate inside the Kirya (Israel’s defense headquarters).

Similarly, despite 54,000 US personnel stationed in Japan, no U.S. officer sits inside Japan’s Ministry of Defense to assess combat capability.

Perhaps in NATO countries and South Korea, U.S. military officials are believed to sit together often.

There are also “Offices of Defense Cooperation” (ODC), or United States Military Groups, which are technically attached to the local U.S. Embassy for diplomatic protection. These teams provide security assistance and work in routine, day-to-day coordination with host ministry personnel.

However, what makes the proposed U.S. officials sitting directly within Taiwan’s military headquarters unique is that Taiwan is not an ally of America in the strict sense, as the U.S. lacks formal diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, and these officials will bypass the traditional AIT.

Of course, multiple reports in recent years have claimed that U.S. special forces are permanently stationed in Taiwan to assist its 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion special operations force, though Washington has officially denied it.  The same has been the case with the speculations about the coming and going of U.S. military personnel from the Army Special Operations Command base in Taoyuan.

How will Beijing React?

At the time of writing, Beijing had not issued an official reaction, possibly because Taiwanese media outlets only recently brought details of this long-term Pentagon deployment to light. It has not been declared officially.

But it goes without saying that Beijing would be “certain to protest” and could respond “with expanded exercises and intimidation”, according to  Zivon Wang, a military analyst at the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies in Taipei.

He expects U.S. personnel not to wear uniforms at the Ministry of National Defense because it could be interpreted as a more formalized US-Taiwan military relationship and might further provoke Beijing.

Incidentally, China has made more air and naval incursions across the median line in the Taiwan Strait since 2022. Although Chinese military aircraft had occasionally crossed the median line (established informally in 1954) in the past, the practice became significantly more frequent from 2022, particularly after Nancy Pelosi (then Speaker of the House of Representatives) visited Taiwan in August that year. What had once been an informal but largely respected buffer increasingly became a zone of routine Chinese military activity.

Therefore, it remains to be seen whether China will respond to the Pentagon’s proposed deployment with loud exercises.

It may also remain silent, as nothing is official yet and Trump has his “negotiating chip” of holding back Taiwan’s military package.

Trump’s admirers often see his unpredictability as useful in negotiations with an adversary, because the other side cannot be sure how far he is willing to go.

But his critics argue that his unpredictability becomes counterproductive when allies cannot distinguish a negotiating threat from a real change in American policy.

It remains to be seen who will prove to be right in the case of Taiwan.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Trump’s Big Taiwan Move: Despite $14B Arms Freeze, Permanent U.S. Military Officials May Sit at MND appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Chunghwa Telecom lined up an unusual deal to use drones to transport blood, in turn offering insight into how unmanned aerial vehicle connectivity (UAV) could be used to advance smart healthcare.

The Taiwanese operator signed a memorandum of understanding with the New Taipei City Fire Department covering transport of blood supplies for emergency medical uses.

Chunghwa Telecom stated the pair plan trials “along the northern coast and mountainous areas” to see if the drones can “improve the efficiency of medical resource allocation”.

The operator’s New Taipei Operations Office is handling its side of the commitment, which involves providing mobile and fixed network connectivity, establishing smart cold chain systems and evaluating technical aspects.

Chunghwa Telecom also agreed to handle the integration of UAVs and various flight-related elements including monitoring the blood drones as they fly, planning their routes and securing the necessary airspace.

It explained the companies hope to provide more reliable blood supplies during emergency situations, particularly in remote or mountainous areas. Longer term, the pair hope to establish standard operating procedures and boost the links between the UAV set-up and existing emergency service systems.

Chunghwa Telecom pitched the work as a practical example of collaboration “between government, healthcare and technology”, which could broaden the use of smart logistics by emergency and medical service providers.

The post Chunghwa opens fresh vein for drone delivery appeared first on Mobile World Live.

China has displayed a full-scale J-10CE mock-up in Azerbaijani markings at the sixth Azerbaijan International Defense Exhibition (ADEX-2026), which opened at the Baku Expo Center on September 30.

China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC), which represents Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), made its debut at ADEX this year by bringing a range of advanced aviation equipment, including the J-10CE fighter jet, L-15A advanced trainer aircraft, Y-20 transport aircraft, Z-20 helicopter, and Wing Loong drones.

Notably, this comes days after photos of a full-scale J-10CE (Vigorous Dragons) mock-up displayed at ADEX 2026 surfaced on social media, showing Azerbaijan’s national flag markings.

Whether this display leads to a sale of J-10C jets remains to be seen, but analysts see it as a potential pathway.

Azerbaijan has not hinted whether it wants to buy the J-10CE. However, reports of its interest in the aircraft have circulated since the Azerbaijani Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Namig Islamzade, was photographed examining the aircraft during the Zhuhai Air Show in China in November 2024, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

Azerbaijan Air Force already operates the JF-17 Block III fighter produced jointly by China and Pakistan. If Azerbaijan goes ahead and acquires the aircraft, it would become the third country to acquire the J-10C after Pakistan and Uzbekistan, and the second country in the world to operate both the JF-17 and the J-10C after Pakistan.

China, for one, has been pushing the J-10CE in the export market by emphasizing that the aircraft has been tested in combat. Pakistan deployed the J-10CE against India during the May 2025 conflict and claimed to have downed multiple Indian Air Force aircraft, including the Rafale, using the long-range PL-15 air-to-air missiles.

IAF called them “Manohar Kahaniya” or Pulp Fiction tales and, in turn, claimed downing nearly a dozen PAF warplanes, including F-16s and JF-17s.

China has positioned itself as a reliable non-Western arms supplier to countries looking to modernize their militaries while reducing reliance on Russia.

Azerbaijan’s existing experience with Chinese avionics, sensors and weapons systems—gained through its JF-17 Block III fleet—could make the J-10CE an attractive option. Chinese experts have presented the more capable J-10CE as a natural high-end complement in a high-low mix, better suited to complex missions than the lighter JF-17.

Coupled with Azerbaijan’s recent acquisition of the Chinese HQ-9BE long-range air-defense system, a J-10CE purchase would integrate Chinese platforms into a cohesive combat architecture for Baku’s forces.

Baku has been considering replacing aging Soviet-era MiG-29s and Su-25s and bolstering its overall military posture to counter Armenia. This could potentially create a perfect opportunity for China’s state export machinery.

Armenia, an arch-nemesis of Azerbaijan, meanwhile, maintains a very limited fighter jet inventory. The bulk of the Armenian Air Force consists of a small number of Su-25 Frogfoots, many of which it lost in the war with Azerbaijan in 2020. It also has older Su-25s and just four Su-30SMs.

Previous reports indicated that Armenia has been in talks with India to acquire 8–12 Su-30MKI multirole fighter jets, in a package variously estimated at $2.5–3 billion, though neither government has confirmed a contract.

Meanwhile, Armenia has emerged as one of the most important buyers of Indian arms, having acquired the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher, the Akash surface-to-air missile system, Swathi weapon-locating radars, ATAGS 155 mm towed howitzers, and the MArG 155 wheeled artillery system.

J-10C

The J-10C is a single-engine, 4.5-generation delta-canard multirole fighter. Its export version, the J-10CE, uses the indigenous Shenyang WS-10 turbofan and carries an AESA radar and an infrared search-and-track sensor. It can be armed with the PL-10, a short-range missile with an imaging-infrared seeker, and the longer-range PL-15.

It also has a glass cockpit, an electronic-warfare suite, beyond-visual-range engagement and precision strike, with in-flight refueling on configured aircraft. A targeting pod supports laser- and satellite-guided munitions. Chinese media often liken it to later F-16s; like the F-16, it uses fly-by-wire to control an unstable airframe.

Chinese state media say the J-10CE will continue to be upgraded for export. Designer Li Jun told China Daily it can be tailored for air superiority or strike, with optional payloads, and that its AESA radar and network-centric systems outperform older mechanically scanned setups. Claims of gallium-nitride radar upgrades, radar-absorbing coatings and engine changes remain unverified.

“The J-10CE can adapt to customers’ needs, including air superiority and strike against ground targets, and can be customized based on the environments and mission requirements of different users. We can also offer optional payload packages to clients,” Li said, making a direct appeal to countries looking to upgrade their fleets.

“The aircraft’s avionics system has received a generational upgrade. Its Active Electronically Scanned Array radar system can rapidly detect and track targets, far outperforming traditional mechanically scanned radars,” Li stated. “The jet boasts powerful features, including network-centric cooperative combat, beyond visual range multiple target engagement in intense electromagnetic scenarios, and multimodal precision strikes. It can also prevail in medium- and low-altitude dogfights,” he added.

However, these reports could not be independently verified.

Despite a coordinated export campaign, the J-10CE has had limited success in the export market.

Countries like Bangladesh and Indonesia have both expressed interest in the jet, but it has not culminated in a deal. Moreover, Egypt recently decided to procure additional Rafale jets (it was also pitched the J-10C).

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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The recent summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping may have projected an image of renewed engagement; however, while two Presidents negotiated above the surface, their navies were preparing for a contest in which nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) could play a decisive role.

The strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing seems to be moving on a very different track—especially under the waters of the Indo-Pacific.

At the moment, the United States may have a substantial lead in the number of SSNs, technology, and operational experience, but China is rapidly catching up by expanding its undersea capabilities.

In its quest to narrow the gap with the US, China has entered a race for undersea advantage across the Indo-Pacific, which could shape deterrence, sea control, and the strategic balance of power for decades to come.

For maritime domination, both SSNs and SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) play critical roles.

SSBNs primarily provide nuclear deterrence by ensuring a credible second-strike capability, whereas SSNs are essentially designed to conduct hunter-killer missions, including tracking and, if necessary, engaging adversary SSBNs, as well as escorting carrier strike groups (CSGs) for sea control missions.

As Korean scholar Dongkeun Lee points out, in the context of the Indo-Pacific, SSN operations can be broadly classified into two primary missions: (1) countering SSBN capabilities and (2) escorting CSGs. The former is closely associated with nuclear deterrence, whereas the latter reflects the traditional sea power function of controlling and protecting key sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

Both missions are particularly important in this part of the world as its principal flashpoints, including the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait, are all maritime domains. Maintaining credible naval capabilities, therefore,  is essential to advancing both deterrence and broader strategic objectives in the region.

Incidentally, around one-third of global shipping traverses the South China Sea. The maritime gateways here are critical not only for China but also for Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.

American CSGs continue to play a major role in controlling and protecting these critical SLOCs. Consequently, SSNs play an equally crucial role in escorting CSGs. By providing lethal undersea capabilities that can silently target threats across multiple domains, including surface and subsurface targets, SSNs can effectively eliminate threats to aircraft carriers.

The United States permanently deploys an aircraft carrier to the Seventh Fleet, based in Yokosuka, Japan, and it is common for more than one CSG to be present in this region at any given time. SSNs’ presence here serves both to protect US carrier groups and to create the possibility of threatening Chinese nuclear submarines.

Likewise, the PRC is rapidly developing its own CSG capability to counterbalance that of the United States in the South China Sea. China’s Yulin naval base on Hainan Island is an important center for its nuclear submarine forces.

