The U.S. Air Force is exploring options for adding air-to-air combat capabilities to its bombers as part of efforts adjacent to its latest fighter force structure plans. The service has raised the possibility of the B-21 Raider, specifically, taking on an air-to-air role, and potentially doing so in cooperation with Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones, in the past. As TWZ has explored for years, the B-21’s inherent attributes – size, extreme range, high operating ceiling, broadband low-observability (stealthiness), and advanced sensors – could actually make it especially well suited to taking part in air-to-air combat missions. The Air Force’s other bombers could also be part of these future plans.

Aviation Week was first to report on the potential for bombers to help bolster the Air Force’s air-to-air combat capacity after obtaining a copy of a new long-term fighter force structure report submitted to Congress last week. Media coverage of this report first began to appear earlier this week following a roundtable on Tuesday with Lt. Gen. David Tabor, the service’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs. The full report, which is unclassified, was not disseminated to reporters at that time.

The Air Force’s central goal now is having 1,509 combat-coded fighters in inventory by 2035, which is hundreds more than it has in service today. This will come from the acquisition of new F-35As, F-15EXs, and F-47s. There are already questions about how realistic this plan might be, and the service has acknowledged several hurdles it will need to overcome. You can read more about this in our initial reporting here.

“Accordingly, the USAF is also evaluating additional recapitalization options, including a new capacity fighter, increased reliance on CCAs [Collaborative Combat Aircraft], and developing air-to-air capabilities on bombers,” the latest fighter force structure report says, per Aviation Week.

“A new capacity fighter” may refer to the possible acquisition of new-production F-16 Vipers, which Lt. Gen. Tabor said at the roundtable could be an option in the future, according to an earlier story from Air & Space Forces Magazine. He also said making any such decision was not an “urgent” priority. This is just one possibility here. The Air Force has floated ideas for other new fighter concepts beyond the F-47 in recent years. Lockheed Martin has talked about the potential for expanding on the F-35 design.

At the roundtable on Tuesday, Tabor also made clear that the introduction of CCAs would influence future fighter force structure plans, but the expected scale and scope of those impacts remain unclear. He does not appear to have addressed the role bombers could play in this equation at that time. The new fighter report itself does not elaborate further on the potential use of bombers, based on Aviation Week’s story. TWZ is seeking more information.

When it comes to the possibility of Air Force bombers, and the B-21 more specifically, taking on an air-to-air role, this is not the first time the possibility has been raised, as mentioned earlier.

“As the NGAD [Next Generation Air Dominance] review goes forward, like, is it possible that what that ends up with could be the B-21 taking a larger role?” reporter Stephen Losey, working at the time for Defense News, asked then-Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin at the Military Reporters & Editors (MRE) Conference in 2024.

“We have not taken that off the table,” the Air Force’s top officer said in response to Losey’s question, but did not elaborate.

At that time, the Air Force’s NGAD program was undergoing a deep review, and the future of the sixth-generation fighter component of the effort had come into question. The decision was ultimately made to continue pursuing plans for what has now become the F-47.

For years now, TWZ has been highlighting how the B-21 could serve in multiple roles beyond just that of a traditional bomber, including in an air-to-air capacity. Air Force officials have themselves described the Raider as having multi-mission capabilities, which could extend into the realm of air-to-air combat.

“If we were to characterize it [NGAD] as a fighter, we would be… thinking too narrowly about what kind of airplane we need in a highly contested environment,” then-Air Force Maj. Gen. Scott Pleus told what was then just Air Force Magazine back in 2019. This could be “a B-21 that also has air-to-air capabilities” and can “work with the family of systems to defend itself, utilizing stealth – maybe that’s where the sixth-generation airplane comes from.”

Pleus’ comments had tied in with adjacent discussions at the time and thereafter about how the B-21 might operate together with future CCA drones. Pleus, who was subsequently promoted to lieutenant general and whose lasting posting was as Director of Staff at the Air Force’s top headquarters at the Pentagon, retired in August of this year.

It remains unclear how the Air Force might be considering employing the B-21, or any of its other existing bombers, in air-to-air combat. This could entail loading out bombers for direct air-to-air engagements, or the integration of new capabilities to help them find targets or to otherwise enable new supporting roles, or a mix of all of the above. The process of achieving air superiority is not limited to neutralizing aerial threats, either.

As TWZ has written in the past in the context of an air-to-air role for the Raider in particular:

“The Raider has the potential to serve as a launch platform for air-to-air missiles, especially outsized very long-range types. Its payload capacity would give it the ability to carry a large volume of smaller air-to-air missiles, as well. B-21s could also employ air-to-ground munitions in support of the suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses mission (SEAD/DEAD), which is also part of the air superiority equation.”

“Maybe most significantly, the B-21s could also act as airborne nerve centers in support of counter-air missions, especially for controlling drones like the Air Force’s planned fleets of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), and have the ability to do so even in the most heavily contested of airspaces. Uncrewed aircraft, in turn, could feed targeting data back to Raiders with air-to-air loadouts. B-21s might even be able to launch some of those drones themselves.”

Deeply networked ‘kill webs’ that bring together distributed arrays of sensors and other supporting elements across vast distances and multiple domains, coupled with very-long-range air-to-air missiles, open up new operational possibilities more generally. This applies to Air Force bombers beyond the B-21.

When it comes to longer-range air-to-air missiles, the Navy has notably already fielded the AIM-174B air-launched version of the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6). The service more recently disclosed another such missile in flight testing now, the AIM-424 Malice.

The Air Force has pursued similar missile developments in the past and put out a call for a new anti-air missile with a maximum range of at least 1,000 nautical miles just in June. The service has been exploring multi-stage types with modular designs that could be configured for longer- and shorter-range engagements, as well. These are all just programs we know about, and do not speak to the developments the Air Force and others could have underway in the classified realm.

There is also the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) LongShot program, which the Air Force, as well as the U.S. Army and Navy, have been involved with over the years. The aim of that effort is to demonstrate the concept of an air-to-air missile-carrying drone to help extend the reach and reduce the vulnerability of tactical fighters and bombers.

On top of all this, tactical fighters are generally ill-suited to, and in some cases outright incapable of, carrying the kinds of outsized payloads being discussed here. This underscores the potential value of incorporating bombers into this equation as a means to engage targets at extreme ranges.

Even in a closer proximity support role of fighter aircraft, B-21s, as well as B-52s, could contribute to air-to-air fight as arsenal ships for longer-range weapons, firing on demand from the rear in coordination with crewed and uncrewed platforms operating at the tip of the tactical edge. B-21s could also use their penetrating capabilities to command drones of their own that provide penetrating fighter-like capabilities.

New air-to-air capabilities on Air Force bombers could include self-protection systems, too. Years ago now, the B-21’s prime contractor, Northrop Grumman, patented an anti-missile defense system for stealthy aircraft designed to fire hard-kill interceptors. The Air Force, as well as the Navy, have openly expressed interest in similar defensive capabilities for aerial refueling tankers and other larger planes. Just being able to provide localized close-in defensive ‘bubbles’ around individual bombers could impact the calculus when it comes to future air-to-air combat requirements.

To reiterate, these are all concepts we have discussed in depth for roughly a decade.

Speaking more broadly about Air Force future fighter force structure demands, as we wrote previously:

“In recent years, sustainment costs, broadly, have only become an increasingly serious concern for the Air Force, as well as the other branches of the U.S. military, especially when it comes to complex manned platforms, such as the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Fleet size and the readiness of those fleets are also highly pressing issues. So, at least in the near term, it’s not surprising that NGAD may end up focusing more on exploring available lower-cost options with distributed capabilities as alternatives to traditional air combat assets with highly centralized capabilities, such as manned fighter jets packed with ‘exquisite’ technologies.”

Despite the decision in the end to proceed with the more exquisite F-47, these points have only become more pronounced as time has gone on. How many F-47s the Air Force ultimately intends to buy is another question that looks to remain unanswered by the latest fighter force structure report. At the same time, there are clear signs that the Air Force is planning to significantly increase its planned B-21 fleet size. The official acquisition target has long been at least 100 Raiders, but the Air Force and Northrop Grumman have said a new topline figure is expected to come in the Fiscal Year 2028 budget proposal next year. The service is now explicitly aiming to have at least 500 CCA drones in service by 2032, too. All of this will compete for funding and other resources, at least to a degree.

In the meantime, there has been a “persistent decline in AA [aircraft availability] rates across the USAF tactical fighter fleet,” which “is the direct mathematical consequence of operating an inventory with an average age exceeding 31 years,” the Air Force’s latest fighter force structure report says, according to Aviation Week. “As legacy platforms – such as the F-16C/D, F-15E, and A-10C – operate well beyond their original engineering service lives, they experience compounding structural fatigue, widespread corrosion, and subsystem degradation.”

“Achieving the mandated AA rates required for a peer-conflict scenario necessitates aggressive divestment of the oldest airframes to fund the procurement of highly available, modernized platforms like the F-35A and F-15EX,” the report adds, per that outlet. Furthermore, “to counter the [Chinese] industrial capacity and numerical advantage in fielding fighters like the J-20 and J-16, the USAF must embrace a hybrid force of manned and unmanned systems.”

With all this in mind, active consideration of new air-to-air roles for bombers, as well as the possibility of “increased reliance on CCAs” and the potential to acquire new current-generation F-16s, at least seems to reflect a hedge strategy on the part of the Air Force.

If nothing else, the door clearly remains open to bombers being a key part of the Air Force’s ‘fighter’ vision in the future.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

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New satellite imagery shows four of China’s new KJ-3000 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft at the Xi’an Aircraft Company (XAC) facility at Xi’an-Yanliang, raising the possibility that the large radar planes are moving toward or have entered serial production.

Satellite imagery captured on October 5 and provided by Vantor shows three KJ-3000s near the XAC factory in the western part of the facility, with a fourth at the nearby China Flight Test Establishment (CFTE). J. Michael Dahm, a senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, assesses that the presence of four aircraft points to the type having entered serial production.

Andreas Rupprecht, an analyst of Chinese military aviation and TWZ contributor, offered a more cautious assessment, noting that the imagery could indicate that series production or low-rate initial production (LRIP) has begun. However, he also pointed out that all four previously identified prototypes could simply have been at the facility at the same time. Specifically, he identified the aircraft seen at the CFTE portion of the airfield as being a prototype.

Whatever the explanation, the imagery offers a fresh look at a program set to significantly expand China’s already substantial airborne surveillance and battle-management capabilities.

The KJ-3000, also referred to as the KJ-20, is based on the four-engine Y-20 transport aircraft, specifically the improved Y-20B variant powered by Chinese-made engines. The aircraft features a large circular radome mounted above the rear fuselage, along with a prominent series of antennas on the forward fuselage. An aerial refueling probe is mounted above the cockpit, while a conspicuous intake at the base of the tailfin is likely intended to provide cooling air for its extensive onboard electronics.

The first low-quality photographs of the aircraft began circulating in December 2024. More detailed imagery emerged in May 2025, showing an example at an undisclosed Chinese airfield. That aircraft, bearing the serial number 7821 and assessed to be the first example, was still wearing primer, in contrast to the examples now seen at the XAC factory.

The KJ-3000 is expected to address longstanding limitations in China’s existing large jet-powered AEW&C fleet. To date, only four KJ-2000 Mainring aircraft have been completed. Based on the Russian-built Ilyushin Il-76MD transport, the KJ-2000 program was constrained by the limited availability of suitable airframes, and now faces the twin issues of reliance on Russian supply chains and aging aircraft.

A domestically produced Y-20-based platform provides a more sustainable basis for a much larger AEW&C fleet, with greater scope for upgrades and potentially export opportunities.

The larger airframe should also provide advantages over China’s numerous turboprop-powered AEW&C aircraft, including greater speed, range, and endurance. Its higher operating altitude would give its radar a better vantage point for detecting and tracking targets, particularly low-flying aircraft and missiles that may be masked from ground-based sensors by terrain or the radar horizon.

The aerial refueling probe could further extend the aircraft’s range and time on station, although the precise operational capabilities of the KJ-3000 remain unclear.

The exact configuration of the KJ-3000’s primary radar has yet to be established. China’s existing KJ-2000 and smaller KJ-500 use fixed radomes containing three active electronically scanned array (AESA) antennas to provide 360-degree coverage, rather than the rotating radomes found on aircraft such as the U.S. E-3 Sentry and Russia’s A-50 Mainstay. Whether the new aircraft follows the same approach remains to be seen.

As well as its large AESA radar, the new aircraft is likely to carry additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, while its communications equipment could make it an important networking node for Chinese forces operating across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific. Such capabilities would be particularly valuable for coordinating combat aircraft, including uncrewed ones, sharing targeting information, and extending the reach of China’s integrated air defense and broader military networks.

The KJ-3000 is also part of a broader expansion and diversification of China’s AEW&C fleet. Alongside the new jet-powered aircraft, the People’s Liberation Army continues to field and develop smaller platforms based on the four-turboprop Y-9 transport family.

These include the KJ-500, which has been produced and delivered at a rapid pace, as well as the newer KJ-700, believed to combine radar with electro-optical and infrared sensors for a broader range of surveillance missions. The precise capabilities of the KJ-700 remain uncertain, but you can read about the platform in more detail here.

The smaller turboprop aircraft offer advantages of their own. They are better suited to operating from dispersed and relatively austere airfields, and they regularly appear at Chinese island outposts and in the strategically important Taiwan Strait. Together, the different types give Chinese forces a range of options for surveillance and command and control, from persistent coverage close to home to operations farther afield.

The U.S. Department of Defense has repeatedly highlighted the growing importance of China’s AEW&C fleet.

In its latest annual report on Chinese military developments, the Pentagon specifically pointed to the KJ-3000:

“The PLA conducted an initial flight with the KJ-3000 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, which will serve as a surveillance aircraft to monitor aircraft, ships, and other vehicles. The KJ-3000 will probably be the world’s first model to use digital radar and will be capable of anti-jamming, passive detection, and target identification.”

Airborne radar and command-and-control aircraft are also important force multipliers for increasingly capable Chinese combat jets, including the stealthy J-20 and aircraft armed with long-range air-to-air missiles. Radar planes like these can serve as critical networking nodes for data sharing and, in some cases, allow Chinese fighters to prosecute targets without turning on their own radar.

In 2022, then-Pacific Air Forces commander Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach praised the command and control associated with J-20 operations, noting that some of China’s long-range air-to-air missiles benefit from support provided by the KJ-500.

For China, a larger and more capable AEW&C fleet would support both the defense of its airspace and efforts to project military power across the Indo-Pacific. These aircraft could help coordinate operations around Taiwan and the South China Sea, improve situational awareness over maritime approaches, and support combat operations at greater distances from the mainland.

The same Pentagon report from 2025 further noted:

“China’s integration of support aircraft, such as the KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft, provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations, as demonstrated during surge operations near Taiwan.”

A domestically developed, jet-powered platform such as the KJ-3000 would be a logical centerpiece of that effort, particularly since it can be produced in substantially greater numbers than the KJ-2000.

The prospect of China expanding its fleet of large, jet-powered AEW&C aircraft stands in contrast to the U.S. Air Force’s troubled effort to replace its aging E-3 Sentry. The U.S. E-7 Wedgetail program has encountered major hurdles, raising concerns about a potential gap in airborne battle management as China continues to field new capabilities.

The October 5 imagery does not confirm that serial production has begun. Further imagery showing additional airframes, activity around production facilities, or aircraft in new operational markings may provide a clearer indication of the program’s progress.

Regardless, the KJ-3000 appears poised to become an important addition to China’s expanding airborne surveillance and command-and-control architecture.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Four KJ-3000 Radar Jets At Chinese Factory Point To Serial Production appeared first on TWZ.

Zone 5 Technologies has shared with TWZ the first photos of its latest Block 40 Rusty Dagger low-cost cruise missile in a surface-launched configuration. The images offer a new look at a weapon developed first with air-launched applications in mind, and for export to Ukraine. It is now being adapted for use from land and sea, including by U.S. and other allied forces.

Zone 5 has not disclosed where or when the pictures were taken, or which programs, specifically, the ground-based launches were conducted under. The images do not offer a clear view of the trailer-mounted launcher, either. A spokesperson for the company did stress to TWZ that versions of Rusty Dagger have now been selected for separate U.S. Army and Navy programs, in addition to its initial development through the U.S. Air Force.

In May, Zone 5, as well as Anduril, CoAspire, and Leidos, received framework agreements from the Pentagon under the Low-Cost Containerized Missile (LCCM) program. The U.S. Army’s Portfolio Acquisition Executive Fires (PAE Fires) is running LCCM in cooperation with the Office of the Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering (OUSW R&E). The aim of this program is to procure more than 10,000 low-cost cruise missiles, in total, over three years, beginning in 2027.

Then there is also the Consolidated Affordable Ordnance System (CHAOS) effort from the U.S. Navy’s Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Munitions (PAE Munitions). CHAOS is focused on low-cost anti-ship cruise missiles, particularly for U.S. allies and partners. CoAspire is also on contract for CHAOS with a version of its Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile-Extended Range (RAACM-ER) design.

“We designed a surface-launch Rusty Dagger to be the foundation of U.S. and allied mass-produced affordable precision deep strike weapons,” Tom Kanewske, chief strategy officer at Zone 5, told TWZ in a statement.

“Our team went from design to demonstration in less than three months, bringing Rusty Dagger from pylons and pallets to ground launcher and shipping containers,” added Kyle Maxhimer, Zone 5’s president.

