At least 852 people died or went missing while trying to reach Europe by sea between July and September 2026, according to a new report from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.

The agency’s migration bulletin, published on 22 October, draws on International Organization for Migration data and examines the protection of people travelling through the Mediterranean and along the Atlantic route towards the Canary Islands.

The highest recorded number was on the West Africa–Atlantic route, with 283 deaths or disappearances. The Western Mediterranean accounted for 229, the Eastern Mediterranean for 199 and the Central Mediterranean for 141.

The findings come as the EU implements its Migration and Asylum Pact and governments face continuing scrutiny over rescue operations, border policing and the treatment of children.

The routes behind the figures

The four route totals add up to 852. The overall figure is a minimum because some shipwrecks may go unreported and the identities or number of passengers can be difficult to establish.

The Atlantic crossing to the Canary Islands involves long journeys in small vessels exposed to changing weather and limited rescue coverage. Different Mediterranean routes present their own risks, including departures from North Africa and Turkey.

The agency is careful to distinguish people confirmed dead from those reported missing. Both are included in the latest figures; the data should not be described as a verified count of recovered bodies.

New attention to Ceuta

The bulletin also reviews the mass attempted crossing into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in July. Spanish government figures cited by the agency put irregular entries from Morocco at more than 72,000 on 30 July.

The event raised questions about reception facilities, safeguarding of children, alleged excessive force and access to protection procedures. Allegations against authorities require examination on their merits and must not be conflated with findings of guilt.

EU Today has reported separately on the Ceuta crisis. The new agency bulletin adds comparative data across migration routes and examines systemic safeguards under EU law.

Monitoring under the migration pact

Independent rights-monitoring structures required under the EU’s new migration framework are still being established in parts of the bloc, the agency says. Their effectiveness will depend on access, independence and whether allegations can be investigated.

The report also addresses restrictions affecting civilian search-and-rescue organisations and uneven support for people displaced from Ukraine.

European governments are simultaneously attempting to reduce irregular crossings, tackle smuggling networks and maintain legal duties to rescue people in distress. These obligations operate together rather than replacing one another.

The new figures provide a measure of the human consequences of dangerous routes, while the recommendations will test how far member states can translate the new framework into effective procedures.

By Ted SNIDER

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The Ukrainian leader faces escalating crises.

Like the man in Monty Python and the Holy Grail, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky may be crying, “I’m not dead.” It is too early to perform a postmortem on Zelensky’s political career. But it may not be premature to attempt an analysis of his deteriorating condition and struggle to survive.

Zelensky’s strength is being undermined on four fronts: overall domestic support, support from his party, financial support from Europe, and a collapsing relationship with President Donald Trump.

Polls show that Ukrainians, who wanted Zelensky to lead them through the war, no longer want him to lead them after the war. Indeed, having fed Ukrainians with fantastical promises of pushing Russia out of all Ukrainian lands and being welcomed into NATO, and having depended on a cooperative relationship with Ukrainian ultranationalists who oppose a compromise peace with Moscow, Zelensky may have put himself into a position where his presidency cannot survive the war. Polling shows a collapse of domestic support for Zelensky, suggesting that he would lose by a wide margin in the next election.

An incident that took place in Italy deserves careful consideration, because it demonstrates the close relationship between Israel and the political institutions of European countries.

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The unexpected

An incident that took place in Italy deserves careful consideration, because it demonstrates the close relationship between Israel and the political institutions of European countries—in a Europe that is becoming a destination for many Israeli citizens seeking to recreate their communities in small territorial enclaves on the Old Continent. Why is it worth discussing this? Because this is an example of a pattern that is beginning to repeat itself in various parts of Europe, and this will have significant geopolitical consequences sooner than we expect.

Here’s what happened. On October 5, 2026, Fanpage.it published an investigative report by Michelangelo Mecchia that had a rare impact in Italian journalism: in less than a week, it reached the Chamber of Deputies, the European Parliament, and the Veneto Regional Council. At the center of the story is an association based in Albignasego, in the Padua area, called Christians for Israel Italy. It is the Italian branch of Christians for Israel International (C4I), a network founded in the Netherlands in 1979 and now present in over forty countries. According to the investigative report, for more than twenty years this network has been raising money for Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank.

So far, this would be a story of transnational religious and political activism—the kind that exists in every democracy. The point is another. Between 2023 and 2024, the Veneto Region allocated 16,000 euros in public funds to the association. And the same association, according to the documentation, has over the years built up privileged access to the leadership of the parties currently governing the country and the region. The question that arises does not concern anyone’s beliefs. It concerns the way in which an Italian public institution chooses its partners, and whether it does so knowing—or wanting to know—who it is funding.

The method used was undercover investigation. Journalists approached the Italian chapter posing as potential donors and asked whether it was possible to support projects in the occupied territories. The answer was yes: all they had to do was indicate “Judea and Samaria” in the transfer description. The term is not neutral. It is the biblical designation that Israeli authorities use for the West Bank and that the settler movement employs precisely to deny that it is occupied territory. According to the investigation, the Italian office also clarified that it works in direct contact with Israeli political authorities.

The main operational channel is Christian Friends of Israeli Communities (CFOIC), a partner organization based in the settlements themselves. According to Fanpage, it is through CFOIC that most of the money destined for the settlements passes, used to purchase drones, cameras, surveillance systems, and jeeps for patrolling the territory. This is therefore not generic humanitarian aid, but equipment for controlling the area around the outposts: the very same security infrastructure that, in the day-to-day reality of the West Bank, serves to demarcate land, monitor Palestinian villages, and facilitate the expansion of the settlements.

Two factors add weight to this picture. The first is the scale. After October 7, 2023, the international network launched an extraordinary campaign that, according to its own 2023 financial report, raised 3.6 million. The second concerns an incident that came to light in the Netherlands, where the investigative journalism platform Investico investigated the Dutch branch of the network: in an interview with reporters, a settler, Nati Rom, proposed using donations to buy guns for settlement residents. The Dutch section subsequently suspended that collaboration. Investico also traced the funding for prefabricated housing units for new settlement residents. It should be noted precisely that the proposal regarding weapons has not been attributed to CFOIC or the Italian section. But it speaks volumes about the environment from which that money comes—and about the fact that the network itself felt it had to distance itself from it.

Then there is the public discourse. Marco Alexander, a tour guide, has spoken several times in the movement’s webinars, suggesting that the best solution would be to relocate the population of Gaza elsewhere, followed by a process of “de-Palestinization.” In a video, the association’s president, Edda Fogarollo, a history professor, attacked Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, for wearing a keffiyeh, calling for the Pope to intervene. The attack came after Israeli police had prevented the patriarch from reaching the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. That an association calling itself Christian would choose to take aim at the shepherd of the Christians of the Holy Land—rather than at those who barred him from entering Christianity’s holiest site—is a political fact even before it is a theological one.

International law as a matter of opinion

The press release in which the Green and Left Alliance brought the case before the Regional Council refers to a “ruling” from 2024. The technical term is different, and the distinction deserves clarification because those who defend the settlements often exploit precisely these inaccuracies. On July 19, 2024, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion, at the request of the United Nations General Assembly, on the legal consequences of Israeli policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. An advisory opinion is not a judgment between parties, but it represents the most authoritative interpretation of current international law that exists. And its conclusions are clear: Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Territory is illegal; Israel must immediately cease all new settlement activity and evacuate the settlers; and all States have an obligation not to recognize the situation as legal and not to render aid or assistance in its maintenance.

This last point is decisive for the Veneto case. The obligation not to provide assistance does not apply only to governments in their diplomatic relations: it extends to the entire state apparatus, including local authorities, to the extent that they use public resources. On September 18, 2024, the General Assembly adopted the opinion through Resolution ES-10/24, approved by 124 votes in favor, 14 against, and 43 abstentions, and called on Israel to end the occupation within twelve months. Italy abstained. That abstention was a political choice by the government, not a suspension of the legal obligations identified in the advisory opinion. The twelve-month deadline expired over a year ago. Meanwhile, the settlements have expanded.

