A weather deterioration in Greece is forecast for the next couple of days and the National Meteorological Service (EMY) has issued an “orange” warning, that is Category 4. The main features of the new spell of bad weather will be intense weather phenomena locally, a drop in temperature, and strengthening winds over the seas. According […]
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Ukrainian marines planned a clearing operation near Pokrovsk for about a month, their deputy commander said in remarks relayed by Army Inform. The Defense Ministry’s news agency published them on 12 October. He also described the Russian infantry the marines captured as barely trained, hungry, and unwilling to fight.
Russia seized Pokrovsk by seeping small infantry groups into the city a few at a time. Beyond the city, Russian advances stayed limited. ISW assessed on 25 February that the capture brought no further operationally significant gains. Small advances continued, and DeepState mapped one near Bilytske in Donetsk Oblast on 7 October. Every stretch where Ukrainian units stop that infiltration closes the route Russia used to take the city.
Karyi, the 40th Separate Marine Brigade’s deputy commander, said that Operation Audit cleared about 6 km². The marines suffered no losses while inflicting them on the Russians, he said, and gathered a lot of intelligence. He promised the enemy many more surprises.
The brigade had announced an operation by the same name on 26 September. It said then that the marines had cleared 5 km² and captured two Russian soldiers. The brigade also said they had stopped the flow of Russian infiltration on that stretch of the Pokrovsk direction.
Karyi called the two prisoners typical of the Russian infantry now sent against the marines, with all of two weeks’ training behind them. He said Russian recruits spend a month on transfers and paperwork before going into battle. They then walk to their positions for one or two weeks.
If drones or Ukrainian ground groups don’t kill them first, he said, they surrender because they no longer want to fight. They are not fed or given water. He described one parcel a week with a can of stewed meat, and water drunk from the ground underfoot. That, Karyi said, is why the Russian troops facing the marines are demoralized and untrained.
Thomas Sankara had a signature look: a natty red beret, worn with military fatigues. A striking figure, Sankara was a military officer and the radical, anti-imperialist prime minister of the Republic of Upper Volta. His arrest in 1983 led to demonstrations, followed by a coup, after which Sankara was released and installed as president. By the following year Sankara had given the country he now led its new name — Burkina Faso. He fashioned a Burkinabè identity in his own anti-imperialist image, eschewing French for local languages, promoting economic self-reliance and national pride.
In 1986, he famously took the then French president François Mitterrand to task in a fiery speech broadcast both in Burkina Faso and France. Sankara’s dashing uniform played an outsized role in how his words were interpreted. Here was Africa’s own Che Guevara. But by October 1987, Sankara was dead, killed during a military coup led by his former friend and ally Blaise Compaoré.
France, the old colonial power, backed Compaoré. Soon after the coup, French officials once again flocked to Ouagadougou, helping to prop up Compaoré for decades.
This potted history is important to understanding the phenomenon of Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina Faso’s current president, an authoritarian head of state who in his charisma and self-presentation so deliberately echoes Sankara.
On September 30, thousands of Burkinabè gathered in Ouagadougou’s Place de la Révolution to hail Traoré on the fourth anniversary of the coup that brought him to power. As the second coming of Sankara, Traoré — whatever their entirely different political ideologies – is arguably the face of contemporary African anti-imperialism. It is a meticulously cultivated image that has almost nothing to do with Traoré’s actual record, or his achievements in Burkina Faso.
Traoré is a pan-African leader for a digital age, an autocrat who has suspended his country’s constitution, dismantled its admittedly fledgling democratic institutions and been accused of crimes against humanity, but who has used artificial intelligence, particularly deepfakes, to bury that record beneath a highly effective cyber cult of personality.
How do Burkinabè reconcile the man with the persona? And is Traoré a triumph of the algorithm, the kind of politician increasingly familiar from Ouagadougou to Delhi, Berlin, Buenos Aires, and of course Washington, DC?
Ibrahim Traoré came to power in September 2022. In his own telling, while Sankara was installed as president, Traoré led the putsch himself. By January 2023, Burkina Faso terminated its military accord with France, giving French special forces one month to leave the country. In June this year, Burkina Faso ended all diplomatic relations with France.
As Traoré turned away from France, he strengthened relations with Moscow. It’s in keeping with the pattern across the countries of the Sahel — Burkina Faso and its neighbours Mali and Niger — as the region’s colonial history with France has been swept clean by a broom held first by the mercenaries of the Wagner Group and latterly the Russian state itself, represented by the Africa Corps.