Zone 5 says the Block 40 version of Rusty Dagger can accommodate warheads in the 100-to-250-pound classes. It can still be configured for air-launch, either from pylons under the wings of aircraft or via palletized munitions systems. In order to be fired from launchers on the ground or at sea, the new version of the missile is fitted with a solid-fuel booster rocket at the tail end.

More specific details about the Block 40’s capabilities compared to the preceding air-launch-only version, also referred to as the Block 20, remain limited. From what we can see now, the two variations appear outwardly similar in many respects, at least broadly speaking. Earlier variations had a distinctive tail configuration with four squared-off fins, two facing upward and two more angled to either side. The shaping of the fins on the Block 40 does look to be more rounded. It’s also possible the missile may have a new cruciform tail fin arrangement, but this could also be a trick of the angle from which the missile is being viewed, coupled with the low resolution of the available images.

Previous reports have said that Rusty Dagger has a range of 300 nautical miles when delivered at low altitude, which is increased to 500 nautical miles when launched by aircraft at medium altitudes and flying at higher speeds. In general, surface-launched versions of missiles typically have shorter maximum ranges compared to their air-launched counterparts.

Zone 5 Rusty Dagger. #AffordableMass pic.twitter.com/Pzj1KnceHC

— Air-Power | NatSec Ledger (@NatSecLedger) June 7, 2025

Regardless, the Block 40 version is an important further evolution of the Rusty Dagger design. The initial air-launched version of the missile, now designated the AGM-188A, has already been in development for several years, in part now under the U.S. Air Force’s Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) program. This has included live-fire tests conducted at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida in January 2025. We now know that Rusty Dagger has been cleared for use on four different types of fighters, including the F-16. Development of CoAspire’s Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile (RAACM) was also conducted as part of the ERAM effort.

Like the Navy’s CHAOS effort, ERAM has been focused primarily on supporting allies and partners, starting first with Ukraine. A Zone 5 spokesperson told TWZ that, as things stand, Rusty Dagger remains the only publicly reported operational missile in its class fielded by the Ukrainian military.

It appears that the AGM-188A “Rusty Dagger” cruise missile has undergone field testing in Ukraine.

Russian sources are publishing photos of an unknown 8-element CRPA antenna. On the back side of the unit there is a circuit board with a large heatsink, which carries the CAGE code… pic.twitter.com/phZeOJfHJ0

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) June 7, 2026

ERAM has also been feeding into the Air Force’s own Family of Affordable Mass Missiles (FAMM) plans. The service wants to acquire 28,000 FAMM munitions in pylon-launched and palletized configurations over the next five years.

As we reported earlier this year, Rusty Dagger is now part of a broader portfolio under Norwegian defense company Kongsberg, which acquired a 90 percent stake in Zone 5. Kongsberg has positioned the missile alongside its stealthy Joint Strike Missile (JSM), with the two weapons serving different, complementary roles.

KONGSBERG announced today that it has closed the acquisition of US missile company Zone 5 Technologies LLC, following approval by US regulatory authorities.

https://t.co/meRxfmYHH6 pic.twitter.com/EXVbYhDers

— KONGSBERG (@kongsbergasa) June 10, 2026

Rusty Dagger is designed around affordability and volume, while JSM offers a sophisticated, low-observable strike capability. The concept gives customers a mix of weapons suited to different targets and mission requirements, rather than relying exclusively on expensive, high-end missiles.

Zone 5 says it is now expanding manufacturing in the United States. Production is established in San Luis Obispo, California, with production beginning in the Dallas-Fort Worth area of Texas. A franchised facility is also being developed in Miamisburg, Ohio, with Hawthorn Aero, a company that describes itself as specializing “in high-rate airframe manufacturing, offering scalable solutions from design to full vehicle integration for aerospace industries.”

The company says each site is designed to reach a capacity of more than 2,500 missiles annually by the end of 2027. If all three reach that level, combined annual capacity would exceed 7,500 missiles.

The expansion reflects the growing emphasis on affordable weapons that can be manufactured in large quantities and replenished quickly, something that is considered especially critical if the United States is to face China in a future high-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific region.

The ground-launched Rusty Dagger shown in the photos underscores how far the missile family is moving beyond its original air-launched role. With production expanding and multiple U.S. military programs in the picture, the surface-launched variant adds another potential route to getting the weapon into service.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Ground-Launched Rusty Dagger Low-Cost Cruise Missile Seen For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

Northern Germany probably isn’t the first place you’d think of to look for a U.S. Navy and Marine Corps classic attack jet. However, contract aggressor company Top Aces flies a squadron of deeply upgraded Douglas A-4N Skyhawks to support European air arms for their “red air” training needs.

Nearly 3,000 A-4s were built between 1956 and 1979, and TWZ’s Jamie Hunter traveled to the Germany Navy base at Nordholz for the latest episode of our “Special Access” to witness some of the last, and by far the most modern, Skyhawks operating up close.

There he learned what it was like operating the iconic but nearly antique jets against some of the world’s most capable fighters. He also discovered that significant developments are on the horizon for Top Aces in Europe, principally the arrival of F-16s that will further enhance the company’s aggressor services for its growing list of European customers.

Enjoy the show!

The post A-4 ‘Super’ Skyhawks Playing The Bad Guys In European Skies appeared first on TWZ.

Iran is rebuilding Eagle 44, a hardened underground airbase carved into the side of a mountain that can shelter fighter aircraft, drones, and potentially cruise and ballistic missiles, despite the remote facility absorbing at least three rounds of airstrikes this year. High-resolution satellite imagery captured by Planet Labs in late September and reviewed by TWZ shows a new section of taxiway completed, several support buildings still destroyed or damaged, wrecked equipment cleared off the pavement, and obstacles that were placed to obstruct the runway now removed. Construction is ongoing at a time when the Pentagon and Trump administration maintain there is little remaining of the Iranian air force for such a facility to protect.

Eagle 44, also called ‘Oghab 44’ after the 44th anniversary of the 1979 revolution, was unveiled by Iranian state media in February 2023 when senior officials visited what was described as the country’s newest underground airbase. Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) F-4D/E Phantom IIs, armed with AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missiles, laser and electro-optically guided bombs, unguided ‘dumb’ bombs, as well as domestically produced anti-ship missiles, were shown using the facility in the footage. The IRIAF had roughly 60 examples in service at the time, its most numerous combat jet by some margin, though how many remain today, and are actually operational, is unknown. In addition to the Phantoms, one-way attack drones were also seen in the background.

The IRIAF, rather than the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force, operates the base, which is located in Hormozgan province and sits in the foothills of the Zagros Mountains, approximately 100 miles northwest of the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian state media described it as “one of the army’s most important air force bases, with fighters equipped with long-range cruise missiles and built in the depths of the Earth.” Then-Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri, who was present at the unveiling, warned that “any attack on Iran from our enemies, including Israel, will see a response from our many air force bases including Eagle 44.” He was eliminated in the opening strikes of the Twelve-Day War, which Israel dubbed Operation Rising Lion, in June 2025.

Work on the cavernous underground tunnel complex began in 2013. Construction of a 2.7-mile main runway, situated on the northern side of the base on a valley floor below the mountain range, started roughly eight years later. Two taxiways run through a smaller ridge connecting the runway to four entrances to the primary tunnel complex, where the jets and weapons are stored, although only one taxiway is currently operational.

The promotional video released in 2023 revealed at least one internal blast door, as well as branches from the main tunnel to revetment areas to park fighters and drones. A support compound of several buildings is on the west side of the base, next to the unfinished taxiway. The purpose of each structure is unclear, but a functioning airbase requires maintenance and repair facilities, crew quarters, reserves of fuel and munitions, security and force protection assets, and infrastructure to coordinate air traffic control and command and control functions.

The United States kicked off Operation Epic Fury alongside Israel on February 28, launching a massive wave of strikes against Iran from the west and south. Eagle 44 is located within striking distance of the munitions carried by air wings embarked on U.S. Navy aircraft carriers operating in the northern Arabian Sea and missiles fired by the guided-missile destroyers that escort them, as well as Air Force tactical and strategic aircraft and Army assets in the region. However, low-resolution images reviewed by TWZ through March 16 indicated that while the base was targeted, little damage was visible.

As the U.S. and Israel continued the relentless air campaign over the next several weeks, the base was targeted again at the end of March, with greater effect, according to a report from The New York Times. High-resolution images the paper reviewed revealed impact craters on the taxiways near the tunnel entrances, one building leveled, and small mounds placed along the runway, presumably to prevent enemy aircraft from landing. Battle damage assessments suggested the strikes were intended to cut the underground caverns off from the runway, trapping whatever was inside and preventing takeoff. The report did not state whether U.S. or Israeli aircraft carried out the attack, and Israeli officials declined to comment. However, the U.S. was primarily responsible for pressuring Iran’s southern flank, while the Israelis attacked the western front.

After the fragile April ceasefire collapsed and the U.S. imposed a second blockade, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), based out of MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, and responsible for executing day-to-day operations of the war, launched multiple strikes across Iran on July 15, and Eagle 44 was hit for at least a third time. An analysis published by Soar Atlas, a satellite imagery provider, identified four aimpoints on July 16, with cratered taxiways and damage to additional infrastructure. According to that analysis, the structures targeted were related to the base’s construction unit, but TWZ has not independently verified this claim. The Pentagon and CENTCOM have not specifically named Eagle 44 in any press briefing or release, and Iran has not acknowledged the base was struck.

The Planet Labs satellite imagery from September 29, obtained exclusively by TWZ, indicates that Iran began reconstruction after the July attacks and that the effort is ongoing.

The main runway, previously blocked by obstacles meant to deter and prevent unauthorized aircraft from landing, is now clear. On the western taxiway (marked in red below), a new section leading into the ridge ‘pass-through’ is complete, with its finished upper cement-concrete layer visible. On the other side of the pass, construction of the next segment is underway, with a subgrade layer of stabilized, compacted dirt laid down but not yet paved (orange). Farther south, in front of the western tunnel entrances, impact craters (blue) are still visible. When finished, the second taxiway will provide a direct link between the western hangars and the runway, allowing additional aircraft to move freely without sharing a single taxiway, a major bottleneck for higher operational tempos and more complex sortie launches and recoveries. A second functional taxiway and tunnel would also provide critical redundancy if the other is hit.

On the primary eastern taxiway, two dark streaks (green) that appeared following the strikes in July run off the edge of the pavement, likely debris left by equipment that was struck and removed. Notably, the streak marks match the width of the wreckage, suggesting it was bulldozed or pushed off the taxiway to reopen it. There is no sign of the equipment being recovered, only that it was cleared out of the way.

In the main support compound (yellow) next to the western taxiway, two buildings are clearly destroyed and a third is damaged. They have not been rebuilt yet, which is consistent with previous reporting from The Times and Soar Atlas that the attacks degraded construction capabilities, and suggests the regime may be focused on completing and repairing the taxiways rather than the installations.

The four entrances to the main tunnel complex (white), arranged in two pairs less than half a mile apart at the end of each taxiway on the southern part of the base, appear to be intact, although the angle makes it unclear whether they are open or sealed. What’s inside the mountain, and how many fighters remain in Iran’s inventory, is unknown. Regardless of the status of the fighter fleet, as we noted earlier, the base can also store drones and could be packed with cruise or ballistic missiles.

The U.S. and Israel have a range of bunker buster bombs that could be used in an attempt to collapse the tunnel entrances, a major choke point for any underground weapons storage site. While not destroying what is being held within, doing so would block anything inside from leaving — and being used — for a period of time. Additionally, the pass-through tunnels make for easy targets, and hitting them would keep fixed-wing aircraft from reaching the runway. No impact points on the mountain itself or damage to the portals inside is apparent, but they could have been sealed and hit farther in, which may not be highly visible via satellite imagery. Reaching the main storage caverns themselves would likely be far harder. Larger bunker busters in the U.S. inventory include the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) guided munition, which could be capable of reaching deeper into the main site, but these are very limited in number and can only be delivered by the Air Force’s B-2A Spirit stealth bombers. It’s highly unlikely the U.S. would expend such resources on a site like this over many others of higher strategic importance.

Eagle 44 is not the only base that Iran is fixing during the lull in hostilities. By the end of May, Iran had cleared 50 of 69 tunnel entrances struck at 18 underground facilities, including some “missile cities,” according to a report by CNN − and that number is likely higher now. Planet Labs, Airbus, and Vantor imagery reviewed by The Wall Street Journal in July showed rebuilt entrances near Kangavar, fresh excavation at Dezful, and repairs near Kermanshah. “They have very impressive industrialization and reconstruction capabilities,” Israeli Brig. Gen. Ran Kochav told the paper. “They refilled their stockpiles,” he added.

A Western official told Bloomberg earlier this month that Iran “remains well-stocked with ballistic missiles and some anti-ship missiles, and can quickly add more,” and a U.S. official posited in May that “the Iranians have exceeded all timelines the IC [Intelligence Community] had for reconstitution.” Both assessments are at odds with what the White House and Pentagon have repeatedly claimed. Secretary Pete Hegseth stated in April that Iran’s air force was “wiped out” and its missile program was “functionally destroyed; launchers, production facilities, and existing stockpiles depleted and decimated,” while acknowledging a week later that the regime was “digging out” launchers, missiles, and bombed facilities but had “no ability to replenish offensive or defensive capabilities.” In May, CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper told Congress, “Before Operation Epic Fury, the Iranian Air Force flew between 30 and 100 sorties each day; today that number is zero.” More recently, at a campaign rally in Kansas on Monday, U.S. President Donald Trump said, “They have no air force… their 229 beautiful fighter jets are now scattered all over the runways, the beautiful runways of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

At the very least, strikes on Eagle 44 cratered the taxiways and degraded support infrastructure, which likely put at least some of whatever airpower is stored there, if any, out of action. But even after enduring months of war and extreme economic pressure due to the ongoing U.S. blockade and sanctions, as well as dealing with damage across the country, Tehran continues to prioritize construction on the remote base. That fact alone could put it back on the target list if the U.S. and Israel launch another operation. But above all else, it points to how important this facility is to the regime, for whatever reason.

Contact the author: ian@twz.com or @ianellisjones

The post Construction Of Iran’s “Eagle 44” Underground Airbase Hasn’t Stopped Despite War appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Army wants to infuse new autonomous capabilities into its current and future fleets of amphibious landing ships and other watercraft. The service is also aiming to acquire up to 100 new purpose-built uncrewed surface vessels (USV). The maritime assets the service has now, often referred to as ‘the Army’s Navy,’ are obscure and generally underappreciated. However, the small force offers an important additional set of naval logistics capabilities, especially for any future fight in the Pacific, which could be further bolstered with optionally-crewed or entirely uncrewed platforms.

Army Maj. Gen. Frederick Crist, head of 8th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), issued plans for future autonomous watercraft capabilities during a talk last week during a talk at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual symposium. 8th TSC, which has its main headquarters at Fort Shafter in Hawaii, is one of the top formations tasked with managing U.S. military logistics across the Pacific.

“In order to be able to increase theater distribution, we have the two composite watercraft companies, at end state there, west of the IDL [International Date Line],” Crist explained, referring to the Army’s future planned maritime force posture in the Pacific. “We continue partnering with industry to be able to move into autonomous watercraft systems to be able to conduct other means of maritime distribution.”

To take a step back quickly, as part of its broader regional role, 8th TSC also has forward-deployed elements in Japan. This includes the 5th Transportation Company, which is currently organized as what the Army calls a composite watercraft company. As of 2024, the unit had a pair of General Frank S. Besson class Logistics Support Vessels (LSV), as well as 10 smaller Landing Craft Utility (LCU) type vessels and four small tugs, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

The Army has eight LSVs, in total, and these are by far its largest and most capable ships. The two youngest LSVs, which were acquired in the mid-2000s, also form a distinct subclass, and their design is optimized for long-distance open-ocean operations, as you can read more about here. It’s not immediately clear which LSVs are currently assigned to the 5th Transportation Company. The unit is also set to receive new Maneuver Support Vessel (Light) landing craft.

Until very recently, the 10th Support Group (Regional), headquartered in Okinawa, was more directly responsible for overseeing forward-deployed Army logistics units in Japan. Earlier this month, the Army performed a so-called ‘reflagging’ of that formation, a largely administrative process that transformed it into the 45th Sustainment Brigade.

As part of the reflagging of the 10th Support Group into the 45th Sustainment Brigade, the Army has also been pushing ahead with plans for “the standup of a second composite watercraft company in Yokohama North Dock,” in the port city of the same name on the Japanese home island of Honshu, Maj. Gen. Crist explained last week. “That end state will have two composite water[craft] companies west of the IDL [International Date Line] under the command and control of the 45th Sustainment Brigade.”

When it comes to the watercraft assigned to these units, “we’re also moving into the autonomous lane,” Crist added. “Just in August, USARPAC [U.S. Army Pacific] had an opportunity to conduct an experiment by retrofitting an existing commercial vessel, the HOS Resolute [sic; HOS Resolution], with a kit to provide autonomous navigation.”

Maritime autonomy firm Sea Machines was able to integrate its SM300 software package on the HOS Resolution in just nine days for this demonstration. The ship is a 257-foot-long offshore support vessel more typically used to support oil and gas rigs. However, it features a stern ramp and four jack-up legs that also make it well suited to loading and unloading cargo at remote beaches.

For years now, the U.S. Marine Corps has also been experimenting with the HOS Resolution and other similar ships more generally. That service has been using the vessels to help refine its new expeditionary and distributed concepts of operations, which are themselves heavily centered on future conflict scenarios in the Pacific. The Marines have brought those capabilities to Army demonstration exercises in the past, as well.

