An anti-corruption investigation reaching from Ukraine's Presidential Office into the management of state-owned Sense Bank has raised questions far beyond the alleged laundering of UAH 150 million. At stake are the governance of nationalised assets, the independence of Ukraine's anti-corruption institutions, a planned bank privatisation, an international arbitration worth more than $1 billion and Kyiv's credibility as it moves deeper into EU accession negotiations.

A week after Ukrainian anti-corruption investigators unveiled an operation carrying the improbable codename “Forrest Gump”, the affair has developed into one of the most consequential governance scandals to hit wartime Ukraine.

At its center is a deceptively simple question: Where did UAH 150 million — approximately $3.4 million — used to secure the release on bail of former Justice and Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko, a centerpiece of the biggest corruption scandal of Zelensky government, actually come from?

The answer alleged by Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau, NABU, and Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, SAPO, is extraordinary.

Investigators say criminal proceeds under the supervision and manual management of deputy head of the Office of the president of Ukraine Iryna Mudra were converted into apparently legitimate funds through a series of companies and bank accounts. The source of the money is linked with the main suspect of another corruption scandal Timur Mindich, a close ally of president Zelensky, and the goal was to post bail for a suspect in the Operation Midas investigation into alleged corruption surrounding the state nuclear company Energoatom.

NABU's official account says members of a criminal organisation, acting with representatives and officials of a state-owned bank, arranged the laundering of UAH 150 million during June 2026. The cash was allegedly introduced into the legitimate financial system through accounts belonging to shell companies before being used for bail.

The most revealing evidence released by NABU is not just a bank transfer but Mudra’s own confessions, which give wider picture. In one recorded exchange, a female voice attributed to her says: “Corruption should be systematised and controlled… There is no need to fight it.” A male interlocutor adds: “And lead it.” This is said by one of the highest Ukrainian official in charge of judicial reform. Yet her own words are arguably more disturbing, presenting corruption not as an abuse to be eliminated but as a system to be organised and kept under political management.

Other recordings portray Mudra discussing state owned Sense Bank, where this money-loundering operation took place, as an asset to be under direct political control and used for enrichment. She recounts a proposed arrangement under which political figures politicians from Zelensky party Servant of the People would refrain from attacking the bank while “Sense Bank has to pay them”, and quotes an instruction she received from above to “take over the bank” because it contains “serious flows”. She then describes its managers as compliant figures who would carry money wherever a senior Presidential Office official instructed them, adding that they had “crawled” to her “like kittens” asking to be taken under protection.

NABU’s published recording also appear to show Mudra discussing protection from the institutions supposed to investigate such conduct. She asks how to mobilize votes for “our” candidates to NABU’s Public Oversight Council and describes SAP chief Oleksandr Klymenko as “not one of ours,” warning that if he secured a second term, “we’ll all be fucked.” Taken together, these phrases suggest something broader than participation in a single suspicious transaction: an alleged attempt to control a state-owned bank while influencing the bodies capable of investigating that control. If authenticated and confirmed in context, they would provide unusually direct evidence of political capture and consciousness of wrongdoing. Mudra denies criminal conduct and says the excerpts were released selectively and without their full context.

Taking over the bank  

Revelations are shocking in many dimension and will have influence for years to come. One of the most striking revelation is usage of the state-owned Sense Bank as systemic money-laundering machine.

Sense Bank carries unusual political and legal baggage. Until 2022 it was known as Alfa-Bank Ukraine and was owned through corporate structures associated with ABH Holdings. Among the beneficial shareholders were Russian businessmen including Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven.

Ukraine subsequently imposed sanctions and, in July 2023, the government took Sense Bank into state ownership. Ukraine's Ministry of Finance says the measure was intended to maintain financial stability and protect depositors after sanctions were imposed on significant shareholders. The state today owns 100% of the bank.

It was therefore no ordinary commercial bank allegedly being exploited. It was an asset that Ukraine had taken into public ownership during wartime, in considerable part because of national-security concerns surrounding its previous ownership.

The source material examined by EU Reporter describes this as a crucial feature of the scandal: after nationalisation, the allegation is not simply that corrupt actors conducted transactions through Sense Bank, but that political influence was progressively established over the institution's governance.