But in April and May 2026, Africa Corps forces were dealt a humiliating defeat in northern Mali by a combination of Tuareg separatists and allegedly Al-Qaeda linked Islamists. The Malian defence minister was assassinated in a suicide bombing at his home near the capital Bamako. With Russia so involved militarily in the Sahel countries, Ukraine has admitted to assisting rebel forces. Both Mali and Niger have cut diplomatic ties with Kyiv. And Burkina Faso has described Kyiv as a destabilising force in the region, making the Sahel effectively a front in Russia’s war with Ukraine. As recently as September, Traoré named Ukraine as a part of Burkina Faso’s “map of enemies” for which, he added menacingly, “we need to prepare.”
Russia, as Coda Story has reported for years, has used everything from weapons sales to mercenaries to paying African influencers to both spread Russian narratives and hold Moscow up as the alternative to continuing to rely on exploitative economic relationships with the West, particularly erstwhile European colonialists.
Despite the extent of Russian attempts to influence the Sahel, it’s not Moscow that is signing the most consequential deals with the military juntas it helps prop up. It’s Beijing. And the deals being signed with China to mine the region’s extensive mineral wealth — the lithium, gold, copper, zinc, bauxite and uranium — have served as a reminder to the United States that it too should resume stalled relationships in the Sahel. Early in 2026, Burkina Faso signed a near $150 million healthcare deal with the U.S. in exchange, it appeared, for favourable access to minerals. Both Zambia and Zimbabwe backed away from similar deals, expressing concern about U.S. demands for data and minerals that amounted to an infringement of sovereignty.
The deals with China and the United States are being negotiated alongside a drive to reduce reliance on foreign loans and grants and ramp up domestic production, particularly of gold. Traoré claims his economic policies emphasise nationalisation and self-reliance. His government has taken over major mining operations and increased state stakes in other industries. In early 2024, his administration suspended export permits for small-scale gold production to crack down on smuggling and keep mineral wealth inside the country. Last month, he inaugurated Burkina Faso’s first gold refinery.
Some of this has had positive economic effects. The World Bank, in a June 2026 update, said the country had an estimated 5.3% growth in 2025, up from 4.8% in 2024, and its fiscal deficit narrowed from 5.8% of GDP to 1.8%. Inflation was also negative, 0.5%, compared to 4.2% in 2024. Reports by the World Bank and IMF have ascribed these growth to external factors such as the gold rally, climate-driven increase in agricultural outputs, and reduction in energy prices.
Economic growth, though, is part of a larger story that includes a crackdown on the press, particularly critical coverage of alleged human rights violations. Human Rights Watch documented 1,840 civilian deaths between January 2023 and April 2025, over 1,200 of which were directly attributed to government forces. Even as the report acknowledged widespread violations by Islamist groups, the actions of the Burkina Faso military, it said, “amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity.” At the same time, Traoré has clamped down on Burkinabè civil society, banning over 100 human rights organizations and dissolving all political parties.
None of it appears to have affected his carefully-honed image in certain online spaces.
Traoré is everywhere. In Accra, the capital of Ghana, his image is pasted onto buses and in parks. In January 2025, at the swearing-in of the Ghanaian president John Mahama, it was Traoré who the crowd responded to, cheering for a rockstar rather than a head of state. Even Mahama joked that Traoré had stolen the show. Artwork celebrating Traoré is frequently posted online. The commentary that accompanies the art is gushing. “Through this artwork,” reads one Facebook tribute, “I celebrate the spirit of a man who stands for sovereignty, truth, and the rise of a self-determined Africa.”
Meanwhile, the Ivory Coast government has granted refugee status to at least 69,000 Burkinabè fleeing Burkina Faso.
In May, when I travelled to Ghana and Ivory Coast to talk to people displaced from Burkina Faso, at least five sources decided they no longer wanted to speak. Guaranteeing anonymity didn’t seem to matter. A Burkinabè journalist who was helping me find people to speak to, stopped responding to my messages the day after I arrived in Accra. Those who did speak to me refused to be quoted for fear that harm would come to family and friends left behind in Burkina Faso.