Regarding the term “genocide,” used in the regional communiqué, legal prudence requires a distinction to be made. The case brought by South Africa against Israel before the International Court of Justice is still pending on the merits, and Israel rejects the accusation. In January 2024, however, the Court deemed some of the claims invoked by South Africa to be plausible and ordered provisional measures; in September 2025, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry concluded that acts of genocide were committed in Gaza. The final judgment rests with the Court. But a ruling class that uses public funds to finance those who publicly advocate for the forced transfer of the population of Gaza cannot claim to be unaware of the legal and moral climate in which it operates.

Public funds for israeli interests

We must be precise here as well, because the issue is serious and does not need to be exaggerated. The 16,000 euros were allocated via two decrees, in 2023 and 2024, under the call for proposals established by Regional Law No. 5 of February 3, 2020, which supports initiatives for Holocaust Remembrance Day, education about the Holocaust, the fight against antisemitism, and the promotion of Jewish culture. The funds went to two events: 9,500 euros for an “Exhibition of Degenerate Art” and 6,500 euros for an initiative dedicated to Eugenio Gentili Tedeschi.

This, however, does not settle the matter; it merely shifts it. Money is fungible: every public euro that covers an association’s cultural expenses frees up a private euro for other purposes, including campaigns for “Judea and Samaria.” But there is a plan even more significant than the flow of funds, and that is the plan of legitimization. A regional grant—especially one based on a law dedicated to the memory of the Holocaust—conferrs upon its recipient a badge of institutional respectability. It is symbolic capital that can then be spent anywhere: in the halls of the Senate, in relations with schools, and in fundraising. And during the Venice exhibition financed with that money, former Member of the European Parliament Magdi Cristiano Allam denied the very existence of a Palestinian national identity. Public sponsorship, in other words, provided a platform for a thesis that denies a people under occupation the right to exist as a political entity.

Finally, there is an aspect concerning the memory of the Holocaust itself. Using a law designed to educate young people about the extermination of Europe’s Jews as a funding channel for entities committed to supporting a military occupation that has been declared illegal amounts to co-opting that memory for a contingent political purpose. This also harms the Jewish communities of Veneto—the primary beneficiaries of the law—who bear no responsibility for the choices made by a Christian-Zionist association and yet find themselves sharing the same budget line with it.

The situation in Veneto is not an isolated administrative incident. Between 2011 and 2025, the Italian branch of C4I organized conferences with Israeli diplomats and members of the ruling party, several of which took place in the Senate chambers. On October 13, 2021, for example, the association hosted a “Jerusalem Prayer Breakfast” at the Senate, with the then-Israeli ambassador Dror Eydar, Giorgia Meloni (who was in the opposition at the time), Matteo Salvini, Lucio Malan, Paolo Formentini, and Simone Pillon announced as attendees. On that occasion, Salvini described the transfer of the capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem as a moral, civic, religious, and political commitment.

President Fogarollo ran in the 2015 Veneto regional elections with Fratelli d’Italia and in the 2022 Padua municipal elections on a center-right ticket; in September 2026, she was on the Pontida lawn with an Israeli flag alongside League deputy Formentini. On January 30, 2024, League Senator Massimiliano Romeo introduced a bill against antisemitism that incorporates the IHRA definition, which was later approved by the Senate; in September 2026, Maurizio Gasparri defended it in a public debate with Fogarollo herself. There is nothing illegal about lobbying, and an association has every right to support a bill. But the IHRA definition is contested by a large part of the legal and academic community precisely because, in its examples of application, it risks equating political criticism of the State of Israel with antisemitism. When it is promoted most zealously by circles that deny Palestinian identity, the suspicion that the aim is to silence dissent regarding the occupation becomes legitimate.

Viewed through a geopolitical lens, the case illustrates a broader dynamic. Christian Zionism, which originated in the Anglo-Saxon evangelical world, has for decades been one of the most effective vehicles for Western support of the West Bank colonization project: it provides money, volunteers, informal diplomatic networks, and above all, a theological framework that removes the issue from the realm of international law and places it in the realm of prophecy. In Italy, where Catholicism has a very different tradition and where the Holy See has recognized the State of Palestine since 2015, this influence has found a foothold not in the Churches but in a segment of the political right, which uses it as a marker of allegiance to the Atlantic camp. The result is paradoxical: an association that calls itself Christian attacks the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, while Palestinian Christian communities in the West Bank—from Taybeh to Bethlehem—have been denouncing settler violence for years.

What the Venetians expect from their institutions

On October 12, regional councilors Carlo Cunegato and Elena Ostanel of the Green and Left Alliance submitted a question requiring an immediate response to the Regional Executive Committee led by Alberto Stefani. Democratic Party councilors Monica Sambo, Alessandro Del Bianco, Chiara Luisetto, and Gianpaolo Trevisi asked Culture Councilor Valeria Mantovan to report to the committee on procedures and oversight. At the national level, Stefania Ascari, a member of the Chamber of Deputies from the Five Star Movement, questioned the Prime Minister and the ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Economy, and the Interior; in Strasbourg, Members of the European Parliament Brando Benifei and Cecilia Strada addressed the European Commission. To date, as far as is known, neither the Region nor the association has provided a public response on the matter.

There are four requests to be made to the Regional Executive, and none of them is radical. The first is full transparency: publish the decrees, financial reports, and expense receipts for the two grants, so that every euro is traceable. The second concerns the present. The 2026 call for proposals under Law 5/2020, approved on August 19 by Resolution No. 886, makes available 55,000 euros, and the rankings have not yet been published. Before awarding the funds, the Regional Executive must verify that no beneficiary supports, either directly or through networks of which they are a part, activities in the settlements. The third is structural: to introduce an explicit clause in regional calls for proposals that excludes from grants and funding any entity that finances activities in territories that international law considers illegally occupied, in accordance with the Court’s opinion. The fourth is political: a clarification as to why an association with these characteristics was able to access funds intended for Holocaust remembrance.

Throughout its history, Veneto has experienced life as a land of emigration and a border region; it knows what it means to have its territory determined by others, and it has also experienced what it means to be invaded, plundered, and culturally and politically violated. It needs no lessons to understand why a people would refuse to have its name erased.

The resources paid for by Venetian citizens through their taxes must be used for public health care, for nursing homes with fees that are becoming increasingly unaffordable, for schools, and for true culture. They must not—not even indirectly, nor through the veneer of respectability that public funding provides—contribute to legitimizing those who support the colonization of another people’s land. International law has already made clear which side to take. It is up to the Region to demonstrate that it understands this.

Brussels, Belgium, 23 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – European Parliament searches conducted by European Union prosecutors in Brussels and Strasbourg on 21 October have brought renewed attention to allegations of financial irregularities involving the former Identity and Democracy … Read more

The protesters cannot be dismissed as members of some particular social segment, being instead a cross-party movement from all sectors of society.

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Albania has returned to the news in recent days, with protests that eventually culminated in the destruction of the Ministry of Education, but the process that led to this chaos began some months ago because of the negotiations surrounding the construction of a gigantic luxury resort in the country, in a megaproject led by Affinity Partners, owned by Jared Kushner, the Zionist agent who is Donald Trump’s son-in-law and who occasionally acts as his ad hoc diplomat. Alongside Kushner in this project, there was also capital from three Arab petro-monarchies and local investors.

The first point of dissent, the spark, so to speak, of this fire, was the fact that the project would be built in an environmental protection area, in the marshy wetland zone of Albania, which is considered a natural paradise where flamingos, pelicans and other animals nest, some of them endangered. Nevertheless, Kushner obtained authorization from Edi Rama’s government to go ahead with the project, as well as the classification of strategic investor, which allows him to bypass local regulations.

