China is increasingly trying to diversify its connections to the region as Pakistan’s actions in Afghanistan create new security and strategic problems for Beijing. The opening of a road through the Wakhan Corridor is an important step in that effort. Afghanistan has formally inaugurated a 121-kilometer road through the corridor, running from Broghil to the […]
Pakistan has outrighty rejected a New York Times (NYT) report that claimed PAF fighter jets were involved in strikes against Houthis, calling the claim “fake and fabricated.”
“The claim in the above-referenced NYT report that Pakistan Air Force aircraft are being used against the Houthis is fake and fabricated,” Pakistan’s Information Ministry said.
In an X post, Pakistan’s Ministry of Information & Broadcasting wrote: Fact Check | Ministry of Information & Broadcasting NYT above referred story attributing employment of PAF aircraft against Houthis is fake and fabricated. International Media houses are again asked to avoid speculative reporting with regards to employment of Pakistan’s Military Forces under Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. Details of any employment, if necessary will be given by concerned authorities. Truth Prevails over Falsehood.
The report came days after Pakistan and Turkey agreed to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement.
File Image: JF-17 Jets
Earlier, a senior Pakistani military official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told NYT that Pakistan Air Force jets were being used in strikes against the Houthis.
Another Pakistani official said Islamabad’s role was aimed at degrading Houthi drone and missile threats through air support rather than a ground offensive in Yemen, the NYT claimed.
Col. David O. Smith, a former U.S. Army attaché in Pakistan and former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, said he had no classified figures, but that the analyst consensus was about 8,000 Pakistani troops deployed in Saudi Arabia. He said the force included a Pakistan Air Force contingent and Army air-defense units, that they would likely help secure oil infrastructure, and that Pakistani soldiers were unlikely to fight the Houthis directly because Islamabad is trying to preserve its relationship with Iran.
Pakistan’s military spokesman, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, confirmed to CNN that Pakistani troops are already in Saudi Arabia and described any role as defensive, without saying whether they would operate across the border in Yemen.
Interestingly, Pakistan earlier furiously denied a social media buzz that claimed Pakistan had lost three JF-17 fighter jets due to a Houthi missile attack that targeted King Abdulaziz Air Base in Saudi Arabia.
“This is absolutely fake. No credible or official source has also reported any sort of damage to PAF JF-17s,” the Ministry of Information reportedly said in its statement. The “deliberate fabrication of damage to PAF aircraft and their alleged evacuation is only blatant Indian propaganda, part of Hindutva deceit and a deceptive mindset,” the Ministry said.
The Pakistani Air Force jets and support aircraft, including JF-17 jets, arrived in April 2026 under the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed in September 2025.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s foreign minister has rejected sending troops to Yemen, despite the “Mecca pact” with Saudi Arabia.
“This is a defense agreement,” said Hakan Fidan, adding: “If one of the countries is attacked, you support its defense. This is not an offensive agreement.” Turkey “will not send its troops to another country’s territory to launch an attack”, he emphasized.
Fidan said Turkish and Saudi military delegations would work together to assess what defensive measures might be needed, without giving details.
It’s not often that events in Mumbai reverberate through global markets. But the Reserve Bank of India’s first interest rate hike in almost four years speaks volumes about the chaotic state of play. The inflation slamming Asia’s third-biggest economy and the rupee’s drop to record lows left RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra with no choice but […]
Five years after seizing Kabul, the Taliban’s strongest argument for international acceptance rests on control. The Taliban governs every provincial capital and faces no conventional army capable of marching on Kabul. It repeatedly cites improved security as proof that Afghanistan’s post-2021 order is settled. But armed resistance is becoming more geographically dispersed, more organizationally diverse […]
Russia appears to be preparing to revive and modernize its inventory of the Soviet-era Pechora S-125 short-to-medium-range surface-to-air missile system, in a move that the IAF leadership could well take note of.
S-125 is the same missile that was used to shoot down the US Air Force’s F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter-bomber over Serbia on March 27, 1999, during the Kosovo War.
The Pechora S-125 (SA-3 Goa) is a legacy Soviet static, short- to medium-range surface-to-air missile system developed to engage low- to medium-altitude air threats using command guidance.
The IAF also modernized its S-125 inventory to plug an operational gap that widened due to delays in procuring MRSAM and Akash air-defense systems. However, the IAF did not pursue modernization to the extent that the capability gains matched the more comprehensive modernization offered by the Russian Pechora-2M.
According to Militarnyi, a Ukrainian media outlet focused on military affairs, the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT) has signed a contract with Moscow-based JSC Oboronitelnye Sistemi to supply 30 specialized wheeled chassis that appear intended for components of the Pechora-2M system.
The Pechora-2M is a heavily modernized Pechora derivative with a self-propelled truck-mounted launcher, digital electronics, an extended engagement envelope, and day/night electro-optical tracking, giving the system much greater tactical mobility.
Under the terms of the contract, Russia would receive 20 MZKT-8021-021 chassis, as well as five each of the MZKT-8022-021 and MZKT-80211-021.
The MZKT-8021/8022 family of specialized chassis was developed specifically to accommodate components of the Pechora-2M air-defense missile system.
Pechora Revival
The delivery schedule extends to 2029, suggesting a planned multi-year acquisition rather than a one-off procurement to meet an immediate operational requirement.
More likely, Russia is seeking to expand its air-defense capacity in response to the heightened threat from the prolific use of drones and other low-cost aerial threats in modern warfare.
Drone warfare has increased the aerial threat severalfold, so it is logical for any nation to increase the density of its AD systems by a corresponding factor.
Russia appears to be increasing its reliance on legacy systems rather than simply discarding them.
Russian Modernisation
The modernized Pechora-2M system was developed as a deep modernization of the Soviet S-125, incorporating a self-propelled, highly mobile launcher and modernized electronics. The modernization transformed the legacy stationary S-125 into a rapidly deployable air-defense platform capable of shoot-and-scoot tactics, reducing its vulnerability to anti-radiation weapons and precision strikes.
The 2M replaces the legacy four-rail stationary ground launcher (5P73) with a twin-rail launcher mounted on a heavy 6×6 truck chassis. The reduction in launch rails was necessary to maintain launcher stability when mounted on a mobile chassis.
The legacy S-125 required considerable time to disassemble, pack onto trailers, move, and re-erect at a new site. In contrast, the Pechora-2M can reportedly be brought into action in roughly 20–25 minutes, facilitating shoot-and-scoot operations.
Besides the self-propelled launchers, the tracking/fire-control radar and other system components are also mounted on high-mobility truck chassis rather than being confined to towed equipment.
File Image: S-125
IAF Pechora Modernization
In 2016, the Indian MoD issued a $272-million tender to digitize 16 Pechora systems. The tender was restricted to Indian companies to support the government’s Make in India policy. The eventual contract, worth ₹591.3 crore, was awarded to Alpha Design Technologies Ltd (ADTL) in 2020.
Russia’s Almaz-Antey is the original equipment manufacturer of the Pechora system. At the time, Indian officials indicated that Russian defense companies preferred to work through Russian state-owned entities, limiting the scope for direct OEM participation by Indian companies.
The scope of the Indian Pechora upgrade was primarily the electronic and mechanical modernization of the existing system rather than a fundamental redesign of its architecture. It included refurbishment and digitization of the missile-guidance radar and integration of the system with the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS).
Alpha Design Technologies Ltd executed the upgrade, focusing on digitization and electronic modernization. It replaced vintage electronic components with modern semiconductor-based electronics and digital processing, while modernizing operator consoles and other system elements.
No Mobility
The system retained its original static, four-rail, ground-mounted configuration (5P73 launcher) and towed transport arrangement because the Indian upgrade scope did not include mobility.
Because it lacks mobility, the IAF has traditionally used the Pechora for point defense of fixed, high-value infrastructure such as air bases, radar stations, and other military installations.
A statically deployed AD system protecting a high-value asset made considerably more sense when precision-guided munitions were either unavailable or relatively uncommon. In contemporary warfare, where precision weapons can routinely achieve single-digit-meter accuracy, a static air-defense system defending a high-value asset can itself become a priority target.
Recall the failed PAF attempt to strike the S-400 system deployed to defend Aadampur air base during Op Sindoor. With foresight, and by leveraging the S-400’s mobility, IAF leadership relocated the system before the attack. The episode illustrates the importance of mobility and survivability for high-value air-defense assets.
A Still-Capable System
Despite its vintage, the Pechora remains a potentially useful AD system. Endowed with mobility and modern sensors and electronics, it would acquire significantly greater survivability and tactical utility.
One of its strengths is electro-optical tracking, which permits passive target tracking without radar emissions, reducing vulnerability to anti-radiation weapons. Both Russian and Indian modernization programs have improved the system’s electro-optical capability.
The Indian upgrade incorporates thermal-imaging-based fire-control equipment, while the Pechora-2M also incorporates TV and thermal/infrared electro-optical channels.
Thermal imaging provides a passive night-and-day detection and tracking capability and, unlike conventional television cameras, does not depend on visible light. However, adverse atmospheric conditions can degrade its effectiveness.
It is interesting to note that the IAF chose to upgrade its Pechora systems without fundamentally modifying the missile. Contemporary reporting on the original upgrade program indicated that the IAF considered the existing missile adequate and concentrated instead on digitization, radar, communications, networking, and other system improvements.
The 5V27 family missile has a substantial fragmentation warhead of around 70 kg and uses command guidance. Its continued availability is one possible reason why extending the life of the Pechora system remains attractive.
Russia may also be reviving and revitalizing Pechora-2M systems because it has a substantial existing inventory of 5V27-series missiles. If so, the approach illustrates an important principle of modern warfare: the value of an old weapon system can change when it is combined with modern sensors, electronics, mobility and networking.
