Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below:

Do you remember the Yellow Vests movement that shook France 2018? On TikTok, a young user has called for a national mobilisation on the seventeenth of October against the cost of living, and the video quickly went viral. So could the Yellow Vests make their big return?

“Please, give us a date, we’re ready to protest! We young people are struggling. We just can’t make a living anymore,” that’s what Justine, a TikToker from Normandy in France has posted a few weeks ago, while wearing a fluorescent yellow vest.

The reference to the 2018 Yellow Vests is unmistakable. The French movement, which began in protest at rising fuel prices, has been widely revived on social media in recent weeks, especially by younger users.

Our colleague Romane Lizée from StreetPress, a fellow member of the Sphera Network alongside Europod, spoke to some of them: young people reviving a protest movement they only knew from a distance.

Yves, a 24-year-old TikToker with over 80,000 followers, made a video called “Survival Guide for the Yellow Vests 2026”. He gives would-be protesters practical advice, such as bringing thick ski goggles or writing a lawyer’s phone number on a piece of paper.

So why is the movement resurfacing now? For many, the movement has come to stand for a general sense of being fed up, something they still feel today.

 “Eight years ago, France put on the yellow vest because petrol hit 1.50 euros a litre, and now we’re almost at three euros and nothing is happening!” That’s how Saïd, a 23-year-old delivery driver, sees it.

The economic context is indeed worse than it was eight years ago. The price of fuel is now almost 2.40 euros a litre.

Throughout September, a series of protests followed one another, called by different professions and for different reasons: climate action, firefighters, a public-sector strike, the law on sexual violence, and finally the student blockades.

High school students have been protesting for a few weeks now, blockading their schools to demand better conditions. We talked about this in a previous Briefed episode. You can find the link in the description.

Now, will the protest be as big and long-lasting as the one in 2018?

Online, a petition launched by the website 17octobregiletjaune, which calls for the protest, has gathered more than 21,000 signatures. Over a thousand actions across the country have been identified on a map by the same website: mostly protests in several cities, but also actions on roundabouts and at petrol stations.

Youth organisations, students’ unions and education staff have already answered the call. More importantly, the CGT, one of France’s main labour unions, has backed it, as have some political figures, like Marine Tondelier, the Green candidate for the presidential election. Still, the true extent of the movement is difficult to predict.

In other European countries, protests are also multiplying, especially among young people. In Spain, huge demonstrations for the right to housing have been taking place in several cities since mid-September. They went quite far: they pushed Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez to call snap elections.

In Brussels, on October 9th, thousands of protesters, including rail workers, teachers, and university and secondary school students, marched against the federal government’s policies, in particular its socio-economic measures. Here again, precarity is a central grievance.

In Italy, on October 8th, students called for mobilisation, notably by camping in front of universities across the country to protest against the sharp rise in tuition fees and student rents.

The triggers behind these protests are not all the same, and the mobilisations take different forms from country to country. But the goal is broadly the same: to call for better living conditions and to defend basic social rights. And young people are particularly mobilised.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Ten years after the Brexit vote, more and more Britons are asking whether they should go back. According to a YouGov poll conducted earlier this month, 52% would vote to rejoin the EU in a referendum.

And the UK’s new Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, seems to be keeping that door open.

But how realistic is that? Andy Burnham became Prime Minister this summer. And since then, he has been dropping hints here and there about a possible return to the EU. A few months ago, he was saying it was too early to even discuss it.

So what changed? Perhaps the international context, but also the realisation that the UK cannot get everything it wants while staying outside the Union.

On 20 November, EU leaders will have the opportunity to discuss the relationship with the UK during a bilateral summit. They will try to reach agreements on a number of issues that have stalled.

What are those topics? First, food. Today, agri-food products face checks and certification when they enter the EU, and that slows trade down. The solution on the table is for the UK to align its sanitary and phytosanitary standards with the EU’s. But the details still need to be agreed.

Second, people. Right now, a European who wants to work in the UK needs a visa. The two sides could agree on a scheme to make mobility easier, especially for young people.

Third, carbon. The British would like to link their carbon market to the EU’s, so that their exporters don’t have to pay extra for their emissions when they sell to Europe. In practice, that means avoiding the EU’s carbon border tax.

Last but not least, industry. And this is a big part of the discussion. As the EU moves towards giving priority to European products, the British fear being left out of this “European preference”.

Now, you might say: in all these cases, isn’t this a bit like being in the EU, without the drawbacks? That’s exactly what critics call cherry-picking.

At the heart of the problem is a simple question: where do you draw the line between being a member and being a partner? It’s the same debate the EU has with Switzerland, which wants to stay very close but not be part of the bloc.

Now, is a return to the EU a realistic scenario? The door is open, as Emmanuel Macron and others have put it.

The UK could apply, and it’s unlikely that any member state would block the process. But the European Commission has already warned: there would be no special treatment for the British.

On the positive side, the UK would start from a good position. It already applies a good part of EU legislation, and it meets the rule-of-law criteria.

But all these years after leaving the EU, the two sides are still negotiating. There are sticking points on free movement and on standards. And those disagreements would make any accession talks that much harder.

