The Houthis (Ansar Allah) attacked Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on October 10, killing at least 13 people and injuring over 300, the deadliest attack on the kingdom in more than a decade, forcing authorities to suspend operations at the airport.

This was not an isolated incident.

Since the fighting resumed between Saudi Arabia and the Iran-backed group in July this year, Houthis have attacked at least five Saudi airports, including King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Airport in Jizan, Abha International Airport, Najran Airport, King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, and King Fahd International Airport in Dammam.

So far, at least 20 people have been killed in these attacks, and hundreds more have been injured, apart from damage to runways, terminals, and aircraft.

Just the King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has been attacked three times this week. The two previous attacks on King Khalid Airport this week killed ⁠four and caused heavy damage to a Saudi commercial plane parked on the tarmac.

The Houthis, in fact, have declared the whole of Saudi airspace as “a zone of military operations,” saying airlines should avoid flying in the country.

Saudi Arabia operates one of the Middle East’s most extensive, multi-layered air-defense networks. Its upper tier includes US-supplied THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) alongside Patriot batteries, South Korea’s Cheongung-II AD system, and improved HAWK launchers.

It also fields French Crotale SAMs, Avenger systems with Stinger missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and Silent Hunter laser systems supplied by China.

The Houthis are also enforcing a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia by choking the Bab-el-Mandeb strait in the Red Sea and have also targeted the country’s oil refineries and East-West oil pipeline.

In fact, in the ‘fog of war,’ it is easy to miss the context that the Houthi-Saudi war did not begin with these strikes on Saudi airports; nor did it start in July when a 2022 ceasefire between the two sides broke over Saudi air strikes on Sana’a airport.

The two sides have been fighting for nearly two decades.

Saudi-Houthi Conflict

The Houthis are a Zaydi Shiite politico-religious movement from northern Yemen’s Saada region, originating in the 1990s as a revivalist group opposing corruption in central government, their economic and social marginalization, and increasing Saudi-backed Wahhabi influence in Yemen, including in traditionally Zaydi areas.

Saudi Arabia’s longest land border with Yemen stretches roughly 1,200 km, much of it still porous. Consequently, expanding Iranian influence through the Houthi rebels carries security implications Riyadh cannot afford to overlook.

The Houthis drone and missile capabilities, and the strategic importance of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb routes for Saudi oil exports, add more risks for Riyadh.

Due to these factors, Riyadh has a vested interest in both containing rising Iranian influence in Yemen and weakening the Houthis’ military capabilities, while at the same time, preventing the economic collapse of Yemen.

If Yemen collapses, the crisis will inevitably spill into its northern neighbor – Saudi Arabia. There are already over 2 million Yemeni migrants in the country, and an economic collapse can further push millions of Yemeni citizens into the country.

Riyadh regularly provides grants to the Yemeni government to prevent its collapse and has already provided US$12.6 billion in the last 14 years. After investing so much money, Riyadh clearly tries to control who leads the country and its policies.

However, Saudi involvement in Yemen was never limited to just financial aid.

Riyadh first got militarily involved in Yemen 17 years ago, in 2009.

Between 2004 and 2010, the Yemeni government and the Houthis were engaged in constant hostilities. This warfare often spilled into Saudi Arabia’s southern parts as well.

After Houthi attacks on Saudi border posts in November 2009, which killed border guards, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on Houthi positions with F-15 and Tornado fighter jets, and even conducted limited ground operations.

Notably, this was the kingdom’s first unilateral military operation in decades.

Fighting continued in 2010, and there were substantial Saudi casualties, with more than 130 Saudi soldiers dead by some estimates.

Riyadh and the Houthis reached a ceasefire in 2010, which stopped the fighting. Meanwhile, the Houthis continued to gain ground in Yemen. By the end of 2014, the Houthis had occupied the very strategic Sanaa and Aden airports.

In March 2015, Saudi Arabia returned to Yemen with Operation Decisive Storm. This time, Riyadh was not alone. It cobbled together a coalition of eight countries, including the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan. The US also provided logistics and intelligence support.