That allegation remains contested and has not been established by a court. But documents released by NABU and widely reported by the Kyiv Independent and other leading Ukrainian media raise questions that are difficult for the Ukrainian authorities to ignore. The Kyiv Independent reported on 22 August that internal Nomination Committee records showed attempts to shape Sense Bank's supervisory board following nationalisation. The paper reported that Iryna Mudra, then deputy head of the Office of the President and chair of the committee involved in selecting supervisory-board members, strongly promoted Mykola Hladyshchenko for a place on the board despite objections concerning competence, potential conflicts of interest and previous employment. Hladyshchenko subsequently became chairman of the supervisory board.

The investigation also cited earlier leaked conversations in which prospective board candidates were allegedly described as “our guys”. Six people reportedly discussed in that context were subsequently appointed. EU Reporter has not independently authenticated those recordings or the leaked committee minutes, so their contents must remain attributed to the publications that obtained them.

However, now the anticorruption agencies established with support and guidance of the EU provide their findings suggesting that the bank was deliberately captured for criminal purposes. NABU says that by early June 2026 the alleged organisers had obtained de facto control of Sense Bank, enabling them to use accounts of controlled businesses in the laundering scheme. That allegation has now triggered action at the highest levels of financial regulation.

Bags of cash, shell companies and a banking bottleneck

The alleged mechanics of the operation read more like a crime thriller than a banking-compliance investigation. According to the investigative material compiled in the source document and subsequent Ukrainian reporting, cash was allegedly concentrated through businesses associated with former MP and developer Maksym Mykytas before being exchanged or routed through companies capable of putting apparently legitimate non-cash funds into the banking system.

The source describes alleged deliveries of cash in bags and boxes, routing through companies including Metrobud and other entities, and discussions about how transactions could pass financial-monitoring controls.

Ukraine's anti-money-laundering regime establishes a UAH 400,000 statutory threshold for certain financial-monitoring obligations, alongside wider risk-based requirements. It would be inaccurate to suggest that every payment above UAH 400,000 is automatically prohibited; rather, banks are expected to identify, scrutinise and where necessary report transactions according to statutory and risk criteria.

The significance of the NABU allegation is therefore not simply the size of the payment. Investigators allege that people involved in the transaction were actively discussing how to overcome or circumvent compliance barriers. Published recordings attributed to members of the alleged group include discussion of a Sense Bank compliance official who could prevent the transaction. Mudra in one recording says that she received demand “from above” to fire a bank official who refuse to clear transaction. The scheme released by NABU paint a shocking picture: to make the transfer the bank's automated monitoring arrangements were temporarily taken out of operation during the transaction.

Those are NABU allegations presented to the court. But the Ukrainian government has already treated them seriously enough to take immediate action. This confirms that NABU accusations are well grounded. 

Saving face

On 19 August, the Cabinet suspended supervisory-board chairman Mykola Hladyshchenko for six months and initiated the suspension of management-board chairman Oleksii Stupak. The Finance Ministry explicitly said that its intervention was designed to address risks including the possible use of Sense Bank for money laundering and inadequate oversight of AML procedures.

The following day, National Bank of Ukraine Governor Andriy Pyshnyi went further. The NBU concluded that Hladyshchenko no longer satisfied the statutory independence requirements for membership of the supervisory board and opened proceedings to examine the collective suitability of the entire board. On 21 August, the government terminated Hladyshchenko's powers altogether.  This regulatory reaction matters because it turns the episode from an allegation concerning individual criminal behaviour into a potential failure of corporate governance and banking supervision.

Sense Bank itself has said it is cooperating with the authorities. Following the NABU searches, the bank said it wanted the circumstances established “fully and objectively” and was providing investigators with the information required under legal procedures.

But the key question is different. There have been already multiple accusations of usage of nationalised Sense bank for allegedly corrupt or shadow schemes. NABU revelation did not come from nowhere and were not a separate incidental case. In previous NABU and journalistic investigations shocking facts of how bank has been used were presented. How was it possible that in time of war after nationalisation of one of the biggest banks  it could turn into money-laundering machine?

The Presidential Office role

The highest-profile suspect is Iryna Mudra. Mudra served as deputy head of the Office of the President and held responsibility for major legal and judicial-policy issues, including international mechanisms concerning Russian aggression and frozen Russian assets. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed her on 19 August. Presidential Decree No. 734/2026 confirms the dismissal but does not give a reason.  NABU and SAPO served Mudra with a notice of suspicion. On 25 August, Ukraine's High Anti-Corruption Court ordered her held in custody for 60 days while allowing release if UAH 20 million bail is posted. Prosecutors had requested considerably higher bail.