In the immediate future, the IAF will need to deploy many more AD systems than it currently does in order to field a robust air-defense capability spanning the entire gamut of aerodynamic threats—aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, guided bombs and drones.
Developing additional AD systems may prove more challenging and time-consuming than upgrading existing legacy systems such as the Pechora.
Upgrading the Pechora to add mobility, modern electro-optical sensors and improved networking should be well within Indian technological capability. Even locally manufacturing additional upgraded systems under an appropriate OEM arrangement could be a cost-effective way to augment India’s air-defense capability.
Russia’s apparent decision to extract additional combat value from an old missile system should therefore be viewed less as a revival of obsolete technology and more as an example of how legacy weapons can be adapted to the changing economics and character of air warfare.
Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
Recently, during the 5th Halla Bolle Conclave held at the Radisson Collection in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, the same separatist discourse once again found space.
The conclave brought together mainstream political leaders and a former separatist figure, with discussions focusing on issues such as restoring statehood, Article 370, autonomy, political rights, governance, youth aspirations, reconciliation, and India-Pakistan relations.
Many of the questions asked and answers given reflected narratives that have long been nurtured in the Valley and closely resemble Pakistan’s longstanding propaganda on Kashmir.
The participation of mainstream political leaders alongside former separatist figures also showed how some of these old narratives still find space in Kashmir’s contemporary political discourse.
Selective Politics of Kashmir’s Mainstream Leaders
Aga Syed Ruhullah Mehdi, the National Conference Member of Parliament (MP) representing the Srinagar Lok Sabha constituency, who behaves like some philosopher-king, is systematically promoting Pakistan’s propaganda and narratives.
He tries his best to hurt India whenever he gets the chance.
For instance, when asked to state his position on the situation in Muzaffarabad and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), he said that he would not talk about it until people in the Valley were ‘empowered’, deflecting by declaring, ‘Return our dignity & we will talk about Muzaffarabad’. He then went on to claim that Kashmiris face the status of ‘second-class citizens’ in the Valley, asserting that ‘our reality is that we are disenfranchised as second-class citizens.’
This is exactly the problem. He avoids questions concerning PoJK but remains extremely vocal when criticizing India.
He is actually misusing his constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression and using Indian democracy as a shield while promoting narratives that are completely in line with Pakistan’s interests. He actually doesn’t want to hurt his masters sitting in Rawalpindi.
He also claims that there is no freedom of speech, frequently protesting that, “as a Kashmiri Muslim voice, I was denied the opportunity to speak.” Yet his actions contradict this narrative. He himself makes the most noise, using every available platform to speak publicly, give interviews, address gatherings, speak in Parliament, and criticize India regularly.
If he is supposedly not allowed to speak, then how is he able to constantly and systematically spread venom and engage in anti-India propaganda repeatedly?
There is a clear difference between legitimate democratic criticism of a government and repeatedly using the democratic space available in India to promote narratives that portray India itself as the source of Kashmir’s problems while giving Pakistan a free pass for its sponsorship of cross-border terrorism and the killing of innocent civilians in J&K and the rest of the country.
Then, an audience member asked National Conference president Farooq Abdullah why Kashmir had aligned with ‘Hindu-majority India’ in 1947. The very framing of the phrase ‘Hindu-majority India’ exposes the toxic ideology behind the question.
However, those who push such narratives desperately need to look at what actually happened to the regions that joined Pakistan in 1947, as well as those parts of the subcontinent that were forcibly taken by Pakistan, and the misery their people endure today.
Look at Balochistan. Look at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Look at the political and institutional failures that ultimately led to the secession of Bangladesh, demonstrating that a shared religious identity alone could not keep Pakistan united. Most importantly, look at the disaster that is Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) today.
For years, the people of PoJK have taken to the streets to protest Islamabad over basic political, economic, and social rights. The recent protests have faced deadly crackdowns, reportedly leaving more than 150 people killed, while the brutal authorities have even gone so far as to restrict the supply of essential goods, including food, flour, medicines, and fuel, during periods of unrest.
When Pakistan’s Failures Are Blamed on India
Yet Pakistan’s propaganda machinery has repeatedly played its cards well in Kashmir. Its influence remains deeply entrenched in the Valley, allowing narratives about Pakistan and India to persist regardless of what happens inside Pakistan.
Pakistan can have Imran Khan in jail, political repression, a deeply constrained democratic system, and an army that continues to exercise enormous influence over the country’s politics, elections, government formation, policymaking, and even the broader political system, yet people in Kashmir are repeatedly told that Pakistan’s problems are somehow the result of an Indian conspiracy.
Even when Pakistan itself is burning, its failures are deflected towards India rather than examined as the consequences of its own political and institutional failures.
This should force Indian authorities to rethink their approach and ask why such narratives continue to resonate in the Valley. Simply dismissing them as propaganda will not be enough. There needs to be a serious effort to understand the channels through which they spread, the political actors who amplify them, and the reasons they continue to influence public discourse.
Certain mainstream political parties and leaders in Jammu and Kashmir have also played a major role in keeping this discourse alive. They have repeatedly used the blood and suffering of Kashmiris for their own political objectives. Rather than challenging narratives promoted by Pakistan, they have often sustained and magnified them.
Take PDP chief Mehbooba Mufti, for example. She has advocated opening the Line of Control in Kashmir so that trade can take place with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and other regions, invoking the old Silk Route and China’s connectivity. One has to ask: what world is she living in?
Does she not understand the region’s geopolitics? Does she not understand the cross-border terrorism and terrorist infrastructure operating from Pakistan-occupied territory? Does she not understand the India-Pakistan dispute over PoJK? Does she not understand China’s illegal territorial claims against India in Jammu and Kashmir, the Shaksgam Valley territory ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, the recent Galwan clashes, and China’s broader geostrategic interests in the region?
It is not simply a matter of opening India’s borders and assuming that will solve everything. Other players have their own interests and nefarious designs, and they too have agency. Besides, extra-regional powers have their own interests. The region is not operating in a geopolitical vacuum.
The problem with Kashmir’s political leadership is that they rarely talk about the issues that actually matter to the people, for which they were elected, and instead think that by playing separatist politics, they can secure their votes and political future.
They rarely talk about how to improve the living standards of common people, eliminate corruption, generate employment, improve infrastructure, attract investment, or make governance more accountable and responsive.
IMAGE FOR REPRESENTATION: Omar Abdullah (R), Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, salutes as he inspects newly recruited Indian Army soldiers from the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry (JAKLI) during a passing-out parade at the JAKLI Army headquarters in Srinagar on December 4, 2025. (Photo by Tauseef MUSTAFA / AFP)
Instead, they have often tried to frame the relationship between the people of Kashmir and the central government in colonial terms, as a master-slave relationship. They repeatedly use words such as “Delhi,” while saying that Kashmiris have to “fight Delhi.” They rarely speak about constructive engagement with the central government.
They now say that Kashmiris have been “disempowered” after the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019. But what happened before 2019? Were Kashmiris not being described as “alienated” and “disempowered” before 2019 as well? Were these same political leaders not making exactly the same arguments then?
If they were making the same arguments before 2019, then what exactly did they do for the people of Kashmir when they had the political power they now claim to have lost?
This is something that needs to be asked.
Need to Move Beyond the Politics of Alienation and Victimhood
Moreover, the words “alienation” and “disempowerment” are not being used accidentally. They carry a specific political meaning and fit into a particular narrative. The problem is that these leaders have never really looked at the relationship between Jammu and Kashmir and the central government in the same way that political leaders in other parts of India look at their relationship with the Center.
The current noise over statehood also needs to be understood in this context. They present the demand for statehood as though it is entirely about the interests of the common people. But is it?
Of course, statehood is important, and people can legitimately demand its restoration. But it also involves political interests. These political parties want more political power and greater control over the administration.
After losing statehood, they feel they lost a significant part of their political authority. They also want statehood because it would give them greater political control and a shield from the scrutiny and accountability they currently face from different agencies and institutions. In this sense, the demand for statehood is also about restoring their own political power and reducing accountability.
But the common people have other priorities. They want good governance. They want corruption to be eliminated. They want development, employment, better infrastructure, better public services, and an improved standard of living.
The question is: when there was statehood before 2019, what did they do to improve the lives of common people?
If the mainstream political parties in Jammu and Kashmir had pursued positive, constructive, forward-looking, and pragmatic politics instead of sustaining and magnifying narratives that have served Pakistan’s interests, the Valley could have been very different.
Political parties have every right to criticize the government. They have every right to demand statehood, greater powers, development, and political representation. But when criticism of India becomes constant while questions concerning Pakistan are systematically avoided, and when every issue is presented through the prism of alienation and disempowerment, it becomes necessary to ask whose interests this politics is ultimately serving.
The mainstream political leadership in Jammu and Kashmir needs to understand that the people of Kashmir cannot be kept permanently trapped in the politics of grievance, alienation, and victimhood. The people deserve politics that focuses on their future, not politics that continuously recycles past narratives.
Views Personal of the Author
The author is a prominent journalist from Jammu & Kashmir and wishes to keep his identity concealed for security reasons.
For any feedback on the story, email us at editor (at) eurasiantimes.com
After years of lobbying by Riyadh, the United States recently greenlit a potential sale of F-35 fighters to Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Turkey is looking to rejoin the F-35 program and is aggressively pursuing the Trump administration to approve the sale of stealth jets.
Another interesting case is India, which is hosting Exercise Tarang Shakti, where six F-35 jets are participating. Indian experts call it a unique opportunity for the IAF to evaluate US stealth jets and see how Indian ground and airborne radars detect them.
Notably, this is the first time F-35s are participating in drills with Indian jets on Indian soil.
