The Houthis (Ansar Allah) attacked Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on October 10, killing at least 13 people and injuring over 300, the deadliest attack on the kingdom in more than a decade, forcing authorities to suspend operations at the airport.

This was not an isolated incident.

Since the fighting resumed between Saudi Arabia and the Iran-backed group in July this year, Houthis have attacked at least five Saudi airports, including King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Airport in Jizan, Abha International Airport, Najran Airport, King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, and King Fahd International Airport in Dammam.

So far, at least 20 people have been killed in these attacks, and hundreds more have been injured, apart from damage to runways, terminals, and aircraft.

Just the King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has been attacked three times this week. The two previous attacks on King Khalid Airport this week killed ⁠four and caused heavy damage to a Saudi commercial plane parked on the tarmac.

The Houthis, in fact, have declared the whole of Saudi airspace as “a zone of military operations,” saying airlines should avoid flying in the country.

Saudi Arabia operates one of the Middle East’s most extensive, multi-layered air-defense networks. Its upper tier includes US-supplied THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) alongside Patriot batteries, South Korea’s Cheongung-II AD system, and improved HAWK launchers.

It also fields French Crotale SAMs, Avenger systems with Stinger missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and Silent Hunter laser systems supplied by China.

The Houthis are also enforcing a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia by choking the Bab-el-Mandeb strait in the Red Sea and have also targeted the country’s oil refineries and East-West oil pipeline.

In fact, in the ‘fog of war,’ it is easy to miss the context that the Houthi-Saudi war did not begin with these strikes on Saudi airports; nor did it start in July when a 2022 ceasefire between the two sides broke over Saudi air strikes on Sana’a airport.

The two sides have been fighting for nearly two decades.

Saudi-Houthi Conflict

The Houthis are a Zaydi Shiite politico-religious movement from northern Yemen’s Saada region, originating in the 1990s as a revivalist group opposing corruption in central government, their economic and social marginalization, and increasing Saudi-backed Wahhabi influence in Yemen, including in traditionally Zaydi areas.

Saudi Arabia’s longest land border with Yemen stretches roughly 1,200 km, much of it still porous. Consequently, expanding Iranian influence through the Houthi rebels carries security implications Riyadh cannot afford to overlook.

The Houthis drone and missile capabilities, and the strategic importance of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb routes for Saudi oil exports, add more risks for Riyadh.

Due to these factors, Riyadh has a vested interest in both containing rising Iranian influence in Yemen and weakening the Houthis’ military capabilities, while at the same time, preventing the economic collapse of Yemen.

If Yemen collapses, the crisis will inevitably spill into its northern neighbor – Saudi Arabia. There are already over 2 million Yemeni migrants in the country, and an economic collapse can further push millions of Yemeni citizens into the country.

Riyadh regularly provides grants to the Yemeni government to prevent its collapse and has already provided US$12.6 billion in the last 14 years. After investing so much money, Riyadh clearly tries to control who leads the country and its policies.

However, Saudi involvement in Yemen was never limited to just financial aid.

Riyadh first got militarily involved in Yemen 17 years ago, in 2009.

Between 2004 and 2010, the Yemeni government and the Houthis were engaged in constant hostilities. This warfare often spilled into Saudi Arabia’s southern parts as well.

After Houthi attacks on Saudi border posts in November 2009, which killed border guards, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on Houthi positions with F-15 and Tornado fighter jets, and even conducted limited ground operations.

Notably, this was the kingdom’s first unilateral military operation in decades.

Fighting continued in 2010, and there were substantial Saudi casualties, with more than 130 Saudi soldiers dead by some estimates.

Riyadh and the Houthis reached a ceasefire in 2010, which stopped the fighting. Meanwhile, the Houthis continued to gain ground in Yemen. By the end of 2014, the Houthis had occupied the very strategic Sanaa and Aden airports.

In March 2015, Saudi Arabia returned to Yemen with Operation Decisive Storm. This time, Riyadh was not alone. It cobbled together a coalition of eight countries, including the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan. The US also provided logistics and intelligence support.

When Saudi Arabia Bombed Yemeni Airports

The campaign began with massive airstrikes targeting air defenses, airports/air bases, missile sites, and Houthi positions. Riyadh also imposed a naval blockade of Yemen.

The coalition particularly targeted Yemeni airports, airbases, air defense missiles, and civilian and military aircraft. The aim was to neutralize any aerial capability that the Houthis might have gained after seizing Yemeni government assets.

In March itself, the Saudi-led coalition launched airstrikes on Sanaa International Airport, the adjacent al-Dulaimi air base, and Al Anad Air Base.

Reports say the attacks damaged or destroyed scores of aircraft, including a Yemeni Air Force CASA CN-235M-300 cargo plane and a Beechcraft Super King Air at al-Dulaim.

The strikes also damaged one Mi-8 helicopter, two Bell 214 Huey helicopters, multiple Su-22 ground-attack fighters, and F-5 jets. The coalition destroyed an Ilyushin Il-76TD cargo aircraft at Sanaa International Airport in late March.

The coalition also damaged the runway at Sanaa International Airport.

The coalition attacked Sanaa Airport again in April. A Yemeni Felix Airways Bombardier CRJ702ER civilian aircraft was set ablaze, and another cargo plane was hit. Two Yemeni Air Force MiG-29s were also reported destroyed in related strikes at the airport.

When an Iranian cargo plane, allegedly carrying humanitarian aid, tried to land at the Sanna airport, coalition jets targeted the airport again and bombed the runway, rendering it unusable.

Brigadier General Ahmed Asseri, spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition, told Reuters at the time that the airport was bombed after an Iranian aircraft refused to coordinate with the coalition and the pilot ignored orders to turn back.

These attacks continued in May.

A contemporary report said that one MiG-29, two F-5s, three Su-22s, one Mi-8, and two Il-76TD cargo planes were destroyed in Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen in May.

The Yemeni Air Force was effectively neutralized in these attacks. The coalition strikes destroyed most MiG-29s, Su-22s, F-5s, and support aircraft on the ground or rendered them unusable.

The coalition further attacked Yemeni airports in 2017 and 2018.

The Saudi-led operation continued for seven years, from 2015 till 2022, when a ceasefire was reached between Riyadh and the Houthis.

This ceasefire was broken in July 2026 when Riyadh once again bombed Sanaa airport in order to not let an Iranian plane land at the airport.

However, by July 2026, the Houthis had considerably improved their offensive capabilities.

This time, it’s the Houthis who are enforcing a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and repeatedly targeting its civilian airports, as well as oil infrastructure.

While the Houthi attacks on Saudi airports are making global headlines, the prelude to these attacks was written over a decade ago in 2015, and the final chapter of this nearly two-decade-long conflict between Riyadh and the Houthis has yet to be written.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

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Russia is prepared to halt attacks on Ukraine for a single day to allow presidential elections but will not agree to a longer ceasefire, the Kremlin said on Monday. 

But had the Russian attack on Ukraine, as planned, succeeded in the initial days, the Ukraine-Russia war would not have dragged into the fifth year, and there would have been no talks of changes in leadership.

Dmitry Peskov said President Vladimir Putin would order Russian forces not to strike Ukraine on polling day if elections were held. “If they truly want to hold elections in Kyiv, then the president of Russia, the commander-in-chief, will be ready to give an order not to launch strikes on Ukraine on election day, specifically on election day,” Peskov told reporters.

He rejected Zelenskiy’s call for a 60-day ceasefire, saying Russia seeks a lasting peace agreement rather than a temporary halt.

“In the Kremlin, both President Putin and officials at other levels have repeatedly stated that we do not want a ceasefire,” Peskov said. “We want long-term peace and are prepared to do everything possible to achieve it.”

Zelenskiy made the 60-day offer on Sunday in an ABC News interview. He said Ukraine would organize elections if Russia agreed to a full ceasefire lasting two months.

“Please tell Putin, give us two months, 60 days of total ceasefire, 60 days, and we will organize elections,” Zelenskiy said.

His comments came a day after U.S. President Donald Trump said Ukraine should replace its President. Trump told reporters that Zelenskiy had failed to reach a deal with Russia and that it was time for a change.

“I think it’s time for Ukraine to get a new president,” Trump said. He criticized Ukraine’s strikes on Russian oil refineries, which followed a U.S. agreement to ease restrictions on Russian diesel exports.

Why Putin Failed To Seize Kyiv?

Russia had a clear plan to capture Kyiv and force a surrender.

On 24 February 2022, Russia’s Airborne Forces launched an operation toward Kyiv, supported by missile strikes and air cover, using attack and transport helicopters.

The objective of this blitzkrieg-style maneuver was to seize Antonov Airport in Hostomel, north of Kyiv, establish a bridgehead, create a secure air corridor for additional airborne troops, and then rapidly advance toward Kyiv.

The plan was to quickly deploy Russian Special Forces and military equipment at Hostomel and then overwhelm Ukrainian resistance after a couple of hard strikes.

If successful, Russian troops, armor, artillery, and supplies could be flown into the airport, allowing them to deploy into Kyiv and overthrow the Ukrainian government.

To execute this mission, Russia tasked its elite Airborne Forces (VDV), particularly the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade, a unit with extensive combat experience from operations in Chechnya, Crimea, and Donbas.

The operation began on February 24 with a coordinated attack involving numerous Russian Ka-52 “Alligator” attack helicopters, which used low-flying tactics to avoid radar detection.

These helicopters fired guided missiles and cannons at the airport’s defenses to suppress Ukrainian forces. Despite intense resistance that cost Russia several helicopters, the assault continued for several hours.

Russian forces seized Hostomel Airport on February 25, 2022. Afterward, the Russian Army and its Airborne Forces tried to turn the airport into a critical forward operating base for their planned push toward Kyiv.

However, Russia’s offensive soon faced considerable setbacks. Russia’s failure to clear the area around the airport quickly led to catastrophe. Ukrainian forces, including special operations units from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense Main Intelligence Directorate, launched a counteroffensive.

Local fighters and Ukrainian forces on the ground inflicted heavy damage on the Russian troops. In one of the most noteworthy junctures of the battle, a sniper killed Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, the commanding general of the Russian 7th Airborne Division, by the end of February 2022.

The invasion’s initial momentum slowed, leading to the infamous 40-mile-long convoy and entire units of Russian troops stalling due to fuel shortages.

By March 4, Russian state television aired footage showing large numbers of destroyed Russian military equipment, struck by Ukrainian artillery, scattered across the base. Russian forces became immobilized without clear orders to advance or retreat.

The situation remained dire until March 29, when Russian commanders finally ordered a retreat from Kyiv Oblast. This marked the beginning of the Russian withdrawal from Hostomel, with damaged equipment that could not be evacuated. Ukrainian artillery fire targeted the retreating forces, further complicating their situation.

Among the equipment left behind were 16 modern BMD-4M armored fighting vehicles and a 1L262E Rtut-BM electronic warfare system. These items were either destroyed during the retreat preparation or intentionally blown up by Russian forces.

When Ukrainian troops reentered Hostomel, they found evidence of the hastily abandoned Russian positions, with remnants of daily life scattered around.

These included unopened food packages, personal items like passports and bank cards, and even Ukrainian armored vehicles that had been captured by Russian forces but could not be taken with them.

The loss of surprise, the inability to clear surrounding areas, and the vulnerability of airborne operations to counterattacks demonstrated how quickly airborne missions can go wrong.

The Russian failure to capture Hostomel Airport proved fatal for Moscow’s overall military strategy in Ukraine. After the Hostomel disaster, Russia withdrew from Kyiv oblast and then regrouped in Ukraine’s southern and eastern provinces to stabilize the frontlines.

This initial failure to seize Hostomel and then proceed to Kyiv also allowed Western countries to mobilize support for Ukraine and resume supplying Kyiv with critical military and humanitarian aid.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Putin’s 2022 Plan to Seize Kyiv Failed — Now Trump Wants a New President & Moscow Offers One Day Solace appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The U.S. Air Force has donated an F-117A Nighthawk, the world’s first operational stealth aircraft, to the Smithsonian Institution, where it will be on permanent public display later this month.

The Nighthawk, serial number 85-0818 and nicknamed “The Overachiever,” is the only F-117 known to have flown combat missions in all four major conflicts, including Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989), Operation Desert Storm (1991), Operation Allied Force over Yugoslavia (1999), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003).

It first flew in 1986 and was withdrawn from combat service around 2007.

The Air & Space Forces Association announced the donation on Sept. 14 at its Air, Space & Cyber Conference. Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works prepared the aircraft for display in a museum. Air Force Reserve crews from the 512th Airlift Wing then flew the partially disassembled Nighthawk from California to Virginia aboard a C-5M Super Galaxy, arriving around Oct. 6.

The National Air and Space Museum’s Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center near Washington Dulles International Airport will reassemble the aircraft. Visitors can watch the reassembly through the glass overlook of the Mary Baker Engen Restoration Hangar before the aircraft joins the permanent collection in late October, alongside other icons such as the SR-71 Blackbird and the B-29 Enola Gay.

Museum officials described the F-117 as the world’s first true operational stealth combat aircraft and said adding it fills a longstanding gap in the national collection. It is the 16th F-117 transferred for public display.

World’s 1st Stealth Aircraft

Aerospace analysts have long admired the F-117 Nighthawk’s distinctive design. A GE blog post describes the Nighthawk’s features and says the aircraft looks less potent alongside other advanced American fighters.

The aircraft has no afterburners. The aircraft is unstable on all three flight axes and requires an onboard computer for control

Despite that, the GE also noted one advantage: the aircraft is practically invisible to enemy radar.

According to General Electric, it was the first stealth aircraft to see the light of day during the Cold War and used a pre-existing engine modified to meet the requirement.

Despite the US technological advantage during the Cold War, contested airspace posed a substantial threat to pilots and their aircraft. Developing enemy technology could allow the enemy’s air force to lock on to American fighter jets and shoot them down at an alarming rate.

Although Lockheed Martin built the F-117 Nighthawk, GE built the engine that could power a stealth warplane. GE created the F404 engine exclusively for the F/A-18 Hornet, and it quickly became a compelling alternative for the F-117, a top-secret aircraft that needed an engine.

The engine was almost identical to the F/F404 A-18’s variant. GE constructed roughly 100 of these engines on a separate assembly line with only government-approved workers. That engine soon earned its stripes by being dependable, maintainable, lightweight, and inexpensive.

The Nighthawk

The US Air Force retired the F-117 Nighthawk in 2008.

The F-117s are reportedly used as developmental and “red air” training platforms a decade after their retirement. Certain aircraft act as aggressors in air-to-air combat during red-air training.

This raised eyebrows because it was unlikely that an archaic aircraft retired a decade ago would resurface for war games. The US Air Force later revealed that it had resurrected the Nighthawk.

Speculation suggests the USAF has brought these aircraft back to life because of their stealth capabilities. The USAF needs to train its fighter pilots against adversary stealth fighters, the Russian Su-57 and the Chinese J-20, as well as cruise missiles.

As a result, USAF pilots may be able to better find and intercept stealth aircraft in future operations and counter enemy cruise missiles if they train against Nighthawks as part of an advanced program.

When the US planned to develop the F-117 Nighthawk, the main challenge was reducing the aircraft’s radar cross-section and electromagnetic signature.

The aircraft had to fly subsonically to reduce obnoxious sonic booms. The aircraft had no afterburners or large exhaust plumes from infrared-emitting engines. It referred to flat surfaces that reflected radar radiation. The result was an otherworldly-looking black jet the US government didn’t recognize until 1988.

Despite the F-404’s ability to fly supersonically, the Nighthawk was limited to subsonic speeds because using afterburners to breach the sound barrier would compromise the aircraft’s stealth.

GE engineers designed the F-117’s unusual exhaust to scatter hot exhaust and evade radar and heat-seeking missiles.

“Really, it was the beauty of it. They could modify an existing engine, the F404, to provide the required thrust and weight. Minor adjustments were made to meet the F-117’s unique intake, and F404-F1D2 was ready to power the stealth attack aircraft,” said Bill Formosi, a former project manager of the F1D2 program.