Let’s see what comes out of the summit on 20 November.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Two ships have been hit by drones in Bulgarian waters in the Black Sea on Monday. Several other ships have been targeted in recent weeks, at a time when Russia is intensifying its attacks on Ukraine.

So, at what point does a hybrid attack become an attack on Nato? On Monday, two ships were hit by drones in the Bulgarian economic zone in the Black Sea.

One of them sank, with 11 crew members missing. The second vessel, which belonged to Ukraine, was damaged but did not sink, and all 15 people on board were rescued.

A week earlier, two other cargo ships had been attacked by drones in the same area, killing 10 people. And on 5 October, a Turkish cargo ship carrying grain was sunk by drones shortly after leaving Ukraine.

There is currently no evidence proving that Russia was behind these attacks, and Moscow has not claimed responsibility.

But that did not stop Bulgarian Prime Minister Roumen Radev from summoning Russia’s ambassador. Radev said that, while there was no conclusive evidence, the outcome of these attacks clearly benefited Russia more than anyone else.

Russia’s ambassador to Bulgaria, Eleonora Mitrofanova, said she had received no information from the Russian defence ministry about the attacks. She also suggested that they could have been provocations carried out by a third party.

And that uncertainty is important, because it makes it much harder for Nato countries to decide when an incident should be treated as an attack.

So how do Europeans cope with these attacks? We’ve already seen several Russian drones end up inside EU territory in recent months. And in some cases, they have been clearly identified.

Take the Russian drone that crashed on a residential building in the Romanian city of Galați in May and injured two people. Or the two drones found at Leipzig airport in Germany this summer, charged with explosives. They were all identified as Russian.

So far, however, the response has consisted mainly of diplomatic measures and political statements. Neither Bulgaria nor Germany has requested formal consultations under Article 4 of the Nato treaty.

Article 4 allows a Nato member to ask for consultations when it believes its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened.

Bulgarian Prime Minister Radev has spoken with Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte about the incidents, which are serious enough to be discussed at Nato level. But Bulgaria has not gone as far as triggering Article 4.

One reason is precisely the ambiguity surrounding all these drone attacks: who is controlling them, whether they were deliberately sent into EU territory, and whether they were jammed or diverted.

But if an attack were clearly attributed to Russia, how would Nato respond? That’s one of the questions currently being discussed within the alliance.

On Monday, Nato’s top military commander, US General Alexus Grynkewich, said he did not believe a conflict between Russia and Nato was imminent or inevitable.

But he also presented what Nato calls a “theory of victory”: a plan designed to ensure that the alliance could rapidly neutralise an enemy attacking one of its members.

The strategy rests on several pillars. One is establishing clear red lines that an adversary should not cross. Another is investing in new military technologies, with drones playing a central role. And the third is maintaining the ability and readiness to fight at short notice.

The idea is not only to be able to respond if a direct attack happens, but also to deter Russia from continuing what Nato describes as hybrid activities against its members.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

The United States has imposed new sanctions on the International Criminal Court, this time targeting the institution itself. While the EU insists on its firm support for the ICC, it is still not using the one tool designed for this kind of situation: the blocking statute.

So, why is the EU holding back? First, a quick reminder of what we’re talking about. The International Criminal Court, or ICC, is based in The Hague. It tries people accused of the gravest crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.

With one important limit: It can act when a crime is committed on the territory of a state that is party to the Rome Statute, or by one of that state’s nationals. The United States is not a party. Neither is Israel or Russia.  

And Washington’s goal is clear: dismantling the court. The Trump administration considers it politicised and without legitimacy.

It is particularly opposed to the arrest warrant against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That’s why, since 2025, the US has imposed several rounds of sanctions, targeting judges and, more recently, the court’s president, the Japanese national, Tomoko Akane.

On Friday, Washington went a step further, targeting the court as an institution.

So what does that mean in practice? All of the court’s assets in the United States are frozen. And, crucially, American companies and citizens can no longer provide services to the court or its members.

You might remember the case of the ICC judge Nicolas Guillou, who has been under sanctions for some time. We’ve talked about him in a previous Briefed episode.

He has explained that he can no longer use basic services such as Mastercard, or online platforms like Airbnb. He has also been warning that these sanctions are meant to intimidate, and that they undermine judges’ independence.

In a state governed by the rule of law, judges must not be put under pressure. This explains why the court’s reaction is so strong. It speaks of an obstruction of justice and an attack on the rule of law. And it is now calling on its members to take concrete action to protect its independence.

In response, the European Commission and the European Council have expressed their support for the court and its work. But without going too far.

They say the EU is ready to take measures so that the court can keep functioning. Yet when the Commission is asked what those measures are, and this has happened several times in recent months, it sidesteps the question.

Because beyond negotiations and diplomatic pressure, there is a tool created for precisely this kind of situation: the so-called blocking statute. It protects Europeans against the extraterritorial reach of sanctions imposed by third countries.

It doesn’t concern American actors. It concerns European companies and individuals who, under the threat of secondary sanctions, may become overly cautious.

In the case of the ICC, it’s about the court’s European banks, insurers and service providers.