Many see this as an historic opportunity to train alongside arguably the world’s best jets and give real-time exposure to the IAF’s Rafale, Su-30MKI and Tejas aircraft. Even IAF critics who don’t favor a potential F-35 sale to India see this as a historic opportunity.
Earlier, a EurAsian Times report said the US State Department announced the proposed sale of F-35 Lightning II and related equipment to Saudi Arabia on September 17, 2026. The proposed sale is expected to cover 48 F-35 aircraft and 49 Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines, along with communications gear, training, spare parts, and other support as requested by Riyadh.
The approval followed years of lobbying by the Saudi kingdom to procure the highly sought-after stealth fighters.Earlier, the Obama administration explicitly ruled it out in late 2015, stating that Israel would remain the sole F-35 recipient in the region to preserve its qualitative military edge (QME).
Later, the Biden administration explored linking a potential F-35 deal to Saudi-Israeli normalization, but talks stalled after the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel.
The US State Department’s proposed sale still requires congressional approval, and analysts believe Saudi’s purchase of the F-35 could hit a roadblock amid concerns about Riyadh’s ties with China and Israel’s opposition to the deal.
Despite being a founding member of the F-35 program and making a significant financial investment, the US expelled Turkey from the consortium and sanctioned it under CAATSA for purchasing the S-400 despite repeated warnings.
Ankara has been actively pursuing a strategy to divest itself of its Russian-made S-400 and sell it off to a potential third-party buyer.
Earlier, the US President similarly responded to questions about lifting CAATSA sanctions on Turkey by saying, “I’ll always speak to President Erdogan. He is a friend of mine, as you know. And I’ll always make him happy.”
For now, Turkey’s path to obtaining the F-35s is still full of hurdles that both Washington and Ankara may find hard to remove, including Israel’s stiff opposition, as the EurAsian Times has explained before.
Like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, several countries have made unsuccessful attempts to obtain the F-35, widely regarded as the leading fifth-generation multirole fighter thanks to its advanced low-observable stealth and groundbreaking sensor fusion.
Functioning as a highly networked airborne command node—often described as the “quarterback of the skies”—it shares data seamlessly across friendly platforms. In fact, analysts believe that it is the most capable fifth-generation fighter in service anywhere in the world.
Despite this, India — a country that faces the dual threat of China and Pakistan along its borders — has been somewhat indifferent to what many consider the world’s best jets.
US Pitch for F-35s
Donald Trump unofficially pitched the F-35 to India during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in February 2025. “Starting this year, we will be increasing military sales to India by many billions of dollars. We are also paving the way to provide India with the F-35 stealth fighters ultimately,” he said at the time.
F-35: Image via US Embassy, New Delhi
The F-35s were also displayed at Aero India 2025 the same month, where they met the Russian Su-57 on the tarmac for the first time.
During his April 2025 visit to India, US Vice President J.D. Vance appeared to reiterate the offer.
“We, of course, want to collaborate more. We want to work together more. And we want your nation to buy more of our military equipment, which we believe is the best in class. American fifth-generation F-35s, for example, would give the Indian Air Force the ability to defend your airspace and protect your people like never before,” he said, making a more direct appeal.
Although the US never made an official offer, the verbal F-35 pitch and the prospect of acquiring a cutting-edge stealth fighter looked great on paper, particularly since China operates two fifth-generation aircraft (the J-20 and J-35A) and is allegedly exporting the J-35A to Pakistan.
However, India’s defense community and Indian Air Force (IAF) veterans seemed unimpressed by the F-35 offer despite acknowledging the aircraft’s potent capabilities, a stance recently reiterated as six F-35s made their debut in India-hosted “Exercise Tarang Shakti 2026” in Jodhpur, Rajasthan.
Seven Reasons Why IAF Veterans Oppose F-35
First, Indian analysts and experts believe that buying an expensive stealth fighter off the shelf from the United States would be a liability, since it would do nothing for the Indian defense manufacturing sector and come with an enormous price tag.
Each F-35 is expected to cost $80 to $120 million, with even higher life cycle costs. Therefore, a fleet of F-35s would impose a heavy financial burden that the Indian Air Force would rather allocate to indigenous programs and more flexible and diverse acquisitions.
Second, analysts and veterans have argued that the US would never part with its technology, eliminating domestic manufacturing. They reckon the F-35 procurement would run counter to the “Make in India” and “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” policies.
Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retd), the former Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS), earlier stressed that even with approval of limited technology transfer and local manufacturing, significant challenges would remain. At the time, he highlighted production risks arising from the F-35’s complex global supply chain, noting that Lockheed Martin sources components from multiple countries. He cautioned that any disruption or delay in delivering these parts could halt the entire manufacturing process.
Air Marshal Khosla further noted that India’s continued reliance on foreign suppliers would constrain genuine localization, and the IAF would struggle to manage such disruptions.
Notably, this concern takes on greater significance as delivery of Tejas Mk-1A fighter jets to the Indian Air Force has been delayed due to delays in delivery of F404-IN20 turbofan engines, affecting the service’s preparedness.
File: F-35 Lightning II and Su-57 Felon captured in the same frame for the first time in history at Aero India 2025
Third, there is concern that diverting resources to acquiring the F-35 would inevitably affect India’s own fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), which aims to deliver a fifth-generation platform with advanced sensors, electronic warfare systems, and networked combat features while fostering a domestic aerospace industrial base.
Experts have urged the IAF to focus on its indigenous programs rather than getting trapped in another round of imports.
Fourth, analysts have also cited logistical challenges and operational incompatibility with India’s diverse air force fleet comprising a mix of Russian Su-30MKIs, French Rafales and Mirage 2000, and Tejas. They believe that adding another fighter type would further complicate maintenance, training, and logistics for an already varied inventory.
Fifth, India operates Russian-supplied S-400 systems, which previously caused friction between the US and Turkey.
“An F-35A deal would likely come with strings attached—most notably, a U.S. demand that India abandon its Russian S-400 air defense systems in favor of the American THAAD,” IAF veteran and commentator Squadron Leader Vijainder K. Thakur earlier stated.
The S-400 is deeply embedded in India’s layered air defense network, and New Delhi has been considering an additional order, meaning it would inevitably become a point of contention in any potential deal.
Sixth, the US has been flagged as an unreliable partner.
“Putting too many military aviation eggs in the unreliable US basket will also be an issue. Americans can be “very unreliable” when it comes to putting sanctions and freezing spares and maintenance support,” IAF veteran and aviation analyst, Air Marshal Anil Chopra (retd), earlier wrote in a detailed EurAsian Times article.
Adding the repeated threat of sanctions by the US and a rapidly changing geopolitical scenario further complicates the purchase.
Seventh, the F-35 is embedded in the US-controlled networks, including the Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN), which sends information back to American servers. Indian experts view this as a breach of operational independence.
Tarang Shakti: F-35 and Rafale
Furthermore, they have cautioned that the US imposes stringent operational restrictions on its system and could try to limit the F-35’s use in combat, particularly against Pakistan.
Critics worldwide have also stressed that an unpredictable US administration could restrict free F-35 operations by limiting hardware and software supplies, commonly referred to as a kill switch. In fact, this is the reason why countries like Canada and Portugal decided to look for an alternative to the American stealth fighter.
Indian strategic discussions generally prioritize accelerating Tejas production, advancing the AMCA, and exploring local manufacturing options for platforms such as the Rafale. If a foreign fifth-generation fighter is ultimately considered, many experts have indicated a preference for the Russian Su-57 because of the technology transfer, local production, and twin-seat variant.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
During his interaction with the press ahead of Air Force Day on October 8, 2026, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) stated that, in the near future, the Indian Air Force would have a “healthy mix” of LCA Tejas Mk 1A, LCA Mk 2, the French Rafale and the indigenous fifth-generation AMCA.
On the face of it, there is little to quarrel with what the CAS stated.
These aircraft will undoubtedly constitute important elements of the IAF’s future fighter fleet. However, the projection has some infirmities that are difficult to overlook.
The first question is what the CAS meant by the “near future”.
If the statement is intended to describe the fighter fleet that the IAF will field over the next decade or so, the mix is understandable. But if it projects the force structure into the 2040s—and beyond—it raises a more fundamental question.
How far into the future was the CAS extrapolating current procurement plans to arrive at the projected “healthy mix”?
Based on the past record of Indian fighter aircraft development projects, I would think at least 15 years from now, well into the 2040s.
By then, Tejas Mk 1A, Tejas Mk 2, Rafale and AMCA could indeed form the backbone of the IAF’s manned combat-aircraft fleet. But describing that combination alone as a “healthy mix” ignores a major transformation already underway in air warfare.
The manned fighter is no longer the whole equation
There is little doubt that the IAF will continue to depend predominantly on the 4th-generation fighters named by the CAS, quite possibly for the next 20 to 30 years. Fighter aircraft have long service lives, and India’s continuing dependence on legacy and contemporary 4th-generation platforms is therefore likely to persist well into the 2040s and perhaps beyond.
But the fighter force of the 2040s cannot be assessed merely by counting manned fighters across different generations.
The changing character of air warfare will demand a mix of manned and unmanned platforms, with different levels of survivability, autonomy and weapons heft.
This matters because the most dangerous missions in a future conflict will likely involve penetrating increasingly dense and sophisticated air-defense networks. A manned 4th-generation fighter, however capable, is not necessarily the most appropriate platform for every such mission.
The Unmanned Component
The IAF’s future force structure will therefore need an increasing proportion of unmanned combat aircraft.
At one end of the spectrum would be relatively inexpensive unmanned systems able to perform reconnaissance, electronic warfare, decoy and weapons-truck functions. At the other end would be sophisticated unmanned combat aircraft capable of operating alongside manned fighters as loyal wingmen.