Unlike other planes of the period, the F-117’s air intakes were grilled and coated with a unique radar-absorbent coating. Spring-loaded doors also opened on the ground to let in more air to the engine. However, once in flight, the hatches would be closed again to maintain the aircraft’s stealth.

According to Formosi, the tailpipe was the engine’s most distinctive feature.

“If you look at an F-117 from behind, you’ll notice that the engines aren’t visible like they are in other aircraft,” he said. “It was done on purpose, and it had everything to do with keeping it quiet. There was a 12-stage tailpipe that went from circular at the engine’s end to flat at the end of the exhaust, rather than an afterburner as the F404 had on the F/A-18.”

“This was done to spread the hot exhaust air over a larger region, reducing its heat signature,” Formosi said.

This is probably why the F-117 Nighthawk, commissioned over 40 years ago and retired over a decade back, has staged a comeback,  this time for public viewing.

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As EurAsian Times recently reported, the U.S. Air Force crew denied Indian officials cockpit access to its F-35 stealth fighter during the recent Tarang Shakti exercise, Indian Air Force Chief Air Marshal AP Singh said. Interestingly, the IAF did something similar with its cutting-edge Su-30 MKIs in 2008.

Speaking at a press conference alongside U.S. Pacific Air Forces Commander General Kevin Schneider, Air Chief Marshal Singh said the U.S. had made no formal offer to sell the F-35 to India, despite all the media buzz and speculation.

“Your people don’t even let us go near the aircraft, and you are talking about selling it to us,” Singh said when asked about any official offer for F-35s.

He added that Indian personnel were not shown the cockpit.

“The US did not show us the cockpit, but allowed us to fly in close formation,” Singh said. He later described his remarks as a joke that should not be taken too seriously and noted that countries protect sensitive technologies, including systems India does not share with the United States.

General Schneider said he did not make decisions on information sharing for programs such as the F-35. “There are program-level security classification guides that determine what we can share, when we share it, as well as how we protect it,” Schneider said.

USAF had deployed six F-35 stealth jets for Tarang Shakti. This was the first time U.S. stealth jets trained against Indian jets and operated from the indian soil. This was a rare opportunity for the Indian military to study and evaluate a stealth fighter using Indian ground radars.

Experts like Air Marshal Anil Chopra, writing for the EurAsian Times, believe it would be a good opportunity for the IAF to prepare for a potential J-20 scenario operated by China.

Chopra wrote: “The F-35A is the only fifth-gen fighter in the exercise. In mock drills, it is much better than China’s J-20, with stealth, low observability, sensor fusion, and first-look, first-shot tactics, and it will better simulate the J-20. That does not mean the IAF will see the F-35’s classified technologies; however, it does mean that the IAF can practice studying a stealth jet from an Indian base—to understand the Chinese J-20 better.”

Prelude to Saudi-Houthi War: When 9-Nation Coalition Led by Saudi Arabia Bombed Yemen With U.S. Support

Parallel from Red Flag 2008

In 2008, India sent its most advanced Su-30 MKI fighters to the US for the Red Flag exercise at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

To protect the Flankers’ classified NIIP N011M Bars passive electronically scanned array (PESA) radar, the Indian Ministry of Defense directed pilots not to use the radar in full operational mode.

IAF stated at the time that “the radar frequencies are top secret, as they can be used to block vital functions of the fighter” and that “while we have a good equation with the USA, we have to be careful about the future.”

The Bars radar was operated only in a limited “training mode” that restricted its range and capabilities, preventing detailed mapping of its frequencies by host forces.

Other limitations during Red Flag 2008 included restrictions on data-links, chaff, flares, and simulation of the R-77 BVR missile. Indian pilots operated without a full cockpit data picture to protect its sensitive technology.

While Indian crew had limited exposure to the F-35s at Tarang Shakti 2026, with the jets kept in a segregated area, the USAF has previously been given noteworthy access to the MKIs.

During the familiarisation phase ahead of Red Flag 2008, Su-30MKI crews exchanged rides with their American counterparts, allowing U.S. pilots to fly in the Flanker’s rear seat, according to reports.

During Exercise Cope India 2023 at Kalaikunda, then-PACAF Commander General Kenneth S. Wilsbach flew a training mission in the rear seat of an IAF Su-30MKI alongside an Indian pilot—an engagement the IAF publicly confirmed.

Earlier Cope India iterations also saw USAF pilots fly in Su-30 trainer variants.

During the just-concluded Tarang Shakti, F-35s operated extensively alongside Su-30MKIs, Rafales, and Tejas in joint tactical missions, large-force engagements, and mixed formations, giving the USAF tremendous exposure to the Flanker’s performance envelope, radar behavior, and tactics in a realistic environment.

U.S. F-117 Nighthawk “The Overachiever” Makes Final Comeback at Smithsonian’s Udvar-Hazy Center

Su-30 MKI vs. F-15 at Red Flag

After the 2008 exercise, a video of a private briefing by USAF Colonel Terrence Fornof, an F-15 pilot and director of requirements and testing at the Air Force Warfare Center at Nellis, circulated online.

Fornof was addressing a group of retired military pilots.

Fornof claimed F-15 pilots “dominated” the Su-30 MKI in one-versus-one engagements. He described Indian pilots as “amazed” and “floored,” saying they didn’t want more one-versus-one fights after the first few days.

He claimed the F-15 exploited a vulnerability in the Su-30’s thrust-vectoring by waiting for the aircraft to enter post-stall maneuvering, after which it “starts falling out of the sky,” allowing the F-15 to close and engage with guns.

Fornof also claimed the Su-30 MKI’s engines were highly susceptible to foreign object damage, leading Indian pilots to request one-minute spacing between takeoffs, and he noted concerns about engine reliability.

He claimed Indian pilots had a high rate of fratricide and that, on paper, the Su-30 had superior radar, thrust, thrust vectoring, and weapons range. He added that once Indian pilots fully mastered the aircraft, they could regularly defeat F-15s and F-16s, but the Su-30 was “nowhere near” the F-22.

USAF later said Fornof’s comments were his personal opinion and that he did not intend to offend allies.

Indian accounts and subsequent reporting rejected Fornof’s points. They claimed that the Sukhois held their own against top USAF pilots and maintained a high serviceability rate throughout the exercise.

“Our pilots were functioning on a stand-alone basis while the USAF pilots were part of a network and were getting inputs on navigation, target information and enemy details. We were getting all our inputs manually and were fighting fit even against all these odds,” a top IAF officer had said at that time.

Other Indian accounts claimed that no Su-30 MKI was shot down in the approximately 10 one-versus-one engagements, and that the IAF was credited with most kills.

All engagements were recorded on ACMI systems. Thrust-vectoring performance differed from Fornof’s account, and U.S. aircrew said they appreciated the IAF’s maneuvers.

Fratricides occurred on both sides. Indian sources attributed theirs largely to periods when AWACS support was unavailable and to poor ground control by U.S. controllers (acknowledged in debriefs), noting that the IAF lacked Link-16 and advanced IFF while the U.S. side had them.

Putin’s 2022 Plan to Seize Kyiv Failed — Now Trump Wants a New President & Moscow Offers One Day Solace

Serviceability was reported above 90 percent, with no confirmed foreign object damage incidents of the type described; a tire burst was quickly repaired. Engines were NPO Saturn (not Tumansky, as Fornof said). The one-minute takeoff spacing was a deliberate safety measure because damaged engines had to be returned to Russia for repair, with no local replacements available.

IAF reported a mission achievement rate above 90 percent and said they performed well in large-force engagements despite operating far from home and under restrictions.

In conclusion, the F-35 access limits and the 2008 Su-30 MKI restrictions highlight standard practice among air forces seeking to protect classified tech during wargames.

• Mail the author at: editor (at) eurasiantimes.com
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The global defense industry appears to be entering a period of structural transformation, driven by rising military spending, technological change, and increasing private-capital involvement.

The “Aerospace & Defense M&A Report 2026: Deal Activity, Market Trends and Outlook,” published by Ropes & Gray LLP  on October 7, 2026, says that Aerospace and Defense Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), Private Equity (PE), and Venture Capital (VC) funding are likely to expand further, showing that 2026 is on track to be one of “the strongest deal-making years” on record.

The report highlights that Defense Tech/Services is the fastest-growing segment at a 22% Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR), followed by Aerospace at 16% CAGR; Aircraft Manufacturers, Parts & Components at 14% CAGR; and Air, Land, & Sea Defense at 9% CAGR.

The report argues that the growth is not simply a temporary response to international conflicts. Governments are rebuilding industrial capacity, replenishing weapons inventories, strengthening supply chains, and accelerating the development of advanced military technologies.

In the United States, the largest market, proposed increases in defense resources, procurement reforms, longer-term contracts, and financial support for defense technology companies aim to attract private capital and expand manufacturing capacity.

In Europe, the EU’s Security Action for Europe initiative aims to mobilize about €800 billion in defense-related investment through national fiscal flexibility, loans, and related financing support.

Germany’s increased spending and procurement reforms can accelerate equipment acquisition and industrial expansion. Collectively, these policies are reshaping the geography of defense investment in Europe.

In fact, the report says that  Europe has emerged as a major driver of new activity. “Europe has become a primary engine of deal flow, not a secondary market. Rising national budgets and new EU-wide financing mechanisms are reshaping where capital is being deployed as well as dictating deployment speed”, it says. NATO’s higher spending ambitions, European rearmament and new financing arrangements are encouraging companies to expand, consolidate and acquire specialist capabilities.

Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific is undergoing a rapid, structural alignment driven by what regional planners call a “contested era.”

China is consolidating its domestic defense industry, though restrictions on cross-border investment limit Western investors’ access. Japan is rapidly reshaping its defense posture and adapting to an environment where the traditional binary definitions of “peacetime” and “wartime” have effectively blurred.

In this era of continuous competition, the report says Japan has elevated allied burden-sharing to its foundational organizing principle.

This shift is most visible in the digital domain. With the operationalization of Japan’s Active Cyber Defense Oversight Commission, Tokyo has adopted a proactive cyber defense strategy. By implementing legal public-private threat reporting and neutralized-access protocols, Japan is signaling a willingness to legally counter and neutralize state-sponsored infrastructure targeting before cyber assaults can cripple critical domestic networks.

One of the report’s most important observations is that defense investment is increasingly a private-equity story. Private-equity firms are acquiring established manufacturers, selling businesses to strategic buyers and building larger companies through additional acquisitions. Venture capital is also financing newer businesses developing military technologies.

Among the ten largest transactions listed for 2026 up to September 30 was GE Aerospace’s $11.8 billion acquisition of Consolidated Precision Products. Other major deals involved aerospace leasing, maritime defense, aircraft components, and specialist detection technologies.

Dubai Aerospace Enterprise bought Macquarie Airfinance for $9.0 billion in what was a leasing consolidation. In a move that signals European rearmament, land-defense scaling, and main-battle tank production, KfW Group (German State Bank) is backing KNDS [Franco-German tank maker Krauss-Maffei Wegmann + Nexter] with $7.8 billion.

In other words, private investors are no longer confined to peripheral suppliers. They are becoming key participants in the industrial ecosystem that supports national defense.

Significantly, the traditional reliance on a handful of legacy prime contractors is giving way to an ecosystem heavily backed by private equity and venture capital.

The private sector is now driving global defense deal-making as it pivots toward software-defined defense, autonomy, and next-generation platforms.

The report shows how defense technology is changing the industry’s center of gravity. Although aerospace and defense remains one of the most active and strategically complex sectors for private capital deployment, software-defined defense, autonomy, and next-generation platforms are pulling ahead as the fastest-growing corner of the market.

Investors are particularly interested in artificial intelligence and software-defined defense systems; autonomous platforms, including unmanned aircraft and maritime systems; counter-drone and missile-defense capabilities; space infrastructure and surveillance; and specialist electronics, communications, and mission-critical components.

However, while these technologies can drive rapid growth, they also carry risks due to restrictive policies in the US and Europe. The report notes that regulatory compliance is becoming a structural hurdle rather than an afterthought.

In the United States, the largest market by transaction value, more national security vetting—including CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) and FOCI (Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence) mitigation—is becoming foundational to ensuring a clean exit.

In other words, the global defense landscape seems to be marked by a distinct paradox.

On the one hand, geopolitical threat vectors are accelerating at breakneck speed. On the other hand, the financial and regulatory machinery needed to field next-generation capabilities faces structural friction.

As a result, companies may depend heavily on a single government customer, handle classified information, or face restrictions on intellectual property developed under government contracts. Cybersecurity compliance and access to sensitive facilities can also complicate acquisitions.

In the United States, the CFIUS can scrutinize foreign investment for national-security risks. FOCI can also affect access to classified work and sensitive facilities.

Similarly, European foreign-investment screening is marked with many complexities. Even businesses that are not conventional arms manufacturers may face scrutiny if they supply strategically important electronics, software, communications or other dual-use technologies.

Commercial risks matter too. Fixed-price government contracts can leave manufacturers exposed when costs rise unexpectedly. Buyers must therefore examine contract liabilities, working capital, supply-chain resilience, workforce retention and the restrictions that could affect a future sale, the report advises.

The report’s overall conclusion, therefore, is that while defense investment opportunities are expanding,  success increasingly depends on technological relevance, reliable industrial execution, regulatory compliance and the ability to navigate national-security restrictions throughout the ownership cycle.

What lessons could India draw from the trends above?

For India, the report is particularly relevant because it highlights a shift in how advanced military capabilities are developed and financed. The implications extend beyond aircraft, missiles, and ships to defense electronics, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, space technology, supply chains, and foreign investment.

India’s first opportunity is to integrate more deeply into international aerospace and defense supply chains. As Western manufacturers expand production and diversify their suppliers, Indian companies could become more important producers of precision components, avionics, electronics, aerospace structures, and maintenance services.

The most instructive lesson may come from GE Aerospace’s September 8, 2026 acquisition of Consolidated Precision Products (CPP). Experts say that it was a paradigm shift in aerospace and heavy industrial manufacturing. For decades, aerospace primes aggressively outsourced manufacturing to optimize their balance sheets, shifting capital-expenditure risks onto multi-tiered supply chains.

But years of systemic, compounding engine delays—magnified by the Pratt & Whitney GTF powder metal crisis and Boeing’s structural manufacturing gridlock — exposed a fatal flaw: primes (like GE) outsourced execution, but they could never outsource the risk.

Therefore, GE Aerospace decided to buy the absolute bottleneck of jet engine production: structural castings and complex airfoils. Its deal with private equity firms Warburg Pincus and Berkshire Partners is meant to address persistent, industry-wide shortages of critical engine parts and airfoils. In other words, GE bought the supply chain to control the delivery.

For India, this implies that beyond focusing on “Make in India” as screwdriver assembly, it should also consider “Own the Supply Chain.”

Second, as defense technology gains primacy, expanding AI-enabled systems, autonomous platforms, counter-drone technology, advanced sensors, and space infrastructure could be more relevant for India than producing isolated components.

Some experts argue that because European primes are cash-rich and seeking low-cost engineering, they would prefer a JV with India to meet capacity needs.

Lastly, as the Ropes & Gray LLP  report illustrates, private equity and venture capital can help consolidate fragmented industries, finance expansion, and support specialized technology businesses. India could adapt this approach to build stronger domestic defense suppliers.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Europe Is Rearming — and U.S. Wall Street is Writing the Checks, Including GE’s Nearly $12 Billion Deal appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Unlike the F-35, India has received a formal offer from Russia for the Sukhoi Su-57 fifth-generation fighter but has not yet decided whether to evaluate it, the head of the Indian Air Force said.

Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh told reporters on the sidelines of the Exercise Tarang Shakti in Jodhpur that the Indian Air Force was aware of Moscow’s proposal.

“As far as the Su-57 is concerned, we have received information that an offer has been made, but no decision has been taken on whether to evaluate it,” he said.

“Once a decision is made, we will assess how well it meets our requirements.”

Russia has repeatedly pitched the Su-57 to India.