Reporters have been intimidated into silence. “Today, any journalist living in the country is forced to practice self-censorship to avoid being arrested,” says Harouna Simbo Drabo, disinformation analyst and Director of Programs & Partnerships of Faso Check. “Burkinabé journalists have two options,” he told me, “either practice self-censorship or go into exile.” After threats to his life, Drabo has left Burkina Faso.
He’s one of the luckier journalists. Since 2022, at least seven Burkinabè reporters have been forcibly conscripted into the army after criticizing the Traoré junta's crackdown on the press. Guezouma Sanogo, Boukari Ouoba, and Luc Pagbelguem were abducted days after their union denounced state media as "instruments of propaganda." Atiana Serge Oulon, editor-in-chief of L'Événement, is among the disappeared. Many, like Drabo, have either left Burkina Faso or quit their jobs.
As conditions deteriorate, what information is becoming available is government propaganda amplified by social media linked to Russian misinformation. In the absence of accurate, verified information, there is inevitably only disinformation. For instance, one of the most persistent pieces of disinformation is the story that Traoré — a supposedly avowed anti-imperialist despite his kowtowing to Moscow, Beijing and Washington — rejected billions of dollars in International Monetary Fund handouts because he believes, à la Thomas Sankara, in economic self-reliance. It is a story that has been debunked but was repeatedly told to me by Traoré supporters, including at least one journalist.
The claim was cited more than 700 times in a single three-day window in January 2025 alone, racking up millions of views across Facebook, X, and TikTok. Dubawa fact-checked the story and found that rather than rejecting money from the IMF, the Burkina Faso government had negotiated a 48-month IMF loan program in September 2023 and drew on World Bank financing in 2024.
By mid-2025. Code for Africa's analysis found social media in sub-Saharan Africa flooded with AI-generated videos casting Traoré alongside Beyoncé, Rihanna, and, in one particularly unhinged iteration, Pope Leo XIV, all of whom supposedly endorsed him as a Pan-African hero holding the line against the West. After US AFRICOM commander Michael Langley criticized Traoré's handling of Burkina Faso’s gold reserves in a Senate hearing, a network of 165 Facebook accounts began posting identical language claiming Putin had deployed special forces to protect Traoré from an American assasination plot. In ten days it pulled 10.9 million views.
In Accra, I caught a bus with a picture of Traoré emblazoned on the side. The driver, who only identified himself as Kofi, insisted that before we spoke I should tell him what I thought of Traoré. I say I am not Burkinabè, that I have not visited Burkina Faso but that I have spoken to many people whose lives have been upended by Traoré’s strongman politics. I told him about Burkinabè journalists in exile, forced to join the army, or even disappeared. I told him that when asked about a transition to democracy, Traoré said it was important for Burkinabè to “forget” about democracy. “We have to tell the truth,” Traoré said, “democracy isn’t for us.” I told him about the Burkinabè refugees I met in Treichville, a district in Abidjan, the Ivory Coast capital.
Kofi listened and then told me that “good things take sacrifice,” including the death of a free press. When I asked what he meant by good things, he showed me AI-generated videos of a smart city Traoré had supposedly built.
African identity is tightly wound around the belief that the continent has more potential than it has achieved. The deficit can be attributed to a lot of issues, but chiefly to Western exploitation and the complicity of African leaders. “African countries have also fallen into autocratic democracy,” Sanusi Sanusi, Research Analyst at the Digital Tech, AI & Information Disorder Analysis Centre, DAIDAC, tells me. “There is an election every couple of years but it isn't free or fair.”
Neil Postman, in Amusing Ourselves to Death, writes that “disinformation does not mean false information. It means misleading information — misplaced, irrelevant, fragmented or superficial information — information that creates the illusion of knowing something but which in fact leads one away from knowing.”
Many Traoré supporters I spoke with, most of whom were men, were convinced they knew things I did not. They told me to educate myself more on Western hypocrisy in Africa. They said they did not have faith in those who appointed themselves arbiters of what was fact and what was disinformation. In Lagos I met Lemi Ghariokwu, who designed album covers for the iconic Nigerian musician Fela Kuti, a revolutionary figure. Ghariokwu, who has a portrait of Ibrahim Traoré hanging in his studio, told me that “Western education and propaganda has made our elite class toothless bulldogs.” Listening to them, it seemed as if a successful Africa needed strongmen, needed autocrats.