The latter could substantially increase the effectiveness of a manned fighter formation. An unmanned aircraft could carry additional weapons, extend the formation’s sensor coverage, perform electronic attack or act as a decoy, while exposing no pilot to the risk of a mission in heavily defended airspace.
There is also an important economic dimension. An unmanned platform does not necessarily have to replicate the capabilities, complexity, or cost of a manned fighter. A future air force could therefore field far more expendable or attritable unmanned combat aircraft than it could afford to field manned fighters.
This would fundamentally alter the arithmetic of air combat.
Why describe only the present procurement mix?
The “healthy mix” the CAS referred to was therefore, in my view, probably intended primarily for mainstream media consumption.
That is not necessarily a criticism of the CAS.
Mainstream reporting tends to operate at shallow depths and gravitates towards readily understood narratives. In India’s case, the Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) narrative is particularly attractive.
Tejas Mk 1A, Tejas Mk 2 and AMCA fit neatly into that narrative, while Rafale provides the foreign component of the mix.
But the full spectrum of capabilities that the IAF will require in the 2040s is considerably more complicated.
It would include manned 4th-generation fighters, 4.5-generation fighters, 5th-generation VLO aircraft and an expanding family of unmanned combat aircraft ranging from relatively inexpensive attritable systems to sophisticated loyal wingmen.
Image for Representation: Indian Air Force
The Uncomfortable Technological Reality
I suspect that the IAF leadership understands this reality.
India’s indigenous technological capability in unmanned combat aircraft is still far short of what it would take to develop and field the full range of systems a future air force will need.
The problem is not simply the airframe. Autonomous operation, artificial intelligence, manned-unmanned teaming, secure communications, distributed sensing, electronic warfare and the ability to operate in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment all present formidable challenges.
MoD bureaucrats are unlikely to be unaware of these limitations either.
Under the circumstances, articulating the full range of what a truly “healthy mix” would entail would perhaps serve little purpose in a public interaction with the media.
But that does not make the issue any less important.
The Real Challenge
The real challenge is not recognizing that India needs a mix of manned and unmanned combat aircraft. It is developing the technologies and industrial ecosystem needed to field them in meaningful numbers.
The IAF of the 2040s will almost certainly still contain large numbers of 4th-generation fighters. There is nothing inherently wrong with that. The question is what surrounds them.
If the future force consists predominantly of today’s manned fighter concepts, supplemented by a relatively small number of AMCA aircraft, it may represent a healthy mix of India’s current procurement programs.
It may not, however, be a healthy mix for the wars India could have to fight in the 2040s and beyond.
The distinction is important. A force structure should not be called “healthy” merely because it contains a balanced selection of aircraft India can build or procure today.
It should be judged against the operational environment in which that force will actually have to fight.
Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
Indian High Commissioner Dinesh Trivedi has conveyed a few home truths to his host country, Bangladesh.
They seem to have been forgotten while demanding that ousted former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina be returned: on August 5, 2024, she was “not brought by the Indian Air Force or the Indian Army.”
India had “hardly any choice” and was “unprepared” when she arrived.
Now a diplomat, the politician avoided stating the obvious: she was brought from Dhaka to India on a Bangladesh Air Force aircraft.
Another reminder: “At that point in time, Hasina was still the prime minister of Bangladesh.”
He said that legal procedures were ‘underway’ for her extradition, and that they take time.
Of course, he didn’t mention Hasina’s repeated announcement in December that she would return of her own discretion.
How times have changed! Once considered the ‘friendliest’ in South Asia, India’s relations with Bangladesh have become complex, even delicate.
Sheikh Hasina’s exile in India and her proposed return have added another layer of complexity to an already extraordinarily complicated relationship.
Addressing the media and her Awami League cadres through audio calls, she has repeated that she will return home, despite knowing that arrest and prosecution await her.
Seeking international support from lawmakers and human rights organizations, she has addressed seminars in London and Geneva via audio.
Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s government expressed ‘outrage’ at her audio address in Delhi and has banned domestic media from reporting it. It did not respond to India’s twin invitations, one bilateral and the other for the BRICS summit in New Delhi.
A brief update is essential.
Following Hasina’s ouster, an interim government led by Muhammad Yunus sustained itself on anti-Hasina and, since she was in India, anti-India sentiment.
Since this year’s February elections, a party with a history of problematic relations with India has been in power. The elections also brought to power an opposition force of Jamaat-e-Islami and students who worked to oust Hasina and see India as an adversary.
As India tries to rebuild bilateral ties under totally changed circumstances, hosting Hasina has complicated them. Rahman’s possible visit in November has been discussed at different levels, but exploring dates and announcing final dates are different.
To anyone unversed in India-Bangladesh ties, the two issues—Hasina’s return and Tarique’s visit—may appear separate. In reality, they are closely intertwined.
The government in Dhaka wants Hasina back, convicted of serious crimes and sentenced to death. Since it involves a bilateral extradition treaty, India cannot simply hand her over.
In this photograph taken on July 28, 2025, images and cartoons related to Bangladesh’s ousted prime minister Sheikh Hasina are seen pasted on a board inside her former official residence before the inauguration of the July Memorial Museum in Dhaka. Once a heavily guarded palace, the former official residence of Bangladesh’s ousted prime minister Sheikh Hasina is being turned into a museum as a lasting reminder of her autocratic rule. (Photo by Munir UZ ZAMAN / AFP) /
As Rahman faces pressure, especially from the opposition, he must weigh in on Hasina’s presence while visiting India. His government’s grievance, also used as leverage, affects ties with Delhi.
Delhi, meanwhile, has a larger strategic interest: building a workable relationship with the government in Dhaka, whoever leads it. Bangladesh is too important to India to let the relationship remain permanently hostage to a former prime minister’s fate.
That is why the proposed Tarique visit matters. But it is also why it is difficult. There is a certain diplomatic stalemate.
Dhaka cannot easily separate Hasina’s presence in India from its own domestic politics. It wants Delhi to accept the new political reality. Yet the Hasina question remains the most emotionally and politically charged issue between them.
Both neighbors want a relationship based on mutual interests and reciprocity. But neither wants to be seen conceding on Hasina to facilitate Rahman’s visit. Any ‘understanding’ with India on this would expose Rahman at home to the charge of having surrendered.
This explains why Rahman’s visit in November is possible, but not certain.
Because after November comes December.
Assuming Hasina returns, another question becomes unavoidable: what happens to her safety?
If the Rahman government arrests and prosecutes her, it is also duty-bound to protect her.
It may regard her as responsible for grave political and human-rights abuses. It may even seek to establish her responsibility through courts. But it cannot allow her fate to be decided by an assassin, a mob or an extremist organization.
With several past attempts on her life, Hasina herself has acknowledged that she could face death if she returns. The Bangladesh government has responded by saying that she would receive full security and legal protection.
The world witnessed the assassination of another former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, in 2007. It reminds us that government protection does not make an extremist threat disappear. A politically prominent person can remain a target even when the state has formally undertaken to protect her.
One would not like to push the Benazir angle too far. Nothing so far suggests a conspiracy or that Hasina is destined to meet the same fate. But religious extremism has deep roots in Bangladesh. It also witnessed killings of people in jail in 1975. Hence, the threat to Hasina’s life cannot be dismissed.
That creates a paradox for Rahman’s government. It is not just a political gesture to an adversary; Hasina’s protection is a state obligation.
Indeed, this matters because Hasina is not merely another former prime minister. She is the daughter of Sheik Mujibur Rahman and has been at the center of Bangladesh’s political life for decades. To her supporters, she represents a political tradition that is now under assault. To her opponents, she represents a period of authoritarian rule for which she must answer.
If she returns and faces trial, Bangladesh will certainly be under an international microscope. If the proceedings are conducted peacefully and in accordance with the law, the government can argue that the country has chosen the judicial route.
If she is imprisoned, the government will have to show that imprisonment is not an excuse for political revenge.
And if, despite state protection, she were killed by extremists, the political consequences could be enormous—even if the government itself had nothing to do with the assassination.
Hasina could become a martyr. The now-banned Awami League could acquire a powerful new symbol. The new government’s credibility could be damaged. And Bangladesh’s already polarised politics could become even more dangerous.
Both must consider the wider strategic considerations.
India cannot build its Bangladesh policy entirely around Hasina.
Her nearly 16-year rule created a close relationship between New Delhi and Dhaka, particularly on security and connectivity. But governments change. India has to deal with the Bangladesh that exists, not simply the Bangladesh it would prefer to see.
That means engaging Tarique Rahman’s government. It means rebuilding political contacts and restoring economic and commercial links. It means addressing border security, connectivity, water, the Northeast, and China’s growing influence. It means recognizing that the new Bangladesh will have its own political priorities.
But normalization does not require India to forget Hasina. Nor does it require Bangladesh to abandon its demand for justice.
Perhaps the two countries can eventually learn to separate these questions.
Tarique Rahman can visit India.
OPED by Mahendra Ved
President (2016-2022), Commonwealth Journalists Association (CJA)
As India hosts Tarang Shakti 2026 multinational drills, one learns not only from large-force engagements or one-on-one combat debriefs, but also from peculiar approaches, mannerisms, body language, and professional conduct.
The Americans have long followed the dictum of stating capabilities as they evolved, and in a way intimidating and making the opponent subservient with their larger-than-life persona.
Americans have led and driven military technologies and used never-ending conflicts to test weapons and doctrines. This gave them confidence and sometimes overconfidence in their approach.
Also, after the end of the Cold War, they chose to be global policemen and thought they would dictate all geopolitical outcomes, although they burned their fingers in most cases, at great cost to American lives and the exchequer.