The project itself is expected to reach the sum of 4.7 billion dollars and would be implemented on the island of Sazan (once a military base), on the island of Vjosa-Narta and on the island of Zvernec, which also have defensive characteristics. Kushner supposedly had the “idea” and “discovered” Sazan while traveling on the yacht of his friend Nathan Rothschild, a context in which he also met the Albanian prime minister.

Kushner’s other partners at Affinity Partners are Luis Videgaray, former Minister of Finance of Mexico, and Elad Gil, an Israeli investor, and the project involves the construction of hotels, marinas and private villas, in an effort that seems to point toward a “Dubai-ization” of Albania.

Since June, therefore, when these shady deals were revealed, Albanian citizens began going to the streets to protest, with slogans (“Albania is not for sale”) against Washington and Tel Aviv and calling for Kushner to be made persona non grata. The protests had already been following protests organized in February and March over corruption accusations against Edi Rama, as well as the fact that the Albanian prime minister had begun a campaign to encourage Israelis to move to Albania.

What has been most worrying for the Albanian government is the fact that these protesters cannot be dismissed as members of some particular social segment, being instead a cross-party movement from all sectors of society. And the protests continued, intermittently, until now in October, which points to a permanent dissatisfaction that is difficult to stifle.

The most recent protests are more focused on youth and on new corruption scandals, problems in education and the government’s attempts to “force” entry into the European Union, but the issue of Jared Kushner’s luxury resort remains on the agenda.

It is possible to analyze the case from the conspiracy-minded angle of “Epstein Island,” especially considering the Rothschild family’s ties to Epstein and to Kushner, but perhaps a more interesting angle points to the geopolitics of the Mediterranean and the power project of the State of Israel.

Israel has been expanding its activities in this area and expanding its presence. Israeli investors, for example, have been mass-acquiring properties in Cyprus and in the Greek port city of Kalamata. When we add up these ventures targeting properties in Cyprus, Greece and now Albania, we clearly perceive that there is an eastern Mediterranean focus in Israeli parastatal business activities. It is striking that these always involve islands and ports, which points specifically to the construction of a thalassocratic strategy on the part of the State of Israel.

Also striking is a specific theme of Albanian political-social reality, which is the fact that it has become common practice for Albanian investors, after being legitimized as strategic investors to secure approval for development projects, to resell their shareholdings for negligible amounts to other, more obscure actors. In many cases, we are talking here about “straw man” schemes used by the Albanian mafia. That would not naturally be the case for Kushner or the Arab petro-monarchies, but the suspicion raised affects the Albanian partners in this investment.

Perhaps that is why the violent repression of the protests has drawn less attention than elsewhere. It appears to be the authentic eruption of popular dissatisfaction in a country that for decades has been victimized by corrupt leaders, highly dangerous mafias and brutal terrorists.

Exclusive: Photographer Simon Montgomery told ‘state’s interest in regulated immigration’ outweighs his family concerns

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A British photographer is facing deportation from Sweden and forced separation from his 16-month-old son after authorities ruled in favour of the country’s immigration interests.

Simon Montgomery’s application to remain after the birth of his son last year was rejected on several grounds by Sweden’s migration agency, a decision that was then upheld by the migration court.

Exclusive: Photographer Simon Montgomery told ‘state’s interest in regulated immigration’ outweighs his family concerns

• UK politics live – latest updates

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A British photographer is facing deportation from Sweden and forced separation from his 16-month-old son after authorities ruled in favour of the country’s immigration interests.

Simon Montgomery’s application to remain after the birth of his son last year was rejected on several grounds by Sweden’s migration agency, a decision that was then upheld by the migration court.

Gli Stati Uniti negoziano con Mosca, mentre l’Europa si limita a commentare. La frase di Zakharova «non sono affari suoi» dice tutto.

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Una seduta al Senato

Il 14 ottobre 2026, nelle comunicazioni al Senato in vista del Consiglio europeo, Giorgia Meloni ha fatto una cosa che fino a pochi anni fa sarebbe sembrata impensabile per un governo italiano di destra: ha preso pubblicamente le distanze dal presidente degli Stati Uniti per difendere una linea più intransigente della sua. L’oggetto era l’intesa sul gasolio annunciata da Donald Trump dopo una telefonata con Vladimir Putin, accompagnata da una licenza temporanea del Tesoro americano che riapre al combustibile russo il mercato mondiale. Per la premier si tratta di una scelta «molto rischiosa»: legittima Mosca mentre le bombe cadono sulle città ucraine, le procura nuove entrate e indebolisce la leva delle sanzioni. Nella stessa seduta Meloni ha sostenuto che Putin starebbe cercando un nuovo nemico, e che quel nemico potrebbe essere l’Europa; e che un’Ucraina che smettesse di difendersi non otterrebbe la pace, ma l’occupazione.

Fin qui la cronaca. Il resto lo hanno fatto l’aula e i giornali. All’applauso della maggioranza si è unito quello di una parte dell’opposizione: Azione, Italia Viva, l’area riformista del Partito democratico. La Stampa ha trasformato il sostegno a Kiev in una questione di valori e di confini, quei confini che «lì si difendono».

C’è poi un dettaglio che vale più di molte analisi. Interpellata dall’ANSA, la portavoce del ministero degli Esteri russo Marija Zacharova ha liquidato le parole della premier con una formula sbrigativa: non sono affari suoi. Nelle stesse ore Volodymyr Zelenskij era a Londra, accolto dal primo ministro Andy Burnham, e denunciava la limitazione dei servizi satellitari militari forniti all’esercito ucraino. Elon Musk, dal canto suo, chiariva che la rete Starshield appartiene al governo americano e che ogni restrizione dipende dalle forze armate statunitensi e, in ultima istanza, dal presidente. Washington tratta con Mosca, Mosca risponde a Washington. Roma applaude se stessa. Patetico, no?

Non un caso esclusivamente italiano

Sarebbe un errore leggere la seduta del 14 ottobre come un episodio di politica interna. La postura italiana è la declinazione nazionale di una grammatica che oggi accomuna quasi tutte le cancellerie europee, e che ha tre regole. La prima: il conflitto ucraino viene presentato come uno scontro esistenziale tra civiltà politiche, in cui ogni compromesso equivale a una resa. La seconda: la minaccia russa viene proiettata oltre l’Ucraina, sul territorio dell’Unione, in modo da rendere il riarmo una necessità che non si discute. La terza, la più insidiosa: il dissenso interno viene ricondotto all’influenza del nemico.

La Germania offre l’esempio più nitido. Il ministro della Difesa Boris Pistorius, che già nel 2023 aveva chiesto che il Paese tornasse kriegstüchtig, capace di fare la guerra, e che da allora indica un orizzonte di pochi anni entro cui la Russia potrebbe attaccare un membro dell’Alleanza, ha sostenuto in questi giorni che la paura della guerra diffusa nella società tedesca sarebbe alimentata deliberatamente da Putin e dall’AfD. Il ragionamento merita attenzione. In un Paese che ha perso milioni di vite nelle due guerre mondiali, il timore di un nuovo conflitto non avrebbe bisogno di agenti esterni per spiegarsi. Attribuirlo a Mosca e al principale partito di opposizione significa trasformare un sentimento politico legittimo in un problema di sicurezza nazionale.

Il quadro si ripete altrove con accenti diversi. Il ministro degli Esteri polacco Radosław Sikorski rivendica i risultati degli attacchi ucraini contro raffinerie e infrastrutture russe; il suo omologo tedesco Johann Wadephul sostiene che non sia il momento di allentare le sanzioni, ma di inasprirle. Francia, Germania e Regno Unito si muovono come direttorio negoziale, tanto che la stessa Meloni ha chiesto che lo facciano almeno con un mandato formale di tutti i partner. Alle parole corrispondono numeri: il piano ReArm Europe presentato dalla Commissione nel marzo 2025, l’impegno assunto al vertice NATO dell’Aia a portare la spesa per difesa e sicurezza al 5% del PIL entro il 2035, il prestito da 90 miliardi a Kiev deciso dal Consiglio europeo nel dicembre 2025. La retorica non è un’eccentricità di qualche ministro, è letteralmente la lingua ufficiale dell’Unione – e purtroppo ci siamo abituati ad essa.

