This article originally appeared on Dean Baker’s Patreon. It is reprinted here with permission.

Virtually everyone who is not a billionaire, or owned by one, agrees that we have to limit the ability of the rich to buy elections. While the Republican Party has taken “policy for sale” politics to a new level, there are plenty of Democrats who have been happy to support obviously awful policy in exchange for contributions from the AI industry, the pharmaceutical industry, the crypto industry, and Wall Street more generally. It costs a lot of money to run a competitive campaign and it’s hard to raise that from small contributions, so there will always be a temptation to bend policy positions to get some serious money.

While most people favor limits on campaign contributions, the current Supreme Court has made this very difficult. They have ruled that campaign contributions are speech and therefore any effort to limit campaign contributions is an unconstitutional restriction on speech.

There are some promising alternative paths that focus on making small donors matter. Seattle has a system of “democracy vouchers” that give every voter in local elections a modest sum that they can contribute to a candidate(s) of their choice. To qualify to get the vouchers, candidates must agree to limits on spending and large contributions.

Super-matches are a comparable system. Under this system, small dollar contributions can be matched up to 8 to 1, which means that even a $50 contribution can make a difference to a campaign. New York City, along with several other cities, have gone this route.

While these paths for amplifying the voice of ordinary people are promising, it will take much more to match the power of the billionaires. It is important to realize they exercise their political power in ways other than campaign contributions, primarily through their ownership of the media.

The importance of billionaire ownership goes far beyond the constant stream of lies and right-wing propaganda from Fox News. Last year, the very Trumpy Ellison family took control of CBS and immediately began to shift its news to the right. They are now taking control of CNN through the merger of Paramount and Warner Brothers. They also got control over TikTok, after Trump wrestled it away from a Chinese company for them.

Trumper Mark Zuckerberg owns Facebook and Instagram and is not shy about banning political material he doesn’t like. And Elon Musk bought Twitter, explicitly to advance his right-wing agenda. The rest of the media landscape doesn’t look much better. The rich and very rich own the countries’ newspapers and broadcast outlets, and most of these people lean right, even if they have not yet joined the Trump Reich.  

And let’s just be clear. The idea that the campaign ads bought by the rich can influence votes, but not the material that people see between the ads, is beyond absurd. Even if we banned all political contributions from rich people and corporations, the rich could still control elections by showing us nothing but their propaganda on television, in newspapers, and on social media.

This is why the Community News Act that Governor Gavin Newsom just signed is so important. The measure provides $20,000 each for up to five journalists per news outlet covering local news. This subsidy can keep newspapers and news sites across the state in business and help to support new ones that might start up. It is similar to other programs that have been started in Illinois, New York, and New Mexico.

This might seem like small change in a world with multi-billion dollar media empires, but it is not realistic to imagine matching the super-rich dollar for dollar; the goal is to sustain reality-based reporting that people can rely upon. (Repealing Section 230 protection for the mega-platforms like Facebook and X would be a big step towards leveling the playing field.) And support for local news reporting is likely to also lead to better national and international reporting, both by training more reporters and also increasing the comfort level with public funding, perhaps opening the door for a national system.

To be clear, there are no political conditions attached to this funding. Conservative news outlets are as eligible for this subsidy as more liberal ones. The point is to support local journalism, not to favor a particular political perspective.

To my view, this system is not ideal. I prefer support coming through an individual refundable tax credit to support local news. This would allow people to have a more direct attachment to the news outlets being supported with public money. Ideally, this would give them a sense of ownership that many feel towards other community organizations.

But whether or not this is the best approach, there is no doubt that the California bill, along with the ones already passed in other states, are big steps forward. It will help to reverse the collapse of local news reporting, which is giving corruption free rein in many areas. We need to build on the positive and make it better, rather than reject a plan because it may not be ideal. Progressive opponents of California’s wealth tax initiative may want to give that point some thought.

The US Air Force’s next strategic bomber, the B-21 Raider, is moving from flight test to the flight line, and the industrial base is expanding to match that pace. As part of this effort, the Department of the Air Force and the manufacturer broke ground on a new bomber final assembly line at Plant 42 in Palmdale, California.