Earlier, as EurAsian Times reported, Russian President Vladimir Putin personally renewed the Su-57 offer to India.

Speaking on the sidelines of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Putin reaffirmed Russia’s readiness to cooperate with India on the Su-57, including exporting and jointly producing the aircraft.

“It’s fifth-generation technology — I think it’s the best in the world as of now,” the Russian President said at the forum.

President Putin recalled Indo-Russian 5th-gen aircraft collaboration and said: “As far as the Su-57 goes, at one point we proposed to our Indian friends to work together on this technology. “But back then, our Indian friends said: ‘Go ahead on your own, and then we will see – maybe we’ll join’…The aircraft could have been our joint project. We built it independently, but we are ready to work with India in this field – to supply this aircraft and to keep developing it,” the Russian President told the reporters. “We don’t have any issues with it or any limitations. The same goes for air defense systems,” he added.

The Su-57 is a supersonic, twin-engine fifth-generation aircraft designed to destroy air, ground, and naval targets. Developed to compete with the F-22 and F-35, the ‘Felon’ jet features enhanced stealth through composite materials and can cruise supersonically.

It is a multi-role fighter jet capable of air superiority missions, ground attacks, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. Russia is integrating a range of lethal weapon systems on the Su-57 platform, including the long-range R-37M missile and hypersonic missiles, as reported by the EurAsian Times.

Additionally, the aircraft is being integrated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) to enhance threat detection, decision-making, and pilot support. However, these features have failed to attract buyers, especially India.

If India proceeds with the Su-57 deal and Moscow meets all Indian prerequisites, including technology transfer, it could inject billions into Russia’s sanctions-hit economy. India would also get an interim fifth-gen fighter till the indigenous AMCA arrives.

Russia’s defense exports have historically benefited through high-profile deals with India. An excellent example is the Su-30MKI, India’s customized variant of the Su-30.

India’s acquisition of the Su-30MKI in the early 2000s influenced other nations, such as Malaysia, which modeled its Su-30MKM on the Indian version. Its versatility—including thrust-vectoring engines, canards, and integrated avionics from multiple countries—made it a flagship for Russian technology.

Another bigger success story is the BrahMos supersonic missile.

India’s DRDO and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya launched the joint venture in 1998 to develop and produce the BrahMos, one of the world’s fastest supersonic cruise missiles.

The Philippines was the first customer of the BrahMos, signing a contract worth approximately $375 million with BrahMos Aerospace in January 2022 for three shore-based anti-ship missile batteries.

The package, intended for the Philippine Marine Corps, includes mobile launchers, missiles, operator and maintainer training, and integrated logistics support. Deliveries began in April 2024 with the first battery and continued through 2025 and into 2026, with the third and final battery nearing completion.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro has indicated interest in further adapting or expanding the capability to suit the country’s geography and operational needs.

The two countries also reached an agreement on air-to-air missile cooperation that “enhances technology collaboration and defense capabilities”, he said.

Indian PM Modi hailed the “growing trust” between Jakarta and New Delhi after meeting Prabowo, which he said underpinned cooperation in “defense, security and maritime affairs”.

“Today, we reached an agreement to enhance defense exchanges, disaster management, and industrial cooperation,” Modi told reporters.

Earlier, Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) spokesperson, Rico Ricardo Sirait, told Reuters on March 9 that Jakarta has agreed to buy the BrahMos missile system from India.

The Indian Navy inducted its first BrahMos system in 2005 aboard INS Rajput. The Indian Army followed in 2007 with its own regiments, and the Air Force later introduced an air-launched version from the Su-30MKI in 2019.

The BrahMos missile saw combat use during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, when Indian forces employed air-launched variants from the Su-30MKI. IAF reportedly fired 15-19 BrahMos missiles.

The Indo-Russian missile could have more export customers.

India sketched a list of “friendly nations” it deemed potential buyers, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and South Africa. The list has since changed, with several countries dropping interest and others queuing up to assess the combat-tested missile system.

India reportedly started talks with Vietnam to sell off the supersonic cruise missile in 2023. An official with BrahMos Aerospace Ltd told the EurAsian Times at the time: “Vietnam had shown interest in the system. But the negotiations have just started.”

Further evidence of BrahMos’s widespread appeal in Southeast Asia is Malaysia’s sustained interest in the missile system, particularly the air-launched variant, which could be integrated with the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s Su-30MKM fighter jets.

By 2025, Malaysia appeared in lists of countries “queuing up” or actively negotiating for BrahMos. In fact, in August that year, reports suggested Malaysia had begun preliminary negotiations with Russia and India for the missile, aiming to revolutionize its Indo-Pacific airpower projection.

Besides Southeast Asia, the Middle East could be a potential market for the BrahMos missile.

Alexander Maksichev, Co-Director of BrahMos Aerospace, explicitly emphasized the UAE as a potential customer. Additionally, India has repeatedly listed the UAE among “friendly nations” eligible for BrahMos exports.

Other countries that have reportedly shown interest in the missile include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and Egypt. BrahMos has also gained traction in South America, with countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Venezuela showing interest.

The Indo-Russian BrahMos is a major export success, and Putin may want to replicate that success with the Su-57, using Russian tech and Indian co-production and marketing.

Whether India will bite the bullet remains to be seen.

• Contact us at editor (at) eurasiantimes.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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Taiwan recently received its first two F-16V (Viper) fighter jets from the US under an $8 billion deal for 66 F-16Vs, approved during US President Donald Trump’s first term.

The F-16 Vipers landed at Taiwan’s Chihhangair Air Force Base in Taitung. President Lai Ching-te called it “a major milestone in elevating Taiwan’s air defense capabilities” and thanked the US for its “long-standing support.”

When Lockheed Martin delivers the 66 new jets by 2028, the Taiwanese Air Force will have more than 200 F-16 Viper fighter jets, making it the largest Viper-standard fleet in the Indo-Pacific region.

Meanwhile, another Asian country, wary of China’s military, plans to acquire 114 Rafale jets from France.

IAF (Indian Air Force) already operates 36 Rafales and has ordered 26 Rafale-M (Marine) fighter jets for its Navy. If and when the IAF acquires all 114 Rafale jets, it will become the largest operator of Dassault jets outside France.

Rafale vs F-16V

Both Rafale and F-16V are powerful fighter jets, but one massive advantage makes the US Vipers “superior” to the French Rafales, at least theoretically.

On paper, the twin-engine, nuclear-capable Dassault Rafale looks far more lethal than Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Viper, a single-engine lightweight fighter that first flew in 1974, more than five decades ago.

However, in modern times, fighter-jet battles are rarely one-on-one platform contests.

As heroic dogfights between fighter jets became a relic of the past and gave way to beyond-visual-range (BVR) contests, the battle for aerial supremacy became a system-of-systems contest rather than a straightforward one-on-one contest.

In this system-of-systems contest, a much less capable fighter aircraft can trounce a much superior aircraft if it integrates ground-, air-, and space-based sensors, capable radars, sensor fusion, an integrated battlespace display, and precision targeting.

In short, a networked fighter jet, even if less capable, is more lethal than a stand-alone aircraft.

Additionally, fighter jet deals are rarely purely military decisions; they are as much geopolitical as they are military.

It’s no surprise that a capable, cost-effective combat aircraft like the Saab JAS-39 Gripen struggled to find an export customer for over a decade. Again, after signing a deal with Brazil for the Gripen E/F variant in 2014, the aircraft failed to win other export customers for more than a decade.

While Gripen is a cutting-edge aircraft with state-of-the-art weapons, its biggest weakness was the lack of a powerful, influential backer on the global stage like the US or France.

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Sweden, where Saab is based, is not really a global powerhouse, has a modest military, is not part of the nuclear club, and is not a member of the UN Security Council, unlike the US, Russia, France, the UK, and China, all of which are permanent members of the UNSC and enjoy veto power that could offer myriad advantages in geopolitical contests.

Brazil’s military transport aircraft, the Embraer C-390 Millennium, faces a similar challenge. Though capable and boasting an enviable safety record, it sells far fewer units than the American C-130J Super Hercules.

In other words, countries not only buy fighter jets; they also prefer to buy from countries with strong military and geopolitical clout.

This is where the US has an unmatched lead over competitors, including France, Russia, and China.

Consider, for example, Ukraine.

It not only received used F-16 fighter jets, but it also received Starlink support and US intelligence inputs, which allowed it to target military targets deep inside Russian territory.

Without this satellite and intelligence support, the F-16s would be only half as effective.

Similarly, consider Israel in the Middle East.

It has not only received advanced US fighter jets such as the F-15 and the F-35, but Jerusalem also gets full US intelligence support, pinpoint information on adversary military targets, and their military movements.

Similarly, Jerusalem gets early warning whenever Iran launches ballistic missiles towards it.

The US has nearly 20 military bases in the region and maintains advanced surface-to-air missile batteries, such as Patriot and THAAD, sea-based missile defense platforms, and AN/FPS-132 missile early-warning radar in the Middle East.

This diversified radar network ensures that not only does Israel receive early warning of every Iranian attack, but Iranian missiles and drones have to pass through a layered missile defense infrastructure spread over the whole of the Middle East before their projectiles can reach Israel.

It is these incremental weapons, missiles, radar and sensors, intelligence, and satellite support that ensure that Jerusalem comes out on top in every regional military conflict.

In the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel’s adversaries, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, had advanced Soviet fighters, and yet Jerusalem was able to trounce their combined military might, thanks to the intelligence support it received.

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Export of military platforms is perhaps the US’s most successful export commodity since the two World Wars.

According to SIPRI, between 2021 and 2025, the US was the world’s top military exporter, accounting for as much as 42% of global military exports.

France was a distant second with just a 9.8% share of global military exports.

However, this uncontested leadership depends on the superior performance of its military platforms in conflict.

So, basically, the US has a vested interest in ensuring the victory of militaries that field US military platforms.

On the other hand, countries that do not field US military platforms often struggle with poor intelligence support.

India, for instance, repeatedly requested Washington to provide satellite reconnaissance pictures to target Pakistani military positions on mountains during the Kargil War in 1999. But Washington declined India’s requests.

Had India bought US military planes, Washington would have, most probably, provided New Delhi with satellite imagery to target Pakistani military positions, so that India could hit these targets and Washington could market the efficiency of its jets.

In a potential conflict between China and Taiwan, Washington would provide Taipei with every possible intelligence and satellite support so that its fighter jets and other military platforms are not trounced against Chinese weapon systems.

As we have seen in the Ukraine War, no other country currently has a satellite network comparable to Starlink. In a potential conflict with China, this US support could be decisive.

With this US support, the F-16 Vipers could be far more lethal than they actually are.

Rafale is a very capable platform. It has an AESA radar, a SPECTRA electronic warfare suite, long-range air-to-air missiles such as Meteor, precision-strike munitions such as Hammer guided bombs, a long-range SCALP EG cruise missile, twin engines, and nuclear capability, which make it a lethal fighter.

However, despite its status as a major military power, France lacks the heft of the United States.

Despite the current “frosty” US-India ties, New Delhi must find a way to work with the US while preserving its strategic autonomy and boosting its Make-in-India initiative.

• This is an Opinion Article
• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern  History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Better than Rafale — Why Taiwan’s F-16 Viper Holds an Edge Over India’s French Jets to Counter China? Opinion appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

India’s air force chief said on Saturday that the U.S. has made no formal offer to sell India F-35 stealth fighters, and added that American personnel have not even allowed Indian officers near the stealth aircraft.

Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh made the comments at a press conference marking the end of the multinational Exercise Tarang Shakti-2026 in Jodhpur, while seated alongside U.S. Pacific Air Forces commander Gen. Kevin Schneider.

“Your people don’t even let us go near the aircraft, and you are talking about selling it to us,” Singh said.

Six U.S. Air Force F-35As, accompanied by more than 200 personnel, participated in Tarang Shakti. This was the first time the American stealth fighters had drilled against Indian jets on Indian soil.

Singh also said the Indian government has not yet decided whether the air force should evaluate Russia’s offer of the Su-57.

“Once the decision is conveyed to us (by the government), we will evaluate how well it meets our requirements,” he said.

Earlier in 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump said, during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington, that the United States would pave the way for India to acquire the F-35.

Later, Vice President J.D. Vance reiterated the offer during his visit to India in April 2025, saying, “We, of course, want to collaborate more. We want to work together more. And we want your nation to buy more of our military equipment, which we believe is best-in-class. American fifth-generation F-35s, for example, would give the Indian Air Force the ability to defend your airspace and protect your people like never before.”

Earlier, as EurAsian Times reported, Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet discussed selling the F-35 to India and raised the prospect of selling the F-21, a highly sophisticated F-16 derivative.

“I think the F-16 also has strong legs, if you will, and more and increasing interest as we go forward from several countries that aren’t quite ready for F-35,” Taiclet said. There are “some countries that could see F-21 or F-16, for India, for example, as a stepping stone to F-35.”

The sale of the F-35 is subject to rigorous U.S. export controls under the Arms Export Control Act, which requires approval from the State Department, the Pentagon, and often Congress. The White House maintains strict policies on technology transfers, regional stability, and the internal politics of the potential recipient state to safeguard its sensitive technology.

The U.S. hesitation is straightforward: sharing it with other countries could put sensitive technology in the hands of enemies, especially if the recipient country has ties to countries like China or Russia, which would try to exploit or reverse-engineer it.

Earlier, writing for EurAsian Times, Air Marshal Anil Chopra (retired) said: The F-35 soft pitch faced almost immediate limitations due to subsequent tariff frictions and India’s core push for technology transfer for domestic manufacturing of its AMCA fifth-gen warplanes and aero-engines.

GE Aerospace has faced immense delays on its 2021 contract to supply 99 F404-IN20 engines to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for the Tejas Mk1A fighter program. Only six out of the promised engines have been delivered instead of the targeted 12-plus a year, prompting HAL to invoke contractual penalty clauses.

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Tariffs on “friend” India and delayed engines for AMCA have badly weakened Indo-US ties.

India also operates Russian-supplied S-400 systems, a factor that previously caused friction between the U.S. and Turkey.

India already operates the Russian-origin S-400 AD System. The U.S. fears these networks could compromise classified F-35 stealth data. The jet relies on the U.S.-controlled Operational Data Integrated Network for software and logistics.

The U.S. may already be accessing such data through many other American platforms on Indian soil.

Meanwhile, introducing a complex new Western platform adds severe maintenance challenges to an already diverse military fleet. Even in the U.S., very few airbases can service stealth coatings.

Buying foreign fifth-generation jets risks diverting funds from India’s indigenous AMCA project. Putting too many military aviation eggs in the unreliable U.S. basket is also a risk. Americans can be “very unreliable” when it comes to imposing sanctions and freezing spares and maintenance support.

Operationally, the F-35 could offer major strategic advantages for the IAF, but any deal involves deep geopolitical, logistical, and financial complexities. Acquisition costs range from $80 to $110 million per jet, plus very high hourly operating expenses, creating budgetary challenges for New Delhi.

After two decades of stable ties, the last two years have seen distrust between the world’s largest and oldest democracies.

While many hope this is a transitory phase, it is becoming clear that the U.S. is not interested in India’s rise as a global power. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau stated at the last Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi that Washington will not repeat its past approach (read: mistake) with China by granting India unfettered market and tech access that could lead to strong commercial competition.

The U.S. wants India strong enough only to serve as a bulwark against China, not to become an independent power center or a technology and economic power.

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The U.S. seems keen only to supply platforms to India through large contracts. Even for aero-structures and smaller components, it prefers make-in-India “Build to Print” over significant technology sharing.

Even the proposed India-USA deal to co-produce GE Aerospace F414 engines with HAL faces major hurdles. The main complications include a nearly threefold cost surge, intense disputes over sensitive hot-end technology transfer, and the risk of delays to India’s Tejas Mk2 and AMCA programs.

Many Indians wonder whether we have invested too much in a partner with a high trust deficit and a vacillating foreign policy. U.S. is known to have “dumped” friends and allies for immediate national interests. The Trump administration’s recent public threats and admonishments to its NATO allies further strengthen Indian concerns.

