Russia is displaying some of its newest air-launched precision weapons in public for the first time at the El Alamein International Airshow in Egypt this week. The S-71K Kovyor and related S-71M Monokhrom, and the S8000 Banderol, reflect Russia’s effort to field larger numbers of relatively inexpensive standoff weapons alongside its more sophisticated and costly missile types. As such, their development and early employment are closely tied to the war in Ukraine, but they also reflect wider global interest in these kinds of weapons.

The weapons, seen in the tweet embedded below, comprise, clockwise from top left: S-71K Kovyor, an unknown smaller guided munition, S8000 Banderol, and S-71M Monokhrom:

Novel munitions for the Russian aircraft, on an expo. pic.twitter.com/L1UPTb8qhX

— krakek (@krakek1) September 6, 2026

For Russia, the requirement has become increasingly important as the war in Ukraine has evolved into a prolonged contest in which industrial capacity is as critical as technology. Russia has expended huge numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles against Ukrainian targets while also developing an enormous strike-drone campaign. At the same time, Ukrainian air defenses have become progressively more capable, forcing Moscow to use combinations of missiles, drones, decoys, and different flight profiles to penetrate or saturate the defensive network. One lesson is the fact that a weapon does not necessarily have to be as capable as a high-end cruise missile if it can be manufactured in much greater numbers and still present a credible threat to the target.

The S-71M, which TWZ previously reported on in detail after Ukrainian intelligence obtained an example, is a compact, turbojet-powered weapon with a distinctly angular airframe intended to reduce its radar signature. Imagery from Egypt gives a better look at its front end, including a faceted nose flowing into a broad central fuselage. The nose has at least one optically flat transparency for an infrared or TV seeker. Its wings are sharply swept and fold against the belly of the weapon for carriage, while the rear of the weapon terminates in an inverted-V tail arrangement. The overall shape is notably different from Russia’s more conventional cruise missiles of the past.

Ukrainian analysis found that the S-71M incorporates an OFAB-250-270 high-explosive fragmentation bomb as its warhead and relies primarily on inertial guidance, rather than carrying a sophisticated terminal seeker, although the seeker window raises questions about that.

Ukrainian intelligence also described its construction as being relatively straightforward, with fiberglass composite material making up much of the outer structure and no evidence identified of specialized radar-absorbing coatings.

As we noted previously, the weapon appears intended as a less expensive, but still survivable standoff weapon option that can be produced in significant numbers.

The S-71M has been tested from the Su-57 Felon fighter, also present at El Alamein. In a press release, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), responsible for the Su-57, said that the S-71M and the S-71K displayed alongside it “were designed for fifth-generation fighters,” although there is no reason why they couldn’t be launched from a wide variety of platforms.

A Su-57 performing at El Alamein, with one of its main internal weapons bays apparently loaded with Kh-69 standoff missiles:

T-50-9 in El-Alamein, opening both main weapon bays. Two, presumably, Kh-69 can be seen in the front one.

Source: @ T汪汪T pic.twitter.com/f6csKc6Y9D

— George N. (@GeorgeN28581) September 8, 2026

Regardless of launch platform, the nature of the war in Ukraine makes the S-71M particularly useful. Russia has increasingly relied on extemporized glide bombs for attacks against targets relatively close to the front, but those weapons require the launching aircraft to operate within a certain distance of Ukrainian defenses. At least in their earlier iterations, such weapons were also crude and prone to failure. Longer-range cruise missiles offer considerably greater standoff but are more complex and expensive. The S-71M sits somewhere between those categories, providing an air-launched, powered weapon with a relatively large warhead and some degree of low observability without the cost and complexity of a full-size, truly stealthy cruise missile.

The S-71K appears to represent a more capable version of the basic concept. Public information remains limited, but the weapon has been associated with electro-optical guidance and greater onboard processing, potentially giving it a capability to deal with targets in a more flexible manner than the largely pre-programmed S-71M. Exactly how that capability is employed, and how autonomous the weapon actually is, remain less clear from the imagery and information released to date.