“It’s more than construction… we’re moving fast to build B-21s! The Department of the Air Force & @northropgrumman have broken ground in Palmdale, CA, on over 1M sq ft of new facilities that will be the final assembly line at Air Force Plant 42,” Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Troy E. Meink recently wrote in a post on  X.

The B-21 Raider is the USAF’s next-generation nuclear- and conventional-capable, long-range penetrating bomber optimized for highly contested environments.

The new assembly line likely supports an agreement signed in February 2026 to increase annual B-21 production capacity by 25% using $4.5 billion in funding from the fiscal year 2025 reconciliation legislation.

Separately, Northrop Grumman is investing approximately $2.5 billion of its own capital over several years in related facilities and capacity. In September 2026, the company also opened the East Gate 3 manufacturing campus in Layton, Utah, to produce key B-21 components.

The construction of an all-new assembly line shows that expansion at the B-21’s production facility has moved from planning and funding to active construction.

This expansion is meant to give the service extra manufacturing capacity as the B-21 advances through flight testing and into initial operational deliveries. 

The USAF plans to buy at least 100 B-21 bombers to replace the B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit and eventually complement the B-52 Stratofortress.

The B-21 Raider program remains in low-rate initial production, meaning Northrop Grumman is building a small number of aircraft to test and refine the production process before full-rate production begins.

At the same time, senior officials have said the Air Force may need more than the current minimum of 100.

In April, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believed “a lot more” B-21s were needed. Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo had earlier said he would favor a fleet of 200 for nuclear deterrence and penetrating strike.

A Mitchell Institute report has likewise argued that 100 is a raid force, not a campaign force. None of those comments changes the program of record, and the Palmdale construction is tied to the February capacity agreement, not to an approved increase in the buy.

Furthermore, a report by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies said the USAF’s current plans to purchase “at least” 100 B-21s match one-time operations into hostile airspace but are insufficient to maintain pressure in a larger conflict because they are “a raid force, not a campaign force.”

Meanwhile, the USAF has said the sixth-generation bomber—which currently has no analogs in the world—is “close” to entering service. In fact, it is expected to reach Ellsworth AFB in South Dakota, one of the three bases selected to host the Raider, in 2027.  

This bomber project has moved at a breakneck pace, going from the official public unveiling in December 2022 to the maiden flight in November 2023. In fact, an operational test pilot flew alongside a developmental test pilot, sharing the B-21 cockpit for the first time in June this year, underscoring the urgency of fielding the bomber.

The B-21 Raider’s rapid path from first flight to operational ramp at Ellsworth AFB in 2027 marks a striking acceleration in how the US fields a complex new strategic bomber.

Observers have lauded the speed, remarking that it has been unusually compressed for a program of this scale and sensitivity. This speed, however, was made possible because of a more fundamental shift: the B-21 was built virtually before it was ever built in metal.

B-21 Raider Rewrote Pentagon Acquisition Rules

For decades, major US defense programs followed the process, but aspirational designs fell behind schedule and prototypes revealed problems missed earlier, delaying programs and driving up costs. Northrop claims to be breaking away from this pattern.

Northrop states that it built the B-21 virtually first, using an extensive digital ecosystem and high-fidelity digital twins long before cutting metal. Succinctly put, unlike previous bombers that were primarily analog and later adapted for the digital era, the B-21 was built to function, endure, and evolve in the contemporary environment.

Developing and producing combat aircraft previously involved designing, building a prototype, testing it, discovering problems, and redesigning. However, Northrop essentially inverted this sequence, using a constantly changing digital model for the Raider.

This gave engineers, manufacturers, and operators a common reference point, enabling them to evaluate and implement design changes almost instantly.

This method enabled engineers to model aerodynamic performance, stealth features, structural loads, and systems integration long before components entered production.

This meant that design modifications that once required expensive rework could be assessed and verified virtually, often in a few hours rather than months. 

The team simulated and refined structural loads, stealth characteristics, flight dynamics, and systems integration in the virtual environment before committing to physical hardware.

