The profile of social activism in North Africa is changing. Young people in the region shifted away from demanding regime change after the thwarted hopes of the 2011 Arab uprisings and the 2019 Hirak movement in Algeria. Now, they tend to seek practical improvements in their social and economic conditions rather than wholesale political reform.

Many of these new social movements focus on environmental concerns, and increasingly on the impact of global warming. North Africa is among the regions in the world most affected by climate change. But its countries are also some of the most promising sites for renewable energy generation, given their abundant sunshine and proximity to the European market. Activists have targeted some renewables projects, testifying to a feeling that authorities are failing to ensure energy transitions are fair and meaningful.

These trends in activism in North Africa match a recent turn in European engagement with the region, away from support for political reform and towards socioeconomic issues. This includes cooperation on clean energy projects. But Europeans should bear in mind that cooperation with North African governments on projects that ignore local interests will fall short of the objective of promoting greater opportunity and long-term stability in the region. This underlines the importance of including local businesses and civil society representatives in initiatives from the very start.

Changing social movements

The Arab uprisings and Hirak protests were driven in large part by social and economic concerns, and sought a political remedy by calling for a change of government. But hopes for better politics have since foundered across North Africa. The region’s protests and social movements now tend to focus on practical and often locally based demands for a more effective state and better services for communities. The 2025 Gen Z protests in Morocco, for example, began as a response to failings in maternity health care before swelling into wider calls for social justice. The shift to more issue-based activism reflects North Africans’ disappointment in past attempts at political reform as well as long-simmering social tensions. These include anger at poor governance and the strain rapid urbanisation puts on jobs and housing.

The shift to more issue-based activism reflects North Africans’ disappointment in past attempts at political reform as well as long-simmering social tensions

But climate change is also encroaching ever more on North Africans’ quality of life. Historically a water-scarce region, North Africa is now experiencing extreme temperatures, rising sea levels, drought and desertification. Once-fertile agricultural land is becoming barren, and flooding from extreme weather events exacerbates the problems for farmers and food supplies. Climate change is also contributing to power cuts and water shortages, as well as catastrophes from flash floods to wildfires. One opinion poll in 2024 showed that one in six people in North Africa had experienced harm from climate change in the previous two years (or knew somebody who had), and that 71% of North Africans saw it as a threat.

With governments often failing to implement policies to mitigate climate impacts, social movements have adopted an environmental focus. These movements sometimes blend protest with community self-help initiatives, and are often local rather than national. Their less explicitly political nature brings them a measure of tolerance by authorities, as does the fact that the movements often pursue environmental objectives that governments also embrace. But activists still face similar restrictions to all civil society movements in North Africa, at times drawing surveillance and repression.

Changing the environment

Such climate-related movements have sprung up across North Africa. In Morocco, a group of Tangier-based NGOs and unions halted a building development that would have involved deforestation, and they now publish an annual report on local environmental issues. Youth for Climate Tunisia trains young people to mobilise on climate issues and organises digital campaigns. The Egyptian group Greenish promotes climate education and capacity building for local communities. Algeria has several community-based groups that work on improving access to water and countering desertification.

Other groups focus on wider environmental concerns. Egypt’s VeryNile pioneered efforts to work with local fishers to collect and recycle plastic pollution from the Nile. In Tunisia, local protests against the impact of phosphate processing in Gabès snowballed after a series of toxic gas leaks in October 2025, becoming a mass movement that continues almost a year later.

But North African social movements also mobilise when green transitions disadvantage local communities and marginalised groups. As North African countries increasingly seek foreign investment in renewable energy projects, some communities worry that land and water resources will be diverted to benefit wealthy elites and foreign investors. In Tunisia, solar projects have aroused local opposition because they take land out of community use and reinforce regional inequalities. In Morocco, solar megaprojects such as the plant in Ouarzazate have prompted anger in nearby communities because of the amount of water they consume.