In Abidjan, the last person I spoke to about Traoré was Oumar, a Burkinabè taxi driver who had moved to the Ivorian capital in 2021. He told me he “supports Traoré with all my heart.” But as we talked, he admitted he had not been back home because “things are only getting worse.” Three Burkinabè refugees I spoke to told me they thought I might be a government agent planted among them to find out what they really thought about Traoré and that I would then report those thoughts back to Ouagadougou.
Many of the Traoré supporters I spoke with thought I was brainwashed by Western media or, worse, too docile to participate in an African revolution. For my part, I thought they were ill-informed and unable or, worse, unwilling to see through propaganda.
The fundamental curse of the age of information and connection is that we rarely confront how the mediums meant to unite us have fractured us. An unprecedented flood of data has shattered shared reality into millions of customized, mutually hostile subcultures.
With the help of AI and social media, Traoré has managed to decouple national and anti-imperial pride from government performance. By the middle of next year, Burkina Faso will no longer be part of the International Criminal Court, denounced by Traoré as an “instrument of neocolonial oppression”, and thus no longer accountable in any international forum. His government has said it is “decolonizing” the school curriculum. Cheered on by social media, Traoré has used anti-imperial grievances and resentments to argue that authoritarian military rule is the only safeguard for sovereignty.
As some Burkinabè exiles told me ironically, they thought both I, so sceptical of Traoré, and the Traoré die-hards in the African diaspora could use a few months living in Burkina Faso. We should, they said, experience the country Traoré has made IRL. See past the carefully curated myth of the man himself, the largely online fantasy of the pan-African, anti-imperial revolutionary who needs to break a few eggs to make the omelet, and assess the country he runs unchallenged.
Olatunji Olaigbe
Adam Shatz
Irina Matchavariani
The post The cyber-fueled cult of Ibrahim Traoré appeared first on Coda Story.
Nigel Farage has pledged to shut down the asylum system for five years and deport 90,000 applicants immediately.
The post Farage Pledges to Shut Down Asylum System appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
Ukraine has been striking the launchers Russia uses to fire ballistic missiles at its cities, Ukrainian Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara told journalists. He said the strikes have already disrupted some Russian attack plans, but supplies of anti-ballistic interceptors still fall short of the threat.
Russia strikes Ukraine’s cities and power grid with drones and missiles every day as it prepares to leave civilians without power and heat this winter. Ballistic missiles are the part of that barrage Ukraine still struggles to stop, so every launcher put out of action before it fires means fewer missiles to intercept.
Ukrainian forces hit eight launchers used for ballistic strikes on Ukraine in September and early October, destroying three and damaging five, Khmara said. They belonged to Russia’s Iskander tactical missile systems and S-400 air defense systems, he added. Such strikes have already forced Russia to cancel or change planned ballistic attacks, the minister said.
The S-400 was designed to shoot down aircraft and missiles, but Russia also uses it to fire ballistic missiles at Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv. In mid-September, Ukraine reported hitting two S-400 launchers near Vygonichi in Russia’s Bryansk Oblast. Russia had used the same systems against Kyiv the night before.
On 23 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukrainian forces had hit an Iskander launcher near the border. He described it as part of a separate operation to hunt nearby launch positions and linked the tactic to low stocks of anti-ballistic missiles.
Khmara called the launcher strikes Ukraine’s asymmetric response to a ballistic threat that remains critical.
“Existing and potential supplies of missiles for anti-ballistic defense are not enough to fully cover this threat,” he said.
Instead of waiting for large long-term contracts, the Defense Ministry is looking for missiles in partners’ available stocks to speed up transfers, Khmara added. “We need dozens and hundreds of missiles, not one-off deliveries,” he stressed.
Meanwhile, Russia significantly cut its 2026 state orders for Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, Ukraine’s military intelligence said on 12 October. It redirected the production capacity, components, and raw materials to Iskander-M ballistic missiles, the agency added.
Overnight on 12 October, Russia attacked Ukraine with a Kh-59 guided missile and 121 attack drones, 76 of them jet-powered, Ukraine’s Air Force reported. Air defenses downed or suppressed 89 drones, but strikes hit 15 locations, and the attack was still going on in the morning.
In the week to 11 October, Russia hit Ukraine’s power generation and transmission facilities more than 200 times and its gas and oil sites 17 times, Zelenskyy said. Russian attacks that week killed more than 150 people and injured more than 700, he added.