Until recently, the undersea dominance tilted heavily in favor of the US. But the alignments are fast changing.

Though the US Navy still leads with an all-nuclear fleet of 71 active submarines (including 51–53 SSNs/SSGNs), China has now surpassed Russia to command the world’s second-largest nuclear submarine fleet with an estimated 9 to 12 SSNs (such as the Type 093 and Type 093A/093B Shang-class) and 6 SSBNs (Jin-class Type 094), totaling roughly 32 active nuclear submarines across its entire naval forces that operate primarily in the Indo-Pacific region.

In a recent IISS assessment, China launched 10 nuclear-powered submarines between 2021 and 2025, totaling 79,000 tonnes, against America’s 7 boats at 55,000 tonnes. For the first time, China out-built the US in both numbers and tonnage in a five-year window, it is argued.

“Most significantly, this includes the seventh and eighth Type 094 (Jin) nuclear-armed ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), which come as part of the emergence of Beijing’s nuclear triad,” the IISS study says.

It noted that commercially available satellite imagery taken in early 2026 showed six Type 094s in total, spread between the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co (BSHIC) shipyard in Huludao, the 1st Submarine Base at Jianggezhuang, the Xiaopingdao test facility and the 2nd Submarine Base at Yalong Bay on Hainan Island.

“Allowing for additional boats either on deterrence patrol or under cover for refit during this period, it is almost certainly the case that China has launched a seventh and eighth Type-094 in 2024 and 2025, respectively,” the IIISS study concludes.

In addition to the Type 094s, Bohai is also producing nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN) for the People’s Liberation Army, with the study suggesting that nine Type 093B (Shang III) boats have been launched between 2022 and this year, based on commercial satellite imagery of the facility and US government assessments.

Incidentally, in March this year,  the US Navy’s intelligence chief, Rear Admiral Mike Brookes, testified before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) that China is undertaking a major shift toward building an all-nuclear submarine fleet as part of a broader effort to strengthen its undersea warfare capabilities and expand blue-water naval power.

According to Brookes, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which operates more than 60 submarines in total, including roughly 50 conventional diesel-electric boats (SSK) and a smaller number of SSNs and SSBNs, is transitioning away from conventional submarines toward a predominantly nuclear construction program to support sustained operations, strategic deterrence and sea-lane interdiction.

Brookes also pointed out that China had expanded submarine production infrastructure across three major shipyards, tripling construction hall capacity and more than doubling production capability to sustain higher output of advanced nuclear boats through the 2030s.

By 2027, China’s submarine force is projected to reach roughly 70 submarines, adding up to six SSGNs, three smaller-class SSNs, and two SSBNs while retiring older Chinese and Russian-built submarines. By 2035, continued expansion could yield up to 80 submarines, with about half nuclear-powered—a major shift in force composition—and projections for the early 2040s include around 20-30 new-class SSGNs and SSBNs.

These platforms will be designed from the keel up for blue-water operations and persistent presence beyond the first island chain, representing an evolution in PLA Navy undersea operational capabilities. China will likely field a more survivable and numerous ballistic missile submarine force equipped with longer-range, more accurate SLBMs, enabling patrols in bastions closer to home waters while holding the US homeland at risk.

Broader deployment of long-range, potentially hypersonic anti-ship and land-attack missiles from undersea platforms is anticipated, along with more sophisticated torpedoes and unmanned vehicles for ISR, mine warfare, and strike missions. Substantial investments in seabed sensors, undersea cables, and unmanned systems will enhance China’s situational awareness while creating vulnerabilities for the US and allies in crisis or conflict.

The Indo-Pacific will remain the PLA Navy’s primary focus, but by 2040 routine submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, Arctic approaches, and possibly the Atlantic are likely, Brookes cautions.

However, as noted above, the US Navy currently has superior acoustic quieting, combat experience, and highly advanced Virginia-class SSNs. But as the EurAsian Times once explained, the US has a backlog of 12 Virginia-class submarines, in addition to three Columbia-class ballistic submarines.

Its production rate of 1.2 per year falls far short of the required 2.33 per year to meet its own needs and those of its allies (under the AUKUS pact, it is supposed to provide at least three Virginia-class submarines to Australia in the early 2030s).

Only three US shipyards can build nuclear-powered attack submarines (Groton, Connecticut; Quonset Point, Rhode Island; and Newport, Virginia). Only two of them are functional at the moment.

While the US defense industrial base is severely strained, China’s naval shipyards are said to be outperforming. With about 9 older Shang I/II boats plus an estimated 16 Type 093B hulls in service, in trials, or under construction, China is said to have the largest SSN series under construction anywhere.

The 093B reportedly features a vertical launch system for 24 YJ-12/YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles and six torpedo tubes, shifting China from torpedo brawls to long-range strike.

In the Indo-Pacific, the undersea race seems to change three fundamentals.

First, the era of uncontested US undersea dominance is over. US SSNs have long hunted Chinese SSBNs inside their bastion, keeping Beijing’s deterrent vulnerable. But now, China can sustain continuous at-sea deterrence patrols from Hainan’s Yalong Bay, protected by surface fleet and seabed sensors. That forces US SSNs to operate closer to Chinese waters, at higher risk, stretching ASW resources thin.

Second, the proliferation of quiet Chinese SSNs with VLS—at least six SSGN hulls launched in the past five years with vertical launch systems that could fire high-speed anti-ship missiles displayed in Beijing—means every US carrier entering the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea now faces a multi-axis underwater missile threat. The carrier’s sanctuary beyond the first island chain, once assumed, is no longer safe.

Third, China’s rapid maritime expansion has fundamentally altered the Indo-Pacific security landscape, prompting Australia and Japan to aggressively build strategic counterweights. Rather than acting in isolation, Canberra and Tokyo have pivoted toward minilateral security alliances, military modernization, and supply chain diversification to offset Beijing’s growing naval dominance.

Australia and Japan, alongside the United States and the Philippines, have formalized a security grouping explicitly designed to counter Beijing’s aggressive maneuvers in the South and East China Seas. This alliance focuses on joint maritime patrols, intelligence sharing, and military interoperability to safeguard freedom of navigation under international law.

Driven by the need to project power across its vast northern approaches, Australia has fundamentally reshaped its defense posture. This is anchored by the AUKUS pact—enabling Australia to acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines—positioning the nation as a formidable southern anchor against Chinese naval projection.

For India, which has no SSNs in service (it previously leased from Russia and now plans indigenous production) and operates only three SSBNs (Arihant, Arighaat, and Aridhaman), the implications are significant.

Against India’s slow naval expansion, Chinese nuclear submarines, including intelligence-gathering vessels, now regularly traverse the Indian Ocean.

Overall, one could say that “the silent service” in the Indo-Pacific is becoming loud.

During the Cold War, the submarine race was primarily fought in the Atlantic. Now, it is shifting to the Indo-Pacific, raising uncertainties over whether it will remain free and open.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post As Trump & Xi Talk — U.S. and China’s Nuclear Submarines Race For Dominance in the Indo-Pacific appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Taiwan has received its first F-16V (Viper) fighter jets from the US amid serious tensions with China, which calls the island a ‘renegade province’.

The Vipers are part of an $8 billion deal for 66 F-16Vs approved during US President Donald Trump’s first term.

The two Lockheed Martin F-16 Vipers touched down at Taiwan’s Chihhangair Air Force Base in Taitung. President Lai Ching-te hailed “a major milestone in elevating Taiwan’s air defense capabilities” and thanked Washington for its “long-standing support”.

Former Air Force serviceman Eric Chan, 57, praised the F-16’s advancements over the past three decades and said the fighter jets based in Taitung will “play a very important defensive role” against China.

“The threat from the CCP has always been there, so we definitely need to strengthen our defense capabilities,” Chan told AFP, referring to the Chinese Communist Party.

F-16 vs F-16 Viper

Earlier, as EurAsian Times reported,  Taiwan’s first two F-16 Vipers — serials 6727 and 6728 — were on the Pacific ferry to Taitung’s Chihhang Air Base.

Deliveries were expected to begin in 2023, and all 66 warplanes were scheduled to be delivered by the end of 2026. However, supply-line pressures due to COVID-19, followed by Lockheed Martin’s decision to shift the F-16 assembly line from Fort Worth to Greenville, pushed the timeline back.

The jet’s electronic-warfare suite has been a separate problem. The embedded AN/ALQ-254 Viper Shield, built by L3Harris, ran into production bottlenecks because it is built into the fuselage rather than carried as a pod.

Taiwanese reporting in July 2026 said the first Block 70s would be delivered without it, with the suite to be fitted later. An AESA radar without the planned internal jammer makes the aircraft thinner than the one in the brochure, and it is a capability gap, not just a reason the schedule slipped.

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Lockheed later started two shifts to prioritize Taiwan’s order to deliver the combat jets. Still, the full 66-jet order is not expected to be delivered before 2028.

When Lockheed Martin delivers the 66 new jets by 2028, the Taiwanese Air Force will have more than 200 F-16 Viper fighter jets, making it the largest Viper-standard fleet in the Indo-Pacific region.

F-16 vs F-16 Viper

Both the legacy F-16 and the latest F-16V jets share a common airframe shape, a single-engine layout, 9g capability, and basic flight characteristics.

The main differences are in sensors, computers, cockpit, electronic warfare, and modern weapons/data-link integration.

However, the biggest capability jump is perhaps in the radar system.

The legacy F-16A/B jets used the mechanically scanned AN/APG-66 radar. Most F-16C/D (Blocks 25–52) used the mechanically scanned AN/APG-68.

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These radars have slower scan rates, more limited multi-target tracking capabilities, and poorer jamming performance.

For the F-16V, however, Lockheed Martin uses Northrop Grumman’s AN/APG-83 SABR AESA radar.

It uses electronic beam steering, supports simultaneous air-to-air and air-to-ground modes, high-resolution SAR mapping, better jamming resistance, and tracks more targets at longer ranges.

Lockheed Martin states it delivers 5th-generation radar capabilities through hardware and software commonality with F-22 and F-35 radars.

“It delivers greater situational awareness, flexibility and quicker all-weather targeting and provides pilots with unprecedented target area detail and digital map displays that can be tailored with slew and zoom features,” said Lockheed Martin in a factsheet about the Block 70/72 jets.

The new Viper standard jets also provide enhanced battlespace awareness.

Block 70/72 features a new high-resolution Center Pedestal Display (CPD), which provides critical tactical imagery to pilots and enables them to take full advantage of AESA and targeting pod data.

The new CPD enables color moving maps, larger and easier-to-manage air-to-air Situation Displays, zoom functionality with the ability to switch information among displays, digital display of Flight Instrument Data, and a color/night helmet-mounted display.

Additional integration of the Lockheed Martin Sniper® Advanced Targeting Pod and Legion-ES IRST system increases pilot situational awareness and enhances warfighter survivability.

The F-16V also provides better pilot protection. Lockheed Martin’s Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto GCAS) was purpose-built to prevent deadly crashes and has already saved the lives of multiple pilots and F-16s since the system entered service with the U.S. Air Force in late 2014.

