Excavations in Germany’s Ruhr region have uncovered evidence of a substantial underground mining operation that predates the area’s industrial expansion. The discovery is providing new clues to the origins of European coal mining.

Archaeologists have identified a previously unknown coal-mining tunnel stretching at least 130 metres beneath woodland near Sprockhövel in western Germany. The remains provide evidence of coordinated underground construction at a time when the Ruhr’s mining industry was still developing, long before the region became synonymous with heavy industry.

The discovery was announced on 15 October by the Westphalia-Lippe Regional Association (LWL), whose archaeologists are working alongside the German Mining Museum in Bochum and GeoPark Ruhrgebiet. The team says its findings shed light on tunnelling techniques used before the eighteenth century, although the newly identified passage has not yet been given a precise scientific date.

At Haßlinghausen, a forest floor conceals old shafts, spoil heaps and depressions left by abandoned mining operations. Researchers did not enter an intact underground gallery. Instead, they identified the location of a collapsed passage by excavating at two former shaft sites and drilling into the surrounding spoil. Subsidence created by the collapse left a recognisable trace above ground.

How Early Miners Organised Underground Work

The evidence suggests a more complex operation than miners simply following exposed seams into the earth. Construction shafts were sunk at intervals along the proposed tunnel. Workers descended through them and excavated separate stretches underground, later joining those sections into a continuous passage.

This method allowed several groups to work simultaneously rather than advancing from a single entrance. It also demanded planning and considerable labour. The filled-in shafts and disturbed soil are still visible in the excavated sections, enabling specialists to reconstruct the miners’ methods even though much of the original tunnel has collapsed.

Till Kasielke of GeoPark Ruhrgebiet explained that the construction shafts were located beside the underground route and then filled after the gallery was completed. Jennifer Garner, an archaeologist at the German Mining Museum, said the excavations would provide material for scientific dating and a better understanding of the effort required to build the structures.

The latest work follows a 2025 investigation of a separate, approximately 70-metre tunnel nearby. That earlier feature reached a coal seam some ten metres below ground. Researchers suspected it might predate the seventeenth century because it appeared to have been overlooked during later mining activity. The newly identified 130-metre passage is a distinct discovery.

The chronology matters because horizontal tunnels changed the possibilities of coal extraction. Early miners could reach seams by digging pits or inclined shafts, but groundwater increasingly obstructed work at depth. Drainage galleries allowed water to escape, making deeper workings more practical and potentially extending the life of individual mining sites.

An Industrial Region’s Earlier History

The Ruhr is usually associated with the vast collieries, factories and transport infrastructure that drove Germany’s expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet coal was extracted locally during the Middle Ages. The transition from small workings to organised subterranean networks remains poorly documented, partly because written records from the earliest periods are scarce.

The archaeological research programme, which began with related investigations in 2024, is intended to address that gap. The team has excavated soil layers associated with old shafts, and the recovered material may help establish when specific construction techniques were introduced. For now, it would be premature to assign the new passage a medieval date.

At Essen, the UNESCO-listed Zollverein Coal Mine Industrial Complex preserves the architecture and machinery of the Ruhr’s later industrial era. The remains at Sprockhövel represent a different historical record: temporary shafts, collapsed passages and waste deposits left by miners whose operations preceded industrial-scale coal production.

Across Europe, such landscapes have become an important part of cultural heritage. EU Today has previously reported on the preservation of Belgium’s Bois du Cazier colliery, where 262 people died in the 1956 mining disaster. In Sprockhövel, the focus is on a much earlier workforce, whose organisation and technical knowledge must be reconstructed from the ground itself.

Further dating and analysis will determine whether the newly identified tunnel pushes back the known chronology of organised drainage and gallery construction in the Ruhr. The excavations have already established that a substantial underground project once operated beneath a forest whose surface retains remarkably little indication of the work carried out there.

Image credit: LWL-Archäologie für Westfalen / Manuel Zeiler

Twice in four months, Egyptian warplanes have bombed Sudanese miners inside their own territory, and dozens of bodies have failed to draw from Abdel Fattah al-Burhan a stance worthy of his citizens’ blood. Cairo, for its part, justifies its military operations, while Port Sudan hides behind a fact-finding committee, a cable of condolences and talk of contact between the two leaderships, without daring to name the party accused of killing its citizens.

