❌

Reading view

U.S. Midterms: Trump’s Grip on Congress Comes Down to the Gas Pump

Photo: EFE.

Two weeks before the midterm elections, Trump’s approval rating has hit a two-term low. The war with Iran has driven up the cost of a tank of gas and a cart of groceries, millennials have turned away from him faster than the rest of the country, and part of his base plans to stay home.


Donald Trump’s name is not on any ballot on Nov. 3, yet much of the U.S. electorate will head to the polls with him in mind.

A national poll released Sunday, Oct. 18, and conducted Oct. 9-13, puts his approval rating at 33%, the lowest the series has recorded in either of his terms. Two in three adults disapprove of his performance, 52% strongly, and the same survey had him at 37% in both April and July.

RELATED: Trump Approval Falls to New Low of 33% Two Weeks Before Midterms

The poll also asked whether the next Congress should act as a check on the president or support his agenda. Fifty-eight percent preferred a Democratic-controlled Congress as a check on him, compared with 39% who want a Republican Congress aligned with the White House, a gap nearly twice as wide as a year ago. Neither party is calling this election a referendum, but the answer brings it close to one.

Almost six out of ten U.S. citizens want the next Congress to counterbalance Trump, a gap that has nearly doubled in one year. Graph: teleSUR

In the race for the House of Representatives, Democrats lead Republicans 52% to 44% among likely voters. Among registered voters the gap holds at eight points; in July it was three.

Other surveys tell the same story. An earlier Ipsos poll put him at 32% in September, and the Pew Research Center had him at 30% in early October. The slide deepened after February, when the war with Iran began.

Between the first bombings on Iran and the election, gasoline soared above 4 dollars and Trump’s approval rating plummeted. Graph: teleSUR

From Hormuz to the Gas Tank

The United States and Israel began bombing Iran in February, when a gallon of regular gasoline cost an average of $2.98, according to AAA. By late March it had topped $4 for the first time since 2022, and each new round of strikes pushed it back up. On Oct. 1, the national average hit $4.41.

At those prices, filling a 15-gallon tank costs about $21 more than before the war.

With Ormuz declared closed by Iran and no oil pipelines capable of replacing it, the gallon rose 48% in the US even with record crude production. Graph: teleSUR

In February, 7 in 10 U.S. citizens considered gasoline affordable. Eight months later, the same share says the opposite.

About a fifth of the oil the world consumes passes through the Strait of Hormuz. According to the official price index for September, consumer prices rose 3.7% over the year, energy 20.4% and gasoline 34.2%, while inflation excluding food and energy stood at 2.6%. Today, 65% of U.S. citizens believe attacking Iran was a mistake.

Tehran declared the strait closed in March and has reaffirmed that stance several times since. In October, Rear Adm. Habibollah Sayyari, chief of staff of Iran’s army, told the official IRNA news agency that the waterway remains closed and that all transit must be coordinated with the armed forces, and he blamed the closure for the rise in U.S. gasoline prices.

Washington says otherwise. On Oct. 7, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that “the Straits of Hormuz are open,” that as much oil is flowing out now “as there was before this conflict began” and that Iran has “lost complete control of the straits.” Overland routes cannot replace the strait either. Before the war, the EIA estimated that the Saudi and Emirati pipelines that bypass Hormuz had only about 2.6 million barrels a day of spare capacity to divert crude, compared with the 20 million barrels a day that moved through the strait.

Ten days later, Vice President JD Vance revealed another side of the same administration. “I recognize that gas prices are too high right now,” he said Saturday night at a televised town hall. Asked why the war had not ended in a clear victory, he said that “in some ways we have won decisively,” though “the enemy gets a vote.” And he repeated that Iran, “the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world,” cannot have a nuclear weapon.

On the campaign trail, the fix being sold in Washington points elsewhere. In a poll of 1,000 likely voters taken in early October, four in five agreed that increasing U.S. energy production “can help make everyday life more affordable,” and 67% backed a proposal whose wording already promised the result, “updating federal permitting laws to reduce delays and lower costs.” It is the same reform the oil industry pitches as the key to affordability.

