An Indian employee of a catering firm in the Val-d’Oise department of France, located near Paris, has been indicted on charges of raping two vulnerable migrant colleagues but will continue to remain free on the street under judicial supervision. The decision stands after the prosecution’s appeal was dismissed for having been filed beyond the statutory deadline, a legal technicality.
According to details reported by French newspaper Le Parisien, the case began on April 17 when an undocumented worker of Sri Lankan origin employed by the same caterer in Saint-Ouen-l’Aumône went to the police to accuse a 34-year-old Indian colleague of rape. She alleged that he had exploited her precarious migration status to rape her, counting on her silence out of fear that she would lose both her job and any chance of being legalized to stay in France.
A short time later, a second female employee of the company lodged a complaint of rape against the same man, describing circumstances that were essentially identical. Both women said the man raped them and then blackmailed them due to their illegal status to win their silence.
In early July, the man was arrested at his home in Pontoise. He had worked for the catering firm since 2015, is the father of three children and had no prior criminal record.
Placed in custody, he firmly denied the allegations during questioning and claimed he was the victim of a plot hatched by the women.
Despite his claims, he was subsequently indicted for the rape of vulnerable persons. However, the judge ordered his release under judicial supervision, requiring him to live in Normandy and forbidding any contact with the two migrant women he allegedly raped.
The public prosecutor’s office, persuaded that pre-trial detention was necessary, lodged an appeal against the release order. A procedural failure inside the services of the Versailles Court of Appeal, however, meant the file could not be examined within the legal fifteen-day period. Consequently the investigating chamber had no option but to record the missed deadline and uphold the judicial supervision already imposed on the indicted man.
The suspect’s employer, which operates sites in both Paris and the Val-d’Oise, quickly terminated the man’s employment.
Following a trial, a 29-year-old Palestinian has been convicted of sexually assaulting a 15-year-old girl on a bus in the French city of Toulouse. The girl, named Clara to protect her identity, openly sobbed in court while sitting next to her mother.
On June 18, the young girl was riding the L11 bus in the city when the Palestinian migrant, Ahmed, sat next to her. Ahmed spoke in court through a translator, claiming he thought he saw the teenager give “a sign” to him that she wanted to get to know him. Ahmed said he was attracted to Clara “at first sight.”
After Ahmed got on the bus, he went to sit next to the victim, at which point he began to rub her shoulders before he grabbed her transport card, which she had been holding between her legs, according to French news outlet La Depeche. He then grabbed her thighs before moving his hands to her chest. The Palestinian was then arrested after a criminal complaint.
In court, after recounting that he was attracted to Clara, he apologized for his sexual assault in criminal court, saying: “I thought carefully. I would like to apologize. I have trouble behaving around girls. That day, I was elsewhere, I behaved badly.”
“Do you realize that she is traumatized?” the judge responded.
Ahmed fled Gaza and arrived in France in March 2025. He said he has had a difficult existence in France living on the street and in squats. He also says he has been actively consuming cocaine and alcohol “to suffer less psychologically.”
He was then given taxpayer-funded social support and offered accommodations in Cugnaux.
Ahmed told the court that he experienced war and violence during his childhood and adolescence.
The court found Ahmed guilty and sentenced him to six months in prison with continued detention. He is also being banned from French territory for two years and is no longer allowed to participate in any activity involving minors. He will also be a registered sex offender.
A civil case may also rule on further damages related to the 15-year-old girl he targeted.
This is far from the only incident in Toulouse. Last year, Remix News reported on a 54-year-old Senegalese migrant who committed serial sexual assaults on the city’s bus lines over the course of three years, with the man targeting multiple women at different times.
In 2025, Remix News reported that sexual assaults on French public transport had risen 86 percent over the preceding ten years.
French authorities have launched a murder investigation after an agricultural worker discovered the partially charred, naked body of a woman in a vineyard last week near Nîmes. While official identification remains pending, the victim is believed to be 29-year-old Sonia Bellina, a popular social media influencer who went missing on Aug. 10.
Bellina, who lived between Paris and Nîmes, built a following of nearly 380,000 users across two TikTok accounts and 13,000 followers on Instagram.
JUST IN: The body of 29-year-old French TikToker Sonia Bellina has been discovered naked and charred in vineyards in Saint-Gilles.
"She ran into the wrong guy at the wrong time. I never thought this would happen to our family, to us. Especially since she was a sunny, kind… pic.twitter.com/WHBAq7GMNt
The Nîmes public prosecutor’s office opened the homicide inquiry following the Aug. 12 discovery in Saint-Gilles, located roughly 12 miles outside Nîmes. The investigation has been assigned to the Gard gendarmerie group and the Nîmes gendarmerie research section.
Speaking to reporters, a woman identifying herself as the victim’s older sister, Mia, said Bellina vanished after leaving for a date the night before the body was found, according to French news outlet Le Dauphine.
“She told us she was going out one evening, she never came back,” Mia said, adding that her sister was scheduled to meet someone she had been seeing. “She ran into the wrong guy at the wrong time.”
La jeune influenceuse gardoise, Sonia Bellina disparue le 10 août, retrouvée carbonisée à Saint-Gilles le 12 août. Sa famille, convaincue de son identité, dénonce le harcèlement en ligne et les commentaires haineux qui persistent même après sa mort.#SoniaBellina#meurtre… https://t.co/UPEklp591xpic.twitter.com/Bjqcy8OkKY
Family members have pushed back against online speculation regarding Bellina’s personal life and background, pleading for privacy as the investigation unfolds.
No arrests have been announced, and French authorities have not officially named a suspect in the ongoing investigation. The family is pleading for witnesses or people with information about the murder to come forward.
The Nîmes prosecutor’s office assigned a dedicated criminal task force of up to 40 gendarmes to comb the vineyards for microscopic forensic evidence and map out her final movements.
A 108-year-old woman was sexually assaulted and robbed in the French city of Lyon on Aug. 7, 2026, in the Villeurbanne suburb of the city.
Around 10:30 a.m., a home caregiver arrived at the 108-year-old woman’s apartment to provide care. The caregiver found the elderly woman partially naked, in a state of shock, and sitting on her sofa. The victim was unable to explain what had happened. Reports note that, given her age and condition, she was a priori not able to undress herself alone.
Emergency services were alerted about the woman’s condition. She was taken to the hospital for examination and medical analyses, according to French news outlet CNews.
Investigators determined that a burglary had taken place. Several individuals allegedly forced open a kitchen window to enter the apartment. Several rooms were searched and ransacked, and bottles of perfume were stolen.