This is the scene before us: a state acting on the Sudanese border by force of arms, and an army commander who avoids naming the party accused of killing Sudanese, for fear of losing an ally whose approval seems to matter more to him than their lives. On the morning of 10 October 2026, the mining site at Jabal al-Uqaydat in the Shamal al-Wadi area inside Sudan turned into a killing field after it was struck by five consecutive airstrikes, according to the testimony of a survivor relayed by Agence France-Presse. Thousands of miners had been searching for gold in a land exhausted by war; some ended up under the rubble, while others fled to the mountains without water or supplies.

In a significant pinpointing of the site of the bombing, The New York Times, in its report published on 12 October 2026, stated that the targeted mine is located in Sudan’s Red Sea State, about 25 miles from the Egyptian border, or roughly 40 kilometres inside Sudanese territory. Al-Hurra, in its coverage of the June attack, had cited an estimate placing Jabal al-Uqaydat about 20 kilometres inside Sudan; the forty-kilometre distance is cited here as attributed to the American newspaper’s determination of the location of the October strike, which keeps the question of sovereignty and the protection of civilians at the heart of the matter.

Agence France-Presse relayed from survivors that thousands of miners were working at the site, and “Emergency Lawyers” counted 72 dead according to preliminary information, while witnesses told the BBC of more than 60 dead and about 150 wounded. Survivors told Sudan Tribune that the dead numbered at least 200, with more than 15,000 workers fleeing, while the Sudan Doctors Network recorded a preliminary toll of 13 dead and 28 wounded, warning that it could rise.

Cairo Justifies the Bombing While Burhan Avoids Naming the Perpetrator

The “Emergency Lawyers” organization accused the Egyptian air force of targeting civilian miners, considering the attack a violation of international law. When Reuters asked Egyptian security officials about the raid, they did not deny the operation but justified it as ending what they described as border chaos and preventing Egyptian and Sudanese groups from taking control of mining areas.

Two days later, the Egyptian military spokesman announced the continuation of the “third phase” of the campaign, noting that warning leaflets had been dropped on those he described as criminal elements. However, the statement placed the operations inside Egyptian territory and did not include an explicit acknowledgment of carrying out a raid inside Sudan or of the killing of the miners.

Thus Cairo has a military justification for bombing a Sudanese site, while Burhan’s authority is incapable of issuing an explicit condemnation of the party that human rights organizations accuse of killing its citizens. The irony is that the state that is supposed to demand the victims’ rights appeared more concerned about its relationship with Cairo than about naming the party responsible for their blood.

From June to October: The Victims Change, the Silence Remains

The October raid was preceded by a strike that targeted the area on 16 June 2026. Agence France-Presse reported 23 dead, while Sudanese platforms estimated the toll at around one hundred. According to the testimonies received, the operations extended to Jabal al-Uqaydat, the Red Mountain and the area around Souk al-Ansari, and included raids by warplanes and drones followed by a ground incursion. The organization “Darfur Victims Advocacy” relayed from witnesses that an Egyptian force of about sixty armed vehicles had surrounded the miners and detained civilians, some of whom were beaten.

In the days following the June attacks, Radio Dabanga reported the arrival of about two thousand deported miners via the Argeen crossing, according to a local activist, while the crossing’s director spoke of more than three thousand over the preceding days, and the Egyptian army announced the arrest of 223 people, including 136 foreigners. On 22 June, Burhan appeared in Al-Ratj to say, according to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed: “Our northern neighbor — people must respect it and not cross the borders so as not to cause problems for themselves and for the state.”

Sudanese had been waiting for their army’s commander to defend their blood, but they heard him urging them to respect the borders of the neighbor accused of bombing them. When the raid was repeated in October, the Sovereignty Council repeated the scene: condolences over the “painful incident,” a fact-finding committee, and an assurance that the two countries’ leaderships are in contact.

Burhan’s adviser, Amjad Farid, described the bombing as an unjustified and unacceptable crime, noting that border violations could be addressed without warplanes, but his position did not translate into an announced official protest or a clear path to accountability.