The government’s own energy agency supplies the missing piece. The United States has been the world’s largest crude oil producer since 2018 and is on track for a record of about 13.7 million barrels a day this year, while 84% of the crude that crossed Hormuz was bound for Asia. With output at record highs, gasoline has risen 48% since the bombing began. Crude is priced on a global market, and this year’s price spikes followed the calendar of the war, not the permitting calendar.

The price shock reached much of the world, and Latin American economies that import refined fuels absorbed it without having had any say in the decision to go to war. For those countries, the permitting fight in Washington is a distant concern; the price of their diesel depends on what happens in Hormuz. How much room Washington has to keep waging the war without congressional oversight will also be decided on Nov. 3.

For Latin American families living in the United States, the most visible face of the second term is immigration policy. At the start, half the country approved of it; now about 60% disapprove, and 56% say deportations have gone too far, eight points more than in April 2025. At the same town hall, Vance acknowledged that his rhetoric about immigrants had been “imperfect” and took the blame. “That’s on me,” he said. His goal, he insisted, is not “to dehumanize any immigrant.” “In fact, I love a number of immigrants,” he added.

An Economy Judged by Team Colors

The president’s approval on the economy has fallen to 28%, its lowest mark across his two presidencies. Forty-eight percent feel worse off than when Trump returned to the White House in 2025, the highest share in a series dating back to 1986, and for the first time in more than a decade, registered voters trust Democrats more to handle the economy, 40% to 33%. Before the 2022 midterms, the same series gave Republicans a double-digit edge on the issue.

That year, with Joe Biden in the White House, each party’s verdict on the economy was the mirror image of today’s, almost point for point, and independents stood at 16% in both surveys.

Democrats and Republicans reversed their judgment of the economy by changing government, meanwhile only independents stayed where they were. Graph: teleSUR

Voters who wear no team colors are moved by their wallets. In the October survey of likely voters, 37% said a candidate’s stance on affordability will decide their vote for Congress, more than double the 15% who put immigration first, an issue central to Trump’s 2024 campaign. That priority is shared by 43% of Democrats, 36% of independents and 32% of Republicans.

Among those who say they are worse off than in 2025, 78% lean toward Democrats, as do 71% of independents in that group.

The Generation that Turned Away Fastest

Millennials, born between 1981 and 1996, are now 30 to 45 years old and make up the largest adult generation in the country. In 2024 they split almost evenly on Trump; exit polls showed voters ages 30 to 44 backing Kamala Harris over him 51% to 47%.

A YouGov poll conducted Aug. 28-31 found 27% approval and 70% disapproval in that age group, the group’s worst showing in the series. Its net rating went from minus 1 in January 2025 to minus 43 in August, a 42-point drop, compared with 30 points nationally.

The Economist makes the opposite case. It argues that millennials have turned their fortunes around and now earn more than any recent generation did at the same age, while narrowing the gap in homeownership. The magazine credits the recovery to markets rather than to a state-funded rescue. October’s polls show what that narrative leaves out.

In the House race, the Pew Research Center found voters ages 30 to 49 favoring the Democratic candidate 43% to 31%, with one in five still undecided.

October’s affordability survey, broken down by age, points in the same direction. Affordability will decide the vote of 45% of voters in their 30s and 44% of those in their 40s, above the 37% average. This is the cohort that entered the job market in the 2008 crisis, pays rent or a mortgage, raises children and fills the tank every day to get to work, and the tank is precisely where prices have climbed the most this year.

The cost of living defines the vote of almost half of voters aged 30-49, above the national average of 37%. Graph: teleSUR

The figures come from surveys with different age brackets and do not prove a single cause. Read together, though, they show the country’s largest generation turning away from Trump faster than everyone else, with the cost of living at the top of its priorities.

RELATED: U.S. Retail Sales Up in September Amid Surging Gas Prices

The Ones Who Stay Home

Among those who voted for Trump in 2024, 23% now disapprove of his performance and 38% reject his handling of inflation. Most of them still prefer Republicans for Congress, so the erosion does not take the form of a switch to the other party. What they have lost is the certainty that they will vote.

Seventy-five percent of registered Democrats say they are certain to vote, compared with 67% of Republicans. Within the Republican Party, certainty reaches 75% among supporters of the MAGA movement and falls to 57% among those who do not identify with it, and more than a quarter of the latter want Democrats to control the next Congress.

Only 39% of Republicans strongly approve of the president, down from 63% in February 2025.