The Army sees the August experiment as a potential stepping stone to integrating increasing degrees into its existing watercraft fleets.

“You could increase the fleet of autonomous vessels by tapping into the existing manned fleet,” Maj. Gen. Crist said. “Put on retrofitting kits to be able to conduct navigation, and then eventually propulsion and engine room activities, and eventually get to a fully autonomous system.”

Even just adding in autonomous navigation capabilities could help reduce the workload for the human crews on Army vessels and provide added margins of safety. Blending autonomy with “propulsion and engine room activities” could improve reliability and reduce maintenance demands. Being able to operate those ships in a fully uncrewed mode, if desired, would open up additional operational possibilities, including just for repositioning ships across the broad expanses of the Pacific.

Reduced manning requirements could be especially attractive for the Army’s ‘Navy,’ which is already a very small part of the service’s overall force structure. Last week, Maj. Gen. Crist also talked about further leveraging traditional crewed vessels owned and/or operated by contractors.

“It’s going to be a broad portfolio of systems of systems,” he said of the overall watercraft vision for the Pacific. “Army watercraft with Army Mariners will be, of course, one aspect of it. We also look for the opportunity to be able to leverage USTRANSCOM’s (U.S. Transportation Command) contracting capability to leverage operational support vessels that are commercially owned and commercially operated. We’re considering ways of being able to have commercial vessels that become manned by Army mariners.”

It is also interesting to note here how extremely similar this all sounds to the modifications the U.S. Navy made to the Spearhead class Expeditionary Fast Transport USNS Apalachicola ahead of its commissioning in 2023. However, despite tens of millions of dollars spent and successful demonstration of autonomous capabilities, the Navy curiously decided to put the Apalachicola into service without any plan to make use of these features operationally. There does not appear to have been any effort to integrate these capabilities more broadly within the Spearhead class since then, either.

Last year, the Navy struck the four oldest Spearhead class ships from its rolls entirely and has put several others on reduced operating status, ostensibly as a cost-saving measure. The service is still acquiring new Expeditionary Fast Transports, including members of the Expeditionary Medical Ship subclass that feature expanded medical facilities. The Spearhead class was born out of a program specifically to meet Army and Marine Corps requirements, and the ships are regularly used to support those services in the Pacific and elsewhere globally.

The Army also wants to expand its fleets of purpose-built uncrewed surface vessels (USV) for use in the Pacific, as well as elsewhere globally. Just earlier this year, Army Maj. Gen. Gavin Gardner, who preceded Maj. Gen. Crist as head of the 8th Theater Sustainment Command, said he wanted to rapidly acquire as many as 100 drone boats. His vision included larger USVs capable of carrying eight to 10 standardized shipping containers.

“I could see those operating in the U.S. PACOM area of responsibility,” Gardner told reporters at a roundtable in June, according to Military Times. “I think that gives you a ton of operations, inventory in motion, easy to respond. And then because they’re autonomous, and we can work with our partner nations forward, you have those berthed up everywhere from Korea to Japan, the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, etc.”

“Clearly, [the autonomous vessels] would be forward in the theater, kind of moving supplies, because we have a constant demand for Army watercraft time now, to deliver equipment and supplies forward in the theater,” Gardner added at that time.

One of the inherent benefits of the Army watercraft fleets, and its LSVs in particular, is their ability to help alleviate the need for the U.S. Navy to meet more localized littoral logistics needs, if they are even available to help in the first place. Navy amphibious and military sealift ships would already be heavily strained by high demand during any major conflict in the Pacific or elsewhere globally. This could easily be further exacerbated by threats to those supply lines. All of this has already been underscored this year by pressure on maritime logistics chains in the context of the war with Iran. The Army’s ‘Navy’ also offers valuable additional capabilities and capacity in non-combat contingencies, such as responding to natural disasters.

More generally, the Army has been working to expand its use of smaller USVs, including speedboat-like designs, in various roles. The service has clearly been paying close attention to Ukraine’s very successful use of drone boats in one-way kamikaze attacks, as well as ones armed with guns and rockets and examples configured as launch platforms for surface-to-air missiles and weaponized uncrewed aerial systems (UAS).

The 7th Infantry Division, one of the Army’s main maneuver combat formations in the Pacific, just recently experimented with a Ukrainian-developed Magura-series USV during an exercise in Michigan. That particular USV was configured to launch a quadcopter-type drone. Another member of the Magura family was observed being used in a one-way-attack configuration by U.S. Army Green Berets from the 1st Special Forces Group during the annual Balikatan exercise in the Philippines earlier this year.

The Army has also been experimenting with American-designed USVs. The aforementioned recent exercise in Michigan also featured a Saronic Corsair, the same type of USV that the Navy used to rescue the crew of an Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter that went down in the Gulf of Oman in June. Explosive-laden Corsairs were also used to carry out the first known U.S. kamikaze USV attack, which was launched against a coastal target in Iran in July.

During another separate exercise in the Philippines this year, Salaknib 2026, Army forces used unarmed Rampage USVs from U.S. firm Havoc, as seen below. As part of that exercise, the USVs escorted a crewed General Frank S. Besson class LSV to its destination, heading out in front to help spot potential hazards.

“There’s all the work that the Department’s already doing with autonomy and autonomous systems that we look to take advantage of in the [Pacific] theater, as well,” Maj. Gen. Crist said at AUSA.

The Navy and the Marine Corps have both been working to grow their operational fleets of smaller USVs, as well as larger ones, in recent years. At the same time, the Navy has suffered years of setbacks and shakeups in its efforts to operationalize bigger and more capable designs. The service awarded contracts for a total of 30 new medium-sized USVs last month in its latest attempt to reverse that trend.

In September, Secretary Pete Hegseth also announced several new initiatives aimed at further expanding use of uncrewed platforms and advanced autonomous capabilities across the U.S. military and all domains. The Pentagon is presently laying the groundwork for the establishment of an all-new top-level Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM), which it hopes to see come to fruition next year.

What is clear now is that the Army’s vision for future watercraft operations, especially in the Pacific, is increasingly autonomous.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post How The U.S. Army’s ‘Navy’ Aims To Go More Autonomous With Its Vessels In The Pacific appeared first on TWZ.

A U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet assigned to Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 31 (VX-31) has been spotted carrying both the AIM-174B and AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM) during a flight over Ridgecrest, California. This represents the first known publicly documented instance of these two advanced air-to-air weapons appearing on the same aircraft.

The aircraft was photographed on October 14 by aviation photographer @photosxlyss2, who shared the result with TWZ. The same Super Hornet was also carrying an IRST21 infrared search-and-track pod on its centerline station.

Two critical elements of the modernization of the U.S. military’s air-to-air missile arsenal, the AIM-174B and AIM-260 provide complementary capabilities, addressing different aspects of the Navy’s evolving air-combat requirements.

Based on the SM-6 missile family, the AIM-174B provides the Navy with an extended-range air-to-air weapon. Its size and reach make it particularly relevant to engagements against high-value airborne assets, including aerial refueling tankers and airborne early warning and control aircraft.

Threatening these support platforms at extended distances complicates an adversary’s ability to sustain fighter operations, maintain airborne surveillance, and coordinate engagements across domains. Such targets are especially important in the Indo-Pacific, where distances are vast and combat aircraft may depend heavily on tanker support to reach and remain on station over contested areas.

 The range of this missile is classified but should be far in excess of that of the AIM-120D AMRAAM, probably in the hundreds of miles, as discussed in the video below.

The AIM-174B has already appeared in several major exercises, including RIMPAC 2024 and Northern Edge 2025. Following developmental trials at RIMPAC, the weapon entered Live Fire Test and Evaluation in 2025. Some examples of the missile have since reached forward-deployed Navy squadrons in Japan.

The AIM-260, meanwhile, is being developed to provide a next-generation beyond-visual-range air-to-air capability. It is intended to address increasingly sophisticated aerial threats and improve upon the capabilities of the very widely used AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) family.

It was another F/A-18F from VX-31 on which the AIM-260 was first publicly seen when departing Eglin Air Force Base in Florida in May of this year. The same type of weapon has since also appeared on a Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18F, as you can read about here.

The AIM-260’s precise specifications remain classified, but it is designed to deliver significantly greater range than the AIM-120 AMRAAM while maintaining a broadly similar form factor. Its compact design is important, as the missile is intended for both external carriage and internal carriage aboard aircraft such as the F-22 Raptor and F-35.

The AIM-260 is being developed to counter the growing long-range air-to-air threat posed by China’s PL-15 and other advanced missiles. Although no official range figures have been disclosed, previous reporting has indicated a target range of at least 120 miles, with the potential to reach considerably farther.

It is unclear when the first operational AIM-260s may begin entering the U.S. inventory. Together, however, the two weapons give the Super Hornet access to a broader range of engagement options, depending not only on the range of the target, but also on the nature of the engagement and overall tactical situation.

The presence of an IRST21 pod is also noteworthy. The infrared search-and-track system passively detects and tracks airborne targets rather than relying exclusively on radar emissions.

Passive sensing is especially valuable in environments where electromagnetic emissions must be managed carefully. Although an IRST system does not automatically provide all the information needed to support a long-range missile engagement, it can contribute to a broader sensor picture and potentially help crews detect targets without immediately revealing their own position through radar emissions.

After a long and troubled development, a full-rate production contract for Block II IRST21 sensors to go into pods for U.S. Navy and U.S. Air National Guard fighters was awarded this time last year, as you can read about here.

The appearance of both missiles on a VX-31 Super Hornet is a notable development in the Navy’s ongoing testing of advanced air-combat capabilities. VX-31, based at the sprawling Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake in California, conducts test and evaluation activities involving naval aviation weapons and systems.

On this occasion, the jet is carrying inert missiles (denoted by their blue bands) in a captive-carry configuration. The flight may have been part of ongoing weapons-integration testing, handling and compatibility evaluations, or another test activity.

At the very least, the configuration offers an intriguing glimpse into how a Navy Super Hornet might go into battle in a future high-end air combat scenario. Pairing the extended-range AIM-174B with the next-generation AIM-260 would provide a powerful combination.

Added to those two will be the AIM-424 Malice, an all-new, very long-range air-to-air missile, the existence of which was only disclosed in August of this year. This is reportedly a two-stage design, which should result in extreme range — said to be in excess of 250 nautical miles — and very high speed. It isn’t known where Malice slots in next to the AIM-174B, although the newer missile is purpose-designed for air launch, unlike the Standard-derived weapon.

As the service prepares for increasingly demanding scenarios in the Indo-Pacific, the new photo underscores the fact that the ability to threaten a wider range of targets at greater distances is one of the key considerations in the evolution of the Navy’s carrier-based fighter force.

With thanks to @photosxlyss2_; check out more of her work via PhotosxLyss on Facebook.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet Spotted Carrying New AIM-174B And AIM-260 Long-Range Missiles Together appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Air Force says any decision on whether or not to acquire new production F-16 Viper fighters is likely a year or more away. The service’s top officer in charge of force structure planning has also now raised the prospect of using a “spectrum of capability” to eventually supplant aging older-model F-16s. All of this comes as the Air Force has laid out a new vision to have 1,509 combat-coded fighters in inventory, hundreds more than it has now, by 2035, amid questions about whether industry and budgets can keep up.

Inside Defense and Air & Space Forces Magazine were among the first to report on the Air Force’s latest long-term fighter force structure plan late yesterday. This followed a roundtable with Lt. Gen. David Tabor, the service’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs. At the time of writing, an unclassified copy of the report, which was submitted to Congress last week, has not been released publicly. TWZ has reached out for more information.

Tabor said yesterday that the target fleet of 1,509 combat-coded fighters by 2035 would be approximately 40 percent F-35s, 40 percent F-15s (inclusive of F-15E Strike Eagles and F-15EX Eagle IIs) and F-16s, and 20 percent F-22 Raptors and F-47s, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine. As an aside, the final expected F-47 fleet size remains unclear, though the Air Force continues to say it plans to acquire at least enough of those jets to replace its 185 F-22s on a one-for-one basis.

The current breakdown of the service’s fighter force structure is 45 percent F-16s, 30 percent F-35s, 15 percent F-15s, and 10 percent F-22s. Last year’s long-term fighter force structure report said the service was aiming for an eventual inventory of 1,558 combat-coded fighters and hoped to hit a milestone of 1,369 aircraft by Fiscal Year 2030. As of the start of Fiscal Year 2026, the Air Force had 1,168 combat-coded fighters, not including 103 A-10 Warthog ground attack jets, which have been part of this force structure planning in the past. The plan now is for the last of the A-10s to be retired by 2030. The new 2035 figure also does not include the hundreds of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones the service wants to have acquired by that time, something we will come back to later on.

Currently, the Air Force expects fighter fleet expansion to be driven by the acquisition of new F-35As, F-15EXs, and F-47s. This was also the case when last year’s fighter force structure report was released. The possibility of the Air Force also acquiring new-production F-16s has come up several times in recent years. Most recently, there were several reports last month that prime contractor Lockheed Martin had made a new pitch to the service for a version of the latest Block 70 version of the fighter, tentatively dubbed the F-16G. New Block 70 and Block 72 F-16s, which differ in what engine they use, are being actively produced at Lockheed Martin’s plant in Greenville, South Carolina. At that time, TWZ did a deep dive into the benefits that this could offer the Air Force.

“There is a spectrum of capability that we might want to replace the F-16s with,” Lt. Gen. Tabor said amid a discussion about the prospect of acquiring new Vipers at the roundtable yesterday, per Air & Space Forces Magazine. “It’s not urgent, frankly. What we don’t want to get to is a point where it is urgent, and we haven’t done the homework and decided ‘hey, this is really the right place to be.’ We do have time to churn through that and make sure that we have a good option going forward.”

“We’re not in a position where that decision has to be made immediately,” Tabor added, while acknowledging that “we are very conscious” that older-model F-16s are set to begin reaching the end of their lifespans in the 2030s. He also said any such planning was unlikely to be part of the process of developing the service’s Fiscal Year 2028 budget proposal, which will be released sometime early next year.

The Air Force is “in the initial phases of analyzing options for the next Future Years Defense Program,” a spokesperson for the service had told us last month without specifically mentioning any particular type of aircraft. “At this stage, we have neither defined the precise mission requirements nor the spectrum of options that could fill it.”

When it comes to the current F-16 fleet, the Air Force had 774 Vipers in inventory at the start of Fiscal Year 2026 and expected that number to drop to 768, according to past budget documents. This includes a mixture of subvariants, and not all of them are assigned combat-coded units. The Air Force has been substantially upgrading at least a portion of its existing F-16s, including with the addition of new active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars and electronic warfare suites, to ensure their operational relevance for years to come.

The Air Force has also already been taking newer F-16s from squadrons transitioning to the F-35 and using them to replace older Vipers in other units. Last year’s fighter force structure report explicitly highlighted plans to supplant Block 30 F-16s in five Air National Guard formations – three combat-coded squadrons and two training units – with Block 40 and 50 types in this way.

As we’ve previously written:

“A new F-16 offers a fresh and highly mature airframe — one with a full service-life ahead of it, on the order of 12,000 flight hours without the need for structural upgrades — double that of the original F-16. This is compared to existing F-16s in the inventory with the decades of wear and fatigue already accumulated on them, with structural upgrades keeping them in the air. That difference in remaining structural life is arguably the single biggest advantage a new-build aircraft has compared with extending an existing one.”

“Dumping more money into existing F-16s is becoming questionable. Service life extensions and technical upgrades can only go so far and supporting these jets is becoming harder as parts dry up and suppliers who made them are long gone. A new airframe would give the Guard many decades of highly efficient service and the piece of mind for future force planning that goes with it.”

…

“The new [F-16G] proposal would let some Guard and Reserve units swap their F-16s for vastly improved F-16s — the same logic that drove the F-15EX buy — while also keeping the Greenville line hot, which is a significant benefit in its own right. And it accomplishes both in the most efficient way possible: not just in acquisition cost, but in sustainment cost, which is really the more problematic burden of the two. In the end, this points to another glaring reality check for the all-stealth-force concept, a vision the Air Force has effectively already abandoned.”

“The Air Force has spent years describing the F-35 as the replacement for its F-16 fleet, yet it now has to contend with aging F-16s, delayed or constrained fighter production, a larger stated requirement for total fighter capacity, and the lengthy transition toward the F-47 and uncrewed combat aircraft. In that environment, a new-build F-16 provides an option that sits between extending legacy aircraft and buying the most sophisticated — and expensive — fighters available.”

You can read our full prior deep analysis on this topic here.

Lt. Gen. Tabor acknowledged many of these exact same points at the roundtable yesterday. He notably described acquiring new F-16s as “maybe the lazy” option, but also one that would benefit from “practically a ready-made aircraft” that is in production now, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

“The question is, can industry produce at those levels?” he also said, speaking more generally. “They’ve assured us that they can, and we believe them, but we also actually need to see it manifest.”

In the context of acquiring new F-16s, especially, it is important to note here that Lockheed Martin order books are very full already as a result of demand for these fighters from U.S. allies and partners. The company’s capacity, at least at present, to add a substantial new Air Force acquisition program on top of that is a real question. This, in some ways, mirrors questions that surround Boeing efforts to meet surging Air Force demand for F-15EXs.

On top of all this, the Air Force’s still-evolving CCA plans remain something of a wildcard in these discussions. The Air Force has ordered General Atomics FQ-42 Vengeance and Anduril’s FQ-44 Fury CCAs into production, and is now aiming to have a combined fleet of at least 500 of these drones in inventory by 2032. The service is also still expecting to acquire additional CCAs, which could be of entirely different types, through a second iterative development cycle, or Increment 2, under this program. This is influencing the service’s crewed fighter force structure plans, but the full scale and scope of those impacts remain to be seen.