Sudan’s Gold: A Wealth Guarded by Force

Al-Uqaydat lies within the gold-rich Nubian Shield belt, and the Chatham House institute estimated that about 60% of gold production in the Northern, River Nile and Red Sea states is smuggled to Egypt, in quantities exceeding one hundred kilograms per day, and more than sixty tonnes since the outbreak of the war through the end of 2024.

By contrast, official gold exports to Egypt in 2024 did not exceed about 16 million dollars, roughly 1% of Sudan’s total gold exports, according to Central Bank of Sudan data cited in the Chatham House report.

Miners told Sudan Tribune that they had observed drilling machinery and trucks carrying rocks across the border into Egypt, and that an Egyptian patrol had previously warned them against approaching a site it said lies inside Egyptian territory. Al-Hurra relayed testimony about friction between workers and personnel of an Egyptian mining company operating near them.

Egyptian Law No. 193 of 2020 authorizes contracting with the Egyptian Company for Mining and the Management and Exploitation of Quarries and Salt Works, affiliated with the National Service Projects Organization, to exploit the quarries and salt works specified by the law for a period of thirty years, while the state-owned Shalateen Mineral Resources Company is active in the south of the Eastern Desert. The businessman Naguib Sawiris also praised the June operation and linked it to investors’ confidence in the Egyptian mining sector.

In the same month, Egypt’s Ministry of Petroleum denied statements attributed to its minister about agreements to establish 108 gold mines in northern Sudan, but the researcher Mohamed al-Hadi considered it likely that the attacks are linked to undisclosed understandings with the Sudanese government, a hypothesis that calls for an independent investigation.

Burhan: When the Ally Becomes More Precious Than the Citizen

The website Al-Hurra relayed from a miner that a group of pro-government joint forces withdrew from the mountain a day before the June raid, and that the Sudanese army did not arrive to evacuate the wounded and collect the bodies until the third day. The testimony raised workers’ suspicions about possible coordination between the two governments, without establishing that it took place.

But Burhan’s silence does not need those suspicions to be proven in order to become a matter of political accountability. Cairo supports the commander of the Sudanese army and considers the war on its borders a threat to its security. Agence France-Presse has verified satellite images showing the repeated presence of Turkish Bayraktar drones at an Egyptian base near Sudan, while reports spoke of facilitating the delivery of drones to the Sudanese army and training its crews inside Egypt, alongside broader military and intelligence cooperation.

An analysis published by the Horn Review in June held that the army’s silence over the raids is linked to Egyptian support for it.

Yet this relationship does not absolve Burhan of responsibility; it multiplies it. Whoever relies on another state’s support in his war cannot make the protection of his citizens a negotiable item, and his need for weapons and political backing must not become an immunity he grants to Cairo at the expense of Sudanese blood.

Sovereignty Tested With the Blood of the Poor

The raids reopen the wound of Halayeb and Shalateen, the disputed triangle under Egyptian control. Sudanese administrative maps confirm that the targeted mining sites lie inside Sudan, while Cairo treats them as part of the border area adjoining the triangle.

Human rights, political and trade union forces have called for an independent international investigation, and the “Sumud” alliance led by Abdalla Hamdok held the Egyptian side directly responsible.

Today, Egypt is required to answer for the bombing and the fall of civilians, not merely to classify them as criminal elements and offer security justifications, and Burhan is required to announce the results of the investigation, determine responsibility, demand compensation and accountability, and take the necessary diplomatic and legal measures.

As for settling for condolences, it is not a defense of sovereignty; it is a declaration that the alliance with Cairo is more precious to the authorities than the Sudanese people’s right to life and justice. At Jabal al-Uqaydat the bill is clear and admits no doubt: the gold crosses the border, the dead remain under the rubble, and Burhan guards his silence.

Former ENRC Chief Executive Says Unresolved Financial Obligations Could Raise Questions About Kazakhstan’s International Business Reputation.