The U.S. has already deepened its ties with India’s airborne platforms, supplying transport aircraft (C-17, C-130), maritime patrol aircraft (P-8I), UAVs (MQ-9), and helicopters (Chinook, AH-64 Apache, and MH-60R).

For a long time, the U.S. was trying to sell the F-16 ‘Viper’ (renamed F-21) and the F-18 Super Hornet as part of India’s Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) proposal. Later, it offered the F-15EX. The U.S. never officially offered the F-35.

Despite being the oldest democracy, the U.S. finds it easier to deal with dependent military Generals, and West Asian Sheikhs, rather than growing democracies. The U.S. has a poor opinion of India’s “Non-Alignment” and “Strategic Autonomy.”

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Washington continues to prefer Pakistan, which helps it connect with China, the West, and Central Asia, and is willing to toe the American line for a few bucks. This Pakistan connection further erodes India’s trust.

Most analysts feel that letting the USA into India’s fighter-aircraft ecosystem is not a great idea. Any F-35 deal, like other aircraft deals, will be only a supply-and-support contract. There will be no technology transfer and no “Make-in-India” element.

While India pushes its own AMCA program, the Su-57 may still be the better choice for an interim fighter.

• By ET Online Desk and Air Marshal Anil Chopra
• Mail us at: editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

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Building on the commercial success and popularity of its PAC-3 interceptors, Lockheed Martin unveiled the more advanced PAC-3 Edge, a program that it is advancing with millions of dollars in funding.

The PAC-3 Edge “will add a revolutionary defensive capability against hypersonic and advanced missile threats,” Lockheed said in an official press statement announcing the interceptor’s debut on October 9, 2026.

The interceptor “leverages combat-proven PAC-3 MSE technology and the latest, industry-leading capability to deliver decisive performance against the Army’s most critical threats,” the company emphasized. 

Although details about the missile remain limited at this stage, the defense giant has indicated that the PAC-3 Edge will have a longer range, higher altitude reach, and greater effectiveness against maneuverable targets than the PAC-3.

The company noted that the PAC-3 Edge achieves superior performance with a next-generation seeker developed by its Strigo Product Center. This seeker—incorporating the latest defense technologies—is expected to significantly boost the interceptor’s ability to defeat highly sophisticated threats. It also features a multi-pulse solid rocket motor from Northrop Grumman that provides precise, controlled thrust throughout the flight profile.

Furthermore, Lockheed’s additional control-system upgrades extend the missile’s effective range and altitude capabilities, the company added.

Lockheed Bets Big on PAC-3 Edge

Lockheed said the improved PAC-3 interceptor is part of the US Army’s Future Interceptor program, “which is currently under competition,” though it stopped short of naming the other competitors.

“The Army’s decision to progress Lockheed Martin into the next stage of development affirms its confidence in Lockheed Martin’s proven Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) experience and the company’s ability to deliver an advanced, layered defense against what’s next,” the company stated.

The US Army’s Future Interceptor program is meant to develop a next-generation interceptor, primarily as an advanced successor or major upgrade path for the Patriot PAC-3.

The effort focuses on the lower tier of the ballistic missile defense battlespace and aims to counter current and emerging air, missile, and hypersonic threats with improved velocity, altitude, range, and maneuverability. It is meant to strengthen the Army’s layered IAMD architecture against near-peer adversaries like China and Russia. 

The unveiling comes as the US military is seeking a Patriot successor amid evolving threats from adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, which have amassed sophisticated hypersonic missiles that are typically much harder to intercept because of their high speeds, unpredictable trajectories, and enviable maneuverability.

In fact, this effort may have gained more urgency after the debacle in the Middle East, where US facilities suffered massive damage in Iranian strikes during its ongoing Operation Epic Fury.

Lockheed says PAC-3 Edge is designed to integrate with existing and future IAMD capabilities, including the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), the M903 launcher, containerized launchers, and HIMARS Flex. It plans to accelerate missile development in 2027 to match PAC-3 Edge’s rapid deployment schedule for 2031.

A noteworthy aspect of Lockheed offering the PAC-3 Edge for the Future Interceptor Program is that it is putting its own money on the line to deliver the interceptor faster than traditional acquisition timelines usually allow.

Lockheed reportedly plans to invest hundreds of millions of dollars of its own funds in the missile alone, in addition to further investments in its solid rocket motor and seeker. “We’ve already probably somewhere between $50 [million] and $100 million or better put into this,” Tim Cahill, president of Lockheed Martin, was quoted as saying by Breaking Defense.

He added that the seeker tech is expected to receive roughly $800 million in total company investment so the technology can be reused across other offensive and defensive systems.

The company has already invested about $250 million in the Strigo Product Center to fund new, industry-leading seeker technology that enables greater precision and maneuverability, as noted in the press statement.

Notably, this heavy investment indicates that rather than waiting for traditional government contracts to fully mature, Lockheed is treating PAC-3 Edge as both a technical leap and a strategic corporate bet.

This approach aligns with Lockheed’s recent emphasis on self-funded prototypes and enabling technologies, including work on a space-based interceptor aimed at an on-orbit demonstration around 2028, or the backward integration of advanced Skunk Works technologies, among other similar efforts.

This overall approach of self-funding projects, or parts of them, reflects the company’s deliberate shift toward “home-run” internal research and development (R&D) that produces real hardware the government can evaluate.

Leveraging The Patriot PAC-3 Appeal 

Lockheed Martin is not selling the PAC-3 Edge as a clean-sheet leap into the unknown. Instead, it is deliberately packaging the new interceptor as the logical, low-risk evolution of the US’s most trusted and successful missile-defense weapon. “Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3 Edge interceptor leverages the combat-proven PAC-3 MSE, delivering even greater maneuverability, power and velocity to ensure the Army’s layered defensive architecture remains the most advanced in the world,” Cahill stated.

PAC-3 has been tested against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and even hypersonic threats in Ukraine and the Middle East, with Lockheed and US officials repeatedly describing high kill rates, despite leaked missiles.

Lockheed claims the PAC-3 Edge inherits the same PAC-3 hit-to-kill architecture and operational pedigree, allowing it to claim continuity. By keeping Edge within the PAC-3 family, including the same launchers, fire-control software, and logistics footprint, Lockheed reduces the usual political and programmatic friction that accompanies a new interceptor.

Notably, Lockheed will leverage the PAC-3’s infrastructure for the new-generation interceptor and, according to reports, will build the PAC-3 Edge on its existing PAC-3 line in Camden, Ark.

Furthermore, the company claims it will cost the same as the PAC-3.  “The cost of this would be about that of the existing PAC-3 MSE,” Tim Cahill told Reuters. “At full production, the annual rate would be about 2,000 units a year, comparable with PAC-3 MSE.”

Against this backdrop, Congress and the United States Army can view Edge less as a risky new start and instead see it as the next spiral of a system that is already proven, funded at scale, and desired by allies.

The PAC-3 Patriot interceptors are the most advanced in the US inventory, alongside the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense). In fact, the recent conflicts in Iran and Ukraine have driven a massive global surge in the missile’s orders. About 17 countries currently operate or have ordered PAC-3 variants, including the United States, the Netherlands, Japan, Germany, the UAE, Taiwan, Kuwait, Qatar, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Romania, Poland, Sweden, Bahrain, Switzerland, Spain, and Denmark.

Many of these have multi-billion-dollar outstanding orders and are actively expanding their stocks.

For foreign customers, Lockheed could position the PAC-3 Edge as a natural path to ordering the next-generation PAC-3 instead of evaluating an all-new option.

Earlier this year, Lockheed also unveiled PAC-3 ACE, a less powerful, more affordable MSE variant accessible to clients outside the US. “It is not designed to replace the MSE, but to supplement it — it has its heritage and maturity, but we bring the costs down by changing some of the components,” Tim Cahill said at the time. 

Therefore, it may not be an exaggeration to say that Lockheed is now diversifying its interceptor portfolio within the same brand: the PAC-3 ACE as a lower-cost, high-volume option for less-stressing threats, PAC-3 MSE as the current high-end workhorse, and the PAC-3 Edge as the future higher-altitude, longer-range, hypersonic-capable top end. 

The unveiling of the new PAC-3 Edge comes as the company already executes a historic ramp-up of capacity. Earlier this year, Lockheed signed a seven-year framework agreement to increase annual PAC-3 interceptor production from 600 to 2,000 under a roughly $58.6 billion framework agreement. The overall expansion effort reportedly includes new facilities, robotics, automation, and supplier expansions.

In summary, Lockheed Martin is backing the PAC-3 Edge with hundreds of millions of its own dollars while keeping the design closely tied to the existing PAC-3 production base and operational architecture. The strategy aims to offer the Army a faster, lower-risk route to a more capable interceptor. Whether this will pay off now remains to be seen.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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The United States is one of the few developed Western democracies that still carries out the death penalty, with dozens of executions every year.

However, even by American standards, the execution planned for December is unusually severe.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has said that Major Nidal Malik Hasan, sentenced to death in 2013 by a general court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), will be executed by firing squad at Fort Hood, Texas, and that the execution will be public.

The Pentagon has since said it will livestream the execution.

It was here in Fort Hood, Texas, that Major Hasan opened fire inside a crowded medical readiness center at Fort Hood, killing 13 people and injuring 32 others in 2009.

Before opening fire on unarmed soldiers, Hasan shouted “Allahu Akbar.” He also shot at the backs of soldiers fleeing toward the parking lot.

Hasan later said it was an effort to stop them from going to Afghanistan and killing his fellow Muslims.

This will mark the first U.S. military execution in over 60 years, the first military execution by firing squad since World War II, and the world’s first-ever officially livestreamed execution.

The last time the U.S. military carried out an execution was in 1961, when Army Pvt. John Bennett was executed by hanging.

The last time the U.S. military carried out a death sentence by firing squad was in 1945.

The best-known case is Private Eddie Slovik, shot by a 12-man firing squad in France in January 1945 for desertion, the only U.S. soldier executed for desertion during the Second World War and since the Civil War.

Nearly 10 months later, Dan J. Lee was executed by the U.S. military’s firing squad in the Philippines in November 1945 for murder and/or rape.

Hasan, therefore, could become the first U.S. servicemember to be executed by a firing squad in over eight decades.

His execution could also become the world’s first officially live-streamed death penalty.

Public executions were common in the medieval period.

In “Discipline and Punish,” French philosopher Michel Foucault writes that the death penalty was a “spectacle.”

“Public torture and execution of criminals provided one of the most popular spectacles of eighteenth-century France,” Foucault wrote in his book.

However, gradually, most countries outlawed public executions.

The UK abolished public executions in 1868 with the passing of the Capital Punishment Amendment Act 1868, which moved all executions behind prison walls.

France followed suit in 1939. In the U.S., the last public execution was carried out in 1936.

Amnesty International said in its report on executions in 2025 that it knew of at least 17 public executions – 11 in Iran and 6 in Afghanistan.

The U.S., therefore, joins a handful of countries like Iran and Afghanistan where public executions are still carried out.

Notably, the U.S. is currently at war with Iran and fought a 20-year-long war with Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021.

The question, then, is what precisely Washington hopes to achieve by joining the league of its adversaries?

Live Streaming of Death Penalty By Firing Squad

It is noteworthy that the general court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) only awarded the death sentence to Hasan in 2013.

Military appeals later affirmed that sentence. The Supreme Court declined review in 2025.

In October 2026, Defense Secretary Hegseth recommended death by firing squad, and President Trump approved the recommendation.

Hegseth later said that the execution will be public, with the Pentagon clarifying that it will be live-streamed.

Hegseth explained part of the reason himself.

“Execution by firing squad. Army major betrays his country. Radical Islamist kills a bunch of Americans at Fort Hood. Of course, we’re going to do it at Fort Hood and do it on a Thursday. We’re going to do it at 1 o’clock, which is when he did it, and it’s going to be soldiers with rifles executing the firing squad,” Hegseth said in an interview with Jack Posobiec on Real America’s Voice.

“It was a radical Islamist attack in uniform inside the ranks, and so he’s going to get a firing squad of soldiers, as it should be. And we’ll make sure that people can watch it, that it’s public, because people need to understand that there are serious consequences for these types of things.”

“Army firing squad for convicted terrorist Nidal Malik Hasan, the jihadist who opened fire on unarmed American soldiers at Fort Hood in 2009. He killed 13 people and wounded 32 others while shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ during the attack,” Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said.

The remarks make it clear that the Pentagon wants to send a strong message against internal threats and reassert the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s (UCMJ) ultimate authority.

It is notable that while, in theory, the UCMJ has the power to award the death penalty for criminal behavior in the armed forces, in practice, the awarding of the death penalty by the UCMJ, and its actual implementation, has had a chequered history.

The UCMJ and Death Penalty

UCMJ is the federal criminal code and procedural system that governs the U.S. armed forces.

The UCMJ was enacted in 1950 and took effect in 1951.

The code creates one uniform system of military justice for all branches. Its rules apply to active-duty members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Space Force; certain reservists on duty; and others such as prisoners of war or retired members.

Its stated objective is to promote justice, maintain good order and discipline, support efficiency and effectiveness in the armed forces, and thereby strengthen national security. It balances the military’s need for discipline and readiness with procedural protections for the accused.

It contains punitive articles that define both uniquely military offenses, such as desertion, absence without leave, insubordination, and disrespect, and ordinary crimes, like murder, larceny, and sexual offenses.

The general courts-martial under the UCMJ have the authority to impose the death penalty.

From its founding in 1951 till 1961, the U.S. Army carried out 10 executions awarded by the UCMJ, all by hanging.

The last military execution in the U.S. was carried out in 1961, after President Eisenhower approved it.

However, in 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a landmark judgment in the Furman v. Georgia case, effectively placed a temporary moratorium on the death penalty across the United States.

In 1984, President Ronald Reagan signed an order that set detailed rules for military death-penalty trials.

It established that the court-martial could not sentence someone to death just because the crime was serious. The prosecutors must also establish one more “aggravating” factor, such as the killing of more than one person, or killing someone during robbery.

Furthermore, the panel could impose the death sentence only if all members agreed on guilt and the sentence. Under these rules, the UCMJ authorized capital punishment again.

From 1984 till mid-2000s, the military sought the death sentence against the accused in 47 cases.

The panel, however, awarded the death penalty in only 15 out of those 47 cases. Even in these 15 cases, many were later reduced to life imprisonment on appeal or commuted.

For instance, former President Barack Obama commuted Dwight Loving’s 1989 sentence to life in 2017.

Currently, four men remain under a UCMJ death sentence: Ronald Gray (1988), Hasan Akbar (2005), Timothy Hennis (2010), and Nidal Hasan (2013).

Notably, former President George Bush approved Gray’s death sentence in 2008, becoming the first U.S. President since Eisenhower, after a gap of 47 years, to approve a death sentence awarded by the UCMJ.

However, a federal judge stayed that execution so Gray could challenge the sentence in court. His execution has still not been carried out.

Now Trump has become only the second President to approve the death sentence awarded by the UCMJ in 65 years.

Hasan’s death sentence is set for December 3.

Notably, President Trump has not only approved Hasan’s death sentence, but also approved his execution by a firing squad and its live-streaming.

Hasan’s execution, therefore, could mark the return of military executions in the U.S. after over six decades.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern  History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Fort Hood Live Execution: How Nidal Hasan’s Livestreamed Firing Squad Could Strengthen UCMJ’s Authority appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Thailand’s Queen Suthida flew a solo sortie in the Royal Thai Air Force’s Saab JAS 39C Gripen fighter jet, becoming the first Thai female Gripen pilot and the first reigning Queen anywhere in the world to fly a modern combat jet solo.

Without an instructor or a co-pilot in the back seat, Thailand’s Queen Suthida took off from a military airbase in southern Surat Thani on October 8, 2026.

For about 41 minutes, the Queen of Thailand owned the air even as King Maha Vajiralongkorn waited with flowers and a golden patch, an honorary Swedish insignia for those who have flown the aircraft.