“CCA is very much a reality,” Tabor said yesterday, per Air & Space Forces Magazine. “It is going to be a part of our future, and there is absolutely a world in which the incorporation of CCAs into the force will mitigate the requirement for the number of fighters. That’s not the CCA that we have right now, but it is advancing very, very rapidly. We’re confident that it will play a major role in future versions of the fighter force structure report.”

The Air Force’s F-22s are currently set to be its first ‘aerial quarterbacks’ for CCAs, with F-35s and F-47s expected to follow. At the same time, TWZ has highlighted previously how CCA could offer particular value when paired with fourth-generation fighters like the F-16. This, in turn, could actually bolster the case for new Viper acquisitions as a more affordable force multiplier.

The Air Force’s ability to secure necessary funding and other factors will play in all this, too. 2035 is a long way off from a budgetary perspective. It also stretches across multiple election cycles, including the one that will decide the next presidential administration, all of which could lead to major changes in defense spending priorities. Congress can and routinely does demand that the U.S. military alter major procurement plans. Just in the past two years or so, legislators have intervened to force the Air Force to move ahead with the acquisition of new E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control planes and to save the U.S. Navy F/A-XX sixth-generation fighter program.

In the meantime, the Air Force clearly faces many continued questions about how to balance the need to modernize its fighter fleets while ensuring it retains enough tactical airpower to meet current and future operational demands. Even so, the service says it sees no need to rush to make a decision about whether to choose the “lazy” route of just buying new F-16s.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Any Decision To Buy New-Build F-16s Not An “Urgent” Priority: USAF appeared first on TWZ.

New footage of Australia’s Ghost Shark extra-large autonomous underwater vehicle (XL-AUV) provides the first look at how the vehicle launches aerial drones, while also revealing a pair of deployable masts not previously seen on the platform. The video comes soon after we got a glimpse of some of the payloads that the Royal Australian Navy plans to integrate on the new uncrewed submarine, as you can read more about in our coverage here.

"Ghost Shark has teeth now." – @PatConroy1, Australia's Minister for Defence Industry.

The @ausgov and @Australian_Navy confirmed the payloads that our Ghost Shark extra-large autonomous submarine carries: sea mines, logistics caches, and air-launched effects for ISR and strike.… pic.twitter.com/IALPFpOf4V

— Anduril Industries (@anduriltech) October 21, 2026

Published by manufacturer Anduril, the footage shows a Ghost Shark surfacing before doors on the top of its hull slide open. A launcher consisting of 12 angled tubes then emerges from a drone sub. Another launcher is seen in the other upper payload bay, but is not raised in the video. While it appears to be of the same type, the second launcher could also have a different arrangement of tubes.

The footage subsequently cuts to an ALTIUS-type drone being launched from one of the tubes, with Ghost Shark itself remaining surfaced.

The sequence provides a much more concrete look at the aerial-drone deployment concept — or one of them — than the photographs released previously, which offered the first public view inside Ghost Shark’s side payload bay.

The Australian government has said the vehicle is being developed for missions including persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and strike, but the precise configuration and operational capabilities of its weapons and how they are launched had not previously been disclosed.

The video does not identify which ALTIUS variant is being launched. However, Ghost Shark has previously been displayed at the Altus factory in Australia alongside derivatives of the ALTIUS-600 family. This includes the ALTIUS-600 for ISR, as well as the ALTIUS-600M, which is designed for strike missions. You can read more about this family of drones here. As we noted before, unarmed variants of the ALTIUS-600 are designed to be optionally expendable, and can be reused, although in many scenarios that isn’t possible. In terms of capabilities, the ALTIUS-600 has a maximum range of around 275 miles and can remain airborne for at least four hours, according to Anduril.

Ghost Shark can clearly deploy a substantial number of aerial drones — two dozen in this case – in a single sortie, enabling swarms to be launched far from an adversary’s coastline. Depending on the drones carried and how they are employed, such a swarm could provide broad-area surveillance, wreak havoc on enemy air defenses via electronic warfare, or attack targets.

The concept could also have value below the threshold of open conflict. A mass launch of relatively inexpensive drones could be used to probe or stimulate an adversary’s air defenses, prompting them to reveal their locations, signatures and operating procedures for collection by other intelligence assets or even some of the drones themselves. There is a precedent for exactly this going back to the early Cold War years, which you can read all about here.

Ghost Shark could carry these capabilities deep into contested waters clandestinely without putting a crew at risk, unleashing their payload even at standoff distances or right next to the shore to give the drones maximum penetration and loitering time over target, depend on the risk profile.

At the same time, while the 12-tube launchers fit neatly into Ghost Shark’s hull architecture, the modular nature of the design means that the same space can accommodate many other payloads, which might include alternative types of aerial drones. This could be fewer larger, more capable types, or far more plentiful smaller, less capable ones.

The other notable development in the video is the appearance of two deployable masts. Their presence is particularly interesting given Anduril’s emphasis on designing uncrewed underwater vehicles without the kinds of protruding mast arrangements associated with traditional submarine designs. On UUVs, masts like these are generally used to support sensors, communications, and propulsion systems.

“We don’t have big masts running down the backbone of our vehicle that a lot of other designs do that then preclude the ability for the payloads to come out in different directions… of the payload module itself,” Dr. Shane Arnott, Senior Vice President for Engineering at Anduril and the company’s maritime lead, told TWZ back in 2024.

“So we have… in effect, unlimited flexibility in this design, just the way that we’ve configured the vehicle and the payload bay itself could be almost anything within a size configuration that you can dream up,” Arnott added. “We haven’t encountered a crazy idea yet from a customer that … we can’t fit.”

The larger mast that lies flat is actually a fairly traditional one for large UUVs. It lies along the centerline of the hull when stowed, between the upper payload bays. It then deploys upward in an arm-like motion and carries an antenna. The smaller mast is located farther aft and rises vertically from its own housing. Potentially, the tall mast supports a line-of-sight datalink to the drones, while the other being a satcom array, such as one connected to Starlink/Starshield, sends drone feed to controllers anywhere in the world. It’s also worth noting that Ghost Shark could just launch the drones and send them on their missions autonomously, without needing to stay surfaced at all. Other arrangements could exist, as well, such as Ghost Shark launching a dozen drones and one larger one capable of carrying its own satcom terminal. This would allow direct control of the drones by operators anywhere in the world without Ghost Shark remaining present near the surface.

Ghost Shark also has a lower-profile swept-back sail on top of its nose section, not visible in the video. Overall, the vessel would retain a very small signature above the waterline while connected to the drones, making it hard to detect by radar and electro-optical imaging systems.

The new video follows the recent disclosure of three payload concepts for the Royal Australian Navy’s Ghost Shark: the deployment of up to 12 sea mines in a mission, the placement of supply caches on the seabed, and the launch of aerial drones. Those capabilities expand the vehicle beyond conventional underwater surveillance into a broader range of undersea warfare missions.

The mine-delivery option could support operations in strategically important maritime areas, while seabed caches could provide a means of positioning equipment and supplies for later retrieval. The aerial-drone capability, as seen in the new video, would allow Ghost Shark to extend surveillance beyond the reach of its own sensors or potentially deliver strike effects without exposing crewed platforms to the same risks. Having 12 ALTIUS drones ready to launch (and potentially the same number in the adjacent upper payload bay) would allow multiple missions to be undertaken.

The modular design is central to Ghost Shark. As we have discussed, the payload section can be configured using different hull sections and mission-specific systems, allowing the same underlying vehicle design to accommodate different requirements. The newly revealed launcher provides a first look at how at least one of those payload concepts may be implemented in practice.

Australia has committed substantial resources to autonomous and uncrewed undersea warfare capabilities, with a planned fleet of Australian-designed and built Ghost Shark vehicles serving alongside the Speartooth large uncrewed underwater vehicle (LUUV) and the BlueBottle uncrewed surface vessel (USV). The Ghost Shark program is also part of the broader AUKUS effort to develop advanced maritime technologies alongside the United Kingdom and the United States.

The new footage provides a clearer picture of the practical design choices behind that effort. Most notably, how the underwater vehicle can operationalize its aerial drone launching capability and the quantity of those systems it could potentially deploy very quickly before slipping back below the waves.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Ghost Shark Uncrewed Submarine Shown Launching Aerial Drones For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

One of the KC-10A Extender aerial refueling tankers the U.S. Air Force retired some two years ago has left the boneyard at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona. This aircraft is one of a set of KC-10As sold to private aerial refueling contractor Omega Air. At least one other potential operator, a still mysterious end user somewhere in North Africa, could also be in line to pick up several ex-Air Force Extenders.

Maxim Loshak, who goes by the handle @az_aviator on X and Instagram, caught the KC-10A leaving Davis-Monthan earlier today. The aircraft currently carries U.S. civil registration number N82247, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records confirm that Omega Air is the new owner. Online flight tracking data also shows the aircraft subsequently flew to San Antonio International Airport, which is Omega’s main base of operations.

Omega's first KC-10A, N82247 (formerly 86-0034), has departed Davis-Monthan en route to San Antonio International Airport. pic.twitter.com/kALlgeuLGy

— KIWA Spotter (@KiwaSpotter) October 20, 2026

The KC-10A in question previously carried the Air Force registration number 86-0034 and had been in the boneyard since May 12, 2023, per the service’s records. The Air Force acquired a total of 60 Extender tankers between 1979 and 1987, and lost one in an accident in 1987. The very last of the remaining 59 KC-10As was retired in September 2024. The Extender was derived from the three-engine DC-10 airliner and was designed to refuel aircraft using either the boom or the probe-and-drogue method.

As seen in the picture at the top of this story, N82247 notably lacks the KC-10A’s trademark boom under the rear fuselage. This is actually not entirely unexpected. The Air Force had put 10 Extenders up for auction last year in a non-flyable state. Each of the planes was missing a single engine, taken from under one of their wings, for reasons that are still not entirely clear. These particular aircraft were also among the first KC-10As to be retired, and their booms had been stripped to be used as spares for other examples that had remained in service until the type’s final retirement in 2024.

In addition to sourcing the requisite engines, “in order to make them flyable, the winning bidder will need to work with Boeing to obtain a fly-away kit to seal up the area where the boom systems was,” an Air Force spokesperson told us last year while the 10 KC-10As were still up for auction.

Omega Air could fit new booms to this KC-10A, as well as other ex-USAF Extenders it is in the process of acquiring. The company could also leave some of them configured as probe-and-drogue-only tankers. Omega already flies two ex-Dutch KDC-10 tankers, which are broadly similar to the KC-10, as well as another DC-10 converted into a probe-and-drogue-only tanker. The company has several Boeing 707-based tankers, as well.

There is a possibility that some of the KC-10As that Omega is acquiring could be operated in non-tanker roles. Carrying cargo was also a major role for Extender while in Air Force service. Still, this seems unlikely given that aerial refueling is Omega’s primary business. Some of the ex-Air Force Extenders might also be used as sources of spare parts. TWZ has reached out for more information about Omega’s overall plans for its new acquisitions.

Regardless, even in a boomless configuration, ex-USAF KC-10As will be a significant addition to Omega Air’s fleet. Demand for private aerial refueling services, in general, has been ramping up in the United States and elsewhere globally in recent years.

For the U.S. military, private contractors offer a valuable way to reduce demand for and strain on organic tanker fleets to meet non-combat-related aerial refueling needs. This, in turn, helps free up government-owned tankers for combat missions and other higher-priority taskings. Those tankers may also simply not need to fly as much with private companies helping to shift the burden. The ability of the Air Force’s existing tanker fleets, in particular, to meet even peacetime demands has been a growing point of concern for years now. This has been further exacerbated by persistent technical and other issues with replacement KC-46 tankers.

With all this in mind, the Air Force’s decision to retire the KC-10A fleet entirely was and still is controversial. Though the Extenders were certainly aging, they were also highly flexible tankers able to carry greater loads of fuel than the KC-46s that supplanted them.

Omega Air clearly still sees value in the KC-10A. As mentioned, at least one other operator in North Africa is at least interested in potentially acquiring Extenders. Others may yet emerge.

If nothing else, after just over two years, an ex-USAF KC-10A has returned to the skies for a second career in the private sector.

Special thanks again to Maxim Loshak for sharing his picture of N82247 with us.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Retired KC-10 Extender Tanker Has Risen From Boneyard To Fly Again appeared first on TWZ.

Ukraine continues to struggle with throttling of the speeds at which weapons using the vital satellite communications services provided by the SpaceX Starlink system can operate, and one weapons manufacturer tells us it is rethinking whether to rely on it in the future. As we have previously reported, heavy use of Starlink on both sides of the conflict in Ukraine, including as a means of guiding one-way attackers in the air and at sea, has underscored potential risks of exclusive reliance on Elon Musk’s orbital communications networks in critical tactical tasks.

At issue are complaints by Ukrainian officials that “in various sectors of the front, the equipment ceases to function at speeds of 130–161 kilometers per hour.”

A limit on how fast Starlink terminals on vehicles can travel before the feed is cut off in certain areas impacts a slew of weapons and campaigns, especially strikes on Russian logistics behind enemy lines and in the sea of Asov, as well as the control of defensive interceptor drones critical for taking down Russian long-range one-way attack drones, like the notorious Shahed-136.

The following video shows one such Shahed interception.

Spectacular footage of a Ukrainian interceptor striking a Russian Shahed kamikaze drone, followed by its fall to the ground. pic.twitter.com/8DrJyS22Fn

— Special Kherson Cat (@bayraktar_1love) October 20, 2026

The limiting of Starlink/Starshield occurred amid deteriorating relations between the Trump administration and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The latest chill between Washington and Kyiv was sparked by the American leader’s claims that Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure have reduced the supply of diesel fuel to the U.S. and other nations more than the conflict in the Middle East. Trump was upset Ukraine kept hitting these targets despite his demanding they stop.

Q: Do you think Ukraine should stop attacks on Russian oil refineries? Have you told Zelenskyy that?
TRUMP: We've talked about it, we have, and I think they're slowing it down, but they are causing a lot of problems. The lack of refineries is the problem. pic.twitter.com/ffpFnRqFlk

— Furkan Gözükara (@FurkanGozukara) October 5, 2026

Exacerbating this issue, Trump on Oct. 9 announced via his Truth Social platform that he had made a deal to purchase diesel from Russia, pivoting away from a years-old Western policy that placed massive economic pressure on Moscow.

Trump: "I have just concluded a highly successful discussion with President Vladimir Putin, of Russia, wherein it was agreed that Russia will immediately supply over 300,000 Tons of Diesel Fuel to the American and Global Marketplace, another 500,000 Tons during the month of… pic.twitter.com/zH0I6HA941

— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) October 9, 2026

Who gave the order to limit the speeds at which Ukrainian weapons using the Starlink/Starshield system operate is unclear.

“The order to limit a satellite system used by Ukraine ​for battlefield communications and drone operations came from inside the White House,” Reuters reported last week, citing two U.S. officials and a Western official briefed on the matter. “The officials said ‌leaders at the Defense Department received a message that the SpaceX Starshield service for the Ukrainian military needed to be slowed.”

“No such request was ever made by the president,” a U.S. official told us on Monday.

“There has been no change to Department of War policy regarding intelligence sharing or any capabilities we are enabling Europeans to provide to Ukraine,” a senior Pentagon official responded to our questions about whether the Pentagon imposed the limits and, if so, why.

When we pushed for a more specific response to the Starlink/Starshield concerns, the Pentagon declined comment. However, Tuesday afternoon, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the Pentagon did not order any changes and that Ukraine violated Starlink’s terms of services.

Hegseth suggests Ukrainians haven't abided by Starlink's "terms of service" pic.twitter.com/Z8MJyQ4Nvq

— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) October 20, 2026

We reached out to SpaceX as well, but the company did not immediately respond. Last week, SpaceX’s founder and CEO, Elon Musk, said that “any limits on speed or usage are decided by the US military and ultimately” Trump. Musk had previously refused Ukrainian requests to use Starlink against targets inside Russia.

The prohibition against using Starlink inside Russia has drastically limited Ukraine’s ability to strike dynamic targets like mobile ballistic missile launchers and hunt for drone launch sites. However, Ukraine has not had to rely on Starlink in its campaign against oil infrastructure or other fixed targets deep inside Russia which upset Trump in the first place.

Tuesday morning, Zelensky spoke with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and again brought up Starlink/Starshield in addition to other major concerns.

“…the situation with Starlink/Starshield… needs to be restored,” Zelensky urged.

I spoke with Marco Rubio @SecRubio, and it was a substantive conversation – focused on the issues that matter. I am grateful for his readiness to help and his clear position. First, ballistic missile interceptors, which are needed to protect lives. Second, early warning of…

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) October 20, 2026

Rubio denied that any assistance was being withheld from Ukraine. Noting that Starlink “is a private company,” the secretary told reporters that Trump is “frustrated…because he doesn’t like to be blamed for things that aren’t true, including accusations that somehow he had ordered intelligence sharing to be cut off. And that’s not true; he’s said that repeatedly.”

SECRETARY RUBIO: There's nothing being deliberately denied to Ukraine. It's simply a balance between our obligations to other partners, and frankly, our own standards and requirements for our own facilities as well. pic.twitter.com/x9NWbIufBa

— Department of State (@StateDept) October 20, 2026

This most recent flap isn’t the first time SpaceX and Musk have faced particularly significant criticism over limiting some Ukrainian use of the network. Actions SpaceX took earlier this year to block unregistered Starlink terminals also had major consequences for Russian forces, which were sent scrambling to find alternatives to fill the massive resulting communications gap.

