A Missouri judge who locked two children in jail cells because he was frustrated by their resistance to a parental custody decision is liable for violating their Fourth Amendment rights, a federal appeals court ruled this week. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit rejected Taney County Judge Eric Eighmy's claim that he was shielded by qualified immunity, a doctrine that blocks federal civil rights claims unless they allege a violation of "clearly established" law.
"A reasonable judge should have known better," Judge David Stras writes in an opinion joined by the two other members of the 8th Circuit panel. "The law was 'clearly established' enough" to "place the issue 'beyond debate.'"
Institute for Justice attorney Dylan Moore, who wrote an 8th Circuit brief arguing against immunity for Eighmy and participated in oral arguments, welcomed the decision. "Every reasonable person knows that a judge can't throw children in jail for no good reason," he said. "Yet Judge Eighmy claimed qualified immunity shielded him from accountability anyway because no prior case told him that imprisoning innocent kids is unconstitutional. That defense is ridiculous, and we are thrilled that the court saw through it. When government officials commit such obvious constitutional violations, qualified immunity should never enter the picture."
The incident at the center of the case happened after an October 2019 custody hearing involving Kadan Rockett, then 14, and his 12-year-old sister, Brooklyn, who had achieved a modicum of fame as magicians performing on America's Got Talent. Their divorced parents, Bart Rockett and Kami Ballard, agreed that Ballard, who at that point lived in Missouri, would have primary custody of the children, while Rockett, who was living in California, would be "responsible for them at the beginning of each month and 'during TV pilot season.'" But Kadan and Brooklyn did not want to go home with their mother, which led to an argument in the lobby of the courthouse.
Eighmy intervened, telling Kadan and Brooklyn to come with him to a conference room, where he informed them that they had to leave with Ballard. "The children would not budge, even after the judge mentioned that the other option was foster care," Stras notes. "Frustrated, Judge Eighmy had the children follow him again, this time to a waiting area in the courthouse's juvenile division." A few minutes later, Eighmy "led them down a hallway to two holding cells."
Outside the cells, Eighmy again threatened Kadan and Brooklyn with foster care, but they were still unmoved. "Lock them up," the judge told an officer, who "patted them down and ordered them to remove their socks and shoes" before confining them in separate cells.
It is not clear exactly how much time Kadan and Brooklyn spent in the cells. The Institute for Justice says "about an hour," while Stras says "the time spent in the holding-cell area was between twenty and forty minutes." In any case, the children's respect for Eighmy's authority had improved by the time he came back. He "asked them one more time whether they would leave with their mother," Stras writes. "This time, they both nodded yes, so he let them go."
In June 2021, Rockett, the children's father, sued Eighmy on their behalf under 42 USC 1983, which authorizes claims against state or local officials who violate constitutional rights under color of law. In his motion to dismiss the lawsuit, Eighmy argued that he was protected by judicial immunity, which is absolute with respect to a judge's official duties. U.S. District Judge Douglas Harpool disagreed, and the 8th Circuit affirmed that ruling in 2023, noting that Kadan and Brooklyn were beyond Eighmy's contempt power because they were not parties to the custody case and that "judges do not do double duty as jailers."
Eighmy reiterated his judicial immunity claim in a motion for summary judgment, and Harpool rejected it again. After the trial began, Eighmy claimed qualified immunity twice, once after all the evidence had been submitted and again after the jury's verdict in favor of Kadan and Brooklyn. Harpool denied him that defense both times.
The jury ultimately awarded Kadan and Brooklyn $5,000 each in damages, and Harpool added about $327,000 in attorney fees. Eighmy appealed again, reiterating his judicial immunity claim. But the appeals court ruled that he had abandoned that argument by failing to raise it during the trial or after the verdict. So Eighmy was left with qualified immunity, which the appeals court said he did not deserve.
Eighmy clearly violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures, Stras says, because he "did not have 'probable cause to believe that [the children had] committed' an offense, much less one that justified placing them in a holding cell. Rather, their only misdeed was one every parent knows well: resisting authority. Even in the context of legal-custody proceedings, refusing to leave with a parent is not a jailable offense. Nor were there 'exigent circumstances' arising out of danger to themselves or others."
Did Eighmy's authority as a judge give him extra leeway? Nope. "Criminal contempt was off the table because the children were neither parties to the custody case nor present inside the courtroom," Stras notes. "Nor could the power to punish a party for violating an injunction have provided the justification, given that Judge Eighmy never issued one."
Eighmy's motive for jailing the children does not change that analysis. "We have no doubt that Judge Eighmy believed he was acting in 'good faith,' and possibly even in the children's best interests, by detaining them," Stras writes. "But good faith in the Fourth Amendment context is about reasonable reliance, either on binding appellate precedent or a warrant issued by a 'neutral magistrate.'"
What about Eighmy's argument that he had no way of knowing his actions were unconstitutional? "The law in this area" was "clearly established," Stras says. "'[I]t would have been sufficiently clear [to] every reasonable official,' Judge Eighmy included, that locking up two children for refusing to follow directions violated the Fourth Amendment. As we put it over a decade and a half ago, long before the events in this case, '[i]t is clearly established that a warrantless arrest, unsupported by probable cause, violates the Fourth Amendment."
That principle was so well established, in fact, that Kadan and Brooklyn, neither of whom had attended law school, took it for granted. "I don't know how you have a right to lock us up," Kadan told Eighmy when he threatened to jail them, according to Rockett's amended complaint. "We have done nothing wrong." The complaint says Brooklyn raised the same point. "How can you just lock up kids?" she asked. "This isn't legal. We've done nothing wrong."
Given Eighmy's obvious disregard for Kadan and Brooklyn's Fourth Amendment rights, "we are not concerned about the lack of a prior case" with "fundamentally similar" facts, Stras says. "Indeed, given how clear the law is, it would have been surprising to find one." He quotes an observation that Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch made as a 10th Circuit judge: "Sometimes the most obviously unlawful things happen so rarely that a case on point is itself an unusual thing."