Local media reported that the flight marked the culmination of extensive simulator training at the base and about 10 hours in a two-seat JAS39D Gripen. However, she was already a pilot before she began training on the Gripen-C, which forms the cornerstone of the RTAF.

On May 13, 2010, the Queen made her flying debut aboard a Cessna T-41D belonging to Fleet 604 at Wing 6 in Bangkok. Since then, she has amassed 1,188.48 flight hours in various aircraft, including the Cessna T-41, CT-4E Airtrainer, Pilatus PC-9, Mooney M20M, Piper PA-34 Seneca, Boeing 737-400, Boeing 737-800, and a twin-seater Gripen-D.

In the past, the Queen has reportedly served as the king’s co-pilot on both domestic and overseas flights while performing royal duties. The royal duo even successfully landed a royal aircraft at Paro Airport in Bhutan in April 2015, widely regarded as one of the world’s hardest airports for pilots.

Notably, only a few precedents exist of royalty or heads of state flying aircraft beyond performing duties. However, a few notable examples exist.

The Spanish Crown Princess Leonor, for instance, flew her first solo flight in December 2025, piloting a Pilatus PC-21 turboprop trainer. She reportedly concluded her air force training with a joint flight alongside her father, King Felipe VI, with both piloting separate Pilatus PC-21 training aircraft.

Some reports also say she flew in an F-5 fighter jet with an instructor.

Meanwhile, Princess Salma bint Abdullah of Jordan, daughter of King Abdullah II, became the first woman in the Jordanian Armed Forces to complete fixed-wing pilot training and receive her wings in 2020.

She even joined the kingdom’s royal air force in providing humanitarian aid to the war-torn Gaza Strip after Israel launched a devastating bombing campaign on the enclave following the October 7 attack by Hamas.

Interestingly, the Jordanian princess comes from a long line of pilots trained to fly both civilian and military aircraft. Jordan’s current leader, King Abdullah II, qualified as a pilot of a Cobra attack helicopter and other types during his military career. He is also purportedly known for his hands-on involvement with the Royal Jordanian Air Force, which operates F-16 AM/BM fighter jets based at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base. 

King Abdullah II’s father, King Hussein, was also a highly skilled pilot who flew a variety of military and civilian aircraft, including the De Havilland Vampire and the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, Lockheed L-1011 TriStar, and Boeing 737, to name a few.

In one instance, the king, flying an unarmed, twin-engine De Havilland Dove prop airplane, was intercepted by two Soviet-built Syrian MiG-17 fighter jets but managed to get away using low-level maneuvers, as documented in several reports.

Britain’s King Charles III earned his Royal Air Force (RAF) wings in 1971 after completing jet pilot training at RAF Cranwell in Lincolnshire. He trained as a fast-jet pilot on the BAC Jet Provost, but unverified reports suggest he also flew a Hawk and some helicopters. Similarly, King Felipe of Spain trained across the services and flew with the Spanish Air Force, including the Pilatus PC-21 turboprop trainer and the Dassault Falcon 900B.

Meanwhile, former US President George H.W. Bush was a combat-decorated WWII naval aviator. He performed 58 combat flights throughout the war and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for valor after the Japanese shot down his torpedo plane on September 2, 1944. He later flew the Convair F-102A Delta Dagger supersonic interceptor jet while serving in the Texas Air National Guard between 1970 and 1973. 

Some civilian heads of state have also flown in military aircraft purely for the love of the game, though they did not pilot them themselves.

For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin flew in the pilot seat of a modernized nuclear-capable Tu-160M “White Swan” supersonic strategic bomber during a 30-minute flight departing from the Kazan Aviation Plant in 2024. Before this, he flew the previous model of the Tu-160 bomber in August 2005. Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi flew in the cockpit of the Tejas LCA, though only as a passenger. 

The Thai Queen, however, has achieved a milestone no other reigning queen in the world has, thereby registering her name in the annals of history.

This development may also boost the popularity of the Gripen, a Swedish-origin jet that forms the backbone of the RTAF alongside the F-16s.

Thailand’s Gripen

Thailand ordered the Gripen C/D fighter jets in 2008, with the first batch comprising six aircraft arriving at Wing 7 in Surat Thani in February 2011.  

In 2015, the Thai Gripen-C/D overpowered the Chinese J-11 aircraft during Exercise Falcon Strike 2015. During the first two days of the war game, the J-11s shot down 16 Gripens in a visual-range battle without taking any losses. But the Gripens completely annihilated the J-11s during beyond-visual-range engagements, as the EurAsian Times explained earlier.

The aircraft were deployed for combat as hostilities broke out with Cambodia last year.

On July 26, 2025, as shelling intensified near the Phu Ma Kua ridge and the ancient Ta Muen Thom temple, the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) deployed its Gripen C/D fighters in a targeted strike against Cambodian artillery positions—marking the combat debut of the type not just within the RTAF but anywhere in the world since the jet became operational.

The RTAF is now upgrading by acquiring the Gripen-E/F, the most advanced aircraft in the Gripen family.

In August 2025, Thailand approved buying a dozen Saab Gripen-E fighter jets instead of the American Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70/72, which was also on offer.

The newly purchased Gripen-E variant will replace the aging F-16s and integrate into the RTA’s existing SAAB Gripen jets.

Whether the Queen will join the Gripen-E’s cockpit as a solo pilot remains to be seen.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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After 321 days at sea, the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier (CVN-72) returned to San Diego, with its island superstructure showing rows of silhouettes of ships, drones, and other targets reportedly destroyed during Operation Epic Fury.

The USS Lincoln arrived at Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego on October 8, concluding a long deployment that included extended operations in the Middle East.

Before the USS Abraham Lincoln arrived in San Diego, the US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth presented the carrier crew with the Presidential Unit Citation, the military’s highest unit-level award for valor.

Calling the mission “historic,” Hegseth noted that the carrier conducted “3,693 combat flights, sinking 64 Iranian warships, launching 450 Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles, and shooting down 77 one-way aerial attack drones.”

Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao lauded the carrier crew in a post on X, saying, “Congratulations to @CNV_72 and all of CSG-3 on this well-earned Presidential Unit Citation for their extreme heroism over the last 10 months in defense of our homeland.”

The citation says the defense included 40 days in combat and an “ironclad maritime blockade against Iran in support of Operation Epic Fury.”

During Hegseth’s recent visit to the carrier before it arrived home, he said, “I’m the only thing standing between you and home,” and that his intention was, “Once they pull up to the dock, we’re getting out of the way.”

The Pentagon released an image of Pete Hegseth standing on the deck of the carrier and examining the superstructure, which was stenciled with a list of targets the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG) destroyed during a 321-day deployment.

Subsequently, Hegseth published another image showing the full extent of the markings, with “Operation Epic Fury” written above rows of ship and drone silhouettes (seen below).

The carrier’s arrival with these markings aligns with the US Navy’s long-standing practice of recording unit or group combat results after major operations.

Observers counted approximately 174 markings on the island superstructure. These traditional victory symbols are attributed to Carrier Strike Group 3’s collective actions, including carrier air-wing sorties, destroyer operations, Tomahawk launches, and air-defense engagements.

What Targets Did The Lincoln CSG Neutralize?

The visible markings include silhouettes representing 23 anti-ship missiles, 34 surface ships, 122 unmanned aerial vehicles, 10 submarines, and what appears to be a large bomb marked “1403.”

The aircraft carrier features 34 kill marks of surface ships neutralized in the sixth month of the conflict in the region. Although official information is scarce, these targets could include warships, corvettes, and even unmanned surface vessels used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) publicly confirmed the destruction of several ships. Some high-profile targets include the Shahid Bagheri carrier, the IRIS Makran forward base ship, the Jamaran-class corvettes, and all four Shahid Soleimani-class catamaran missile corvettes.

Calculating Iran’s Losses in Op. Epic Fury as CRS Nearly Doubles the U.S. Aircraft Count From 42 to 81

The US Navy also neutralized multiple Bayandor-class corvettes and other frigates, several fast-attack craft and missile boats, at least 16 mine-laying vessels, and multiple auxiliaries and support vessels.

It is hard to say which of these vessels the Lincoln carrier group neutralized, but reports say the group operated in the Arabian Sea and, at times, closer to the Gulf of Oman during the early phase of Operation Epic Fury.

The group could have struck these targets with Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from escort Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, such as the USS Spruance, USS Michael Murphy, and USS Frank E. Petersen, or with F-35C Lightning IIs and F/A-18E/F Super Hornets from the carrier’s air wing.

The aircraft carrier features about 100+ triangular silhouettes that resemble the Shahed-136 one-way attack drones that were extensively deployed by the IRGC in its strikes on US military assets. However, they could also potentially reference other similar kamikaze drones, given Tehran’s massive inventory of these low-cost assets.

The escort ships—the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers doubling as critical air-defense assets alongside the aircraft carrier-could have downed these drones. These state-of-the-art warships are equipped with the Aegis Combat System to detect, track, and engage drones at medium to long range with Standard Missiles such as the SM-2 or SM-6, and the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM). 

The carrier itself has self-defense systems such as the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM) and the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS). Furthermore, F-35s and Super Hornets operating from the carrier may have shot down some of these incoming drones.

Notably, the island carries 23 missile silhouettes. Hegseth credited the strike group with destroying 21 anti-ship cruise missiles. The citation does not say whether those were stopped by escort ships, by F-35s and Super Hornets, or by the carrier’s own Rolling Airframe Missiles and Phalanx guns.

USS Abraham Lincoln also prominently features 10 submarines, which is unsurprising given that US CENTCOM focused on decimating Iran’s Russian-built Kilo-class and other submarines during the conflict.

For example, a Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet that flew from the USS Abraham Lincoln on combat missions in the Iran war was spotted with submarine kill markings earlier. Jeff Rojas photographed the aircraft, which belongs to VFA-41, a Navy fighter squadron known as the “Black Aces,” on October 1.

Fort Hood Live Execution: How Nidal Hasan’s Livestreamed Firing Squad Could Strengthen UCMJ’s Authority

How the aircraft destroyed an Iranian submarine is unclear, but Rojas said, “I assume that it was dry-docked and they dropped a laser-guided bomb.” 

The US missiles damaged many Iranian submarines, including some produced indigenously, that were docked in ports during early bombardment, but neither the Navy nor CENTCOM has publicly claimed that Navy fighter jets were involved.c

Instead, the US military earlier said it used air-launched AGM-114 Hellfire laser-guided missiles, probably fired from MQ-9 Reaper drones, and ground-launched Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missiles against submarines in particular.

However, the CSG may have taken out at least some of these submarine targets with Tomahawk missiles.

Most details, including specific individual ship sinkings by Lincoln CSG platforms or the exact methods used, rely on official claims and open-source analysis rather than independent battle-damage assessments available in the public domain.

Interestingly, the number of targets the War Secretary cited in his address differs significantly from the number of kill markings visible on the flattop. Neither the United States Navy nor the Department of War (DoW) has clarified why the flattop bears only 34 surface ship kill marks, even though Hegseth counted 64 in his address, or why the carrier lists 106 drones while Hegseth’s estimate was far more conservative at just 77.

Although these markings are often symbolic or selective rather than a strict, audited one-to-one accounting of every engagement, a reason for the discrepancy is awaited.

A Mission Marred With Chaos

The carrier’s prolonged deployment garnered national attention after Stars and Stripes, the news outlet affiliated with the US Armed Forces, reported on deteriorating conditions aboard the carrier, a major mental health crisis, and worsening living conditions in August 2026.

“Interviews with active-duty sailors and family members, along with dozens of public social media comments and posts by crew members, describe sailors struggling with exhaustion and declining morale, including reports of suicidal thoughts and at least one instance where a crew member was prevented from jumping overboard,” the report underlined.

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After this explosive disclosure caused a stir and exposed the Pentagon, War Secretary Pete Hegseth, Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao, and CENTCOM leadership dismissed much of the coverage as misrepresented or dishonest, while acknowledging challenges of extended deployments. Nonetheless, the report and the public reaction paved the way for the carrier’s return and a stopover in Thailand last month, giving the crew much-needed respite

The Secretary of War also pushed back against the allegations of the Navy being stretched thin and a crisis about the carrier, including reports of eight sailors who attempted suicide. “Lincoln into some sort of a symbol, a symbol of dysfunction or a symbol of low morale or a symbol of a failed mission,” Hegseth said, adding, “what makes the US military and the US. Navy and all these sailors different is that you adapt and that you’re resilient and you overcome — you finish the mission nonetheless.”

That said, aircraft carriers have been instrumental in the Iran War, which has dragged on for months despite periods of lull and negotiations. Two carriers—the USS George Washington and USS George H.W. Bush—are currently deployed in the theatre, with a third, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, expected to arrive later this month amid a spike in tensions.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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France and Germany have rejected reports that their Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) project has collapsed, asserting their joint program to develop a next-generation battle tank remains on track.

On Thursday, France’s armed forces chief Fabien Mandon told parliament that Germany had decided to leave the battle tank program.

On Friday, French Defense Minister Catherine Vautrin said the MGCS project was still on course, speaking during German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s visit to the country.

“We would like to tell you, together with my colleague Minister Boris Pistorius, that MGCS remains a current and active project,” Vautrin said alongside the German defense minister in Le Haillan outside the southwestern French city of Bordeaux.

Pistorius said that he “fully” agreed.

“The MGCS project is not finished. It has not been abandoned. Nobody has stopped it. On the contrary, it is a flagship project of Franco-German cooperation.”

On Thursday, Mandon told French lawmakers the two armies had spent several years “to define what a future battle tank should be”. “The outcome is not good,” Mandon told lawmakers.

“We had hoped to build a future tank in cooperation with the Germans, but unfortunately we have to acknowledge that the Germans have decided to leave the project.”

Later on Thursday, he issued a statement softening his remarks, saying: “Although delayed, the program is continuing and remains highly relevant.”

Main Ground Combat System (MGCS)

Launched jointly by France and Germany in 2017, the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) aims to develop a next-generation battle tank to replace France’s Leclerc and Germany’s Leopard 2 tanks.

It is a “system of systems” project that includes a main battle tank and a network of other combat systems, such as artificial intelligence (AI) for decision-making, advanced sensors, robotics, and onboard unmanned aerial vehicles.

Earlier this June, Rheinmetall’s CEO warned that France may pull out of the MGCS project. “There is always a risk, but nothing has been decided yet,” Armin Papperger told Welt am Sonntag, adding that Paris is planning to drastically cut funding for the project.

A German government spokesperson later questioned the MGCS project, saying it was doubtful a joint tank would be built and that the project would likely focus on “platform-independent” technologies.

Meanwhile, Jean-Paul Alary, CEO of KNDS, the Franco-German company developing the tank, had said at the Eurosatory show in France that, although he could not comment on the MGCS’s current state because it is a political matter, it would be “very bad news” for Europe if the project failed.

The MGCS has remained embroiled in crises and beset by delays, much like the now-abandoned FCAS. Disagreements over the tank’s design, technology, and industrial responsibilities have plagued the MGCS for years.

In short, Berlin wants a stronger, better-armed tank for a potential battle with Russia, while Paris prefers a lighter tank for worldwide deployment. Political and budgetary tensions also persist over which country’s industry should lead.

The project was initially intended to be led by the Franco-German joint venture KNDS, comprising Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and France’s Nexter. However, Germany allegedly leveraged its considerable political support to push for Rheinmetall’s involvement. Tensions have since grown between the KNDS and Rheinmetall over leadership of program “pillars,” production shares, and contracts.

From a French perspective, Rheinmetall’s involvement has altered the project’s delicate power dynamics, creating discontent and increasing frustration.

Moreover, the project has reportedly been starved of funding. As Rheinmetall CEO Papperger recently noted, the shareholding companies have received only €25 million ($29 million) since the project’s inception.

Meanwhile, France has grown uneasy with Germany’s increasing assertiveness and its emergence as Europe’s preeminent economic and, increasingly, military player, as veteran journalist Prakash Nanda of EurAsian Times noted.