Jet-powered drones are still the main problem for Ukraine’s air defense. It stops more than 90% of slower propeller-driven Shaheds, compared with about 55% for the jet ones.
Ballistic missiles have struck Kyiv repeatedly this autumn. On 24 September, Russian ballistic and hypersonic missiles damaged a maternity hospital in the capital. On 7 October, a Russian missile barrage killed 22 people in Pryluky, Chernihiv Oblast.
Artificial intelligence is rapidly making its way into national defense. Reconnaissance, early warning, target detection, mission planning—everywhere, machine-learning systems promise faster analysis, faster responses, and faster decision-making. In a military context, this sounds like progress. In reality, AI exacerbates a security problem that cannot be solved technically. Anyone who attempts to do so anyway risks […]
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British imams are openly preaching that husbands can beat wives who refuse sex – and the police are doing almost nothing about it.
The post The British Imams Telling Men to Beat Their Wives for Refusing Sex appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
O SheUltra Portugal regressou este sábado, 10 de outubro, ao Algarve para a sua segunda edição, reunindo 170 mulheres inscritas num desafio de 43 quilómetros entre a Praia da Falésia e o AP Victoria Sports & Beach Hotel, no concelho de Albufeira, cujo evento mais do que uma prova de resistência, voltou a afirmar-se como uma celebração da superação pessoal, da inclusão e da solidariedade na luta contra os cancros femininos.
A britânica Sadie Besley foi a grande vencedora desta edição, concluindo o percurso em 4 horas e 38 minutos. A segunda posição foi alcançada por Gemma Chafer, com um tempo de 4h43, enquanto Jayne Charnock terminou na terceira posição, com 4h45.
Com uma filosofia que coloca a participação acima da competição, o SheUltra permite que cada mulher corra ou caminhe ao seu próprio ritmo, sem limite de tempo. O objetivo é proporcionar uma experiência inclusiva, em que cada participante possa enfrentar o seu próprio desafio, num ambiente marcado pelo apoio mútuo e pela entreajuda.
Criado em 2024, no País de Gales, por Huw Williams, a quem foi diagnosticado um cancro neuroendócrino em estádio 4, o SheUltra nasceu da vontade de criar um espaço seguro onde as mulheres se pudessem reunir, partilhar experiências e falar abertamente sobre a sua saúde.
Desde a sua criação, o evento tem vindo a afirmar uma identidade própria no panorama do trail running, associando a atividade física à sensibilização para a prevenção, a deteção precoce e o apoio às mulheres afetadas pelo cancro.
Um dos símbolos mais marcantes da iniciativa é a entrega da medalha logo à partida, numa homenagem às mulheres que perderam a vida para a doença e àquelas que continuam a lutar contra ela. Um gesto que recorda que o verdadeiro significado do SheUltra vai muito além dos tempos registados na meta.
O SheUltra está também associado ao apoio à equipa de oncologia de Faro, recordando-se que na primeira edição em Portugal, foram angariados 10.000 euros, bem como disponibilizados dois manequins de treino destinados a apoiar a formação dos profissionais de saúde e a sensibilização para a deteção precoce do cancro da mama.
A realização da prova conta com o envolvimento da comunidade local e com o apoio da Associação Free Challenge e da ATR – Algarve Trail Running, entidades que contribuem para a concretização do evento e para a promoção do desporto e da participação comunitária. Para mais informações clique aqui.
Two Ukrainian defense-tech firms, The Fourth Law and Odd Systems, have joined forces to mass-produce thermal imaging sensors in Europe and the US, The Fourth Law told Militarnyi. The goal is to wean Western militaries off foreign suppliers, chiefly China, for the core part of every thermal camera.
Amid Russia's daily attacks, Ukrainian drone makers have been shifting production to allied countries. Linza and Zoom drones are now built in Germany, and another top manufacturer has taken its technology to Canada and Finland. Sensor plants would move a core component west, not just finished drones.
The project, called Project Foundation, will build long-wave infrared sensors, known as microbolometers. These chips register heat, so a camera can pick out a person or vehicle at night or through smoke. The aim, The Fourth Law said, is to "ensure the sovereignty of Western countries in the field of thermal imaging technology."
The project will run two sites, First Foundation in Europe and Second Foundation in the US, from a headquarters in Eindhoven, a Dutch semiconductor hub. Mass production is due to start in 2027. Within three years, the partners want to quadruple Europe's output of these sensors and double America's.