Mudra denies criminal wrongdoing. She has argued that the published recordings have been presented selectively and out of context. Through her lawyers, she has said that she is cooperating with investigators and is prepared to answer their questions through the proper legal process. The underlying source document expressly records those objections and cautions concerning the provenance and quality of some recordings.

On 24 August President Zelenskyy said the anti-corruption bodies had “no questions” for him regarding the investigation.

The billion-dollar shadow over Sense Bank

There is another legal dimension. Former shareholder ABH Holdings commenced ICSID arbitration against Ukraine after the 2023 nationalisation, seeking more than $1 billion and alleging unlawful expropriation. UNCTAD records the dispute as ABH v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/24/1, concerning the former ownership of Alfa-Bank/Sense Bank. A separate proceeding, EMIS v Ukraine, also concerns alleged unlawful expropriation of Sense Bank.

The government's 2023 decision was taken in the context of sanctions and financial-stability considerations. Whether it complied with the relevant investment treaties is a matter for international tribunals, not for a criminal investigation conducted three years later. Nevertheless, evidence about how the asset was governed after nationalisation could become relevant contextual material in those proceedings.

ABH's case alleges that the taking of Sense Bank was unlawful. Ukraine will defend the nationalisation on its own legal and national-security grounds. A subsequent allegation that politically connected actors exploited the nationalised institution does not answer that legal dispute, but it could make the factual history of the asset considerably more uncomfortable for Kyiv. The source analysis supplied to EU Reporter correctly identifies this potential intersection. Forrest Gump can raise a question about bad faith in the original nationalisation and the consequences might go much further than a bail for one allegedly corrupt official.

And the cherry on the top: Mudra was also one of the officials responsible for formulating and publicly defending Ukraine’s position against ABH Holdings, the former owner of Sense Bank, in its more than $1 billion ICSID claim over the bank’s nationalisation; she later chaired Ukraine’s delegation in other major international proceedings. This creates a particularly damaging contradiction: an official who defended the takeover as a lawful national-security and financial-stability measure is now accused of helping place the same bank under political control and use it to launder criminal proceeds. The allegations do not by themselves prove that the 2023 nationalisation was unlawful, but they seriously undermine the factual and moral credibility of Ukraine’s case and offer ABH a powerful argument that the bank was not transferred into genuinely independent state management, but into a system vulnerable to political capture.

Why Brussels should be watching

Forrest Gump is not an isolated investigation. Its roots reach into Operation Midas, NABU's investigation into alleged large-scale corruption at state nuclear operator Energoatom. NABU says Midas uncovered a criminal structure involved in substantial corruption and subsequent money laundering. Later investigative developments have continued into 2026.

The Forest Gump allegations concern money ultimately used as bail for an individual implicated in that wider investigation. This changes the character of the alleged conduct. If prosecutors prove their case, it would mean that money generated through criminal activity was not merely hidden or spent. It was allegedly recycled back into the criminal-justice system itself to secure the liberty of another suspect.

And here we come to the point vitally important for Brussels.

Ukraine formally opened negotiations on the EU's Fundamentals cluster on 15 June 2026. That cluster includes the judiciary, fundamental rights, justice and security, public procurement and financial control. Crucially, it is the first cluster opened and the last to close, and the European Commission has made clear that progress under it determines the overall pace of accession negotiations.

Ukraine is simultaneously receiving extraordinary financial support from the European Union. The Ukraine Facility provides up to €50 billion between 2024 and 2027, and support is tied to democratic mechanisms, the rule of law, sound financial management, anti-corruption safeguards and reform commitments.

The issue for Brussels is therefore not whether corruption exists in Ukraine. No serious accession process operates on the assumption that candidate countries are free of corruption.

The more important test is whether institutions can discover it, investigate it, prosecute it and correct the governance failures that allowed it without political obstruction. Viewed from that perspective, Forrest Gump presents two competing narratives. The negative interpretation is obvious: people occupying some of the highest positions in the Ukrainian state are alleged to have manipulated a nationalised bank and circumvented controls to launder criminal proceeds.

The more positive institutional interpretation is that Ukraine's own anti-corruption agencies investigated them, published evidence, served suspicion notices, triggered removals at a state bank and brought one of the country's most senior former presidential officials before an independent anti-corruption court.