As a result, the physical aircraft that emerged from this approach matched or even outperformed the models’ predictions, according to the manufacturer.

This, in turn, has allowed the program to compress testing timelines, accelerate production, and keep costs under tighter control.

Unsurprisingly, the result was an unusually mature aircraft when the first Raider took flight. Northrop earlier said, “Before the B-21 ever took to the sky, the flying test bed completed more than 200 test sorties totaling more than 1,000 flight hours, testing production hardware, software, and sensors in a dynamic environment and enabling teams to tackle discovery well in advance.”

The speed with which B-21 moved from production to testing and into an operational setting at a USAF airbase was best demonstrated by the approach the manufacturer and the Air Force took during flight testing. A major 180-day test cycle was reportedly completed in just 73 days, as revealed in May 2026.

Officials have even stated that the program is exceeding expectations, as test aircraft are achieving high “code one” rates, which is the rate at which the aircraft is ready to fly again with minimal issues

The Combined Test Force achieved half the originally planned missions in less than half the planned time, while supporting significant contract value.

This compression was not the product of rushed flying, and reflected fewer surprises, higher aircraft availability, real-time data analysis, and the ability to clear multiple test points on single sorties.

The advantage of building the aircraft digitally has reportedly extended to the production lines. “Where the digital environment meets the production floor, this digital technology expedites configuration management, facilitating communication between technicians and engineers during the build, in some areas already reducing manufacturing hours by roughly a third,” according to the Northrop Grumman newsroom.

Nonetheless, the B-21 is not without risk, though experts think careful digital engineering, precise digital twins, and a conscious move away from sequential physical prototypes can break the long-standing pattern of delays.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

The post B-21 Raider: Northrop, US Air Force Break Ground on New Palmdale Line. Flight Test Runs Ahead of Schedule appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Why would the European Union list the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation in February, and then, seven months later, have its top diplomat sit down with the foreign minister of the government the Guard Corps defends?

At the UN General Assembly last month, EU chief diplomat Kaja Kallas met Abbas Araghchi, who served in the Guard Corps during the Iran–Iraq war.

Dutch prime minister Rob Jetten met president Masoud Pezeshkian, who in 2019 joined fellow parliamentarians in wearing the Guard Corps uniform to protest Washington’s terrorist designation of it. France, Italy, and Norway held meetings of their own.

These talks came less than nine months after Iranian security forces, on 8 and 9 January, killed protesters on a scale without precedent in the country’s modern history.

The human rights group HRANA has verified more than 7,000 deaths, and the UN special rapporteur warned that the toll may exceed 20,000.

In September, the UN fact-finding mission concluded that the crackdown amounted to crimes against humanity. Nor has the killing stopped: Iran Human Rights counted at least 532 executions in the first eight months of this year, including protesters arrested in January.

After a massacre, a foreign policy guided by European values should pursue one aim above others: making a repetition more costly for those who would order and carry it out.

Naming and shaming raises the reputational cost of repression, targeted sanctions raise its material cost, and delegitimisation raises the political cost of staying loyal to the regime.

They work only in combination, since sanctions without delegitimization tell the regime’s elite that their assets are at risk, but their standing is not.

EU vs US sanctions

Europe has used the first two instruments. The EU listed the Guard Corps in February and sanctioned additional Iranian officials for human rights abuses.

However, these measures target assets and individuals, while the government that presided over the killing keeps its seat at the top table.

The UNGA in New York showed how little the third instrument has been used.

The terrorist listing freezes the Guard Corps’ funds. Neither Araghchi nor Pezeshkian is on an EU sanctions list.

Yet it leaves a question unanswered: how far should the logic of a terrorist designation extend to the government that funds and publicly defends it?

Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union requires the Union’s external action to be guided by human rights and to be consistent.

Branding the Guard Corps a terrorist organisation in Brussels while posing for photographs with the government it defends in New York sits uneasily with that obligation.

This inconsistency is costly. In a study in foreign policy analysis, my co-authors and I examined how Iranians reacted to US sanctions. Comprehensive sanctions produced a rally around the government, even among reformists.