Following his interview with EU Today, Felix Jeff Vulis discusses his outstanding financial claims, his relationship with Kazakhstan and why he intends to bring the matter to the attention of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

For more than three decades, Felix Jeff Vulis has maintained close professional ties with Kazakhstan, a country whose transformation into a major international mining and industrial economy he witnessed firsthand.

His relationship with Kazakhstan began in the 1990s, when he helped introduce the country’s economic potential to American investors. In 2001, he joined Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC), eventually becoming Chief Operating Officer and then Chief Executive Officer.

Under his leadership and that of his colleagues, ENRC expanded internationally, listed on the London Stock Exchange in 2007 and entered the FTSE 100, becoming one of Kazakhstan’s most prominent industrial companies.

But the relationship between Vulis and the group that subsequently became Eurasian Resources Group (ERG) has taken a different direction.

In a September interview with EU Today, Vulis described his years at ENRC, the challenges of corporate governance and the impact of the British Serious Fraud Office investigation, which ended in 2023 without charges.

He also raised a question that had remained largely outside public discussion: financial and contractual obligations that he believes ERG and related entities have failed to honor.

The first interview concluded with Vulis maintaining that ending a corporate position would not eliminate previously established financial obligations.

Now, in this proposed continuation, Vulis addresses the outstanding claims more directly and explains why he intends to seek the attention of Kazakhstan’s highest political authorities.

The unresolved financial questions

EU Today: In your previous interview, you spoke about financial obligations that you believe remain outstanding. What exactly are you referring to?

Felix Vulis: Throughout my many years with ENRC, I held significant executive responsibilities and worked under various contractual and financial arrangements.

My position is that certain obligations arising from those arrangements have not been fulfilled. These matters include remuneration and other financial entitlements associated with my professional relationship with the group.

I believe the relevant documentation should be reviewed and the legitimate outstanding obligations settled.

EU Today: Are we talking about a substantial amount of money?

Felix Vulis: I would prefer not to discuss specific figures publicly at this stage. There are financial calculations, contractual documents and correspondence that need to be considered.

This is not simply about a number. It is about respecting agreements and commitments.

EU Today: Has ERG been given an opportunity to resolve these matters privately?

Felix Vulis: My preference has always been to resolve outstanding issues through professional discussions rather than public confrontation.

I believe that an agreement remains possible if the relevant parties are prepared to examine the documentation and engage constructively.

But after so many years, I also believe that unresolved obligations cannot simply remain unanswered indefinitely.

Why the president of Kazakhstan?

EU Today: You have indicated that you intend to bring this matter to the attention of Kazakhstan’s President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Why?

Felix Vulis: Because Kazakhstan is not an ordinary country in my professional life.

My relationship with Kazakhstan began long before I joined ENRC. I have spent decades working with its industries, institutions and people.

I have enormous respect for the country and its economic achievements.

At the same time, the Republic of Kazakhstan is an important shareholder in ERG. I believe that shareholders, particularly those representing a sovereign state, have a legitimate interest in ensuring that companies associated with them respect their financial and contractual commitments.

I intend to inform President Tokayev about my situation and explain why I believe these outstanding obligations deserve attention.

EU Today: Are you asking the President to intervene personally in a private financial dispute?

Felix Vulis: I am not asking the President to act as a judge or to assume responsibility for obligations that legally belong to a corporate entity.

I am asking for attention to a matter that I believe deserves a fair and professional review.

Kazakhstan has worked hard to establish itself as a reliable destination for international investment. That reputation depends, among other things, on confidence that legitimate business commitments will be respected.

EU Today: Do you believe the matter could damage Kazakhstan’s international reputation?

Felix Vulis: I sincerely hope it does not.

Under President Tokayev, Kazakhstan has made important efforts to strengthen its international standing, attract foreign investment and build confidence among its economic partners.

I recognize and appreciate those efforts.

However, when a former chief executive of one of the country’s most internationally recognized industrial groups raises unresolved financial claims, questions can arise about corporate governance and the treatment of contractual obligations.

I believe the best way to avoid unnecessary reputational questions is to examine the matter fairly and resolve legitimate claims.

The international dimension

EU Today: You are an American citizen. Could this matter also be raised in the United States or Europe?