Which narrative ultimately prevails will depend heavily on what happens next.

What once felt like science fiction, an AI robot Olympics, now looks more possible as robotics improves. Reports mention sprinting, soccer, table tennis, gymnastics, and other tests. The World Humanoid Robot Games in Beijing brings in more than 2,000 robots for 51 events. That scale shows how fast robot sports are growing.

Still, could robots run something like their own Olympics one day? It could happen. But getting a world wide version would mean big upgrades in tech, clearer event rules, stronger safety, and a solid way to organize it across countries.

Robots are already competing in sports

The idea is now more than just theory. The World Humanoid Robot Games has made a global stage where robots take part in sports and show what they can do in motion. In August 2026, a Chinese humanoid robot named Tiangong Ultra is said to have run the 100-meter dash in 8.86 seconds. That time beats Usain Bolt's well known mark of 9.58 seconds.

These events let teams study balance and how a machine moves. For viewers, it is a fun way to watch progress in robotics unfold.

What would an AI robot Olympics look like?

A future AI robot Olympics might look like the human Games, but add contests made for machines.

In the main lineup, there could be robotic sprint races, robot jumping events, robot swimming, robot soccer, robotic weightlifting, and robot gymnastics. Alongside those, there could also be robot-only events that check battery use, fine control, path finding through obstacles, long mechanical runs, gripping and moving objects, and doing tasks with less outside help.

Robots would not be judged in the same way as people. Some scores could come from the kit itself, like the sensors, the motors, and the software setup. Organizers might also ask how well the system handles shifts in its surroundings, or how steadily a robotic hand finishes tricky work.

With this setup, a robot Olympics would feel more like a tech contest than a simple sports meet. It could draw teams from around the world to prove who builds the better machine.

AI would be just as important as hardware

A big contrast between sports played by people and robot contests is how much artificial intelligence is involved. A robot’s body still matters, but it is also tested on how it reads the world, avoids trouble, and chooses what to do next.

The International Olympic Committee has pointed out that AI matters more and more. It did this with the Olympic AI Agenda, and the plan talks about using AI in a way that stays focused on people throughout the Olympic Games.

So a coming robot event could link AI work with real athletic effort. The contest could set up tasks where deciding on the fly is just as critical as raw speed.

There are still major challenges

Robots have made real strides, but they still cannot fully take over normal sports run by people. A few humanoid machines can sprint at high speed. Yet they often trip on simple tasks like slowing down, staying upright, or getting back up after a fall. In recent events, there were crashes that showed gaps in current engineering.

If robots were to compete regularly, clear rules would be needed. People would have to decide what kind of machines are allowed. Would it be remote control only, full autonomy, or some kind of mix with assistance? There would also need to be set limits for the gear and the code. Battery limits and safety rules would matter too. The goal would be to keep the games fair even in PH Bingo on GameZone.

Could it become a major global event?

It feels more likely now than it did a few years back. More countries are joining in already, and many robotics events are getting tougher and more advanced. If the tools keep getting better, an event built around AI robots could bring in makers, schools, major tech firms, and robotics teams from many places.

For people who like tech and digital games, this kind of change also shows how fast interactive stuff is moving. If you have been watching new trends in gaming and online entertainment, you might run into sites such as PH Bingo on GameZone. That is one more sign that digital tools keep reshaping how people relax.

An AI robot Olympics plan would still take time, so it is not ready yet. Still, the base work is happening. Today’s robot contests already show that machines can handle more complex physical tasks. As AI models, sensors, power systems, and robot parts improve, the gap between a science demo and a real sport may shrink in a way that draws more attention.

Right now, the traditional Olympics belongs to people. But the growth of robot contests hints that a separate global event for machine athletes may be closer than many expected.

The European Union has sent urgent support to Serbia through its civil protection mechanism as severe wildfires continue to affect the Deliblato Sands Special Nature Reserve, where more than 3,500 hectares have already been impacted.

In response to the worsening situation, Serbia activated the civil protection mechanism on Friday 21 August, requesting European support to reinforce ongoing firefighting efforts. Within hours of Serbia's request, the EU mobilised 4 helicopters from the strategic reserve of the rescEU fleet based in Czechia, Romania and Slovakia, as well as ground firefighting teams from Germany and Romania. 