Several European countries have called for the blocking statute to be activated. Yesterday, at the Foreign affairs council in Luxembourg, the Belgian and Dutch ministers asked the Commission to start analysing whether to do so.

But for now, they are still waiting for an answer. The Commission believes the priority is to use the six months before the sanctions take effect to negotiate with Washington, possibly to get them withdrawn.

This approach was backed by several EU foreign ministers yesterday. Let’s see whether that window for dialogue is enough, or whether the pressure to activate the blocking statute keeps growing.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

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European gas storage levels are unusually low for this time of year, reaching their lowest autumn level since 2011.

With Russian gas imports set to end in 2027, could Europe face a tougher challenge in the months ahead? 

First, how do Europe’s gas reserves work? EU countries fill underground gas storage sites during spring and summer, when demand is lower, and draw on these stocks during the winter, when heating pushes consumption up.

Since 2022, the EU has required member states to ensure their gas storage facilities reach 90 percent of capacity by a deadline between 1 October and 1 December. That helps secure supplies ahead of winter.

But this year, stocks are well below that target, at just over 70 percent in early October. They still have time to rise before the deadline, but the situation is attracting attention.

Does that mean Europeans are at risk of running out of gas this winter? According to the European Commission, no. It acknowledges that storage levels are low compared with previous years, but says the EU’s gas system should still be flexible enough to meet demand this winter.

That said, a colder or longer winter than expected, or disruptions to supplies in other parts of the world, could put additional pressure on the market. Especially at a time when the EU is preparing to phase out Russian gas imports in 2027.

The EU has adopted a gradual ban, with transitional arrangements for existing long-term contracts.

Russian liquefied natural gas, or LNG, is due to be phased out completely from January 2027 only. Russian gas delivered by pipeline will follow later, with the deadline set for the end of September 2027.

And Russian gas still accounted for around 12 percent of EU gas demand through May 2026. Imports even increased in the first months of this year compared with the same period in 2025, amid disruptions to energy flows linked to the war in the Middle East.

So, from January, Europe will lose one source of supply.  Which means Europe should try and reduce its gas consumption.

But it’s easier said than done, particularly as winter approaches. Heating needs depend heavily on temperatures, and households cannot simply stop heating their homes.

Still, Europe has shown in the past that consumption can fall significantly. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Commission called on member states to reduce their gas demand by 15 percent. 

And they succeeded: their gas demand fell of around 18 percent, compared with the previous five-year average. A few months ago, following the escalation of the war in the Middle East, the Jacques Delors Institute recommended reviving efforts to reduce gas demand.

That being said, the reduction achieved in 2022 was partly helped by a mild winter and greater use of alternative energy sources, including coal and nuclear power.

Those options may help again, but they come with limitations. Much will depend on the weather and how long the winter lasts.

Which doesn’t mean Europe should not call for lowering the demand and accelerate the deployment of renewable energy.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Spain is heading for early elections, after prime minister Pedro Sánchez called a snap vote last week. According to current polls, the conservative People’s Party, or PP, is ahead of Sánchez’s Socialists, while Vox is also making significant gains.

So, what would happen if the PP and Vox decided to govern together? And what would that mean for Europe? 

Let’s start with the numbers. According to Politico’s poll of polls, the PP, the conservative right-wing party, is currently polling first, at around 34 percent. The Socialists of the PSOE are at around 26 percent, and the far-right party Vox at around 18 percent.

The Socialists already came second in the last general election, in 2023. The PP won the most seats, but it couldn’t form a government. Pedro Sánchez eventually secured enough support from other parties, including the left-wing Sumar, to remain prime minister.

This time, the balance could be different. If the current polling were reflected in the election result, the PP and Vox could have enough seats to form a government together. PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo has said he could negotiate with Vox.

And this would not be completely new in Spain. The PP and Vox are already governing together in four Spanish regions: Extremadura, Aragon, Castilla y León and Andalusia.

Now, would that mean Spain would have  a government with Vox ministers? One possibility would be a government led by the PP, with Vox supporting it from outside, without taking ministerial positions. That’s what we’ve seen in Sweden, for example.

But what seems more and more likely is that Vox would become part of the government itself. The Vox MEP José Buxadé told Politico a few weeks ago that if his party negotiates a coalition with the PP, it would seek ministerial positions proportional to the number of votes it receives.

According to Politico, based on current polling, that could mean a third of ministers coming from Vox. So, what would this mean for Europe and for Spain? A lot.

Spain is currently one of the EU countries where the government has taken relatively progressive positions on issues such as migration, climate policy and social policy.

A change of government would therefore give more weight to the right in the European Council. That could be particularly important on migration, but also on economic files.

And then there is climate policy. Vox has called for the abolition of the European Green Deal, arguing that environmental policies have harmed employment and Spain’s energy policy.

Something that is very much contradicted by the fact that Spain is one of the European countries that has been particularly resilient during the energy crisis, thanks to its renewable energy.

So a change in climate policy could have consequences not only for Spain, but also for the EU’s wider energy transition.

And there could be another major change: foreign policy. Pedro Sánchez has been one of the more outspoken European leaders on the war in Gaza. Spain has taken a particularly critical position towards Israel and has recognised a Palestinian state.