Felix Vulis: As an American citizen, I have the right to protect my legitimate financial and contractual interests through the appropriate legal channels.

If a reasonable settlement cannot be reached, I intend to explore every lawful avenue available to me, including bringing the matter to the attention of relevant European institutions in Brussels and appropriate authorities in the United States.

That may include the US Department of State and the US Department of the Treasury, where there is a relevant basis for doing so.

I would much prefer that such steps prove unnecessary.

EU Today: Would you also approach European political institutions?

Felix Vulis: I reserve the right to raise the matter with appropriate European institutions, including the European Council, through lawful procedures and established channels.

My objective would be to explain my position and seek appropriate consideration, not to turn a private commercial matter into an international political confrontation.

EU Today: Some people might interpret these statements as pressure on ERG. How would you respond?

Felix Vulis: I am simply explaining the options that may be available to someone seeking to protect his contractual rights.

I have no interest in harming Kazakhstan or creating unnecessary difficulties for its international partners.

But I also do not believe that a person should be expected to abandon legitimate financial claims simply because the other party is a large and influential corporation.

Kazakhstan beyond ERG

EU Today: Has this experience changed your opinion of Kazakhstan as a place to do business?

Felix Vulis: No. My respect for Kazakhstan remains unchanged.

I still believe it has extraordinary economic potential, particularly in mining, critical minerals, energy, infrastructure and industrial development.

Its strategic position between Europe and Asia creates opportunities that extend far beyond the extraction of natural resources.

The country has the industrial experience, human capital and geographic advantages necessary to attract significant long-term investment.

That is precisely why I believe questions of contractual reliability and corporate governance matter so much.

EU Today: What message would you like President Tokayev to take from your letter?

Felix Vulis: That I remain a friend of Kazakhstan.

I am proud of the work we accomplished there, and I appreciate the efforts of the President to strengthen the country’s international credibility.

I hope the relevant parties will examine my claims seriously and help facilitate a fair resolution within the appropriate corporate and legal framework.

The strongest message Kazakhstan can send to international investors is that legitimate commitments are respected and contractual obligations are fulfilled.

The final question

EU Today: What would you say directly to ERG’s leadership today?

Felix Vulis: I would say that there is still an opportunity to resolve these matters professionally.

We have a long shared history. I spent an important part of my life helping build this company into an internationally recognized industrial group.

I would prefer to conclude our outstanding business through dialogue, mutual respect and fulfillment of legitimate obligations.

But I also intend to protect my rights.

I believe the responsible course is to sit down, review the facts, address the outstanding financial questions and reach a fair conclusion.

EU Today: What would you say to your former employees in Kazakhstan?

Felix Vulis: Thank you.

People sometimes talk about corporations as if corporations build factories.

They don’t.

People build factories.

People operate furnaces. People go underground. People run power stations. Engineers solve problems at three in the morning.

Whatever disagreements exist today cannot erase what those people accomplished.

I remain extremely proud of having worked with them.

EU Today: After years of silence, why should ERG believe that this time is different?

Felix Vulis: Because I am speaking now.

For years I chose discretion.

That was a conscious choice, not an inability to speak.

I continue to believe that a negotiated solution is better for everybody: for me, for ERG, for its shareholders and for everyone associated with our shared history.

But negotiation requires two sides.

EU Today: What exactly do you want?

Felix Vulis: A table.

The appropriate representatives.

The documents.

A serious discussion about everything that remains outstanding.

And then a comprehensive settlement that allows everybody to close this chapter.

EU Today: An apology?

Felix Vulis: No.

A solution.

EU Today: Revenge?

Felix Vulis: Absolutely not.

Revenge is emotional.

This is business.

EU Today: And if ERG refuses?

Felix Vulis: Then I will continue to defend my rights through every lawful mechanism available to me.

And where I am legally entitled to speak about my own experience, I reserve the right to do so.

EU Today: Is that a threat?

Felix Vulis: No.

It is clarity.

There is still an opportunity to resolve this privately and professionally.

I would prefer that.

After more than twenty years of shared history, I think sitting around a table is a much more intelligent ending than spending the next several years sitting opposite each other in courtrooms.

EU Today: If the people running ERG read only one sentence from this interview, what should it be?