The post The 8th Circuit Rejects Qualified Immunity for a Judge Who Jailed 2 Kids for 'Refusing To Follow Directions' appeared first on Reason Magazine.
A federal judge referred Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner and one of his deputies to the Department of Justice for potential prosecution for alleged misconduct. In response, Krasner's office filed a motion seeking to force the Judge--Paul Diamond--from a case involving his office.
Yesterday, Judge Diamond rejected the Philly DA's motion with a terse and forcefully worded order.
Here, from the order, is some background:
In the last two years, the Third Circuit, this Court, and the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court have condemned as dishonest repeated post-trial concessions of relief made by the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office. . . . The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was so concerned that it took the remarkable step of ordering all Philadelphia Common Pleas Judges to seek the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General's intervention whenever the DAO made a post-trial concession, so that the Attorney General could confirm the concession's honesty. . . .
The DAO's present post-trial concession is also remarkable: Here, four DAO supervisors credibly testified that the District Attorney himself and his lieutenant, Assistant District Attorney Matthew Stiegler, urged them to make false representations to this Court to "protect the office." According to "the Four," the District Attorney threatened them with "consequences" if they did not. Because these and related accusations, if true, could amount to criminal misconduct, I disqualified the District Attorney and Stiegler from participating further in this case and referred the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation. In the DAO's newly-filed Motions and the District Attorney's unsworn "Declaration"—all of which generate more heat than light—the DAO seeks my recusal from all matters in which the Office appears and asks me to reconsider my rulings in this case. I decline to do either.
And on the merits of the recusal request, here is what Judge Diamond had to say:
During the three-day hearing before me, the DAO failed to object to virtually all the rulings and actions it now challenges. That the Office chose to object only after the Court issued a decision unfavorable to the District Attorney and his lieutenant confirms that the DAO merely disagrees with those rulings. . . .
The Office challenges my noting that the District Attorney neither testified nor offered an affidavit in response to the Four's testimony—on which I based my disqualification order and DOJ referral. I do not credit the District Attorney's absurd suggestion that he did not know he could testify—especially after I twice asked DAO counsel if he wished to call any witnesses. Nor has the District Attorney explained why he did not offer a responsive affidavit, which would have required the declarant to tell the truth (under penalty of false swearing). The Office thus cannot truthfully dispute that the District Attorney chose not to give his version of events in Court under oath. The DAO's apparent belief that this tactical choice was reasonable hardly warrants recusal.
Finally, the DAO believes that I should have been leerier of Mason's testimony—the various corroborative documents notwithstanding—and more responsive to the uncorroborated, dubious testimony of Stiegler. Again, disagreement with my credibility determination is not a basis for recusal. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 ("[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings . . . do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."); Wecht, 484 F.3d at 220–21 (recusal not warranted despite the court's "skewed and unfair reading of the record"). The other arguments the DAO raises do not warrant discussion. Accordingly, I will deny as frivolous the Motion for Recusal.
And on the question of reconsideration:
The DAO does not discuss or even mention the burden and criteria a party seeking reconsideration must meet. Rather, as it did in seeking my recusal, the Office urges me to revisit my rulings because it disagrees with them. Once again, that disagreement does not warrant reconsideration. . . .
I will not discuss here every protest the Office makes to virtually all my rulings, my credibility determinations, and (once again) my reference to the District Attorney's silence in the face of damning testimony from his own employees and former employee. In his belated, unsworn "Declaration" the District Attorney attacks three of these witnesses as unworthy of belief. This after-the-fact attempt to cram "evidence" into a closed record seems intended to persuade the media, not the Court. In any event, the evidence is unpersuasive and does not warrant reconsideration. . . .
Accordingly, I will again deny the DAO's frivolous Motion.
Judge Diamond's order concludes:
Four of the District Attorney's supervisors offered powerful, unrebutted testimony that their boss and Stiegler urged them to misrepresent to this Court. When the Four told the District Attorney that he had thus created a conflict compelling them to inform the Court and withdraw from this case, he threatened them with "consequences." There are few attorney transgressions more serious than lying to the Court, urging others to do so, or threatening them should they tell the Court the truth. . . . If this in fact occurred, it is all the more serious because it occurred after four Courts condemned the DAO's conduct in circumstances like those presented here. Disqualifying the District Attorney and Stiegler and referring them for investigation is thus reasonable and warranted. That the District Attorney chose not to testify but sought to "make his case" with an unsworn declaration—the credibility of which I am unable to assess—makes that investigation even more necessary. Although Mr. Krasner may yet have the opportunity to testify under oath in another forum, his intemperate filings provide no basis for recusal or reconsideration of my rulings.
The post Judge Refuses to Recuse in Case Involving Alleged Misconduct by Philly DA's Office appeared first on Reason Magazine.
According to The Washington Post, "The chairman of the Republican-led House Oversight Committee is investigating two D.C.-based activist groups over hosting what he called 'jury nullification training sessions,' claiming that their instructions given to potential jurors were an illegal attempt to subvert federal prosecutors."
The committee chair in question, Rep. James Comer (R–Ky.), has set his sights on the groups known as Free DC and Harriet's Wildest Dreams because they, in Comer's words, believe "that potential jurors should not make decisions impartially based on applying the law as instructed to the facts presented before them in the case, but based on their subjective, personal beliefs and activist agendas."
I hate to break it to Comer, but many prominent members of America's Founding generation would have agreed with those D.C. activists.
The debate over jury nullification asks whether there is a proper place in our legal system for a jury to acquit, not because of any lack of evidence of a defendant's guilt, but because the jury believes the underlying law that was supposedly broken, or the prosecutor's particular enforcement of that law, to be unconstitutional.