The 2019 designation of the Guard Corps, by contrast, produced almost no rally outside the regime’s hardliner core. Thus, targeted pressure on the security apparatus does not drive Iranians into its arms.

Handshakes, on the other hand, may give the apparatus exactly what targeted sanctions are meant to withhold: international legitimacy.

The photographs from New York reach two audiences.

The first sits inside the state: an officer deciding whether to fire on a crowd, or to step aside, weighs one question above most others, namely whether the regime will survive, and each of those photographs suggests an answer.

The second audience is the families of those killed, executed, and blinded since January. For them, the message is that Europe has moved on after eight months.

A picture is worth a thousand words

I am not against diplomacy. Kallas raised the sharp rise in executions with Araghchi, and Jetten raised human rights and Iranian actions on Dutch soil with Pezeshkian. Channels on shipping, detained Europeans, and de-escalation should stay open.

My objection concerns the level and the format: a meeting between leaders, photographed at the General Assembly with no public conditions attached, is not a technical channel.

Concerns voiced in private do not travel as far as the photograph, which signals normal relations with a government that has done nothing to earn them.

Four steps would help.

First, the Council should agree on a common line: contact at the technical and envoy level, and leader-level meetings only on public conditions, beginning with a halt to protest-related executions.

Second, human rights sanctions should move up the chain of command, to those who answer politically for the security forces.

Third, member states should invest in accountability that does not depend on Tehran, such as universal jurisdiction cases and evidence-sharing with the UN mission.

Finally, Europe should engage openly with Iran’s democratic opposition.

The EU has already decided, in law, what the Guard Corps is. Its leaders have yet to act accordingly. A massacre answered with sanctions in February and handshakes in September does not raise the cost of the next one. It lowers it.

Washington has sent two contradictory signals on Taiwan in the last few days. Whether these signals reflect strategic ambiguity or strategic confusion in the coming days has become a matter of debate among the strategic experts.

On the one hand, Trump is holding back a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan, pre-approved by the U.S. Congress, despite a bipartisan group of senators explicitly urging him to “formally notify . But the U.S. President has described his decision to pause as a “very good negotiating chip” for his talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Whether that worked in his summit meeting with Xi last week in Washington is not known. But Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo confirmed yesterday (October 6) that he has “not heard” of any new sale being cleared, even in smaller chunks.

On the other hand,  the Pentagon is seemingly doing the opposite of this pause.

According to reports, the U.S. Department of Defense will station two representatives on a long-term basis inside Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense headquarters in Taipei from 2026 to 2028.

One official will come from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD-Policy] — the office that writes U.S. national security and defense strategy. The second will come from the Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA] — a federally funded think tank that does mathematical modeling for war games and combat capability assessment.

The program is called the “Taiwan-US Defense Ministry Joint Cooperation Assessment,” with a total budget of NT$471 million [$14.8 million], including NT$152.5 million this year for personnel, consultancy, travel, data collection, and even interpretation for classified-level meetings.

If confirmed, this will be unprecedented.

This would mark the first time U.S. defense officials are permanently embedded inside Taiwan’s military headquarters, shifting cooperation away from traditional channels managed through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Washington’s de facto embassy.

The military relationship between the United States and Taiwan is highly integrated yet formally unofficial. It is governed by the legal framework of the “U.S. Taiwan Relations Act” (TRA), which Congress passed on April 10, 1979.

Congress enacted it immediately after the U.S. formally terminated its previous “Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan)” to officially recognize “the People’s Republic of China (PRC)” in Beijing.

Rather than abandoning Taiwan, Congress designed the TRA as a legal framework to ensure that “robust, unofficial security, commercial, and cultural ties” continue uninterrupted.

In short, the TRA provides a domestic legal workaround for treating Taiwan as a country without formal diplomatic recognition. However, under it, the U.S. is also obligated to maintain Taiwan’s capacity to resist force or coercion in general and the forcible annexation by the PRC in particular.