“They are constantly fighting against the mismatched temperaments of their leaders, their orthogonal domestic politics, and the irreconcilably diverging strategic cultures at the heart of their deep states,” Carnegie Europe’s Strategic Europe wrote in a blog last month.

A core divergence lies in strategic outlook: France consistently advocates for greater European strategic autonomy, while Germany remains more committed to robust transatlantic ties with the United States. Meanwhile, economic and trade policies add another layer of friction, with the two powers often diverging on EU-level decisions regarding fiscal rules, industrial strategy, and market access.

France and Germany have struggled to rein in their powerful defense companies, leaving three major European projects — the Eurodrone, the FCAS fighter program, and the MGCS tank program — in serious difficulty. The FCAS has already collapsed, while the other two now risk failure.

• Contact the author (s) at editor (at) eurasiantimes.com
• With AFP Inputs
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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A newly updated Congressional Research Service (CRS) report counts 81 US military aircraft as lost or damaged in the ongoing conflict with Iran. EurAsian Times analyzes the losses Tehran sustained during the ongoing conflict. 

The latest figure is nearly double the 42 aircraft the Congressional Research Service tallied in a May 2026 report, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

The jump from 42 to 81 most likely reflects updated reporting and newly available public information.

In addition to the Congress research figures, two other reports published by the Congressional Budget Office and the Pentagon’s inspector general had earlier provided deep insights into the war. The latest CRS report reportedly cited that data.

“As of August 1, 2026, the armed conflict with Iran has cost DoD approximately $38 billion. That amount reflects the costs of replacing expended munitions and equipment lost in battle, increased flying hours, other operations, and increased fuel costs,” the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) stated in the report last month.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon’s IG report estimated the US campaign cost $33.4 billion between February 28 and June 30, with at least $22.3 billion spent on munitions alone.

Citing information published by the CBO, the latest CRS states that the overall cost of the lost aircraft is between $1.9 billion and $3.3 billion, depending on the Pentagon’s replacement costs. However, CNN News was informed by some unidentified sources that the cost of the war is much higher–at least $45 billion–excluding damage to US infrastructure and bases spread across the Gulf, repeatedly struck by Iranian forces.

The revised losses in the Congress report include manned aircraft, helicopters, and drones, though it clarifies that the total is not a count of destroyed aircraft, adding that some damaged aircraft may have returned to active service after repairs.

It lists 12 F-15E jets as destroyed/damaged, up from four F-15E Strike Eagle Fighter jets listed in the May 2026 report. The US lost three F-15E fighters in a friendly-fire incident related to the Kuwait Air Force aircraft, whereas the fourth was downed by Iran using shoulder-mounted air defense systems, as previously noted by the EurAsian Times. 

Both CBO and IG reports also earlier listed just four F-15E losses. Therefore, the eight F-15Es mentioned in the new report are likely the jets that were damaged in an Iranian strike on the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan in September 2026. Citing an unidentified US official, Reuters earlier reported that Iran had struck an A-10 Warthog, leaving it with a missing wing, while eight F-15s sustained light damage and were returned to service.

The latest list also includes the F-35A, the US Air Force’s most prized and expensive stealth fighter. The CBO report had earlier noted that replacing/repairing the aircraft would cost $120 million, without saying whether it would be written off or repaired.

Although some OSINT observers at the time believed this acknowledged the F-35 loss, others warned that the CBO was only recording the repair cost while leaving room for a potential replacement.

Furthermore, the latest list also reiterates the loss of the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), which was struck and damaged while on the ground at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, during an Iranian missile and drone attack.

However, instead of merely reporting the loss, it expressed concern about losing this highly specialized aircraft and the far-reaching effects it could have on the USAF.

“Congress may assess whether losses in certain high-demand platforms that are aging and limited in number, such as the E-3 Sentry, create capability gaps or increase risk in other theaters,” it stated.

Notably, the US Air Force has only 16 of these critical AWACS remaining in its inventory, and losing each could disproportionately affect American combat posture in the Western Pacific, where the threat of war with China is never off the table.

Another newly listed loss on the updated CRS is the US Navy’s MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter, which did not appear in the May 2026 list. On July 1, an MH-60S Sea Hawk from a George H.W. Bush aircraft carrier made an emergency landing in the Arabian Sea, although the Navy ruled out hostile action at the time.

Most of the rise since May is attributed to drones. The report now counts 45 MQ-9 Reapers lost, up from 24 in its May report. This is also a considerable increase from the 30 Reaper losses cited in the IG report. Furthermore, a US Army AH-64 Apache that was shot down over the Strait of Hormuz in June 2026 has also found its name on the list. 

Notably, the newly published report raises several issues for Congress to address, including whether the Pentagon provides enough detail about the losses for lawmakers to assess the consequences and potential solutions.

CRS notes that the Department of Defense’s reporting on the losses has been limited or vague, especially since even the September 2026 Lead Inspector General report relied in part on earlier CRS open-source tallies rather than providing a fully independent, comprehensive public accounting.

What Did Iran Lose In The War?

Iranian authorities have offered only limited, selective figures on their own military and civilian casualties and have not published a comprehensive accounting of equipment destroyed during Operation Epic Fury launched by the US in coordination with Israel.

Iran has nothing equivalent to the CRS list. Open-source counts already disagree: one tracker puts Iranian aircraft losses above 90 airframes, mostly transports and tankers, while a narrower documented list counts 43.

Open-source trackers have recorded dozens of Iranian aircraft—combat jets, transports, tankers, trainers, and helicopters—destroyed primarily on the ground at air bases early in the campaign, although a few were downed in air.

In the initial days of the war, two Iranian fighters, a Northrop F-5 and a F-4 Phantom II, were destroyed in an Israeli strike at Tabriz Shahid Madani International Airport. Around the same time, the US destroyed two Iranian Sukhoi Su-22 aircraft at Shiraz Shahid Dastgheib Airport, along with two Lockheed C-130 Hercules and an Il-76 transport aircraft.

CENTCOM released footage of the two Su-22s. Satellite imagery was later cited for the two C-130s and the Il-76 at the same airfield. Further Phantom losses have been reported at the 3rd Tactical Air Base in Hamadan, but not documented to the same standard.

A Qatari Air Force Boeing F-15QA shot down two Iranian low-flying Sukhoi Su-24 tactical bombers on March 2, 2026, after they failed to react to radio warnings.

In the second week of March 2026, Israel said it had destroyed multiple IRIAF F-14 Tomcats in a massive air strike on Isfahan Airport, and 16 aircraft used by the IRGC Quds Force at Mehrabad International Airport were also struck. At the time, experts posited that these strikes may have wiped out the entire Tomcat fleet, particularly since some of these jets had already been destroyed in the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025.

Historian Tom Cooper estimated that only about 10 Tomcats were flyable when the war began, compared with roughly 35 still listed on paper.

Satellite imagery confirmed at least two, and probably three, destroyed at Isfahan; some higher counts include airframes later described as wooden decoys. Iranian state media released footage on June 10 of an F-14 returning from a mission, so the “fleet finished” claim did not hold.

At Mehrabad, imagery after the Israeli strikes showed damage to at least 17 aircraft, including a Boeing 747 and a Harbin Y-12. Separate open-source lists also record Boeing 707 and 747 tankers destroyed at airfields between March and April.

An Israeli Air Force F-35I “Adir” stealth fighter jet shot down an Iranian YAK-130 aircraft over Tehran on March 4, as the EurAsian Times reported. On March 10, videos documenting the demolition of a Lockheed C-130 Hercules, a Lockheed P-3 Orion, and an Il-76 at Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani Airport in Kerman, Iran, were released by CENTCOM.

Later that month, reports also surfaced of Iranian J-7 fighter jets and Bell 214 helicopters. In addition to these, several Iranian drones–deployed on a large scale–were shot down by US forces, although these were mainly one-way attack platforms.

Those drone losses are the hardest to count. Many were expendable one-way airframes, and neither side has published a reconciled total. Iran also claimed shootdowns of Israeli drones, including Heron and Hermes airframes, in early March; those claims are likewise unreconciled.

Iran has not released an official inventory of destroyed ships, but the sinking of IRIS Dena in the Indian Ocean became one of the starkest and most unforgettable symbols of the US war against Iran, especially since it was the first such sinking since World War Two.

Dena was a Moudge-class frigate, sunk on March 4 about 19 nautical miles off Galle, Sri Lanka, while returning from India’s International Fleet Review. The US said the Los Angeles-class submarine USS Charlotte fired two Mark 48 torpedoes and one hit. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed a US submarine carried out the strike.

Sri Lanka recovered 32 survivors; Iran later put the dead at 104. Some reports said the ship carried no operational armament because of the exercise, and that its Bell 212 was not aboard.

The accurate historical marker is narrower than “first sinking since World War Two”: first ship sunk by a US submarine since 1945, and first submarine sinking in combat since ARA General Belgrano in 1982. India and Sri Lanka both joined the search.

Furthermore, the US forces destroyed 17 Iranian warships, including a submarine, in the early days of the conflict, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time. These numbers likely climbed in the weeks leading up to the April 7 ceasefire and may have risen further after hostilities broke out in July 2026.

In fact, The Aviationist recently published photos of an F-35C that returned from the theatre bearing markings of three submarines, a surface combatant, a Shahed-type drone, an artillery piece, and several ground-based launchers.

Those markings record claimed engagements. They are not a confirmed naval order of battle.

Over the months, US forces have repeatedly endorsed destroying or damaging Iranian Navy and coastal targets, with Donald Trump alleging that the whole force had been wiped out.

Open-source reporting has suggested that a large portion of Iranian air defenses that are part of a meticulously built layered network, including the S-300, Bavar-373, Khorad-15, to name a few, were also destroyed in US and Israeli strikes. Additionally, both the US and Israel claimed to have destroyed several ballistic missile launchers in the initial days.

Israel said one early wave put more than 25 fighters against over 35 missile storage and launch sites around Tabriz and Kermanshah. Without a pre-war inventory or a public battle-damage assessment, none of these claims can be turned into a share of the force destroyed. Mobile launchers are the largest gap: a struck site is not proof the missile was in it.

That said, these figures are not fully confirmed, as Tehran has not officially published its losses.

Nonetheless, despite suffering major losses throughout the war, Iran has survived, dealing a blow to joint US-Israeli aspirations of completely destroying its ballistic missile or even the Nuclear program.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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After EurAsian Times reported on a potential clash brewing between the Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon, Portugal has said it is seriously considering F-35 stealth jets to replace its aging F-16 Fighting Falcons. 

Portugal has not officially launched a formal tender to replace its 28 upgraded F-16M fighter jets, but competition between European and US firms appears to be heating up.

“The Portuguese state will always decide in ‌accordance ⁠with the national interest. There is one point that is also clear: we are seriously considering the F-35 proposal, just as ​we are ​considering ⁠others,” Rangel told a news conference after the meeting.

Meanwhile, speaking in Lisbon, the Portuguese capital, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the US would make Portugal a “very competitive” offer to replace its F-16 fleet.

Earlier, as EurAsian Times reported, Portugal was reviewing its plans to acquire F-35 jets and eyeing European alternatives.

In a March 2025 interview, Portuguese Defense Minister Nuno Melo rejected the prospect of acquiring the American fifth-generation aircraft, citing Washington’s unpredictability.

“We cannot ignore the geopolitical environment in our choices. The recent position of the United States, in the context of NATO … must make us think about the best options, because the predictability of our allies is a greater asset to take into account,” Melo had stated.

Many European nations are concerned that an ‘unpredictable’ Washington could pause delivery of critical parts or software for the F-35s.

The Portuguese idea of sidelining the stealth US jets may have come after German defense experts said the US could use a “kill switch” on the F-35 to impose its political objectives.

Portugal, like others, believes any F-35 fleet would quickly become ineffective without access to US-controlled maintenance, logistics, and computer networks. Thus, the US would indirectly control F-35 operations for almost any country.

Echoing these concerns, the Portuguese Minister said, “The world has changed … and this ally of ours … could bring limitations to use, maintenance, components, and everything that has to do with ensuring that aircraft will be operational and used in all types of scenarios.”

The Portuguese Air Force first expressed interest in the F-35 in 2023, when Joe Biden was president. At the time, General João Guilherme Rosado Cartaxo Alves, the FAP’s Chief of Staff, stated that the F-35A is the best option to replace the aging F-16 AM/BM jets.

In April 2024, Portuguese Air Force Chief of Staff General João Cartaxo Alves said the service was in a “transition” phase toward the stealth fighter. The Chief also said the program would cost an estimated 5.5 billion euros and take around 20 years to implement—a statement that made it seem like a purchase was imminent.

The Portuguese Ministry of Defense later backtracked and said, “This is a vision for the future, so currently, there is no process for purchasing aircraft to replace the F-16.

Since then, the aircraft has awaited a formal announcement, especially since leadership earlier confirmed that the current F-16 AM/BM fleet would continue to operate until 2030.

However, European policy has shifted dramatically since Donald Trump assumed office in January 2025. While dismissing the idea of acquiring an F-35, the Portuguese Defense Minister also hinted that his country was looking towards Europe.

Without giving specific details, he said, “There are several options that must be considered, particularly in the context of European production.”

Portugal has not opened a formal tender to replace its F-16s. Four aircraft are in contention: Lockheed Martin’s F-35, the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault’s Rafale and Saab’s Gripen E.

Lockheed Martin, Airbus and Saab have each signed cooperation agreements with AED Cluster Portugal, the national aerospace and defense industry association.

Saab’s memorandum, covering the Gripen E, was signed in December 2025. The company has also pitched local work through Embraer-controlled OGMA, citing the production model used for Brazil’s Gripen program.

On September 23, 2026, Dassault Aviation said it had signed a memorandum with the cluster on behalf of Rafale partners Thales and Safran. The agreement aims to explore cooperation with Portuguese industry as Lisbon weighs renewing its F-16 fleet.

“Dassault Aviation, representing its RAFALE partners, Thales and Safran, signed with AED Cluster Portugal, Portugal’s association for the aeronautics, space and defense industries, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to explore potential areas of cooperation between RAFALE partners and the Portuguese industrial sector, in the context of the Portuguese Air Force’s F-16 fleet renewal,” it said in a statement.

Airbus said on September 24 that it intends to submit an unsolicited Eurofighter proposal in late October or early November. The offer will include public and private financing “to alleviate the payment plan,” along with military cooperation and industrial work, Eurofighter campaign manager Ivan Gonzalez Exposito told reporters.

Defense Minister Nuno Melo has said the jets will have to be replaced in the near future. Any choice remains subject to a technical evaluation and to the industrial return for Portugal.

After initial apprehensions with the F-35, the biggest question is: will Portugal opt for ‘superior’ F-35 stealth jets or European 4.5-gen alternatives, Rafale, Eurofighter and Gripen-E?

• Mail us at editor (at) eurasiantimes.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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The best victory is “winning without shedding a drop of blood” is an ancient Chinese proverb attributed to Sun Tzu’s ‘The Art of War,’ written nearly 2,500 years ago.

In 2026, that old strategy has a new rendering: ‘Learning without Bleeding.’

China is treating the Russia-Ukraine War as a “living textbook” for adapting the war-fighting strategy of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), learning drone warfare, and systematically converting battlefield lessons into PLA training, procurement, and force design without having to fight itself.

According to a recent paper by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), China is running the most systematic effort of any outside power to convert lessons from the war in Ukraine into military advantage, absorbing the errors of both sides.

“Chinese analysts are explicit about the value of Russia’s war against Ukraine” and are adopting the war’s lessons into policy debates, weapons procurement, and military doctrine at a breakneck pace.

Analysts in Beijing are describing 2024 as “year one of world drone war,” when the two sides fielded enough drones to show the contours of the new mechanized battlefield.

For the study, the authors reviewed more than 90 Chinese-language sources published over more than four years, from July 2022 to August 2026.

These Chinese-language sources include PLA outlets, defense journals, university research papers, peer-reviewed journals, and research institutions linked to defense industries.

The authors of these Chinese papers include participants in the military learning system. They include researchers at PLA universities and academies, engineers at defense industrial design institutes, civilian academics working alongside numbered military units, and military acquisition organizations that turn battlefield lessons into requirements and procurement.