These assets remain deployed and are supporting ongoing firefighting operations. Additionally, a liaison officer arrived in Serbia to facilitate close coordination between the Serbian authorities, the EU emergency response co-ordination centre, and the deployed teams, ensuring that assistance is delivered swiftly and effectively where it is most needed.

For emergency assessment and operational planning, the EU's Copernicus emergency management service was already activated on 8 August, providing satellite mapping and analysis of the affected area.

The fires have been ongoing for more than two weeks, fuelled by strong winds, challenging conditions, and terrain that is difficult to access for ground-based intervention. The scale and persistence of the emergency have threatened one of Serbia's most important natural areas.

Preparedness and Crisis Management Commissioner Hadja Lahbib said:

"Civil protection mechanism in action: firefighting teams from Czechia, Germany, Romania, Slovakia have joined the fight against wildfires in Serbia, working alongside local responders. In times of challenge, Europe stands strong."

On 24 August, we celebrated Ukraine’s Independence Day. This occasion embodies the bravery, resistance and resilience of the Ukrainian people in the face of Russia’s vicious war of aggression. It also symbolises Ukraine’s journey over the past 35 years in becoming a modern, democratic and European country.  

To mark the occasion, the European Commission unfurled the Ukraine flag in front of the Berlaymont building in Brussels, which was also illuminated in Ukrainian colours. 

As we celebrate this milestone, the EU reaffirms its unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, we have provided Ukraine and its people with unprecedented humanitarian, financial and military assistance. So far, this support amounts to €220.2 billion. 

Over the past months, the EU has stepped up its support for Ukraine’s economy and defence - because Ukraine’s prosperity is Europe’s prosperity, and Ukraine’s security is Europe’s security.   

We made the first disbursements under the €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan to help sustain the country’s financial needs and boost its defence capabilities. And on Ukraine’s Independence Day, we approved €6.1 billion in support for air and missile defence systems, missiles, ammunitions, and radars. 

Standing with Ukraine is also about holding Russia accountable. In July, we adopted a 21st package of sanctions, further restricting Russia's ability to fund its illegal war and to carry out attacks on Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure.  

The EU has stepped up efforts to secure the return of Ukrainian children forcibly transferred or deported by Russia, and is making sure Russia faces accountability for its crimes through the International Claims Commission and the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.  

Ukraine belongs in the European family and in the European Union. We remain committed to supporting and assisting Ukraine on this process. This summer, Ukraine opened two accession negotiation clusters, illustrating its impressive capacity to implement reforms even during times of war. 

We continue standing with Ukraine in pursuing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, and supporting their European path. 

For more information 

Press release - Commission approves €6.1 billion for Ukraine's defence

Visual story - Slava Ukraini, long live Europe

Previously operating as NetGuardians, Vyntra has spent a decade helping East African banks fighting financial crime, screening more than two billion transactions annually across the region and expanding its capabilities into broader transaction intelligence.

Vyntra’s presence in East Africa began with its Nairobi operations as NetGuardians in 2016 and has since grown into a Service Excellence Center, supporting banks across the region. The company marked the milestone with a private reception at its Nairobi office, bringing together senior executives from banks across the region and members of the local team. The event also highlighted how the offering has evolved following the 2025 merger, bringing fraud detection, payments compliance, AML transaction monitoring and end-to-end transaction visibility together within one transaction intelligence platform. 

East Africa’s payments market has changed significantly over the past decade, driven by the early adoption of mobile-first payments such as M-Pesa. Vyntra’s work in the region has evolved with it, from IT log monitoring and behavioural fraud analytics to broader financial crime and payments capabilities. 

Fraud patterns have also changed. Earlier cases often involved internal fraud, while the Covid-19 time period saw a sharp rise in social media scams targeting bank customers. Today, banks across the region face threats including SMS impersonation, fraudulent investment schemes, SIM swaps and organised money mule networks. As fraud has become more organised and regulatory scrutiny has increased, real-time monitoring and stronger financial crime controls have become a greater priority for banks across the region. Kenya’s inclusion on the Financial Action Task Force grey list accelerated that shift, bringing financial crime further into board-level discussions.

In response to these shifts, Vyntra is expanding its capabilities across fraud prevention, AML monitoring and payment operations, including a new case manager, executive dashboard, fraud detection algorithms and frontline case view designed to give teams more context during investigations.