In 1791, the influential Founding Father James Wilson, who was a signer of both the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, delivered a widely discussed lecture on law at the College of Philadelphia. "Whoever would be obliged to obey a constitutional law, is justified in refusing to obey an unconstitutional act of the legislature," Wilson said. "When a question, even of this delicate nature, occurs, every one who is called to act, has a right to judge." Needless to say, jurors are among those "called to act" in this very manner. Jurors therefore have their own "right to judge" the constitutionality of the law (and prosecution) before them.
Thomas Jefferson made a similar point in a 1789 letter to Thomas Paine. "The trial by jury," Jefferson wrote, is "the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution." How else may a jury hold the government accountable to the principles of the Constitution than by judging for itself the constitutionality of the government's actions, including the actions of the police and prosecution?
According to Comer, the job of a juror is mechanically "applying the law as instructed to the facts presented before them in the case."
But that's not what Founding Fathers such as Wilson and Jefferson thought. They argued that the job of the juror was to apply the text of the Constitution to the actions of the government and to acquit the defendant if either the law or its enforcement came up short. As Alexis de Tocqueville put it in his great book, Democracy in America, the jury "places the real direction of society in the hands of the governed, or a portion of the governed, and not in that of the government."
The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments this week in two cases that are worth keeping track of.
The post Jury Nullification Is Not a Crime appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Thanks to a 2005 DUI conviction in Pennsylvania, Edward Williams permanently lost the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. But he did not realize that until a decade later, and his confusion on that point is understandable.
The federal law that stripped Williams of his Second Amendment rights is commonly described as applying to "felons," and Williams' offense was a misdemeanor. But although his sentence did not include any time behind bars, his crime theoretically could have sent him to prison for up to five years. That was enough to trigger 18 USC 922(g)(1), which covers anyone convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."
When a lawyer alerted Williams to that wrinkle, which made his continued ownership of firearms a federal felony, he got rid of his guns. But he did not think that requirement was fair, reasonable, or constitutional, and this week a federal appeals court agreed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit recognized a historical tradition of disarming "physically dangerous individuals" whose possession of firearms would pose a threat to public safety. But it said Williams plainly does not fit into that category.
"The federal government spent nearly a decade trying to permanently disarm a peaceable man over a nonviolent misdemeanor—and it lost bigly," says Brandon Combs, president of the Firearms Policy Coalition, which supported Williams' lawsuit. "The government does not get to turn a nonviolent conviction into a lifetime ban on exercising a constitutionally protected right."
The 3rd Circuit's en banc decision in Williams v. Attorney General affirms a 2023 ruling by a federal judge who likewise concluded that disarming Williams was unconstitutional. It elaborates on the logic of Range v. Attorney General, a 2023 decision that restored the gun rights of a Pennsylvania man who had been convicted of food stamp fraud. In both cases, the 3rd Circuit held that applying Section 922(g)(1) to the plaintiffs was not "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation"—the Second Amendment test established by the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.
Writing for the majority in Williams' case, 3rd Circuit Judge Paul Matey acknowledges that the Supreme Court has described "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons" as "presumptively lawful." But "those longstanding customs restricted the violently dangerous (within which some felons would be included), not felons writ large," he says. "Felons were restricted because they posed a physical danger, rather than for their offense of conviction."
Matey argues that "focusing on physical dangerousness corrects the erroneous argument" that "only law-abiding and responsible citizens can exercise the rights protected by the Second Amendment"—a claim that the Supreme Court rejected in the 2024 case United States v. Rahimi. "We find no history that supports disarming irresponsible people, where 'responsible' is defined by the whim of the sovereign or the will of the majority," he says, alluding to the danger of allowing legislators to whittle away at the Second Amendment by criminalizing an ever-widening range of conduct.
Matey emphasizes "the novelty of forever restricting all felons from possessing firearms for lawful purposes." The original restriction, which Congress approved in 1938 as part of the Federal Firearms Act, applied only to violent crimes such as murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon. In 1961, Congress expanded the ban to cover nonviolent crimes punishable by more than a year in prison.
Williams' 2005 DUI conviction qualified for two reasons. He had a prior DUI conviction, stemming from a 2000 arrest in State College. And when he was arrested again in Philadelphia four years later, his blood alcohol concentration was a whopping 0.223 percent. That made his second offense a first-degree misdemeanor, which carries a maximum prison sentence of five years.
Since then, Williams has stayed out of trouble. "He has done nothing violent, let alone dangerous, for over twenty years, and has held steady employment at the same job for over three decades," Matey notes. Williams drinks only occasionally, and a psychological evaluation found he "has a normal personality, without psychopathology and without addiction or violent tendencies."
The Justice Department nevertheless argued that Williams' continuing disarmament is consistent with the Bruen test, which requires historical analogs that are "relevantly similar" in motivation and scope. In making that case, the government relied mainly on early laws aimed at "habitual drunkards"—the same analogy that the Supreme Court unanimously rejected last June in United States v. Hemani, which involved the federal ban on gun possession by "unlawful" drug users.
Although the Justice Department "acknowledges it may proscribe Williams's possession of firearms only if he 'presently poses a physical danger if armed,'" Matey says, it "offers no evidence to establish this as the aim of the habitual drunkard laws." Those laws, the Supreme Court noted in Hemani, "did not seek to protect the public from violence so much as to protect habitual drunkards from themselves and their families from financial devastation."
Nor did the habitual drunkard laws permanently disarm people, as Section 922(g)(1) does. "Most statutes capped the commitment of habitual drunkards to the state inebriate asylum, prison, or hard labor to a few months or years," Matey notes. "Others provided for an indefinite period of incarceration, but had no indication that upon release individuals continued to forfeit their arms. Rather, once someone was 'safe' to 'go at large,' they were restored to the status of a full rights-bearing citizen."