Given the tenuous nature of Ukraine’s ability to use Starlink/Starshield, the Wild Hornets company is reevaluating whether to use the SpaceX system in future endeavors even though, so far, it has experienced few problems with it. Wild Hornets is a major Ukrainian combat drone maker. Among other weapons, it makes the Sting interceptors, designed to defend against Russian Shahed kamikaze drones.

The Starlink/Starshield issue isn’t affecting current operations, a Wild Hornets spokesman told us Tuesday morning. “Our own communications system provides the basic connection to our interceptors,” he said. “Plus, our technology for remote control of the interceptors can use various sources of internet connectivity. True, the military often uses Starlink for this, but in our case, the terminal doesn’t need to be moved at high speeds (it simply provides a connection between the command center and the ground station to which the interceptor is connected—it’s somewhat similar to cell towers).”

Concerns about the reduction in speeds at which Starlink terminals can operate has Wild Hornets thinking about ditching a future project, the spokesman told us.

“But we understand that there are other types of interceptors,” added the spokesman. “For example, some drones carry a terminal on board and need to fly at high speed with it. In such cases, Starlink’s limitations make their operation impossible. From this point of view, it also makes us rethink some of the projects we’re currently working on. For example, launching interceptors from aerial platforms.”

“We’re keeping an eye on the situation,” the spokesman continued. “For our current operations (connections with ground stations), we can use any source of stable internet connectivity. Therefore, various solutions are possible in different locations. However, for these needs, everything is operating normally with Starlink at the moment. As for our plans with new projects, we don’t have a clear decision yet, but we will be testing alternatives.”

The spokesman declined to provide further details about what “alternatives” could look like.

There are a number of ways the lack of Starlink for extended-range drone operations could be mitigated to a degree, but the persistent, reliable, high-bandwidth and compact capability SpaceX provides has no direct alternative at this time. The use of drones that work as line-of-sight relays, which can be daisy chained together electronically with other airborne relays, with a connection spanning dozens or even hundreds of miles to a ground entry point is possible. You can read about this concept here. The use of swarms of balloons to create an active network over a battlespace and using Starlink on those slower moving platforms to relay line-of-sight connections to multiple drones below is another possibility. You can read more about this concept here. But we must stress again, nothing can fully replace Starlink/Starshield and its seamless beyond line-of-sight communications architecture at this time.

“I believe, in any case, depending on a single solution is very risky,” the Wild Hornets spokesman proffered. “Especially if you don’t have full control over it. Especially when it comes to something as critical on the battlefield as communications. That’s exactly why our ecosystem is built around our own communications technology and basically is open to various solutions when it comes to internet connectivity.”

The No. 1 interceptor: STING by Wild Hornets has destroyed over 15,000 Shaheds and Gerberas in one year

Confirmed data shows that STING has topped the interceptor rankings for 12 consecutive months. In September this year, Ukraine’s Defense Forces downed around 1,600 Shaheds,… pic.twitter.com/4v1aeOxPiy

— Wild Hornets (@wilendhornets) October 13, 2026

As far as military units are concerned, the commander of the Georgian Legion told us that his forces have been affected by issues with Starlink/Starshield even though the main concerns have been about the speeds at which weapons can travel and still have connectivity. The Georgian Legion is fighting in the heavily contested Kramatorsk region of eastern Ukraine.

“We use Starlink a lot because, in this war, reliable communication is essential,” Mamuka Mamulashvili told us. “It helps us stay connected when everything around us is changing. Of course, we’ve learned not to rely on just one system. There are alternatives, like mobile internet, fiber-optic connections, radio and other satellite systems such as OneWeb. But honestly, none of them can fully replace Starlink in Ukraine right now.”

“The problems were not limited to the speed restriction of approximately 160 km/h,” the Georgian Legion commander pointed out. “Starlink connectivity itself was also intermittent, repeatedly switching on and off. This caused communication disruptions across various drone systems, not just those operating at speeds exceeding 160 km/h. As a result, the impact was broader than the restriction on high-speed interceptor drones. Intermittent connectivity created problems for drone control and communications across multiple systems, affecting their reliability and the ability to carry out missions as intended.”

“We had serious communication problems,” Mamulashvili explained. “At one point, our drone operators were struggling to maintain a reliable connection with the drone systems, which disrupted coordination and made it difficult to carry out missions as planned. When you lose the connection between the operator and the drone, you can lose control of the situation in seconds. We managed to adapt, but it definitely affected our work.”

“We have to adapt and find solutions, as we always do,” the commander said. “This war teaches you one thing every day. You can’t depend on a single technology or expect someone else to solve all your problems. You have to be ready for anything and keep moving forward.”

Russian sources, meanwhile, are gloating over the speed limits placed on weapons using Starlink/Starshield, particularly how it is affecting Ukraine’s mid-range drone attacks that have crippled Russian logistics. As we explained in a previous report, Ukrainian units have relied on the SpaceX system to help extend the range of their drones to reach as far as 150 miles into Russian-occupied territory. The SpaceX system is not used to hit targets inside Russia proper.

The following video shows some of these mid-range attacks.

Russian rail logistics are now also the target of Midstrike drones, with lines to Crimea being particularly affected. pic.twitter.com/K1BFd0QVov

— Sergio (@SergioCentaurus) June 5, 2026

“Disabling or slowing down Starlink has significantly reduced the enemy’s ability to launch medium-range drone strikes along the ‘Novorossiya’ highway,” influential Russian milblogger Vladimir Romanov reported. The highway, also known as the R-280, is a key link between cities in occupied southern Ukraine and the occupied Crimean peninsula. The road has been a frequent target of Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign.

“The success of these strikes depends on the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ access to American satellite communication,” Romanov noted. “For the past six months, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been attacking civilian transport – trucks, cars, and buses – exclusively through the use of ‘Starshield.’ This means that, for the past six months, American military satellite infrastructure has been used to carry out terrorist acts against Russian civilians, and so on. In other words, the United States is still directly involved in the war with Russia!”

America's gifts to Russia never end, with Russian military bloggers now confirming that Washington's operation to cut Ukraine's Starlink has halted Ukraine's ability to strike Russian logistics routes in Ukraine.

An operation likely written in the Kremlin, executed by… pic.twitter.com/iXcIAu5Rr3

— SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre (@StratcomCentre) October 20, 2026

As for how widespread worries among Ukrainian weapons manufacturers are, the Wild Hornets spokesman suggested that his company is not alone. He said he has spoken with other companies relying much more heavily on Starlink/Starshield who have expressed concerns. He pointed to growing interest in the European Eutelsat satellite constellation as an example of companies seeking options, but noted that “of course, creating something like Starlink won’t be easy.”

We’ve reached out to the Ukrainian Brave1 defense technology incubator and the National Association of Ukrainian Defense Industries (NAUDI) for additional insights into how this issue is affecting Ukraine’s defense manufacturing base.

It will be interesting to see if other Ukrainian weapons companies also consider scrapping plans to rely on Starlink in the future and what architectures will emerge at least as a backstop to it.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Major Ukrainian Arms Maker Rethinking Future Reliance On Starlink appeared first on TWZ.

NATO member Finland is preparing to reintroduce anti-personnel landmines into its military arsenal, with a contract for around one million examples due to be signed soon, following the country’s withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention that aims to eliminate these weapons. The move comes as Helsinki looks to strengthen its territorial defenses against a longstanding Russian threat and the prospect of a larger Russian military presence along its eastern border in the years ahead.

Finland’s withdrawal from the treaty, which prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines, took effect on January 10 of this year. Reflecting growing concern among NATO’s eastern-flank members about Russia’s military posture and the lessons of the war in Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have also moved to leave the convention.

Mines have, for many centuries, been used to complicate an attacker’s movement, slow operations, and force troops to devote time and resources to clearing obstacles. Anti-personnel mines, in particular, have long been employed in defensive campaigns, but they come with significant humanitarian risks. They can kill or maim civilians long after hostilities end, which has seen them fall foul of international humanitarian law in many countries — at least when those nations don’t see a realistic risk of invasion.

It is a measure of how badly the European security environment has deteriorated that anti-personnel mines are back on the agenda.

The Finnish Defense Forces previously said that discussions with the domestic defense industry and preparations to train military personnel would begin early this year. It has now announced that the project seeks two different types of anti-personnel mines, of Finnish manufacture.

The two weapons will comprise a modern tube mine activated by a tripwire trigger, and a pressure-activated step mine. In the future, more technically advanced mines may also be procured, including cluster-type mines of the kind deployed by Russia in Ukraine. In general, anti-personnel mines have been very widely used by both sides in that conflict, with Kyiv notably receiving them as part of U.S. air packages, as you can read about here. Neither the United States nor Russia are signatories of the Ottawa Convention.

“The aim is for production of the new anti-personnel mines to begin in Finland in 2028,” said Col. Riku Mikkonen, inspector of engineers for the Finnish Army Command.

“We have a materials procurement project underway, which is currently in the preparatory and market review phase. At the same time, we are drawing up the technical specifications for the mines,” Mikkonen added. “We will soon move on to the stage where we issue requests for tenders, so that we can eventually proceed to a competitive tendering process and conclude contracts.”

At this point, no contracts have been signed. However, once the procurement effort is underway, the Finnish Defense Forces are set to return their anti-personnel mine stockpile to what it was before acceding to the Ottawa Convention in 2012.

The first new mines and associated training equipment are expected to become available during 2027. Ultimately, all conscripts will be trained to employ anti-personnel mines. The total cost of the project is around $110 million, with the last of the mines scheduled to be delivered in the 2030s.

Helsinki has stressed that it does not intend to lay anti-personnel mines during peacetime. Mikkonen said the weapons would be used only under emergency conditions.

Finland’s decision reflects a national defense philosophy that has long been shaped by direct experience with Soviet aggression. The Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939, beginning the Winter War, and fought another conflict with the country from 1941 to 1944. Finland lost territory but preserved its independence, subsequently maintaining conscription, a large trained reserve, and a defense strategy built around making any invasion costly.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reinforced Finnish concerns that major conventional warfare in Europe remained a realistic possibility. Finland joined NATO in April 2023, and the country shares a little over 800 miles of border with Russia.

Finland’s defensive approach traditionally emphasizes rapid mobilization to defend national territory and delay a much larger attacking force until reinforcements can arrive. The role of anti-personnel mines in that scenario is clear, being sown to slow down infantry movements and hamper advances through vulnerable areas. Their disproportionate effect, at least in theory, is especially relevant for a country with a relatively tiny population compared to the length of its border.

At the same time, anti-personnel mines would form only one part of a much broader defensive system incorporating artillery, airstrikes, engineering obstacles, fortifications, and reserve forces. It should be noted that Finland also has a considerable armory of anti-tank and anti-vehicle mines, most of which are of local manufacture.

In general, Moscow has been restructuring its military command arrangements and starting to establish the foundations for a larger conventional presence across northern Europe.

In 2024, Russia reestablished the Leningrad Military District, an apparent response to Finland’s and Sweden’s subsequent entry into NATO.

The Leningrad Military District is responsible for a strategically important region that covers the approaches to St. Petersburg, areas bordering Finland, and territory extending toward the Arctic. Its reestablishment gives Russia a dedicated command structure for managing forces facing NATO across this northern sector.

While significant, the creation of a military district does not necessarily generate additional combat power.

Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to drain resources in terms of personnel, equipment, logistics, and more.

Nevertheless, Moscow’s longer-term plans point toward a substantial expansion of its ground forces and military infrastructure in areas facing Finland and the wider NATO alliance.

A central element of Russia’s reorganization is the formation of the 44th Army Corps in the Republic of Karelia, near Finland’s eastern border. The corps was established in 2024 as part of the wider effort to strengthen Russia’s military presence in the northwest.

Russia’s wider military development also encompasses the Kola Peninsula and approaches to the Arctic, where facilities support the Northern Fleet and its strategic nuclear submarine force.

Satellite imagery last year showed construction at the Lupche-Savino garrison near Kandalaksha, including facilities intended to accommodate an artillery brigade and at least part of an engineering brigade. The location is approximately 70 miles east of Finland’s border.

Earlier this year, a separate report by the Finnish Yle media outlet found that the Russian military was expanding a base in the town of Novaya Vilga to hold as many as 6,000 Russian troops. It is located about 100 miles from the Finnish border.

Breaking News: Where exactly is Russia building its massive new military garrison?

For the first time, a completely new base is going up behind Finland's eastern border, set to hold up to 6,000 soldiers. Take a look at the first satellite data: https://t.co/IuZerZRyeQ #russia pic.twitter.com/2UvQXheaAP

— Mika Mäkeläinen (@Mikareport) June 10, 2026

For Finland, the situation could change dramatically if the war in Ukraine winds down, and the Russian military assembles in greater strength closer to its borders.

Finland’s Military Intelligence Review 2026 assesses that Russia’s military reforms have not yet significantly increased its capabilities in its immediate vicinity. But it still anticipates a substantial increase in Russian military capabilities as circumstances permit and identifies Finland as a major direction for future force development after the war.

A ceasefire or settlement in Ukraine would not automatically enable Russia to launch a major offensive against Finland. A ceasefire could ease the immediate military pressure on Russia while still creating a serious economic and political challenge for the Kremlin. Russia’s wartime spending has sustained defense-sector production and employment, but winding that spending down risks exposing structural weaknesses.

With a ceasefire or settlement, Moscow would still need to rebuild units, replace equipment, replenish personnel, and establish the logistical capacity to sustain large-scale operations. However, there are indications that this is already happening, at least to a degree.

Recent imagery analysis indicates, for example, a significant buildup of newly delivered Russian armor, including new T-90M tanks, at the 22nd Central Tank Reserve Base, located around 450 miles from the Finnish border.

Mind you, the 22nd with T-90Ms, BTR-82As and BMP-3ms (and maybe BREMs) is just the latest storage depot beign refilled. There's also the 80th mainly with 2S19s and the 374th near the Finnish border with 2S43s and 2S44s since 2025…

— Jompy (@Jonpy99) October 15, 2026

Finland’s planned acquisition of anti-personnel mines fits into a broader effort to prepare for a potential future conflict. Prominent in the minds of Finnish — and other Nordic — defense planners is the fact that Russia is rebuilding the command structures and infrastructure needed to support a larger military presence near NATO’s northern frontier, even as the war in Ukraine limits its immediate ability to do so.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Finland To Build A Million Landmines As Russian Threat Looms appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. military has successfully demonstrated a new lower-cost receiver that could form part of a future over-the-horizon (OTH) radar. The testing also raises the question of whether the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) research site in Alaska, which the U.S. Air Force transferred away more than a decade ago, could be repurposed for operational use in this role. A new radar of this kind would help the United States plug critical gaps in surveillance coverage over the ever-more strategic Arctic region. Canada is notably already pursuing a multi-billion-dollar OTH radar project in cooperation with Australia for this exact purpose.

The U.S. military put out a press release yesterday regarding the testing of the newly developed receiver array, which occurred between September 7 and September 11. This was the culmination of a series of “Arctic air domain awareness” experiments conducted cooperatively by U.S. and Canadian authorities over the past three years.

The final round of experimentation last month “examined whether an existing high-frequency transmitter [HAARP], paired with a newly developed, low-cost [16-element high-frequency] receiver array, could detect aircraft beyond the coverage of current long-range radar sites,” according to the release. “The effort focused on improving awareness across a region where vast distances, harsh weather and limited infrastructure present challenges for air surveillance.”

“Researchers used the University of Alaska Fairbanks’ High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program [HAARP] facility and a receiver array in Cold Bay developed by MITRE to collect data on participating aircraft over the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea,” the release added. “MITRE also supported the effort throughout the three-year experiment series and designed and executed the field experiment in partnership with government, scientific, and operational participants.”

The remote HAARP site was built in the 1990s as part of a joint U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy effort. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was also involved. The central component of the 33-acre facility is an array of 180 crossed-dipole antennas, which can transmit up to 3.6 megawatts of radio frequency energy, according to the Air Force.

The primary purpose of HAARP was to provide U.S. government and independent researchers with a state-of-the-art facility to explore ionospheric phenomena. On the U.S. military side, work was focused on improving long-range surveillance and communications capabilities, including ways to communicate with submerged submarines. Over the years, HAARP has also been the subject of several entirely unsubstantiated conspiracy theories.

In 2014, the U.S. Air Force announced that it would shutter the HAARP site and dismantle it. However, the following year, the decision was instead made to transfer it to the University of Alaska Fairbanks, which has continued to operate it as a civilian research facility.

“During an experimental air domain awareness initiative, HAARP served as a high-power illuminator, transmitting signals toward the ionosphere to support the detection of airborne targets over Alaska’s maritime approaches,” according to the captions of several pictures that accompanied the release yesterday. “The experiment evaluated bistatic over-the-horizon detection methods to explore potential improvements in long-range surveillance and air domain awareness across Alaska’s maritime approaches.”

The most common types of OTH radars are so-called ‘skywave’ or ‘backscatter’ designs. They usually consist of two large and geographically separated arrays of antennas. The ‘illuminator’ array pumps out signals that are bounced off the ionosphere, the ionized layer of Earth’s upper atmosphere, at a specific angle so that they return to the ‘receiver’ array. Objects of interest (in the air and/or on the surface depending on the specific configuration) are detected in the process. As TWZ has previously written:

“Commonly, radars are limited by line of sight due to the curvature of the Earth in relation to the altitude they are operating at. OTHRs overcome this critical limitation, but with some major drawbacks.”