Wycliffe Muma, Director Service Delivery and Country Manager at Vyntra, said: “Ten years in East Africa is an important milestone for us because the business we have built here has grown alongside our customers and the market. The fraud landscape is very different from when we first arrived, and banks are now dealing with faster, more organised threats across more complex payment environments.”

“The merger with Intix was an important part of that evolution. It gave us a much broader view of the transaction journey, which matters when fraud moves across channels, systems and institutions. The anniversary was a chance to recognise the customers and colleagues who have been part of that journey, but also to show how we are continuing to develop the platform around the challenges banks are facing now.”

Joël Winteregg, CEO of Vyntra, added: “Transaction Intelligence in Africa is moving beyond financial crime detection and transaction visibility toward something more fundamental: understanding a bank’s customer identity. That will shape how banks detect risk and respond to increasingly complex financial crime.”

To find out more, please visit: www.vyntra.com

About Vyntra

Vyntra, created from the union of Intix and NetGuardians, is the new global force in AI-powered Transaction Intelligence, combining deep expertise in Financial Crime Prevention and end-to-end visibility, Vyntra equips over 130 financial institutions in 60+ countries with tools to detect fraud, ensure AML compliance, and gain real-time visibility into every transaction risk and respond accordingly.

EU chief Antonio Costa has paid tribute to all those who he says are “standing strong in defending their homeland on the front lines and across Ukraine”.

The Portuguese-born official was speaking on Monday at Sofiiska Square in Kyiv, the country's capital, to celebrate Ukraine’s Independence Day.

He told the packed audience that 24 August marks the moment when Ukraine joined the “free nations of Europe”.

He said: “It is a crucial date in Ukraine’s long struggle for freedom and independence.”

He told Ukrainians that their  “courage and bravery inspire the world”.

He thanks those fighting in the frontlines: “Their families, their parents, their children, all of them, they are losing and risking their lives for the freedom of Ukraine and the freedom of Europe.”

He recalled EU member states had met on the very first day of the war, on 24 February 2022 “to galvanise European support for Ukraine”.

The president assured Ukraine that “European solidarity has been strong and unwavering ever since,” adding, “We have always been with you in providing political, financial, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support.”

He called the conflict a “terrible war” he hopes will “never happens again”.

The former Portuguese PM assured the war torn country, “We will continue to provide as much support as necessary, for as long as necessary.”

Turning to possible EU accession for Ukraine, he suggested this as: “The best guarantee of security and long-term democratic stability — for Ukraine and for Europe as a whole.”

He said: “Our goal is Ukraine’s integration into the European Union’s peace project: a union of nations that have overcome nationalism, that uphold democracy and the rule of law, and that work together for shared prosperity and development.

“We all know that accession is a demanding process.

"But these challenges should not block our political determination, rooted in geopolitical necessity and the free, democratic choice of the Ukrainian people.”

And there we have it: yet another proposed date for parliamentary elections in Serbia. This time, according to President Aleksandar Vučić, they may take place on either 18 or 25 October, writes Helena Ivanov.

But, this is not the first date the President has suggested. Earlier this year, July was among the possibilities mentioned – which, obviously, did not happen. In June, Vučić went considerably further, announcing that he would remain President for only a few more weeks, after which he would resign and support the ruling Serbian Progressive Party, potentially as its candidate for Prime Minister. More than a few weeks have since passed, and he remains President.

In the meantime, October, November, December and even January 2027 have all been suggested at various points in the never-ending discussion over when Serbia will actually go to the polls.

And then, a few days ago, speaking to the Radio Television of Serbia, the country’s public broadcaster, Vučić claimed that he had finally made his decision: parliamentary elections would take place on either 18 or 25 October. Even this supposedly final announcement, of course, still leaves us with two dates.

A foreign reader may reasonably wonder why there has been so much drama over when, exactly, Serbia will hold its next elections. But domestically, this constant pushing back of the date has raised eyebrows for another reason: Vučić has historically been anything but reluctant to call an election.

Since the Serbian Progressive Party came to power in 2012, Serbia has held four rounds of snap parliamentary elections: in 2014, 2016, 2022 and 2023. Snap elections have, in other words, become quite regular in Serbia’s political life.

Vučić repeatedly used them at times of political pressure. When the country entered a crisis, or when protests threatened to gain momentum, an election offered an opportunity to reset the political landscape. Most recently, after the two mass shootings in May 2023 triggered months of large anti-government protests, Serbia went to early parliamentary elections that December. Vučić’s coalition won, and the protest movement gradually lost momentum.