When Saudi Arabia Bombed Yemeni Airports

The campaign began with massive airstrikes targeting air defenses, airports/air bases, missile sites, and Houthi positions. Riyadh also imposed a naval blockade of Yemen.

The coalition particularly targeted Yemeni airports, airbases, air defense missiles, and civilian and military aircraft. The aim was to neutralize any aerial capability that the Houthis might have gained after seizing Yemeni government assets.

In March itself, the Saudi-led coalition launched airstrikes on Sanaa International Airport, the adjacent al-Dulaimi air base, and Al Anad Air Base.

Reports say the attacks damaged or destroyed scores of aircraft, including a Yemeni Air Force CASA CN-235M-300 cargo plane and a Beechcraft Super King Air at al-Dulaim.

The strikes also damaged one Mi-8 helicopter, two Bell 214 Huey helicopters, multiple Su-22 ground-attack fighters, and F-5 jets. The coalition destroyed an Ilyushin Il-76TD cargo aircraft at Sanaa International Airport in late March.

The coalition also damaged the runway at Sanaa International Airport.

The coalition attacked Sanaa Airport again in April. A Yemeni Felix Airways Bombardier CRJ702ER civilian aircraft was set ablaze, and another cargo plane was hit. Two Yemeni Air Force MiG-29s were also reported destroyed in related strikes at the airport.

When an Iranian cargo plane, allegedly carrying humanitarian aid, tried to land at the Sanna airport, coalition jets targeted the airport again and bombed the runway, rendering it unusable.

Brigadier General Ahmed Asseri, spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition, told Reuters at the time that the airport was bombed after an Iranian aircraft refused to coordinate with the coalition and the pilot ignored orders to turn back.

These attacks continued in May.

A contemporary report said that one MiG-29, two F-5s, three Su-22s, one Mi-8, and two Il-76TD cargo planes were destroyed in Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen in May.

The Yemeni Air Force was effectively neutralized in these attacks. The coalition strikes destroyed most MiG-29s, Su-22s, F-5s, and support aircraft on the ground or rendered them unusable.

The coalition further attacked Yemeni airports in 2017 and 2018.

The Saudi-led operation continued for seven years, from 2015 till 2022, when a ceasefire was reached between Riyadh and the Houthis.

This ceasefire was broken in July 2026 when Riyadh once again bombed Sanaa airport in order to not let an Iranian plane land at the airport.

However, by July 2026, the Houthis had considerably improved their offensive capabilities.

This time, it’s the Houthis who are enforcing a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and repeatedly targeting its civilian airports, as well as oil infrastructure.

While the Houthi attacks on Saudi airports are making global headlines, the prelude to these attacks was written over a decade ago in 2015, and the final chapter of this nearly two-decade-long conflict between Riyadh and the Houthis has yet to be written.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

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Russia is prepared to halt attacks on Ukraine for a single day to allow presidential elections but will not agree to a longer ceasefire, the Kremlin said on Monday. 

But had the Russian attack on Ukraine, as planned, succeeded in the initial days, the Ukraine-Russia war would not have dragged into the fifth year, and there would have been no talks of changes in leadership.

Dmitry Peskov said President Vladimir Putin would order Russian forces not to strike Ukraine on polling day if elections were held. “If they truly want to hold elections in Kyiv, then the president of Russia, the commander-in-chief, will be ready to give an order not to launch strikes on Ukraine on election day, specifically on election day,” Peskov told reporters.

He rejected Zelenskiy’s call for a 60-day ceasefire, saying Russia seeks a lasting peace agreement rather than a temporary halt.

“In the Kremlin, both President Putin and officials at other levels have repeatedly stated that we do not want a ceasefire,” Peskov said. “We want long-term peace and are prepared to do everything possible to achieve it.”

Zelenskiy made the 60-day offer on Sunday in an ABC News interview. He said Ukraine would organize elections if Russia agreed to a full ceasefire lasting two months.