Una postura folle e controproducente

Definire folle questa linea non è un’iperbole polemica, se per follia si intende l’ostinazione nel ripetere un comportamento che produce effetti opposti a quelli dichiarati. Lo si vede su tre piani.

Il primo è strategico. La teoria della deterrenza insegna da decenni che una minaccia vale quanto la credibilità di chi la pronuncia, e che la credibilità dipende dalla capacità di dare seguito alle parole. L’Europa di oggi alza il tono senza disporre degli strumenti per sostenerlo. La vicenda Starlink lo ha mostrato con una chiarezza quasi didattica: l’esercito ucraino, che gli europei finanziano e incoraggiano, dipende per comunicazioni e guida dei droni da un’infrastruttura che appartiene a un’impresa americana ed è controllata dal Pentagono. Basta una decisione a Washington perché una parte delle operazioni si fermi. Promettere la vittoria in una guerra di cui non si controllano i satelliti è una forma di ipocrisia strategica, e gli avversari la leggono per quello che è.

Il secondo piano è economico, ovviamente. Già nel 2024 il rapporto di Mario Draghi sulla competitività europea indicava nel differenziale dei prezzi dell’energia rispetto agli Stati Uniti uno dei fattori del ritardo industriale del continente. Da allora la rinuncia agli idrocarburi russi è diventata dogma, la guerra in Iran ha fatto salire ulteriormente i prezzi dei carburanti e l’impegno al 5% del PIL per la difesa promette di assorbire risorse che i bilanci pubblici non hanno, se non a spese di sanità, pensioni e investimenti civili. Il paradosso è evidente: proprio mentre Washington, per ragioni del tutto interne legate alle elezioni di metà mandato, cerca gasolio a buon mercato anche da Mosca, i governi europei rivendicano come principio morale il fatto di pagare l’energia più cara dei loro concorrenti.

Il terzo piano è diplomatico, e forse è quello decisivo. Una politica estera che esclude per principio il negoziato si condanna a non sedere al tavolo quando il negoziato arriva. Ed è esattamente ciò che sta accadendo: Stati Uniti e Russia definiscono intese energetiche, ritmi della guerra e condizioni di un’eventuale tregua, mentre l’Europa commenta. La risposta di Zacharova alla premier italiana non è soltanto sgarbo diplomatico. È la misura esatta del peso che Mosca attribuisce oggi alle capitali europee. Si può discutere se sia giusto; è più difficile sostenere che sia sbagliato come descrizione.

Il prezzo della credibilità

Il danno più profondo, tuttavia, non si misura sul fronte e nemmeno sui mercati. Si misura nel rapporto tra le istituzioni e i cittadini. Quando la distanza tra ciò che viene proclamato e ciò che accade diventa visibile a occhio nudo, la parola pubblica perde valore. Da quattro anni i cittadini europei si sentono ripetere che la sconfitta della Russia è vicina, che le sanzioni la stanno piegando, che ogni nuovo pacchetto di aiuti sarà quello risolutivo. Ora vedono il principale alleato trattare con Mosca, l’Ucraina dipendere da decisioni prese a Washington e i propri governi aumentare la spesa militare mentre i servizi peggiorano. Non serve un’opera di disinformazione straniera per produrre sfiducia. Basta il confronto tra i discorsi e i risultati.

Questa sfiducia si innesta su una crisi di rappresentanza che ha radici più lunghe. Peter Mair una decina di anni fa, nel suo libro Ruling the Void, aveva descritto con largo anticipo il ritiro dei partiti dalla società verso lo Stato, e la progressiva separazione tra governo responsabile, cioè fedele ai vincoli esterni, e governo rappresentativo, cioè sensibile alla domanda degli elettori. Insieme a Richard Katz aveva coniato la nozione di partito-cartello, per indicare formazioni che competono nell’arena elettorale ma condividono la gestione delle risorse e delle scelte di fondo. L’applauso trasversale del 14 ottobre è un’illustrazione quasi perfetta di quel modello. Su un tema che riguarda la vita e la morte, il costo dell’energia, il destino dell’industria, l’elettore che dissente non trova in Parlamento un’offerta politica che lo rappresenti.

Gli effetti sono sotto gli occhi di tutti. In Francia i governi cadono uno dopo l’altro senza che emerga una maggioranza stabile. In Germania la coalizione al potere governa con l’opposizione più forte del dopoguerra alle spalle. In Italia l’astensione è diventata il primo partito. Le procedure restano intatte, le elezioni si tengono regolarmente, ma le decisioni rilevanti si prendono altrove, e il voto finisce per confermare scelte già compiute.

Governare attraverso la sfiducia

A questo punto si impone una domanda meno ovvia. Se la sfiducia danneggia le istituzioni, perché le classi dirigenti europee continuano a percorrere una strada che la alimenta? La risposta più semplice sarebbe l’incompetenza. Ma esiste un’ipotesi più robusta, che spiega meglio i fatti: la sfiducia, entro certi limiti, è una risorsa di governo.

Il meccanismo funziona così. Un elettorato sfiduciato si frammenta, si astiene, si disperde tra partiti nuovi e instabili. La frammentazione produce ingovernabilità; l’ingovernabilità, a sua volta, rende indispensabili le grandi coalizioni «responsabili», i governi tecnici, gli accordi trasversali che tengono fuori dal potere le forze considerate inaffidabili. Più il sistema è instabile, più diventa necessario il centro che promette stabilità. La crisi della rappresentanza, invece di indebolire chi governa, ne consolida la posizione, perché lo rende l’unico argine contro il caos che la crisi stessa ha prodotto.

La guerra perfeziona questo dispositivo in due modi. In primo luogo, consente di trattare il dissenso come una questione di sicurezza. Quando la paura del conflitto viene attribuita a Putin e all’opposizione, chi chiede di negoziare smette di essere un avversario politico e diventa un veicolo dell’influenza nemica. Carl Schmitt aveva indicato nello stato d’eccezione il luogo in cui si rivela la sovranità; Giorgio Agamben ha mostrato come l’eccezione tenda a diventare tecnica ordinaria di governo. L’emergenza permanente, che sia sanitaria, finanziaria o bellica, sottrae le decisioni al conflitto democratico e le affida a chi si presenta come garante della sopravvivenza collettiva. In secondo luogo, la guerra giustifica lo spostamento delle scelte verso sedi sottratte al controllo elettorale: la Commissione, il Consiglio europeo, la NATO, i formati ristretti come l’E3.

Occorre essere precisi su un punto, per non scivolare nella caricatura. Questa lettura non presuppone un piano concordato in qualche stanza segreta. Non serve. Basta che gli interessi convergano: le industrie della difesa che vedono crescere gli ordini, le burocrazie europee che acquisiscono competenze nuove, i partiti di governo che trovano nell’emergenza una ragione di esistere, i grandi gruppi editoriali che vendono la mobilitazione morale. Ciascuno agisce secondo la propria convenienza, e la somma di queste convenienze produce un sistema che si autoalimenta. Siamo a tutti gli effetti nella gramsciana crisi organica, la fase in cui il vecchio muore e il nuovo non può nascere, e in cui proliferano fenomeni morbosi. La gestione della sfiducia è uno di questi: un modo di sopravvivere alla crisi senza risolverla.

Vincere a qualunque prezzo

Resta l’ultima questione, la più grave. Che cosa sono disposte a sacrificare queste élite per uscire vincitrici dalla fase attuale? La risposta, guardando agli ultimi anni, è che una parte del sacrificio è già stata compiuta. La politica è stata sacrificata quando le scelte fondamentali sono state trasferite fuori dai parlamenti e la distinzione tra maggioranza e opposizione è diventata ornamentale. L’economia è stata sacrificata quando la competitività industriale del continente è stata subordinata a obiettivi geopolitici fissati altrove, accettando prezzi energetici insostenibili e il rischio concreto di deindustrializzazione. Chi ha già rinunciato a questi due pilastri ha poco da perdere sul terzo, che è il costo umano.