Changing European policy

One thing that unites these disparate movements is that activists seek concrete improvements in quality of life, as well as a bigger role in determining their countries’ futures. This aligns with an increasing sense in Europe that the best way for the EU and member states to promote rights and opportunity in North Africa is through a focus on socioeconomic development.

As the EU’s 2025 Pact for the Mediterranean showed, European policymakers aim to cooperate with North African partners on tangible initiatives that match local government priorities, including in green energy and water management. But the environment-focused social movements should remind European policymakers that working only with governments is not enough to ensure progress on economic and social rights, as I argued in an ECFR policy brief last year. The EU must frame its projects in a way that gives local populations as much agency as possible, by breaking down barriers for small businesses and including civil society in project design and planning.

The EU must also ensure that the projects it supports genuinely offer mutual benefit. In climate policy, the pact’s logic of “a partnership of equals” means European support for renewable energy projects including solar and wind power and the production of green hydrogen. Such projects would then supply clean energy for Europe and promote North African development as well as reduce local energy costs. In turn, greater opportunities and lower prices in the region could help promote the stability that European policymakers also seek.

But not all climate and environmental projects meet these goals—as the local criticisms show. To fulfil the promise of clean energy projects for both sides, Europeans must complement their investment in power generation with other measures to limit environmental trade-offs and to help benefits to flow to local communities. These should include infrastructure development and technology transfer to build up a local clean energy ecosystem. That is the best way for Europe to help ensure that the aspirations expressed in North African environmental movements are met.

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Within a few weeks, Britain will have a new prime minister. Andy Burnham, who was recently elected as an MP following nine years as mayor of Greater Manchester, looks set to take over without competition following Keir Starmer’s announcement that he would step down from the role.

Burnham has wide support among Labour MPs who think he represents the best hope of reviving the party’s popularity and seeing off the populist-nationalist Reform UK party in Britain’s next election. However, his recent experience in regional politics and his sudden ascent to become prime minister-in-waiting mean that Burnham’s approach to domestic policy is much clearer than his approach to foreign affairs. Domestically, as prime minister, he is likely to focus above all on spreading power and opportunity across Britain’s regions and communities.

Nevertheless, to achieve both his aim of inclusive regeneration and to protect the country’s security, Burnham needs to make some fundamental choices about Britain’s place in the world. It is possible to anticipate at least some of how he is likely to approach Britain’s international role. While Burnham is likely to continue with Starmer’s current approach to crisis management, the pressure of global trends and his political instincts could push him to set out a clearer picture of Britain’s partnerships, with a greater emphasis on Europe and middle powers.

Burnham’s vision of renewal

In Burnham’s set-piece speech on Monday, he presented the vision that he said will guide his leadership of Britain. He sees the defining goal of his premiership as restoring the British people’s trust in government by making it deliver better for all parts of the country. Some of his policy ambitions continue in the broad direction pursued by Starmer and chancellor Rachel Reeves: a focus on industrial strategy, the pursuit of greater self-sufficiency in key sectors essential for national security, encouraging innovation, directing public procurement towards domestic production, encouraging inward investment in Britain and tackling the shortage of affordable housing.

Burnham has said less about the foreign policy questions that have taken up much of Starmer’s time as prime minister, including Ukraine, the Middle East, relations with Donald Trump’s America and China. He will likely emphasise that he is prioritising domestic affairs, in contrast to Starmer who sometimes seemed more comfortable dealing with global issues than difficult domestic choices (and was mocked by critics as “never here Keir”). This might make Burnham inclined to appoint a relatively senior politician as foreign secretary who could carry out some high-profile diplomatic commitments on his behalf.

Aligned on foreign affairs

In any case, British policies on Ukraine and the Middle East are likely to remain much the same, because Starmer’s positions are mainstream within the Labour Party. According to foreign secretary Yvette Cooper, Andy Burnham is “100% behind [the UK’s] unwavering support for Ukraine” and is a fundamental believer in NATO and Britain’s multilateral partnerships. Jonathan Powell, Starmer’s influential national security adviser who played a key role in these areas, will likely stay on at least until the end of the year. Although Burnham has occasionally sounded more critical of Israel’s war in Gaza—he called for a ceasefire in October 2023, two months before Starmer—there is little reason to expect any significant change in policy.