…

“While they offer much lower fidelity than many of their line-of-sight counterparts in most cases, they make up for it in huge range, hundreds of miles to thousands of miles (1,500 miles is common, for instance, for powerful military sky wave/backscatter OTHR systems) and a large coverage area. The sky wave type of OTHRs achieve this by bouncing their radio waves off the ionosphere to a coverage area where they hit targets and return the same way to the receiving station. The angle at which the radio waves hit the ionosphere dictates the range, and that angle is limited to a specific envelope or the waves won’t properly bounce back toward Earth. As such, placing the radar in the right place in relation to the targeted surveillance area or areas, to begin with, is key.”

In the testing last month, Air Force E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar planes, HC-130J Combat King II rescue aircraft, and KC-135 aerial refueling tankers “served as cooperative targets, providing known positions against which researchers could compare the experimental data,” according to the official release. “The team successfully completed testing, meeting or exceeding its test execution objectives. Initial results show the system was successfully able to achieve full skywave (beyond line of sight) detections of aircraft and correlation to truth flights. Thorough data analysis is ongoing.”

The release also says that the tests “explored how existing infrastructure and emerging technology could complement current surveillance capabilities.” This raises the possibility that the HAARP site, specifically, might be utilized as part of a new OTH radar. Whether or not this is actually under consideration is still unclear, and TWZ has reached out for more information.

Regardless, OTH radars have been experiencing something of a renaissance in recent years in the United States and elsewhere globally. Separate reports just in the past day or so have highlighted what appears to be significant progress on at least one part of a long-planned OTH radar in Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave.

Outside of Alaska, the U.S. military has been working to establish a Tactical Mobile Over-the-Horizon Radar (TACMOR) site in the South Pacific archipelago nation of Palau. The originally stated goal had been to finish work on this facility in 2026, but the project has faced legal challenges.

As already mentioned, OTH radars have also been part of U.S. plans to improve surveillance coverage in the Arctic. Like the recent testing in Alaska, there has been significant cooperation with Canada in this regard over the years, including through the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

Today, NORAD relies heavily on a network of ground-based radars called the North Warning System (NWS) to provide aerial surveillance coverage in the High North. The radars that make up the NWS are also all pointed northward, and none of them provide the kind of wide-area long-range coverage that an OTH design would offer.

The NWS reflects a long-standing focus on monitoring for aerial threats heading across the North Pole toward North America, especially possible nuclear strikes from Russia (and the Soviet Union before it). However, new avenues for geostrategic competition in the Arctic with Russia, as well as China, over natural resources, from oil and natural gas to fish and other sealife, as well as trade routes have emerged in recent years amid receding ice and other impacts of global climate change. This, in turn, has only prompted growing demand for surveillance coverage.

“We need a layered sensing grid, from [the] seafloor to the space layer. And we have no choice. It has to be layered and deep, a defense in depth, from a sensing point of view,” Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Maj. Gen. Chris McKenna, head of 1 Canadian Air Division and the Canadian NORAD Region, also said during a panel discussion at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium in 2025, at which TWZ was in attendance. “And I will say I suffer from an insufficiency of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] in the Arctic on a daily basis. And I am fighting for information.”

McKenna was responding at the time to a direct question about gaps in so-called “domain awareness” in and around the Arctic and how to address them.

“I think there’s an importance here of not just air domain, but also space domain, and having a sufficiency of ISR in the Arctic to actually build you the [domain awareness] picture,” he added. “I haven’t really touched on over-the-horizon radar, but I certainly can get into it. I think that’s a really important capability given the austerity of the Arctic and the need for it to cue other things.”

For its part, Canada is now building its own new Arctic Over The Horizon Radar (A-OTHR), at an estimated cost of more than $4 billion. In an announcement last year that caught many off guard, the Canadian government announced that it would be leveraging technology originally developed for Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) to support this development. It is also important to note here that relations between Canadian authorities and the Trump administration have been and continue to be heavily strained over a variety of issues, which has prompted broad concerns about future defense and security cooperation.

Back in the United States, OTH radar plans are also now tied in with the broader Golden Dome air and missile defense initiative. Golden Dome is seeking to establish new layers of defense around the U.S. homeland against a wide array of threat types, and puts major emphasis on new space-based sensor and interceptor capabilities. Expanded defensive architectures within the Earth’s atmosphere are also part of this plan.

“Adversaries are developing and building advanced nuclear and conventional delivery capabilities,” U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Joseph Jarrard, Vice Commander of the U.S. element of NORAD and Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), warned at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in August. This includes “cruise, hypersonic, and ballistic missiles, as well as fractional orbital bombardment systems, or FOBS, to threaten not only Alaska and Hawaii, but the entire continent of the United States.”

Chinese hypersonic and other developments, in particular, enable new modes of attack that “can approach North America from the south, rather than the traditional northerly vector for which our legacy early warning radars were designed,” Jarrard continued. “The Chinese have also been building a conventionally-armed ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles that can range [sic] targets throughout Alaska, providing Chinese leaders strike options against our homeland below the nuclear threshold.”

“Russia’s advanced missiles, like the nuclear-armed Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, are designed to circumvent the ground-based radars used by NORAD and NORTHCOM to detect and characterize an inbound threat, and challenge the ability to provide threat warning and attack assessment,” he added.

New OTH radars positioned in Alaska and elsewhere in the Pacific will not be able to address all of these threat developments alone. At the same time, the recent testing leveraging the HAARP site is another step toward meeting demands for sorely needed expanded long-range radar coverage in the Arctic.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Alaska’s HAARP Site Now Being Used To Test New Air Force Over-The-Horizon Radar Tech appeared first on TWZ.

New photos provide an interesting first public look inside the payload bay of Australia’s Ghost Shark extra-large autonomous underwater vehicle (XL-AUV), and a glimpse of the highly modular concept at the heart of the Royal Australian Navy’s emerging undersea warfare capability. Australian authorities had said in the past that they plan to use Ghost Sharks to conduct “persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike” missions, but without any real elaboration.

The photographs were taken during a recent visit to the Anduril Australia factory in Sydney, New South Wales, by Pat Conroy, Australia’s Minister for Defense Industry. They emerged as the Australian government announced new details of payload development for Ghost Shark, the Speartooth large uncrewed underwater vehicle (LUUV), and the BlueBottle uncrewed surface vessel (USV), on October 19. While the announcement described the payloads in very broad terms, the photos plus additional details from the Anduril event reveal a more concrete picture of the missions Ghost Shark is being designed to perform.

The three previously undisclosed payload options include deploying up to 12 sea mines in a mission, leaving supply caches on the seabed, and launching Anduril’s ALTIUS aerial drones for reconnaissance or strike missions.

“Ghost Shark now has teeth, and will have the ability to inflict damage on any potential adversary,” Conroy said.

The payload bay image is significant in its own right. Ghost Shark’s modular design is intended to accommodate different mission-specific systems, allowing the Royal Australian Navy to configure the same underlying platform for different operational requirements. Ghost Shark was designed to be extremely modular, flexible, and readily reconfigurable. As part of this, the overall payload portion can be readily configured in different ways using different-sized modular hull sections. Since the nose and the tail are different pieces, with an expandable section in the middle, there is plenty of scope for different payloads as well.

Seeing the internal bay for the first time provides a more tangible look at that approach than earlier photographs of the submarine’s exterior.

Inside the bay of one of the Ghost Sharks on display, there appear to be cylindrical spacers, formed in segments, rather than operational stores. These spacers, and other areas inside the bay, look as if they are fabricated from plywood or similar. Overall, this means it is not entirely clear if they represent the kind of ballast that would be loaded to take the place of actual payloads during trials, or whether they are part of a mockup.

Of the three payload options, the ability to deploy ALTIUS aerial drones is particularly noteworthy. An underwater vehicle capable of releasing aerial systems could extend a naval force’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) reach beyond the submarine’s own sensors. Depending on the drone variant and mission configuration, it could also provide a means of delivering effects at a distance without putting personnel directly in harm’s way. Other roles could include stimulating enemy air defense networks, perhaps even responding to pop-up air defence threats as they appear and attacking them. The ability to put miniaturized satcom terminals, as well as AI, on small drones also greatly opens up the possibilities for UUV-launched aerial drones.

Which ALTIUS variants the Ghost Shark will be able to deploy has not been publicly disclosed. The models displayed at the Altus factory are all derivatives of the ALTIUS-600 family. Notable versions include the ALTIUS-600 for ISR, as well as the ALTIUS-600M, which is designed for strike missions. As you can read here, the basic drone has an overall weight of between 20 and 27 pounds, depending on its payload, which typically weighs between three and seven pounds. The ALTIUS-600 has a maximum range of around 275 miles and can remain airborne for at least four hours, according to its developer. Unarmed variants of the ALTIUS-600 are designed to be recoverable and reusable, although it is unclear how practical that would be after launch from a UUV.

There is another missing part of the payload puzzle, namely the kinds of capsules that would contain the ALTIUS UAVs for launch from the sub.

The Rheinmetall Asteria 533mm-diameter mine pictured alongside the Ghost Shark is not installed in the vehicle’s payload bay. Its appearance nevertheless provides an intriguing visual counterpart to the newly disclosed mine-delivery capability. According to the manufacturer, the Asteria can be deployed from surface vessels, aircraft, and submarines (normally via torpedo tubes). It can be remotely controlled via an acoustic link and is optimized for the defense of harbors, straits, ports, and other critical areas.

The seabed supply-cache concept points to a different operational role. Ghost Shark could position equipment and supplies underwater for later retrieval, potentially supporting forces operating in areas where conventional resupply is difficult or risky.

The notional supply cache payloads — which are under development by the Defense Science and Technology Group (DSTG) — don’t appear to be on display here. Alex Luck, a naval analyst who closely tracks submarine developments, told TWZ that the cache payloads would likely take the form of capsules, similar in shape to the Asteria mine, but containing whatever supplies need to be moved. It is not immediately clear who would use those caches. One option could be special operations forces, but if the payloads could later rise to the surface, they could be accessed by other forces, too.

It should also be noted that the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps, in particular, are envisioning future fleets of UUVs and USVs that can carry out kinetic attacks and employ electronic warfare and other non-kinetic effects, as well as emplace mines, providing a direct parallel with the planned mission set for Ghost Shark.

Some of the new payload capabilities are due to be featured in Exercise Maritime Big Play Pacific in San Diego, an AUKUS Pillar II activity focused on advanced maritime capabilities and interoperability. The Australian government says the development effort involves the Royal Australian Navy, Defense Science and Technology Group, the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator and defense industry.

As we have discussed in the past, Maritime Big Play has links to the U.S. military’s Technology Readiness Experimentation (T-REX) effort and NATO’s Robotic Experimentation and Prototyping Augmented by Maritime Unmanned Systems (REPMUS) exercise series, according to the Pentagon. The U.S. Navy has also been conducting a growing number of large-scale uncrewed-focused maritime exercises and demonstration events in recent years.

Under AUKUS Pillar II, Australia is collaborating with the United Kingdom and the United States on Ghost Shark and its associated capabilities. While Pillar I centers on providing Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, Pillar II focuses on the joint development of advanced defence technologies, including artificial intelligence and autonomous systems.

Exactly how the Ghost Shark will be deployed during the Maritime Big Play Pacific exercise is unclear, but, speaking about the concept of operations, Conroy described examples of it being deployed from a shipping container or launched from the back of a small vessel using a crane. In the past, we have also seen the Ghost Shark loaded in a standard shipping container and transported in a Royal Australian Air Force C-17A Globemaster III airlifter.

Overall, U.S. military wargames have highlighted how uncrewed systems could shape a high-end conflict across the Pacific, particularly a fight over Taiwan. One set of Taiwan conflict simulations found that large swarms of relatively low-cost, networked drones could be decisive in helping locate and attack an invading force, while other wargaming by the Center for a New American Security has highlighted the severe challenges of defending the island against a Chinese assault. Maritime drones could also play a major role: the U.S. Navy has explored submarine-launched aerial drones that act as “flying periscopes,” extending sensor coverage and providing targeting data beyond a submarine’s own reach, while uncrewed underwater vehicles could conduct mine-laying and other asymmetric missions around key maritime chokepoints. The rapid growth and technological advances made by the Chinese submarine fleet also underscore the critical importance of anti-submarine capabilities, in which uncrewed systems can play a major role. Together, these developments underscore the potential value of autonomous systems for the Royal Australian Navy as it prepares to operate across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific.

Australia’s 2026 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program allocate up to A$5.8 billion (approximately $4.05 billion) over the decade to autonomous and uncrewed undersea warfare capabilities, including A$1.7 billion (approximately $1.19 billion) for a new fleet of Australian-designed and built Ghost Shark vehicles.

The newly released imagery and payload details offer the clearest picture yet of how Australia intends to expand Ghost Shark beyond a conventional underwater surveillance role. The next key milestones should provide more details of how the payloads will be integrated into the vehicle, and how they might be deployed in practice.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Ghost Shark Extra-Large Uncrewed Underwater Vehicles’ Payload Bay Seen For First Time appeared first on TWZ.

A Russian satellite, Kosmos 2612, may have passed within approximately 85 feet (26 meters) of a U.S.-registered satellite belonging to commercial imagery provider ICEYE. This would be an extraordinarily close and potentially dangerous pass-by for two objects in space traveling at thousands of miles per hour. For weeks beforehand, ICEYE-X36, which would be of special interest to Russia, had already found itself in increasingly close orbital alignment with its pursuer. The two satellites now look to be drifting further and further apart, but the episode has been a clear sign of what is to come as the potential for conflict in space only continues to grow.

Publicly available space tracking data from the satellitemap.space and orbitalradar.com websites show that Kosmos 2612 (also written sometimes Cosmos 2612 and abbreviated K2612) and ICEYE X36 had their especially close encounter at approximately 16:07 UTC today. Private space services company LeoLabs also told TWZ today that it could not “confirm or contradict what other data sources have stated publicly,” but that it has “high-confidence that the objects came within approximately [emphasis in the original] 500 meters [1,640 feet] of each other.” Kosmos 2612 had been making progressively closer passes by ICEYE X36 in recent days.

Short time-lapse of part of this morning’s first pass of ICEYE-X36 (59103) and COSMOS 2612 (68762) over South America under partly cloudy skies. pic.twitter.com/t8RhwmKcV4

— s2a systems (@s2a_systems) October 18, 2026

6/x
Note that while ICEYE-X36 was Finnish built, it is (like other ICEYE sats who's ownership transferred) no longer Finnish. It is registered in the US but might be Ukranian owned/leased now.

— Dr Marco Langbroek (@Marco_Langbroek) October 17, 2026

“COSMOS 2612 closed from hundreds of kilometers away to extreme proximity to ICEYE-X36. It then maneuvered around ICEYE-X36,  remained nearby for an extended period, and then began moving away,” LeoLabs also stated in a report assessing the situation, which was updated today and provided to TWZ. “The latest observations show the spacecraft strongly diverging and confirm that the close-proximity activity had ended.” 

LeoLabs’ broader assessment here is supported by data from other publicly available sources, as seen below.

UPDATE: Cosmos 2612 appears to have maneuvered following a close approach with the ICEYE satellite.

The latest TLEs show 2612 in a larger orbit that will drift away with no further maneuvers.

In this animation, I fit an impulsive burn to bridge 2612’s previous TLE to its most… https://t.co/owzTZiijka pic.twitter.com/RBqGDvVH9H

— Adam Cohen (@AdamCohen8) October 18, 2026

Additional context

None of the distances stated earlier may seem especially close, let alone worrisome, by terrestrial standards. However, this is absolutely abnormal for operations in space that are not being directly coordinated by the parties involved. As a point of reference, in 2020, another Russian satellite, Kosmos 2542, came within 150 to 300 kilometers (93 to 186 miles) of USA 245, a KH-11 spy satellite, and became a major international news story.

“We are aware of the situation and tracking it closely,” a spokesperson for ICEYE’s U.S.-based division told TWZ this morning. “Our constellation architecture is designed for continuity and resilience.”

ICEYE was founded in Finland, but now has offices globally. The company specializes in providing imagery via synthetic aperture radar (SAR) from satellites like ICEYE X36, which was launched in 2024.

SAR has the benefit of being able to capture images day or night, and regardless of bad weather or other obscurants like heavy smoke. There are trade-offs in terms of the kinds of details typically visible via SAR compared to what is seen in visual spectrum imagery. Ukrainian authorities have been utilizing ICEYE imagery for years now, including for targeting purposes, as part of the ongoing conflict with Russia. There have been reports in the past that ICEYE X36 has been operating more directly under the control of the Ukrainian government, but this has not been confirmed.

Kosmos 2612 is one of six satellites (Cosmos 2609 through Cosmos 2614) the Russian military launched via a single Soyuz-2.1b rocket on April 17. The exact purpose and configuration of these satellites are unconfirmed. However, they appear to be so-called inspector types capable of rendezvousing and maneuvering close to other objects in space. We will come back to this later on.

What is clear is that Kosmos 2612 has spent the past three weeks deliberately maneuvering to extremely closely shadow ICEYE X36.

“Over two weeks beginning on September 30, 2026, Cosmos 2612 executed a series of new maneuvers that brought it back into coplanar alignment and placed it at nearly the same altitude as the commercial satellite,” Clayton Swope, Deputy Director of the Aerospace Security Project and Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank in Washington, D.C., along with Research Assistant Chantal Li, wrote in an analysis of the situation just last Thursday.