The Lyon prosecutor’s office opened an investigation for burglary by breaking and entering and sexual assault. The sexual assault qualification was retained specifically “given her state of nudity at the time of discovery.” No other details were provided about the woman’s condition.
There have been no announced arrests or identifications of suspects, who remain on the run.
No specific descriptions of the perpetrators, additional stolen items, forensic results, or precise circumstances of the undressing beyond the initial findings have been made public. The investigation is ongoing.
A police union spokesperson, Benjamin Camboulives of Alternative Police (CFDT), commented publicly that “the delinquents no longer have any limits,” but this added no new factual information about the case itself.
Marine Le Pen’s candidacy for president means Europeans should brace for the possibility of a France wholly different to the one they know.
A Rassemblement National government would be hostile to the EU and a disruptive partner on numerous issues facing Europe; including on Russia, enlargement, climate and migration.
The party is divided over whether and how to work with other right-wing parties in France; and how to position the country within Europe and the Western alliance.
Le Pen is likely to work in a “duo” with party leader, Jordan Bardella, but there are notable differences between their outlooks. Europeans should pay attention to these.
European political leaders would struggle to influence a Le Pen-led government, but nor should they expect a unified European far-right to emerge. They would be wise to begin their preparations now.
Note: This policy brief is a second edition of an earlier paper published on June 9th 2026. It updates the prior analysis in light of Marine Le Pen’s confirmation that she will run for the French presidency.
The restoration of a matriarch
In the early hours of November 2nd 1976, a bomb exploded outside the Paris home of the far-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen and his family. The perpetrators were never found. His youngest daughter, Marine, 8 years old at the time of the attack, later seethed that the family was not shown “the slightest sign of solidarity or compassion” by the French authorities. Today, as Marine Le Pen launches into her fourth—and most competitive—bid for France’s presidency, that quote reveals something of the woman who might soon occupy the Elysée Palace. If she wins, European policymakers will need to understand this self-defined outsider and how her family’s and party’s long years in the political wilderness shape her domestic and international agenda.
That insurgent self-perception may seem odd now. After all, the National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) is far ahead in polling for the first round of the election, is accepted by an increasing share of French polite society, and is close to some of the country’s most powerful economic elites. But it still explains why the rest of Europe should brace for the possibility of a French president who sees herself as a rebel against the country’s and the EU’s established norms and institutions. As this paper will argue, a Le Pen presidency of France would be a significantly more formidable challenge to European orthodoxies than Giorgia Meloni is in Italy or Viktor Orban was in Hungary.
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Only one thing is certain about the result of France’s presidential election next year: President Emmanuel Macron’s decade in power will come to an end. Who replaces him is an open question, with any number of conceivable outcomes. The exact field of candidates is not yet clear, not even in Macron’s centrist camp, where two former prime ministers—Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal—are vying for primacy. French presidential election campaigns are often volatile; both those in 2017 and 2022 saw major shifts over the half-year before polling day. But current polling suggests that the RN party candidate is on track to win the first round, on April 18th 2027, and to enjoy good prospects in the second, due on May 2nd.
The RN went through months of speculation over who would represent it at the presidential election. In March 2025, Marine Le Pen was convicted of embezzling European parliamentary funds and received a five-year ban on standing for election. Over recent months, Jordan Bardella, the RN’s untested young leader and Le Pen’s protégé, was talked about as the party’s best hope.
On July 7th 2026, however, the Court of Appeal reduced Le Pen’s ineligibility penalty, which enabled her to run. It also required her to serve a year of house arrest with an electronic ankle tag. That evening, Le Pen announced that she would seek the presidency and would appeal to the Court of Cassation. The penalty is suspended until France’s highest court rules on the case, which could take place as late as April 2027.
Her candidacy has significant implications for the rest of Europe. Le Pen is an experienced campaigner and an established (though also divisive) figure in France. Her bid for the presidency is perhaps more likely to survive the heat of the campaign than a Bardella run would have. The fact that she is the candidate probably increases the chances of the French far-right coming to power for the first time since Marshal Pétain, the puppet leader of Vichy France.
Le Pen is marked by the RN’s long years in the wilderness. She believes in radical solutions. As president, she would likely be a confrontational and abrasive force in Europe.
To reiterate, the outcome of the election remains wide open. But the scale of the potential rupture of a Le Pen win means policymakers elsewhere in Europe must both understand the RN and prepare for that eventuality. To that end, the authors of this paper have extensively researched the party’s Europe and foreign policies. The following study is based on in-depth interviews with an array of senior RN figures and external experts as well as analysis of the party’s speeches, legislative proposals, voting records and electoral programmes. The result is a series of five theses about what a Le Pen win next year would mean for Europe.
Understanding an RN presidency
Point 1: Marine Le Pen’s candidacy reaffirms her primacy inside the RN, although her duo with Bardella will endure
Marine Le Pen’s decision to run for president despite her upheld conviction—and in contradiction of her own prior statements—is a reminder of her centrality to the RN. She is still the party’s dominant leader. The decision also dispelled the illusion that Bardella constitutes a real alternative to her leadership. It showed that today’s RN is still Marine Le Pen’s inheritance and achievement.
The party was founded as the National Front (FN) in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen, along with French former members of the Waffen-SS and other nostalgists for colonial French Algeria. It drew together different threads of the far-right. For decades most French citizens considered it beyond the pale. When Jean-Marie Le Pen narrowly made it into the second round of the 2002 presidential election, it shocked both France and Europe. He was roundly defeated by 82% to 18% by then-president Jacques Chirac.
Taking the reins of the party from her father in 2011, however, Marine Le Pen pursued a strategy of “dédiabolisation” (“detoxification”). This saw her expel Jean-Marie from the party in 2015 over his racist and anti-Semitic comments. After her resounding defeat to Macron in 2017 she intensified the process, renaming the party and dropping its commitment to “Frexit” (leaving the EU).
In 2019, she appointed a fresh-faced young activist from a deprived Paris suburb to lead the RN’s campaign for the European Parliament election. Jordan Bardella delivered the party’s first ever first-placed result in a national election and was rewarded with the RN presidency in 2021. He would play a central role in the party’s 2022 presidential campaign—a much closer contest—and in its triumphant win in the 2024 European vote. Le Pen further empowered Bardella when she announced he would be her choice for prime minister. When it looked like she might be banned from running, Bardella became her natural replacement as a presidential hopeful.