Burnham is pro-European (and has a Dutch wife) and said in 2025 that he hoped Britain would rejoin the EU in his lifetime. But during the recent by-election that brought him back into parliament, held in a constituency that voted strongly for Leave in 2016, he emphasised that he was not advocating that Britain rejoin now. In the short-term, his government’s focus will be on completing the EU-UK agreements that were due to be signed at a summit meeting on July 22nd. The summit is also supposed to set a direction for the next steps in the reset process; it seems unlikely that Burnham will come into office with views that would significantly change Britain’s approach to negotiations.

For a medium-sized, open economy like Britain, prosperity, re-industrialisation and the kind of economic security that Burnham wants to focus on cannot be achieved without paying attention to international partnerships

Nevertheless, despite Burnham’s likely intention to broadly preserve Starmer’s foreign policy and to focus on domestic issues, he will have to answer big questions about Britain’s international role. For a medium-sized, open economy like Britain, prosperity, re-industrialisation and the kind of economic security that Burnham wants to focus on cannot be achieved without paying attention to international partnerships in areas like trade, supply chains, investment energy and technology. Britain is already overdue to develop a more defined national strategy for these sectors, for an age where the kind of rules-based international order that it once relied on (and saw itself as a guardian of) has given way to a messier and more uncertain world.

Finding Britain’s global place

While Starmer played a strong role in supporting Ukraine and building security coalitions with other European countries, he did not set out a compelling wider vision of how Britain should position itself and its interests in a challenging global context. Burnham, however, is well placed to take on this task. His commitment to inclusive growth at home pairs well with a revised view of how Britain works internationally: he could set out a vision of internationalism for Britain that is rooted in the needs and aspirations of communities across the country, in line with the goal of regional regeneration that he espoused.

To do that, however, he will have to take some decisions about Britain’s international partnerships and affiliations, and how they relate to each other.

Given the alignment in Britain’s interests and the extent of its links with Europe, its relationship with the EU must be at the centre of foreign policy. The idea of a closer relationship with Europe is increasingly popular and, at a time when the US has become unreliable as a partner, presents the best foundation for promoting British security and prosperity. Whatever institutional form it ultimately takes, Burnham could set a more explicitly political vision of Britain’s role in Europe as a central element in navigating a complex and uncertain world.

Alongside this, he will need to create a balance between Britain and the US that preserves the benefits of cooperation but gives Britain greater ability to withstand pressure. Central to this will be technology and particularly AI—a subject that was surprisingly absent from Burnham’s speech, but which ministers within Starmer’s government are thinking about. Some in Labour circles expect Burnham to adopt a less deferential approach to Trump than Starmer pursued, at least until the US-Israeli attack on Iran this year.

Beyond the traditional transatlantic relationship, Burnham will need to determine how Britain acts towards increasingly influential emerging and middle powers. Here, it may be significant that Lord Jim O’Neill, a former Treasury official and economist for Goldman Sachs, has emerged as one of Burnham’s key economic advisers. O’Neill coined the acronym “BRICS” and argues strongly for including non-Western powers in global economic management. Most relevantly, he has proposed that rethinking traditional Western economic models goes hand-in-hand with greater engagement with non-Western countries that have different political-economic models.

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Britain’s G20 presidency in 2027 could be the perfect opportunity for Burnham to set out an ambitious vision of how international economic cooperation can benefit the populations of all countries. At the same time, Burnham should confront the trade-off between global cooperation and sustainability, and the risks of dependency, de-industrialisation and vulnerability to coercion. China will bring these trade-offs into sharp relief, making it among the defining strategic questions of Burnham’s premiership.

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