Felix Vulis: Call me.

Let’s sit down and finish this properly.

Mines in supply chains of western carmakers linked to widespread deforestation of primary rainforest in nickel-rich lands inhabited by Tolaki people in Indonesia

Volkswagen, Ford and Tesla are among the electric carmakers whose batteries may contain nickel mined in indigenous woodlands plagued by deforestation, an analysis has found, highlighting the struggle to make vehicles that are free from environmental destruction.

Corporate disclosures and trade flows from the last two years show mines in the battery supply chains of automotive giants are linked to the loss of trees in Sulawesi, a wildlife hotspot in Indonesia that houses the world’s largest nickel deposits. The metal is widely used in cathodes in car batteries because it boosts energy density and increases range.

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© Photograph: Didi Hardiana, NGO Puspaham

© Photograph: Didi Hardiana, NGO Puspaham

© Photograph: Didi Hardiana, NGO Puspaham

The selection of the Borralha tungsten mine, planned for Montalegre, in northern Portugal, as a strategic project of the European Union is “an achievement” and an opportunity of “great importance”

The post Tungsten mine as EU strategic project important for nation – operator appeared first on Portugal Resident.

Two 14-year-old boys were killed when an explosive device detonated in the evening in the Konotop district of Sumy Oblast, according to the statement by Oleh Hryhorov, head of the Sumy Regional Military Administration. The children encountered the dangerous device in a field, suffered severe injuries, and died at the scene, the statement said.

In 2022, Russian forces occupied parts of Sumy Oblast, but Ukraine liberated the region in April. Russia intensified its offensive again in 2025. Today, mines, unexploded ordnance and Russian drones shot down over the region pose a danger, as their warheads can detonate after falling. Overall, 146 children in Ukraine have suffered mine-related injuries, former Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko reported in April. For example, two months ago, an 11-year-old boy and a 15-year-old boy in Sumy Oblast were injured when an explosive device detonated.

Hryhorov expressed his condolences to the parents and relatives of the victims and urged people to remain cautious:

“Please be as careful as possible and remind children: do not approach unknown or suspicious objects, touch them, or try to move them. Take care of yourselves and your loved ones,” Hryhorov said.

Demining efforts continue in Sumy Oblast

On 24 February 2022, Russian forces entered the territory of Sumy Oblast. The first battles in the region took place that same day. In particular, Russian forces attempted to break through to Sumy, but Ukrainian troops repelled the offensive. On 11 April 2022, Ukraine restored control over the entire Sumy region.

As early as 7 June 2022, deminers were working in the Konotop, Sumy, and Okhtyrka districts, according to the Government Portal. That day, they surveyed areas and neutralized explosive devices.

The work of deminers remains deadly dangerous. In September 2024, two pyrotechnicians from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast were hit by a mine while demining Sumy Oblast: one died, while the other was hospitalized. In July 2025, deminer Oleh Petrenko was killed during humanitarian demining operations in Shostka District when a Russian FPV drone detonated, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine reported. Another pyrotechnician was injured, the statement said.

Nevertheless, the work continues despite the danger. In 2025, State Emergency Service deminers in the Sumy Oblast found and neutralized 5,283 explosive devices, the agency said in April. Sumy Oblast ranked sixth among all Ukrainian regions by this figure.

Twenty-two percent of Ukraine’s territory is potentially contaminated with explosive devices — more than 133,000 square kilometers, former Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko reported in April this year. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, State Emergency Service and National Police deminers have surveyed more than 248,000 hectares of territory and found more than 1 million 112 thousand explosive devices, the statement said.

After expanding domestic control over mining to pursue economic sovereignty, Burkina Faso has moved up the value chain with its first gold refinery, inaugurated by its president, Capt. Ibrahim Traoré, on September 28.