Nevertheless, despite Bardella’s rapid rise and growing public profile, the RN remains firmly in Le Pen’s hands. For nearly half a century, the promotion of family members, such as Marine Le Pen’s niece Marion Maréchal, and significant turnover among the lower levels of the party has kept power within the Le Pen clan. Many of the party’s cadres remain more loyal to her than to Bardella, and were determined that she should run rather than him.
Now that the party is back behind its leader, Le Pen will continue to highlight the duo she forms with Bardella—as she did on prime-time television when she launched her campaign. She once again promised to make him prime minister if she becomes president. Running a “ticket” for the French presidency is unprecedented and anathema to the function. But it has a distinct advantage: broadening her voter coalition while keeping the party together.
Le Pen’s own political base has two main parts. First, an anti-elite and disaffected working- and middle-class electorate in the northern post-industrial Pas-de-Calais region that she has represented since 1998 (as a councillor, MEP and in the National Assembly), And, second, a chain of strongholds along the Mediterranean coast, which adhere to long-term RN positions hostile to immigration and taxes.
By contrast, Bardella appears more economically liberal and temperamentally closer to other parts of the French right, including the conservative flank of the Republicans (LR, the rump centre-right force) and culturally reactionary forces like Éric Zemmour’s far-right Reconquest. He is also more engaged with the wider European right, especially Meloni in Italy. Within the RN itself this aligns him more with a more bourgeois and younger new electorate.
Over the last year, Bardella had even started to sand down some of the party’s most abrasive ideas. Where Le Pen cleaves to some of the party’s old Putin-friendly instincts on Russia, he has spoken in defence of Ukraine’s sovereignty. He also broke from Le Pen on pensions reform, suggesting dropping the fixed retirement age and moving to a more contributory system. Where Le Pen went to Budapest to help out an embattled Orban, he struck a friendly tone towards Germany and even met with the country’s ambassador in Paris. All this created expectations in Brussels and other EU capitals that a President Bardella might be closer to the bloc’s economic orthodoxies and more open, at least, to compromises.
Le Pen’s candidacy firmly relegates him to a subordinate position within the party. Gone, too, is the spectre of a somewhat more conciliatory RN presence in the Elysée Palace if the party wins power next year. “Bardellism cannot exist, as it is ultimately Marinism”, Jean-Philippe Tanguy, a senior RN figure, has said. The reassertion of Le Pen’s primacy within the RN thus makes the party both more likely to take power and more likely to disrupt the rest of the EU and its foreign policies if it does.
Point 2: An RN presidency would be a rupture in French and European politics
France is a highly centralised state, and its president wields executive power more akin to an American president than to counterparts in its European neighbours. The country also remains a pivotal power in Europe as one of its two nuclear-armed countries and half of the Franco-German motor that long drove the European project.
News of an RN win would therefore send shockwaves around the continent, stunning the mainstream. It would also lift the spirits of much of Europe’s radical right after a difficult 2026 in which its pre-eminent governing leader, Orban, lost power and its links with Trump turned out to be liabilities. After all, the RN has been unapologetic in its support for fellow “patriots” across Europe. Le Pen campaigned for Orban, and Bardella has engaged closely with Meloni and her government in Italy and Nigel Farage’s Reform in the UK.
Farther afield, the RN has been increasingly welcomed by fellow nationalists like Israel’s Likud government, which hosted Bardella and other far-right leaders in 2025. The Trump administration has professed its own commitment to supporting “patriotic parties” and would react favourably to an RN win. This is despite Bardella’s and Le Pen’s efforts to cool their party’s earlier enthusiasm for the US president.
The RN would revel in the sense of rupture. In private, party leaders compare their potential accession to power to left-winger François Mitterrand’s historic victory in 1981—which they see as the only true political change France has undergone in the last 50 years.
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Thus empowered, the RN would want to enact its programme. Although foreign and defence policy may not be its top policy priority, “fixing” France’s relationship with the EU is bound to be one.
In its 2019 and 2024 European election campaign manifesto, the RN suggested transforming the European Commission into a mere secretariat of the EU, leaving legislative initiative only to the European Council. The party decries attempts to expand qualified majority voting, refuses any new transfers of competencies on foreign and defence policy to the commission—and seeks European allies in that endeavour.
The RN is vehemently against EU common taxation and borrowing. Both Le Pen and Bardella have proposed slashing the French contribution to the EU budget (by “between €2bn and 3bn”, as Bardella suggested, equivalent to 9-14% of the French payment in 2024). RN MPs have already put forward severalamendments to the budgetary laws to that effect. In July, Bardella has even advocated reducing the contribution by half. In place of European joint spending, the party wants the creation of a sovereign wealth fund to back “sovereign industries” in defence, technology and energy.
The party’s antipathy towards NATO means it plans to prioritise national-level defence instead. The RN has committed to maintaining current defence spending, but argues this should support France’s own military-industrial infrastructure first and foremost. Even if it has paused an earlier plan to leave NATO’s integrated command, at least for “as long as the war [in Ukraine] goes on”, Le Pen revived the idea as recently as May 2026.
The strictly national principle applies to energy too. The RN has promised to lower French energy costs, notably by breaking from EU-wide electricity pricing (which often depends on gas prices less relevant to France’s nuclear-heavy energy system) and thus allegedly reducing the French retail price. And, despite claiming to be concerned about the consequences of climate change, the RN is relentless in its opposition to the European Green Deal and its insistence that French nuclear energy should exempt the country from EU climate strictures.
Overall, if Le Pen were to become president, the RN’s highly disruptive European agenda would inevitably put France on a path to confrontation with European partners and institutions. As the fight against the EU is both a symbolic and a policy priority for the RN, other European leaders may have to find a way to negotiate on some of the demands—that for a budget rebate, for example—in order to prevent French vetoes.
Point 3: The RN’s inexperience and lack of interest in foreign policy would make France an erratic partner, especially in a crisis
Europe’s best hope, in the event of a Le Pen presidency, may reside in the fact that foreign policy would not be the top priority for the RN in power.
First, the RN’s foreign policies often remain vague or only partially formed. Despite its long-standing presence in the French political landscape, the party has no national governing experience and only in 2022 won a significant share of seats in the National Assembly. With little network among the French diplomatic establishment, RN leaders have rarely engaged closely with foreign policy debates. The party prefers to hide behind references to General de Gaulle’s pro-independence foreign policy to justify criticisms of the EU or NATO without being too specific.