The study highlights how China is adopting lessons from the war in Ukraine at a breakneck pace.

It finds that “Chinese analysts pick up new battlefield techniques within an average of four months, but turning them into hardware, training, and force structure takes a year or more.”

Essentially, within four months of a new weapon system or war-fighting doctrine/strategy being introduced on the battlefield in Ukraine, Chinese analysts take note and start discussing it in their research papers.

However, filtering these lessons into Chinese military structure, procurement, and industrial production takes nearly a year.

For instance, Sea drones appeared in the war in Ukraine by September 2022, and by November, Chinese analysts were discussing these new weapon systems in their research papers.

Similarly, Fiber-Optic Drones first appeared on the battlefield in Ukraine in March 2024, and Chinese research papers began discussing them that same month. By March 2025, PLA units were already training with Fiber-Optic Drones.

Interceptor drones appeared in the war in Ukraine in February 2024; Chinese analysts noted them by July 2025, and PLA units began training on such interceptor drones by October 2026.

These instances show how quickly Chinese analysts note new weapons systems in the war in Ukraine, followed by PLA units adopting them within a year.

China’s lessons learned fall into two broad areas: offensive capabilities and defensive capabilities.

China copies offensive techniques from Russia, whose army resembles the PLA’s and whose fixes have been tested in combat.

China derives defensive requirements from Ukraine’s attacks and builds them into hardware. Beijing believes that if China goes to war with any Western power, it will face attacks similar to those Russia faced.

However, both offensive and defensive lessons are primarily derived from drone warfare.

Meanwhile, industrial lessons flow into a manufacturing base that already leads the world.

Offensive Learnings in Drone Warfare From the Russian Army

Among offensive techniques, Beijing’s most important lesson is economic.

In March 2025, the PLA Daily treated the claim as settled fact: a single reconnaissance-strike drone costs less than 1 percent of a modern fighter while achieving more than 90 percent of its battlefield coverage.

According to the study, while these figures are rough, the Central Military Commission’s newspaper takes them at face value.

Chinese analysts noted that in 2014, both Ukraine and Russia purchased and used more than a million drones. The Chinese Naval Academy estimated that this amounted to an average of two drones hovering over each soldier deployed on the front line.

The second lesson from drone warfare that China internalized is speed.

According to the National Defense University’s Joint Operations College, Russian forces can strike a detected target within three to five minutes—compared to hours in earlier wars

Researchers at a PLA unit attribute this to Russia’s reconnaissance-strike complex, in which a low-cost reconnaissance drone pushed deep into the enemy rear serves as the observer and guides another drone’s strike, with Orlan-10s cueing Kub and Lancet loitering munitions.

The copying target is not any single platform but rather the connection between them: drones wired directly into artillery and command networks.

For China, the drone warfare’s third critical lesson is overcommunication and connectivity.

Chinese analysts treat electronic warfare as the deciding factor in the drone war, recording heavy losses on both sides to jamming and countermeasures.

They have also noted with interest Russia’s fiber-optic first-person-view (FPV) drone steered through a thin cable, which is immune to jamming.

The PLA Daily flagged the shift in May 2024, weeks after the fiber-optic drone’s operational debut, and by April 2025, state media were weighing its trade-offs in detail. In the same month, China Central Television (CCTV) showed a People’s Armed Police unit in Yunnan training with FPV drones and researching fiber-optic models.

Defensive Learnings in Drone Warfare From the Ukrainian Army

While China has tried to internalize Russia’s offensive drone warfare techniques, Beijing has paid even more attention to some of the drone warfare techniques adopted by Ukraine.

Beijing believes that in the event of a military conflict with the West, it could face similar attacks as Russia faces from Ukraine in the ongoing war.

Chinese analysts were especially alarmed by two attacks from Ukraine: first, the use of sea drones for attacking Russian ships, warships, harbors, and bridges.

In the journal of the state shipbuilder’s underwater-warfare institute, a team from the Naval University of Engineering tallied repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian ships, ports, and the Kerch Bridge and found more than 10 large naval vessels damaged.

They concluded that a systematized sea-drone offensive could be met effectively only with counter–sea–drone equipment that also fights as a system.

Another researcher proposed countering suicide boats with interceptor swarms, in skirmishes devoid of humans entirely.

Another Ukrainian attack that caught China’s attention and alarmed it was Operation Spider’s Web.

On June 1, 2025, Ukraine attacked Russia’s strategic bombers, deep inside its territory, by using FPV drones launched from within Russia.

Chinese Foreign Ministry’s magazine estimated Russian losses at 11 strategic bombers and identified the raid’s novelty in being launched from inside Russia, at close range.

The PLA’s training system answered within four and a half months.

In an October 2025 exercise, a brigade defended against a drone attack team of more than 20 operators, using detection gear that locates drones by their radio emissions and matches them against a catalog of more than 800 commercial models, paving a path for Chinese response to a Spider’s Web–style drone infiltration.

Chinese analysts also concluded that a successful drone interception strategy must account for the economics of interception.

According to a Global Times analysis of Ukraine’s interceptor drones, “the cost of procuring one man-portable air-defense missile buys several hundred air-defense FPV drones.”

Therefore, Chinese analysts concluded that the best weapon against a drone is another drone.

China also concluded that if it is attacked, it will be attacked by drones en masse, and therefore it must defend itself against thousands of drones.

In this respect, China has also noted Russia’s defense strategy.

 A 2026 review from a Chinese state aerospace design institute recorded that Russia “has built in combat a counter-drone equipment system of electronic jamming first, firepower interception as the backstop, and self-defense interception as the supplement.”

Beijing also noted that Russia was forced to pull its strategic bombers back about 6,000 kilometers to the Chukotka Peninsula and deploy retractable protective nets.

The study noted how quickly these studies are being adopted into hardware.

At the Zhuhai air show in November 2024, the counter-drone systems of the state electronics, ordnance, and aerospace groups dominated Chinese coverage, led by CETC’s Tianqiong, NORINCO’s Hurricane 3000 microwave weapon, and CASIC’s LW-60 laser.

The September 2025 military parade put counter-drone missile-gun systems, high-energy lasers, and high-power microwave weapons on state display.

In late July 2026, CCTV aired footage of an army drone crew putting a missile into a fast boat maneuvering at sea, and in August the army flew armed KVD002 drones against sea drone targets in exercises.

China has also learned that in a war of attrition, production wins.

For Chinese analysts, a drone war is won by the side that can build more, and no country builds more drones than China. So here, China only needs to build on its advantages.

China also recognizes Starlink’s importance in the Ukraine War and has concluded that low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite constellations will play a decisive role in any future war. China is therefore working to build its own LEO satellite constellations.

The CSIS study concludes that China is learning from and implementing lessons from the Ukraine War faster than any other country.

As Russia and Ukraine fight a ‘war of attrition,’ China could be the biggest winner.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern  History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post China Logs Ukraine’s Newest Drone Tactics in Months, Fields Hardware Within a Year — “Learning Without Bleeding” appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

A profound transformation is underway in the politico-military-industrial complex that has dominated the US defense realm for over seven decades.

As drones, AI, autonomous systems, satellites, robots, and networked platforms reshape the battlefield, Silicon Valley is quietly edging out the US defense market’s big five: Lockheed Martin, RTX, Boeing, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman.

On October 6, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth tapped SpaceX CEO Elon Musk and Palmer Luckey, the co-founder of defense technology firm Anduril, to lead “Project Meridian: The Future of Warfare,” a new 120-day initiative tasked with identifying the technologies and capabilities required for future military dominance.

“We are witnessing rapid advances in artificial intelligence, autonomy, directed energy, robotics, biotechnology, among other critical high-tech areas. Combined, these new domains, new ways of fighting, and technological developments will profoundly alter the character of warfare,” Hegseth said in his one-page memo while announcing Project Meridian on September 30.

“To maintain global dominance, the United States must anticipate future operational environments and act decisively to develop the tools to dominate in them.”

Defining the scope of the study, Hegseth said: “Project Meridian will study the battlefields of the future, identify which weapons and technologies warfighters will need to harness to dominate in these environments, and propose actionable solutions to start developing, testing, and fielding these capabilities such that America will have overmatch for the 21st century and beyond.”

In his memo, Hegseth hinted that the center of gravity is shifting over who defines and decides the parameters of future defense weapons, technologies, and requirements.

“Project Meridian will leverage critical perspectives from outside the Pentagon, drawing upon a group of top technologists, innovators, business leaders, policymakers, and national security experts.”

Its primary function will be to map the trajectory of future warfare, identify critical capability gaps, and propose actionable solutions, Hegseth said.

The Elon Musk and Palmer Luckey-led panel will therefore discuss not a particular weapons platform, but what American warfare and the battlefield will look like in the future.

What they will discuss and define is not merely a change in weapons technology, but the way the Pentagon sees warfare and organizes the production of military power itself.

The study’s co-directors will “identify the domains that we must conquer, and capabilities we must master,” Hegseth said at Marine Corps Base Quantico on September 30.

“The Project Meridian effort will examine the technologies and operational concepts required to sustain U.S. military advantage across the full spectrum of future warfighting domains across a 10-20 year time horizon,” said a spokesperson for the Department of Defense.

The Musk- and Luckey-led study could therefore shape the Pentagon’s defense procurement decisions for decades.

It’s no accident that while SpaceX’s Musk and Anduril’s Luckey are on the panel, the executives of the Big Five are conspicuously missing.

Silicon Valley to Replace US’ Military-Industrial Complex?

The US military-industrial complex started taking shape in the 1950s.

While the two World Wars saw large-scale mobilizations and the channeling of industries toward weapons production, the distinctive military-industrial complex emerged in the 1950s.

US President Eisenhower himself later described the “conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry as new in the American experience.”

In April 1950, the top-secret U.S. National Security Council (NSC) policy (NSC-68) concluded that the “only plausible way to deter the Soviet Union was for President Harry Truman to support a massive build-up of both conventional and nuclear weapons.

In other words, the US should maintain elevated defense spending even during peacetime.

U.S. military budget jumped from USD 13 billion to USD 60 billion within a couple of years. Most of these funds went to private contractors, rather than government bodies.

For nearly the next seven decades, military production and weapons procurement in the US followed a set pattern.

The Pentagon defined its requirements, the US Congress approved the budgets, defense production firms, mostly a handful of prime contractors, submitted bids, and the winner developed platforms with lifecycles ranging from a few years to a few decades.

Fighter jets, bombers, submarines, aircraft carriers, missiles, radars, military communication platforms- all these platforms were developed this way.

For decades, they remained industrial objects; however, these platforms gradually became computational systems. The F-35, for instance, has been described as a flying supercomputer.

New-age military platforms, however, are first and foremost computing platforms.

Drones, for example, are all these systems rolled into one.

They are at once a fighter jet and a bomber, equipped with radar seekers, missiles, a network of sensors, a communication system, and a software platform that integrates AI into flight paths and target selection.

Satellite constellations are becoming central to military communication and targeting by drones, as seen in the critical role Starlink is playing in the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian drones use AI to select flight paths that exploit gaps in Russia’s layered air defense network.

Command-and-control software and Battlefield Management Systems (BMS) fuse information from diverse sources, including satellites, drones, ground-based radars, and AWACS, within seconds to create a unified, simplified battlefield picture and propose the most critical sites for targeting.

Underpinning all these systems are software, computing systems, and AI, not just hardware.

In this new warfare, large, expensive defense platforms are often a liability, rather than an asset.

In short, military value is shifting at an unprecedented speed.

Defense platforms costing millions of dollars and once considered invincible could now be targeted by a drone costing just a few thousand dollars.

This shift is also forcing military suppliers to change. Software firms in Silicon Valley that combine artificial intelligence (AI), autonomy, and machine learning (ML) to deliver innovative defense solutions are now at the center of this shift.

In recent years, they have won contracts worth tens of billions of dollars, edging out the Big Five of defense production.

The rise of these new military technology firms marks the biggest shift in the US arms industry over the past five years.

“Companies like SpaceX, Palantir, and Anduril have been tapped for multi-billion-dollar contract awards from the Pentagon for communications, targeting, unpiloted vehicles, anti-drone defenses, and hypersonic weapons. The funds from these awards will flow to the companies over time, which should put them in the top ranks of Pentagon contractors by value of awards within the next several years,” a recent report from the Costs of War project said.

For instance,

has received awards for countering Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from the Marines (US$642 million); a contract for its Roadrunner UAV interceptor system (US$250 million); and contracts for its Ghost Shark autonomous underwater vehicle as part of the U.S.-UK-Australia AUKUS project, to name a few.

Anduril has also been selected to build the next generation of Army goggles, the Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS), which are “intended to give soldiers everything from night-vision capability to warnings of incoming airborne threats.”

In June this year, the U.S. Air Force awarded engineering, manufacturing development, and production contracts for Collaborative Combat Aircraft Increment 1 to both Anduril (FQ-44) and General Atomics.

However, Anduril’s most lucrative contract could be in border security technologies. The Big Beautiful bill commits over US$6 billion for various border security technologies. However, as Eurasian Times reported earlier, the bill’s conditions mean Anduril is the only firm that qualifies for these border surveillance tenders.

SpaceX is launching most of the U.S. military’s satellites. It is also receiving funding for the military version of its Starlink system.

Separately, the Pentagon is considering investing in SpaceX’s Starship system.

SpaceX and Anduril could also win billion-dollar contracts in the upcoming ‘Golden Dome’ project.

Established tech firms are also challenging the Big Five’s dominance. For example, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Oracle, and IBM are collectively investing US$10 billion in the Pentagon’s cloud computing program.

“To the extent that the Pentagon moves towards AI-driven weapons systems, including swarms of drones and uncrewed aircraft, ships, and combat vehicles, the dominance of the Big Five firms may be reduced,” the report by the Costs of War Project added.

In fact, a recent essay on the Anduril Industries blog, ‘Rebooting the Arsenal of Democracy,’ dismissed the Big Five defense contractors as ‘remnants of the Cold War’ that need to be supplanted if America is to take the lead in developing and producing the weapons of the future.

“Why can’t the existing defense companies simply do better? The largest defense contractors are staffed with patriots who still lack the software expertise or business model to build the technology we need.

“Tomorrow’s weapons – autonomous systems, cyberweapons and defenses, networked systems, and more – are enabled through software, while these companies specialize in hardware. These companies work slowly, while the best engineers relish working at speed… These companies built the tools that kept us safe in the past, but they are not the future of our defense,” the essay said.

The trend, therefore, has already started.

Project Meridian, which could profoundly impact US defense procurement for decades, will further accelerate this trend.

Musk and Luckey’s appointment to lead this study suggests Silicon Valley tech firms are quietly edging out the US military-industrial complex’s Big Five.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post No Boeing, Lockheed or Any of the Big Five: Musk & Luckey Co-Lead Project Meridian on America’s Future Warfare appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Pakistan has outrighty rejected a New York Times (NYT) report that claimed PAF fighter jets were involved in strikes against Houthis, calling the claim “fake and fabricated.”

“The claim in the above-referenced NYT report that Pakistan Air Force aircraft are being used against the Houthis is fake and fabricated,” Pakistan’s Information Ministry said.

In an X post, Pakistan’s Ministry of Information & Broadcasting wrote: Fact Check | Ministry of Information & Broadcasting NYT above referred story attributing employment of PAF aircraft against Houthis is fake and fabricated. International Media houses are again asked to avoid speculative reporting with regards to employment of Pakistan’s Military Forces under Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. Details of any employment, if necessary will be given by concerned authorities. Truth Prevails over Falsehood.

The report came days after Pakistan and Turkey agreed to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement.

Earlier, a senior Pakistani military official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told NYT that Pakistan Air Force jets were being used in strikes against the Houthis.

Another Pakistani official said Islamabad’s role was aimed at degrading Houthi drone and missile threats through air support rather than a ground offensive in Yemen, the NYT claimed.