Contrary to the considerations that the Supreme Court deemed relevant in Hemani, Matey says, the Justice Department "fails to show that Williams threatens to 'misuse[] a gun while intoxicated,' or that he 'poses a danger to himself or others as a result' of
alcohol abuse. In fact, much like those nineteenth-century drunkards released from custody and restored their rights, the record shows that Williams poses no present physical danger from the use of a firearm, or anything else."
The 3rd Circuit is one of three federal appeals courts that have allowed people with nonviolent felony records to argue that Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to them. But such challenges have been blocked in six circuits, notwithstanding compelling historical evidence that the law reaches much farther than the Second Amendment allows. So far, the Supreme Court has declined to accept any of the many petitions asking it to resolve that circuit split.
The post The 3rd Circuit Upholds the Gun Rights of a Man Who Committed a Nonviolent Misdemeanor 2 Decades Ago appeared first on Reason Magazine.
By Madeline CARR
Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
Recent warnings from American AI leaders have created the impression that the world is only beginning to confront the dangers of advanced artificial intelligence.
Dario Amodei, chief executive of tech company Anthropic, has called for governments to intervene to slow the development of increasingly powerful AI models.
His proposal begins with independent evaluators embedded inside AI companies, moves on to regulation and progresses to government-backed coordination among democratic states.
Ultimately, it seeks global agreements with China on testing of AI systems, dangerous applications of the technology and the pace of AI development.
Yet there is a China-shaped hole in this narrative. The Asian superpower is portrayed as the difficult final participant in a governance system that the US and its allies must first create.
In fact, China has already established an extensive system of AI rules, assessment, filing, technical standards and government oversight. Here’s how China’s AI governance system has developed in stages alongside the technology itself.
Beijing’s 2022 rules on algorithmic recommendation services apply to technologies that select, rank, filter or recommend online content to users.
They compel companies that use algorithms to examine how they work, to protect the personal information of users, to give users certain controls, and to introduce safeguards for workers, consumers, children and older people.
China’s deep synthesis provisions, effective from January 2023, extended regulation to synthetic (or AI-generated) text, images, audio and video. AI companies must authenticate users, protect data, keep relevant records, assess their systems and identify synthetic material that could be mistaken for authentic content.
The interim measures for generative artificial intelligence services were introduced in August 2023. These added rules for public-facing generative AI, particularly those that can influence public opinion or persuade uses in other ways.
The measures apply to the legality and quality of training data, users’ personal information, intellectual property and discrimination based on protected characteristics. The rules also cover transparency by AI companies and the accuracy and reliability of products.
Under the rules, companies must address problems found in their services. These services must undergo a security assessment to examine their risks and compliance with Chinese legislation. The companies must also file information about their algorithms with Chinese authorities.
These mechanisms are not identical to the independent evaluators that would be embedded in AI companies, as has been proposed by Amodei. But they perform some of the same functions.
Frontier risks
Beijing’s latest set of measures is called the AI safety governance framework 3.0, published in September 2026. It sets out a broad approach to identifying, grading and responding to risks throughout the lifecycle of AI systems.
Building on earlier versions, the framework covers AI model and data risks, vulnerabilities in open source models (those which can be freely modified by users), AI’s effects on employment and society and increasingly autonomous systems.
It includes a dedicated mechanism for managing risks associated with rapidly developing AI agents (systems that carry out tasks in response to instructions by a user).
The framework addresses some of the same dangers now generating alarm in Silicon Valley, including highly autonomous systems, the misuse of chemical, biological and nuclear technologies, and the possibility of humans losing control of advanced AI. It proposes continual safety evaluations, risk based safeguards, humans being in charge, and emergency intervention mechanisms.
An independent analysis by the US Carnegie Endowment for International Peace thinktank has described the framework as China’s attempt to “to advance frontier safety without the need for heavy handed regulatory interventions”.
Legal consequences
None of this means that Chinese AI rules should be transplanted elsewhere. Its institutions, regulatory traditions and technological priorities are different.
Many functions now presented as urgent aspirations in the US, including evaluation, accountability for AI companies, risk classification for AI systems, regulatory filing, technical standards and government oversight are already embedded in the governance architecture of the world’s other AI superpower.
The US is free to conclude that a market-led system best serves its economic and strategic interests. The Trump administration has favoured a “minimally burdensome” national approach to AI and has sought to limit more demanding state-level regulation.
But a market-led model cannot mean privatising the rewards of AI while exporting its risks. US companies may capture the commercial gains, while governments elsewhere are left to investigate security incidents, protect public systems and absorb the wider costs when those technologies fail. The OpenAI agent that gained unauthorised access to Australia’s state healthcare service shows how AI risks are being exported.
If Washington rejects extensive controls before systems are released, the US needs a credible legal regime for assessing who is liable for damage caused by those AI models. Otherwise, countries dependent on foreign AI systems will face increasingly difficult choices about whose technology to trust, and on what terms.
Silicon Valley’s governing ethos has long been to “move fast and break things”. That was always a questionable principle for technologies woven deeply into public life. It is untenable for companies whose own leaders now warn that their products could cause catastrophic harm.
Beijing has already surrounded its AI sector with public obligations, regulatory oversight and an evolving framework of risk assessment. A global debate that treats such governance as a future aspiration should at least recognise that one country is already ahead of the curve.
Original article: theconversation.com
Former Swain Co. sheriff faces sex crime charges from NC and Cherokees. He might avoid NC prosecution if judge buys mental fitness claim.
Unfit to stand trial? Ex-sheriff facing sex charges seeks to avoid prosecution. is a story from Carolina Public Press, an award-winning independent newsroom. Our breakthrough journalism shines a light on the critical overlooked and under-reported issues facing North Carolina’s more than 11 million residents. Please consider making a contribution to support our journalism.