“Please tell Putin, give us two months, 60 days of total ceasefire, 60 days, and we will organize elections,” Zelenskiy said.

His comments came a day after U.S. President Donald Trump said Ukraine should replace its President. Trump told reporters that Zelenskiy had failed to reach a deal with Russia and that it was time for a change.

“I think it’s time for Ukraine to get a new president,” Trump said. He criticized Ukraine’s strikes on Russian oil refineries, which followed a U.S. agreement to ease restrictions on Russian diesel exports.

Why Putin Failed To Seize Kyiv?

Russia had a clear plan to capture Kyiv and force a surrender.

On 24 February 2022, Russia’s Airborne Forces launched an operation toward Kyiv, supported by missile strikes and air cover, using attack and transport helicopters.

The objective of this blitzkrieg-style maneuver was to seize Antonov Airport in Hostomel, north of Kyiv, establish a bridgehead, create a secure air corridor for additional airborne troops, and then rapidly advance toward Kyiv.

The plan was to quickly deploy Russian Special Forces and military equipment at Hostomel and then overwhelm Ukrainian resistance after a couple of hard strikes.

If successful, Russian troops, armor, artillery, and supplies could be flown into the airport, allowing them to deploy into Kyiv and overthrow the Ukrainian government.

To execute this mission, Russia tasked its elite Airborne Forces (VDV), particularly the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade, a unit with extensive combat experience from operations in Chechnya, Crimea, and Donbas.

The operation began on February 24 with a coordinated attack involving numerous Russian Ka-52 “Alligator” attack helicopters, which used low-flying tactics to avoid radar detection.

These helicopters fired guided missiles and cannons at the airport’s defenses to suppress Ukrainian forces. Despite intense resistance that cost Russia several helicopters, the assault continued for several hours.

Russian forces seized Hostomel Airport on February 25, 2022. Afterward, the Russian Army and its Airborne Forces tried to turn the airport into a critical forward operating base for their planned push toward Kyiv.

However, Russia’s offensive soon faced considerable setbacks. Russia’s failure to clear the area around the airport quickly led to catastrophe. Ukrainian forces, including special operations units from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense Main Intelligence Directorate, launched a counteroffensive.

Local fighters and Ukrainian forces on the ground inflicted heavy damage on the Russian troops. In one of the most noteworthy junctures of the battle, a sniper killed Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, the commanding general of the Russian 7th Airborne Division, by the end of February 2022.

The invasion’s initial momentum slowed, leading to the infamous 40-mile-long convoy and entire units of Russian troops stalling due to fuel shortages.

By March 4, Russian state television aired footage showing large numbers of destroyed Russian military equipment, struck by Ukrainian artillery, scattered across the base. Russian forces became immobilized without clear orders to advance or retreat.

The situation remained dire until March 29, when Russian commanders finally ordered a retreat from Kyiv Oblast. This marked the beginning of the Russian withdrawal from Hostomel, with damaged equipment that could not be evacuated. Ukrainian artillery fire targeted the retreating forces, further complicating their situation.

Among the equipment left behind were 16 modern BMD-4M armored fighting vehicles and a 1L262E Rtut-BM electronic warfare system. These items were either destroyed during the retreat preparation or intentionally blown up by Russian forces.

When Ukrainian troops reentered Hostomel, they found evidence of the hastily abandoned Russian positions, with remnants of daily life scattered around.

These included unopened food packages, personal items like passports and bank cards, and even Ukrainian armored vehicles that had been captured by Russian forces but could not be taken with them.

The loss of surprise, the inability to clear surrounding areas, and the vulnerability of airborne operations to counterattacks demonstrated how quickly airborne missions can go wrong.

The Russian failure to capture Hostomel Airport proved fatal for Moscow’s overall military strategy in Ukraine. After the Hostomel disaster, Russia withdrew from Kyiv oblast and then regrouped in Ukraine’s southern and eastern provinces to stabilize the frontlines.