Col. David O. Smith, a former U.S. Army attaché in Pakistan and former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, said he had no classified figures, but that the analyst consensus was about 8,000 Pakistani troops deployed in Saudi Arabia. He said the force included a Pakistan Air Force contingent and Army air-defense units, that they would likely help secure oil infrastructure, and that Pakistani soldiers were unlikely to fight the Houthis directly because Islamabad is trying to preserve its relationship with Iran.

Pakistan’s military spokesman, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, confirmed to CNN that Pakistani troops are already in Saudi Arabia and described any role as defensive, without saying whether they would operate across the border in Yemen.

Interestingly, Pakistan earlier furiously denied a social media buzz that claimed Pakistan had lost three JF-17 fighter jets due to a Houthi missile attack that targeted King Abdulaziz Air Base in Saudi Arabia.

“This is absolutely fake. No credible or official source has also reported any sort of damage to PAF JF-17s,” the Ministry of Information reportedly said in its statement. The “deliberate fabrication of damage to PAF aircraft and their alleged evacuation is only blatant Indian propaganda, part of Hindutva deceit and a deceptive mindset,” the Ministry said.

The Pakistani Air Force jets and support aircraft, including JF-17 jets, arrived in April 2026 under the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed in September 2025.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s foreign minister has rejected sending troops to Yemen, despite the “Mecca pact” with Saudi Arabia.

“This is a defense agreement,” said Hakan Fidan, adding: “If one of the countries is attacked, you support its defense. This is not an offensive agreement.” Turkey “will not send its troops to another country’s territory to launch an attack”, he emphasized.

Fidan said Turkish and Saudi military delegations would work together to assess what defensive measures might be needed, without giving details.

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After claiming it intercepted foreign aircraft on two separate occasions last year, China has made another major claim: a “foreign warship” lost power while pursuing a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) Type 055 destroyer, seemingly an indirect reference to the USS Benfold.

Zhang Jun, a captain on the PLA Navy’s Type 055 “Zunyi” destroyer, said a foreign warship lost power while his warship, engaged in a routine training exercise at the time, the Chinese state-owned publication Global Times claimed.

Speaking on China Central Television (CCTV), the officer said the destroyer had multiple encounters with foreign warships and aircraft during the exercise. 

“During that mission, we were conducting routine training exercises when a foreign warship began tracking our ship. As we sailed at high speed, the foreign vessel had to match our speed. While we were in a standoff, its power and electricity all suddenly went out, its radar stopped emitting, and its navigation lights went dark,” Zhang said. “This lasted for nearly half an hour. But our equipment and our crew had no problems at all,” he added.

When asked whether the engagement made him nervous, the Chinese officer said, “Why should I be nervous? I was definitely not nervous. As long as you are within range of my missiles, I can definitely destroy you.”

The officer stopped short of providing more details, including the time and place of the encounter and the name of the foreign warship. However, the claims appear aimed at the US Navy warship USS Benfold, which apparently lost power and was stranded in the South China Sea in July 2026, as previously reported by the EurAsian Times.

“On July 24, 2026, while conducting routine operations in the Indo-Pacific, Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65) reported an engineering casualty involving its generators, causing a loss of power,” Navy Cmdr. Matthew Comer, spokesperson for the 7th Fleet, said in a statement to USNI News in August  2026.

“There were no injuries to the crew, who demonstrated resilience, grit, professionalism and unwavering steadiness in their response,” he added.

The incident reportedly occurred while the USS Benfold was engaged in routine operations in the Indo-Pacific as part of the USS George Washington carrier strike group (CSG).

After the power loss, the guided-missile destroyer reportedly drifted for four days and was supplied by other ships in the South China Sea, which China claims as its sovereign territory and where frequent standoffs occur between Beijing and other forces.

The Seventh Fleet spokesperson did not mention a high-speed pursuit of a Chinese vessel or any engagement between the US carrier strike group and PLA Navy warships, although these encounters are not uncommon in the region.

When asked whether China’s claimed scenario is plausible, Indian Navy veteran and commentator Rear Admiral Girish Kumar Garg (retd) told the EurAsian Times, “For an Arleigh Burke-class ship, high-speed propulsion has nothing to do with total power loss. Complete power failure can happen if all onboard power generators fail or the power distribution system malfunctions. Although rare, it is not impossible.”

Further, when probed about potential reasons for the complete power loss, Rear Admiral Garg said, “Can be many reasons- fuel contamination can be a major cause. Power overload due to too many systems operating and loaded on the running generators can also cause them to trip. However, generally, if all onboard power generators are running and connected, then they cater for full ship’s electrical load plus some extra load margin.”

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The USS Benfold power loss incident was not the first of its kind. Earlier, the USS Higgins had an “engineering casualty” in its electrical system in May 2026,  which caused it to lose power and propulsion for many hours in the Indo-Pacific area. No chase of another vessel had occurred at the time.

Nonetheless, state media and Chinese experts used the opportunity and their purported claims to highlight the enviable capabilities of the PLAN’s Type 055 warships.

Chinese military expert Shi Hong told the Global Times that the Type 055 is considered the world’s best large destroyer in terms of comprehensive capabilities. Meanwhile, Xu Yi, another crew member on the ship that was involved in the purported encounter, said, “We have a powerful offensive and defensive system. In the future, we will definitely conduct operations externally in formation. In fact, we have already begun integrating multiple formations and exploring what makes for the best combination.”

Some pro-PLA observers on social media widely amplified the Chinese claims, aligning with similar previous instances.

However, Beijing deliberately makes specific claims while avoiding direct naming of the foreign assets to avoid a diplomatic response and to eliminate the possibility of a counter-narrative from official sources and a potential bilateral tussle.

Chinese Military Keeps Confronting Foreign Assets

In the past few years, China has claimed to have intercepted and expelled unidentified foreign aircraft from the same region on multiple occasions.

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Last year, Chinese state media, CCTV, released a video on June 29 showing two J-16 fighter jets—considered the cornerstone of the PLA Air Force’s interception efforts—being dispatched to warn and drive out a “foreign aircraft” that allegedly breached China’s territorial sea boundary. 

“The foreign aircraft flew over at a low altitude, not very disciplined, almost at a vertical 90 degrees, breaching our territorial sea line,” air force aviation brigade member Zhang Zhanfang stated on the broadcast at the time.

The Chinese media did not disclose the exact date or location of the incident, making it challenging to identify the foreign aircraft in question.

Later that year, Global Times reported on a documentary shown on CCTV in October 2025, in which a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) pilot from the special mission aircraft formation claimed he could simultaneously lock two foreign stealth fighter jets while flying the J-16 fighter jet and force both jets to withdraw.

“They headed straight toward our two aircraft. Their intention was very clear—it was a provocation. With our backs to the territorial sea line, we had to intercept them,” Li Chao, a pilot from the People’s Liberation Army’s Western Theatre Command, said while recounting the incident that allegedly took place during a coastal training exercise in 2024.

Although the Chinese did not disclose which foreign stealth aircraft it was referring to, only two aircraft fit the description: the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II of the US Air Force (USAF).

Both aircraft are frequently deployed in the Indo-Pacific for training, war exercises, and other operational missions, as the EurAsian Times noted in a detailed report published at the time. 

Washington did not acknowledge the claim, but the incident drew a wide debate over whether a 4.5th-generation jet could intercept US fifth-generation stealth fighters.

Separately, US and Chinese ships have had sporadic encounters in international waters, as the US Navy conducts regular FONOPs (Freedom of Navigation Operations) in the region.

Earlier this year, in January 2026, reports noted that a Chinese warship, CNS Taiyuan, encountered a foreign warship during “a long-range training exercise” in undisclosed waters. The report said the foreign ship meant to provoke the Chinese crew, but the crew instead followed orders and drove the vessel away.

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Similarly, in January 2025, reports noted that China had claimed that its navy “drove away” a “foreign warship that attempted to spy on its Shandong aircraft carrier during a long-distance training mission. At the time, a Chinese sailor attached to the Type 055 destroyer CNS Yan’an crew said a foreign warship attempted to engage in “illegal reconnaissance” and infiltrate a formation led by the carrier during a routine training mission. 

In June 2023, a US destroyer, USS Chung-Hoon, had a close encounter with a Chinese warship in the Taiwan Strait. The US Navy alleged that the Chinese ship executed an “unsafe” maneuver, crossed the US ship’s path, and forced it to slow down to avoid a collision.

Another significant incident occurred in 2018 when a Chinese warship came dangerously close to the USS Decatur in the South China Sea. The US Navy described the action as “unsafe and unprofessional.

Despite a thaw in ties between Chinese and US leaders, the fight over Indo-Pacific dominance continues.

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OPED by Rear Admiral Girish Kumar Garg, VSM (Retd)

The difficulty in ending the Iran war is not identifying the ingredients of peace. The nuclear issue, missiles, sanctions, regional armed groups, freedom of navigation, and Israel’s security concerns are all well known. The harder question is: how adversaries who deeply distrust each other can take the first step without believing that they are making themselves more vulnerable.

Military action can change the battlefield, but it cannot by itself create a durable political settlement. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the danger that military calculations become disconnected from the strategic objective.

The answer may not lie in one grand bargain, but in a sequence of reciprocal bargains, each limited in scope, independently verifiable and linked to the next. The objective should not be to create trust between Iran, Israel and the United States. That is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.

The objective should be to create a system that can function despite the absence of trust.

The broad issues are already clear. Iran wants recognition of its sovereignty, sanctions relief, and protection from military attack.

Israel wants assurance that Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon and that Iranian-supported groups cannot threaten its population. The United States wants to prevent nuclear proliferation, protect regional stability and avoid another open-ended war.

These objectives are not necessarily irreconcilable. The difficulty lies in sequencing them.

Iran fears that surrendering strategic capabilities before receiving meaningful concessions will leave it exposed. Israel fears that sanctions relief before Iranian capabilities are constrained will simply give Tehran resources to rebuild. Washington fears that concessions without Iranian compliance could be interpreted as weakness.

This is the classic security dilemma: each side sees its own actions as defensive while viewing the other’s actions as a threat that must be countered.

A successful peace process must therefore address not only what is negotiated, but how concessions are exchanged.

Replace the Grand Bargain with Reciprocal Bargains

The first step could be a time-bound Strategic Pause, perhaps lasting 30 days. During this period, the parties would freeze specified offensive operations, avoid attacks on civilian infrastructure and commercial shipping, and suspend actions that materially escalate the confrontation.

Compliance would need independent monitoring. More importantly, neither side should have to make a leap of faith. Each concession should trigger a corresponding concession by the other side.

A verified Iranian reduction in a specified category of nuclear activity could trigger suspension of particular sanctions. A verified reduction in attacks by regional armed groups could trigger defined relaxation of maritime or economic pressure. A verified violation would automatically suspend the corresponding benefit.

The settlement would therefore be built incrementally, with each step creating the conditions for the next.

Address Israel’s Security Dilemma

No settlement can succeed if it ignores Israel’s fundamental security concerns. From Israel’s perspective, Iran’s nuclear program is only one part of the threat. Iranian support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis has created a network of armed actors capable of imposing military pressure on Israel and disrupting regional security.

The practical approach would be to negotiate capabilities and behavior rather than political allegiance.

Iran could progressively restrict the transfer of specified advanced weapons, particularly long-range missiles, precision-strike systems and sophisticated drones, and commit to preventing attacks that deliberately target civilians or expand the conflict beyond agreed limits. In return, Iran would receive progressively stronger security assurances against direct attack.

The exchange is straightforward in principle: Iran reduces the forward military pressure it generates through its regional partners, while its security becomes less dependent on maintaining that forward deterrence.

For Israel, the benefit would be reduced military pressure on its territory. For Iran, the benefit would be a reduced perceived need to maintain an extensive regional deterrence architecture.

Hezbollah, Hamas & Houthis Need Different Solutions

These three groups should not be treated as one problem.

For Hezbollah, the central issue is Lebanon’s sovereignty and the presence of a heavily armed non-state actor on Israel’s northern frontier. A settlement should strengthen the Lebanese state’s authority and provide for a phased reduction or relocation of heavy weapons from sensitive areas. The immediate objective need not be the disappearance of Hezbollah as a political organization, but preventing any non-state actor from initiating a major interstate conflict without the Lebanese state’s consent.

Hamas presents a different challenge because it is inseparable from the unresolved Palestinian question. Requiring Hamas simply to disappear is unlikely to be realistic. A more viable pathway would involve Hamas relinquishing governance in Gaza, progressively reducing heavy weapons and transferring administration and security responsibilities to a legitimate Palestinian structure supported by the international community.

That process would need reconstruction and a credible political horizon for Palestinians. Otherwise, disarmament could simply create a vacuum for another armed movement.

The Houthis should be addressed through a separate Red Sea security arrangement. Iran could restrict the transfer of specified missile, drone, and maritime-strike capabilities, while a Yemeni political process provides the Houthis with a legitimate political future.

The objective would be to separate Yemen’s internal conflict from the wider Iran-Israel confrontation and restore freedom of commercial navigation.

Turn sanctions into an instrument for peace

Sanctions relief should also be redesigned. Iran is unlikely to make major concessions today in exchange for benefits that may arrive years later.

A Peace Escrow Mechanism could address this problem. Sanctions would be suspended in stages rather than simply lifted. Oil revenues, access to frozen funds, and selected financial channels could be released automatically when independent monitors verify specified Iranian actions.

The same principle would operate in reverse. If commitments are violated, the corresponding benefits would automatically pause.

Iran would therefore not have to trust that sanctions relief will eventually materialize; the economic benefit would be directly linked to verified compliance. At the same time, the United States and its partners would retain leverage until Iran demonstrated its commitments.

Sanctions would cease to be merely punishment or bargaining leverage and become an instrument for implementing the settlement.

Make Hormuz The First Test

The Strait of Hormuz offers an immediate opportunity for confidence-building because its security affects the entire international community.

Iran could provide a verifiable commitment to the safe passage of commercial shipping, while the United States and its partners could suspend specified maritime pressure measures during the Strategic Pause. An independent mechanism could investigate incidents and determine responsibility.

If commercial vessels can move safely while military forces exercise restraint, it would demonstrate that reciprocal commitments can work even when the parties remain deeply hostile.

That lesson could then be applied to the nuclear program, missiles and regional armed groups.

Peace Through Managed Distrust

The central mistake would be to expect trust to precede the agreement. Trust is more likely to result from repeated compliance.

The settlement should therefore rest on four principles: reciprocity, verification, gradualism and automaticity. Every concession should have a corresponding benefit; important commitments should be independently verifiable; major concessions should be broken into manageable stages; and agreed rewards or penalties should operate automatically rather than depend on renewed political bargaining.

This approach also gives each government a politically defensible narrative. Iran can present the process as an exchange of specific military concessions for tangible economic and security benefits rather than capitulation. Israel can demonstrate that its security concerns are being addressed through enforceable restrictions rather than political assurances. The United States can retain leverage while reducing the risk of another prolonged regional war.

Most importantly, the framework recognizes a basic reality of international politics: peace does not always begin with trust. Sometimes it begins with managing distrust.

The parties do not have to agree on history, ideology or regional ambitions. They need only agree that certain actions are too dangerous to continue and that restraint can produce tangible benefits.

A durable peace is therefore unlikely to emerge from one dramatic handshake or a single comprehensive treaty. It is more likely to emerge from a chain of smaller agreements in which each side discovers, step by step, that restraint produces greater security than escalation.

The real diplomatic breakthrough would not be an agreement that ends all disagreements. It would be an agreement that makes continued disagreement less dangerous, more predictable and progressively less dependent on the use of force.

The ultimate test of diplomacy will not be whether Iran, Israel and the United States learn to trust one another. It will be whether they can construct a system in which they do not need to trust one another to stop fighting.

• OPED By Admiral (R) Girish Kumar Garg
• This is an Opinion Article. Views Personal of the Author
• The writer is a retired Rear Admiral and was the Naval Officer-in-Charge (A&N Islands)

The post Hezbollah, Hamas & Houthis Cannot Be Disarmed With a Single Deal: U.S. & Israel Need New Mechanism: OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.