Most of the gold mined in the country was previously exported as unrefined dore to be processed abroad. Now, it will be processed, tested for purity, and certified domestically at the Raffinerie Nationale d’Or du Burkina Faso, built at a cost of USD 19 million on more than 12 acres in the capital, Ouagadougou.​

“From now on, gold … must not only be extracted in Burkina Faso, it must be processed, controlled, valued and certified in Burkina Faso,” Traoré said, inaugurating the new facility.​

Inviting the country’s youth “to learn to master the whole value chain,” he added, “Natural resources belong to the people. They must contribute to improve their living conditions.”​

In the struggle for sovereignty​

Burkina Faso has long been one of Africa’s largest gold producers. However, proceeds from its extraction were historically siphoned out of the country by foreign companies owning its mines. Burkinabe ownership was limited to only one mine, which a former mines minister owned privately.​

The state-owned mining company, Société de Participation Minière du Burkina Faso (SOPAMIB), served only as a dormant holder of 10% stakes in Burkina Faso’s foreign-owned mines.​

Changes began in 2022 with the ouster of then-president Roch Kaboré in a popularly supported military coup amid mass protests against the Burkinabe state’s subjugation to French neocolonialism.​

Subsequently, in 2023, Traoré’s transitional military government (backed by the trade unions, the anti-France protest movement, and wide sections of the civil society) consolidated mass support by expelling French troops from the country, asserting Burkina Faso’s sovereignty.​

Recognizing that control over its own economy and natural resources is a central pillar of sovereignty, his government launched sweeping reforms to the mining sector in mid-2024.

It revived the dormant SOPAMIB and began transferring foreign-owned mines to the state-owned mining company, nationalizing five key gold mining assets within a year.​

Following the nationalization of yet another gold mine later in September 2025, six of the country’s 15 industrial mines, accounting for 40% of the national mining operations, are domestically owned – three by the state, and three by Burkinabe private companies.​​

In the remaining foreign-owned mines, the reforms raised SOPAMIB’s free stake from 10% to 15%. It also enabled the state to buy an additional paid stake of 30%, either entirely through SOPAMIB or in partnership with domestic private investors, potentially raising the Burkinabe stake in foreign companies to 45%.​

Mining revenues finance national development

As state revenues grew from its expanded ownership, the government undertook major infrastructural projects. In 2025, it laid 500 kilometers of low-voltage lines and 165 kilometers of transmission lines, connecting almost 160,000 new households to the national grid and electrifying 131 rural localities.

​Its National Development Plan (NDP) for 2026–2030 is one of the largest economic programs ever rolled out in the Sahel. It is a 64-billion-dollar plan, two-thirds of which is to be funded domestically from state revenues generated and citizen shareholding programs.

​Read more: Burkina Faso launches Five-Year plan

​Further inspiring confidence in the viability of its five-year plan, the government expanded the 2026 annual budget by 7.58% mid-year, having already collected almost 57.5% of the projected annual revenue. This has boosted infrastructural spending without increasing the budget deficit.

​The government has also used its rising revenues to improve its fiscal position. Cashing in on the rally in gold prices in 2025, the government repaid USD 2.13 billion in domestic debt last year. To systematize the use of additional revenue generated from the cyclical movement of mineral prices, it established the Burkina Faso Sovereign Mining Investment Fund (FSMIB) in May 2026.​

Read more: Burkina Faso asserts financial independence from the West with mineral-backed sovereign fund​

Financed by surpluses generated when international mineral prices rise above the state-set benchmark, the FSMIB is not for easing short-term budgetary pressures. It is ring-fenced for long-term strategic infrastructural and industrial projects to reduce the need for external funding, on which such projects have historically depended.​

The mining reforms have not only reorganized the distribution of mining proceeds away from foreign extraction toward national economic development, but have also helped to massively increase production itself.  The 94-ton annual output in 2025 is the highest ever recorded in Burkina Faso – a nearly 47% increase from the 64 tons in 2024.​

Formalization of artisanal mining – a game changer​

Critical for this rise was the formalization of artisanal mining. In the absence of state procurement infrastructure, artisanal miners have historically sold the gold they mined to smugglers who paid the international spot price in cash. Tons of gold were thus extracted from Burkina Faso every year with no paper trail, no taxes, and no yield to the national economy, beyond sustaining the meager livelihoods of the artisanal miners.​​

A meager quarter to less than half a ton of the gold extracted by artisanal mining annually entered the official channels overseen by the National Agency for the Supervision of Artisanal and Semi-Mechanized Mining Operations (ANEEMAS). [See: years].