This initial failure to seize Hostomel and then proceed to Kyiv also allowed Western countries to mobilize support for Ukraine and resume supplying Kyiv with critical military and humanitarian aid.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Putin’s 2022 Plan to Seize Kyiv Failed — Now Trump Wants a New President & Moscow Offers One Day Solace appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The U.S. Air Force has donated an F-117A Nighthawk, the world’s first operational stealth aircraft, to the Smithsonian Institution, where it will be on permanent public display later this month.

The Nighthawk, serial number 85-0818 and nicknamed “The Overachiever,” is the only F-117 known to have flown combat missions in all four major conflicts, including Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989), Operation Desert Storm (1991), Operation Allied Force over Yugoslavia (1999), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003).

It first flew in 1986 and was withdrawn from combat service around 2007.

The Air & Space Forces Association announced the donation on Sept. 14 at its Air, Space & Cyber Conference. Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works prepared the aircraft for display in a museum. Air Force Reserve crews from the 512th Airlift Wing then flew the partially disassembled Nighthawk from California to Virginia aboard a C-5M Super Galaxy, arriving around Oct. 6.

The National Air and Space Museum’s Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center near Washington Dulles International Airport will reassemble the aircraft. Visitors can watch the reassembly through the glass overlook of the Mary Baker Engen Restoration Hangar before the aircraft joins the permanent collection in late October, alongside other icons such as the SR-71 Blackbird and the B-29 Enola Gay.

Museum officials described the F-117 as the world’s first true operational stealth combat aircraft and said adding it fills a longstanding gap in the national collection. It is the 16th F-117 transferred for public display.

World’s 1st Stealth Aircraft

Aerospace analysts have long admired the F-117 Nighthawk’s distinctive design. A GE blog post describes the Nighthawk’s features and says the aircraft looks less potent alongside other advanced American fighters.

The aircraft has no afterburners. The aircraft is unstable on all three flight axes and requires an onboard computer for control

Despite that, the GE also noted one advantage: the aircraft is practically invisible to enemy radar.

According to General Electric, it was the first stealth aircraft to see the light of day during the Cold War and used a pre-existing engine modified to meet the requirement.

Despite the US technological advantage during the Cold War, contested airspace posed a substantial threat to pilots and their aircraft. Developing enemy technology could allow the enemy’s air force to lock on to American fighter jets and shoot them down at an alarming rate.

Although Lockheed Martin built the F-117 Nighthawk, GE built the engine that could power a stealth warplane. GE created the F404 engine exclusively for the F/A-18 Hornet, and it quickly became a compelling alternative for the F-117, a top-secret aircraft that needed an engine.

The engine was almost identical to the F/F404 A-18’s variant. GE constructed roughly 100 of these engines on a separate assembly line with only government-approved workers. That engine soon earned its stripes by being dependable, maintainable, lightweight, and inexpensive.

The Nighthawk

The US Air Force retired the F-117 Nighthawk in 2008.

The F-117s are reportedly used as developmental and “red air” training platforms a decade after their retirement. Certain aircraft act as aggressors in air-to-air combat during red-air training.

This raised eyebrows because it was unlikely that an archaic aircraft retired a decade ago would resurface for war games. The US Air Force later revealed that it had resurrected the Nighthawk.

Speculation suggests the USAF has brought these aircraft back to life because of their stealth capabilities. The USAF needs to train its fighter pilots against adversary stealth fighters, the Russian Su-57 and the Chinese J-20, as well as cruise missiles.

As a result, USAF pilots may be able to better find and intercept stealth aircraft in future operations and counter enemy cruise missiles if they train against Nighthawks as part of an advanced program.

When the US planned to develop the F-117 Nighthawk, the main challenge was reducing the aircraft’s radar cross-section and electromagnetic signature.

The aircraft had to fly subsonically to reduce obnoxious sonic booms. The aircraft had no afterburners or large exhaust plumes from infrared-emitting engines. It referred to flat surfaces that reflected radar radiation. The result was an otherworldly-looking black jet the US government didn’t recognize until 1988.