How many of the 77 million people who voted for Trump in 2024 will return to the polls without his name on the ballot is a question no one can answer yet. Turnout models based on 2022 and 2024 favor Republicans; votes already cast or locked in, by contrast, favor Democrats.

The risk for Republicans is at home. Their MAGA-unaffiliated voters are the least confident of going to the polls. Graph: teleSUR

What is at Stake in the Senate

With the slim House majority Republicans are defending, losing a handful of seats would be enough to hand over control, and presidential approval is among the best predictors of midterm results. Even so, 58% of likely voters who “somewhat” disapprove of Trump still prefer the Republican in their district.

The Senate is split 53-47 in Republicans’ favor, and Democrats need a net gain of four seats to win back the majority. Of the 35 seats on the ballot, seven are rated toss-ups, and six of them — in Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Ohio and Texas — are held by Republicans. North Carolina, a Republican seat, is already rated as likely to go Democratic.

The seven states that decided the last presidential election — Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin — offer an early clue about 2028. Trump carried all seven in 2024, and today his net approval is negative in every one of them, between 15 and 25 points underwater among registered voters, according to the Civiqs tracker. He cannot run in 2028, and those numbers measure a president, not his successor, but they map the terrain his party will inherit.

Six of the seven open Senate races are played in Republican seats, while their approval is now negative in the seven states that gave the White House to Trump in 2024. Graph: teleSUR

On Nov. 3, Trump’s name will still be missing from the ballot. The outcome will depend less on votes that switch parties than on the votes that are never cast, among them those of a generation that split almost evenly on him two years ago and in August disapproved of him by more than two to one.

The Arch and the Gas Pump

On Wednesday, Oct. 14, 20 days before the election, the new Air Force One flew low over the airport in Bullhead City, in the Arizona desert. It is the Boeing 747 that Qatar’s royal family gave Trump, now painted red, white, blue and gold. “When they give you a 747, you say two words, thank you,” he told supporters.

Arizona is one of the swing states that change hands from one presidential election to the next. Joe Biden won it in 2020 by about 10,500 votes, Trump took it back in 2024, and today his approval there is 18 points underwater. The state has no Senate race this year, but it does elect a governor and all nine of its House members. The president chose Mohave County, where he won more than 77% of the vote two years ago, with early voting already a week underway. He went looking for his base, the voters he needs at the polls, not at home.

From the plane he moved on to people who leak military information. “In my opinion, leakers should be shot,” he said, and he called the journalists covering him “almost as bad as a leaker.” He touted the ballroom he is building at the White House and the triumphal arch he plans for the capital. On Iran, whose leaders, he said, “are gone,” he let slip a confession. “I might have gone too far. I don’t know who the hell to deal with.” And he promised that once the war ends, “your gasoline is going to go down to even lower than it was before it started.”

He was addressing a country that fills its tank at wartime prices and pays rents 2.8% higher than a year ago, according to the official price index. Three days later, his vice president admitted on television what the gas pump was already saying. Trump, in Arizona, had preferred to talk about monuments.

The planned arch would stand 76 meters (250 feet) tall, about 26 meters (85 feet) taller than the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, and would rise at the foot of the bridge leading to Arlington National Cemetery, as part of the celebrations for the 250th anniversary of U.S. independence.

Napoleon commissioned the Paris arch in 1806, after his victory at Austerlitz, to honor his armies. Construction dragged on for three decades. When it was inaugurated in 1836, the emperor had been dead in exile for 15 years, and he passed beneath the arch only once, in 1840, inside the coffin that brought his remains back to France.

  •  

Europeans Rise Up in Resistance to Austerity Measures

Unrest across eight countries reveals a growing working-class rejection of public spending cuts.

Across Europe, a widespread wave of public protests and labor strikes unfolded during September and October 2026. Demonstrations took place in major urban hubs across France, Belgium, Italy, Albania, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Germany.

RELATED:
Madrid Protesters Unite to Defend Housing and Public Education

While individual mobilizations emerged from specific domestic triggers, the overarching unrest reflects a shared socioeconomic environment characterized by declining purchasing power, public budget austerity, rising energy prices, and real estate speculation.

The economic backdrop of late 2026 includes sustained structural pressure on working-class households. Energy market shifts driven by international conflicts significantly escalated fuel and electricity costs across the continent, directly inflating the cost of basic consumer goods.