Over the years, U.S. personnel have served in Taiwan as trainers and advisers. Hundreds of active-duty U.S. military advisors—often colloquially referred to locally as “English teachers” to maintain a low profile—are routinely deployed across Taiwan.

U.S. military observers are present within Taiwan’s annual “Han Kuang live-fire military exercises”. They actively guide Taiwan’s defense strategy toward decentralized command, logistics, and real-world combat readiness.

Taiwanese fighter pilots undergo advanced combat training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona.

The US remains Taiwan’s primary foreign weapons supplier, with a total backlog of orders nearing $20 billion.

In fact, Taiwan received its first new batch of two advanced Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70 fighter jets on October 2.  This was part of an $8 billion deal approved in 2019 for 66 new-build F-16 Block 70 jets, with the remaining 64 aircraft scheduled for future delivery.  out of a 66-aircraft fleet on order.

However, all these coordination efforts between Washington and Taipei are usually routed through the AIT intermediary, as the U.S. adheres to its  One China” policy. In that sense, the new proposal to station Pentagon personnel directly inside the Taiwanese Defense Ministry represents a shift from this historical status quo.

The new arrangement puts Americans directly into the core of Taiwan’s defense policymaking, including policy coordination, Han Kuang exercise planning, asymmetric warfare doctrine, and major weapons procurement evaluations, it is said.

Of course, the U.S. routinely sends military and civilian defense officials to work directly inside the defense ministries of partner and allied nations. Established by the Pentagon in 2009, the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program specifically trains and deploys high-performing senior U.S. Department of Defense civilians.

These advisors are embedded in partner-nation defense ministries to support institutional capacity building, strategy, financial management, and logistics.

The U.S. also actively deploys specialized defense consultants directly to the defense ministries of nations looking to transition away from historical adversaries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, and various Balkan nations looking to exit Moscow’s orbit.

The U.S. has a long history of embedding liaison officers in allied countries. For example, it has a Joint Political-Military Group in Israel that embeds officers in missile-defense cooperation for Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and now Iron Beam. But American officials do not operate inside the Kirya (Israel’s defense headquarters).

Similarly, despite 54,000 US personnel stationed in Japan, no U.S. officer sits inside Japan’s Ministry of Defense to assess combat capability.

Perhaps in NATO countries and South Korea, U.S. military officials are believed to sit together often.

There are also “Offices of Defense Cooperation” (ODC), or United States Military Groups, which are technically attached to the local U.S. Embassy for diplomatic protection. These teams provide security assistance and work in routine, day-to-day coordination with host ministry personnel.

However, what makes the proposed U.S. officials sitting directly within Taiwan’s military headquarters unique is that Taiwan is not an ally of America in the strict sense, as the U.S. lacks formal diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, and these officials will bypass the traditional AIT.

Of course, multiple reports in recent years have claimed that U.S. special forces are permanently stationed in Taiwan to assist its 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion special operations force, though Washington has officially denied it.  The same has been the case with the speculations about the coming and going of U.S. military personnel from the Army Special Operations Command base in Taoyuan.

How will Beijing React?

At the time of writing, Beijing had not issued an official reaction, possibly because Taiwanese media outlets only recently brought details of this long-term Pentagon deployment to light. It has not been declared officially.

But it goes without saying that Beijing would be “certain to protest” and could respond “with expanded exercises and intimidation”, according to  Zivon Wang, a military analyst at the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies in Taipei.

He expects U.S. personnel not to wear uniforms at the Ministry of National Defense because it could be interpreted as a more formalized US-Taiwan military relationship and might further provoke Beijing.

Incidentally, China has made more air and naval incursions across the median line in the Taiwan Strait since 2022. Although Chinese military aircraft had occasionally crossed the median line (established informally in 1954) in the past, the practice became significantly more frequent from 2022, particularly after Nancy Pelosi (then Speaker of the House of Representatives) visited Taiwan in August that year. What had once been an informal but largely respected buffer increasingly became a zone of routine Chinese military activity.

Therefore, it remains to be seen whether China will respond to the Pentagon’s proposed deployment with loud exercises.