The Soviet Union invested heavily in military, space, and nuclear power in the four decades after WW II and was a major competitor to the USA and the West. But the Soviet communist economy was otherwise hollow, and geopolitical power ultimately became unsustainable.
For long, the Russians, and their Soviet predecessors, believed in secrecy that kept the opponents guessing, and often being unsure, were frightened of the unknown capabilities.
The French have long worried about a possible Soviet juggernaut overwhelming and running over Europe, and have traditionally not trusted the Americans for their security. They just chose to have their own independent aircraft industry.
Indian military aviation gained valuable experience in WW II and, immediately after independence, began seeing air combat action that continued as recently as Op Sindoor. India benefited from exposure to British, Russian, American, and French aerial platforms and learned operational employment concepts from each.
It is worth understanding each one’s peculiarities.
American Air Operations Approach
The U.S. Air Force (USAF) operations approach has traditionally focused on integrating airpower across all domains to deter, compete, and win in contested environments. They believe in the “Competition Continuum” and view operations through a continuous framework of cooperation, competition, and conflict as part of their core operational concepts.
They believe that you are either with them or against them.
USA has long tried to use its technological edge to overwhelm its opponents. But that did not always work. American air power achieved tactical and operational successes in Vietnam, but it ultimately failed to accomplish its primary strategic and political objectives.
Coercion may not break the “Will” of a determined enemy.
The strategic bombing campaigns, such as “Operation Rolling Thunder” (1965–1968), failed to break the resolve of the North Vietnamese leadership or stop the continuous flow of men and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Political constraints of employment prevented air power from delivering a decisive blow. Heavy conventional bombing can be counterproductive against an asymmetric, rural insurgency, as was the case in Vietnam, often alienating the local population instead of winning “hearts and minds”.
US air power worked well in uncontested campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, but failed to achieve worthwhile political objectives. More recently, in “Operation Epic Fury” against Iran, the massive air campaign combined high-altitude dominance with sustained heavy bomber strikes against Iranian infrastructure.
They used stealth platforms (B-2 and F-35) and heavy bombers (B-52) to strike command centers, air defenses, and missile sites simultaneously across Iran. The B-52 missions were meant to target deeply buried, fortified military installations.
The US air power largely achieved its technical objectives, degrading conventional Iranian military production, force projection, and air defense networks. But the air dominance failed to force an unconditional surrender or collapse the regime.
Iran adapted by ceding high skies and shifting focus downward to the lower airspace over the Strait of Hormuz using low-cost drones and missiles, disrupting global shipping and raising transit costs for the U.S. Navy. Iranian missile and drone counter-attacks successfully struck regional forward bases in countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait, damaging U.S. ground infrastructure and support aircraft.
The U.S. has been focusing on Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), synchronizing air, space, cyberspace, land, and maritime capabilities seamlessly across services. NATO has shifted to Agile Combat Employment (ACE), moving operations away from large, centralized bases to dispersed, makeshift locations to increase survivability.
New approach to “Point Defense” requires integrated systems to protect critical base infrastructure from drone and missile threats. USAF is now preparing for “Force Generation” by restructuring how combat-ready forces are presented, trained, and sustained for high-end peer conflicts with China in the Indo-Pacific.
USAF continues to prepare for global vigilance, global reach, and global power. US air warriors are highly professional and focused on leading the world in technology employment, doctrine, and tactical concept development.
FILE IMAGE
Russian Approach to Air Operations
Russia fields the world’s second-ranked military power. Russia possesses the largest nuclear weapons stockpile globally, estimated at over 5,400 warheads.
Russia operates the world’s third-strongest air force, backed by a massive total inventory of over 4,000 military aircraft. Production lines for key tactical aircraft like the Su-34 strike fighter and Su-35 air superiority jet have continued, helping offset operational attrition.
The integration of ultra-long-range air-to-air armaments, such as the R-37M missile, allows Russian jets to threaten targets at extended stand-off ranges.
Advanced 4.5-generation aircraft like the Sukhoi Su-35S feature thrust-vectoring engines for high maneuverability, powerful phased-array radars, and robust electronic warfare suites, alongside early-production fifth-generation Su-57 stealth fighters. Large stockpiles of cruise and ballistic missiles allow for persistent strategic and tactical bombardment.
The Russian Sukhoi Su-57 fifth-generation fighter aircraft prepares to take-off during Aero India 2025, a military aviation exhibition at the Yelahanka Air Force Station in Bengaluru on February 12, 2025. (Photo by Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP)
Russian forces maintain advanced, dense electronic warfare systems that can disrupt enemy communications and neutralize incoming drones. The highly sophisticated integrated air defense systems feature long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) platforms like the S-400 and S-500.
During the Cold War, the Soviet air arm was designed for long-range, high-altitude interceptions under close ground control. Aircraft were supplemented with long-range air-defense missiles.
Aircrews train extensively in extreme post-stall maneuvers such as the “Cobra,” using vectored engine thrust to maintain control at near-zero airspeeds. For long, Russia treated airpower as an army-centric, ground-support extension, or flying artillery, rather than an independent offensive strike force.
The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) was not designed to execute independent, deep-penetration air campaigns like NATO doctrine. Russia lacks comprehensive suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capabilities for wide offensive dominance.
Russia prioritizes layered defense against adversary aerospace threats using advanced mobile SAMs integrated closely with fighter aviation. Lessons from Ukraine have made them switch to stand-off attacks.
Fighters like the Sukhoi Su-34 release glide bombs from 35 to 50 kilometers away to mitigate the risk of entering dense adversary air defenses. They are switching to high-volume usage of tactical and long-range attack drones, along with synchronized cruise missile strikes.
Integration of domestic and foreign-supplied drone technology has expanded real-time reconnaissance and strike coordination on the front lines.
French Approach to Air Operations
The French approach to air operations relies on centralized command and control, rapid global power projection, and a strategic doctrine focused on using precise, minimal necessary force. France has combined air and space into a single force, as the domains are considered contiguous.
The National Air Operations Center (CNOA) at Lyon-Mont Verdun acts as the core command node. This setup allows France to control domestic airspace defense and international expeditions simultaneously.
The French Air and Space Force (FASF) emphasizes rapid responses. French aircraft are designed for agile response. They can project global power, such as deploying multiple Rafale fighters and multi-role tanker transports within hours.
FASF believes in “precision over mass,” using high-tech advanced sensors and specialized platforms like the Rafale. By maintaining very small fleets, they can handle technological upgrades and logistics better.
France favors swift, lethal, targeted actions over extended, nation-sapping campaigns. France is also actively pushing for longer-range air-to-air missiles to counter advanced peer competitors.
The FASF is participating in joint global deployments like Mission Pégase and multinational exercises like Tarang Shakti in India. They also regularly study partner experiences and the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) operational insights to refine modern combat tactics.
France is one of the few countries that builds entire aircraft domestically, reducing dependence and arm-twisting from larger powers like the USA.
French aircrews are heavily trained in dynamic, austere tactical approaches designed to operate in high-threat or completely unprepared environments.
French transport aircrews regularly qualify for tactical approaches onto unprepared surfaces like grass, dirt, and raw Arctic sea ice. French tactical air traffic controllers work alongside aircrews to coordinate stealthy, steep tactical descent profiles to avoid ground fire.
During transits, crews do not fly standard civilian airline tracks, instead simulate full tactical engagements, utilizing low-altitude terrain masking, defensive manoeuvring, and variable cockpit configurations.
The French take some of the most intensive approaches to joint crew mission debriefs, structured around a meticulous three-pronged framework: a specialized learning mode, learning structure, and learning culture. The goal is to seamlessly blend individual pilot progression with overall collective squadron performance, capitalizing directly on individual tactical mistakes to systematically update institutional knowledge.
Rafale fighter jet. Credits: NATO.
The “Pégase” doctrine trains to rely less on massive permanent foreign bases and to demonstrate its aircrews’ ability to deploy multi-role Rafale fighters, A330 MRTT tankers, and A400M transports anywhere in a short time. FASF prioritizes decentralized command and empowering junior aircrew leaders with high autonomy to execute missions quickly inside an adversary’s OODA loop without waiting for centralized approvals.
Indian Aircrew and Dynamic Operations
From years of real combat experience and exercises with major global air forces, the Indian approach to air operations has fundamentally transformed, evolving from a traditional tactical army-support instrument into a highly lethal, multi-domain, strategic aerospace power.
Documented across successive IAF doctrines, India’s operational philosophy is dictated by unique regional geopolitics, primarily the two-front challenge of Pakistan and China, both with nuclear arms.
The IAF operates on a refined Western-style command philosophy tailored for high-tempo operations. IAF believes in centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution. While headquarters handle macro-level operational decision-making and resource allocation, local commanders retain execution autonomy to ensure flexibility, agility, and rapid responsiveness in highly dynamic environments.
Historically restrained, India’s modern operational blueprint emphasizes strategic coercion and escalation dominance through its “No-War-No-Peace” strategy. The IAF acknowledges a grey-zone interregnum between total peace and overt war. India mandates using air power as a deterrent instrument of statecraft, with selective tactical application to manage cross-border crises, without inevitably triggering full-scale escalations.
Unlike Western concepts that envision protracted air campaigns, the Indian leadership focuses on intense, precise, and swift achievement of objectives to decisively penalize an aggressor before international political pressures force a ceasefire. A clear plan for quick action and conflict termination.
Faced with advanced missile networks and drone saturation, India has fused its defensive and offensive architectures. IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) is the backbone of India’s air operations. IACCS aggregates data from satellites, AWACS, ground radars, and fighter sensors into a single, real-time digital picture. Systems like the indigenously developed Akashteer (Army) seamlessly mesh with the IAF’s IACCS.