As displayed at El Alamein, the S-71K retains the overall faceted, low-observable appearance of the S-71M but has a visibly different airframe and wing arrangement. Its body is notably broad and compact relative to its length, with folding wings that are relatively thick, and a more refined inverted-V tail giving it more the appearance of a small uncrewed aircraft than a conventional air-to-surface missile.

Meanwhile, the Banderol represents a somewhat different path to the same general problem. Ukraine’s intelligence service previously obtained and analyzed an example of the small jet-powered cruise missile, which TWZ reported on last year. The weapon is considerably smaller than Russia’s principal cruise missiles and has been associated with launch from drones and helicopters. Its reported range of around 500 kilometers (311 miles) and relatively small warhead make it something of a complementary system intended to provide another, more economical way of putting a precision weapon onto a target from the air.

In terms of its appearance, the Banderol is more conventionally missile-like, with an ogival central fuselage, a pointed nose, and sharply swept folding wings. Its proportions underline just how small it is compared with Russia’s better-known air-launched cruise missiles.

The Banderol is particularly relevant in the context of the economics of the Ukraine conflict. Russian forces have increasingly used combinations of relatively inexpensive one-way attack drones and more expensive cruise and ballistic missiles. The drones can be produced in large numbers and used to complicate air-defense operations, while the more capable missiles provide greater speed, range, payload, or penetration capability. A small turbojet-powered weapon such as Banderol offers another point on that spectrum.

At least one image has recently emerged showing a Banderol carried by a Russian Mi-28NM Havoc attack helicopter. This would be in line with unconfirmed reports from Ukraine last month that Russia was using the Mi-28 as an additional launch platform for the weapon, including firing them from over the Sea of Azov to attack targets around Odesa.

An S8000 “Banderol” (“Dan-T”) small cruise missile mounted on a Russian Mi-28NM attack helicopter. pic.twitter.com/Xcx3MmFK3B

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) September 6, 2026

Its reported use also illustrates how the distinction between a cruise missile and a large one-way attack drone is becoming increasingly blurred. The Banderol incorporates a conventional missile-like airframe and jet propulsion but has been associated with drone operations and makes extensive use of commercially available components. TWZ’s earlier examination of the weapon also highlighted the extent to which modern Russian weapons programs can combine relatively simple airframes with foreign-sourced electronics and propulsion technology.

Russia has revealed an Orion (Inokhodets) UAV carrying the S8000 Banderol air-launched cruise missile, marking the clearest Russian footage yet of the weapon integrated with the drone. #Russia #Orion #CruiseMissile #Defense pic.twitter.com/yLHb7h1oW9

— Drone Wars (@Drone_Wars_) July 13, 2026

Likely Banderol loitering munition on the ground (perspective exaggerates it's size) and under Orion drone.

Banderol has been reported as one of the munition used in recent strikes and appears to use a jet engine and a FAB-100 warhead or similar. pic.twitter.com/j50DUsNuVe

— krakek (@krakek1) April 27, 2025

Seen together at El Alamein, the three weapons provide an unusually useful snapshot of where Russian air-launched strike development is heading. They are presented alongside a fourth, so-far unidentified munition. This unnamed weapon is notably short and fat, with a cruciform tail, and an optical window in the nose. Its overall size and shape suggest it may have been developed specifically to arm drones.

The appearance of the weapons at an arms fair underscores the fact that Russia is not the only country confronting the problem of producing and fielding sufficient precision weapons at an acceptable cost. The growing interest in lower-cost cruise missiles, loitering munitions, attritable aircraft, and other forms of expendable precision strike is now evident well beyond Russia.

Russia is also clearly trying to make these weapons harder to intercept, an increasingly important consideration as Ukrainian air defenses have demonstrated an ability to shoot down even glide bombs in some circumstances. The S-71K in particular incorporates unusually pronounced low-observable shaping, suggesting that survivability was also a central requirement from the outset.