In urban centers, market-driven housing policies and real estate deregulation led to steep increases in residential rents, outstripping wage growth and increasing housing insecurity for young workers and low-income families.

Mainstream institutional coverage frequently characterizes these events through a lens of isolated public order disturbances or temporary economic grievances.

Labor organizations, tenant unions, student groups, and neighborhood alliances have increasingly framed their demands around public resource protection, wage indexation, market regulation, and social welfare preservation.

Protests in Belgium escalate into clashes with Police

🔻 Protests by student and school groups in Belgium over rising education costs and restricted access to higher education turned violent in central Brussels and the city of Liège. Police used tear gas and water cannon to… pic.twitter.com/Nm32hPzgvR

— Tehran Times (@TehranTimes79) October 18, 2026

Roots of the Uprising: Albania, Spain, and France

Albania: The Vjosa-Narta Resistance and Sazan Island Mobilizations

In Albania, mass demonstrations began in May 2026 following public controversy surrounding large-scale real estate and luxury tourism developments along ecologically sensitive coastal zones, related to the family of United States President Donald Trump.

Known as the Flamingo Revolution, the protests were initially triggered by foreign investment proposals backed by international private equity firms, including United States-based entities.

These proposals targeted protected areas in the Vjosa-Narta lagoon delta and Sazan Island, a former military territory off the coast of Vlorë.  

The movement escalated after an incident on May 30, 2026, when private security personnel physically removed local environmental activists at a development site in Zvërnec.

By June, demonstrations expanded from coastal municipalities into the capital, Tirana. Organized primarily by environmental groups, university student assemblies, and grassroots youth coalitions, the protesters demanded an immediate halt to coastal land privatization, the enforcement of environmental protections under European Union standards, and the resignation of Prime Minister Edi Rama.

On June 9, 2026, tens of thousands gathered in central Tirana. In response, Prime Minister Edi Rama publicly dismissed the critique regarding foreign capital involvement, stating in June that the international scrutiny was primarily driven by high-profile political names associated with the investment project rather than environmental policy.  

Throughout July and August 2026, daily civic actions maintained a continuous presence in Tirana, marking 100 consecutive days of anti-government demonstrations by September 8, 2026. By mid-September, the focus expanded as university and high school student assemblies joined the broader movement to protest rising living costs, tuition increases, and systemic public corruption.

Tensions culminated between October 13 and October 18, 2026, when thousands of demonstrators assembled outside the Ministry of Education and Prime Minister Rama’s offices. Clashes erupted between protesters and state security forces, leading to the deployment of tear gas and water cannons by law enforcement.

Official police reports confirmed over 160 detentions and nearly 400 individuals charged following widespread civil disobedience and public building blockades in central Tirana.

Massive protests in France against the high cost of living and the deterioration of public services. pic.twitter.com/H3FUK6kcvC

— Globe Eye News (@GlobeEyeNews) October 18, 2026

Spain: The Pensioner Eviction and the National Housing Crisis

In Spain, social unrest escalated rapidly on September 21, 2026, surrounding the national housing crisis. On September 23, 2026, police enforced the court-ordered eviction of María del Carmen “Maricarmen” Abascal, an 87-year-old resident in Madrid, following a legal dispute with property investors.

By September 30, 2026, housing collectives and the Madrid Tenants’ Union (Sindicato de Inquilinas e inquilinos de Madrid) established a continuous protest encampment in Madrid’s Puerta del Sol, which grew to over 1,200 tents.

Similar encampments emerged in Barcelona’s Plaça de Catalunya and Málaga’s Plaza de la Constitución. According to data from the Youth Council of Spain, average residential rent prices had reached €1,176 per month, absorbing roughly 98.7 percent of the average young worker’s salary following a decade of steady price increases.

Protesters demanded an immediate legal cap on rent prices, a total ban on short-term vacation rentals, the expropriation of residential housing units owned by private investment funds, and the passage of strict tenant protection laws.

The central government headed by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez presented two urgent decree-laws proposing a ban on evictions for vulnerable residents until 2030 and a two-year extension on existing leases.