According to RN insiders, the party’s foreign policy decisions emanate from private discussions between Le Pen and Bardella, with the occasional counsel of the advisory group Les Horaces. If she attains power in 2027, Le Pen may seek to attract more experienced figures from the traditional right (from LR or UDR) or from the military to lead on top foreign policy positions.
Second, the RN is clearly prepared to change its tone on international topics when political expediency dictates. RN figures privately insist that foreign policy cannot win it elections, but can lose it ones. They blame Le Pen’s defeat in April 2022 on her failure convincingly to pivot away from Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine two months earlier.
The party abandoned Frexit after the UK’s Brexit turned out to be a disaster. It curbed its old openness to strongmen such as Putin (repaying a contentious loan to a Russian bank in 2023) and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. In recent years, it attempted to erase its anti-Semitic past by adopting a strongly pro-Israel line. Since February 2022, the party has walked a tightrope: paying lip service to Ukraine’s right to self-defence while criticising sanctions against Russia as costly to French consumers and opposing some military aid to Kyiv as escalatory. Having greeted Trump’s re-election in 2024, the party has become a nimble critic as his erratic foreign policies have made alignment with him a political liability.
It is safe to assume, then, that, even with Le Pen as candidate, the party will tend towards orthodox language on most foreign policy ahead of the election. It has a vested interest in a campaign that focuses on topics such as immigration, crime and purchasing power (where the party is most confident), rather than one that debates France’s role in Europe or global geopolitics (where it is more uncertain and, in some cases, divided).
And even if the party wins power, the domestic agenda will likely come first. This can be summarised as: countering cultural and industrial decline by pursuing “national preference”. In policy terms it would include harsher law-and-order measures (especially on migration and crime), trade protectionism and efforts to reverse green policies in the hope of revitalising industry, and prioritising French nationals over foreigners in accessing welfare or public services. European partners should reckon on an RN presidency being most intransigent on EU matters related to those domestic priorities—and possibly being more open to negotiation in other areas.
In sum, however, they should expect a Le Pen foreign policy that is unclear, evolving or even contradictory. Under her leadership, France would take few initiatives and rather behave as a blocker. For example, it is hard to imagine an RN president responding decisively to a security crisis on Europe’s eastern flank. If under pressure from EU member states to be tougher on Russia, she would likely seek concessions and negotiations rather than further action.
If it does anything proactively, such a presidency would concentrate on disentangling France from EU policies that contradict its domestic goals. At best, the RN’s lack of interest and inexperience may be an opportunity for other European governments to shape some of the outcomes, as long as they keep their expectations low.
Point 4: How broad and how European? The strategic debates running through the RN
Today’s RN is infused by two strategic debates that would shape Le Pen’s tenure as president.
Movement or coalition?
The first has to do with the RN’s political identity: the party is struggling to determine whether it seeks to forge an union des droites (union of the right) or whether its outsider populist status remains its core identity.
In the long years the FN and the RN spent on the political margins, the Le Pens’ “neither left, nor right” approach appealed to disillusioned voters who rejected all forms of politics. It acknowledged the cordon sanitaire between the mainstream right and their parties. Even back in the FN days, Jean-Marie Le Pen crushed several internal attempts to unite the right. Marine Le Pen remains firmly opposed to any such efforts today.
If she is elected, it is unclear how Le Pen will position herself towards other right-of-centre French parties. Her instinct seems to be that working with them would dilute the RN and prevent it from conducting truly disruptive policies. Given her aversion to compromise and her long years of ostracism by the mainstream political class, Le Pen would struggle to extend a hand to others to form a majority in the National Assembly.
She may, however, continue using Bardella as a useful bridge to other parties of the right, at both national and European levels. In an interview with Le Figaro after Le Pen’s official launch of her presidential bid, he insisted that, as prime minister, he would seek to gather the right-wing electorate back to his party in order to build a “solid majority”.
It is reasonable to expect that, if Le Pen allows Bardella to forge these links at home, she will let him do so abroad too. If so, Bardella would continue building alliances with the European right spanning conservatives and various families of the radical right, likely with immigration as a focal point. The RN has already demonstrated its ability to build coalitions with other far-right parties and the European People’s Party to advance tougher migration legislation in the European Parliament. It would likely continue to do so if elected. Bardella has indicated that he wouldshare this agenda with leaders such as Meloni and German chancellor Friedrich Merz and seek to work with them.
Rival futures
The second faultline within the RN today is between rival conceptions of national sovereignty, a point that came across especially strongly in the authors’ interviews with senior party figures. Le Pen and the “old guard” around her have long held the view that France must resist Anglo-American hegemony and EU technocracy alike. They treat Washington and Brussels as equal threats to French autonomy.
Yet a new generation around Bardella—having come of age against the backdrop of the 2015 terror attacks in Paris and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine—has adopted an identity-based sense of Europeanness. It acknowledges the need for European cooperation against common threats, as long as this cooperation is “chosen”. It is inclined to invoke a shared Western and European cultural affinity.
For example, on Russia and Ukraine, Le Pen and the old guard have continued to blame NATO’s enlargement for “provoking” Russia. This fits their antipathy to Washington and Brussels. Their old ideological affinities with Moscow as a counterweight to American hegemony allow them to imagine a future in which Russia might even be a partner in a multipolar order once the war ends. But Bardella has admitted the “naivety” of Europeans in the face of the Russian challenge. Despite a less-than-keenly pro-Ukrainian voting record in the European Parliament, he has also spoken in favour of Ukrainian national sovereignty and against Russian imperialism.
These debates will continue within the RN—especially because Le Pen has been unwilling to sweep aside Bardella’s “union of the right” and rhetorically “pro-Ukraine” positions. For as long as she wants the electoral breadth he brings, the tension will persist.
Point 5: The likeliest outcome of an RN presidency would be a more isolated France in a weaker EU
The disruptive nature of RN policies towards Europe means France’s relationship with European partners would deteriorate over time.
At first, the RN would likely seek to reassure the financial markets and its international partners. Victory for the party may be accompanied by protests and strikes, and the new government would face economic limitations like France’s high levels of debt. In this context, Le Pen may want to project stability. Nevertheless, the RN has promised to engage on a number of priorities that will put it at odds with other European governments—including those led by the right—as well as EU institutions.
Opting out of the EU-wide electricity pricing could push up prices for other member states; quitting the migration pact would put greater pressure on others; curbing the French contribution to the EU budget would force others to pay more and possibly trigger an infringement procedure. More generally, Paris governing in a spirit of French exceptionalism would roil Europe’s collective efforts on common challenges.