The political logic was relatively straightforward. Each electoral victory allowed Vučić to present the result as renewed democratic legitimacy and, in practice, helped kill the momentum from the streets.

This time, however, things have been different.

The student-led protests that began following the collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy in November 2024 grew into something far more durable than previous protest movements. More importantly, they eventually transformed from a protest movement into one that is openly demanding political change. Since May 2025, students have explicitly called for snap elections.

Unlike previous waves of protest, this one did not simply disappear after several weeks or months. It survived for well over a year, repeatedly bringing enormous numbers of people onto the streets across Serbia. For example, on 15^th March 2025, it is estimated that as many as 350,000 people attended the protest in Belgrade, making it the largest protest in Serbia’s contemporary political history.

The students have also stated that they intend to contest the election through a list of 250 MP candidates. Crucially, these candidates are not expected to be the students themselves. Rather, the movement has been selecting people it considers capable of representing its demands, while deliberately distancing itself from both the existing opposition and the ruling establishment. As of today, the names of those on the list remain unknown, with students stating that the list will only become public when the elections are officially called.

And yet, despite his previous willingness to resort to elections to end the protests, Vučić spent more than a year refusing to give the students precisely what they were asking for.

That reversal inevitably produced speculation that, unlike on previous occasions, the President was no longer quite as confident that an election would resolve the crisis in his favour. Vučić himself has never said anything to suggest that he fears losing, and he continues to project confidence in his party’s prospects. But he has also never offered a particularly convincing reason for why a political leader who once reached for snap elections so readily became so reluctant to call one all of a sudden.

This is ultimately why the endless discussion over dates matters. The question is not whether Serbia votes on 18^th October, 25^th October or some later date. It is why elections, once one of Vučić’s favourite tools for consolidating power, suddenly became something he appeared determined to postpone for as long as possible.

There is one potential, and relatively simple answer: he needed time to get his ducks in order, weaken the protests’ momentum, and try to win the public back before going to the polls. And indeed, while Vučić has been reluctant to formally call elections, he has certainly not been reluctant to campaign. Quite the opposite. For months, he has been campaigning in full gear.

He has toured Serbia, met citizens, announced new projects and attempted to address some of the voters’ grievances. He has promised another package of direct financial assistance, including the possibility of cash payments to all adult citizens. In July, Vučić also launched the Ko si bre ti? [Who The Hell Do You Think You Are?] portal, through which citizens can anonymously report public officials for corruption, abuse of office, or unlawful behaviour.

The political purpose is not particularly difficult to understand. The message is that Vučić has heard the public, that he understands why people are angry, and that he will fix the very problems that brought people onto the streets in the first place.

Moreover, by launching the portal, Vučić has reinforced the message that citizens’ grievances are not his fault, but that of other officials whom he intends to hold accountable.

Of course, Vučić’s campaign has also been accompanied by sustained media attacks against the students and virtually anyone associated with the movement, aimed at discrediting the protesters, their demands and, increasingly, their very ability to govern the country.

The same campaigning effort is visible in foreign policy. Vučić has continued doing what he has always done particularly well: maintaining relationships in virtually every direction and presenting himself domestically as the only figure capable of speaking to everyone.

In May, despite the EU’s pressure not to do so, he went to Moscow for the Victory Day parade. That same month, he travelled to China for a state visit with Xi Jinping. He has repeatedly courted the Trump administration and publicly invited President Donald Trump to Serbia on many occasions. In July, to the surprise of many, the European Commission recommended opening Cluster 3 in Serbia’s EU Accession talks, although the move was ultimately blocked by several member states. And, perhaps most strikingly, in August, Vučić hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Belgrade, despite Serbia refusal to impose sanctions on Moscow. All of this has reinforced one of Vučić’s key messages: that he is the only man capable of keeping Serbia on good terms with Beijing, Washington, Brussels, Moscow and now apparently Kyiv simultaneously and at a geopolitically very complex time.

Taken together, Vučić’s strategy becomes fairly obvious: delay the elections for as long as possible, use the extra time to get a head start on campaigning, and call them only once he believes the political tide has turned sufficiently in his favour. This also gives him a considerable advantage once the official campaign begins, as his opponents will only have a few weeks to catch up with what has effectively been his months-long campaign.