The Auto GCAS is designed to reduce incidents of controlled flight into terrain, or CFIT. According to U.S. Air Force statistics, CFIT incidents account for 26 percent of aircraft losses and a staggering 75 percent of all F-16 pilot fatalities.

The F-16V also provides extended structural capabilities.

The Block 70/72 has an extended structural life to 12,000 hours – more than 50 percent beyond that of previous production F-16 aircraft. The older F-16s had a structural life of around 8,000 hours.

According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16V could serve for 40 years without any major repairs.

The conformal fuel tanks provide increased fuel capacity and range without sacrificing the jet’s aerodynamic performance.

Furthermore, legacy F-16s relied on multiple older computers with limited processing power, whereas the F-16V has a single high-performance Modular Mission Computer (MMC) and a modernized avionics architecture. This gives far higher computing power for sensors, weapons, and data fusion.

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The F-16V is certified for a very wide range of modern weapons, such as AIM-120D AMRAAM, AIM-9X, JASSM, JSOW, JDAM variants, and SDB, and uses Link 16, which provides enhanced situational awareness and enables real-time command, control, and tactical data exchange among military aircraft, ships, and ground forces.

They also have greater electrical power, cooling, and data-processing capacity to support the future integration of advanced electronic warfare equipment, weapons, and infrared search-and-track systems.

Because of all these capabilities, even though both the older F-16 and the latest F-16V share the same airframe design, the F-16V is a much more lethal aircraft.

Modern sensors, avionics, radars, an electronic warfare suite, Link 16, structural improvements, and an improved weapons package and ferry range mean the F-16V is a much more capable jet. That is why operators such as Taiwan, Greece, Bahrain, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Turkey are upgrading their existing F-16 fleets.

“Indian Pilot Crashes UAE Jet Full of Israelis” — The Headline That Would Have Run, Had Machchhar Not Fought Back: OPED

According to Su Tzu-yun, a senior analyst at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, the AN/APG-83 radar was designed to detect targets with small radar cross-sections and could “improve the F-16V’s chances of detecting PLA stealth aircraft such as the J-20 and J-35”.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern  History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Taiwan’s Brand New F-16 Vipers Land at Chihhang AFB. Analyst Says Its Radar May Detect China’s J-20 Jets appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Amid simmering tensions with China, Japan plans to upgrade its F-15J fighter fleet to the “Super Interceptor” variant, while also procuring F-35 Lightning IIs and pursuing a sixth-generation fighter program.

The F-15J is a variant of the F-15 Eagle customized for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF), produced under license, and upgraded over the years.

Japan’s F-15 Japan Super Interceptor program is a major modernization effort to upgrade the fleet with advanced sensors, avionics, electronic warfare systems, and expanded weapons capability.

The program reportedly includes 68 F-15Js modernized under an earlier Multi-Stage Improvement Program (MSIP), but Tokyo is currently focusing its attention on upgrading 20 F-15J aircraft to the F-15JSI standard first.

Japan is pushing its F-15 Japan Super Interceptor (JSI) program with fresh investments in the aircraft’s avionics and support systems, with a revised timeline that extends the deployment of the first 20 aircraft to fiscal year (FY) 2029, Janes reported.

“The original plan called for the completion of modifications to the 20 aircraft by the end of FY 2027. However, in light of the progress of the modification program, deployment completion is now targeted for the end of FY 2029,” a spokesperson for Japan’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA) said.

Notably, Japan has decided to retire older, non-upgraded F-15Js starting in the late 2020s, while keeping the upgraded fleet into the 2030s.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) has described the Super Interceptor program as creating a bridge to the 2030s, when the sixth-generation Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) will likely enter service. The F-15JSI will complement Japan’s F-35 fleet. Tokyo’s program covers 147 Lightning IIs — 105 F-35As and 42 F-35Bs — of which dozens have already been delivered, with the rest still on order from the US

The upgrade will essentially boost JASDF’s air defenses and strike options against China’s growing military capabilities and assertiveness in the region, which has led to increased engagements between the two sides.

For example, a Chinese J-15 last year locked its fire-control radar on JASDF’s F-15J during an encounter southeast of Okinawa, as the EurAsian Times reported. No shots were fired, but Japan viewed this as a “dangerous act,” as fire-control locks represent the final step in the targeting process before a missile launch.

Notably, Japan’s F-15Js already handle most air defense identification zone (ADIZ) intercepts, and Okinawa-based squadrons alone often account for most scrambles, mostly against Chinese aircraft. The F-15JSI upgrades will improve Japan’s ability to detect, engage, and strike Chinese forces amid rising assertiveness in the East China Sea, around the disputed Senkakus Islands, and near Okinawa, which lies between Japan and Taiwan

The development comes as the US Air Force (USAF) has confirmed that it will deploy its first Boeing F-15EX Eagle II fighter aircraft to Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan, by the end of the year. About 36 Eagle IIs will be stationed at Kadena to replace older fourth-generation US aircraft based in Japan, with an eye on China.

What is the Super Interceptor Program?

Japan originally received about 213 F-15J and twin-seat F-15DJ aircraft and still operates the world’s largest F-15 fleet outside the United States.

Japan initiated the Super Interceptor program in 2019 as the “F-15 capability enhancement” effort. Boeing and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) are jointly undertaking the program through an “integrated partnership,” which will introduce some technologies currently fielded on the F-15EX.

At the heart of the upgrade is replacing the older mechanically scanned AN/APG-63(V)1 radar with the Raytheon AN/APG-82(V)1 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.

The AESA radar offers longer detection ranges, better multi-target tracking, jamming resistance, and improved performance against low-observable or high-speed threats. This system will provide the F-15J a dramatic leap in detection range, resolution, and multi-target tracking. The new radar will also support more sophisticated air-to-ground mapping and targeting modes, enabling the aircraft to perform precision strike missions.

The radar is closely tied to the Advanced Display Core Processor II (ADCP II) mission computer (ADCP II), which processes information from the AESA radar, electronic warfare suite, and other sensors much faster. This will enhance situational awareness and support advanced software architectures that allow for easier future upgrades and integration of new weapons or sensors. Succinctly put, this will turn the aircraft into a far more flexible, networked fighter, capable of sharing data with other platforms.

The JSI upgrade will dramatically improve the F-15J’s electronic warfare with the BAE Systems AN/ALQ-250 Eagle Passive/Active Warning Survivability System, or EPAWSS. This sophisticated electronic warfare suite combines radar warning, electronic support measures, and active jamming capabilities into a single, highly integrated package.

EPAWSS will help the aircraft detect and counter a wide range of modern threats, including advanced surface-to-air missiles and fighter radars.

It will improve the aircraft’s ability to operate closer to contested airspace or survive long enough to launch standoff weapons from safer distances, while working with the AESA radar’s EW features to create a layered defensive capability. This would be particularly critical against China’s growing EW capability, AESA radars, and missile threats.

More importantly, the airframe’s hardpoints and systems are modified to carry a substantially larger missile load than the standard F-15J’s eight missiles, potentially more than double in some configurations.

The aircraft will carry significantly more air-to-air weapons, as well as long-range standoff strike options, allowing the JASDF to strike land or maritime targets from hundreds of kilometers away. The upgraded F-15s will be able to act as “missile trucks,” launching precision strikes against Chinese surface ships, coastal missile batteries, radar sites, or other targets from outside the range of many PLA air defenses, while complementing the stealthy F-35 in combat.

Notably, experts believe that Japan could go to war with China over a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan due to its geographical proximity to the self-ruled islands. The increase in armaments would be particularly useful in that scenario—networked with F-35 aircraft, E-2D Hawkeyes, ground or naval sensors, and US forces, the F-15JSIs could provide volume of fire while stealth assets handle forward roles.

Additionally, the aircraft is expected to receive a host of upgrades to the cockpit, communications, and avionics to modernize the pilot interface and connectivity.

There is also some speculation that the platform will also receive infrared search-and-track technology to enable long-range target identification.

That said, the F-15JSI is not a stealth aircraft and will still face disadvantages against China’s most advanced systems such as the J-20 and future sixth-generation platforms. However, the planned upgrade will transform the F-15J into a more lethal, survivable, and versatile platform tailored to the specific challenges of Chinese air and maritime assertiveness in the region near Japan.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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On 30 September, a Flydubai flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv with 174 people on board, the majority of them Israeli, encountered a dangerous “incident”. Mid-flight, the co-pilot allegedly stabbed the captain, Indian national Smit Machchhar, and may have tried to either crash or hijack the aircraft.

The aircraft plunged thousands of feet in seconds. As per reports, badly wounded Machchhar fought back and physically unlocked the cockpit door. The action has been called heroic, as Israeli passengers and an Emirati crew managed to enter the cockpit and take control of the plane and co-pilot, reportedly from Oman.

Relief pilots on board helped land the plane safely in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was among the first to name Machchhar: “My salute to the Indian pilot Captain Smit Machchhar for his extraordinary bravery. Despite being stabbed and seriously injured, he fought back, resisted, opened the cockpit door, and enabled passengers and crew to overpower the attacker — preventing a catastrophic mid-air disaster. He saved the lives of 174 people, including Israeli citizens and other nationals. I wish Captain Machchhar a speedy and full recovery. He is a true hero.”

Israel’s Foreign Ministry went further, explicitly listing the three nationalities: “This man is a hero. Captain Smit Machchhar, the Indian captain of flydubai Flight 1073, fought back after being stabbed in the cockpit. Despite being severely injured, he managed to unlock the cockpit door — allowing Israeli passengers and the Emirati crew to intervene and save all the passengers. Together, their extraordinary courage saved 174 lives. Indian. Israeli. Emirati. Different nationalities. One extraordinary act of courage. We wish Captain Machchhar a full and speedy recovery.”

Israel’s ambassador to India, Reuven Azar, wrote: “Together with Israeli, Indian and UAE nations, I pray for the life of Captain Smit Machchhar, the experienced and gifted hero Indian pilot of flydubai flight FZ1073. His courage & the courage of other Israeli & Emirati passengers & crew members saved the lives of 180 souls. United against terrorism!”

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi replied in kind: “Captain Smit Machchhar is a HERO. In the face of the gravest danger and despite being seriously injured, he showed immense courage and an unwavering resolve to protect the lives of others. His valour helped save hundreds of lives and avert a great tragedy. India is proud of Captain Machchhar. Praying for his speedy recovery, renewed strength and good health.”

The Embassy of India in Israel added: “A resounding salute to Captain Smit Machchhar, the brave Indian pilot of flight FZ1073! Despite sustaining injuries in an extraordinary and challenging situation, Captain Machchhar displayed remarkable courage, composure and devotion to duty, helping ensure the safety of everyone on board.”

Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, UAE Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, called his Israeli counterpart Gideon Sa’ar, inquired about the passengers’ safety, expressed wishes for their well-being, and discussed strengthening bilateral relations. Saar later said the two had expressed “mutual determination… to strengthen relations between the countries on all levels and to collaborate against extremist elements seeking to harm security and undermine stability in the region.”

Flydubai described an “altercation” on the flight deck, said on-duty crew traveling as passengers secured the aircraft, and urged against “premature speculation” while investigations continue. The UAE’s General Civil Aviation Authority called it a “security incident.”