Despite the F-404’s ability to fly supersonically, the Nighthawk was limited to subsonic speeds because using afterburners to breach the sound barrier would compromise the aircraft’s stealth.

GE engineers designed the F-117’s unusual exhaust to scatter hot exhaust and evade radar and heat-seeking missiles.

“Really, it was the beauty of it. They could modify an existing engine, the F404, to provide the required thrust and weight. Minor adjustments were made to meet the F-117’s unique intake, and F404-F1D2 was ready to power the stealth attack aircraft,” said Bill Formosi, a former project manager of the F1D2 program.

Unlike other planes of the period, the F-117’s air intakes were grilled and coated with a unique radar-absorbent coating. Spring-loaded doors also opened on the ground to let in more air to the engine. However, once in flight, the hatches would be closed again to maintain the aircraft’s stealth.

According to Formosi, the tailpipe was the engine’s most distinctive feature.

“If you look at an F-117 from behind, you’ll notice that the engines aren’t visible like they are in other aircraft,” he said. “It was done on purpose, and it had everything to do with keeping it quiet. There was a 12-stage tailpipe that went from circular at the engine’s end to flat at the end of the exhaust, rather than an afterburner as the F404 had on the F/A-18.”

“This was done to spread the hot exhaust air over a larger region, reducing its heat signature,” Formosi said.

This is probably why the F-117 Nighthawk, commissioned over 40 years ago and retired over a decade back, has staged a comeback,  this time for public viewing.

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As EurAsian Times recently reported, the U.S. Air Force crew denied Indian officials cockpit access to its F-35 stealth fighter during the recent Tarang Shakti exercise, Indian Air Force Chief Air Marshal AP Singh said. Interestingly, the IAF did something similar with its cutting-edge Su-30 MKIs in 2008.

Speaking at a press conference alongside U.S. Pacific Air Forces Commander General Kevin Schneider, Air Chief Marshal Singh said the U.S. had made no formal offer to sell the F-35 to India, despite all the media buzz and speculation.

“Your people don’t even let us go near the aircraft, and you are talking about selling it to us,” Singh said when asked about any official offer for F-35s.

He added that Indian personnel were not shown the cockpit.

“The US did not show us the cockpit, but allowed us to fly in close formation,” Singh said. He later described his remarks as a joke that should not be taken too seriously and noted that countries protect sensitive technologies, including systems India does not share with the United States.

General Schneider said he did not make decisions on information sharing for programs such as the F-35. “There are program-level security classification guides that determine what we can share, when we share it, as well as how we protect it,” Schneider said.

USAF had deployed six F-35 stealth jets for Tarang Shakti. This was the first time U.S. stealth jets trained against Indian jets and operated from the indian soil. This was a rare opportunity for the Indian military to study and evaluate a stealth fighter using Indian ground radars.

Experts like Air Marshal Anil Chopra, writing for the EurAsian Times, believe it would be a good opportunity for the IAF to prepare for a potential J-20 scenario operated by China.

Chopra wrote: “The F-35A is the only fifth-gen fighter in the exercise. In mock drills, it is much better than China’s J-20, with stealth, low observability, sensor fusion, and first-look, first-shot tactics, and it will better simulate the J-20. That does not mean the IAF will see the F-35’s classified technologies; however, it does mean that the IAF can practice studying a stealth jet from an Indian base—to understand the Chinese J-20 better.”

Prelude to Saudi-Houthi War: When 9-Nation Coalition Led by Saudi Arabia Bombed Yemen With U.S. Support

Parallel from Red Flag 2008

In 2008, India sent its most advanced Su-30 MKI fighters to the US for the Red Flag exercise at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

To protect the Flankers’ classified NIIP N011M Bars passive electronically scanned array (PESA) radar, the Indian Ministry of Defense directed pilots not to use the radar in full operational mode.

IAF stated at the time that “the radar frequencies are top secret, as they can be used to block vital functions of the fighter” and that “while we have a good equation with the USA, we have to be careful about the future.”