The real test will therefore begin when the elections are finally called. The students have demonstrated that they can mobilise hundreds of thousands of people on the streets. They now have to demonstrate that they can turn that mobilisation into votes and defeat a political veteran who has spent more than a decade perfecting the art of winning elections.

As for Vučić, he is set to find out whether the political instrument he once used so effectively to end protests can still save him from the most persistent protest movement of his rule.

Artificial intelligence is becoming part of the machinery of modern markets. Banks, hedge funds and trading firms are using increasingly sophisticated models to identify opportunities, manage risk and execute trades, writes Amir Naser Hojati.

Most discussion focuses on one question: What happens when an AI model gets something wrong?

I think there is another risk.

What happens when many good models reach the same conclusion at the same time?

After roughly 15 years of trading futures, I have learned that markets often become dangerous not because one participant is wrong, but because too many become convinced of the same thing.

As traders sometimes say: when everyone moves to the same side of the boat, start watching the waterline.

Different models, same trade

Financial institutions may believe they are diversified because they use different models, vendors and strategies.

But those systems may still be learning from similar information: price history, volatility, order flow, economic data and news sentiment. They may also be optimizing toward similar goals.

Different models do not need to be identical to produce the same trade.

Several independent systems can simultaneously decide to reduce the same exposure, buy the same asset or hedge the same risk.

That creates hidden dependence.

A market can appear diversified while many supposedly independent systems are reacting to the same information in similar ways.

The real vulnerability may therefore not be one bad model, but the connection between many good ones.

Markets have seen this before

Crowded trades are nothing new.

Portfolio managers react to the same data. Traders watch the same levels. Risk desks cut exposure when volatility rises.

Technology increases the speed of those reactions. AI may also increase their consistency.

Humans disagree, hesitate or sometimes simply choose to do nothing.

Machines are less likely to disagree unless that behaviour is deliberately built into them.

If many models detect the same deterioration in risk and begin reducing exposure simultaneously, individually rational decisions can produce an irrational market outcome.

Each model may be doing exactly what it was designed to do.

The market can still become unstable.

Historical success can be dangerous

A strategy can perform well for years because market conditions remain broadly familiar.

That history creates confidence.

But markets do not owe us tomorrow because something worked yesterday.

One of the most dangerous moments is not when a model is obviously failing, but when it has accumulated enough successful history that people stop questioning its assumptions.

A calm sea can make almost any captain look skilled.

For AI-driven markets, the important question should therefore not only be:

How accurate is this model?

It should also be:

What assumptions does this model share with everyone else's?

More intelligence is not always more resilience

The usual response to model risk is to add more: more data, more parameters, another model, another control.

But resilience does not always come from adding complexity.

Sometimes it comes from removing exposure.

A system may become safer not because it predicts markets more accurately, but because it knows when conditions are unsuitable for taking risk.

That is one of the hardest lessons to translate from discretionary trading into automation.

Finding a trading signal is relatively easy.

Teaching a machine when a valid signal should be ignored is much harder.

Experienced traders know that a setup can look perfectly good and still not deserve capital. The market may be too crowded, liquidity may be changing, or correlations may be breaking down.

Sometimes the best trade is no trade.

Diversity of behaviour matters

Using several different AI models does not necessarily provide diversification if all of them react to stress in the same way.

Real diversification may require different behaviour, not just different architecture.

When should a model refuse to trade?

When should it reduce confidence?

When should it respond more slowly?

And how should it behave when the actions of other models are themselves changing the market?

That matters because financial markets are not ordinary prediction problems.

Predicting the weather does not change the weather.

Predicting a market can change the market because participants act on the prediction.

As more intelligent systems enter that feedback loop, their collective behaviour may become as important as the quality of any individual model.

The next edge may be restraint

Financial institutions will continue building faster and more powerful models.

But I suspect the next competitive advantage will not come only from making machines better at finding trades.

It will also come from making them better at recognizing when everyone else has found the same trade.

Markets have always punished excessive certainty eventually.

AI does not remove that principle. It may simply allow certainty to spread faster.

The smartest trading systems of the next decade may therefore be distinguished not only by how quickly they act, but by something harder to program:

Kknowing when not to join the crowd.

Amir Naser Hojati is a futures trader and fintech entrepreneur with around 15 years of experience in financial markets. His work focuses on algorithmic trading, automated risk management, and AI-driven trading systems.