It may also remain silent, as nothing is official yet and Trump has his “negotiating chip” of holding back Taiwan’s military package.

Trump’s admirers often see his unpredictability as useful in negotiations with an adversary, because the other side cannot be sure how far he is willing to go.

But his critics argue that his unpredictability becomes counterproductive when allies cannot distinguish a negotiating threat from a real change in American policy.

It remains to be seen who will prove to be right in the case of Taiwan.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Trump’s Big Taiwan Move: Despite $14B Arms Freeze, Permanent U.S. Military Officials May Sit at MND appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The federal Civil Rights Data Collection, for the first time in decades, tells us about the teacher workforce and reminds us racial disparities are still stark in American public schools.

(Image credit: Joel Solis)

The federal Civil Rights Data Collection, for the first time in decades, tells us about the teacher workforce and reminds us racial disparities are still stark in American public schools.

(Image credit: Joel Solis)

Russia appears to be preparing to revive and modernize its inventory of the Soviet-era Pechora S-125 short-to-medium-range surface-to-air missile system, in a move that the IAF leadership could well take note of.

S-125 is the same missile that was used to shoot down the US Air Force’s F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter-bomber over Serbia on March 27, 1999, during the Kosovo War.

The Pechora S-125 (SA-3 Goa) is a legacy Soviet static, short- to medium-range surface-to-air missile system developed to engage low- to medium-altitude air threats using command guidance.

The IAF also modernized its S-125 inventory to plug an operational gap that widened due to delays in procuring MRSAM and Akash air-defense systems. However, the IAF did not pursue modernization to the extent that the capability gains matched the more comprehensive modernization offered by the Russian Pechora-2M.

According to Militarnyi, a Ukrainian media outlet focused on military affairs, the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT) has signed a contract with Moscow-based JSC Oboronitelnye Sistemi to supply 30 specialized wheeled chassis that appear intended for components of the Pechora-2M system.

The Pechora-2M is a heavily modernized Pechora derivative with a self-propelled truck-mounted launcher, digital electronics, an extended engagement envelope, and day/night electro-optical tracking, giving the system much greater tactical mobility.

Under the terms of the contract, Russia would receive 20 MZKT-8021-021 chassis, as well as five each of the MZKT-8022-021 and MZKT-80211-021.

The MZKT-8021/8022 family of specialized chassis was developed specifically to accommodate components of the Pechora-2M air-defense missile system.

Pechora Revival

The delivery schedule extends to 2029, suggesting a planned multi-year acquisition rather than a one-off procurement to meet an immediate operational requirement.

More likely, Russia is seeking to expand its air-defense capacity in response to the heightened threat from the prolific use of drones and other low-cost aerial threats in modern warfare.

Drone warfare has increased the aerial threat severalfold, so it is logical for any nation to increase the density of its AD systems by a corresponding factor.

Russia appears to be increasing its reliance on legacy systems rather than simply discarding them.

Russian Modernisation

The modernized Pechora-2M system was developed as a deep modernization of the Soviet S-125, incorporating a self-propelled, highly mobile launcher and modernized electronics. The modernization transformed the legacy stationary S-125 into a rapidly deployable air-defense platform capable of shoot-and-scoot tactics, reducing its vulnerability to anti-radiation weapons and precision strikes.

The 2M replaces the legacy four-rail stationary ground launcher (5P73) with a twin-rail launcher mounted on a heavy 6×6 truck chassis. The reduction in launch rails was necessary to maintain launcher stability when mounted on a mobile chassis.

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The legacy S-125 required considerable time to disassemble, pack onto trailers, move, and re-erect at a new site. In contrast, the Pechora-2M can reportedly be brought into action in roughly 20–25 minutes, facilitating shoot-and-scoot operations.

Besides the self-propelled launchers, the tracking/fire-control radar and other system components are also mounted on high-mobility truck chassis rather than being confined to towed equipment.

IAF Pechora Modernization

In 2016, the Indian MoD issued a $272-million tender to digitize 16 Pechora systems. The tender was restricted to Indian companies to support the government’s Make in India policy. The eventual contract, worth ₹591.3 crore, was awarded to Alpha Design Technologies Ltd (ADTL) in 2020.