The Bars radar was operated only in a limited “training mode” that restricted its range and capabilities, preventing detailed mapping of its frequencies by host forces.

Other limitations during Red Flag 2008 included restrictions on data-links, chaff, flares, and simulation of the R-77 BVR missile. Indian pilots operated without a full cockpit data picture to protect its sensitive technology.

While Indian crew had limited exposure to the F-35s at Tarang Shakti 2026, with the jets kept in a segregated area, the USAF has previously been given noteworthy access to the MKIs.

During the familiarisation phase ahead of Red Flag 2008, Su-30MKI crews exchanged rides with their American counterparts, allowing U.S. pilots to fly in the Flanker’s rear seat, according to reports.

During Exercise Cope India 2023 at Kalaikunda, then-PACAF Commander General Kenneth S. Wilsbach flew a training mission in the rear seat of an IAF Su-30MKI alongside an Indian pilot—an engagement the IAF publicly confirmed.

Earlier Cope India iterations also saw USAF pilots fly in Su-30 trainer variants.

During the just-concluded Tarang Shakti, F-35s operated extensively alongside Su-30MKIs, Rafales, and Tejas in joint tactical missions, large-force engagements, and mixed formations, giving the USAF tremendous exposure to the Flanker’s performance envelope, radar behavior, and tactics in a realistic environment.

U.S. F-117 Nighthawk “The Overachiever” Makes Final Comeback at Smithsonian’s Udvar-Hazy Center

Su-30 MKI vs. F-15 at Red Flag

After the 2008 exercise, a video of a private briefing by USAF Colonel Terrence Fornof, an F-15 pilot and director of requirements and testing at the Air Force Warfare Center at Nellis, circulated online.

Fornof was addressing a group of retired military pilots.

Fornof claimed F-15 pilots “dominated” the Su-30 MKI in one-versus-one engagements. He described Indian pilots as “amazed” and “floored,” saying they didn’t want more one-versus-one fights after the first few days.

He claimed the F-15 exploited a vulnerability in the Su-30’s thrust-vectoring by waiting for the aircraft to enter post-stall maneuvering, after which it “starts falling out of the sky,” allowing the F-15 to close and engage with guns.

Fornof also claimed the Su-30 MKI’s engines were highly susceptible to foreign object damage, leading Indian pilots to request one-minute spacing between takeoffs, and he noted concerns about engine reliability.

He claimed Indian pilots had a high rate of fratricide and that, on paper, the Su-30 had superior radar, thrust, thrust vectoring, and weapons range. He added that once Indian pilots fully mastered the aircraft, they could regularly defeat F-15s and F-16s, but the Su-30 was “nowhere near” the F-22.

USAF later said Fornof’s comments were his personal opinion and that he did not intend to offend allies.

Indian accounts and subsequent reporting rejected Fornof’s points. They claimed that the Sukhois held their own against top USAF pilots and maintained a high serviceability rate throughout the exercise.

All engagements were recorded on ACMI systems. Thrust-vectoring performance differed from Fornof’s account, and U.S. aircrew said they appreciated the IAF’s maneuvers.

Fratricides occurred on both sides. Indian sources attributed theirs largely to periods when AWACS support was unavailable and to poor ground control by U.S. controllers (acknowledged in debriefs), noting that the IAF lacked Link-16 and advanced IFF while the U.S. side had them.

Putin’s 2022 Plan to Seize Kyiv Failed — Now Trump Wants a New President & Moscow Offers One Day Solace

Serviceability was reported above 90 percent, with no confirmed foreign object damage incidents of the type described; a tire burst was quickly repaired. Engines were NPO Saturn (not Tumansky, as Fornof said). The one-minute takeoff spacing was a deliberate safety measure because damaged engines had to be returned to Russia for repair, with no local replacements available.

IAF reported a mission achievement rate above 90 percent and said they performed well in large-force engagements despite operating far from home and under restrictions.

In conclusion, the F-35 access limits and the 2008 Su-30 MKI restrictions highlight standard practice among air forces seeking to protect classified tech during wargames.

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