This enables autonomous low-level airspace tracking and swift coordination between ground-based systems (like the S-400 and Akash missiles) and interceptor aircraft.
Air operations depend heavily on space for targeting, navigation, and early warning. This evolution has driven an official push to rename the service the Indian Air and Space Force (IASF) to solidify its cross-domain mandate.
Through large multilateral exercises like Exercise Tarang Shakti, the IAF tests its ability to plan and communicate alongside global air assets (such as the F-35, Rafale, and Su-30MKI), building the plug-and-play capability needed for coalition frameworks.
Driven by the national Make in India initiative, India is transitioning from “threat-based” procurement to a “capability-demanded” force structure. Operational planning actively favors indigenously produced platforms (like the Tejas fighter, Light Combat Helicopter, and SkyStriker loitering munitions) alongside advanced electronics, AI-driven sorting algorithms, and electronic warfare suites to ensure technological self-reliance during a prolonged crisis.
Indian aircrew balance high-stakes strategic execution with advanced technological adaptation across diverse geographical environments. Indian military aircrews operate in some of the world’s most unforgiving geographies, requiring specialized tactical approaches. Modern aircrew treat the air and space domains as a single continuum. Crew maintains readiness for both kinetic, punitive precision strikes and non-kinetic shaping operations.
Aircrew train for complete tri-service integration and multi-domain synergy. IAF and Army Aviation crews continuously practice high-tempo combined maneuvers, such as combat para-drops, fast-roping troops from Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH Dhruv), and deploying heavy underslung artillery via Chinook helicopters. Exercises like Yudh Abhyas and tri-service operations (Kargil, Operation Sindoor) train crews to blend air assets seamlessly with ground-based precision weapons, air defense grids, and electronic warfare units.
Indian crews train in agile combat employment, practicing approaches, controlled landings, and rapid departures from dual-use public infrastructure, such as national highway emergency landing strips. India’s aircrew approach leans heavily on simulation and advanced technical upgrades. Indian military crews have traditionally excelled in international air exercises and earned wide recognition.
US vs Russian vs French Networking Traits
The American personal and professional networking culture relies heavily on a mix of proactive communication, authenticity, and a “give-first” mindset.
They listen more than they speak, following a two-ears-to-one-mouth ratio to understand others’ needs.
They are sincere and unpretentious, avoid feigned interest, and build trust quickly. Successful professionals share resources, insights, and introductions freely without keeping an immediate score. They exhibit an upbeat, approachable demeanor and act as a social magnet.
They turn brief chats into long-lasting bonds. Once friendly, they enjoy drinks and laughs.
Russian networking culture relies heavily on deep, trusted inner circles and the traditional exchange of mutual favors, contrasting sharply with more superficial or transactional Western networking styles.
Initially, Russians are naturally suspicious or reserved toward strangers and people outside their immediate circle. Trust is not given automatically. It must be earned over time through repeated, honest interactions.
Once you are accepted into a Russian’s inner circle, the relationship becomes a deeply loyal, enduring bond marked by mutual support and strong personal generosity.
Russians value blunt honesty, clarity, and directness over polite small talk or excessive smiling, which they may view as insincere. They are open to leveraging personal connections to bypass bureaucratic hurdles or solve complex problems.
They love Indians and have watched portrayals of the underprivileged’s carefree, happy-go-lucky demeanor in Hindi movies from the 1950s to the 1980s. They will dance over shots of vodka, singing Hindi songs. Long “Hindi-Russi Bhai Bhai” speeches are always punctuated with shots of neat Vodka.
French personal networking relies on building deep, long-term trust, intellectual engagement, and strict boundaries between professional and personal life.
So don’t expect to be invited to someone’s home or meet their family until you’ve built a deep, multi-year relationship.
Unlike the transactional and rapid-fire approach often seen in Anglo-Saxon business cultures, the French value quality over quantity. First impressions are heavily anchored in respect and hierarchy.
The French value critical thinking and logic. Conversations with the French often turn into a discussion about industry trends, philosophy, or culture. Politely challenging ideas is not seen as rude.
The French love long lunches, paired with wine and cheese. They have a subtle sense of humor. With Indian aviators, they find common ground in the Mirage-2000 and Rafale.
Indians befriend everyone quickly. They can be loud. But they are great hosts and may overdo gifting.
A hug is a very natural way of greeting in India. Handshakes can be firm.
Finally, aviation has its own language. Aviators can get together and drive each other crazy with jokes, fun, laughter and mirth. In a bar, one can see all aviators ending up scissoring and locking their arms into combat maneuvers. Socializing is no less exciting than the air combat they did earlier in the day.
Tarang Shakti is about all this and more.
Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retired) is an Indian Air Force veteran fighter test pilot and former director-general of the Center for Air Power Studies. He is currently the strategic advisor (aerospace) at SIDM.
As nations worldwide race to bolster air defenses against missiles and one-way attack drones, India’s indigenous Akash surface-to-air missile system—proven in combat against Pakistan during Operation Sindoor in May 2025—is rapidly gaining popularity in the export market.
India’s Defense Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh recently disclosed that the Akash air defense system has been exported to three countries.
Although Armenia’s purchase of the system is already known, this is the first time a high-ranking Indian official has revealed that the AD system has been acquired by two other countries in Central Asia: Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
“The first customer was Armenia, which has taken multiple batteries. Thereafter, we’ve also exported it to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Production has stabilized. We have additional orders for our own services, and I’m sure there will be many more from various parts of the world, including some of the areas that you mentioned,” the Defense Secretary told ANI on Oct 1, 2026, in an exclusive interaction.
Describing Akash as a milestone in self-reliance, Singh said, “Akash, I would say that it is one of our success stories. It shows the maturing of our indigenous missile design and production system. It is effective in dealing with high-velocity aerial targets.”
He also noted that production of the Akash missile system has stabilized, and orders from other nations are growing even as procurement for the Indian Armed Forces continues.
A mobile short-to-medium-range surface-to-air missile system developed by the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), Akash provides area air defense against multifarious air threats to mobile, semi-mobile, and static vulnerable forces and areas. The missile has a range of 25–30 kilometers, can intercept targets at altitudes of about 18–20 kilometers, and carries a 60 kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead.
“The real-time multi-sensor data processing and threat evaluation enables simultaneous engagement of multiple targets from any direction. The entire system is flexible, upscalable, and can be operated in group and autonomous modes. It employs command guidance and relies on phased array guidance radar to guide the missile till intercept,” states BEL, the manufacturer of the system.
With this export, India appears to have gained a foothold in Central Asia, where the countries have historically relied on Russian arms, but are now diversifying arms supplies as Moscow remains embroiled in a protracted conflict with Ukraine.
File Image: Akash Missiles
Notably, China has emerged as the biggest beneficiary of this vacuum left by Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine, as previously explained in depth by the EurAsian Times. In fact, both Turkmenistan and Tajikistan already operate a host of air defenses sourced from Beijing, making India’s Akash purchase an even more noteworthy development.
The decision to acquire Akash possibly stems from its strong combat performance during the conflict with Pakistan as part of Operation Sindoor.
Earlier, former DRDO scientist Ravi Kumar Gupta told EurAsian Times: Akash’s versatility gives it an edge over other systems. He said that unlike other surface-to-air missiles that work only at particular altitudes and in specific climates, Akash’s biggest advantage is that it can work “all places.”
“The systems are developed for diverse conditions and can withstand extreme conditions anywhere in the world, which makes them ‘most reliable and sturdy.’ Since the system is fully indigenous, India can fine-tune it to any buyer’s requirements cost-effectively with a high degree of effectiveness against the adversary,” Gupta told EurAsian Times.
Akash: Sky in the Limit
On May 7, 2025, the Indian Air Force (IAF) launched attacks on terror sites located deep within Pakistan as part of “Operation Sindoor.” Pakistan retaliated with “Operation Bunyan al-Marsus.”
Following the first round of strikes by the IAF, Pakistan started to attack India’s western sector with waves of drones, including Chinese and Turkish-origin drones, missiles, rockets, and other aerial threats targeting Indian military installations and civilian areas. At one point, more than 600 drones were fired simultaneously across India’s western front.
The Akash AD—part of a layered air defense network that also included S-400, Barak-8/MRSAM, older systems like Pechora and OSA-AK, counter-UAS grids, and the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) or Akashteer—showcased resilience in the face of these attacks, ensuring that none of the Pakistani drones and missiles hit any targets.
At the official press briefing on Operation Sindoor, Air Marshal A.K. Bharti, the Director General of Air Operations (DGMO) of the Indian Air Force, specifically praised the Akash AD for thwarting Pakistani attacks.
“Another highlight has been the stellar performance of the indigenous air defense weapon system like the Akash system,” he stated. The sentiment was echoed uniformly across the board, with Lt Gen Rajiv Ghai, who later became the Deputy Army Chief, saying, “BrahMos, Akash and many other homegrown platforms and weapons played a decisive role in Operation Sindoor.”
Notably, small drones made up the majority of Pakistan’s projectiles during the conflict, which were mainly used to scan Indian defenses and overwhelm the air defense network, although a few kamikaze drones, missiles, and aircraft-launched munitions were also used.
Akash operated as a key hard-kill layer against these low-to-medium altitude threats, as its indigenous design, mobility, multi-target capability, and cost-effectiveness suited it well for the threats that characterized much of Pakistan’s response.
According to reports from the time, the Akash intercepted multiple drones and loitering munitions, disrupted swarm attempts, and even helped down guided missiles mid-flight at low altitude.
Akash interceptors helped protect higher-value, longer-range assets by keeping drone-saturation attacks out of the S-400 envelope. However, defense officials cited by Indian media said Akash, which has an interception range of 25 kilometers, played a major role in countering all kinds of threats, including aircraft, armed attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the Turkish Byker Yiha III kamikaze drones.