Quel costo, per ora, lo pagano soprattutto gli ucraini. Persino deputate della Verchovna Rada che hanno sostenuto con zelo la linea della guerra a oltranza, come Mar’jana Bezuhla, o che se ne sono distaccate, come Anna Skorochod, descrivono un Paese con le infrastrutture distrutte, una mobilitazione forzata segnata da abusi e una popolazione allo stremo, e ammettono che il conflitto è diventato per alcuni un affare; ma il costo comincia a ricadere anche sulle società europee: nei bilanci pubblici, nei salari erosi dall’inflazione energetica, nell’idea, ormai pronunciata senza imbarazzo da ministri in carica, che bisogna abituarsi alla prospettiva di combattere.

Qui la retorica bellica rivela la sua funzione più profonda, poiché non serve a vincere la guerra contro la Russia, che nessuna cancelleria europea ha i mezzi per vincere da sola. Serve a vincere la partita interna, a conservare il controllo di sistemi politici che non riescono più a produrre consenso e che hanno bisogno di un nemico esterno per giustificare la propria permanenza. In questo senso il prezzo umano non è un effetto collaterale del calcolo. Ne è una variabile, regolata secondo la convenienza del momento, nella perpetua danza macabra dell’utilitarismo politico.

Esiste un’alternativa, e non coincide con la resa: consiste nel riportare la diplomazia al centro della politica estera europea, nel riconoscere che un ordine internazionale ormai multipolare non si governa con le crociate morali, nel restituire ai parlamenti e agli elettori il potere di decidere sulla guerra e sulla pace. Gli indicatori per capire se qualcosa si muove sono concreti: il mandato che il prossimo Consiglio europeo affiderà, o non affiderà, ai negoziatori; il destino del regime sanzionatorio dopo la licenza americana sul gasolio; la tenuta dei bilanci nazionali davanti all’obiettivo del 5%.

Finché la risposta resterà quella applaudita il 14 ottobre, l’Europa continuerà a pagare un prezzo crescente per una guerra che non decide, mentre chi la governa troverà nella sua stessa instabilità la ragione per restare dov’è.

European leaders have to find the resolve to stop fueling the war against Russia and engage in diplomacy with Moscow.

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There is a straightforward way to alleviate the social chaos sweeping Europe, as well as the war in Ukraine threatening to engulf the continent. It’s an easy fix – and it’s not shoving more white powder up Zelensky’s nose paid for by European taxpayers.

European leaders just have to find the resolve to stop fueling the war against Russia and engage in diplomacy with Moscow to establish an all-encompassing security architecture (as Russia had proposed back in December 2021). That, in turn, will salvage European nations from unsustainable debt driven by militarism and propping up a kleptocracy in Kiev, whose puppet leader is obviously degenerating from cocaine addiction.

Across Europe, cities are looking like battle zones with mass protests, public tensions, buildings burning, shops looted, riot police baton-charging crowds, and masked mobs running amok. France is bearing the brunt of street violence, but so too are Italy, Belgium, and others. Spain and Portugal are seeing their cities turned into tent camps in protests against a lack of affordable housing.

In the turmoil, it is easy to lose sight of the basic problem. People en masse are suffering from economic privation. Why can’t their individual and social needs be met in an efficient and effective manner? Why is there seemingly no money to fix broken societies?

Curfews are declared in Paris and cities across France while Italy moves to deploy soldiers in Milan to restore a semblance of order. Thousands of arrests have been made in recent days. Revolution is in the air, and so too is the sinister possibility of supposedly democratic governments flipping to become police-state dictatorships.

In this volatile, explosive situation, it is tempting to look for scapegoats.

French President Emmanuel Macron goes on national television to denounce “ultra-left groups” who he says are mindlessly trying to destroy France.

Even American President Donald Trump weighs in to claim that a once great nation (France) is being “conquered by immigrants, jihadists and communists.”

There were also predictable accusations in Western media that Russia is fomenting the unrest across Europe.

Another misdirection is to portray the European governments as cash-strapped and unable to deliver relief from the cost-of-living crisis and deteriorating public services. The governments and media tend to define the problem as one of balancing fiscal bookkeeping, overspending on social welfare, aging populations, or some other demographic factor.

European nations, we are told by pundits, are in massive debt and under pressure from bond markets to ramp up austerity by slashing public spending. The challenge for France and other governments is that they “no longer have the fiscal room to simply throw more money at these problems,” as one commentator put it.

Another commentator lamented that: “Hamstrung governments seem to have no answer to the public’s furious demands, making further discontent likely.”

In other words, we are told, “there is no alternative to austerity,” to paraphrase the late British leader Margaret Thatcher.

But that premise deceptively tells only part of the picture. The crucial part omitted is that the fiscal crunch of European governments is largely caused by the reckless funnelling of money to fuel the war in Ukraine and inordinately build up their own military forces. That wasteful misallocation of resources is “justified” by relentlessly and absurdly demonizing Russia as a “threat to Europe”. The news media play the role of amplifying the propaganda.

The media do not question, never mind expose, how Europe’s economies have been exhausted by a proxy war agenda against Russia that has involved cutting themselves off from Russian affordable energy, the lifeblood of industry, and on top of that racking up hundreds of billions in debt by propping up the endemically corrupt Kiev regime.

That regime is losing the war against Russia as it runs out of conscripts for the meat grinder. Yet, European governments are fixated on keeping the futile war going with ever more funding of the regime.

Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s top diplomat, dissembled this week by claiming that “Ukraine would have surrendered a long time ago if not for European support”. This is a tacit admission that the EU and Britain are fueling the war.

She also accused the Trump administration of forcing Ukraine into a surrender. In her soulless view, diplomacy and peace are sneered at as surrender.

European societies are deprived of financial resources for vital public services and infrastructure all in the fraudulent name of “defending” Ukraine in a war that has gone on for nearly five years. There is no end in sight if the European leaders have their way.

The European Union’s unelected bureaucracy has donated €90 billion to the Kiev regime for 2026 and 2027 alone, in addition to over €200 billion already allocated. This largesse is still not enough. The Zelensky dictatorship is calling for an extra €70 billion to be doled out, and the EU Russophobic elites are clamoring to oblige.

No wonder that European societies are visibly falling apart from underinvestment and widespread hardship from the soaring cost of living. The social implosion is a direct consequence of a policy of militarism and war, a policy that the Euro elites are running with impunity and unaccountability. That’s dictatorship by any definition.

The depiction of fiscally constrained and helpless European governments is an illusion. The constraint is not a natural condition of societies. It is the consequence of a deliberate, criminal policy of warmongering.

So spare us the scapegoating and misdirection. Spare us the curfews and calls for emergency police state powers to curb “hooligans and extremists.” That misdirection is playing into the hands of the ruling class, which has delegitimized itself by its sponsoring of war in Ukraine, its support for American aggression against Iran and Yemen, and its complicity in Israeli genocide in Gaza and Lebanon.

Contrary to the politicians and pundits claiming that there is “no easy fix” to the chaos erupting in Europe, there is. It is for the European governments to stop fueling the war in Ukraine and actually manage societies according to democratic needs.

However, that rational and feasible solution is probably out of reach under the prevailing political system. The elites in control of the system are incapable of overseeing any meaningful reform. They will not engage in diplomacy to find a peaceful settlement in Ukraine with Russia.

And so the outcome seems to be either they consolidate the emerging dictatorship and quash the legitimate social demands of the people, or the people will prevail by sweeping away the corrupt regimes that masquerade as “democratic”.