Enlargement could prove an especially inflammatory topic. Plenty of European governments have concerns about bringing Western Balkans countries, Moldova and especially Ukraine into the EU. But if the RN wins the French presidency, it will be the most outspokenly opposed government among major European states. It has warned that enlargement would ruin French agriculture and suppress French wages; intensify the EU budgetary demands on France; and further centralise power within the EU at the cost of individual states. The accession of Ukraine, with its vast agricultural industry, particularly alarms the RN.
The long-term result of these trends would likely be some degree of French isolation. The party’s policies and instincts would set Le Pen up for conflict with the European Commission—but also with other national governments, including right-wing counterparts. Although others in the EU might conceivably come around to RN doubts about enlargement, the insistence on French national priority will alienate even ideologically sympathetic forces elsewhere.
Tensions could emerge with other far-right leaders, such as Meloni, over issues like migration. Despite broad ideological alignment on reducing migration, the RN prioritises national sovereignty over the management of borders and migration flows. By contrast, Brothers of Italy has advocatedgreater EU coordination and burden-sharing. As a result, a cohesive far-right alliance at the EU level should not be taken for granted. If these conflicts escalate, an “empty chair” moment, where France simply withdraws from EU meetings as it did under de Gaulle in 1965, is not unthinkable.
At a time when nationalist parties are rising in other major EU states, including Germany, an RN presidency could encourage unilateralism there too. The result could be doubly paradoxical: a lonelier right-wing France in a more right-wing Europe, and a more nationalist France more exposed to the interference of external powers like China, Russia and the US.
How the rest of Europe can move into “brace position”
As the rest of Europe faces up to the possibility of President Le Pen, the risk is that leaders and other policymakers bunch around one of two poles: complacency (the over-confident belief that she could simply be “handled” like any other challenging leader); and panic (the fatalistic assumption that an RN-led France would automatically mean the beginning of the end of the European project). Of the two courses, the first—the assumption of business as usual—currently looks like the greater risk. But neither is advisable.
This paper has shown that an RN win is a real possibility and would herald great disruption for the EU and its place in the world. It has argued that a Le Pen presidency would see itself ultimately as a radical insurgency against the French and European establishment. But it has also explored some of the complexities and shed some light on how the rest of Europe should think about them. In particular, leaders elsewhere on the continent should:
Abandon all precedents when thinking about an RN-led France
As president, Le Pen would be as fundamentally rooted in French traditions and peculiarities as equivalent leaders are in those of their countries. Trump’s America is simply too different to be closely relevant to France, despite the executive power both presidents wield. Orban’s Hungary does not fit either, with its distinctive tale of state capture and subordination to kleptocratic interests. Meloni’s Italy, meanwhile, is a complex story of creeping authoritarianism at home but emollience internationally. A Le Pen presidency would bear passing resemblances to each, but be sui generis.
Seek to understand the party and its instincts
Le Pen is a familiar figure, but her party has never held national power before and has evolved over time. Knowing how it ticks will be essential. This should lead decision-makers to engage with the party now, including by pursuing carefully calibrated efforts to meet with its senior figures to assess their true intentions. The decision of the German government to make contact with Bardella, for example, was the right one—though Europeans should be wary about reading Le Pen’s positions and instincts via Bardella and his circle.
Brace for a wider, but not necessarily more unified, European right
An RN win would be significant for Europe’s far-right. But ECFR’s research points firmly away from the idea of a coherent and durable European “union of the far-right” of any sort. The radical right has an emphatic sense of momentum, but that is not the same thing as a common project. Indeed, dismantling European integration is likely to generate conflicts over budgets and policies on issues like borders, energy, industry and defence—even between governments of similarly nationalist ideological hues.
Manage expectations when seeking to work with an RN-led France
Even in today’s more plural Europe, France is too big and too important to be circumvented entirely in a world of predators. Perhaps there would even be some limited common ground (most likely to be around defence, geoeconomics and building strategic autonomy). There could even be the possibility to mould a party that is still uncertain about its exact foreign policy agenda. But, especially under Le Pen rather than Bardella, this would still be a significantly less predictable, less collegiate and less European France than the one partners have known under Macron.
Prepare to deploy all the arts of European and international politics
An RN-led presidency would be complicated and disruptive. It would call for real diplomatic skill and political leadership in the EU and the rest of Europe, especially in powerful states like Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and, outside the bloc, Britain. In some cases, the task at hand might be to moderate France and bind it into groups of other states on matters of common and agreed interest. In others, it would be to build coalitions of the willing where France was reluctant to join. This would be a good time to deepen relationships between Brussels, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, Madrid and London, as well as other capitals.
The other futures
Europeans prepare for the possibility of Le Pen as president of France, they should keep in mind that an array of outcomes is still possible. There is also a significant chance of a moderate candidate making it to the second round and rallying the republican front once again against the RN. And in today’s volatile and fragmented French politics, there is even the possibility of a far-right against far-left runoff. But polls are polls, and probabilities are probabilities. This paper is a response to one major possibility among several—and an urgent call to France’s European partners to be ready.
About the authors
Célia Belin is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and head of its Paris office.
Jeremy Cliffe is editorial director and senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He co-heads the New Politics Project within the European Power programme.
Camille Lons is a policy fellow and deputy head of the Paris office at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Constance Victor is the Paris office coordinator at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Acknowledgments
We would like to start by thanking ECFR colleagues, including Piotr Buras, Teresa Coratella, Agathe Demarais, Janka Oertel, Nicu Popescu, Jana Puglierin, Marta Prochwicz Jazowska, Herman Quarles, Jeremy Shapiro, Vessela Tcherneva and Pawel Zerka who gave thoughtful comments on various drafts. We would also like to thank Zineb Bouziane for her thorough research support in the earlier stages of this project.
We are grateful to experts such as Catherine Fieschi, Jacob Ross and Victor Mallet for engaging with us and offering constructive feedback. We also would like to acknowledge the politicians, journalists and thinkers we interviewed over the course of this research; while we respect their anonymity, we thank each of them for their time and insights.
The task of editing the two editions of this paper fell to Kim Butson and Adam Harrison and we are grateful for their time and dedication in bringing it to completion. Thanks also go to Chris Eichberger for offering beautiful visuals to complement our work.
The design and working principle of a windmill or a wind powered machine haven’t changed much since they first appeared in Persia some 1,200 years ago. All windmills contain vanes or sails exposed to the wind, which causes them to turn. The rotary motion is then used to do work, such as grind grains into flour or pump water.
In 1868, French engineer Ernest Sylvain Bollée came up with a new design that made his windmill look and work radically different from a traditional windmill.