There is, however, a significant complication to Russia’s attempt to turn its wartime experience into an export opportunity. Buying any kind of weapons from Moscow has become considerably more difficult because of sanctions, restrictions on access to foreign technology and financing, and the wider political risks associated with maintaining a Russian defense relationship. Those factors matter just as much to a prospective customer as the performance of the weapon itself.

Author’s note: earlier reporting on the S-71 family appears to have transposed the S-71K and S-71M versions. Most authoritative accounts now indicate that the more refined, more stealthy version is the S-71K Kovyor (meaning carpet), while the simpler weapon is the S-71M Monokhrom.

Update, September 9:

Rostec, the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate, has provided more details of the weapon identified at El Alamein as the Banderol. Rostec calls this weapon the ‘Dan-T’ loitering munition, which is an export designation for Banderol.

According to Rostec:

The ‘Dan-T’ munition operates on a ‘fire-and-forget’ principle and is adapted for launch from Russian and foreign aircraft and helicopters. The munition is equipped with a compact jet engine and can strike targets at a range of hundreds of kilometers. The ‘Dan-T’ features a special flight mode designed to evade enemy air defence systems.

Rostec adds that the Dan-T has been combat-tested in the war in Ukraine, where it claims there have been “hundreds of successful launches” against enemy targets in the Special Military Operation zone. “We expect this munition to attract widespread interest from foreign customers,” said Rostec.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Russia’s New Stealthy Lower-Cost Air-Launched Standoff Weapons On Display In Egypt appeared first on TWZ.

Ukrainian F-16 pilots are facing such a severe shortage of air-to-air missiles that some daytime sorties have seen them rely solely on the fighters’ internal guns to engage Russian aerial threats, according to a journalist who recently spoke with a senior Ukrainian Air Force commander. Meanwhile, the lack of air-to-air missiles means that the available weapons stocks are now being rationed.

The disclosure provides a remarkable glimpse into the day-to-day reality of Ukraine’s F-16 operations. While the aircraft may be available, the pilots may be ready, and Russian drones and cruise missiles may be approaching, there may simply not be enough missiles on hand to arm the jets.

According to Newsmax journalist Shelby Wilder, the Ukrainian Air Force can find itself monitoring missile shipments as they cross the country’s border, with personnel counting not just the hours but the minutes until those weapons reach the aircraft. The concern is whether the missiles will arrive in time for the next major Russian aerial attack.

The Ukrainian commander, who identified himself by the callsign “Phantom” and as commander of the country’s 107th Wing, confirmed the underlying problem when asked directly whether Ukraine was severely short of missiles for its F-16s.

“Yes, that’s true. Any aircraft without weapons is … useless,” Phantom said.

That blunt assessment is particularly striking given what Ukraine is asking its F-16s to do, and the relentless nature of Russian bombardments against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

The moment when a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet shot down a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile at extremely low altitude pic.twitter.com/7zVujRkYaG

— MilitaryNewsUA (@front_ukrainian) June 1, 2026

The fighters have become an important part of Ukraine’s layered air defense network, hunting Russian drones and cruise missiles while also providing a potential counter to Russian combat aircraft, and conducting air-to-ground sorties. Ukraine has operated the F-16 since the summer of 2024.

“We are focusing on defending our skies against Russian unmanned drones to protect our infrastructure inside the country,” Phantom said. “Our target priority is cruise missiles.”

Destroying as many incoming threats as possible before they reach Ukrainian cities and infrastructure requires missiles, with the F-16 primarily armed with the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the shorter-range AIM-9 Sidewinder.

According to the new disclosure, those missiles have become a commodity whose availability can determine how a sortie is flown.

The F-16 carries an M61A1 Vulcan 20mm rotary cannon, but using the gun against an aerial target is fundamentally different from engaging it with a missile, and comes with its own risks, as we have explored before. This tactic is especially hazardous when going after small targets and especially slow ones, and it becomes even more dangerous at night.

Ukraine has already demonstrated that its F-16s can use their guns in combat. In May 2025, the Ukrainian Air Force said an F-16 pilot had destroyed three aerial targets and was engaging a fourth with the aircraft cannon before an emergency forced him to eject.