The European Union has signed an international agreement strengthening the recovery of criminal assets, as Brussels seeks to address the failure of national authorities to confiscate the overwhelming majority of wealth generated through organised crime, corruption and money laundering.
The agreement, opened for signature in Strasbourg on Wednesday, 14 October, introduces additional provisions governing the identification, freezing, confiscation and management of assets held across national borders.
It supplements the Council of Europe’s Warsaw Convention, which established an international framework for cooperation against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
The Additional Protocol adopted by the Council of Europe extends existing asset-recovery mechanisms and strengthens the ability of national authorities to cooperate when criminal proceeds are transferred beyond the country where an offence occurred.
European authorities have long struggled to deprive criminal organisations of the profits generated by their activities.
An estimate frequently cited by European institutions suggests that only around one per cent of criminal proceeds are ultimately confiscated.
The figure highlights a persistent weakness in criminal enforcement. Police and prosecutors may identify offenders and secure convictions without recovering the money used to finance further criminal operations.
Organised crime networks can distribute their assets through bank accounts, companies, property holdings and intermediaries operating in different jurisdictions.
Investigators must establish the origin and ownership of those assets, obtain the necessary legal orders and secure cooperation from foreign authorities before funds or property can be transferred again.
The problem has become increasingly serious as criminal organisations operate across several countries while enforcement powers remain largely national.
In an earlier examination of Europe’s response to drug-trafficking networks, EU Today reported on the importance of confiscating criminal assets rather than concentrating exclusively on arrests and drug seizures.
The financial structures supporting trafficking organisations can survive the prosecution of individual members, allowing criminal enterprises to replace personnel and continue operations.
The protocol is intended to address practical obstacles encountered when authorities seek assistance from another country.
Its provisions cover international cooperation in asset recovery, the management of seized property and the execution of confiscation decisions.
They also address circumstances in which confiscation may be possible without a conventional criminal conviction, subject to the safeguards and legal requirements established by participating states.
Such arrangements can be particularly relevant when suspects have fled, proceedings cannot be completed or assets are held through structures designed to conceal their ownership.
The protocol also provides for improved cooperation between designated asset-recovery authorities.
These mechanisms are intended to reduce the delays that can arise when investigators must navigate different national procedures while attempting to secure property that may be rapidly moved or disposed of.
The Council of Europe’s treaty documentation explains that the protocol seeks to update the Warsaw Convention in accordance with developments in international anti-money laundering standards.
The revised framework has also been developed with reference to EU rules and the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force.
The agreement builds on legislation already adopted within the European Union.
The 2024 Asset Recovery and Confiscation Directive established stronger provisions concerning the tracing, freezing, confiscation and management of assets associated with criminal activity.
That directive is intended to improve national asset-recovery systems and strengthen cooperation between authorities.
The EU has separately developed a new anti-money laundering framework, including the establishment of the Frankfurt-based Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism.
The authority has responsibilities concerning the supervision of high-risk financial institutions and coordination between national bodies combating illicit financial activity.
The new Council of Europe protocol addresses a related but distinct problem: how authorities recover assets once suspected criminal proceeds have been identified, particularly when those assets are located in another jurisdiction.
An earlier EU Today report on criminal enforcement of sanctions violations illustrated the importance of asset confiscation in cases involving breaches of European restrictions.
Although sanctions enforcement and organised crime investigations operate under different legal arrangements, both can require authorities to identify property, obtain judicial orders and prevent assets from being moved beyond their reach.
The protocol was adopted by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on 15 May 2026 and opened for signature on 14 October.
The European Union’s participation requires further legal procedures before the new provisions become binding.
The Commission had previously submitted proposals authorising the EU to sign the agreement, reflecting the division of responsibilities between the Union and its member states in criminal justice and financial regulation.
Individual governments must also determine how the international obligations interact with national procedures governing investigations, property rights and confiscation.
The effectiveness of the agreement will depend on the speed of its implementation and the resources available to investigators, prosecutors and financial intelligence authorities.
Criminal organisations can transfer funds internationally through transactions completed in minutes. Judicial cooperation and the enforcement of confiscation decisions frequently require considerably longer.
The protocol offers governments additional instruments for narrowing that gap, but cannot eliminate the administrative and legal obstacles without corresponding improvements in national enforcement.
For European authorities, the practical measure of success will be the amount of criminal wealth that can be identified and recovered.
The Strasbourg agreement provides a wider legal framework for that task at a time when the profits generated by organised crime continue to exceed the assets confiscated by enforcement agencies.
Four in five new jobs created in Britain since 2014 were taken by migrants while the number of British people on out-of-work benefits increased by 2.3 million, according to a report from the Centre for Social Justice.
The post Migrants Taking Four in Five New Jobs appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
Back in 1983, the Supreme Court declared that "a person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another." That increasingly doubtful proposition underpins a nationwide network of more than 144,000 AI-assisted cameras that track the travels of innocent motorists across the country billions of times each week.
So far, state and federal courts have almost uniformly rejected constitutional challenges to automated license plate readers (ALPRs) installed by companies such as Flock Safety. But in a decision that could signal a shift in the legal treatment of Flock cameras, a federal judge in Oklahoma recently recognized that they enable "a type of indiscriminate mass surveillance."
ALPRs are much more sophisticated than the technology that the Supreme Court considered in 1983, when it approved the warrantless use of a radio transmitter that helped police tail a suspected methamphetamine manufacturer's car. Three decades later, by contrast, the Court said police should have obtained a search warrant before attaching a GPS tracker to another drug suspect's car.
The majority opinion in the latter case emphasized the physical intrusion necessary to install the tracker. But five justices embraced an alternative rationale, saying GPS tracking impinges on reasonable expectations of privacy by revealing potentially sensitive information about the target's historical whereabouts.