“It has been very effective against aircraft and other systems. This is the first time we saw it in active conflict. We hear that Akash has been used, and it has brought down a couple of aircraft. The whole team of scientists who have worked on the project is very, very happy. A great moment for all of them,” former DRDO chairman, Dr. G. Satheesh Reddy, said in an interview with NDTV days after the ceasefire was announced on May 10, 2025.
The most compelling commentary on Akash came from Gaddamanugu Chandramouli, the former Akash project director and DRDO scientist, who spent his entire career developing the system.
“Akash, which was indigenously built from scratch, was used in a combat zone for the first time and has proved to be robust and effective. The automated missile system caught the other countries by surprise,” Chandramouli told The Hindu in May 2025.
The Akash Weapon System can simultaneously engage Multiple Targets in Group Mode or Autonomous Mode. It has built-in Electronic Countermeasures features. The entire weapon system is mounted on mobile platforms. It can effectively engage helicopters, jets, and UAVs at ranges of 4-25 kilometers. It is fully automatic and has a quick response time from target detection to kill.
DRDO claims it is the first system in the world capable of engaging four aerial targets simultaneously at a range of 25 kilometers by command guidance using a single firing unit.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
More than a year after Donald Trump unofficially offered the F-35 to India, the fighter jet debuted in India’s multinational exercise Tarang Shakti 2026.
For the first time, six US F-35 Lightning II fighter jets and more than 200 airmen joined the Tarang Shakti multinational drills in Jodhpur, western India.
Photos of the jets appeared on social media ahead of their participation in tactical exercises alongside the Indian Air Force’s stalwarts, including the Rafale, the Su-30MKI, and indigenous Tejas fighters in Jodhpur, Rajasthan.
Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force published a video on September 29, 2026, showing an F-35 and Tejas flying together.
The @usairforce F-35A Lightning IIs are making their exercise debut in India at Tarang Shakti.
Combining stealth, advanced sensors, and information-sharing capabilities, the F-35s bring new opportunities to train with the Indian Air Force and other partners, strengthening… pic.twitter.com/wGfT6OxtAc
The exercise comes more than a year after US President Donald Trump offered the F-35 to India during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in February 2025. So, while the deployment is meant to provide the IAF practical exposure to the aircraft’s operations and sensor integration in a multinational setting, it has inevitably sparked questions about whether the US is signaling its intent to sell the fighter.
F-35 for India?
“Starting this year, we will be increasing military sales to India by many billions of dollars. We are also paving the way to ultimately provide India with the F-35 stealth fighters,” Trump told reporters in February 2025.
Vice President J.D. Vance reiterated the offer during his visit to India in April 2025, saying, “We, of course, want to collaborate more. We want to work together more. And we want your nation to buy more of our military equipment, which we believe is the best in class. American fifth-generation F-35s, for example, would give the Indian Air Force the ability to defend your airspace and protect your people like never before.”
These pitches took many by surprise, but there was a catch: they were merely verbal pitches, not official offers accompanied by formal discussions.
So, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, chief of the Indian Air Force, ultimately told reporters that India was not considering the F-35 option, adding that it had not received a formal offer. A fervent supporter of augmenting Indian air power, the IAF top boss emphasized that purchasing a fighter jet was not like “buying a washing machine or refrigerator,” implying that the appropriate process must be followed. “We haven’t examined it [F-35].”
Later that year, the Minister of State for External Affairs, Kirti Vardhan Singh, told Parliament that it had held no formal discussions with the US about acquiring F-35 fighter jets.
However, more than a year later, the deployment of the F-35s for Tarang Shakti gives the impression that the exercise may be an attempt by Washington to keep the door open or provide useful exposure that could entice the Indian Air Force (IAF).
Meanwhile, the Russian envoy to India praised the F-35 fighter jet in a rare move while arguing that it was not suitable for India.
Speaking at the NDTV Defense Forum 2026, Russian Ambassador to India Denis Alipov said, ”The US is welcome to promote its product. It’s a good aircraft, no doubt about that. But way too expensive. If India goes for that, well, that would be India’s sovereign decision. But we are offering a much better deal. Next year we are going to see hopefully many firsts at the Bengaluru air show.”
It appears the Russians might be smelling the US offer.
Russia has also been aggressively pursuing to sell India its fifth-generation Su-57, which Moscow positions as a competitor to the F-35.
It has offered New Delhi a host of options, including an off-the-shelf purchase of Su-57 fighters, full licensed production in India, technology transfer, a “two-seat variant,” and help with India’s own fifth-generation aircraft, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).
IAF veteran and commentator, Air Marshal Anil Chopra (retd), told the EurAsian Times, “IAF has trained alongside the F-35s in the past, such as in the Pitch Black exercise. The deployment is likely meant to test the waters by enticing the IAF, and probably to create conjecture, considering that no official offer was ever made. They could also be creating a deliberate distraction for India, particularly since the Russians have sustained their Su-57 campaign and expanded the scope of the initial offer to make it more and more appealing.”
“As for the cost factor mentioned by the Russian envoy, everything we buy is expensive. The Su-57 may be cheaper than the F-35 initially when looking at per-unit price, but it wouldn’t be cheap in the long term,” Chopra added.
That said, since both Su-57 and F-35 offers were made to India around the same time, the two jets have been viewed as competitors in the context of India’s acquisition of a fifth-generation fighter to augment its airpower.
As Air Marshal Chopra added: India may need a fifth-gen fighter as a stopgap solution till the AMCA arrives. If the US makes an enticing offer and meets India’s core requirements, American jets offered to the IAF are “quite possible”, but India should best avoid letting the USA get into its fighter aircraft ecosystem.
F-35: Image via US Embassy, New Delhi
F-35 vs Su-57 Showdown?
Although India is developing its own fifth-generation stealth aircraft, the AMCA, it is unlikely to be delivered to the IAF before the mid-2030s. Defense Secretary R.K. Singh recently said the first flight is targeted for September 2028, but the aircraft may take time to become operationally available to the IAF.
This means waiting for the AMCA would leave India with a glaring capability gap vis-à-vis adversaries China and Pakistan. China already operates two different fifth-generation stealth fighters: the J-20 and J-35A, and is currently testing two sixth-generation fighter prototypes. Meanwhile, Beijing could export its 5th-gen J-35A to Pakistan.
File: F-35 Lightning II and Su-57 Felon captured in the same frame for the first time in history at Aero India 2025
However, Air Marshal Chopra had earlier told the EurAsian Times that the decision not to show any interest in the Su-57 and the rhetoric about focusing on AMCA is meant to keep American ire and sanctions at bay.
For now, India’s path to bolstering its airpower includes accelerating Tejas production, advancing work on AMCA, and signing a deal for 114 Rafale fighters with France.
Observers have noted that India’s sustained disinterest in buying the F-35, arguably the best fifth-generation stealth fighter on the market, stemmed mainly from American unreliability, including painful delays in delivering F404-IN20 turbofan engines for Tejas Mk-1A jets.
So far, the US has not been able to break into the Indian fighter jet ecosystem, and has pitched multiple warplanes to the IAF, including F-15EX, F-21 (modified F-16), and F/A-18 Super Hornets. However, none of them appears to have lured the Indians. Can the F-35 do? Only time will tell.
Indians are reportedly also concerned about operational costs linked to the F-35, anxiety over introducing a complex Western platform to its fleet, Washington’s unwillingness to transfer the technology and allow local manufacturing, and potential operational restrictions on F-35 use.
Skeptics have noted that the sale may never go through, given that India operates the Russian S-400 air defense system and has integrated it into its layered air defense network.
Earlier, the US expelled Turkey from the F-35 consortium for buying the S-400 and has not yet approved the F-35 sale to it, despite Ankara’s assurances that it would never activate the system.
Meanwhile, India is also aggressively evaluating the French 6th-gen FCAS program.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
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Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey recently signed the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement”. Many analysts believe this trilateral pact is aimed at checking Iranian and Israeli “hegemony” in the tumultuous Middle East region.
Meanwhile, the biggest question running through India’s nearly 1.5 billion people is how this trilateral defense pact will impact India, which has fought multiple wars with Pakistan and maintains a tense relationship with Islamabad.
Despite hogging global media limelight for playing the role of mediator in the ongoing Iran war, Pakistan’s position back home looks scary with relentless terror attacks and a deteriorating security situation.
Pakistan continues to face tremendous domestic pressures. Protests in Pak-controlled Kashmir have intensified since mid-2026, with scores of innocent protesters killed by the security forces.
Islamabad imposed a communication blockade, ordered foreign journalists to leave the region, and limited access to international media outlets, including Al Jazeera’s digital platform.
This is no ordinary region. India claims the Pak-controlled Kashmir as its own and has vowed to integrate it with Jammu and Kashmir. Reportedly, pro-India slogans and flags were seen in the demonstration.
Then, regions like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) are Pakistan’s Achilles’ heel. Separatism in these two regions appears to have gone beyond the control of the Pakistan Army, and looks as volatile as East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) during 1971. The question is how long Pakistan can hold these two regions, and at what cost.
Dismal economic conditions, disgruntled population, and heightened tensions with neighboring India and Afghanistan have intensified Pakistan’s problems. The question is: does Pakistan have the financial muscle or resources to fight a five-front conflict — Balochistan, KPK, Kashmir, India and Afghanistan, simultaneously?
On top of it, Pakistan has signed a defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which means they should be prepared to fight outside the country as well, probably against Houthis in Yemen. That would open a sixth front.
Indian military exposed Pakistan’s defense architecture during Operation Sindoor last year in May. India not only managed to breach Pakistani defenses to hit multiple terror targets in the first wave of attacks, but India also launched precision strikes that impaired critical Pakistani military infrastructure across the country.