One air-to-air weapon not mentioned by Phantom is the laser-guided 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) rocket, now apparently also part of the arsenal. These rockets would offer the Ukrainian Air Force an extremely valuable, lower-cost option for engaging drones and subsonic cruise missiles. 

Regardless, Phantom specifically called for additional air-to-air missiles, as well as interceptors for ground-based Patriot batteries.

“We require more means of protection, such as Patriot missiles and air-to-air missiles, AIM-9s or AIM-120s to our fleet,” he said.

Phantom’s message is that simply delivering more aircraft is not enough. Ukraine needs a sustainable weapons pipeline to keep those aircraft combat-effective.

Ukrainian Air Force F-16AM Fighting Falcon departing Belgium after receiving depot-level maintenance earlier this year. pic.twitter.com/Hy35iUZd8P

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) August 28, 2026

This is increasingly becoming a wider problem across Ukraine’s air defense network. Patriot interceptors have been heavily consumed, with relatively few replacement missiles now trickling in, leaving Ukraine with limited ability to defend against ballistic missiles in particular. The strain is now spilling into the lower tiers, including the air-to-air missiles carried by F-16s. Ukraine’s continued consumption of interceptors is a major driver, but it is competing with the enormous demand generated by ongoing wars in the Middle East and a broader surge in demand for advanced air defense weapons around the world. With production struggling to keep pace, scarce interceptors are effectively being rationed across an increasingly crowded global battlefield.

“At least we need to try to increase the production, or at least to allow Ukraine to localize the production in Ukraine or other European countries,” he said.

That proposal reflects the fundamental vulnerability of a relatively small fleet operating in a high-intensity air war. Every missile fired at a Russian cruise missile or drone is one less available for the next engagement. A finite inventory therefore has to cover both routine air-defense missions and the possibility of much larger Russian attacks. At the same time, both the AIM-9 and especially the AIM-120 are used for Ukrainian ground-based air defenses too. The AMRAAM, in particular, is the effector for the NASAMS, which protects Kyiv, and other key objectives against cruise missiles and drones.

The problem becomes even more acute because Ukraine cannot know precisely when the next major Russian strike will arrive.

That is why, according to Wilder’s account, the arrival of missile shipments is being followed with extraordinary urgency.

At the same time, Phantom welcomed the major technological leap that the F-16 represents over the Soviet-designed MiG-29s and Su-27s that formed the backbone of Ukraine’s fighter force.

“The F-16s in comparison with the legacy aircraft like MiG-29 or Su-27? This is kind of like a new technology,” Phantom said.

But sophisticated aircraft are only as useful as the weapons available to them.

Ukrainian F-16s have reportedly destroyed huge numbers of Russian drones and cruise missiles, and in July a Ukrainian F-16 was publicly identified by the U.S. Joint Chiefs chairman as having shot down a Russian fighter.

CONFIRMED!
On July 8, 2026, a Russian Su-35 multi-role fighter was shot down on the eastern sector!

Glory to Ukraine!
Together to victory! pic.twitter.com/r8S9fgQaC5

— Ukrainian Air Force (@KpsZSU) July 8, 2026

Phantom also asked Ukraine’s Western partners to think beyond individual weapons transfers and toward production capacity.

He also urged the United States and European countries to do more to prevent Russia from acquiring components used in its own missile production through third party countries.

“We need to make as much as we can to stop providing the parts, most technological parts to Russians, bypassing the direct sales, of course, through the third party,” he said.

Phantom argued that Russia continues to obtain sophisticated components through intermediaries and even ostensibly civilian products.

“It would not be a surprise that Russians [are] using the washing machine that they’re buying from the third party to use those smart details for building missiles,” he said.

His recommendation is tighter sanctions and enforcement designed to cut off Russia’s access to those components.

“Important is to sanction to stop Russia from being able to have access to those parts,” he said.

That, combined with missile shortages, could become an even bigger problem when Russia conducts another major aerial campaign against Ukraine, particularly as Moscow traditionally intensifies attacks against the country’s energy infrastructure during the winter months.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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