Ukraine's front line burns through sensors faster than Europe can make them. "Europe currently produces less than 500,000 such sensors per year, while Ukraine consumes this amount in about five months," Odd Systems co-founder Yaroslav Azhniuk said in February, when he first announced plans for a plant able to make one million sensors a year. European sensors cost about five times as much as Chinese ones and are hard to buy at all, because Europeans need them too, he added.
Factories working for Ukraine abroad have already become sabotage targets. In March, an arson attack in Pardubice, Czechia, destroyed nearly all the production capacity of a plant making drones and thermal sights for Ukraine's army. Czech investigators are looking into a possible Russian trail behind the attack.
Russia is planning a winter strike campaign involving up to 1,000 missiles, drones, and bombs targeting, among other facilities, electrical substations, hydroelectric and thermal power plants, and boiler houses. The information is contained in a document that, according to sources cited by The New York Times, Ukraine's Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal presented as an intercepted Russian plan to destroy energy infrastructure systematically. The newspaper reported on 2 October.
Russia has been striking critical infrastructure across Ukraine since the beginning of its full-scale invasion. Such attacks have become particularly frequent ahead of and during winter. Ukraine's recent battlefield gains may have prompted Putin to reconsider his strategy and attempt to force Ukraine to surrender through winter strikes, analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) suggest. Russia's reported plans to attack Ukraine's energy, water supply, and sewage systems could threaten the basic living conditions of millions of people. Such strikes could increase pressure on civilians and the Ukrainian economy while forcing the state to divert more resources to emergency infrastructure repairs instead of defense needs.
The New York Times was unable to verify the document's authenticity independently, but noted that it was written in Russian and dated August.
A representative of Ukraine's defense-industrial sector who has reviewed the document believes it is more of a calculation than a finalized Russian military operations plan, according to Schemes, an investigative journalism project by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), in a report published on 8 October.
The document outlines how many missiles, drones, and bombs Russia would need to deprive Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa of electricity, heating, water, and sewage services, Radio Liberty reported on 9 October. The document's full list of priority cities also includes Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Poltava, Chernihiv, Kryvyi Rih, Cherkasy, Kropyvnytskyi, Lviv, Vinnytsia, and Ivano-Frankivsk.
According to the document, Russia plans to begin by attacking substations near Ukraine's western border, through which the country receives electricity from Europe. Hydroelectric power plants could be targeted next, followed by facilities intended to shut down Ukraine's three operational nuclear power plants, Radio Liberty reports. The document lists a total of 60 key targets.
According to Schemes, the document states that Russia would need up to 770 Molniya and Geran drones, Dan-T/Banderol missile-drones, 170 FAB guided aerial bombs, and 75 Kinzhal and Iskander-M ballistic missiles to carry out the attacks.
The document devotes particular attention to water supply and wastewater systems. These include pumping stations, treatment facilities, and other infrastructure essential for cities to provide residents with water and dispose of wastewater.
Russia has not previously attacked such facilities on a similar scale, The New York Times notes.
Preparing for possible attacks on water supply and sewage systems is significantly more difficult than protecting energy infrastructure, Oleh Popenko, head of the Ukrainian Union of Utility Services Consumers, told Current Time, RFE/RL's Russian-language network.
“Sewage is a very complex system. There are specific challenges: where to discharge wastewater, how to organize treatment facilities, and so on. Some work is also underway in this sector, but it will be much more difficult here than with district heating utilities,” Popenko says.
Creating alternative routes in case sewage pumping stations are destroyed is an expensive and technically challenging task, he adds. Such construction could cost billions of hryvnias.
The priority is to equip water utilities with backup power sources so they can continue operating during power outages. However, if Russian strikes damage the sewage system itself, resolving the problem quickly will be much more difficult, Popenko believes. Specific solutions, including wastewater disposal and the operation of treatment facilities, will have to be determined according to the extent of the damage.
Sewage pumping stations play a particularly important role. They pump wastewater onward for disposal and treatment. If such a station is put out of operation by a strike, the city needs an alternative way to divert wastewater while the damaged facility is being repaired, Popenko says. Bypass pipes or channels could be installed for this purpose, but setting up such a system during wartime is far from easy.