“According to current orbital elements, the Russian #KOSMOS 2612 satellite is now within 1-2 km [0.6 miles to 1.2 miles] of #ICEYE-X36,” Dr. Marco Langbroek, currently a lecturer on Space Situational Awareness at the Faculty of Aerospace Engineering of Delft Technical University in the Netherlands, wrote in a thread on X on Saturday. “Based on current elements, it might come within meters of the latter within a few hours from now. This is an #RPO [rendezvous and proximity operation] without consent.”

2/x
Initially I was skeptic whether #ICEYEX36 really was an intentional target: but a series of manoeuvers by #Kosmos2612 starting on Sept 30, were clearly designed to bring the two objects very close and synchronise their orbital periods, orbital altitude and eccentricity: pic.twitter.com/BhIoi8Rtbe

— Dr Marco Langbroek (@Marco_Langbroek) October 17, 2026

“New TLEs [two-line elements] show that K2612 made a manuever [sic] on Oct 16 and is now stationkeeping within 5 km [3.1 miles] or less of ICEYE X36,” Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist and astronomer, who previously worked for the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics and has long been tracking objects of interest in orbit, also wrote in a series of posts on X on Saturday. “To my knowledge this is the first LEO [low Earth orbit] rendezvous of two active satellites where the owner of one of the sats did not give approval.”

McDowell later clarified that “close passes” of objects in orbit had certainly occurred previously, “but not I think rendezvous [sic] (matching velocity vector).”

“This is the most advanced and potentially dangerous uncooperative RPO we’ve observed,” Adam Marsh, LeoLabs vice president for technical solutions, separately told Breaking Defense.

Unprecedented orbital maneuvering

As underscored by the previous interaction of Kosmos 2542 and USA 245, close shadowing of satellites in orbit is certainly nothing new. The U.S. government, as well as Russia and others, have been observed engaging in this kind of activity in the past. At the same time, just how close Kosmos 2612 got to ICEYE X36, and how long they spent in close alignment, are, at the very least, highly unusual.

“It’s important to note that ‘red’ on ‘blue’ engagements,  such as this, are relatively uncommon in Low Earth Orbit (LEO),” LeoLabs’ report points out. At the same time, “this was not a routine conjunction or ‘fly by.’ The sequence included a controlled approach, changes in relative position, close-proximity loitering, additional small maneuvers, and a controlled departure. The behavior is consistent with sophisticated rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO).”

On top of this, there are other signs that what just happened between Kosmos 2612 and ICEYE X36 may follow a Russian playbook of sorts that could also be used in a prelude to an on-orbit anti-satellite attack.

Within weeks of their launch in April, Kosmos 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, and 2614 had all moved orbital planes shared by multiple ICEYE satellites. Three of them subsequently made close passes by ICEYE X36, specifically, but none of them initially kept station with it. ICEYE CEO Rafal Modrzewski did say “the company later moved its ​satellite, prompting further Russian manoeuvres [sic],” according to a story Reuters published last week.

Russian satellites approaching ICEYE: a closer look at the timeline.

Tracking data via @LeoLabs_Space . Analysis via COMSPOC SSA.

On April 16, Russia launched six maneuverable satellites (Cosmos 2609-2614) from Plesetsk. Five of them — Cosmos 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, and 2614… pic.twitter.com/ISoToOptnp

— COMSPOC_OPS (@COMSPOC_OPS) July 15, 2026

To take a step even further back, before Kosmos 2542 was caught shadowing USA 245 in 2020, there were reports that the U.S. spy satellite had shifted its orbit. This was possibly prompted by the movements of another Russian ‘inspector,’ Kosmos 2543. This does not appear to have ever been confirmed.

While in space, Kosmos 2542 had deployed Kosmos 2543 in November 2019. Then, on July 23, 2020, the U.S. military said that it had detected Kosmos 2543 itself launching a smaller object in what it described as a test of a space-based anti-satellite weapon. In a subsequent interview with Time, then-Chief of Space Operations Gen. John “Jay” Raymond, U.S. Space Force’s top uniformed officer, disclosed that American forces had first observed Russian “nesting doll” satellites – a reference to traditional Russian matryoshka dolls – similarly demonstrating the “characteristics of a weapon system” in 2017.

U.S. officials have been warning for years that Russia’s growing array of inspector-type satellites, ostensibly designed to examine other assets the country has in orbit if they break down or otherwise malfunction, are inherently dual-purpose in nature. Beyond launching projectiles, a host of other modes of attack, kinetic and non-kinetic, are enabled by the underlying ability of a spacecraft to maneuver very close to other objects in orbit and hold that position. This includes the use of grappling arms to cause damage or just tow a satellite out of orbit, spraying aerosols to harm or impair optics and solar panels, and electronic warfare jamming. A satellite could turn out to be the weapon itself, becoming a kinetic interceptor that smashes into its target on command.

One satellite shadowing another closely in orbit allows various kinds of intelligence gathering, as well. Collection of imagery and signal emissions can offer valuable details about a target’s capabilities and vulnerabilities, as well as how it is being used in a particular context.

“As observed by LeoLabs Global Radar Network and analyzed by our team, COSMOS 2612 demonstrated a sequence of capabilities that could be used to inspect, characterize, shadow, or potentially interfere with another spacecraft,” according to LeoLabs’ report. “These actions require planning, maneuverability, precise navigation, and significant fuel. They may also indicate the use of onboard sensors capable of measuring the relative position of another spacecraft.”

What has just transpired between Kosmos 2612 and ICEYE X36 highlights how just a viable threat of attack can be disruptive in its own right. Simply forcing an imagery-gathering satellite out of position could prevent it from collecting over an intended area, or at least doing so in the most effective manner.

Furthermore, satellites only have a limited amount of fuel with which to maneuver in any way after reaching orbit. Harassment in space that forces them to burn off that finite resource at a higher-than-expected rate could reduce their total operational life expectancy, as well as further limit their effectiveness and make them more vulnerable to attacks or accidents. Debris in space is a steadily growing hazard that satellites increasingly need to dodge.

The United States, among others, has been actively pursuing on-orbit refueling capabilities to help address these issues. Last month, American officials also made the bombshell admission that there are unspecified U.S. weapon systems in orbit now, ostensibly for defensive purposes amid growing threats from Russia, as well as China. Both of those countries, among others, have been actively developing and fielding various anti-satellite capabilities inside and out of the Earth’s atmosphere.

“We can only speculate about the operation’s goal, but it could have been anything from simply intimidation to outright destruction or sabotage of a U.S.-registered satellite,” CSIS’ Clayton Swope told TWZ directly today in light of the new developments regarding Kosmos 2612 and ICEYE X36. “Perhaps the operation is on hold. There are, however, several other satellites that shadowed ICEYE X36 back in May that could be brought in[to] action too.”

Attribution and broader ramifications

It is important to point out that space, as a domain, inherently creates complications when it comes to attributing any form of attack, should one occur. Satellites do suffer mishaps, sometimes with catastrophic results, the causes of which are not always clear.

Just in January, a Russian inspector satellite launched in 2014 appeared to break up unexpectedly. Sometime around the end of July, the Chinese reconnaissance satellite Yaogan 50-02, which had only been launched some four months earlier, also broke up in orbit. On Sept. 13, a similar fate befell the U.S. Cold War-era Farrah III spy satellite, also known as USA 32. At the time of writing, no firm evidence has emerged to indicate any of these incidents were the result of hostile action rather than accidents of some kind.

Update: Debris from active PRC satellite Yaogan 50-02.@S4S_SDA has now cataloged 62 pieces of debris originating from the PRC's active Yaogan 50-02 satellite (68196 / 2026-051A) on around 20 July 2026 (ref my initial analysis on Substack, link in thread).

In spite of the… pic.twitter.com/1ecF68W8VQ

— Space Domain Awareness (@shell_jim) October 12, 2026

Some recordings of USA 32 (#19460), whose fragmentation in LEO on 13 Sep 2026 at approximately 2113 UTC was confirmed by U.S. Space Forces–Space (S4S). By the time of the recordings, a large number of fragments had already dispersed over a wide section of the track. pic.twitter.com/gjRxCTPz2o

— s2a systems (@s2a_systems) September 16, 2026

“While the intention behind COSMOS 2612’s behavior remains uncertain, the deliberate nature of the activity, the fuel required to conduct this activity, and the proximity to a Western commercial imaging satellite make the event strategically important,” LeoLab’s report notes. “This event, and the capabilities demonstrated, do not establish hostile intent. It does, however, demonstrate capabilities that could support intelligence collection, on-orbit inspection, coercive signaling, interference, or preparation for future counterspace operations.”

It is very possible, if not highly probable, that Kosmos 2612’s recent activities will be indicative of a trend going forward. Aggressive and potentially dangerous maneuvering by armed forces in close proximity to each other is not uncommon within the atmosphere, especially in the air and at sea. Extending a variation of those tactics into the space domain would make sense, especially given the central role that capabilities in orbit increasingly play in modern military operations globally. Those roles extend to early warning, general intelligence gathering, weapons guidance, near-real-time communications, and beyond.

American officials have already said in the past that American assets in space are routinely the target of “reversible attacks,” meaning ones that do not cause permanent damage. That also speaks to the difficulty of attribution if there is no lasting effect or impact to draw attention to.

The U.S. government’s long-time monopoly on the space domain has also been steadily eroding in recent years, especially in light of China’s massive expansion of its intelligence-gathering and other satellite constellations. The scale and scope of what commercial satellite imagery and other space services providers, like ICEYE, offer today have led to a further democratization of space-based capabilities to countries like Ukraine that do not possess significant, if any, constellations of their own.

All of this, in turn, has increasingly driven the U.S. military, specifically, to plan for more proactive operations and potential direct conflict in orbit to ensure it retains its edge going forward. The aforementioned disclosure of U.S. on-orbit weapons is indicative of those developments and an accompanying shift in U.S. policy to be more open about counter-space capabilities.

More details may yet emerge about Kosmos 2612 and its recent rendezvous in orbit with ICEYE X36, but it already points to how space has become an increasingly likely potential zone for direct conflict going forward.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Russian Satellite’s Unprecedented Shadowing Of A Very Particular Radar Imaging Satellite Is A Big Deal appeared first on TWZ.

Germany appears to have dropped plans to directly procure the larger, Block 3 version of Boeing’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), leaving doubts over Berlin’s ambitions to field uncrewed combat aircraft alongside its crewed fighters before the end of the decade.

Boeing confirmed to Breaking Defense that Germany’s Ministry of Defense had informed the company it would not proceed with a direct acquisition of the drone, which had previously been lined up. The decision, first reported by Politico, represents a setback for Boeing’s effort to position the Ghost Bat as a candidate for Berlin’s planned CCA capability, something that had seen it announce a partnership with Rheinmetall, the largest arms manufacturer in Germany, earlier this year.

NEW: Germany has formally scrapped plans to buy the Ghost Bat combat drones directly from Australia, documents show.

Its air force wanted them by 2029. Now it faces a longer wait.

Behind the decision is a much bigger political dilemma facing Germany as it races to rearm. pic.twitter.com/2fWHPoQOl0

— Chris Lunday (@lundayfunday) October 15, 2026

“With Boeing Defense Australia as a partner, we are laying the groundwork to optimally tailor the MQ-28 to the Bundeswehr’s requirements,” said Armin Papperger, CEO of Rheinmetall AG, in March of this year. “As a system integrator, we ensure that integration, operation, and further development come from a single source while simultaneously strengthening industrial value creation in the form of an industrial hub in Germany and Europe. We see revenue potential for Rheinmetall in the range of three-digit millions of euros.”

#Rheinmetall and #Boeing partner on German MQ-28 #Ghost #Bat
https://t.co/zGEhjQNqqi pic.twitter.com/VLBDQ8EAaV

— Rheinmetall (@RheinmetallAG) March 31, 2026

The move does not necessarily mean the MQ-28 is out of contention for Germany’s wider program. Instead, Berlin appears set to move toward a different acquisition approach, with competing designs potentially having an opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities before a selection is made.

A Boeing spokesperson told Breaking Defense the company “stands ready to support” its German customer on the next steps, while referring questions about the decision to the German Ministry of Defense.

The ministry declined to discuss the specific procurement with the same outlet, citing regulations governing public contracting and the need for such matters to be addressed by parliament.

“[As a] matter of principle — and regardless of the specific case in question — we cannot provide information regarding potential procurement projects,” a ministry spokesperson told Breaking Defense.

Germany has set an ambitious goal of fielding CCAs by 2029. These uncrewed aircraft are intended to operate alongside crewed fighters such as the Eurofighter, extending their reach, adding sensors and weapons, and giving air forces additional options for conducting high-risk missions.

However, the reported change in Berlin’s acquisition plans raises questions about whether that deadline remains achievable.

According to Politico, Germany is now looking toward the early 2030s for the capability to arrive, with flight testing expected to begin in 2027. That would suggest the original target was based around the introduction of the MQ-28, which has already undergone extensive testing, rather than a newer design. The reshuffle could now give prospective suppliers additional time to demonstrate their designs.

The reported new timeline suggests that Germany’s CCA effort could be entering a more competitive and potentially longer development phase.

There is also a question about the degree of operational capability that will initially be fielded by the given date. Getting a CCA into meaningful frontline service is a very significant task, calling for integration with crewed fighters, communications systems, mission-planning networks, weapons, and sensors. Then there is also testing, certification, training, and the establishment of supporting infrastructure. For Germany in particular, getting a military drone, let alone an armed one, cleared to operate routinely in commercial airspace has long been an issue.

If Germany acquired the Ghost Bat directly, it would have offered a route to a CCA capability without having to begin an entirely new aircraft development effort.

However, the MQ-28 was always one of a larger field of candidate aircraft.

A week ago, Airbus and Kratos Defense & Security Solutions announced the first flight of their U740 Valkyrie uncrewed combat aircraft, a Europeanized version of the XQ-58A Valkyrie. Airbus is simultaneously working on its larger U760 Ravenstorm, intended for service in the early 2030s, and the company has previously pitched a stealthy CCA-like concept known as Wingman.

The ride of the Valkyrie
With the successful first flight of the Airbus U740 Valkyrie in Europe, we are one step closer to introducing an operational uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) to the German and other European Armed Forces.
The flight achieved all… pic.twitter.com/S2sFrtdmGA

— Airbus Defence (@AirbusDefence) October 12, 2026

Other entrants include Anduril, General Atomics partnered with Germany’s INTEC, as well as Lockheed Martin. Meanwhile, Helsing and Hensoldt are pursuing the homegrown CA-1 Europa, very much an MQ-28 lookalike.

Germany may not be looking for a single drone to do everything, a point we have discussed in the past:

“One option might be a split high-low approach that could pair more capable, longer-range systems for deep-strike missions with cheaper, attritable collaborative combat aircraft that can fly alongside crewed fighters. At this point, it should also be noted that CCAs could also give older fourth-generation fighters a new lease on life, boosting their lethality and survivability by extending their sensor reach, adding weapons capacity, and allowing uncrewed aircraft to take on more dangerous tasks.”

At the same time, Germany continues to define its requirements for a capability described in media reports as a Jagdbomberdrohne, or fighter-bomber drone. Berlin has yet to publicly clarify its intended concept of CCA operations, including whether the Luftwaffe envisions an uncrewed wingman operating alongside crewed fighters, a platform capable of carrying out long-range strike missions independently, or a system designed to perform both roles.

There are signs that the strike mission is being prioritized, at least initially, with a reduced emphasis on air-to-air missions. This is essentially the reverse of the U.S. Air Force’s CCA effort.

Since Germany is set to receive the F-35 stealth fighter, there is also an argument that Berlin could place more orders for the crewed jet. This could have the dual role of filling the gap left by the collapse of the pan-European Future Combat Air System (FCAS), specifically its sixth-generation crewed fighter, and the delayed introduction of the first operational CCAs. Germany is also looking forward to receiving more Eurofighters.

Germany’s evolving CCA plans form part of a broader effort by Western air forces to develop uncrewed aircraft capable of working alongside advanced fighters. These systems are intended to expand the number of available platforms, distribute sensors and weapons across a larger force, and potentially take on missions that would otherwise expose pilots and expensive crewed aircraft to greater risk.

Boeing’s Ghost Bat could still have an opportunity to compete, depending on the structure of the eventual acquisition process and the requirements Berlin establishes.

However, with testing reportedly planned from 2027 and operational fielding potentially slipping into the early 2030s, the original 2029 ambition for an operational German CCA appears increasingly uncertain.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Germany Drops Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat Rapid Procurement Plan appeared first on TWZ.

As he prepares for a potential future conflict on the continent, the commanding general of Multi-Domain Command Europe told TWZ that he envisions dispersing hundreds of high-altitude balloons at a time. The balloons, Brig. Gen. Steven Carpenter explained, would be used for a wide range of purposes, from serving as communications platforms to launching weapons. For years now, TWZ has been closely tracking the expanding use of high-altitude balloons and other lighter-than-air systems globally for intelligence gathering, networking, as platforms for launching drones, and in support of other missions.

Basically, in the European scenario, hundreds or possibly thousands of balloons would be sent east. They would provide attritable real-time reconnaissance, strike, and decoy capabilities, while also acting as a force multiplier for other assets by providing a resilient active network over the battlefield — one that could help fill in the gaps if the space-based layer gets degraded.

“We would like to proliferate the stratosphere with high-altitude balloons, but I mean 200, 300 at a time,” Carpenter told us during last week’s Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) conference in Washington, D.C., which TWZ attended. The Army would utilize high-altitude balloons “not only as decoys, a lot of decoys, but also communications retrans[mission platforms], electronic sensing, as well as electronic attack, and then obviously air-launched effects to be able to drop them down and use kinetic means as well.”