Avion Pilatus PC-6 (By JDrewes (see www.jandrewes.de), slight edit by Alvesgaspar – Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0)
On Sunday, June 28, 2026, a Pilatus PC-6 crashed near Nancy in the town of Tomblaine, killing all eleven people on board. The victims included five experienced skydiving instructors, five first-time tandem skydivers, and one pilot. The accident is the deadliest general aviation disaster in France in several decades.
The Civilian Victims: Ordinary Lives Cut Short
Beyond the tragic death toll, the crash claimed the lives of individuals remembered by their families and friends for their dedication, kindness, and humanity.
Cynthia Vally: A Dedicated Healthcare Professional
Cynthia Vally, 48, was the mother of two children and served as Chief Operating Room Nurse at the Gentilly Polyclinic in Nancy, part of the Elsan healthcare group. Known for her professionalism and commitment to both patients and colleagues, she embodied the core values of the healthcare profession. Co-workers describe her as deeply compassionate and unwaveringly dedicated. Family and friends paid tribute on social media, remembering her warmth, kindness, and infectious zest for life.
Youssef El Idrissi: Devoted Father and Sports Enthusiast
Youssef El Idrissi, 48, an accountant from Tomblaine, was well known in the local sports community. A member of the GSA Tomblaine veterans soccer team, he was remembered as a warm-hearted, friendly man. A devoted father of two boys, he never missed one of his sons’ games. Friends from the club noted that he had not originally planned to be on the ill-fated flight, underscoring the unpredictable nature of the tragedy.
Damien Giacovelli: A Committed Healthcare Provider
Damien Giacovelli, a self-employed registered nurse based in Nancy, was also among the passengers. His career reflected a strong personal commitment to caring for others.
A High School Student and First-Time Skydivers
Among the victims was an 18-year-old high school student from Jarville-la-Malgrange. His identity has not been released out of respect for his family’s privacy. The four other civilian passengers had come to experience their first tandem skydive, a recreational activity designed to introduce newcomers to skydiving under the supervision of certified instructors.
The Skydiving Instructors: Five Highly Experienced Professionals Lost
Five certified skydiving instructors lost their lives in the crash, each bringing years of expertise and passion to the sport.
Davy Tellier: A Respected Professional Firefighter
Davy Tellier, 53, served as a senior non-commissioned officer in the professional fire service in southeastern France. His death deeply affected the regional fire and rescue community. Officials from the local fire service expressed their heartfelt condolences to his family, honoring his years of dedicated public service.
Filip Kovacevic: A Passion for Aviation
Filip Kovacevic, formerly employed by PSA in Mulhouse, specialized in refrigeration and air-conditioning systems. He later worked as a subcontractor for Veolia in Cernay while pursuing his passion for aviation and skydiving. Friends remembered him as a thoughtful mentor, generous with his knowledge and always eager to encourage others.
Anthony Planchon: The Pilot’s Final Act
Anthony Planchon, the pilot of the Pilatus PC-6, reportedly performed a final act of courage. According to witnesses, he steered the aircraft away from a vehicle in an apparent effort to avoid additional casualties on the ground. Fellow members of the Strasbourg skydiving school described him as someone who embraced life wholeheartedly, always organizing gatherings and sharing his love of aviation and skydiving. His enthusiasm and generosity leave a profound void among those who knew him.
Albéric Moulès: A Passionate Instructor
Albéric Moulès, 33, owned the company Vertical Addict in the Charente-Maritime region. Well known in New Caledonia, where he trained as a professional skydiver and instructor, he earned widespread respect for his outstanding teaching skills. A Facebook memorial group was created in his honor, reflecting the deep impact his death has had on the skydiving community.
The Crash and Weather Conditions
The accident occurred on Sunday, June 28, 2026, shortly after takeoff from Nancy-Essey Airport. The aircraft crashed near residential areas in Tomblaine but, despite the obvious danger, caused no fatalities on the ground. French Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez, who visited the scene shortly afterward, confirmed that the aircraft went down approximately 300 meters (about 980 feet) beyond the departure end of the runway.
The severe heat wave affecting France at the time has been identified as a possible contributing factor. High temperatures reduce the performance of light aircraft by decreasing engine power and lift. Aviation consultant and Aviation Sans Frontières President Gérard Feldzer noted that the extreme heat, combined with a heavily loaded aircraft and possibly full fuel tanks, may have significantly reduced the Pilatus PC-6’s takeoff performance.
The Aircraft: A Proven but Demanding Design
The Pilatus PC-6 is a Swiss-built single-engine aircraft widely used for mountain operations and skydiving. With more than sixty years of operational history, it is regarded within general aviation as a remarkably versatile and reliable aircraft, often described by aviation professionals as the “Swiss Army knife” of utility airplanes.
Nevertheless, its age raises questions regarding the maintenance status of the aircraft involved. Aircraft of this category require regular inspections by certified maintenance facilities. Investigators will examine when the last inspection was completed and who performed it. Although the PC-6 has an excellent engineering reputation, it has been involved in several accidents over its operational history, most often associated with demanding operating environments such as mountain flying and parachuting operations.
The Investigation: Challenges Without a Flight Recorder
Two parallel investigations have been launched to determine the cause of the accident. France’s Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety (BEA) has dispatched investigators to the crash site, while a separate criminal investigation into involuntary manslaughter has been assigned to the Air Transport Gendarmerie.
No Flight Recorder
Unlike commercial airliners, the Pilatus PC-6 is not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder. The absence of these devices significantly complicates the investigation. The only available recordings come from Nancy’s air traffic control tower, although authorities indicate that no radio communications appear to have taken place between the pilot and controllers during the aircraft’s final moments.
Evidence Available to Investigators
Investigators will focus on analyzing the wreckage for mechanical failures, reconstructing the flight path through eyewitness accounts, and reviewing the aircraft’s maintenance history. According to a nearby witness, the airplane appeared to approach normally before the engine suddenly went quiet, suggesting the possibility of an engine failure.
Engine Failure Scenarios
If the engine did indeed fail at an altitude of approximately 100 to 150 meters (330 to 490 feet), the pilot would have had only seconds to respond. Under such conditions, even immediate corrective action may not have been sufficient to prevent the crash. The pilot may have attempted to avoid nearby homes, but the aircraft likely lacked the altitude needed to complete an evasive maneuver safely. Standard aviation procedures advise pilots of single-engine aircraft not to attempt a turn back toward the runway after an engine failure shortly after takeoff, as such maneuvers can lead to an aerodynamic stall and loss of control.