Indian military targeted multiple airbases including Nur Khan (Chaklala) near Rawalpindi, Mushaf (Sargodha), Murid, Rafiqui, Rahim Yar Khan, Sukkur, Jacobabad, Bholari, and others—using supersonic BrahMos and other precision munitions.
Satellite imagery confirmed the heavy damage, including destroyed runways, hangars, command-and-control centers, and loss of up to 14 aircraft (as per IAF) and scores of personnel on the ground. Pakistan also claimed downing multiple Indian jets, but it could hardly penetrate the Indian air defense network, led by the S-400.
Operation Sindoor demonstrated that Pakistan’s defenses could be easily penetrated and its Air Force could be crippled even with limited, restrained strikes.
Meanwhile, Turkey is already a member of NATO, arguably the most powerful Islamic country in terms of military. It does not really need Pakistan or Saudi Arabia to defend itself. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has been battered by Iran and Houthi rebels. But when the US could not completely defend it, what can Pakistan and Turkey do?
In the case of Pakistan, it is the most vulnerable of the three.
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on 7 August 2026 by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, assumes utmost importance for Islamabad. The pact’s core clause treats an armed attack on any one party as an attack on all three.
It directly follows the September 2025 Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
For Riyadh, it’s another insurance policy, but for Pakistan—still repairing airbases more than a year later—the pact is aimed at sending a strong deterrence message to India, which has pledged a devastating response to any terror attack on the country.
File Image
Collective defense commitments from Riyadh and Ankara are sure to boost Pakistan’s morale, but Turkey (and Saudi Arabia) have been supporting Pakistan since 1947 and have never managed to turn the tide against India.
For instance, during the 1971 war, Turkey provided critical military and diplomatic support to defend Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Operating under the CENTO defense pact, Ankara provided substantial material support to Pakistan by providing aircraft assistance and military hardware, but to little avail.
Even politically, Turkey refused to recognize the newly independent state of Bangladesh for over two years. It only recognized Bangladesh in February 1974 after Pakistan did.
Meanwhile, India has already established strong military ties with Ankara’s adversaries, Greece, Cyprus, and Armenia. India also shares robust military ties with Israel. There might not be a formal agreement on paper, but India-Israel ties go beyond any melodramatic pact.
No doubt, the Mecca pact embeds Pakistan in a broader Islamic-world security architecture at a moment when its conventional defenses have been publicly tested while the country’s biggest province, Balochistan, continues to fight for its liberation, just like East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
For a country simultaneously battling insurgencies in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Pakistan-administered Kashmir while managing tense borders with both Afghanistan and India, the Mecca defense pact is far more valuable to Pakistan than it is to either Saudi Arabia or Turkey.
Nitin J Ticku holds a double master’s degree in Journalism and Business Management from the University of Glasgow. He has over 20 years of global experience in MARCOM, Journalism, and Digital Marketing, and has worked & traveled widely across Europe, the Americas, and Asia. Nitin is the Editor of the EurAsian Times.
This is an Opinion Article
He can be reached at editor (at) eurasiantimes.com
India appears poised to overlook Russia’s Su-57 fifth-generation stealth fighter and opt for a sixth-gen aircraft instead.
Defense Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh recently clarified that New Delhi has “not thought about” new Sukhoi variants, prioritizing the upgrade of the Su-30MKI fleet under the ‘Super Sukhoi’ program and the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) instead.
Moscow’s aggressive pitch—including local production, full source codes, and a two-seat variant—has failed to sway planners wary of diverting resources from self-reliance goals.
With AMCA still a far away and China fielding growing J-20 numbers, India is actively exploring partnerships in sixth-generation programs.
India’s Ministry of Defense has reportedly initiated efforts to join the French-led sixth-generation fighter program. This was stated in a report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense, presented in Parliament, according to news agency PTI.
The ministry has sought a roadmap from the French side for acquiring such aircraft. The panel noted that two major consortia are developing sixth-generation fighters: one involving the UK, Italy, and Japan; another involving (now-defunct) France and Germany.
The Indian Air Force plans to partner with one of these groups so that India does not fall behind in advanced combat aircraft technology.
End of Su-57?
In 1962, the USSR agreed to transfer technology to produce nearly 800 MiG-21 jet fighters for India, which it had earlier denied to China. They helped India set up factories for the aircraft, aero-engines, and avionics.
India’s relationship with the Soviet Union grew strategically, culminating in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
Through the 1971 India-Pakistan War for the liberation of Bangladesh, the Soviet Union stood by India against US and Chinese intimidations.
During the Cold War, India and the USSR maintained a “special and privileged strategic partnership” that was built on five major components: politics, defense, civil nuclear energy, anti-terrorism cooperation, and space.
Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, India maintained warm relations with Russia’s successor state. The first major political initiative after the dissolution was the Strategic Partnership signed by the two countries in 2000.
The IRIGC (India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission) is the main body responsible for conducting official affairs between the two countries at the governmental level. Both countries are members of international bodies, including the UN, BRICS, G20, SCO, and Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping. Russia supports India’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
India is one of the largest markets for the Russian defense industry. Approximately 60 percent of the Indian military’s hardware today is of Russian origin. Military hardware supplies and, more recently, joint-venture production have been key pillars.
The Soviet Union was the first to support Make in India defense production.
The MiG-21 factories set up in the early 1960s later produced the MiG-27 (170) and the Su-30 MKI (230). Su-30 MKI was a joint D&D project. Russia also learned a lot from the Su-30 MKI project and imbibed some of these ideas for its Su-30SM aircraft.
222 Su-30 MKI were produced under license at HAL’s Nashik plant since 2004. An estimated 920 AL-31FP turbofans were manufactured at HAL’s Koraput Division. The Su-30MKI is the backbone of the IAF’s fighter fleet.
In 1965, Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) was set up at Avadi, Chennai, with Soviet assistance. HVF products included Russian-designed T-72 Ajeya and T-90 Bhishma tanks.
In September 1965, the Soviet Union and India signed the first contract for the delivery of naval equipment, including four Project I641 diesel-electric submarines, five Project 159E corvettes, and five Project 368P motor boats. The Agreement also envisaged rendering Soviet technical assistance for the construction of a submarine naval base in Vishakhapatnam.
Recently, two frigates, the INS Tushil and INS Tamala, were built by Russia at the Yantar Shipyard, while the remaining two are under construction at Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) in India through technology transfer.
Russia is reportedly expanding its shipbuilding cooperation with India, with two Indian shipyards being considered for the construction of four non-nuclear icebreakers. Russian shipbuilding officials have reportedly offered New Delhi their nuclear-powered design for an Indian Navy aircraft carrier.
GSL is also constructing 24 river-sea class cargo ships for Russian clients in the Caspian Sea by 2027. Cooperation with India in shipbuilding has its benefits for Russia, as the unit cost per vessel is projected to be half of what it would cost Russian shipbuilders.
Between 2012 and 2016, Russia accounted for 68% of India’s defense imports. Russia and India’s cooperation is not limited to a buyer-seller relationship but includes joint research and development, training, service-to-service contacts, and joint exercises.
India and Russia have a strong success story with Joint Ventures (JVs). The BrahMos is a medium-range ramjet supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from submarines, ships, and fighter aircraft. BrahMos Aerospace is a joint venture between the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya. The missiles are already being exported.
Under an over ₹5000 crore contract signed in July 2021, over 610,000 AK-203 assault rifles are to be manufactured in India with technology transfer from Russia, by the JV Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL).
Indian companies hold a controlling 50.5 percent share, and Russian companies hold 49.5 percent. The level of indigenous content has already reached 50% and is rising rapidly, with a target of 100% in the near future.
India and Russia have also agreed to expedite the delivery of spare parts of Russian-origin military platforms by setting up a JV in India.
Notwithstanding the above, some JVs did not take off. India had withdrawn from the joint Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) program due to technical issues. Finally, Russia continued the project and today has a successful Sukhoi Su-57 ‘Felon’ 5th generation fighter.
Following the selection of the Ka-226T to meet an Indian requirement for 197 helicopters, an agreement was signed in December 2015 to create a JV between Rostec, Russian Helicopters, and HAL to build the helicopters at a new factory in Tumakuru, India.
Later, India decided to make its own Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) based on the indigenous ‘Dhruv.’ India’s LUH is delayed, and Russia has been pushing the case for Ka-226T again.
Similarly, India canceled the Indo-Russian program to develop a new Multirole Transport Aircraft (MTA) for both countries through a JV between Russia’s UAC and India’s HAL.
In February 2023, on the sidelines of the Aero India 2023 air show, the Russians offered to jointly develop the Il-276. However, India would prefer the aircraft to be powered by a European engine rather than a Russian one.
India has operated a wide range of Soviet and Russian combat jets that formed the backbone of the Indian Air Force for decades. Key types include the prolific MiG-21 (in multiple variants including Bison), MiG-23 (BN and MF), high-altitude MiG-25, ground-attack MiG-27, and air-superiority MiG-29 (including upgraded versions).
From the Sukhoi stable came the Su-7 fighter-bomber and the highly successful Su-30MKI, which remains the IAF’s primary multi-role platform that India is looking to upgrade.
India’s decision to effectively rule out the Su-57 marks a noticeable shift. After decades of reliance on Russian fighters—from the MiG-21 to the Su-30MKI—New Delhi is prioritizing the AMCA program and partnerships in sixth-generation projects.
While the historic Indo-Russian defense ties remain strong in other domains, the rejection of Moscow’s most advanced stealth jet signals a clear preference for next-generation technology.
With China rapidly expanding its stealth fleet and AMCA still years away, India appears to be choosing long-term capability over Russian platforms.
With Inputs from EurAsian Times story by Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retired)
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