That theory came to the fore in a 2018 case involving mobile-phone location data collected by cell sites, which the majority said implicated the Fourth Amendment because "individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements." The Supreme Court reiterated that principle this year, extending it to data collected by Google's Location History feature.
"An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in records about his cell phone's location," Justice Elena Kagan said in the majority opinion, "and police intrude on that constitutionally protected interest when they demand the information." By similar logic, U.S. District Judge Sara E. Hill concluded this month in the Oklahoma case, people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in ALPR records, and police therefore generally need a warrant to search them.
Those databases include "information about all vehicles that pass by any network-connected camera at all times," which police can peruse "on demand," Hill noted. "Freedom from persistent, dragnet-style surveillance while in public is not a foreign concept in our society, and it is a reasonable expectation that society already accepts," as reflected in the Supreme Court's cellphone decisions.
Like cars, cellphones "move in public places where people can see you in plain view," Hill wrote. "But it becomes constitutionally problematic when law enforcement can indiscriminately and passively catalog your whereabouts over an extended period of time and then use that information for any purpose whenever convenient."
At this point, Hill's decision is an outlier. "It appears that nearly every court examining the issue to date has determined that ALPR technology use is not a search under the Fourth Amendment because people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements on public streets," she noted.
Last month, for instance, a federal judge in California held that ALPR database searches are "clearly distinguishable from and less extensive than the 'near perfect surveillance' achievable" with cell-site or Location History data. And the day after Hill's ruling, a state judge in California rejected a challenge to San Jose's Flock camera network, saying "there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in license plate data collected from cameras directed solely at public streets."
A federal lawsuit involving the same city's ALPR system, which the Institute for Justice filed last April, is still pending. So are challenges to Flock cameras in cities such as Wichita, Kansas, and Norfolk, Virginia.
Even when they reject such lawsuits, courts commonly acknowledge that the legal picture could change as the number and capabilities of ALPRs multiply. If so, it seems likely that Hill will eventually be joined by other judges who recognize the perils of "indiscriminate mass surveillance."
© Copyright 2026 by Creators Syndicate Inc.
The post Other Courts Should Heed a Federal Judge's Warning About Flock-Enabled Mass Surveillance appeared first on Reason Magazine.
In the second half of this insightful conversation, former political prisoner Mansa Musa joins Black Panther Party archivist and photographer Billy X Jennings to examine the pivotal 1971 FBI office break-in by antiwar activists. The stolen documents exposed COINTELPRO—the federal government’s covert operation to surveil, infiltrate, and dismantle radical political movements. Despite state-sponsored efforts to suppress the organization, the Panthers’ legacy survives through modern social movements, culture, politics, and communal socialism. Oakland Mayor Barbara Lee, who worked closely alongside the Panthers on their early survival programs, brings deep personal insight into their lasting community impact. Published in conjunction with the 60th anniversary of the Black Panther Party, this feature continues our series on the BPP’s enduring role in social justice.
Related links:
Credits:
The following is a rushed transcript and may contain errors. It will be updated.
Mansa Musa:
I was reading Huey’s dissertation for his doctoral called War Against the Black Panther Party: A Study in Oppression in America. And in that, he outlined one COINTELPRO and COINTELPRO systematic attack on the party to the point of Eddie Conway wrote the book called The Greatest Threat Ever, outlining how the federal government systematically targeted anybody, but more specifically members of the Black Panther Party to either isolate them or kill them or send them to prison where they served death of a thousand cuts and then they ultimately die. Talk about once that information came out about COINTELPRO and its involvement in destroying the party, how did that change your views or how did that impact the political landscape as you seen it when it come to organizing and revolutionary ideology?
Billy X Jennings:
It wasn’t till 1970 that people officially found out what COINTELPRO was. We always knew there was some kind of program out there that wiretapped us, how the FBI followed us and set us up for different charges like that. But on a personal basis, COINTELPRO helped me stay out of jail. Now, COINTELPRO is not something they invented for the Black Panther Party. It’s something they always had going on, but they ramped it up three degrees because of the party, how the party came out or how effective the party was. So in 1970, when these young anti-war people broke into this post office in Pennsylvania, it helped me out because at that time, Huey P. Newton was on Nixon’s enemy list. I am Huey P. Newton’s personal aid. So when FBI sees Huey, they see me.
And so I’m a much easier target than Huey. So they started using the draft to gift me, the selective service. Now, this is the same method they used against members of SNCC, another organization that preceded us. They would get the selective service to start sending them letters to have them drafted. And you only got three choices. Either you’re going to leave and go to Canada, you’re going to go underground, or you’re going to jail. Any one of them stopped you from being affected, and that’s what they wanted. They wanted to stop people from being affected so they would hold this selective service thing over their head. So what happened when they did the same thing to me, right? They arrested me when I was with Huey after coming to court. So I went to court for this draft evasion thing. The federal government had three of their attorneys on my case.
And so what happened was this, they wanted to charge me for draft evasion, but my attorney pointed out they wanted all the documents, film, phone, anything connected with Bill Jennings. And they immediately dropped my case on the spot because they were still trying to hide the fact that they had a program called COINTEL PRO and they didn’t want to reveal it because of me.
So they just dropped my case. So I walked away from that whole case because COINTEL PRO was discovered and they didn’t want to dispose all the footage they had of me and Huey together because that’s what they were doing, compiling stuff on Huey. I just happened to be there.
So that’s how COINTEL PRO affected me, but a lot of party members went to jail. Geronimo G Jaga did 27 years. They pulled him off the street. The FBI lied on him. They said he helped kill someone in the LA, but at the same time, the FBI was watching him while he was in Oakland attending meetings. They lied on the brother, just like they did. Maybe about 35 or 40 Panthers went to jail, maybe 35 Panthers were killed through COINTEL PRO. And many like Fred Hampton were victims, minding their own business. The next thing you know, law enforcement has them in their clutches one way or another. So it was not easy being a party member during those times.