US President Donald Trump, after speaking with Netanyahu, called Machchhar a hero who was “in very bad shape” yet managed to open the door and called for help.

Passengers who rushed the cockpit shared firsthand information. Yaniv Hayoun, who later met Netanyahu still wearing a blood-stained shirt, said: “When I went in, I saw the terrorist on the controls, between the two seats. There were no pilots in the seats. I grabbed the terrorist, put him in a hold, and first of all pulled him outside.” He added that he then took the controls: “I watch Air Crash Investigation, Mr Prime Minister.”

Zvika Manes described tying the attacker “with his own zip ties and with the multimedia headphones” and said, “I’m covered in blood. It was insane.” Others spoke of “terrible screams,” a plane that “was simply diving and spinning like crazy,” and the feeling that “September 11 is happening again.” Several credited “miracles” and the Indian captain’s last effort to open the door.

Interestingly, the day before the flight, Netanyahu said Israel had “indications that, ahead of the elections, our enemies will try to attack us,” without naming anyone.

Opposition leader Yair Lapid, after a security briefing that night, said there was “no reason to put the public in a panic” and that security threats should not be used in election messaging.

Security officials told Hebrew media they knew of no specific attack threat.

After Flydubai FZ1073 diverted, Lapid wrote: “Nothing even resembling this morning’s plane incident appeared in the security briefing with the prime minister last night. Nothing similar, nothing reminiscent of it, not even a hint.”

He later called the airport reception “cheap politics” and accused government-aligned voices of hitching “a pathetic ride on heroic Israelis.”

Netanyahu told CNN the warning was “not specifically” about this flight. Asked about Iran, he said it was too early to say and that Israel would join the probe.

Jackson Hinkle, who has about 3.8 million followers, posted the version that drew the widest reach: “Netanyahu expected to lose election. He’s still facing 7 criminal charges. He takes a trip to the UAE this week. He returns to Israel after 6 hour meeting. He warns of terror plot before elections. Iranians respond saying they are not planning attack & Netanyahu is just trying to cancel the elections. 24 hours later flight FZ1073 takes off from UAE to Israel. Attempted hijacking & 9/11-style terrorist attack on flight. Israeli special ops on board thwart attack. Netanyahu immediately convenes security cabinet meeting. All too predictable…”

Max Blumenthal, editor of The Grayzone, wrote: “When Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud ally and Defense Minister Israel Katz instantly blamed jihadist terror for the FlyDubai incident, they drowned out an initial assessment by IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir and his top commanders that ruled out hijacking as the motive behind the altercation… Even Donald Trump is entertaining doubt, proclaiming that the stabber was ‘perhaps a terrorist or a wack job.’ ‘This is the story that I heard. I don’t know if it’s true,’ Trump added… The FlyDubai incident was absolutely fortuitous for Netanyahu… In the midst of his most consequential and likely final campaign for re-election, Netanyahu is essentially taking credit for an Entebbe sequel.”

George Galloway, former British MP, titled a monologue “A false, false flag day” and wrote: “Iran is going to be blamed for what didn’t happen at Fairford and what didn’t become the new 9/11… And bye bye Fly Dubai.” The post pairs the flight with a separate UK incident and treats both as blame aimed at Iran.

James Li, an independent journalist, said: “Jihad terror or false flag? Sticking to just the facts of the FlyDubai attempted hijacking, the biggest red flag that Israel must answer for is how a pilot who has no authorization to fly that airplane was able to thwart multiple layers of security, and bring an axe to boot?”

Kim Iversen: “I’m NOT buying it.”

Daily Iran News, on the passenger who said he learned recovery from a TV series: “If you believe this story, you better get a shrink.”

Fox News posted Netanyahu’s Hannity interview without endorsing a conspiracy reading. Trump’s own line, widely reposted, was: “I don’t know if it’s true, but that’s the story I got from Bibi.”

No one has been able to stop conspiracy theorists and their wild imaginations.

The Flydubai posts began within about an hour of the emergency signal, before Saudi investigators questioned the co-pilot, before the airline described anything beyond an “altercation,” and before the Indian embassy confirmed that Captain Machchhar was in a Tabuk hospital.

Hinkle’s timeline, Iversen’s “I’m NOT buying it,” Galloway’s “false, false flag day,” and thousands of smaller posts did not wait for investigations; they used the election date and Netanyahu’s warning the day before.

Within hours of the 11 September 2001 attacks, posts and later films claimed the US had staged or allowed the hijackings, with many even blaming Israel.

The 2008 Mumbai attacks were called a false flag in parts of the Pakistani press and on social media, despite the gunmen’s admission and the subsequent trial.

The 2019 Pulwama (Kashmir) suicide bombing was described by some Pakistani officials and online accounts as an Indian set-up. After 7 October 2023, a parallel claim held that Israel had known in advance, stood down, or staged the Hamas assault to justify the war in Gaza.

The same pattern followed the 2015 Paris attacks, the 2016 Nice truck attack, and, in India, the 2001 Parliament attack. In each case, the theory arrived before any official report.

It appears a false-flag script is always ready when countries like India or Israel are involved. The UAE sits in the same frame: it is a close partner of both, and the Dubai–Tel Aviv route exists only because of that alignment.

Had the aircraft crashed, the same accounts would have lambasted the pilot and run headlines like “Indian Pilot Crashes Emirati Aircraft Full of Israeli Passengers”, to sow discord among the three allies.

Thank God, all are Safe!

• This is an Opinion Article
• Mail us at: editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

The post “Indian Pilot Crashes UAE Jet Full of Israelis” — The Headline That Would Have Run, Had Machchhar Not Fought Back: OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Infineon officially opened a $1.4 billion facility in Thailand, a move it pitched as strengthening and diversifying its manufacturing footprint while adding capacity for further growth.

The semiconductor company stated the new backend manufacturing hub was strategically located in the heart of Southeast Asia, reinforcing its ability to serve customers worldwide at a time when demand continues to grow, “driven by digitalisation, electrification and energy transition”.

It has been designed for a phased expansion, with the potential to scale up to five modules, meaning it could become one of the company’s largest backend manufacturing sites over time.  

The site will initially open with 30,000sqm of cleanroom space, which can be expanded to 150,000sqm.

Infineon has initially made an investment of $113 million into the site, while the Thailand Board of Investment stated the entire project is worth $1.4 billion.

In total, the site will create 1,000 highly skilled roles, starting with an initial 350 jobs.

The move complements a wider semiconductor drive, with the country aiming to secure around $18 billion in investment within the sector across photonics, power electronics and sensors.

Alexander Gorski, COO at Infineon, said the company was establishing a new hub in the region, which was “surrounded by a fast-growing ecosystem and with excellent access to global logistics”.

Infineon adds Thailand to its global manufacturing footprint, consisting of 13 locations across US, Europe, China and Southeast Asia.

The post Infineon opens doors to Thai chip site appeared first on Mobile World Live.

As Japan marks the anniversary of the 1945 atomic bombs, its leaders are pushing for a renewed debate on nuclear weapons in a challenge to the nation’s long-time pacifist stance.

Japan’s constitution renounces offensive military force, and successive governments have maintained a decades-old pledge not to possess nuclear weapons, produce them or permit their introduction into the country.

That commitment is now under pressure as East Asian neighbors — notably China — boost their military capabilities, while doubts persist about the reliability of Tokyo’s biggest security backer, the United States.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has refused to clarify whether she will maintain the stance known as the three non-nuclear principles, and Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi called last month for a “discussion without a taboo” on the subject.

In December, an unnamed senior administration official told local media in an off-the-record session suggesting that Japan should possess nuclear weapons.

The remark was widely reported by major Japanese outlets including national broadcaster NHK and Asahi Shimbun, sparking public criticism.

“If I look at it cynically, I can’t help but think that maybe she really wants to change” Japan’s anti-nuclear commitment, 82-year-old Satoshi Tanaka, a campaigner who survived the 1945 attack on Hiroshima, told AFP.

The country marked the 81st anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing on Thursday and will do the same on Sunday to commemorate the attack on Nagasaki.

The August 1945 assault by the United States killed more than 210,000 people, including many from the effects of radiation exposure.

It remains the only time that atomic weapons have been used in warfare, and was one of the last major acts of World War II.

The Takaichi administration is undertaking a major update of the national defense strategy this year in the face of China’s expanding military ambitions.

The prime minister has already lifted Japan’s self-imposed ban on weapons exports and expanded defense spending, while pushing to amend the constitution.

Those policies have drawn rebukes from China, which accuses Japan of “new militarism” and Takaichi of bending to the whims of the far right.

They have also unnerved survivors of the 1945 bombings, who have long helped shape Japan’s post-war pacifist political culture.

Tanaka, the Hiroshima survivor, expressed frustration that current political leaders like Takaichi are focusing on military capacity at the expense of diplomacy.

“There is so much talk about national security. What about building peace through diplomacy?” he said.

Despite winning the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts, they are debating whether to continue their national association as their members grow older.

As of March, Japan recognized just over 91,000 survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, down from over 164,000 a decade ago. Their average age is 86.7.

The Big Worry

The focus has turned firmly towards the future of the non-nuclear principles, which date to 1967.

Takaichi’s supporters argue that the final clause needs to be changed to allow the United States to bring nuclear arms to Japan and ensure regional deterrence.

Hirofumi Yoshimura, head of the Japan Innovation Party, a coalition partner of Takaichi’s government, said the principle deserved discussion in the context of the US-Japan security alliance.

“Of course, we need to work toward building a world without nuclear arms,” Yoshimura told reporters on the anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing.

“But when considering how to ensure the effectiveness of extended nuclear deterrence within the framework of our alliance with the United States, I believe we should…continue to adhere to the principle of ‘neither possessing nor producing’ nuclear weapons,” he said.

“As for ‘not allowing them to be brought in,’ I do think there is some room for discussion on that point.”

Critics argue that Takaichi’s hawkish approach to defense increases the danger for Japan.

After Takaichi attended the annual ceremony in Hiroshima on Thursday, she sat down for a televised meeting with survivors.

When pressed, Takaichi declined to offer clarity on whether she might change the country’s nuclear course.

“Our nation currently adheres to the ‘three non-nuclear principles,'” she said in response to a direct question from Tanaka, without discussing what she might do next.

“That,” Tanaka told AFP on Friday, “only explains the current situation. It says nothing about the future.

“It only worries me more. I am concerned.”

By Agence France-Presse

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Australia is poised to become the first international buyer of the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), one of the US Air Force’s (USAF) best-kept secrets and unarguably its longest-range air-to-air missile.

Speaking at the ongoing multi-national military drills, Exercise Pitch Black, Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said the country will invest “almost” $736 million AUD, or about $518 million USD, to acquire “up to 450” missiles for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).

The missiles would be acquired through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route.

“This announcement is the latest milestone in the delivery of long-range, high‑tech capabilities for our Defense Force,” Marles said in Darwin. “The Albanese government continues to deliver critical capabilities that will allow the ADF to strike at a longer range, deter any adversary, and protect our national interests. It is fitting to make this announcement at Exercise Pitch Black, which is an important demonstration of Australia’s commitment to the peace, stability, and security of our region.”