However, on October 2, 2026, the Spanish Congress rejected the legislation following opposition votes from the People’s Party, Vox, and Together for Catalonia (Junts). Opposition spokesperson Cuca Gamarra argued that affordability could only be achieved through increased residential construction, while Junts spokesperson Míriam Nogueras stated the decree would create legal market uncertainty. In contrast, tenant union representatives called for nationwide general mobilizations to enforce housing rights.

📌KNE: Victory for the struggle of the school students in France!
🔴“Victory for the struggle of the school students in France!”, emphasises the Press Office of the Central Council of KNE in a statement on the large-scale student protests, noting…
🔗https://t.co/sxtH89fNp0…

— International Relations Section of the CC of KKE (@intern_kke) October 5, 2026

France: Educational Strikes and Fuel Price Mobilizations

In France, a distinct wave of social unrest began on September 15, 2026, sparked by sharp increases in retail fuel costs. Driven by regional maritime supply disruptions and international market volatility, average diesel prices in France reached €2.37 per liter, nearing historical highs.

Initial blockades were established by transport workers, agricultural workers, and commercial fishermen who obstructed access to major fuel depots in Frontignan and port facilities in Nice and Sète.

This economic disruption coincided directly with public sector labor actions in secondary and higher education.

On September 18, 2026, teaching staff and suburban education workers across the Île-de-France region initiated strikes over class overcrowding, wage stagnation, and severe administrative budget reductions. Student assemblies subsequently blockaded high schools and university campuses in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille.

The movement saw a broad convergence of trade unions, including the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and Solidaires, along with student organizations and former Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) networks.

The protesters demanded the immediate indexation of wages to current inflation rates, increased state spending on education and healthcare, and emergency price caps on petroleum products.

In response to the growing disruptions, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced on September 16, 2026, that the government would increase state fuel subsidies to the maximum allowable limit under European Union rules.

When protests continued into October, the government released 10 million barrels of strategic diesel reserves to stabilize market supply, while law enforcement authorities deployed heavy riot control measures, leading to thousands of detentions nationwide.

Zakharova calls out Macron's double standard on protests

Russian MFA spokeswoman says Macron demands "uncompromising" crackdowns on French rioters while the West lectures others on "human rights."

As Limoges City Hall burns, Zakharova notes: the people attacking Europe aren't… pic.twitter.com/mcwYHHfFav

— Sputnik (@SputnikInt) October 19, 2026

Escalation Across the Mediterranean: Greece and Portugal

Greece: Public Sector Strikes and Anti-Privatization Mobilizations

In Greece, social mobilizations accelerated on September 5 2026, driven by rising electricity tariffs, real estate inflation, and persistent wage stagnation.

The unrest gained momentum following coordinated labor actions organized by the All-Workers Militant Front (PAME) and supported by major public sector confederations, including the Civil Servants’ Confederation (ADEDY).

On September 28, 2026, nationwide strikes disrupted public transport, maritime ferry connections between the mainland and Aegean islands, and municipal services.

In Athens, over 45,000 demonstrators marched toward Syntagma Square in front of the Hellenic Parliament. Student assemblies from the National Technical University of Athens and the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens joined the marches, blocking central thoroughfares.

Protesters focused their demands on structural economic reforms, including:

•          The immediate restoration of collective bargaining rights dissolved under previous austerity frameworks.

•          Strict state price controls on essential consumer goods and electricity tariffs.

•          Increased public funding for higher education and healthcare infrastructure.

•          Direct wage indexation to compensate for post-2022 inflationary losses.

Addressing parliament in late September, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis defended the administration’s fiscal stance, stating that government policy must maintain strict fiscal discipline to ensure sovereign debt stability.

📌Dimitris Koutsoumbas, GS of the CC of the KKE, on the youth protests
🔴In Spain, people are taking to the streets becuase they are being evicted from their homes. In France, because they’re being denied an education. In Greece, students are setting up tents in Syntagma Square… pic.twitter.com/qO5UR3LWoG

— International Relations Section of the CC of KKE (@intern_kke) October 15, 2026

Portugal: The Housing Dignity Movement (Vida Justa)

In Portugal, demonstrations expanded across major urban centers during the first week of October 2026. Catalyzed by the civil movement Just Life (Vida Justa) alongside tenant rights group Door to Door (Porta a Porta) and university student unions, tens of thousands gathered in Lisbon, Porto, Coimbra, and Faro.