Mansa Musa:
And they knew Eddie Conway was at work when this incident happened. They went to where he worked at in the post office and told the people to say that he wasn’t at work. And then they planted a snitch in his cell or they had one of them snitchers come up and say that Eddie said something. They had coerced people to lie against. So to your point, that was their methodology during that time. Like you say, they going to get you through selective service. They’re going to get you through income tax. They’re going to get you any way, shape, form or fashion. But talk about what do you think about this recent group in Philly that call themselves the Black Panther and then switch their name to the Black Lions and they’re doing some organizing. They got a large presence on social media. They can be seen, engaged in mutual and exercising their rights through confrontation with the police.
Basically, their strategy is being more confrontational. Are you familiar with them and what you think about
Billy X Jennings:
Them? Well, I am somewhat familiar with them. I get emails from them, messages. But just recently there was a meeting held in Philadelphia with Panthers, real Panthers, original Panther members and members of the Black Lions. We suggested then that they change their name because our legacy was built on positive direct action in the community. This is our legacy. We can’t have any young group. We don’t even know what you believe. Come and say you’re party members. The Black Panther Party stopped existing in 1982. So you should come up with a name for your own legacy so people can identify you because what you’re doing, we don’t know who you are. COINTELPRO and all that, you might be good at heart, but we don’t know you. Start your own legacy. Start from ground one, change your name because our name is built on our legacy of what we’ve done and we don’t know what you’re going to do.
The Black Panther Party had 14 different medical facilities. Two are still open to this very day, one in Seattle and one in Portland.
Mansa Musa:
You
Billy X Jennings:
Can see Black Party still alive in groups like the Gray Panthers. They took up where the Black Panther Party left off with the senior citizens. The Black Panther Party had a senior escort service. All these different services the party provided, free buses to prison program. And the main purpose for that program was to keep the family unit together
Mansa Musa:
Because
Billy X Jennings:
People have cars, but many of the state prisons are far, far away. You might have a car that’s good for getting around the city, but getting on the freeway, your car might not make it. So we provide these services to keep the family unit together. It’s good that the Black Lives change their name. It’s good they’re doing social work in the community, but they also have to understand that longevity. Dealing with the police is good to have people who deal with the police who the police know they can’t run and rub shot it in our community. I don’t have anything bad about that, but that shouldn’t be your main focus. That should not be what you’re all about. The party blossom out past that, that’s how we started getting community support, breakfast programs, liberation school, providing services for people. That’s how you get people to change their mind, their attitudes about you.
They see what you do through your social
Mansa Musa:
Practice. In that regard, Billy, talk about what would be your message to youth because you got a lot of young people that’s learning about the party. You got a lot of young people that’s through social media becoming informed about it. And what would you tell them when they come up and say, okay, to your point, no, you’re not original member of the Black Panther Party. No, you don’t have the right to say that in terms of and then saying that’s what you are. But what would you tell them when they come up and say, we want to change the condition, social conditions, we want to do it in the same light that the Black Panther Party did it. What would you tell them to do?
Billy X Jennings:
I would tell them the Black Panther Party were operating in the 1960s and we’re in the 2026 era right now. So we can’t go back and keep doing stuff in the past. We had to come up with new ways of doing things, a new attitude of doing things. We set the table for all these social programs to be embraced in the community, but they have to take it from there. They have to take where we started and bring it into their conditions now. And I would say to young people, get with another group that has your same ideology, your same philosophy. If they’re serving the community or working in the community, work with them because we need to unify all our efforts and come together. Educating young people, having political education classes, taking people outside of the community, outside of their environment so they can see the bigger world and see where they fit in.
All those things are things that are doable things, job training, telling people how to write a resume. Those are those small things, but those things that help because we have a lot of hardcore brothers who get out of jail who are not educated in the educational system. They need that kind of nourishment to bring them up. That’s what we should be doing, community service to bring our people up and not run away from the people. The Black Panther Party, when we had social programs, we invited people to come back to work. We provided a place for doctors and nurses to, if you wanted to give back to the community, we have a clinic here. You could donate four to six hours a week to have those facilities there or people in the community or have a community meeting around issues in the community. That’s how you bring interested people together, unifying people.
Mansa Musa:
Yeah, that’s a good point because they got what they call the Malcolm X Grassroots Collective. I’m in DC and what they do every second and fourth Wednesday of the month, they have political education class and their political education. They’re not calling themselves some other than what they are organizing, but what they do, they have political education class and then the materials that they use, they using materials that they learned about from the Black Panther Party. But talk about the 60th and what you got planned with some of the things that you’ll be organizing for the 60th.
Billy X Jennings:
Well, that’s a lot. Well, I would say the 60th is what my particular role is, is I’m sponsoring a couple workshops on chapter history. Black Panther Party had over 40 different offices of the Black Panther Party. And there’s a lot of history in these different cities and geographical areas that we don’t know about that only the local people there knew about. So we’re trying to bring that history together so that people in Chicago would know what the people in Portland, Oregon was doing or the people in Seattle will find out who were some of the people that started the party down in Houston, Texas. And some of the programs, Salem, some of the problems the Winston-Salem chapter deal with because they were a chapter of the Black Panther Party that was actually in the South because they had problems that a lot of us didn’t have in California,
So forth. But chapter history, I’m doing some tours of Oakland, like I said, to educate a lot of people who’ve never been there before. A lot of people come to the reunions, they bring their grandkids or their great-grands. They want to show them what they was involved in, how all this thing originated. I have doing tours. I got a couple exhibits at the main library in Oakland about Black Panther Party rank and file. I have an exhibit open October 5th at the Alameda Law Library, which is across the street from the Oakland main library. Oh,
It’s across the street from the Oakland Main Museum. So that exhibit’s going to focus on the impact of the Black Panther Party on the law because of the political prisoners, clientele pro, racism in the police department, all those kind of things. So I got my hands full and on the 18th, which is the last day of the conference, I’m in charge of a day in Bobby Hutton Park. Local hip hop artists, poets, a couple bands will live music and we have speakers come, going to do it like we did back in the 1960s. Treat music, food, a joyful day in the community. Don’t caution that and all you have to do is bring your blanket, sit out and hear some speeches and hear some music and unify in the community.