​In October 2023, the government reorganized ANEEMAS into the National Society of Precious Substances (SONASP), tasking it with developing infrastructure to procure metals from artisanal miners. The annual official artisanal production rose in 2024 to 7.13 tons, a 15-fold growth over the previous year.

​When the annual gold production in 2025 reached a historic high of 94 tons, roughly 42 of those came from artisanal miners. Rising from just over seven a year ago, artisanal production was nearing the industrial mines’ output of about 52 tons by 2025, as SONASP’s procurement infrastructure expanded.

​To further help SONASP expand coverage in a concentrated manner, the government established nine new cooperatives of artisanal miners in the first half of 2026. It also delineated four mining corridors exclusively for artisanal miners, de-escalating the historic conflict between artisanal and industrial miners.

​With this state support structure in place, artisanal miners had already supplied 29 tons to SONASP this year by June 30, exceeding the 26 tons produced by industrial mines in the first half of this year. In this period, the government completed the construction of four new power plants, adding 126.4 megawatts of generating capacity to the national grid.

​Due in part to the improved power supply, the industrial mining output rose in the first half of this year by 7.25% over the first half of 2025. Official artisanal output grew by 45%.

​“We want to master everything to the last detail”​

“Comrades, producing in quantity is no longer enough. Extracting is no longer enough. Exporting our resources is no longer enough,” Mines Minister Yacouba Zabré Gouba said on September 28 at the inauguration of the country’s first gold refinery with an initial annual capacity of 164 tons.​

“The revolution we have engaged in requires that each national resource be used by the nation,” processing it across all stages of the value chain. “Our gold will no longer be used” by foreign companies “to create added value” while “our people remain in need,” he added.

​”We start with gold,” said Traoré. But there are “many other metals … in our subsurface that we want to extract,” including manganese, copper and zinc. “We want to master everything to the last detail.”

At least 82 bodies had been recovered, according to local officials and activists, while dozens of other miners were feared trapped or missing. The latest figure represents an increase from the 67 deaths earlier reported by the Sudan Doctors Network as rescue operations continued.

The collapse occurred in an area controlled by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has been fighting Sudan’s military since April 2023. The continuing war has severely weakened state institutions and access to basic services across large parts of the country.

Limited rescue efforts

In a statement, the Sudan Doctors Network said they lacked basic safety and protective measures required at mining sites. It said search and rescue operations were continuing to locate survivors and people trapped beneath the rubble, warning that the death toll could rise.

The network called out the negligence that had exposed miners to grave risks and called on the authorities controlling the area to protect mining workers, provide medical and logistical support, and prevent unregulated mining activities from continuing without adequate safety measures.

Rescue operations have themselves been severely constrained. Murtada Ahmed, spokesman for the Kordofan Human Rights Observatory, told Radio Dabanga that the operation was progressing slowly because almost no specialized equipment was available. Local residents and miners have largely been forced to rely on their own efforts and basic machinery to recover bodies and search for people trapped underground.

A wider artisanal mining crisis

The disaster in Sudan comes only weeks after another major artisanal mining tragedy in the Central African Republic, where more than 100 people were killed when an artisanal gold mine collapsed following a landslide in the western part of the country.

Informal and small-scale mining provides a livelihood for millions of people and remains an important source of income in communities where formal employment opportunities are limited. At the same time, miners frequently work in dangerous conditions, with limited regulations, protective equipment, geological assessments, and emergency rescue capacity.

In Sudan, gold mining has become particularly important following the country’s economic collapse and war. The sector includes thousands of small-scale and informal operations, while gold-producing areas have also become economically and strategically important to the rival forces fighting for control of the country.

Disaster as Sudan’s war continues

The mine collapse is taking place as the war that has devastated Sudan since 2023 continues, producing widespread displacement, hunger, and the breakdown of essential services.

Read more: The Blue Nile front: Sudan’s war intensifies along Ethiopia’s border

West Kordofan is among the areas affected by the conflict between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces. The control of mining areas by armed actors has added another layer of vulnerability for workers and surrounding communities.