Preparations for winter are underway, but protection for energy infrastructure remains inadequate, Popenko believes. The main concern is large substations that transmit electricity from nuclear power plants and distribute electricity imported from Europe.
At the same time, some protective measures are already proving effective. Despite drone attacks over two days, one of Kyiv's substations withstood the strikes, and the city did not lose power, although scheduled outages were in effect, the expert says.
Popenko considers a repeat of last winter's scenario, when parts of Kyiv went without heating for weeks, entirely possible. Russian forces continue to attack energy facilities, and in his assessment, strengthening air defenses in Kyiv is the only way to protect its combined heat and power (CHP) plants from large-scale attacks.
“There are no other ways — for example, building some sarcophagi around CHPs or constructing shelters — because Russia can destroy these facilities again through massive strikes. And then the city risks being left 50–60% without heat,” Popenko believes.
Residents are also preparing for winter, but their options vary, he says. Some homeowners' associations participate in government programs to insulate apartment buildings and purchase backup power supplies for elevators and pumping stations. Owners of private houses are buying generators, among other measures. However, such equipment and preparations require substantial funds, meaning not everyone can afford them, he notes.
Ukraine has already experienced prolonged power outages during previous winters, particularly in 2022 and 2023. At the time, some regions went without electricity for 18–20 hours a day, the expert says. This experience may help people prepare for possible disruptions, but it does not eliminate the risk of further attacks and infrastructure damage.
A giant wind farm risks blinding radar used to track Russian jets and missiles, the Ministry of Defence has warned as it opposes Net Zero plans to build 23 turbines twice the height of Big Ben in Yorkshire.
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Russia is concentrating missiles on a smaller, more specific set of targets, and its jet-powered attack drones are part of the reason, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed. Its combined attack overnight on 7 October killed 22 people in Pryluky, the State Emergency Service (SES) said as of the morning of 8 October. Russian milbloggers noted the shift the same day.
Russia often uses concentrated drone and missile strikes to overwhelm localized Ukrainian air defenses and destroy urban centers, ISW noted. Pryluky, where the strike killed children, was one of the areas a Russian channel says drew a significant share of the Kh-101s that night. With winter close, ISW expects the same pattern against Ukraine's energy grid, with jet drones partly letting Russia keep its missiles for priority targets without firing many more.
Russia launched 48 Kh-101, Iskander-K, and Kalibr cruise missiles overnight on 7 October, Ukraine's Air Force reported. It also fired ballistic missiles, Zircon and Oniks anti-ship missiles, and 130 strike and decoy drones, 46 of them jet-powered Shahed-type models.
Russian milbloggers claimed the same day that Moscow had grouped a large part of its missile salvo into repeated waves on a few areas, while other weapons kept stretching Ukraine's air defenses elsewhere. The pro-war Russian Telegram channel Dva Mayora described the change as a switch from striking with splayed fingers to a series of hits with missile "fists." Defenders must then absorb a sharply rising load around one chosen site as one wave follows another, the channel claimed.
Citing Ukrainian monitoring channels, it claimed that roughly 30 or more Kh-101 cruise missiles flew toward Pryluky, Kremenchuk, Svitlovodsk, and Oleksandriia in Chernihiv, Poltava, and Kirovohrad oblasts. It put the Kremenchuk group at up to 15 missiles, Kh-101s and Kalibrs among them, aimed at the area of Kremenchuk and its hydroelectric plant.
ISW said the jet-powered versions penetrate Ukrainian air defenses deeper and more reliably than propeller models. In ISW's assessment, that partly lets Russia concentrate cruise and ballistic missiles on priority targets without significantly raising missile use. Russia builds about 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet drones a month, Ukraine's military intelligence agency (HUR) told Militarnyi in August.
ISW expects Russia to apply the pattern in a likely brutal winter campaign against energy infrastructure. Russia likely intends to make city life untenable and force Ukraine to capitulate to its demands, ISW assessed. Such tactics have not worked before and are unlikely to work now, analysts added.
They called cheap countermeasures to jet drones and small cruise missiles vital, alongside Western air defense aid such as US-made Patriots, which can stop ballistic missiles. Ukraine has already paired a Soviet-era Kub launcher with American RIM-7 interceptors to catch jet drones.
German radar maker Hensoldt has signed a memorandum with Ukraine's Defense Ministry for more large-scale radar deliveries, the company said on 5 October. Ukrainian defense outlet Defense Express reads it as a step toward fitting Hensoldt's TRML-4D, already in Ukrainian service, into FREYJA, a planned shield against ballistic missiles.