The AIM-260 is apparently designed to succeed the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), which is already extensively used by the RAAF.

The missile will initially be integrated on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and later fielded on the F-35A and EA-18G Growler, according to the Australian Defense Department. However, there is speculation that the missile may eventually be fitted to the MQ-28 Ghost Bat, which has already test-fired an AIM-120 AMRAAM.

With this acquisition, Australia will officially become the first export customer of the JATM, even before allies like Israel.

Interestingly, the AIM-260 JATM purchase continues a pattern in which Australia serves as an early or exclusive partner for advanced US systems. For example, Canberra was the first international customer for the Super Hornet, the first and the only export customer for the EA-18G Growler, the first international buyer of the AGM-158 JASSM and AGM-158C LRASM long-range missiles, the first non-US customer for the MH-60R military helicopter, and only the second country (after the UK) approved to buy Tomahawk cruise missiles.

Australia is also the only nation outside the United States assembling GMLRS rockets, and one of only two countries (alongside the UK) granted access to highly restricted U.S. nuclear propulsion technology for submarines under AUKUS.

Moreover, the Australian Shadow ministers are proposing the purchase of the B-21 Raider bomber from the US to fill the capability gap until the AUKUS submarines arrive, a possibility first publicly examined by Marles in 2022 and referenced in the 2023 Defense Strategic Review, as previously reported by EurAsian Times.

Australia’s official announcement to purchase the AIM-260 JATM once again validates the strength of these strategic ties. “The acquisition of the AIM-260 JATM will provide Air Force platforms with a credible deterrent against airborne targets, complementing existing air-to-air missile capabilities and other surface-based missile capabilities across the Australian Defense Force (ADF). It will also further enhance Australia’s interoperability with the United States,” the Australian Department of Defense said in a statement.

More significantly, though, it marks a major improvement in the RAAF’s combat capacity in the face of China’s growing Indo-Pacific security threat. 

AIM-260 JATM Against China

Although the announcement did not name China, Australian strategic documents and officials consistently identify Beijing’s rapid military expansion as the primary security challenge in the Indo-Pacific.

The 2023 Defense Strategic Review described China’s build-up as “the largest and most ambitious of any country since the end of the Second World War,” conducted “without transparency or reassurance,” and noted that Chinese actions in the South China Sea undermine the rules-based order in ways that affect Australian interests.

Australian leaders have repeatedly flagged China’s coercive behavior in territorial disputes, unsafe intercepts of ships and aircraft, and growing Chinese influence in the South Pacific, which Canberra has historically considered its own sphere of influence.

Experts have also suggested that Australia may get dragged into a US-China conflict in the future. Although Canberra has never officially confirmed that it would join forces with the US military in a military contingency, it hosts several US military facilities that may come under attack by Chinese long-range missiles, as explained in detail by a previous EurAsian Times report.

Although ties between Australia and China have stabilized in recent times, Canberra has committed billions of dollars to acquire advanced, high-tech missiles as part of a broader strategy to safeguard the nation, deter potential adversaries, and defend national interests.

Marles had earlier highlighted that this involves turning Australia into a “porcupine island,” fully armed with deadly weapons to thwart any attacking nation. The acquisition of the AIM-120 JATM aligns with this approach, especially given that China has developed an array of long-range air-to-air missiles in recent years. 

The AIM-260 JATM is considered a response to the Chinese PL-15 air-to-air missile. China has purportedly produced and deployed at least 500 J-20 fighter jets, each capable of carrying up to 8 PL-15 missiles that have a range of 200 to 300 kilometers.

Additionally, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing very long-range air-to-air missiles (VLRAAM) that can strike targets. A previous Pentagon report stated that China already has the PL-17 VLRAAM and is working on a more advanced long-range missile, PL-XX or PL-21.

In contrast, the existing AIM-120 AMRAAM in the RAAF arsenal has a range of about 150-160 kilometers, even in its most advanced iteration.

With long-range, greater kinematic performance and improved guidance, the AIM-260 JATM will allow Australian fighters to engage threats earlier and from safer distances. Moreover, it could be integrated on multiple RAAF jets, giving the service a common advanced air-to-air weapon across its main combat aircraft.

The AIM-260 JATM Is Coming

The existence of the AIM-260 JATM was initially confirmed in 2019 during an Air Force Life Cycle Management Center industry conference. Due to its sensitivity, the AIM-260 JATM is classified as a Special Access Program (SAP), and details about the missile remain scarce.

In 2022, General Mark Kelly, the head of the United States Air Force’s Air Combat Command, shared an artist’s concept of the Lockheed Martin F-22 firing an AIM-260 JATM.

More recently, the US Navy publicly revealed the rendering of the missile in February 2025. At the time, experts inferred that it was comparable in appearance to the AIM-120 medium-range air-to-air missile, including in size.

Nonetheless, the AIM-260 appears to have a larger rocket motor section and no mid-body surfaces, unlike the AIM-120.

Although little is known about the covert missile, reports suggest it will be powered by dual-pulse rocket motors or ramjets to increase its range and performance.

Experts anticipate that the AIM-260 will have an advanced multi-mode seeker system that may include infrared imaging and active radar. They claim that the dual-seeker system will improve resilience to electronic warfare countermeasures and increase accuracy.

Like the AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM derivative, the AIM-260 is anticipated to have a two-way datalink. This feature would greatly increase the missile’s efficacy in networked battle by enabling mid-course targeting upgrades or re-targeting.

After initially being introduced with the USAF’s Raptor, the missile will eventually be fitted to the F-35 and the Navy’s F/A-18E/F. In fact, the AIM-260 JATM will also likely arm the US Navy’s F-47 sixth-generation combat aircraft, which is currently under development.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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For decades, the US has maintained an unassailable lead in aircraft carriers.

The US currently operates 11 flattops, all of them nuclear-powered. China is a distant second with three aircraft carriers, none of them nuclear-powered.

The US operates roughly half of the world’s true aircraft carriers. However, for years, the security analysts in Washington have been wargaming for a nightmarish scenario.

What if the US’s carrier fleet is not a force multiplier, but a strategic vulnerability? Or, to put it another way, can Beijing sink the US Navy’s aircraft carriers?

These questions have assumed significance ever since China claimed to have developed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), the DF‑21D and DF‑26B, also known as “carrier-killers.”

These ASBMs are part of China’s broader A2/AD (Anti-Access and Area Denial) architecture intended to push U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) beyond the first island chain.

In the last decade, several wargames, research studies, think‑tank reports, and opinion columns have wondered whether carriers are becoming obsolete, the new battleships – large, complex, and expensive systems – but vulnerable to cheap, long‑range missiles.

But a new Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) research paper has flipped the script: if US carriers are vulnerable, why can’t Washington also hold China’s new carriers at risk?

Are Aircraft Carriers Becoming Obsolete? 

In 2023, the South China Morning Post reported that researchers at North University of China claimed that it took an average of only 24 hypersonic missiles to sink the USS Gerald R. Ford and its five escort ships across 20 simulated battles.

From an economic point of view, that would imply that for every $1 China spends on new classes of low-cost hypersonic missiles, it could destroy $10,858.59 worth of U.S. capital ships.

A British study published in 2024 found that their carriers – the HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales – were similarly at risk.

Not just think tanks, even senior US government figures have expressed similar fears.

US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said in a recent podcast interview: In wargames against China, ‘We lose every time.”

The secretary went further, linking US defeat to the vulnerability of aircraft carriers: “We know what our real capability [is]…If our whole power projection platform is aircraft carriers and the ability to project power that way strategically around the globe . . . and if 15 hypersonic missiles can take out our 10 aircraft carriers in the first 20 minutes of a conflict, what
does that look like?”

But if US carriers are so vulnerable, why can’t Washington bring China’s expanding carrier fleet within its firing range?

China’s Expanding Carrier Fleet

After the US, China has the world’s second-largest carrier fleet.

Beijing currently operates a fleet of three aircraft carriers. China launched its third carrier, Fujian (Type 003), an 80,000‑ton supercarrier capable of launching a mix of over 50 fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, and key enablers such as KJ-600 airborne early warning and control aircraft.

China also launched Sichuan (Type 076), a 40,000‑ton amphibious assault ship also suspected of serving as a drone carrier capable of using an electromagnetic (EM) catapult to launch GJ-11 stealth unmanned combat aircraft.

A fourth carrier (Type 004) is undergoing construction. Satellite imagery suggests that this will likely be China’s largest and first nuclear-powered carrier.

China plans to construct six additional aircraft carriers by 2035, bringing its total carrier force up to nine, according to the Department of War (DOW).

China’s growing carrier fleet is a force multiplier; however, it could also become a strategic vulnerability.

The Vulnerability of the US Aircraft Carriers

China recognized early that the US ability to project force globally rests on its fleet of 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. It also recognized that it would be decades before it could match Washington in carrier fleet strength.

Therefore, China focused its energy on developing weapons systems that could negate the US advantage and developed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs).

Recent pieces have argued that Chinese hypersonic and ballistic missiles, supported by an increasingly sophisticated space‑ and AI‑enabled “kill web,” could force US and allied carriers so far offshore that their air wings become operationally irrelevant.

For example, the YJ-21 is a Chinese air-launched medium-range ballistic missile specifically designed to strike high-value assets such as carriers. This missile can be launched from fighters and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and uses redundant guidance systems that make it difficult to jam; a variant can be fired from Type 055 destroyers, though this may have been the YJ-20.

Combined with older missiles such as the DF-26, colloquially known as “carrier-killers” with a range of up to around 4,000 kilometers (km), and the DF-17, which has a shorter range of up to around 2,500 km but is designed to strike high-value assets and evade US interceptors (e.g., THAAD and Patriot), China has an arsenal of systems capable of hypersonic speeds that can hold carriers at risk up to 2,500 miles away.

However, the current discussion in Washington often frames carriers as unique to the United States and uniquely vulnerable, while underplaying the fact that China is now building its own large-deck, network‑enabled capital ships that are at least as targetable as the U.S. ships China aims to threaten.

How the U.S. Can Make China’s Carriers Vulnerable?

According to the CSIS paper, Washington could follow a five-pronged strategy to make China’s growing carrier fleet vulnerable.

(1) Subsurface ambush operations: China’s Achilles’ heel at sea remains anti‑submarine warfare (ASW).

“Despite various improvements, PLAN surface ASW, fixed‑wing ASW, and undersea sensing are still patchy compared with U.S. and Japanese capabilities, particularly in noisy littorals and chokepoints,” it said.

A cost‑effective way to threaten China’s carriers is through a layered subsurface screen built around the following assets:

■  U.S. nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) operating at range.

■  Allied diesel-electric submarines from Australia, Japan, South Korea, and potentially the Philippines, including submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion where available.

■  Shared undersea sensing networks and common heavyweight torpedoes, enabling coordinated ambush of PLAN carrier groups in transit corridors rather than near the Chinese coast.

■  Shared unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) capable of both conducting intelligence collection and limited strike missions against PLAN ships.

The key is to turn the “undersea domain into a continuous threat envelope that forces Beijing to invest heavily in escorts, ASW aviation, and fixed sensors simply to move carriers out of its home waters.”