Serbia is approaching a decisive parliamentary election on Sunday, 25th October, with former President Aleksandar Vučić facing an unprecedented challenge from a student-led political movement that emerged from nationwide anti-corruption protests.

The election comes amid growing allegations of political intimidation, surveillance and restrictions on independent journalism. International observers have expressed concern about the conditions under which the campaign is taking place, while opinion polls suggest that the opposition Student List could challenge Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).

Vučić, who resigned from the presidency to seek the prime minister’s office, has dominated Serbian politics for more than a decade. His attempt to retain power through a different constitutional position comes at a time when Serbia’s relationship with the European Union has deteriorated over judicial independence, media freedom and its continuing ties with Russia.

Student protests become an electoral challenge

The opposition movement developed following the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad in November 2024, which killed 16 people.

The disaster triggered demonstrations demanding accountability for alleged corruption, failures in public procurement and inadequate construction oversight. What began as a student protest subsequently developed into a nationwide political movement.

As EU Today previously reported, the demonstrations exposed mounting dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of public institutions and corruption allegations.

The Student List, formally registered for Sunday’s election, has brought together academics, professionals and activists who argue that Serbia requires fundamental changes to public administration and political accountability.

Unlike conventional opposition parties, the movement has developed without a single dominant political leader. Its organisers have sought to mobilise voters who previously abstained from elections, including younger citizens dissatisfied with the established political parties.

The movement is fielding 250 candidates and has emerged as the principal electoral challenger to the SNS.

Allegations of intimidation and surveillance

The closing stages of the campaign have been overshadowed by allegations involving Serbian police, intelligence services and political supporters.

A Reuters investigation published on 22nd October documented accounts from activists and journalists describing intimidation, physical attacks and alleged misuse of surveillance technology.

The investigation cited the SHARE Foundation, a Serbian digital rights organisation, which reported that at least 14 individuals had been targeted with advanced spyware.

Independent cybersecurity researchers have also examined alleged attempts to compromise the devices of political activists and opposition figures.

Serbian authorities have denied accusations of systematic political repression and rejected allegations that state agencies conducted unlawful surveillance.

Concerns about media freedom have nevertheless intensified. Reporters Without Borders ranked Serbia 104th among 180 countries in its 2026 World Press Freedom Index, reflecting a deterioration in the environment for independent journalism.

The ruling party maintains that it remains committed to democratic institutions and Serbia’s European integration.

European observers scrutinise the vote

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has deployed an election observation mission to monitor campaigning, electoral administration and voting procedures.

Its mission includes 14 core experts and 30 long-term observers, with additional short-term observers requested for election day.

A delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is also observing the election alongside representatives of the European Parliament and other international institutions.

Earlier this month, the Council of Europe’s pre-electoral delegation described the campaign environment as highly polarised and called for electoral rights to be respected.

The findings of international observers will become particularly important if the result is close or either side disputes the count.

Preliminary assessments are expected on 26th October.

Consequences for Serbia’s European ambitions

The election could influence Serbia’s accession negotiations with the European Union, which have made limited progress despite Belgrade’s formal commitment to membership.

Brussels has repeatedly raised concerns about judicial independence, the treatment of journalists, corruption and Serbia’s alignment with European foreign policy.

As EU Today examined in July, the failure to advance accession negotiations reflects disagreements extending beyond individual judicial reforms.

Serbia has maintained close economic and political relationships with Russia and China while continuing to seek access to European markets and investment.

A victory for the Student List could create an opportunity to reconsider the country’s approach to EU integration, although its candidates would still face the difficulties of governing a politically divided country.

A victory for Vučić would preserve much of Serbia’s existing political leadership, but the scale of the opposition challenge suggests that domestic pressure for institutional reform would continue.

Much will depend on turnout, the distribution of parliamentary seats and whether the results are accepted as legitimate.

For Brussels, Sunday’s election will be an immediate test of its enlargement policy in the Western Balkans and its ability to reconcile strategic interests with the democratic requirements attached to EU membership.

Officials will call on UK to ‘step up’ financial support at Brussels summit – with post-Brexit issues also on agenda

EU leaders will press Andy Burnham at a summit in Brussels to contribute more to Ukraine’s defence effort in 2027.

EU officials argue that the UK, Canada and Japan should do more to support Ukraine, but entreaties to these G7 countries for extra financial aid at recent international meetings have not been answered, Brussels says.

Officials will call on UK to ‘step up’ financial support at Brussels summit – with post-Brexit issues also on agenda

EU leaders will press Andy Burnham at a summit in Brussels to contribute more to Ukraine’s defence effort in 2027.

EU officials argue that the UK, Canada and Japan should do more to support Ukraine, but entreaties to these G7 countries for extra financial aid at recent international meetings have not been answered, Brussels says.

Visa quotas, university fees and NHS surcharges remain sticking points ahead of post-Brexit negotiations next month

A deadline for a youth mobility scheme between the EU and the UK could be deferred by six months in a bid to ensure Andy Burnham has a successful “reset” summit on 20 November, diplomats have said.

EU ambassadors in Brussels on Wednesday heard that the UK was still insisting on international tuition fees, quotas and an NHS surcharge for EU students. This has fuelled fears the summit could fail, just as the prime minister is promising to unveil a new vision for Britain’s long-term relationship with the EU.

Visa quotas, university fees and NHS surcharges remain sticking points ahead of post-Brexit negotiations next month

A deadline for a youth mobility scheme between the EU and the UK could be deferred by six months in a bid to ensure Andy Burnham has a successful “reset” summit on 20 November, diplomats have said.

EU ambassadors in Brussels on Wednesday heard that the UK was still insisting on international tuition fees, quotas and an NHS surcharge for EU students. This has fuelled fears the summit could fail, just as the prime minister is promising to unveil a new vision for Britain’s long-term relationship with the EU.

MEPs called for more ambitious action to reduce emissions and avoid further increases in temperature.

On Thursday, the European Parliament called on the European Union (EU) to define a timetable to progressively abandon fossil fuels and assume a leading role in the COP31 negotiations, which will be held in November in Turkey.

RELATED: Europeans Rise Up in Resistance to Austerity Measures

The resolution was approved after the 27 member states adopted a common position for the climate summit, in which they recognize that the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees faces increasing difficulties.

MEPs called for more ambitious action to reduce emissions and avoid further increases in temperature, insisting on the need to accelerate the energy transition.

The text urges the EU to promote an international treaty on the non-proliferation of fossil fuels and to establish concrete timetables to gradually eliminate subsidies and production of oil, gas and coal.

The European Parliament also requested that the EU itself adopt a clear strategy to abandon these energy sources in all sectors of the economy and serve as an international reference.

The parliamentarians stressed that dependence on fossil fuels represents a risk in a context of geopolitical tension and considered that decarbonization strengthens European strategic autonomy.

The resolution warns that Europe is the continent that is warming the fastest, which is why it considers it essential to maintain climate commitments and avoid a setback in environmental policies.

In addition, the European Parliament called for increasing international financing for climate adaptation, compensation for loss and damage, and support for the most vulnerable countries against the effects of climate change.

A delegation of fifteen MEPs will participate in COP31 to champion these priorities, which include strengthening climate finance and promoting greater protection of ecosystems and biodiversity.

teleSUR: JP

Source: EFE

MEPs have “strongly condemned” the “unprecedented” missile and drone attacks by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia, and their military offensive in Yemen.

In a resolution adopted in Strasbourg on Thursday, MEPs describe these attacks as “flagrant violations of international law … Read more

In questi giorni il caro vita turba i sonni del mondo politico e sindacale, compresi quanti finora hanno ignorato i diffusi rincari dell’energia e dei beni di prima necessità, riducendo l’emergenza a mera polemica politica.

Segue nostro Telegram.

In questi giorni il caro vita turba i sonni del mondo politico e sindacale, compresi quanti finora hanno ignorato i diffusi rincari dell’energia e dei beni di prima necessità, riducendo l’emergenza a mera polemica politica.