Ballistic missiles remain the hardest threat in Russia's air war. After Russia's overnight barrage on 7 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine is still searching daily for Patriot missiles. The only other system Ukraine can use against them is the Franco-Italian SAMP/T, which fires Aster 30 interceptors made in small numbers. That gap is why Fire Point is reworking its FP-7 missile into a Patriot-like interceptor. Such an interceptor still needs radars to find its target first.
Hensoldt CEO Oliver Dörre signed the document on the sidelines of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz's visit to Ukraine. Beyond deliveries, it covers further development of radar capabilities. The partners will also study options to deploy and jointly operate TRL-4D LR long-range radars. Hensoldt said this expands cooperation already agreed on in ballistic missile defense.
The TRL-4D LR is the land-based version of a long-range radar Hensoldt also builds for the German Navy, German outlet Sicherheit & Verteidigung reported. The outlet cited Germany's defense procurement office as giving the naval version a range of more than 400 km (250 miles) against air targets. That, it concluded, puts the range well beyond the TRML-4D's.
"The Ukrainian air defence forces urgently need our high-performance radars to help protect infrastructure such as bridges," Dörre said.
Defense Express, describing the same memorandum, tied both the mass deliveries and the joint-operation plan to the TRML-4D. Hensoldt's release names no model for the deliveries and links joint operation to the TRL-4D LR.
Hensoldt and Fire Point signed a memorandum on FREYJA at the Eurosatory arms show in Paris in June, with the TRML-4D to play a key role, Hensoldt announced. Fire Point is set to act as prime contractor and hold design authority. Hensoldt is to produce, test, and deliver the radars.
Defense Express expects any study of deployment options to focus on how well the radar detects ballistic missiles and relays that data. Hensoldt has its own unit in Ukraine to work closely with operators, the outlet noted. Earlier, the company began setting up a local hub so Ukraine can service and repair the TRML-4D itself.
Ukraine's military uses the TRML-4D both standalone and as the built-in radar of the IRIS-T SLM medium-range air defense system, Defense Express noted. Hensoldt lists an instrumented range of 250 km (155 miles) at altitudes up to 30 km (19 miles). Defense Express, citing the manufacturer, gives track ranges of more than 120 km (75 miles) for fighter jets and more than 60 km (37 miles) for supersonic missiles.
More radars give earlier warning of ballistic strikes, but they cannot stop them. Until the FP-7.X makes its first ballistic intercept, planned for mid-2027, that job stays with Patriot and SAMP/T missiles. Partners delivered three times fewer air defense missiles in the first half of 2026 than a year earlier, Zelenskyy said on 5 August.
Defense officials from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan spoke with North Korean representatives at Russia's Center-2026 strategic exercises, Afghanistan's Defense Ministry reported. So far, neither Moscow nor Pyongyang has confirmed any meeting, and Kabul disclosed no details of the talks or any agreement.
Since invading Ukraine, Russia has gathered a circle of sanctioned governments it both leans on for its war and props up in return—a trade that runs in opposite directions depending on the partner. Each new tie leaves one more isolated state with a stake in the war grinding on.
The exercises ran from 28 September to 3 October in Russia's Chelyabinsk Oblast. The Taliban attended as observers for the first time since it retook power in 2021, Militarnyi reported, one of dozens of foreign delegations present.
Mawlawi Nasibullah Madani, commander of the Abdullah bin Masoud Joint Combat Training Command, led the Taliban delegation. The ministry said its officers held discussions with North Korea's military attaché and with officials from China, India, Vietnam, and other countries on bilateral ties and military cooperation. The delegation also toured an exhibition featuring heavy weapons, drones, long-range missiles, and robotic systems.
On 27 May 2026, Russia and the Taliban signed a military-technical cooperation agreement. Russia's special envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, claimed the deal is a practical framework focused on repairing Soviet- and Russian-made equipment the Taliban already holds. Russia remains the only country to formally recognize the Taliban government, a step it took in July 2025.
North Korea signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with Russia in June 2024 that includes a mutual defense clause. Pyongyang has since sent an estimated 14,000 troops to Russia's Kursk Oblast. In April, Ukraine's Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War put North Korea's losses at 7,058, including 2,251 killed.
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