Further, this approach also leverages existing areas of production and operational excellence from various U.S. allies, making implementation faster and cheaper than more novel approaches.

(2) Land-based maritime strike networks: China’s A2/AD system is, in part, a land‑based missile problem. The United States and its regional partners can mirror that logic by building a distributed, multinational anti‑ship missile network on land from Japan through the Philippines and, where politically feasible, into the South Pacific and even around key maritime terrain globally, including the following:

■  U.S. Marine Corps and Army units fielding Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) missile systems, Mid‑Range Capability (i.e., Typhon batteries), and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs) adapted to strike ships and a host of information warfare systems (e.g., cyber, space, electronic warfare, and inform/influence activities) stationed as a
littoral rotational force.

■  Australian, Japanese, and potentially Philippine coastal missile batteries (e.g., upgraded Type 12, BrahMos, and naval strike missiles) integrated into common fire control and ISR architectures.

■  Pre‑negotiated access, dispersal sites, and logistics arrangements to ensure these units can survive Chinese Air Force and Rocket Force (PLAAF/PLARF) strikes and continue to generate maritime fires.

Such a network can threaten PLAN carriers during deployment, not just at the point of conflict.

Moreover, “the mere expectation that upon entering the Philippine Sea, carriers such as the Fujian or Sichuan will face dense, land‑based anti‑ship fires backed by allied ISR raises the perceived risk of using them as front‑line tools of coercion.”

(3) Long-range air and space-enabled fires: The United States and its allies can conduct long-range strikes using a mix of bombers, fighters, and maritime patrol aircraft:

■  U.S. Air Force bombers and Navy aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles, such as LRASM and future hypersonic anti-ship weapons, connected to a complex battle network that both supports the attack and degrades enemy sensors.

■  Allied F‑35 fleets (from Australia, Japan, and South Korea) using low‑observable sensors to contribute to the maritime picture and deliver their own long‑range anti‑ship munitions.

■  A mix of kinetic and non-kinetic attack vectors with a conscious emphasis on mission kills, specifically by degrading flight‑deck operations, destroying aviation fuel and ordnance handling, or disabling key escorts and logistics ships supporting the carrier, rather than only aiming for catastrophic hull loss.

This approach is particularly suited to large military powers such as the United States but can be partially adopted by states with smaller budgets by investing in a limited number of fifth‑generation or advanced fourth‑generation aircraft plus modern anti‑ship missiles.

(4) Cyber-electromagnetic disruption: PLAN CSGs are nodes within a broader battle network. Their combat value depends on complex links to off‑board ISR, satellite navigation, command networks, and electromagnetic attack and defense platforms.

By disrupting the carriers’ connections to this broader network, the United States and its allies can deny the PLAN access to the enablers that make its forces more combat-capable.

Rather than treating ships solely as physical targets, U.S. and allied planners should prioritize EM and cyber operations.

(5) Unmanned swarm and port-denial campaigns: The Ukraine war has shown how even a state with a modest navy can use unmanned surface vessels (USVs), unmanned aerial vehicles, and shore‑based missiles to attrite a larger fleet.

Ukraine has successfully forced Russia to pull major units out of Sevastopol and turned the Black Sea into a contested battlespace.

While the terrain of the Pacific is not identical to the Black Sea, a similar logic can be applied to PLAN carriers, especially in the first island chain.

Swarms of relatively low‑cost USVs and loitering munitions can attack ships in port, logistic hubs, and fixed defenses, driving carriers to relocate to more distant, less convenient bases.

The central idea is to make a carrier’s routine employment around Taiwan, the South China Sea, or beyond the first island chain appear prohibitively risky.

By following these steps, the U.S. and its allies could blunt the advantage of China’s growing carrier fleet.

While China has for years invested in AA/AD vectors to make the U.S. carriers vulnerable, Washington could flip the script and make Beijing’s own carriers equally vulnerable.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee  News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

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China’s state broadcaster recently released the first footage showing multiple DF-17 hypersonic missiles in a single frame, in what appears to be a deliberate power-projection message. The display comes at a time when hypersonic weapons have proven their lethality and ability to penetrate air defenses in the Ukraine and Iran wars.

On August 3, state-owned CCTV aired video from the PLA documentary series Zhìshèng (“Victory”) featuring at least six DF-17 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) together.

Military affairs expert Zhang Junshe told the Global Times that the display indicates the system has been mass-deployed and is reliably placed on combat duty.

Zhang emphasized that the DF-17 is a vital weapon that can alter the rules of modern air defense warfare, as it can precisely hit adversary forward air defense installations and strategic command targets by leveraging its hypersonic penetration advantage.

Typically, hypersonic weapons are very hard to intercept by conventional missile defense systems due to two main reasons: 1) these weapons travel faster than Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound, equivalent to approximately 100 kilometers (60 miles) per minute; 2) these are highly maneuverable weapons that follow an unpredictable trajectory.

Only a few countries have developed and combat-deployed hypersonic weapons, including China, Russia, and sanctioned countries like Iran and North Korea.

Of these, both Russia and Iran have used these weapons in combat with Ukraine and the United States, respectively.

On its part, Ukraine has intercepted some Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missiles with Patriot batteries.

However, these hypersonic missiles have been wreaking havoc on Ukrainian cities in recent weeks, as earlier reported by the EurAsian Times. Moscow purportedly exploits a gap in its air defense coverage and launches Kinzhal and Tsirkon hypersonic missiles to cause devastation in the embattled country. Additionally, Moscow has struck Ukraine with the Oreshnik hypersonic missile, which Ukraine has been unable to shoot down so far.

Meanwhile, Iran claimed to have fired hypersonic missiles (Fattah-class) on Israeli cities and US military bases across the Middle East during the hostilities earlier this year.

However, independent verification of claimed terminal speeds, maneuver performance, and interception rates remains limited. Previous video footage from Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities showed Iranian missiles dodging as many as 10 interceptor missiles and hitting their targets at hypersonic speeds.

Notably, the latest footage comes more than a month after CCTV published footage of a DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle missile launch in June 2026. At the time, analysts noted that China was sending a deterrence message by emphasizing its strike capability to the United States, particularly amid tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the First Island Chain, and the South China Sea.

The same argument may apply to the latest footage, particularly since the DF-17 is the world’s first medium-range missile to field a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

China has amassed a variety of deadly hypersonic missiles, including the DF-17, DF-27, YJ-21, and YJ-20. These weapons are part of the formidable Chinese A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) network along its coastline.

Chinese experts believe that even the most advanced missile defenses in the US, including the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defense) and PAC-3 Patriot, are not effective against hypersonic weapons.

“Existing US missile defenses can theoretically intercept some hypersonic weapons in their final stage, but high speed, maneuverability, and stealth make it very difficult,” read a previous Chinese paper titled “Tactical Missile Technology” on the ability of US missile defense systems to intercept hypersonic weapons.

The US and allied forces are developing countermeasures, including improved sensors, the Glide Phase Interceptor, SM-6 variants, and other technologies, but substantial challenges remain in tracking and engaging maneuvering hypersonic vehicles at scale for now.

Chinese experts have noted that the DF-17 is a potent strategic deterrent because it is a conventional, medium-range missile capable of reaching important targets in the first island chain—stretching from the Japanese archipelago through Taiwan to the Philippines—including strategic sites in Japan and other areas.

Chinese experts have previously noted that the missile may reach as far as parts of the Second Island Chain, extending from Japan through Guam, Micronesia, and Palau. They believe that coordinated multi-vehicle salvo launches may play a crucial role in both launch site security and strike effectiveness—compounding the threats faced by the US military forces in the Indo-Pacific region.

DF-17’s Mass Deployment

The DF-17 is China’s first operational road-mobile medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

With a range of 1,800–2,500 kilometers, it is Beijing’s most operationally mature hypersonic strike system and is widely regarded as capable of penetrating nearly any missile defense network worldwide.

Like ICBMs, hypersonic glide weapons are launched by rockets high into the atmosphere. However, unlike ICBMs, whose warheads rely primarily on gravity once they begin their descent, hypersonic glide weapons dive back toward Earth sooner, then flatten their flight path. They make continuous course corrections to stay on target while traveling at speeds up to 12 times the speed of sound, using onboard navigation systems, making them much harder to detect by the adversary and allowing them to suppress enemy missile defenses at an early stage, clearing the way for follow-on strikes.

The DF-17 made its public debut in October 2019 at a military parade that marked the 70th anniversary of Communist Party rule in China.

In 2021, the PLA conducted its first known hypersonic test involving the DF-17 glide vehicle, rattling the United States. Later, the Pentagon published the China’s Military Power 2022 report, referring to the DF-17 as a critical threat in the Western Pacific.

“The DF-17 passed several tests successfully and is deployed operationally. While the DF-17 is primarily a conventional platform, it may be equipped with nuclear warheads,” the report added.

Zhang pointed out that the DF-17 can avoid adversary targeting and reconnaissance because it does not depend on fixed launch silos.

Moreover, DF-17’s powerful anti-jamming and precision strike capabilities greatly increase its battlefield survivability and make it well-suited for a variety of complex field combat scenarios, as it is difficult for adversary satellites to detect its operational patterns.

“In addition to a longer vehicle body and more wheels [of the TEL], the biggest change in the DF-17 is the shape of the missile itself. Unlike the cone-shaped warhead we are familiar with from past models, the DF-17’s warhead has undergone significant changes and now features four wings and a tail fin,” Gong Chunyu, a training staff officer from the DF-17 conventional missile formation, was quoted as saying by CCTV earlier. 

“This design reflects a more scientific and advanced concept, with the missile capable of flexible and varied flight trajectories and greatly enhanced penetration capabilities,” he added.

It may be noted that China’s public releases of multiple TELs in formation and field launches demonstrate that the system is no longer experimental or small-scale, and it signifies distributed, mobile, ready forces that could hunt US-based targets quickly.

The missile’s range and penetration capability are repeatedly linked to targets in the western Pacific. Analysts interpret this as reinforcing China’s ability to hold at risk U.S. and allied bases, airfields, command nodes, and surface ships in a Taiwan or regional contingency—raising the cost of a US intervention.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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The United States and South Korea have joined hands to locate the wreckage of two World War-era aircraft that crashed into the sea more than seven decades ago, during the height of the Korean War.

The two allies began a combined underwater excavation project on August 3 in waters off South Korea’s eastern coast in an effort to locate the wreckage of American aircraft that went down during the 1950–53 Korean War, Seoul’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated.

The effort, which involves the US Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) and the ministry’s Agency for KIA Recovery & Identification, will be carried out in Gangneung and Yangyang in Gangwon until August 28.

The MoD noted that about 40 people would be sent for the project, including members of the Korean Navy’s First Fleet and the Air Force’s 18th Fighter Wing, as well as American underwater planners and divers.

The divers will try locating the wreckage of a US F4U Corsair fighter that reportedly crashed in waters off Yangyang County in February 1952 while escorting another damaged attack aircraft.

Following this, the research team will focus on recovering the wreckage of the Curtiss C-46 Commando, a US military transport aircraft that crashed twice in the Gangneung area in October and November of 1952, as reported by Yonhap News Agency.

In the first instance, the plane crash left 17 people missing, while in the November incident, two people were found dead and seven were reported missing.