Vox takes a very different position. The party strongly supports Israel and has called for European funding to the Palestinian Authority to be suspended.

The Spanish election is still several weeks away, so we don’t yet know whether the PP and Vox will actually be able to form a government, or what form such an agreement would take.

But if they do, Spain’s position in Europe could change quite significantly.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

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France has been seeing growing protests by high school and university students in recent weeks.

The movement is continuing today with a fourth day of mobilisation. According to the government, the far-left opposition party is fuelling the protests. For Donald Trump, the movement is the result of mass migration and the presence of Islam.

But what are young people actually protesting about? High school students’ anger has been building for some time. One of the tipping points came in June, when temperatures inside many schools rose above 35 degrees. Many classrooms had no fans, let alone air conditioning.

And this happened in buildings that were already often in poor condition. Add to that the fact that absent teachers are frequently not replaced. The result was what you might call a general overheating — both literally and politically.

The government, meanwhile, has accused the left-wing party La France Insoumise (France Unbowed, or LFI) of fuelling the protests. Some commentators have even suggested that the movement was orchestrated by the party from the beginning.

There is little doubt that LFI is supporting the mobilisation and may be trying to benefit politically from it. But dismissing the protests as political manipulation risks ignoring problems that are well documented.

As sociologist and child psychiatrist Laelia Benoit recently told Le Monde, assuming that high school students cannot think for themselves and must necessarily be manipulated by adults or political parties is, in her words, a way of denying them their ability to act politically.

And many of their demands are supported by both parents and teachers. Teachers, for example, have long complained about the lack of replacements when they are absent.

This is supported by the latest PISA report on France: 87% of French students — as well as school principals — said their school’s capacity to teach was affected by a lack of teachers.

So young people are increasingly asking to be heard. Earlier this week, they put forward their demands, resulting in 10 concrete measures supported by both high school and university students.

Among other things, they are calling for a major programme to renovate schools, more staff, a guaranteed €1 meal at university canteens, and higher housing benefits and grants so that students can live with dignity.

So what is the government offering in response? France has opened an online platform in recent days where students can submit their demands. Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu said yesterday that the platform had already received more than 40,000 contributions.

So for now, the government’s message is essentially: go back to class and submit your demands online. The prime minister then pointed to the additional €1 billion he has proposed for the education budget next year.

And as for more immediate measures, he announced five areas of work that should begin at the end of October. They include tackling teacher replacements, improving schools’ material conditions, reorganising school timetables, reforming the university admissions platform which appears to be a nightmare, and thinking about how to give high school students a greater voice.

Let’s see if that is enough to ease the protests.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Chinese carmakers are taking an increasing share of the European car market, particularly when it comes to electric vehicles. Why are European carmakers now opening their factories to their Chinese competitors?

Until recently, the main concern in Europe was Chinese-made electric vehicles being imported into the EU. That’s why, two years ago, the EU imposed hefty tariffs on Chinese electric cars.

But Chinese manufacturers have found another way into the European market: they are setting up production here. Some are building factories of their own. Others are entering partnerships with European carmakers and using their existing production sites.

That’s the case with Stellantis and Chinese manufacturer Leapmotor. And now Dongfeng is also negotiating to produce cars at the French plant of Rennes La Janais. Because by moving production to Europe, Chinese manufacturers may be losing one of their main advantages, which is cheap labour.

But low labour costs are only one part of their competitive edge.

Chinese manufacturers also continue to benefit from state support. And setting up production in Europe doesn’t necessarily mean building brand-new factories.

In many cases, Chinese companies are looking to partner with European manufacturers and use factories that are already there — factories that are no longer operating at full capacity. That means they can save significantly on investment costs. And they can also rely on their European partners’ existing sales and distribution networks.

So how big is this Chinese presence in Europe becoming? For 2028, there are already 12 projects involving Chinese carmakers setting up production in Europe. Several are in Spain, with others in France, Belgium, Slovakia, Hungary, Sweden and Austria.

Now, why would European manufacturers allow their Chinese competitors to produce cars in their own factories? Part of the answer is that European carmakers are struggling to keep up in electric vehicles sells. And that is contributing to factory closures and job losses.

European manufacturers have to meet EU targets on average CO2 emissions each year. And producing more electric vehicles is necessary to meet those requirements.

So partnerships with Chinese manufacturers can serve two purposes: they can help European companies fulfilling their green cars objectives, while also keeping existing factories and jobs running.

Though there is a longer-term risk for European manufacturers. The more Chinese companies establish themselves in Europe, the more competitive pressure they could put on European brands — potentially even leading to takeovers. That has happened before: Volvo Cars, for example, was acquired by Chinese group Geely in 2010. 

In Germany, carmakers are for now refusing to open the doors of their production sites to the Chinese. But they do have partnerships with Chinese companies to produce vehicles in China, where they can benefit from lower production costs. That explains why they were very much opposed to imposing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles.

But the situation is now changing. Volkswagen closed its Dresden factory last year, and other German plants are also facing closure risks. Germany’s car industry is therefore increasingly joining calls for stronger protection against Chinese competition.