A Tragedy That Will Shape General Aviation
According to France’s Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety, this is the deadliest general aviation accident ever recorded in France in terms of fatalities. The investigation is expected to be lengthy and technically complex, requiring expertise in aeronautical engineering, mechanical systems, meteorology, and human factors.
For the grieving families, the investigation represents a painful search for answers about how eleven people could lose their lives just seconds after takeoff in an aircraft widely regarded as reliable. The outpouring of tributes across social media and regional news outlets reflects the profound emotional impact of this tragedy, extending far beyond the statistics of an aviation accident.
Determining the precise cause of the crash will be critically important for France’s general aviation community, particularly for skydiving schools that rely on aircraft such as the Pilatus PC-6. The investigation’s findings could influence future safety procedures, takeoff operating limitations, and maintenance standards for this class of aircraft throughout France and Europe.
Several bomb threats by anonymous callers targeting diplomatic missions and commerce buildings in central Athens triggered a major police response Friday morning. Authorities have been carrying out security checks at four locations, including the French Consulate, the Egyptian Embassy and two business organizations. According to Greek Police, unknown callers contacted the French Consulate and the […]
Cover image: picture alliance / Anadolu | Lucas Mukasa
When the G20 met on African soil for the first time in November 2025, it signalled that the continent is becoming more important to the world as an economic partner. China and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have already spent the past decade gaining ground as trade partners to African countries, narrowing the EU’s long-held lead.
France and Italy have recast their economic strategies accordingly, hunting for markets and suppliers of their own in Africa as global alliances shift and supply chains fracture. In 2026 alone, Italy convened its second Africa Summit in Addis Ababa and France held its Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi, the first France-Africa summit co-organised with an African country outside France or Francophone Africa. The rest of Europe is also adapting its approach. Since 2020, at least nine European countries have revised or substantially repositioned their Africa policies, recognising that Africa can be more than a supplier of natural resources.[1]
Africa’s own governments are pressing for this shift, positioning themselves as equal partners rather than aid recipients. European language is adjusting to match, with Brussels, Paris and Rome talking more about investment and partnership than about aid. European leaders must now make those national strategies pull in the same direction, keeping pace with rivals and delivering for both sides of the Mediterranean.
Under pressure
The EU is Africa’s largest trading partner, but individually its largest member states are just middle-sized players in today’s Africa.
Investment tells a similar story. European firms hold the largest stock of foreign investment in Africa, over €250bn, but only 10% of all new investment to African companies in 2024 came from Europe.[2]China and Gulf Arab states have spent the past decade increasing state-backed private investment to build market share across the continent. On present trends, the EU will fall further behind.
The right sort of investment
The kind of investment matters as much as its scale in making Africa a stronger industrial partner for Europe: greenfield manufacturing projects, regional infrastructure and industrial ecosystems do more than capital alone to build that capacity. However, European commercial ties with Africa are more extractive than transformative. In 2025, 70% of EU imports from Africa were primary products and just 28% were manufactured goods. Both French and Italian imports from Africa follow the same trend, which also shows up in where the money goes. In 2024, Italy and France were among the top investors in Africa’s extractives. Most capital-exporting economies share this extractive bias, since it reflects where Africa’s industrial development currently stands. Manufacturing gets only a modest share of investment, even though it matters most for the continent’s shift away from raw material exports.
The reason lies in how investors price risk. Capital is expensive in Africa: investors see the continent as disproportionately risky, which pushes money towards safe, asset-backed extractive projects rather than the long-term capital needed for more uncertain sectors, such as manufacturing. Even Africa’s own $4trn in domestic capital sits idle: weak banks and cautious institutions channel it into short-term holdings and government debt instead of long-term manufacturing investment.
Winds of change
France, Europe’s traditional leader on African matters because of its colonial and post-colonial history, and Italy, now seeking to emerge as its rival in European policy towards Africa, are already trying to address these issues. Both have overhauled their Africa policies and both used their G7 presidencies (in 2024 and 2026 respectively) to position Africa and development cooperation within a broader agenda of economic security built on private capital rather than aid. Yet this shift has not been matched by greater strategic coordination across Europe.
France, Italy and the EU broadly agree on what matters—energy, critical minerals, infrastructure, skills and industrialisation—but not on how to pursue it. A growing number of other member states, such as Germany and Spain, now see the continent as a partner for secure supply chains and political influence. The EU’s Global Gateway, its flagship strategy to mobilise up to €300bn in global infrastructure investment by 2027, was meant to give these efforts a common framework. Yet these strategies largely continue to operate in parallel, reflecting national priorities, commercial interests and historical ties. That leaves Europe without the scale, coherence or investor confidence needed to support industrial ecosystems and compete with partners able to combine finance, diplomacy and commercial clout.
Italy’s flagship Africa strategy, the 2024 Mattei Plan, and France’s 2026 Africa Forward investment strategy illustrate this dynamic: though the two emerged from different starting points, they increasingly pursue the same objectives, target overlapping countries and lean on comparable financial instruments. This reflects both Europe’s converging strategic interests and the reality that Africa’s infrastructure deficit concentrates investment in a narrow set of sectors. But it also shows that these strategies are additive rather than complementary.
Doing more with less
A core part of France’s and Italy’s new strategies is how to finance their ambitions in Africa. China, the UAE and even America use their private sectors as tools of state strategy. Italy and France are responding by using public money to pull in private investment and international lenders.
The Mattei Plan itself is a modest €5.5bn public fund spread over four years (2024–2027), but it uses guarantees, development finance and partnerships to unlock far more money than that. Italy’s export credit agency, SACE, has already put up €4bn in guarantees since the Mattei Plan was launched, pulling in an estimated €18.5bn of private funds. Partners such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank and the UAE add even more to the pot.
France’s plan, set out in the Africa Forward Summit, is part of a wider €23bn package, split between a €14bn pledge from Paris and €9bn from African partners. Of that, just €1.94bn is public funds; the rest is private. The strategy targets African strategic autonomy, especially in food and digital technology, and leans more on small businesses, private investors, and risk-mitigation tools such as the African Trade and Investment Development Insurance, a pan-African credit insurer. As with Italy, the aim is to make limited public money go further.
