Poland, Sweden and Estonia are among the countries demanding a tougher approach to Russian visitors, particularly former military personnel who fought in Ukraine. The proposals could affect hundreds of thousands of Russian nationals who continue to receive visas for travel to the European Union despite restrictions introduced following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
According to a report published on Sunday, EU officials are finalising plans to address vulnerabilities in the Schengen visa system, which governments increasingly regard as a potential entry point for individuals involved in intelligence operations, organised crime and acts of sabotage.
Swedish Justice Minister Gunnar Strömmer said the Commission was working towards a January announcement, although Stockholm would prefer an earlier decision. He told Politico that vulnerabilities in the existing arrangements could be exploited by hostile actors.
The initiative is expected to feature in discussions surrounding the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 12 October, when ministers will examine Russia’s intensifying hybrid campaign against EU member states.
Despite the deterioration in relations between Brussels and Moscow, Russian citizens continue to receive substantial numbers of Schengen visas. Approximately 478,000 tourist visas were reportedly issued to Russian nationals in 2025, including a significant proportion allowing multiple entries.
The figures have renewed questions about whether existing screening arrangements adequately reflect the security environment created by Russia’s war against Ukraine.
In September 2022, the EU suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia, ending preferential treatment and introducing stricter application procedures, additional documentation requirements and more restrictive conditions for multiple-entry visas.
However, the decision did not amount to a general prohibition on Russian tourism. National authorities retained considerable discretion over applications, producing differences in how individual Schengen countries handle Russian visitors.
The Commission’s existing visa guidelines also preserve access for certain categories of travellers, including journalists, political dissidents, civil society representatives and people travelling for essential family reasons.
The new initiative would therefore concern not only the number of visas issued but also the extent to which national screening decisions can affect the security of other Schengen countries. Under the Schengen system, a visa issued by one participating state generally permits its holder to travel throughout the area.
Estonia has taken a particularly forceful position, proposing an EU-wide entry ban targeting former members of the Russian armed forces who participated in the invasion of Ukraine. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna estimates that approximately 650,000 former Russian combatants could fall within the category of individuals requiring closer scrutiny.
Tallinn has advocated individual entry restrictions rather than relying exclusively on broader measures covering Russian nationals generally. Tsahkna warned that former soldiers, particularly those with combat experience and connections to Russian intelligence services, could present a serious security challenge if they entered European countries.
He suggested that Moscow could exploit former combatants to penetrate organised criminal networks or facilitate violent operations against European targets. These assessments remain security warnings rather than evidence that Russian veterans as a group are involved in such activities.
A coordinated European policy would also seek to prevent individuals refused entry by one member state from exploiting differences in national visa procedures elsewhere.
The visa proposals form part of a wider effort to restrict the activities of Russian nationals whose presence in Europe may present security risks. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has previously indicated that member states are considering tighter controls on the movement of Russian diplomats within Schengen, alongside restrictions on visas for former combatants and a reduction in Russian tourism.
One proposal would prevent Russian diplomatic personnel from travelling beyond the member state in which they are accredited. Such restrictions would complicate cross-border activities by diplomatic officials suspected of conducting intelligence operations under official cover.
The issue has acquired greater urgency as European governments report an expanding pattern of Russian-linked sabotage, including suspected arson attacks, cyber operations and attempts to disrupt critical infrastructure.
Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner acknowledged that the initial decline in visa issuance to Russian nationals had levelled off. He urged member states to reduce the number of visas granted and to strengthen scrutiny of applicants.
The immediate question is whether member states can agree on common restrictions that go beyond the existing visa framework. An outright prohibition on Russian tourism would represent a significant departure from the current approach, under which national governments retain responsibility for individual visa decisions.
More narrowly targeted measures against former combatants could prove easier to justify on security grounds, although identifying eligible individuals would require reliable information and cooperation between national authorities. The Commission has yet to publish its proposals, and the precise legal instruments under consideration remain unclear.
Foreign ministers meeting on Monday will discuss Russia’s hybrid campaign and possible European responses. The Council’s published agenda places the issue in the context of Moscow’s continuing aggression against Ukraine.
Whether the Commission ultimately proposes new binding restrictions or stronger common guidelines, the central difficulty remains the same: a Schengen system built around common freedom of movement must accommodate increasingly different national assessments of the security risks associated with travel from Russia.
Hours later, masked intruders crossed into Latvia, damaged an electrical distribution unit and stole surveillance cameras before retreating into Belarus.
Latvia has reported an unusually aggressive incident on its border with Belarus in which armed, masked men threatened Latvian troops during an attempted migrant crossing, followed several hours later by an incursion targeting surveillance infrastructure.
The confrontation began on Monday evening when at least 20 people approached the Latvian border from Belarus accompanied by three masked men. Latvia’s National Armed Forces said the escorts were armed, issued threats to Latvian soldiers and actively drove the migrants towards the frontier. Latvian troops prevented the group from entering the country.
Several hours later, masked individuals crossed from Belarus into Latvian territory and targeted equipment used to monitor the border. Interior Minister Jānis Dombrava said they damaged an electrical distribution cabinet and removed surveillance cameras before returning across the frontier ahead of the arrival of a Latvian border-guard unit. Latvian authorities have not publicly identified the intruders or established whether all of those involved in the second incident were the same men who had earlier accompanied the migrants.
Dombrava described the events as markedly more aggressive than previous episodes on the frontier. He warned that Belarus should understand that incidents of this kind could have “more serious consequences” for the country.