Tuttavia, anche le poche mobilitazioni in corso dimenticano che la causa primaria dell’inflazione è proprio l’economia di guerra: l’escalation militare ha fatto ripartire la corsa dei prezzi, con conseguenze particolarmente pesanti per le economie europee, dipendenti dal greggio in transito nel Golfo Persico.

Un tempo le forniture principali arrivavano dalla Russia a costi decisamente inferiori a quelli attuali. Affermare che l’economia di guerra sia la causa principale dell’inflazione e del rallentamento economico europeo significa semplicemente prendere atto della realtà.

I dati parlano chiaro: tra marzo e agosto la UE ha sostenuto 54 miliardi di dollari di costi aggiuntivi netti solo per le importazioni di gas e petrolio. Questo dato basterebbe da solo ad aprire un dibattito serio sulle conseguenze economiche dei conflitti.

A confermare il quadro è l’Ufficio Studi della CGIA di Mestre: a fine anno gli italiani pagheranno 29 miliardi di euro in più tra rincari di elettricità, gas e carburanti. Solo in Italia il costo dell’energia elettrica è balzato del 51,2%. Rincari dovuti all’instabilità delle catene di approvvigionamento, alle speculazioni finanziarie e all’aumento delle spese militari, che sottraggono risorse essenziali al welfare.

Di fronte a questo scenario, la risposta del Governo appare timida e priva di coraggio. Mentre sostiene le spese per il riarmo, prova a calmierare con fondi pubblici le bollette degli italiani (che stimano una spesa aggiuntiva media di 153 euro all’anno per l’elettricità e 477 euro per il gas). Parallelamente, i rincari a doppia cifra colpiscono anche i beni alimentari di largo consumo: la dimostrazione che non si tratta di un incidente di percorso, ma di un effetto strutturale dell’economia di guerra.

In questo contesto, le manifestazioni di piazza rischiano di rivelarsi inefficaci, sia per la scarsa adesione sia per la debolezza delle motivazioni. Manca una riflessione complessiva sul sistema economico e sui meccanismi che spingono verso il basso i salari (a partire dai criteri di calcolo dell’IPCA). I bonus non sono la soluzione, bensì il sintomo del progressivo smantellamento del welfare pubblico.

È urgente iniziare a parlare apertamente di “economia di guerra”: un modello di produzione che alimenta la corsa alle risorse, dirotta i fondi pubblici verso la difesa e giustifica la sottrazione di risorse ai servizi essenziali. In caso contrario, continueremo a inseguire singoli provvedimenti tampone senza mai affrontare la vera radice del problema.

Articolo originale:  lantidiplomatico.it

Cela fait un certain temps que je voulais écrire un article sur les destins de la Russie et de l’Ukraine depuis le début du conflit en 2014. Le fil conducteur est que l’Ukraine a drastiquement réduit ses échanges commerciaux avec la Russie, depuis 2014, sans jamais les compenser par une augmentation des échanges commerciaux avec l’Europe. Cela a eu comme conséquence involontaire que l’Europe a dû injecter des sommes importantes en Ukraine juste pour empêcher sa monnaie de s’effondrer alors que la guerre se poursuivait. Pendant ce temps, la Russie a diversifié ses échanges commerciaux avec les pays non-européens, de sorte que sa balance extérieure est aussi solide aujourd’hui qu’elle l’était en 2014, ce qui lui procure les liquidités dont elle a besoin pour soutenir l’effort de guerre.

Ian Proud

Points importants :

• L’Ukraine a exporté 24% de moins et importé 46% de plus en 2025 qu’en 2014. La guerre a fait grimper les importations alors que les exportations ne se sont jamais remises de la signature de l’ALECA et ont été entravées par l’effort de guerre.
• Le déficit commercial béant que l’Ukraine a creusé depuis le début de la guerre a exercé une pression accrue sur les sponsors européens pour qu’ils fournissent le capital dont l’Ukraine a besoin pour empêcher l’effondrement de sa monnaie, en plus de fournir des fonds pour répondre à ses besoins budgétaires.
• Ce défi de financement pour l’Europe persistera après la fin de la guerre, tant que l’Ukraine ne sera pas autosuffisante en stimulant ses exportations et/ou en attirant suffisamment d’investissements étrangers pour compenser ses déficits commerciaux.
• La force des exportations russes et ses excédents commerciaux constants n’ont pas été affectés par la guerre. Après le début de la crise ukrainienne, la Russie a commencé à diversifier ses principales exportations d’énergie hors d’Europe, ce qui lui a permis de résister à la réduction progressive de ses exportations vers l’Europe. En effet, la Russie a tiré une énorme manne, en 2022, de la flambée des prix de l’énergie. Il n’y a aucune preuve que les sanctions aient eu un impact significatif sur le modèle d’exportation russe.
• La Russie avait déjà commencé à réaccumuler des réserves de change après l’effondrement des prix du pétrole fin 2014, jusqu’avant le début de la guerre. Suite à l’immobilisation des 300 milliards de dollars de réserves russes en Europe, la Russie a commencé à accumuler des réserves en or, pour sanctionner les bénéfices futurs. La Russie dispose désormais de réserves liquides de plus de 420 milliards de dollars, ce qui signifie que l’immobilisation de ses réserves de devises étrangères n’est plus un facteur limitant sur le plan économique.

Analyse détaillée

Le modèle d’exportation de la Russie, dans lequel elle enregistre constamment d’importants excédents commerciaux, lui a permis de générer les réserves de devises étrangères et d’or qui ont sans aucun doute contribué à financer la guerre en Ukraine. Le déficit commercial de l’Ukraine s’est creusé depuis le début de la guerre, nécessitant des injections continues de capitaux européens pour empêcher l’effondrement de sa monnaie.

Cela aide à expliquer que la Russie puisse soutenir la guerre plus longtemps ; elle n’a pas besoin de contracter de nouvelles dettes importantes, sa dette restant faible, à 20%. L’Ukraine ne peut financer la guerre et maintenir ses comptes nationaux en équilibre qu’avec de l’argent européen qui ne peut être garanti à long terme et qui, de toute façon, a augmenté la dette ukrainienne de 20% du PIB en moyenne chaque année depuis le début de la guerre. Ce n’est pas durable.

L’Accord de libre-échange approfondi et complet de 2014 a désavantagé l’Ukraine car il forçait le pays à ne plus commercer avec la Russie.

Le point de départ est la signature par l’Ukraine d’un Accord de libre-échange approfondi et complet avec l’Europe, le 27 juin 2014.

Herman van Rompuy, alors président du Conseil européen, déclarait alors que « des liens politiques et économiques plus forts apporteront plus de stabilité et de prospérité à l’ensemble du continent européen ».

Au même moment, le président Porochenko déclarait « au cours des derniers mois, l’Ukraine a payé le prix le plus élevé possible pour réaliser son rêve européen ».

Car le véritable cout de cet accord a été supporté par l’Ukraine qui a vu ses exportations s’effondrer et ses importations augmenter, car elle avait fait le « choix souverain » de ne plus maintenir ses liens commerciaux avec la Russie.

Ce fut un choix catastrophiquement mauvais. La Russie représentait environ 25% des exportations ukrainiennes avant 2014 et ce chiffre était tombé à moins de 5% en 2021, avant le début de la guerre. L’Ukraine n’a pas comblé cet écart en augmentant le volume de ses exportations vers l’Europe, qui sont restées en grande partie inchangées.

De plus, le même schéma peut être observé en Géorgie, qui n’a également connu aucune augmentation réelle de ses exportations vers l’UE après la signature de l’ALECA. L’UE utilise un certain nombre de mécanismes de règlement des différends commerciaux et d’autres barrières non tarifaires pour bloquer la croissance des importations en provenance des pays partenaires de l’ALECA.

Ainsi, en encourageant l’Ukraine à commercer avec l’Europe et non avec la Russie, l’Europe a imposé une perte économique sèche à l’Ukraine qui avait pris la décision souveraine de renoncer à une relation commerciale auparavant rentable, pour poursuivre un objectif politique d’intégration à l’UE.