And that brings us back to the Franco-German paper that is circulating in Brussels, which calls for measures to restrict Chinese access to the European market.

Because this debate goes well beyond cars. The EU is increasingly concerned about Chinese competition and dependence in a range of strategic industries. This will be discussed next week, when EU leaders meet in Brussels.

The European Commission could also present a new so-called “diversification” tool, either at the summit or around it. One possibility would be to require companies not to rely exclusively on China for certain critical materials. Something which could trigger what we call a trade war. I’ll be following that very closely!

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

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The EU wants to bring new countries on board faster. But after years of waiting, will the Commission’s new proposals actually make enlargement easier?

On Tuesday (6 October), the European Commission is expected to propose changes to the EU’s enlargement process. The goal is clear: speed things up. Some candidate countries have been waiting for more than a decade, without a single new member joining the EU.

And geopolitics is adding to the pressure. With Russia’s war against Ukraine and a changing global balance of power, EU leaders increasingly see enlargement as a way of strengthening Europe’s weight on the international stage.

But bringing one, two, or several new countries into the EU raises some very complicated questions. One of them is decision-making. Another is money. So, what is the Commission proposing?

First, it wants to change the way enlargement negotiations are approved. At the moment, EU countries have to agree unanimously on several key steps in the process — including granting candidate status and opening different chapters of negotiations.

The Commission wants to make some of those decisions easier and faster, while keeping unanimity for the final decision on membership.

The other idea is gradual integration. In other words, candidate countries could take part in more EU programmes and benefit from certain forms of integration before actually becoming full members.

This is not exactly new. MEP’s think tankers, EU member states have been raising that idea for a while. And candidate countries already have access to a number of EU programmes and funding mechanisms. The idea is to give countries something concrete while they are still going through the accession process.

Now, there is an even bigger obstacle: money. The EU would have to finance enlargement at a time when its budget is already under pressure.

Because none of the countries currently considered likely to join in the nearer term would be expected to become a net contributor to the EU budget. In other words, they would likely receive more from the EU than they would contribute.

Ukraine is the obvious example. Despite being a big country with a solid economy, its current situation makes it fragile and unable to contribute largely to the EU budget. 

Its accession could have a significant impact on EU spending, particularly through the Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion funds.

So the Commission is considering a transition period during which new members would not immediately have full access to all EU programmes.

That could make enlargement financially easier in the short term. But it doesn’t solve the problem permanently. Once the transition period ends, the same question comes back.

And there is a broader issue too: would the EU itself be able to function as a union of more than 30 countries? What could prove difficult, is that many important decisions still require unanimity — including areas such as foreign policy, taxation and parts of the EU budget.

Changing that would require treaty reform, which is politically extremely sensitive because member states would have to give up some of their veto powers.

Andrew Duff, a former British liberal MEP who has written about enlargement for the European Policy Centre, argues that the EU should have started thinking about this much earlier — particularly after Brexit. In his view, the EU has not carried out the kind of institutional reform that would prepare it for a much larger membership.

So in the end, today’s proposals could make the accession process more flexible and give candidate countries more opportunities to integrate before membership.

But they don’t resolve two of the biggest questions: how to finance enlargement, and how to reform EU decision-making.

Before we wrap up, a quick word on the countries which are believed to become members next. The frontrunner is Montenegro. The most optimistic forecasts suggest it could potentially become an EU member as early as 2028. Then comes Albania, which is also well advanced in the process.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

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Germany shut down its last nuclear power plants in 2023, bringing Angela Merkel’s nuclear exit policy to its conclusion. But now, nuclear power is making a strong comeback everywhere in Europe. Will Germany return to nuclear policy?

Until now, German chancellor Friedrich Merz had been reluctant to bring the nuclear topic on the table, partly because there was no agreement within his coalition. He has even said that Germany’s nuclear phase-out was irreversible. But that position is not shared by everyone in his own party.

And as support for the far-right AfD (Alternative for Germany) grows — a party that is strongly in favour of nuclear power — nuclear energy is becoming less politically taboo in Germany.

According to a non-public document sent by Berlin to other EU member states and reported by the media Euractiv (currently Rapporteur), the German government wants nuclear energy to be taken into account when the EU sets its climate targets for 2040.

For now, those discussions focus on renewable energy. Germany is not proposing to abandon renewable-energy targets, but rather to leave room for other low-carbon technologies, including nuclear power and carbon capture.

The logic is similar to the debate over the EU’s 2035 target for new cars: the overall objective remains, but countries could have more flexibility over how they achieve it.

And that proposal is likely to be welcomed in France. But could they convince a majority of EU countries? The picture across Europe is changing.

Many EU countries already operate nuclear power plants, while others are building new reactors or considering a return to nuclear. Italy, for example, is looking to revive a nuclear industry after abandoning nuclear power following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.

Poland has never operated a nuclear power plant, but it is now developing its first one. And several other countries that currently have no reactors are seriously considering building them.

Only a small group of EU countries remain opposed to developing nuclear power, including Austria, Portugal, Luxembourg and Malta.