The central issue driving the protests was real estate speculation and the expansion of short-term tourist accommodations, which had led to significant residential displacement in urban neighborhoods.

According to national statistical reporting, residential property prices in Lisbon had increased by 12.4 percent year-over-year by mid-2026, while median national wages remained under €1,050 per month.

On October 3, 2026, demonstration columns marched along Avenida da Liberdade in Lisbon toward the Assembly of the Republic. Speakers at the rally called for immediate state intervention to secure affordable living conditions, demanding:

•          An immediate freeze on residential lease renewals and rent price caps indexed to local wage levels.

•          The mandatory revocation of tax incentives granted to non-resident foreign real estate investors.

•          Substantial state investment in public housing construction.

•          An increase in the national minimum wage to €1,000 per month to offset basic living expenses.

Government representatives pointed to existing tax relief programs for young buyers, but grassroots spokespersons rejected these measures as inadequate against systemic market speculation.

Convergence and Expansion: Germany, Italy, and Belgium

Germany: Heating Cost Protests and Urban Rent Freezes

In Germany, demonstrations gathered force across major industrial and urban regions in mid-October, led by trade union factions, tenant associations (Mieterverein), and progressive youth organizations.

The mobilizations were prompted by public sector wage negotiations and sharp increases in seasonal municipal heating and gas bills following regional energy supply realignments.

Protests took place in Berlin, Leipzig, Cologne, and Hamburg. Demonstrators assembled at the Brandenburger Tor in Berlin, calling for:

•          Federal legislative caps on natural gas and district heating charges.

•          A nationwide five-year freeze on residential rents in cities exceeding strict vacancy limits.

•          Higher public investment in municipal transport networks and social housing initiatives.

•          Wage increases for public sector employees above the annual core inflation rate.

Federal officials acknowledged the economic burden placed on households, but emphasized that national budgetary constraints limited further large-scale energy price subsidies.

🇪🇸🔥 #MADRID – The Madrid teachers' demonstration, on the first day of the call for an unlimited strike, links up with the encampment at Plaza del Sol – who have been there since late September 2026 for the right to housing, against tenant evictions, against the surge in prices…

— World_Breaking_News03 (@Breaking2003) October 14, 2026

Italy: The “Italia in Piazza” General Strike and Cost-of-Living Mobilization

In Italy, social tension culminated on October 17, 2026, in a coordinated general mobilization organized under the banner “Italy in the Square” (Italia in Piazza). The action was spearheaded by grassroots trade unions, including the Unione Sindacale di Base (USB) and COBAS, alongside student collectives and housing rights coalitions.

Demonstrations affected major urban centers, including Rome, Milan, Turin, and Naples. In Milan, an estimated 60,000 people marched through the city center, resulting in the temporary suspension of public transit lines and commercial activity.

Protesters cited declining real wages, cuts to basic social protection mechanisms, and rising utility prices as the primary drivers of the mobilization.

Key demands raised by Italian protest organizers included:

•          An immediate statutory minimum wage of €10 per hour.

•          The automatic reintroduction of wage indexation tied to inflation metrics (scala mobile).

•          Increased public funding for national healthcare (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale) and public transit systems.

•          A moratorium on residential evictions involving primary residences for low-income households.

Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni issued a statement from Rome, characterizing the disruptions as politically motivated actions designed to destabilize public order during delicate national budget negotiations.

MILAN RIOTS 🙏🔥 🇮🇹

Milan is experiencing weekend unrest that began as cost-of-living protests and escalated into looting, vandalism, and clashes with police.

On Saturday and Sunday (17–19 October 2026), demonstrations in Milan and other northern Italian cities (including Turin… pic.twitter.com/GuQVFDoahE

— Sheila17 (@sheila17_xo) October 19, 2026

Belgium: Public Service Strikes and Educational Budget Mobilizations

Simultaneously, on October 17, 2026, Belgium experienced significant public sector disruptions centered in Brussels and Liège. Organized by joint trade union fronts (FGTB/ABVV and CSC/ACV) in coordination with secondary and higher education student unions, the actions brought together public transport operators, municipal sanitation staff, and academic workers.