De plus, depuis le début de la guerre, les importations ukrainiennes ont augmenté, entraînant une augmentation progressive de son déficit commercial. Cette augmentation des importations a été causée par le fait que l’Ukraine achète des armes aux États-Unis en utilisant des fonds européens et nationaux empruntés. Ainsi, l’Ukraine emprunte de l’argent pour créer un déficit commercial qui doit être comblé par de nouveaux afflux de capitaux.

Entraînée dans un déficit commercial persistant et croissant par la guerre, l’Ukraine a besoin d’injections continues de fonds étrangers pour empêcher l’effondrement de sa monnaie.

Le graphique ci-dessous montre la croissance du déficit commercial de l’Ukraine avec la croissance correspondante des recettes classées comme « Revenu secondaire » dans sa balance des paiements trimestrielle. Ces entrées de capitaux classés comme « Revenus secondaires » sont des injections en provenance d’Europe (principalement) qui sont vitales pour renforcer les réserves de change de l’Ukraine et ainsi éviter une ruée sur la devise. Le point clé est que le financement étranger à l’Ukraine est plus qu’un simple événement fiscal. Il s’agit d’un mécanisme de soutien essentiel dans les circonstances où l’Ukraine est incapable d’attirer suffisamment d’investissements étrangers en temps de guerre.

La Russie n’a tout simplement pas été confrontée au même défi, choisissant plutôt de diversifier ses exportations vers d’autres pays alors que l’Europe fermait progressivement ses échanges commerciaux. Les sanctions n’ont pas entamé son commerce.

Le graphique ci-dessous illustre de manière élégante comment le commerce de la Russie a changé et évolué depuis. Les exportations russes ont connu des pics et des creux depuis 2014, bien que les creux aient souvent été causés par des événements mondiaux tels que les effondrements des prix du pétrole de 2014 et 2016 et le COVID.

Le déclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine a provoqué une énorme manne de revenus d’exportation car le prix du pétrole a bondi. Malgré l’imposition de milliers de sanctions par les pays occidentaux après le début de la guerre, les exportations russes sont restées très résistantes. Cela est dû à la diversification par la Russie de ses exportations vers les pays d’Asie.

En bref, malgré les nombreux gros titres dans les médias occidentaux traditionnels sur les sanctions « entravant l’économie de guerre de la Russie« , il n’y a aucune preuve substantielle que cela ait été le cas.

Le modèle d’exportation russe continue d’être une salle des machines qui lui fournit les liquidités dont elle a besoin pour financer la guerre sans contracter de nouvelles dettes importantes. Cela lui donne un avantage significatif sur l’Ukraine et ses soutiens européens dans cette « guerre d’usure« .

La Russie a accumulé des réserves depuis le début de la guerre pour compenser l’immobilisation de 300 milliards de dollars en devises par les pays occidentaux. La Russie investit désormais dans l’or pour protéger ses actifs.

Enfin, je commente depuis un certain temps que la Russie a entamé le processus d’accumulation de réserves de change en 2017 alors qu’elle modifiait sa politique monétaire pour adopter un rouble faible afin de maximiser les revenus en roubles tirés des exportations et qu’elle entreprenait un certain nombre d’achats en dollars via le ministère des Finances. Vous pouvez voir cette accumulation de réserves dans le graphique ci-dessous.

Après le début de la guerre, après l’importante manne de revenus tirés des exportations en 2022 et des chiffres commerciaux toujours solides par la suite, la Russie a continué à accumuler des réserves. Cependant, suite au gel de ses avoirs en devises, elle a plutôt choisi de stocker ses réserves en or, pour les protéger des sanctions.

Si la Russie souhaite évidemment récupérer ses avoirs immobilisés après la fin de la guerre (gros point d’interrogation), elle a néanmoins constitué un important coussin financier à hauteur de plus de 420 milliards de dollars de réserve en plus de celle qui reste gelée.

Ces importantes réserves contribuent sans aucun doute à garantir l’effort de guerre russe sans avoir besoin de gros emprunts. La dette de la Russie représente aujourd’hui environ 20% de son PIB.

En 2021, la dette de l’Ukraine s’élevait à environ 49% de son PIB. Aujourd’hui, elle représente environ 110% de son PIB.

Publié à l’origine par The Peacemonger.
Traduction: Le Saker Francophone

The European Parliament has awarded the 2026 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its officials, recognising the Hague-based tribunal’s work in investigating and prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

Announcing the decision in Strasbourg on Thursday, 22 October, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said the award reflected the European Union’s commitment to multilateralism and international institutions.

Metsola praised the Court for its work in upholding international law and justice. The announcement was met with a standing ovation in the parliamentary chamber.

The decision comes amid an escalating confrontation between the European Union and the administration of US President Donald Trump over the ICC’s jurisdiction and independence.

Washington’s sanctions against the Court

On 9 October, the United States imposed sanctions on the ICC as an institution, extending measures previously directed against individual judges and prosecutors.

The restrictions place the Court under the US Treasury’s sanctions regime, limiting financial transactions involving American individuals, businesses and institutions. Washington has issued several temporary and limited exemptions intended to allow specified operations to continue.

The measures followed earlier sanctions against senior ICC officials, including Court President Tomoko Akane, and form part of Washington’s campaign to prevent the tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over American personnel.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has argued that the ICC threatens American sovereignty by asserting authority over nationals of countries that have not accepted its founding treaty.

The Court rejected the latest restrictions, describing them as an attempt to obstruct the administration of international justice.

Established under the Rome Statute, the ICC operates independently of national governments and investigates serious international crimes where its jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.

Neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the Rome Statute.

Arrest warrants involving Russia and Israel

The dispute with Washington has intensified since the ICC issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected with military operations in Gaza.

Israel rejects the Court’s jurisdiction and disputes the allegations. Washington has similarly opposed the proceedings against Israeli officials.

The ICC has also pursued investigations into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In March 2023, its judges issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children.

Further warrants followed in 2024 against senior Russian military commanders and officials in connection with attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure.

The proceedings demonstrate the geographical scope of the Court’s investigations, although its ability to secure arrests depends heavily on cooperation from individual states.

The ICC has no independent police force and relies on national authorities to execute its warrants.

European Parliament backs international justice

The ICC’s nomination for the Sakharov Prize was submitted by the Socialists and Democrats group in the European Parliament.

Its selection comes as European lawmakers examine how the EU should respond to American sanctions affecting the Court and organisations supporting its activities.

The October restrictions have raised practical questions about access to banking, technology services and other infrastructure required by the tribunal.

European governments must also consider how to support an institution established through an international treaty while maintaining relations with Washington.

The Sakharov Prize carries no legal authority to reverse American sanctions or compel governments to cooperate with ICC investigations. Nevertheless, the award represents an explicit institutional endorsement of the tribunal at a time when its operations face increasing external pressure.

Other nominees and award ceremony

The ICC was selected from three finalists announced earlier this month.

The other nominees were Tanzanian opposition leader Tundu Lissu and Iranian sisters Taraneh and Romina Rahimi, whose cases have attracted international attention over political persecution and judicial proceedings.

The Sakharov Prize, established by the European Parliament in 1988, is named after Soviet physicist, dissident and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov.

It recognises individuals and organisations defending human rights, freedom of expression and fundamental liberties. The award includes €50,000.

Previous recipients include Nelson Mandela, Malala Yousafzai and imprisoned journalists.

In 2025, the prize was awarded jointly to Belarusian journalist Andrzej Poczobut and Georgian journalist Mzia Amaglobeli.

The formal presentation of the 2026 prize is scheduled for 16 December at the European Parliament in Strasbourg.

The award places the ICC alongside previous Sakharov laureates while drawing further attention to the unresolved dispute between Washington and European governments over international criminal jurisdiction.