Mansa Musa:
Okay. Thank you, Billy. Thank you. And Billy, we really appreciate you taking your time out to come on and educate our audience about all things the Black Panther Party. More importantly, clearing up a lot of misconcepts about the party, what it stood for, some of the more subtleties of it as opposed to, to your point, a lot of the things that was distorted primarily for the purpose of disassociating it from people, getting people to look at it in a different light. You came on today and educated us on how the party really operated as, like y’all said, the Vanguard intercommunal with us.
Billy X Jennings:
The party’s whole thing is to educate people. I had a young lady who worked in my campaign office when Bobby Seal ran for mayor. She is now the mayor of Oakland. So I know that she knows about the 10 point program and all those things. So the party is about growth and development and stuff like that. The Black Police Officers Association of Oakland was started because of the Black Panther Party, right? Because when they shut up our office on 45th and Grove in September 1968, the Black officers refused to help the white officers who was suspended from their job for shooting at that office. And they started an organization, which is one of the biggest Black organizations in Oakland. But a lot of people don’t know that history, but when we have chapter histories, a lot of this history that happened in those cities come up.
Who were now in charge of state health facilities work at the medical clinic and stuff like that. So there’s a lot of roots where people came from. We just have to talk about it, dig it up and document it for future generations because 17 years ago, when I was 17, I joined the party. Today I talked to people from all over the world. I just got off the phone talking to the New Zealand Panthers who are going to send some representatives out here. They have 15 members that came for our 50th. We have people from all over the world. We have Charlotte O’Neill coming in from Tanzania.
Mansa Musa:
Okay.
Billy X Jennings:
For over 50 years. Charlotte’s going through our libations. She has a film. She travels the world. We have all type of Panthers coming in, so this is going to be a event.
Mansa Musa:
There you have it. There you have the bars today. Look, you gave that row out. And we thank you for coming and sharing this information because like you said, at the end of the day, after everything all is said and done, the party was about educating our people about getting them to understand their right to self-determination and how to go about getting self-determination, understanding the contradictions, understanding social conditions, and more importantly, organizing to change conditions. And it’s a tribute to the party. No matter what people say about the party, that is the lasting legacy of the party is educate, educate, educate. Thank you, Billy. We appreciate you. All right. How do you want people to get in touch with you if they want to get in touch with you? They
Billy X Jennings:
Can get in touch with me by going to our website, itsabouttimebpp.com, which there’s a phone number and an address on that website. But for the 60th, you can go to bpp60.org for your latest update information on what’s happening with the 60th.
The U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments today in an important case that asks how much judicial deference is owed to the U.S. Sentencing Commission's commentary on the federal sentencing guidelines when a judge is applying those guidelines during the sentencing of a federal criminal defendant. That may sound like a somewhat dry legal dispute, but the ramifications are big not only in the realm of criminal law, but also for the broader legal battle over statutory interpretation, the role of the courts, and the authority of those federal agencies that some critics have called "the administrative state."
The case is Beaird v. United States. Kendrick Jarrell Beaird was arrested for pointing a gun at someone and, because he had a prior felony record, was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, Beaird faced an even higher sentence if the firearm "involved…is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine." His gun's magazine was capable of holding 17 rounds. Did that count as large capacity and thus trigger a higher sentence? The federal sentencing guidelines did not directly say, but the U.S. Sentencing Commission's commentary on the guidelines did: According to the commentary, a magazine capable of accepting "more than 15 rounds of ammunition" counts as large capacity.
Are the federal courts bound to follow the Sentencing Commission's commentary in a case like this and dutifully impose a steeper sentence? Or may the courts impose a lower sentence based on their own alternate view of the best reading of the text of the sentencing guidelines?
In Stinson v. United States (1993), the Supreme Court held that the commentary to the federal sentencing guidelines is entitled to major deference from the courts. "We decide that commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative," the Court said, "unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline."
Among the questions at issue in today's oral arguments in Beaird is "whether Stinson v. United States still accurately state[s] the level of deference due to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines." In other words, should there be cases in which a judge's alternate reading may trump the interpretation favored by the commission's commentary?
Those questions alone make this a notable case. But this particular dispute also arrives in the midst of a broader, ongoing battle over judicial deference to the authority of federal regulatory agencies. For instance, in Kisor v. Wilkie (2019), the Supreme Court narrowly upheld a precedent which said that a federal agency's interpretation of its own "ambiguous" rule is entitled to broad judicial deference unless the agency's interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations being interpreted."
Justice Elena Kagan's 5–4 majority opinion in Kisor v. Wilkie justified this holding on the grounds that the Court's deferential doctrine "enables the agency to fill out the regulatory scheme Congress has placed under its supervision."
Writing in dissent, Justice Neil Gorsuch faulted this approach for requiring judges "to accept an executive agency's interpretation of its own regulations even when that interpretation doesn't represent the best and fairest reading." That sort of deference, Gorsuch argued, "creates a 'systematic judicial bias in favor of the federal government, the most powerful of parties, and against everyone else.'"
This Kagan-Gorsuch clash of legal visions is likely to arise again in the Beaird case. Whether or not Kagan's pro-deference view will still command the majority, however, remains to be seen.
The post A New Supreme Court Case Tests the Limits of Judicial Deference to Federal Agencies appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Login