The episode comes amid sustained pressure on Latvia’s 172km border with Belarus. According to the Latvian State Border Guard’s latest figures, 21 people were prevented from crossing illegally from Belarus on Tuesday, taking the total number stopped at that frontier since the beginning of 2026 to 11,946.
Latvia has for several years treated irregular migration from Belarus not simply as an immigration issue but as a security operation. Riga accuses the Belarusian authorities of deliberately facilitating migrant movements towards the EU border as a means of exerting political pressure.
In January, the Latvian National Armed Forces published what it described as evidence of Belarusian state involvement in organising illegal crossings. The military said documented cases included migrants being transported in Belarusian military vehicles and Belarusian officials participating in operations to direct people towards Latvia. That earlier material does not, however, establish the identities or affiliation of those involved in this week’s armed confrontation.
Pressure on the frontier intensified during the summer. In July, Latvian soldiers used tear gas and fired a warning shot when a group attempting to enter from Belarus refused orders to withdraw and, according to Latvian authorities, threw logs towards security personnel.
The methods used to circumvent the fortified border have also become more elaborate. In August, border guards found Latvia’s first known tunnel used for an illegal crossing from Belarus after intercepting 15 people near Skrudaliena. A second tunnel was discovered nine days later near Krāslava after another 28 people crossed the frontier. The State Border Guard said both incidents formed part of the continuing pressure on Latvia’s eastern border.
Riga responded in August by launching Operation VILKATIS, bringing together border guards, police and the armed forces under a co-ordinated security operation. Surveillance drones and other military capabilities have been deployed to reinforce monitoring of the frontier.
On Tuesday, the same day Latvian authorities disclosed the latest confrontation, the government extended Operation VILKATIS until 31 December. The Cabinet described the instrumentalisation of migration by Belarus as a hybrid threat and said additional resources would continue to be used along the eastern border.
The involvement of armed escorts changes the immediate security calculation for Latvian personnel. Previous incidents have largely centred on migrants, smugglers and attempts to bypass physical barriers. This week’s episode included direct threats against serving soldiers, followed by an unauthorised crossing and deliberate interference with border-monitoring equipment.
Latvia has not publicly attributed the operation to a particular Belarusian military, security or border agency. The account released by Riga therefore establishes an armed incident originating from Belarusian territory, but not yet who ordered or organised it. For Latvia, however, it adds another element to a border that is already being managed as part of the country’s wider response to hybrid threats on NATO and the EU’s eastern flank.
France has notified the European Commission that it will extend controls at its internal Schengen borders from 1 November 2026 until 30 April 2027, maintaining checks with Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Spain and Italy as well as at relevant air and sea borders.
The notification, published in the Commission’s official register of temporary internal border controls, means the restrictions currently due to expire on 31 October will continue for another six months.
Paris cites a combination of security and migration concerns, including persistent jihadist threats, antisemitic attacks, organised migrant-smuggling networks and risks associated with irregular movements towards the Channel coast.
The French notification also refers to instability in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Somalia, Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine and security considerations surrounding the Paris Peace Forum on 10–11 November.
France is not alone.
Germany has extended controls on all of its land borders until 15 March 2027, citing irregular migration, migrant smuggling and pressure on its asylum system. Austria is maintaining controls on borders with Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia until the same date, while Poland has notified Brussels of checks on its borders with Germany and Lithuania through 30 March.
Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Italy also have temporary internal controls in force.
The expansion has created an increasingly complicated map inside an area established around the principle that people should normally be able to cross internal borders without routine checks.
EU Today has been following that change closely. In September, EU Today reported that Germany had extended checks on all nine of its land frontiers, while a subsequent examination found that temporary controls were spreading across the Schengen area.
The French extension takes that trend into spring 2027.
Under the Schengen Borders Code, governments retain the right to restore controls when they identify a serious threat to public policy or internal security. The Commission stresses that such action must remain exceptional, proportionate and limited to what is necessary.
The revised rules permit controls responding to a foreseeable threat for an initial period of up to six months, with extensions possible under defined conditions. Governments maintaining controls for extended periods must provide additional risk assessments and reporting.
There is therefore no legal contradiction between Schengen membership and temporary border checks. The political question concerns their frequency and duration.
In June, the European Commission had called for a gradual reduction in internal controls where conditions allowed. EU Today reported at the time that Brussels regarded the restoration of normal passport-free movement as possible in several countries.
The direction since then has largely been the opposite.
Migration remains one factor, but national notifications increasingly cite several threats simultaneously: terrorism, organised crime, Russian sabotage, war in Ukraine, Middle Eastern instability and pressure on asylum systems.
That makes it harder to identify a single event after which controls could simply be removed.
The system also creates practical consequences for cross-border regions. Millions of Europeans live in one Schengen state and work, study or conduct business in another. Selective checks can therefore cause delays even when passports are not examined systematically.
France’s controls are especially significant because of the number and economic importance of its neighbours. The extension covers land connections with six countries and internal air and sea routes.
It also comes as the EU operates new systems intended to strengthen the external Schengen frontier. Europe’s Entry/Exit System has introduced biometric registration for many non-EU travellers, while the migration and asylum pact has changed procedures for handling irregular arrivals.
The original political bargain behind Schengen was that stronger management of the common external frontier would support open internal borders.
The growing use of national internal controls shows that several governments remain unwilling to rely on that external system alone when confronted with migration, terrorism and wider security risks.
France’s latest notification is formally temporary. But by the time the new period expires on 30 April 2027, internal checks will have become a long-running feature of travel across several of Europe’s most important borders.
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