It is noteworthy that the F4U Corsair played a major role as a fighter-bomber and close air support (CAS) aircraft for the US Navy and Marine Corps during the Korean War, despite being a piston-engine design in the early jet age. Corsairs scored a modest number of aerial victories—around 10 total credited to Navy and Marine pilots—according to some accounts. However, the Corsairs also unfortunately suffered significant losses, primarily due to intense anti-aircraft fire at low altitude during their CAS role.

According to some sources, a F4U-4B Corsair of the Fighter Squadron 53 crashed into the sea on 21 February, 1952 while escorting a flak-damaged US aircraft toward Sokcho-ri Airfield (K-50). The pilot was purportedly flying through a snowstorm, which caused disorientation, and the aircraft suddenly swerved and crashed into the sea, killing the pilot.

Separately, the Curtiss C-46 Commando—a twin-engine, heavy-lift cargo and troop carrier that had already proven itself in World War II—was extensively used to transport men and materiel during the Korean War.

Although the reports did not identify the exact aircraft the researchers are looking for, some sources note that a C-46D-10-CU (serial 44-77538) crashed into the sea a few kilometers offshore on October 16, 1952, shortly after takeoff from Kangnung (K-18) en route to Pohang. Meanwhile, a second C-46D-15-CU (serial 44-78114) crashed approximately 200 yards past the end of the runway on November 15, 1952, after an engine failure during a courier flight on the same route.

The EurAsian Times, however, could not verify the exact aircraft the US and South Korean teams are searching for or the cause of their crashes.

The combined survey team will use maritime unmanned systems and underwater detection equipment to carry out the search. Once potential sites are identified, divers or remote sensing technology will examine the locations, the Korean media reported.

The initiative to find the old relics is significant but not rare.  Several archaic World War II aircraft, aircraft carriers, and ship wrecks lost in combat have been recovered by US entities, including the US Navy, the DPAA, Project Recover, and private American recovery groups.  These efforts often focus on accounting for missing aircrew, in line with the US military’s motto—“Leave no one behind.”  However, some recoveries are meant for historical preservation or museum restoration. 

Discoveries In Recent Years

Earlier this year, a team of maritime and naval conservation organizations embarked on a quest to recover a World War II torpedo bomber—TBD-1 Devastator— from the sea floor, where it has rested for more than 80 years.

The US Naval History and Heritage Command partnered with the Air and Sea Heritage Foundation to recover the aircraft that ditched off Jaluit Atoll in the Marshall Islands in February 1942 from the USS Yorktown aircraft carrier. 

Similarly, a B-17 Flying Fortress that went down in the Baltic Sea in 1943 during intense fighting against the Nazis was located and recovered by researchers from Texas A&M University near Denmark in February 2026. 

In 2017, Project Recover located the debris of the B-24 bomber that was shot down by anti-aircraft fire in 1944 near Hansa Bay, Papua New Guinea. In 2023, DPAA conducted its deepest underwater recovery mission to date, with elite US Navy divers descending about 200 feet underwater in a pressurized bell. They recovered some remains, dog tags, a bombardier’s ring, and other items, according to reports.

In 2019, researchers managed to locate the final resting place of the USS Hornet, the World War II aircraft carrier sunk in a 1942 battle with the Japanese Navy. The research ship R/V Petrel reportedly discovered the carrier in waters off the Solomon Islands at a depth of about 17,500 feet. The carrier was seen lying upright and almost undamaged on the deep and barren ocean below in overhead sonar photos

In 2018, a search team headed by Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen discovered wreckage from the USS Lexington, an aircraft carrier that sank during World War II, in the Coral Sea. The R/V Petrel, the team’s research vessel, discovered the wreckage approximately 800 kilometers off the eastern coast of Australia, at a depth of 3,000 meters.

More recently, the US  managed to find the wreckage of a civilian aircraft, Pan Am “Clipper Endeavor”, which mysteriously crashed in Puerto Rico in 1952, killing 52 people. The operation was led by the Air/Sea Heritage Foundation, in partnership with others, including Discovery Channel’s “Expedition Unknown.” 

It is worth noting that these are just a few of many notable discoveries that the US has made in collaboration with other agencies and partners from sea beds far from its own shores, and do not encapsulate the whole picture of these efforts.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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Japan must reinforce and transform its defense capabilities with a stronger “sense of urgency and crisis” than ever before, Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said Tuesday, as Tokyo released its annual white paper that once again flags risks from China, North Korea and Russia.

In the preface to the 598-page Defense of Japan report, Koizumi wrote that the security environment surrounding the country is now the most severe and complex since the end of World War II.

He pointed to the rapid military build-ups by Beijing and Pyongyang, their expanding cooperation with Moscow, and the new forms of warfare demonstrated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, warning that a serious crisis capable of shaking the postwar order cannot be ruled out in East Asia.

Japan is already accelerating its military modernization. Defense spending has been pushed higher, with the budget for the current fiscal year exceeding 9 trillion yen for the first time, while Tokyo deepens security partnerships across the Indo-Pacific.

Missile launchers are being stationed on remote southwestern islands closer to potential flashpoints, the Self-Defence Forces are moving to field longer-range “counterstrike” weapons that could hit targets beyond Japanese territory, and rules restricting arms exports have been loosened to allow greater transfers of equipment and technology to like-minded partners.

In the Indo-Pacific, “not only are China and North Korea further strengthening their military capabilities, China-Russia and Russia-North Korea are also reinforcing their cooperation,” he also added.

The new white paper said China was “intensifying its activities” in the region around Japan, “extending beyond the so-called first island chain to the second island chain”.

It listed a series of incidents in 2025, including activities by Chinese aircraft carriers and the “unusual close approach” by Chinese aircraft to Japanese planes in two incidents in June and July.

Japanese jets scrambled 595 times in the year to March 31, 2026, including 366 sorties against Chinese aircraft and 214 for Russian planes. This compares to 704 the previous year and was the fewest since at least 2021.

Japan decided in April to lift its self-imposed ban on weapons exports, but the white paper highlighted issues in the country’s production base that could jeopardize procurement and innovation.

Koizumi also said that he and US counterpart Pete Hegseth had “exchanged candid views” on the “unwavering” US-Japan alliance, while also increasing security cooperation with the Philippines, Australia and South Korea to realize a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”.

“As the security environment becomes increasingly and rapidly severe, what is required now is to strengthen resilience against crises all across the entire Indo-Pacific region,” Koizumi said.

“In order to do so, Japan will build and expand multilayered networks among allies and like-minded countries, and enhance interconnectivity with like-minded countries and others in every area.”

Meanwhile, China has repeatedly voiced concern at what it sees as a return to “new militarism” by Tokyo.

After World War II, Japan adopted a pacifist constitution in 1947, with Article 9 renouncing war as a sovereign right and prohibiting the maintenance of military forces, seeking a peaceful global order.

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized,” reads Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.

Japan, the only victim of a nuclear attack in history, also adopted the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” of non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction of atomic weapons. Even though all five victors of the Second World War built their nuclear weapons.

Japan relinquished wars of aggression, militaristic societies, and the production of nuclear weapons. In the post-war era, Tokyo directed the nationalistic impulses of its country toward becoming an economic powerhouse and technology leader.

Japan became the world’s second-largest economy in 1990 after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

China’s military muscle-flexing in the South China Sea, North Korea’s missile proliferation, and Japan’s strained ties with Russia, especially after the Ukraine invasion, are forcing Japan to shed its post-war inhibitions and adopt a more assertive defense role.

Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe played a critical role in Japan’s transformation. Abe had raised the prospect of the country hosting US nuclear weapons facilities on Japanese soil, boosted defense spending, and called for a strong foreign and security policy.

Under Abe, Japan passed legislation allowing the Japan Self-Defense Forces to engage in overseas combat missions. Essentially, this bill allows Japan’s armed forces to help defend its allies, like America, even if Japan itself isn’t under attack. The Japanese Constitution, following the devastation from the war, previously limited Japan’s forces to self-defense within its borders.

In December 2024, Japan approved a 9.4% increase in defense spending for FY2025. This marked another record figure for the 11th year in a row for Japan’s national defense budget. Japan, which has historically spent less than 1% of its GDP on defense, has also promised to raise it to 2% of its GDP by 2027.

This defense spending hike was part of the Defense Buildup Program, which outlines US$273 billion in defense spending over the five-year period through FY2027.

Japan is also building alliances with China’s competitors. It has developed and promoted military ties with several countries in and beyond the Indo-Pacific region. It has strengthened security cooperation with Australia and India—both members of Quad alongside Japan and the USA—through high-level dialogues, joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and mutual access to each other’s military facilities.

In December 2022, Japan announced a joint program with Italy and the United Kingdom to develop a new sixth-generation combat aircraft—the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP).

Japan is developing two hypersonic weapon concepts: the Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) and the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP), as well as long-range missiles.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) also conducted flight tests for its island defense hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). Four test launches were conducted at a site in California, with one launch in August 2024, two in November 2024, and one in January 2025.

Japan’s new 10kW-class high-power laser electronic warfare (EW) vehicle recently entered service to counter aerial and missile threats, including hostile unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and low-altitude missile systems.

Meanwhile, Tokyo announced on July 30 that it had test-fired a Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile from one of its warships, the Aegis guided-missile destroyer JS Chokai (DDG-176), for the first time.

Additionally, Tokyo fielded the Type 25 Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile, its first indigenous hypersonic boost-glide weapon, following successful California flight tests and domestic deployment drills that included loading launchers onto ships and aircraft.

In late July, an F-2 fighter conducted the first captive-carry flights of the air-launched Improved Type 12 (Type 25) long-range missile at Gifu Air Base, validating integration ahead of planned service in 2027.

Separately, a 100 kW-class shipboard laser system began sea trials aboard the test ship Asuka in late 2025, targeting drones and projectiles. Japan also conducted its first anti-ship missile live-fire on domestic soil in June 2025, firing a Type 88 from Hokkaido.

These developments highlight Tokyo’s push for stand-off strike and layered defenses amid regional tensions.

Mail us at: editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

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China released the teaser footage of the fifth prototype of its sixth-generation fighter jet, the J-36. The big question is: has Beijing leapfrogged the U.S. F-47 aircraft?

China Military Bugle, the official press account of the People’s Liberation Army, published a four-minute video on July 26, marking the 10th anniversary of China’s first heavy transport aircraft, the Y-20, entering service.

In the video’s last scene, one of the Y-20 co-pilots asks his captain: “Who are we refueling today?”

“First the ‘Master Six’, then the ‘Little Six’,” the captain replies.

The final shot clearly shows the now familiar three-engine tailless J-36 flying next to the Y-20.

In Chinese defense circles, “Master Six” is an informal nickname for the H-6 strategic bomber, and “Little Six” is a reference to the sixth-generation fighter.

PLA just hinted at the 6th-gen fighter in the video Y-20's 10th anniversary service!

"Captain, who are we refueling today?"

"First 'Sixth Master' (H-6), then 'Little Six' (6th-gen)."