In Brussels, thousands of demonstrators gathered near the European Quarter, marching toward the federal parliament building. The movement focused on rising urban living costs and proposed structural spending cuts to secondary and university educational systems.

Protesters demanded:

  • The full preservation and enforcement of Belgium’s automatic wage indexation system across all employment sectors.
  • Increased federal budget allocations for public education, student housing, and public transit.
  • Legislative action to curb commercial energy price speculation and residential real estate inflation.

Federal government spokespersons stated that maintaining current fiscal trajectories was necessary to adhere to European Union public debt standards, while indicating a willingness to continue sector-specific labor dialogue.

Institutional Reactions and State Repression vs. Protesters’ Demands

As demonstrations converged across the European continent through mid-October 2026, state authorities responded with a combination of security deployments, judicial actions, and public condemnations.

Government officials framed the widespread public disruptions as threats to political stability and fiscal order, while protest coalitions emphasized that state actions prioritized debt constraints and elite economic interests over the material needs of the population.

In France, the executive branch adopted an uncompromising stance. President Emmanuel Macron publicly criticized what he described as “unbridled violence” following the escalation of high school blockades, fuel port disruptions, and urban demonstrations.

Interior Ministry directives led to the widespread deployment of specialized CRS riot control units, water cannons, and tear gas in Paris, Lyon, Marseille, and Limoges.

Law enforcement agencies reported making between 1,800 and 2,400 detentions nationwide by mid-October, with human rights monitoring groups and legal collectives expressing concern over indiscriminate police tactics, pre-emptive arrests, and severe injuries sustained by secondary school students.

In Southern Europe, local administrations similarly sought to delegitimize the protest movements. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government characterized the “Italia in Piazza” general strike as a politically motivated attempt by opposition factions to destabilize the nation during crucial state budget negotiations.

Police forces in Milan and Rome deployed water cannons and heavy cordons to clear key arterial roads and transit hubs blocked by union members and youth assemblies. In Albania, Prime Minister Edi Rama argued that persistent anti-government and student demonstrations—initially sparked by the “Flamingo Revolution” against coastal real estate privatization in Sazan and Vjosa-Narta—endangered the country’s economic integration and accession standing with the European Union.

Albanian authorities utilized water cannons and tear gas against university student blockades in Tirana, leading to dozens of detentions and criminal charges.

Across Spain and Portugal, state responses highlighted severe institutional divisions over economic reform. While Spanish local police enforced court-ordered evictions in Madrid and cleared public squares, parliamentary opposition parties blocked proposed national lease extensions and eviction bans.

In Portugal, government spokespersons maintained that market-based housing strategies and tax incentives for foreign buyers were necessary to attract capital, directly rejecting the Vida Justa movement’s demands for immediate rent controls and foreign investment caps.

From Localized Grievances to Pan-European Class Solidarity

What began as distinct domestic actions, resistance against speculative real estate projects on Albania’s protected coastline, outrage over elderly evictions and surging rents in Spain, and secondary school labor strikes over state underfunding in France, rapidly converged into a interconnected continental mobilization.

This convergence reflects shared structural drivers: the systematic erosion of real wages, the commodification of urban housing, the decline of essential public services under sustained fiscal austerity, and the compounding impact of energy inflation.

Across national borders, working-class households, student coalitions, and independent trade unions have consistently targeted the policy frameworks that prioritize fiscal deficit targets and private asset protection over public welfare and living standards.

The organizational strategy of the autumn 2026 movements highlights a shift in popular mobilization methods. By utilizing decentralized communications, student assemblies, neighborhood collectives, and grassroots trade union alliances, protest networks frequently bypassed established political parties.

This organizational horizontalism enabled rapid, cross-sector coordination—demonstrated by the simultaneous national strikes and urban blockades in France, Italy, Belgium, and Portugal on October 17, 2026.

As winter approaches, the continued alignment of labor unions, housing organizations, and youth movements suggests that Europe’s autumn of discontent may mark the beginning of a sustained, pan-European struggle for structural economic reform, market regulation, and social welfare preservation.

Sources: TeleSUR – Al Jazeera – Democracy Now – BBC – DW – France 24 – EFE – AFP – AP – The guardian – El País – El Mundo – La Radio del Sur – La República – RTVE – Xinhua – CGTN – Press TV – Anadolu Agency – RT – TRT World

  •  
❌