So why has nuclear power become more politically acceptable again? The legacy of Chernobyl and Fukushima still matters. But Europe’s energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also changed the debate.

The shock of soaring fossil-fuel prices has encouraged governments to look for energy sources that can provide electricity without relying on fossil fuels — and nuclear power is increasingly being presented as one of them. Although there are major questions around that argument.

Nuclear power can provide large amounts of low-carbon electricity once a reactor is operating. But building and renovating reactors is extremely expensive and can take decades.

Take France’s Flamanville reactor: its final cost has been estimated at around €23bn , compared with an initial estimate of around €3bn.

There are also questions over nuclear waste, the risk of accidents, and the security of uranium supplies. European countries remain partly dependent on foreign suppliers, including Russia, for uranium.

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EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

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Italy brought back border controls with Spain in August, and has now extended them until at least 15 October. Giorgia Meloni’s government fears that migrants who arrived in Ceuta, reach the continent and Italy.

Are these restrictions legal in the Schengen area? What are the EU’s levies to avoid such controls?

Since 1 August, Italy has temporarily reintroduced controls at its air and sea borders with Spain. The measure has now been extended until 15 October. In return, Spain has also introduced controls at its air and sea borders with Italy.

“This is not against Spain” the Italian foreign affairs minister Antonio Tajani said, adding “we have a duty to protect our borders.”

The starting point was the arrival of tens of thousands of migrants in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta at the end of July. Italy said it was concerned about possible secondary movements towards the rest of Europe, and brought back controls at its borders with Spain.

But from a legal point of view, EU countries can’t simply reintroduce border controls whenever they want.

The Schengen area is based on the principle of free movement, meaning there should normally be no checks at internal borders. The Schengen Borders Code provides an exception. If a country faces a serious threat to public policy or internal security, it can temporarily reintroduce border controls, as a measure of last resort.

The controls can initially be introduced for up to 30 days, and can then be extended under certain conditions.

Italy has already extended its measure, which has now been in place for more than two months.

What does the European Commission say about Italy’s decision? The Commission has been asked about the Italian controls and says it is currently assessing the situation.

But the Brussels-based organisation The Good Lobby argues that Italy is violating the Schengen rules. It filed a complaint with the European Commission, asking it to open an infringement procedure against Italy.

According to Alberto Alemanno, who filed the complaint, there is no security threat that would justify bringing back the controls.

His argument is that none of the migrants who arrived in Ceuta were transferred to Italy. And, he says, people travelling between Ceuta and mainland Spain are already subject to identity checks.

So Italy’s justification, he argues, does not meet the conditions set out in the Schengen Borders Code.

Now, is Italy the only EU country bringing back border controls? No. If you look at the notifications sent by EU countries to the European Commission, around ten countries have reported temporary controls at some of their internal borders in recent months.

In response to the situation in Ceuta, Italy is the main example.

Austria also notified the Commission of controls in September, citing the situation in Ceuta among several reasons. But those controls concern its land borders with Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia.

So Austria is not checking passengers arriving by air from Spain.

Germany, for example, has invoked the same exception in the Schengen rules to carry out controls at its land borders with all its neighbours.

That does not mean that every border crossing is closed, or that every traveller is systematically checked. It means German authorities can carry out checks at those borders, including spot checks.

Germany’s main justification is continued migratory pressure, alongside other security concerns. And for now, the Commission is kind of letting all of this happen. It did raise concerns at some point: in June, the Commission published an assessment of temporary border controls in nine EU countries, including Germany, Austria and Italy.

It did not formally declare these countries’ controls illegal. Instead, it called on them to work towards lifting the controls, arguing that the EU has put in place measures to address some of the risks being invoked to justify them.

Those measures include the new Migration and Asylum Pact and new rules on entry and border management. The bigger question, then, is how long temporary border controls can remain in place before they stop being an exception to Schengen and become the new normal.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Donald Trump is betting on voluntary commitments from AI companies. On Tuesday (29 September), he unveiled a self-regulatory agreement drawn up with some of the biggest names in the AI industry.

What does it mean, and how does it differ from the EU’s Code of Practice for general-purpose AI?

On Tuesday, September 29, Trump brought together the CEOs of some of the biggest AI companies. Together, they signed what could be described as a self-regulation pact: a short list of non-binding commitments called the White House Accord on Super Intelligence.

That’s the other novelty: Trump no longer wants to talk about artificial intelligence, but about “super intelligence”. The term AI apparently has negative connotations.

So, what exactly have these companies committed to? The CEOs of OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Meta, SpaceX and Nvidia have pledged to put safeguards in place, quickly detect and fix problems, and have their systems checked by independent auditors.

The principle of voluntary commitments may sound familiar to Europeans: They echo the EU’s Code of Practice for general-purpose AI — which, like the White House agreement, is not legally binding.

So what’s the difference? First of all, OpenAI, Anthropic and Google have also signed the EU code, while Meta, SpaceX and Nvidia have not.

And, more importantly, the EU does have binding rules in place: the AI Act, which is already in force. As part of this regulation, the European Commission developed the Code of Practice to help companies comply with the rules.