The final shot clearly shows the unannounced but well-known 6th-gen jet. pic.twitter.com/dmVdErtXmO

— Li Zexin 李泽欣 (@XH_Lee23) June 28, 2026

Notably, while there have been multiple videos and pictures of the J-36, this is the first time that the video of the unusual, three-engine fighter jet has been released in official Chinese media.

This is seen as China’s first official acknowledgment of the existence and flight testing of the next-generation fighter jet.

Online videos and pictures of the J-36 have been circulating since December 2024, when China simultaneously unveiled two next-generation stealth aircraft, dubbed J-36 and J-50, during flight tests near Chengdu, Sichuan.

The J-36’s trijet design, featuring a blended double delta wing structure, was immediately documented. However, those videos were shot from the ground, and China’s government, military officials, or aviation companies did not make any comment on the new fighter jet.

Nearly three months later, in March 2025, the J-36 made a second appearance over Chengdu. This time, it flew solo, and the videos gave clear views of the aircraft’s trijet configuration, dorsal intake, and control surfaces.

Since then, the aircraft has been sighted multiple times flying over Chengdu.

The latest video, featuring the J-36 flying next to the Y-20, also makes it clear that the aircraft is equipped with air-to-air refueling capacity.

Song Zhongping, a military commentator and former PLA instructor, told Hong Kong-based SCMP that the video indicated that the sixth-generation fighter was almost certainly equipped with air-to-air refueling capability.

“And it is highly likely that it has already conducted air-to-air refueling tests during flight testing,” he said.

Air-to-air refueling capacity is crucial to navigate the long distances of the Pacific theatre.

“If a tactical aircraft’s endurance and combat radius approach those of a medium-range strategic bomber, it would be capable of carrying out patrol missions of strategic significance,” Fu Qianshao, a military analyst and former PLA Air Force officer, said.

The latest images appear to show further significant changes to the aircraft’s design and underscore its rapid evolution.

According to experts, this might be the fifth prototype of the J-36.

China’s decision to officially acknowledge the J-36 in the Y-20 anniversary video, while simultaneously flying what appears to be a fifth prototype within just 19 months of the first sightings, marks a significant acceleration in its sixth-generation fighter program.

The aircraft’s large airframe, evolving stealth features, and confirmed aerial-refueling capability suggest Beijing is prioritizing long-range, high-endurance operations across the Pacific. If the current pace of flight testing continues, China could field an operational sixth-generation platform earlier than many Western programs currently project — a development that would reshape the airpower balance in the Indo-Pacific.

Andreas Rupprecht, an aviation analyst and expert on China’s air force, said the structural differences between the earliest and latest examples made it unlikely the sightings simply showed a single aircraft being repeatedly modified.

“It is still difficult to assess this with any certainty,” he said. “But if one takes the reports from reliable sources as a basis, there is indeed some strong evidence to support it.”

According to Rupprecht, the J-36 program appeared to have progressed through at least three distinct configurations since December 2024.

However, he cautioned that faster flight testing of the J-36 might not translate into quicker operationalization of the fighter aircraft into the PLA Air Force (PLAAF).

Rupprecht suggested that he expected China to deliver the first pre-production batch to the PLA Air Force before 2030, with operationalization of the final production model some years later.

He also suggested that the J-36’s unusually large size meant the aircraft was more likely to serve as a heavily armed command platform capable of directing armed loyal wingman drones and other fighter jets, aided by its powerful sensors and long-range weapons.

“I am more convinced that the J-36 is something entirely distinct,” he said, describing it as an “aerial air-defense node” comparable in concept to an Aegis-equipped US warship coordinating a wider combat network.

In Rupprecht’s view, these different roles and designs make J-36’s comparisons with the F-47 misleading. In fact, he suggested that it will be more fruitful to compare the F-47 with J-50.

Regardless of the substantial differences in design and possibly in their roles, it can not be denied that China’s J-36 is progressing much faster than the US’s next-generation fighter jet.

While the J-36’s fifth prototype is flying, there is no publicly available picture of the F-47 flying.

The first flight of the F-47 is expected sometime in 2028.

In fact, according to the latest reports, the F-47 is expected to initially fly with an interim engine, as the US’s Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion (NGAP) program could be ready for integration onto an actual aircraft only by 2030.

This means that at least the F-47 prototype, and possibly the first operational F-47s, will have to fly with a different engine before the NGAP engine is integrated into the F-47 around 2030-2031.

Meanwhile, the GCAP, the UK, Italy, and Japan’s combined tri-nation sixth-generation fighter jet program, is expected to enter operational service around 2035.

The FCAS, Germany, Spain, and France’s sixth-generation fighter jet program has already collapsed.

Fu Qianshao, a military analyst and former PLA Air Force officer, said that China’s program was progressing much faster than comparable efforts in the US, Russia and Europe.

“In my view, China’s fighter development … is now ahead of its competitors,” he said.

These timelines suggest that for the first time in history, China might beat the US and Europe in integrating a next-generation fighter jet in operational service, which could have far-reaching consequences for the balance of power, particularly in the Pacific theatre.

Furthermore, the J-36’s aerial refueling capability, combined with its unusually large size and greater fuel capacity, would give it exceptional range, an advantage that could prove decisive in the contest for air superiority across the Pacific theater.

“The aircraft could potentially operate beyond the western Pacific and, in some cases, reach the Indian Ocean, which would have significant strategic implications,” Fu added.

• Nitin J Ticku holds a double master’s degree in Journalism and Business Management from the University of Glasgow. He has over 20 years of global experience in MARCOM, Journalism, and Digital Marketing, and has worked & traveled widely across Europe, the Americas, and Asia. Nitin is the Editor of the EurAsian Times.
• He can be reached at editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

The post J-36 vs F-47: China’s J-36 Pulls Ahead of U.S. F-47 as PLA Becomes First To Release “Teaser” of 6th-Gen Aircraft appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Japan has become the latest entrant to the exclusive club of countries that possess the Tomahawk cruise missile.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 30 that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) had test-fired a Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile from one of its warships, the Aegis guided-missile destroyer JS Chokai (DDG-176), for the first time.

The test was conducted on June 29 in the Pacific Ocean with US Navy’s support. It followed the March 2026 announcement by the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency that Chokai had completed the necessary upgrades to fire long-range standoff missiles.

With the launch, Japan became the third nation (apart from the United States) to fire a Tomahawk from a surface combatant—after Australia and the Netherlands—and the fourth overall, following the United Kingdom, which has launched the missile only from submarines. The successful test marks a major step in Tokyo’s effort to field a credible long-range conventional strike capability.

The MoD verified that the missile reached its intended target and that the ship and crew successfully carried out the launch sequence. It did, however, conceal certain information, such as the precise location in the Pacific, the number of missiles fired, the range attained, the target’s specifics, and the missile variant used.

Historic moment as JS Chokai becomes the first JMSDF warship to live-fire a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile. We can expect a torrent of state media commentaries from you-know-who proclaiming the impending end of the world with Japan’s remilitarism. https://t.co/zXXalHYluW pic.twitter.com/wT1rHAP2V7

— Collin Koh (@CollinSLKoh) July 30, 2026

Chokai is expected to return to Japan around September 2026, indicating that the Tomahawk capability will be deployed in the volatile Indo-Pacific region.

Japan plans to equip all eight of its Aegis destroyers—two Kongō-class, two Atago-class, and two Maya-class— with Tomahawks. Modifications will be carried out gradually on ships based at Yokosuka and Sasebo.

Additionally, Japan is also building two Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEVs), due to enter service in fiscal years 2027 and 2028, respectively. Officials have stated that these ships will not have Tomahawk launch capability upon entry into service, though they are designed for future integration.

Tomahawk forms a central part of Japan’s effort to develop “standoff defense capabilities” in response to a more demanding regional security environment vis-à-vis China, which is widely seen as a potential aggressor amid unprecedented military expansion.

Moreover, it aligns with Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which officially recognized “counterstrike capabilities” as a self-defense measure.

Japanese officials consider the Tomahawk as a deterrent: by holding an aggressor’s launch sites and supporting infrastructure at risk, Japan aims to make any attack on it far more costly and less likely to succeed.

Having said that, the Tomahawk missile is viewed by experts as an interim solution adopted by Japan until indigenously developed options, such as the Type 12 and other long-range missiles, are ready for induction.

Defense By Offense: Japan’s Tomahawks are Here

Japan’s test-firing of Tomahawk has formally heralded the country’s transition from a purely defensive posture to one that includes credible long-range counterstrike stand-off capabilities. This aligns with Japan’s push to strengthen its long-range strike capabilities to deter China, which has steadily expanded its military presence in the East China Sea. 

Tokyo regards China’s rapid buildup of missile forces and naval power, together with its assertive actions around the Senkaku Islands (administered by Japan but claimed by China and Taiwan), as Japan’s greatest strategic challenge. Moreover, the Japanese leadership fears that the country could get dragged into a China-Taiwan conflict triggered by the PLA’s invasion of Taiwan, due to its geographic proximity.

Speaking at a news conference earlier, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi exclaimed that the new capability would be “of great significance for reducing the possibility of an armed attack on Japan itself,” potentially referring to regional rivals such as China. “To defend against incoming missiles while preventing further armed attacks, Japan must possess the capability to launch an effective counter-attack – a counterstrike capability. Long-range missiles can be used for this counterstrike capability.”

The Tomahawk cruise missile is primarily designed to strike high-value, heavily defended land targets, such as command centers, airfields, and critical infrastructure.

With a range of approximately 1,600 kilometers, Tomahawks launched from the western Pacific or waters around Japan can cover all of North Korea and reach deep into eastern China, as well as parts of Russia’s Far East. This essentially gives Japan the ability to strike missile launch sites, air bases, command-and-control nodes, logistics hubs, and amphibious staging areas from outside an adversary’s defensive envelope.

Unlike fixed land-based platforms, sea-based launch platforms are mobile, making missiles more difficult to preempt. The Tomahawk features in-flight retargeting via data links, enabling more adaptive responses during a potential conflict.

With the integration of Tomahawk, Japan can impose costs on the aggressor’s rear-area infrastructure rather than solely defending against the first wave of missiles or ships. This supports “deterrence by denial”, making invasion or sustained attack harder, and “deterrence by punishment”, threatening meaningful retaliation—both of which were earlier missing from the Japanese military’s inventory and philosophy.

Tomahawks will operate alongside ground-launched systems such as upgraded Type 12 missiles and Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectiles, as well as air-launched weapons including the Joint Strike Missile carried by F-35s.

Together, these systems will form a layered, distributed long-range fires network that complicates adversary planning and raises the cost of aggression.

Fielding the Tomahawk will deepen interoperability with the United States while reducing Japan’s exclusive reliance on US forces for deep-strike missions, thereby enhancing Tokyo’s self-reliance as a security actor, which it has been desperately seeking for some time.

China is likely to be wary of Japan’s possession of Tomahawk, particularly since the missile has already proved its efficacy in combat multiple times, most recently in the Iran war. Previous reports suggested that the US military fired over 850 Tomahawk missiles, a number that may have swollen by now as hostilities continue

Beijing has consistently opposed Japan’s defense buildup as provocative and had strongly criticized the deployment of the Mid-Range Capability system in Japan, which can also launch Tomahawks, earlier this year.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
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