Russia’s Almaz-Antey is the original equipment manufacturer of the Pechora system. At the time, Indian officials indicated that Russian defense companies preferred to work through Russian state-owned entities, limiting the scope for direct OEM participation by Indian companies.

The scope of the Indian Pechora upgrade was primarily the electronic and mechanical modernization of the existing system rather than a fundamental redesign of its architecture. It included refurbishment and digitization of the missile-guidance radar and integration of the system with the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS).

Alpha Design Technologies Ltd executed the upgrade, focusing on digitization and electronic modernization. It replaced vintage electronic components with modern semiconductor-based electronics and digital processing, while modernizing operator consoles and other system elements.

No Mobility

The system retained its original static, four-rail, ground-mounted configuration (5P73 launcher) and towed transport arrangement because the Indian upgrade scope did not include mobility.

Because it lacks mobility, the IAF has traditionally used the Pechora for point defense of fixed, high-value infrastructure such as air bases, radar stations, and other military installations.

A statically deployed AD system protecting a high-value asset made considerably more sense when precision-guided munitions were either unavailable or relatively uncommon. In contemporary warfare, where precision weapons can routinely achieve single-digit-meter accuracy, a static air-defense system defending a high-value asset can itself become a priority target.

Recall the failed PAF attempt to strike the S-400 system deployed to defend Aadampur air base during Op Sindoor. With foresight, and by leveraging the S-400’s mobility, IAF leadership relocated the system before the attack. The episode illustrates the importance of mobility and survivability for high-value air-defense assets.

A Still-Capable System

Despite its vintage, the Pechora remains a potentially useful AD system. Endowed with mobility and modern sensors and electronics, it would acquire significantly greater survivability and tactical utility.

One of its strengths is electro-optical tracking, which permits passive target tracking without radar emissions, reducing vulnerability to anti-radiation weapons. Both Russian and Indian modernization programs have improved the system’s electro-optical capability.

The Indian upgrade incorporates thermal-imaging-based fire-control equipment, while the Pechora-2M also incorporates TV and thermal/infrared electro-optical channels.

Thermal imaging provides a passive night-and-day detection and tracking capability and, unlike conventional television cameras, does not depend on visible light. However, adverse atmospheric conditions can degrade its effectiveness.

It is interesting to note that the IAF chose to upgrade its Pechora systems without fundamentally modifying the missile. Contemporary reporting on the original upgrade program indicated that the IAF considered the existing missile adequate and concentrated instead on digitization, radar, communications, networking, and other system improvements.

The 5V27 family missile has a substantial fragmentation warhead of around 70 kg and uses command guidance. Its continued availability is one possible reason why extending the life of the Pechora system remains attractive.

Russia may also be reviving and revitalizing Pechora-2M systems because it has a substantial existing inventory of 5V27-series missiles. If so, the approach illustrates an important principle of modern warfare: the value of an old weapon system can change when it is combined with modern sensors, electronics, mobility and networking.

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What the IAF Should Note

In the immediate future, the IAF will need to deploy many more AD systems than it currently does in order to field a robust air-defense capability spanning the entire gamut of aerodynamic threats—aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, guided bombs and drones.

Developing additional AD systems may prove more challenging and time-consuming than upgrading existing legacy systems such as the Pechora.

Upgrading the Pechora to add mobility, modern electro-optical sensors and improved networking should be well within Indian technological capability. Even locally manufacturing additional upgraded systems under an appropriate OEM arrangement could be a cost-effective way to augment India’s air-defense capability.

Russia’s apparent decision to extract additional combat value from an old missile system should therefore be viewed less as a revival of obsolete technology and more as an example of how legacy weapons can be adapted to the changing economics and character of air warfare.

• Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
• Views Personal of the Author
• Follow the author @vkthakur

The post The Missile That Shot Down U.S. Stealth Aircraft is Coming Back—Mobile. Why India Must Take Note of the Russian Move appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.