You could think of it as a checklist for AI companies, to help them make sure they are complying with the law.

Another difference is the sheer volume of recommendations. The document published by Trump is just one page long. The European Code of Practice runs to more than 60 pages and was prepared with the help of dozens of independent experts.

It is also more comprehensive, covering not only safety, but also transparency and copyright. But this raises another question: if both documents are voluntary,  how effective can they actually be?

When the European Code of Practice was published, some civil society organisations criticised it, arguing that voluntary commitments are not enough and that concrete obligations are needed.

There are binding obligations under the AI Act. But they are not as precise as what is in the code of conduct.

Similar criticisms have emerged since the White House agreement was published on Tuesday. And it is worse in the US case, since companies are absolutely not legally bound by the commitments they have made.

The United States has generally been less inclined towards binding regulation of the sector. Trump has argued that rules can hinder the development of companies, and has promoted a national framework that is as minimally restrictive as possible.

The White House document does leave the door open to legislation in the future. It says that, over time, it may make sense to codify these steps into lows or regulations.

But for now, they remain voluntary commitments. If you are interested in this topic, there will be a live event on Tuesday next week about AI and its safeguards, organised by VoxEurope.

 It will be online and you can find all information on Vox Europe website. 

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below:

Hundreds of people were still camping yesterday at Puerta del Sol in Madrid. They were demanding action on housing, as rents and property prices continue to rise.

Following an outcry triggered by the eviction of an 83-year-old woman from her home, and the mobilization of thousands of people across Spain, the government adopted two housing decrees.

Did they take the protesters’ demands into account?

MariCarmen Abascal had lived in her apartment since the 1950s, having inherited the lease from her parents. But the property was bought by an investment fund, which then challenged the validity of her lease and quadrupled her rent.

Last week, MariCarmen was evicted from her home. The eviction sparked widespread outrage and led hundreds of protesters to camp in central Madrid, calling for action.

Yesterday, she was finally allowed to return home after reaching an agreement with the owners.

Aside from MariCarmen’s case, the demonstrations are largely driven by young people who are fed up with rising rents and property prices, especially in major cities such as Madrid and Barcelona.

In Madrid, property prices have risen by around 87 percent over the past ten years. That’s less than in Portugal or the Netherlands, where prices have increased even more. But it’s still a significant rise, especially as wages have grown much more slowly over the same period.

Rents are taking up a huge share of people’s incomes. In Madrid, they account for almost half of tenants’ net income on average. So, how did the Spanish government respond?

Yesterday, it adopted two housing decree-laws. The first decree would suspend evictions until 2030 and automatically extend existing rental contracts by two years.

It would also introduce tighter rules on seasonal rentals and prevent speculative investment funds from acquiring housing until 2028.

The second decree is more ambitious. It would allow tenants to extend their future rental contracts indefinitely. This is what the tenants’ union has been calling for.

Landlords would no longer be able to end a lease simply because it had reached its expiry date. Tenants who pay their rent and respect their legal obligations could remain in their homes for as long as they wish.

This would also limit rent increases, since rents can only be raised moderately during an existing contract.

So, the government has taken the protesters’ demands into account. But there is still a major obstacle: as our Spanish partner El Salto reports, the tenants’ union fears that this second measure may not pass through Parliament.

That could explain why the government adopted two separate decrees. The first is considered easier to get through Parliament.

Now, what about the EU’s proposals to tackle rising rents? We discussed them earlier this month.

One of the main proposals concerns short-term rentals. The idea is to introduce restrictions, particularly in tourist areas where housing is under strong pressure. By bringing more homes back onto the long-term rental market, the Commission hopes to ease pressure on prices.

But these proposals have not yet been adopted, so we’ll have to wait and see what impact they have. And in any case, more will need to be done at national level.

Even if prices stop rising, they are already so high that many workers can no longer afford to live in major cities.

More social housing is needed, as well as more renovation. Increasing the supply of decent, affordable homes could help ease pressure on rents and property prices.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below:

The EU is negotiating its next long-term budget, worth 2 trillion euros. But reaching an agreement among the 27 member states is proving difficult. The deadline is approaching, and the stakes are high.

Will the EU member states be able to agree on the budget? And what are the different options?

The bloc’s next long-term budget covers the period from 2028 to 2032.

The aim is to reach an agreement by the end of this year. Then, in 2027, the European Parliament will have to give its consent, and the political agreement will need to be translated into legislation, with funding allocated to the different programmes.

But with just three months left before the end of the year, reaching a deal on time is proving difficult. A meeting of EU ministers dedicated to the budget last week led nowhere. Countries stuck to their positions.

On one side are the so-called frugals: Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. But they prefer to call themselves “modernisers”. They want to limit spending and are reluctant to increase their contributions to the EU budget.

On the other side are countries worried about receiving less European funding in the years to come.

The European Commission argues that the next budget needs to be bigger than the previous one to address new challenges, including European competitiveness and defence.

And it’s not just the Commission’s view. The European Parliament and many observers share it.

But the countries calling for spending cuts say the EU cannot simply add new priorities to existing ones. They argue that choices have to be made.

So the Commission has proposed another option: increasing the EU’s own resources.