Air-launched effects (ALEs) is a collective term the U.S. military now commonly uses to discuss air-launched drones configured for a wide array of missions. The ALE umbrella encompasses designs that can be used for surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic warfare tasks, or signal relay, and can act as decoys. It also includes loitering munitions often referred to as kamikaze drones, capable of carrying kinetic attacks.

In general, modern high-altitude balloons offer persistent deployment that can last for days, weeks or even months at a time. After navigating to an assigned operating area, some modern balloon systems can hold their position, in spite of prevailing winds, by modulating their altitudes to keep on station.

In addition, high-altitude balloons operate at heights providing excellent fields of view for radars, cameras, and other sensors in all directions and across very broad areas. From a perch of 60,000 feet or more, they also offer a way to peer into certain denied areas while still soaring in international airspace and keeping farther away from potential threats. During a conflict, the balloons could be deployed deep into enemy airspace as they are attritable.

Though some balloon systems can hold their general positions in many circumstances, Carpenter told us that seasonal weather changes will still play a role in deployment.

“The flight paths are different. We study that,” he noted. “We understand during what seasons where the best places are to launch those high-altitude systems, and then again to hold enemy cities and capabilities at risk at any time, so that we can defeat them at the time and place of our choosing.”

We asked Carpenter for more details about how he sees balloons being used by troops in Europe.

“I think everybody knows there’ll be a point where satellite communications are going to be degraded, if not eliminated,” he stated. “One of the things that we’re focusing on is in the stratosphere, so above 60,000 feet up to 80,000 feet, which is next to impossible to target unless you’re using one of your exquisite systems, fifth-gen fighters, SA-21 Bravo [S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile system], etc. to shoot that stuff down.”

Many of the balloons would be equipped with Link 16, a NATO-standard tactical datalink communication system central to U.S. and allied military operations, the general said. Link 16 allows coalition forces to seamlessly transmit and exchange real-time situational awareness data. You can read more about how Link 16 works, and its increasing dependence of space, in our story here.

As for using balloons as ALE delivery platforms, Carpenter told us there are “different technologies, different altitudes that we’d have to deliver those from” at “different ranges, different levels of yield or lethality. But for us, it’s really just a single arrow in a quiver full of arrows, utilizing space capabilities, cyber capabilities, or surface-to-surface capabilities. In this case, you’re talking just another air-to-surface capability with your air-launched effects off balloons.”

Carpenter said that when it comes to balloon-launched ALEs, he is looking at “everything from shorter range, lower yield, maybe targeting an adversary ballistic missile radar, to longer range, higher yield capabilities that you might use to maybe take out a ballistic missile system.”

In such cases, the balloons would carry drones deep into enemy territory, where they would be launched opportunistically to strike the targets Carpenter suggested. The size of the target, and how well it is protected, would determine what kinds of drones the balloons would launch, as well as their proximity to the target.

Should a fight break out in Europe tonight, Carpenter said he is confident he can rely on the technology.

“Our operating concept is proven,” he stated, noting that “we’ve already tested those capabilities against most modern adversary systems that exist. We’ve already validated our operating concept in terms of getting to mass and scale that we would need in large-scale conflict.”

As we have previously reported, while high-altitude balloons have been used for decades, the modern concept of these systems was recently employed operationally by the U.S. in a combat theater.

The Army had planned to demonstrate the ability of balloons to operate in swarms with a high degree of autonomy in the Pacific region last year before those assets were redirected to the Middle East. When exactly that deployment occurred and how long it lasted are unclear.

“We were asked to pivot and do some experimentation in combination with operations, and we pivoted and supported operations in CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command],” Andrew Evans, Director of Strategy and Transformation with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, or G-2, told Breaking Defense, according to a story the outlet published last week. “They were effective for the mission that they were assigned,” he added. However, Evans was not able to disclose the exact location and operational scenarios in which they were used.

Other countries, including U.S. allies and partners, are increasingly fielding balloon-based and other lighter-than-air systems, too. Ukrainian forces notably have been using balloons to conduct kinetic attacks and launch drones against Russian assets. On the other side of that conflict, the Russians have used balloons as decoys to confuse and misdirect air defenses.

The following video shows Ukrainian forces using balloons to launch kamikaze drones.

American-made Hornet middle-range strike UAV being tested with balloon-assisted launch system.

Such resolution allows to drastically increase its original range (approx. 100km).

Hornet OWA-UAVs are actively employed by Ukrainian forces for strikes on Russian logistics and other… pic.twitter.com/S1bHqLNhPY

— Status-6 (@Archer83Able) May 20, 2026

To achieve the effects he laid out, Carpenter told us that he will still need to surge capacity to Europe.

“The Army will make decisions on which vendors they’re going to go with,” he pointed out. “But the ability to field that at scale is just simply based on the resources provided. I’m talking about money to go ahead and bring them into theater.”

Pushed to provide details of how quickly he could have the desired number of balloons, Carpenter told us that “if the United States or NATO and its allies were on a wartime footing, it would be extremely rapid, but we would need to get them into theater before crisis turned to conflict. So we’d have to keep a close eye from an IC [intelligence community] perspective on indicators and warnings to make sure we have the right systems on the ground at point of need.”

The Army’s overall vision for balloons is not new; the service has been openly discussing it for at least six years now. However, the use of high-altitude balloons in this context is now being operationalized. Meanwhile, China has very actively shown off its ability to gather intelligence and conduct other missions using balloons and other lighter-than-air craft on a broad operational level across the Pacific. TWZ had been reporting on this reality for years before it was thrust fully into the public consciousness after a Chinese spy balloon passed over parts of the United States and Canada back in 2023.

The concept Carpenter laid out for how balloons will be used in a future European conflict is another example of the renaissance in lighter-than-air military technology and how the Pentagon is increasingly seeking to weaponize it on a grand scale.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Army’s Plan To Launch Hundreds Of Balloons Into Enemy Territory If A Future Conflict Breaks Out appeared first on TWZ.

Thanks to Google Earth, we can finally put this one to bed. Since the B-21’s unveiling, people have made wild claims about its wingspan, specifically how tiny it is. This was never the case, as we have reported continuously since we first set eyes on it. Many AI-generated and enthusiast-made B-21 fact sheets have gone viral on social media showing wingspans under 130 feet, which only helped propel the nonsense. Now we can definitively say, give or take a few feet, the B-21 spans 152 feet and is 61 feet long. This puts it at about 12% smaller in terms of wingspan than the B-2, and about the same — 12% smaller — when it comes to length.

The image in question, taken of Edwards AFB and dated June 20, 2026, was recently uploaded to Google Earth. While we have seen satellite images of the B-21 going about its business before, this one was published in the public domain and had enough resolution, when paired with Google Earth’s excellent measurement tools, to get conclusive measurements.

Since we first saw the B-21 at Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, during its unveiling, which TWZ attended, we put the top-end size at 155 feet wingspan-wise. That analysis has only narrowed over the years. I have had many emails, social media threads, and other engagements with folks claiming the aircraft was in the sub-130-foot wingspan range. Now we can finally put those battles behind us.

B-21 span nowhere that number. Bizarre people think this. Around 150-155 best estimate

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) September 19, 2025

I smile every time I see these graphics showing like 130 foot wingspan on the B-21. People think it's way smaller than it is.

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) August 25, 2025

So what does the size tell us? Nothing we don’t already know. The B-21 was always going to be smaller than the B-2. Our analysis from many years ago has stayed the same — the aircraft would be designed with a premium on range and affordability, as well as very low observability, over massive payload. This resulted in the aircraft you see today. It is smaller, but with design priorities that have shifted from its predecessor’s, and 12% smaller in pure dimensions makes total sense considering what Northrop Grumman was trying to achieve. Above all else, it points to the B-21 having an extreme unrefueled range, with improved aerodynamics for high-altitude cruise, more gas for its size, and two efficient engines instead of four.

As for its length, the B-21 is nearly the same length as an F-15 fighter, which sounds bizarre for a large bomber. However, flying wings are visual transformers, looking like compact UFOs side-on and massive head-on or from the planform view.

What's even more fascinating is that this thing is probably about the same length as an F-15 or close to it. Flying wings are transformers. From flying saucers side-on to massive flying wedges in the bank to huge boomerangs head on. pic.twitter.com/0UXOK0uVVN

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) May 22, 2024

As far as what else we can discern from the Google Earth image? Not much. We get a bit of a better view of the B-21’s exhaust configuration, but nothing is really revelatory there. The exhausts are deeply buried with large planar exhaust exit ‘ramps’ and have a large chevron trailing edge over the exhaust aperture itself. We have seen some pretty detailed images of this general arrangement from the rear that have been posted on social media. We do see the exhaust pathway as black in color, a feature that was edited out in the official top-down photo of the B-21 seen above, which was released in April, and this is something we mentioned at the time.

(Images): “Northrop Grumman’s B-21 Raider Over Palmdale”

Source: jmh.creates#anonymoushadoww #ufotwitter #uaptwitter #ShadowLurker #Twitter pic.twitter.com/0zLn4ADWl1

— Anonymoushadoww (@anonymoushadoww) September 25, 2026

Regardless, at least we can say with total confidence that the B-21 is smaller than its progenitor, but not by all that much — about 12% to be more exact.

Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com

The post We Finally Know The B-21 Raider’s True Wingspan appeared first on TWZ.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces say they have carried out the world’s first frontline evacuation of a wounded soldier by aerial drone. The soldier, from the 30th Mechanized Brigade, is said to have been recovered successfully and is undergoing treatment and rehabilitation.

“This is a historic event, at least for our unit for sure,” said “Napalm,” a squad commander and programmer with the 92nd Assault Brigade’s uncrewed ground vehicle (UGV) company. The precise date and location of the operation have not been disclosed, and the claim of a global first has not been independently verified. However, a video of the event has been published by the 92nd, which you can watch below:

At this point, it should be noted that the footage has not been independently verified and could depict a staged demonstration rather than an actual combat evacuation. It should, at least, be treated with a degree of caution.

According to accompanying reports, the infantryman was wounded while holding his position. Mines and intense Russian drone activity prevented a conventional ground evacuation, prompting the 92nd’s specialists to attempt an aerial extraction. The video shows the soldier clipping himself to the underside of the drone via a harness before being flown to safety. The extemporized nature of the platform is underscored by the fact that, while in the air, the soldier dangles below its rigid landing legs.

The aircraft was a heavy hexacopter manufactured by Ukrainian company Gurzuf Defense, which provided it free of charge. A UAV operator from the 30th Mechanized Brigade piloted the drone. Throughout the recovery, the soldier remained in contact with the drone operator.

The operation involved the 92nd, 30th and 14th Mechanized Brigades, the 10th Army Corps and Gurzuf Defense.

Ukraine increasingly uses uncrewed ground vehicles to deliver supplies and evacuate casualties from exposed positions. According to Euromaidan Press, Ukrainian UGVs conducted approximately 112,000 logistics and evacuation missions between January and August 2026.

However, ground robots can struggle with mines, mud, and cratered terrain, while remaining vulnerable to drones and artillery. These obstacles make it especially difficult to conduct UGV operations in the battlefield’s “kill zone,” which can extend six to nine miles or more from the front line. You can read an in-depth account of Ukrainian UGV efforts in this previous story.

A video showing a Ukrainian UGV in action in the Donetsk region:

Aerial platforms are able to reach casualties in places where ground vehicles cannot safely travel, and can get there far quicker, without having to stick to specific routes.

The 92nd has not disclosed the evacuation distance or flight duration of the mission. If, as reported, the drone used was an Audag-6 model, this is stated to be capable of carrying a 200-pound payload over a distance of up to 15 miles.

Meanwhile, the recovery points to a growing trend in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Only days before the story of the evacuation broke, it emerged that Ukraine is also now testing the StarGate, a purpose-built aerial medical evacuation drone — also of the heavy hexacopter type — developed by the SkyFall company. This is a rather more tailored solution to the problem, with a covered, medical-grade stretcher slung below the drone. It has a reported payload capacity of around 330 pounds, uses AI-assisted navigation, and can also deploy nets against hostile drones attempting to intercept it.

The 92nd’s operation used a heavy-lift hexacopter adapted for an ad hoc casualty transport, rather than a more bespoke design. This means the soldier had to be adequately trained on how to strap in, and also had to be in a condition that they could actually perform this procedure. This would also be the case even if other soldiers were able to assist them in strapping in.

While these kinds of solutions may be new to the battlefield in Ukraine, using uncrewed aerial systems for personnel recovery and medical evacuation is far from new.

Back in 2016, the Army completed a demonstration of the Lockheed Martin K-Max helicopter in a casualty evacuation role. The K-Max can operate with and without a pilot and was used as a drone by the Marine Corps to deliver cargo in Afghanistan.

“Unmanned and autonomous platforms have the potential to completely rewrite the medical doctrine,” Army Col. Daniel Kral, head of the Army’s Advanced Technology Research Center (TATRC), explained during a conference at Fort Detrick in Maryland in 2017.

In 2019, TWZ reported on U.S. Army efforts to explore how uncrewed craft might speed up the casualty evacuation process. This work included evaluation of the Dragonfly Pictures, Inc. (DPI) DP-14 Hawk, a small, tandem-rotor drone with a 400-pound cargo capacity.

The emergence of autonomous air vehicles, or uncrewed ‘flying taxis,’ with short or vertical take-off and landing capabilities in the urban air mobility sector has also generated military interest. The U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, for example, has conducted studies into how craft such as these could be adapted for combat search and rescue, with the idea that they would be airdropped to recover a fighter pilot shot down while operating over hostile territory.

Closer to the Ukrainian hexacopter concept is the Flowcopter FC-100, a heavy-lift quadcopter drone that the U.S. Army tested in a medical evacuation capacity in Poland during the large-scale Saber Strike exercise earlier this year. Carrying a 220-pound payload, the drone has a range of more than 60 miles.

All of these concepts aim to address the inherent vulnerability of larger personnel recovery platforms in more contested environments.

In their favor, they offer the potential to rescue troops from more precarious situations, with the smaller drones touching down in relatively tight areas in mountainous, forested, or jungle environments. Autonomous navigation systems can guide the drones through smoke, dust, or bad weather, too.

On the other hand, these small craft have no space for a medic, pararescuemen, or other additional personnel. Bearing in mind their limited range and lower speeds, they also need to be in the right location to respond to emergencies as and when they occur.

For the Ukrainian Armed Forces, aerial medical evacuation drones are being rapidly developed and now fielded to help address another problem: the vulnerability of UGVs in areas of the battlefield that have long become far too hazardous for crewed medevac platforms to operate.

By now, both sides in the Ukraine war are relying heavily upon small, autonomous uncrewed aircraft to perform a wide variety of resupply, surveillance, communications, and strike roles on and around the front lines. With that in mind, the adaptation of these kinds of vehicles for casualty evacuation and personnel recovery missions is the next logical step.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Aerial Drones Appear To Be Picking Up Wounded Off The Battlefield In Ukraine appeared first on TWZ.

Nearly a month ago, we reported on a uniquely configured vessel that was far along in its construction at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard on Changxing Island in Shanghai. The intentions behind this design appeared to be as an uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) mothership, capable of deploying a handful of very large vehicles or many more smaller ones via its stern garage door and well deck. Its large pylons would be used to lift the vessels up and down out of the water and to different levels in the ship. Now it appears China has not just one, but two of these vessels nearly complete.

Make sure to read our initial report on this vessel configuration for full context by clicking here.

The new image was taken in Guangzhou and the vessel has a near identical shape, but with smaller proportions and minor changes to its overall moldline, compared to the larger one in Shanghai. This new vessel appears to be about a third smaller overall than its counterpart. The lift towers number six in total instead of six larger ones and six smaller ones on the Shanghai vessel. Regardless, the major design features are all there, including the flight deck and hangar behind the forward superstructure, the location of the smokestacks, and so on.

While two of these assets could still be considered largely intended for experimental use, a growing fleet would have increasing tactical and even strategic importance. Being able to easily launch and recover large numbers of UUVs, or a few very large ones, far from Chinese shores would provide an asymmetric capability. A fleet of ships that is dedicated to deploying, recovering, and tending to these systems, some of which can remain on patrol for very long periods, would be a major indication of how important China sees UUV operations as part of its future strategy.

There have been rumors that these vessels are part of a larger overall program that will see more ships with similar capabilities constructed. Once again, this would be a strong indication that these vessels’ utility will go beyond testing and limited operational use cases. The launch and recovery of large UUVs remains a conceptual work in progress for the U.S., with nothing similar in the U.S. Navy’s inventory, as we discussed in our original post.

Large long-range UUVs can be used for many tasks, from mapping the sea floor to hunting submarines and ships to searching for mines to launching cruise missiles and drones to being turned into immensely destructive weapons in their own right that can circumvent traditional strategic defenses. For China, providing a credible threat to America’s outposts deep in the Pacific and even the U.S. seaboard would be on the table.

There is speculation online as to where exactly this vessel was built. The first place that came to mind is Guangzhou Shipyard International’s (GSI) facilities on Longxue Island, just southeast of the city of Guangzhou. GSI is a subsidiary of the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC). It is here that many of China’s most unique vessels are born. These include drone test ships of various kinds, massive beach landing barges, and giant supply ships. Upon closer review of archival satellite imagery, we can say for certain that GSI did build this ship. An image from October 2nd shows it peeking out of a covered graving yard area at the facility prior to launch.

The emergence of two of these large UUV tenders in such a short period of time underscores China’s major bet on the technologies they will support. If more ships are added to the currently known fleet of two, a clearer picture of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s large UUV plans, and its expeditionary potential, will come into focus.

Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com

The post Second Chinese Submarine Drone Mothership Emerges appeared first on TWZ.