Rome and Paris find it easier to build coalitions with international lenders and non-European partners than with each other
Both countries have internationalised their financing—leaning on institutions such as the AfDB, the World Bank, Gulf sovereign investors and export-credit cover. Yet joint European ventures remain rare: aside from a handful of joint initiatives—such as the collaboration between the Italian, French and German state development banks on a water infrastructure project in Morocco under the Mattei Plan, or Denmark’s support for the Italy-AfDB Mattei Plan financing facility—both strategies have attracted relatively little structured participation from other European governments. Rome and Paris find it easier to build coalitions with international lenders and non-European partners than with each other. This limits opportunities to pool resources and build larger industrial investment platforms.
What Europe should do
France and Italy are changing course. The EU should now turn their separate initiatives into systems that reshape investment and drive African industrialisation. Three recommendations show how.
Share the risks
Since European countries individually cannot outspend China or the Gulf states, they must change the terms on which their capital competes. Member states and European institutions should increasingly pool guarantees, coordinate development finance institutions and build common project pipelines. Joint risk-sharing mechanisms involving institutions such as Italy’s development bank (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti), France’s development agency (Agence Française de Développement), the European Investment Bank and African financial institutions would reassure private investors more than multiple national commitments operating independently. The objective should be to change the risk calculus for investors.
Think in corridors
European countries deal with Africa country by country, or sector by sector. Industrialisation, however, crosses borders and sectors. Value chains need regional energy systems, transport corridors, customs integration, digital connectivity and labour mobility. Europe’s comparative advantage lies precisely in its experience building integrated markets. Even its most ambitious African venture, the Lobito Corridor—a planned rail line linking Congolese and Zambian mines to Angola’s Atlantic coast, backed by America, the EU and Italy—has yet to knit infrastructure, investment and regional integration into a single plan. Rather than approaching Zambia, Angola or Namibia as separate investment destinations, Europeans should use their collective weight to back it, and corridors like it, as platforms that align infrastructure, regulation, energy and manufacturing across several countries.
Help shape the rules
Some barriers sit above any single project: high sovereign risk premiums, the cost of capital and weaknesses in the global financial system continue to discourage productive investment in Africa. Europe should use platforms such as the G7 and the upcoming UK and South Korean G20 presidencies to ensure greater African participation in these discussions. It should also work to reform the global investment environment itself: support the African Credit Rating Agency, use multilateral guarantees more, and make financing cheaper for African economies. Shaping these rules is how Europe can help Africa become an industrial partner.
***
Europe is adapting, and France and Italy are showing the way. The challenge now is to weave these separate national efforts into one system capable of making Africa a genuine economic partner with a stronger geopolitical voice.
[1] Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
[2] EU outward investment to Africa: €9bn in 2024, per Eurostat (approximately $9.7bn converted at the yearly average exchange rate of 1 EUR = 1.0822 USD). Total FDI inflows into Africa: $97bn in 2024, per UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2025. $9.7bn ÷ $97bn ≈ 10%.
Cover image: picture alliance / Hans Lucas | Frédéric Pétry
The restoration of a matriarch
July 7th saw one period of uncertainty in French politics end and another begin. Despite an appeals court upholding Marine Le Pen’s fraud conviction, the leader of the far-right National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) will run for president next year. The election result remains wide open, but she is polling strongly and the possibility of a Le Pen-ist France is once again plausible. Should she win, the rest of Europe would have to contend with a highly abrasive and confrontational leadership in Paris, determined to unwind significant parts of the country’s integration with the rest of the EU.
Bracing for impact
European policymakers must prepare for that turbulent eventuality. In particular, they should:
Avoid clinging to precedents when thinking about an RN-led France. A President Le Pen would be neither “a Viktor Orban” nor “a Giorgia Meloni”, but a distinct phenomenon rooted in French political traditions and circumstances.
Seek to understand the party and its instincts. Le Pen is a familiar figure, but her party has never held national power before and has evolved over time. Knowing how it ticks will be essential.
Manage expectations about the pliability of a Le Pen presidency. Unlike Bardella, she primarily thinks not in terms of alliances with the broader political right (at home or in Europe) but of the RN as a monolithic national movement, beyond left and right, dedicated to French autonomy. Working with others will come less easily to her.
Prepare to deploy the arts of European and international politics. As France is one of the keystone states of the EU, its turn away from the project could be highly disruptive. Handling a Le Pen presidency will demand a clear sense of where cooperation could be possible (elements of European defence, perhaps) and where events might necessitate coalitions-of-the-willing circumventing Paris.
Courting public opinion
France’s appeals court on July 7th confirmed Le Pen’s conviction for embezzling European public funds. It reduced her “ineligibility” sentence, opening the possibility of her running as a candidate in the presidential election, but required her to serve a year of house arrest wearing an electronic tag. Le Pen has always said she would not run in those circumstances, but has announced that she will appeal to the Court of Cassation, France’s highest court, suspending the penalty until it delivers its verdict at some point in the new year. Until then, she is tag-free and able to take back the reins from her young protégé, Jordan Bardella. The possibility that his more cautious approach might temper the party’s populist radicalism now seems remote.
Now entering her fourth presidential campaign, Le Pen is an experienced candidate well-known to the French electorate. Having taken over the party (then called the National Front) from her father in 2011, she has sought to detoxify its image. Le Pen presents herself as both an empathetic leader and an unapologetic nationalist who champions “national priority” for French citizens over foreigners. She is polling far ahead of challengers in the first round and appears highly competitive in the second. Current polls put her slightly ahead of her strongest (centrist) challengers in the second round of voting, though French presidential elections cansee significant volatility.
This week, Mark Leonard welcomes Célia Belin, head of ECFR’s Paris office and senior policy fellow, and Jeremy Cliffe, ECFR’s editorial director and senior policy fellow, to discuss Marine Le Pen’s decision to run in France’s 2027 presidential election.
After a Paris appeal court ruling rescinded her ban from holding public office, Le Pen has reasserted leadership of the far-right National Rally (RN) and sidelined Jordan Bardella, who was widely expected to lead the party into the 2027 election. Her announcement has led to rivals across the centre and the left recalibrating their strategies in an already volatile political landscape.
Together, Mark, Célia and Jeremy explore how Le Pen’s candidacy changes France’s electoral outlook. They discuss whether she is a stronger candidate than Bardella, how French political parties are preparing for an election that RN enters as the favourite, and they draw on ECFR research to examine what an RN presidency could mean in practice.
Would a Le Pen government seek confrontation with Brussels? How might it reshape France’s approach to migration, the EU budget and European integration? Could nationalist governments across Europe really cooperate? And how would a Le Pen presidency impact relations with Ukraine, the US and France’s European allies?
This podcast episode was recorded on July 8th 2026.
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