These are revenues that go directly into the European budget, rather than relying entirely on contributions from member states. The idea is to raise additional money without asking national governments to pay more.

But this proposal is also facing opposition from countries calling for spending restraint. They argue that the bloc should not simply look for more money to fund all its priorities.

So how can the 27 countries break the deadlock?

When ministers cannot reach an agreement, the issue is taken up by EU leaders themselves. And that is exactly what is expected to happen in the coming months.

The president of the European Council is planning several meetings of EU leaders before the end of the year, in an attempt to bring countries closer together.

He is even said to be considering a summit lasting three to four days at the end of November, to give leaders enough time to reach an agreement and avoid a difficult December.

But what happens if the 27 countries still fail to agree before the end of the year? There is some room for manoeuvre in 2027. According to media reports, several dates have already been set aside early next year for last-minute negotiations, should an agreement not be reached in time.

But this leaves very little room for delay.

The European Parliament will still need several months to give its consent, and the EU will then have to finalise the legislation and prepare the different programmes.

That brings us very close to 2028, when the new budget is supposed to take effect.

And if everything is not ready by then, the EU does have a mechanism to keep things running.

It can continue covering certain ongoing expenses and payments that have already been committed, even without a new long-term budget in place.

Unlike in the United States, where a budget deadlock can lead to a government shutdown and some public employees being temporarily sent home without pay, the EU has a system designed to avoid such a complete halt.

But this would only be a temporary solution.

It would not provide the certainty needed to launch new programmes or guarantee that all European funding will be available as planned.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below:

Rebuilding Gaza will require tens of billions of dollars. European countries have just approved new funding for water and waste management. But with the ceasefire still fragile, can reconstruction really get underway?

The EU has just approved two projects aimed at helping rebuild Gaza. Together, they provide €43m in support for the Palestinian Authority, mainly for water and waste management.

The funding is intended to improve access to drinking water for around one million people in Gaza, restore waste collection and launch pilot recycling programmes.

This comes on top of a much larger €883.6m package announced by the EU in July for Gaza. This is totally independent from the board of peace initiated by Donald Trump.

The European Commission has brought together donors from EU member states, as well as countries such as Norway and Switzerland. The European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are also involved.

That is the purpose of the donor conferences regularly organised by the Commission. And this format has sometimes been seen as an alternative to the reconstruction efforts led by Trump’s Board of peace.

As far as the Board of peace is concerned, it also made new announcements last week, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly.

It announced a $2.45bn plan to support reconstruction over six months. Is that significant compared with Gaza’s needs? And do the two funding plans complement each other?

The short answer is: the funding is still far from enough. The needs for rebuilding Gaza are estimated at least $71bn.

The economy has also collapsed, with very little economic activity currently possible in Gaza and unemployment affecting almost the entire population.

But the different funding plans can complement each other.

The Board of Peace six-month plan is divided into dozens of areas of spending. One of the largest is the construction of permanent shelters to replace the tents where many people are currently living.

The plan also includes clearing rubble, rebuilding homes and restoring public transport, among other things.

But reconstruction also depends on security. Is the ceasefire holding, and is Israel committed to allowing aid and reconstruction to move forward? That’s one of the major questions.

European commissioner Dubravka Šuica stressed this point at the UN last week, saying that European assistance relies on clear commitments from Israel to facilitate the implementation of these projects.

Israel has reopened one crossing for international aid, but according to several international reports, it is still restricting the distribution of humanitarian assistance inside Gaza.

And although a ceasefire has been agreed, Israeli military operations targeting Hamas have continued, with civilians among those killed.

According to Gaza’s Health Ministry, 22 Palestinians were killed and 209 injured between 9 and 16 September alone.

Another 21 people were killed on 16 September when a residential building, already damaged during the war, collapsed.

Overall, more than 1,300 people have reportedly been killed in Gaza since the ceasefire began, according to Gaza health authorities.

What’s more, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, which is supposed to govern the territory under the peace agreement is still based in Cairo. Israel has not authorised all of its members to enter Gaza.

And the committee says the conditions for carrying out its mandate are not yet in place.

That is another obstacle to reconstruction getting fully underway.

There is one more source of uncertainty: possible Palestinian elections in November. Those elections could also be postponed.

So while funding for reconstruction is beginning to take shape, there are still major questions over security, governance and political stability.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below:

This summer, a group of 45 men was arrested in France. the reason: their adherence to misogynist ideas and incitement to hatred in a Telegram group with more than 1,700 members. 

In the UK, several young men linked to the misogynist ‘manosphere’ movement have been arrested in recent years.

Are European authorities finally taking this threat seriously? And how are they responding to it?

Emy, Alexis, Ryan, Lola and Aminata are five French people in their twenties, and they have one thing in common: recently, they have all seen someone close to them become involved with online masculinist networks and become radicalised. 

Speaking to the French media outlet StreetPress – a member of the Sphera Network alongside Europod – they explain how their friends or ex-partners have started making misogynistic and violent remarks, such as: “Nowadays, women control men, and we need to restore the balance,” or even, “A good slap doesn’t do any harm.”

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