On October 4, I published a post on "Libertarianism and Democracy," critiquing political philosopher Matt Zwolinski's earlier Liberalism.Org article on the same topic. Earlier today, I posted Matt's response to me. The present post is my rejoinder:

I would like to thank Matt for his interesting and insightful response. We agree on several key points, including that democracy is generally superior to authoritarianism, that libertarian critiques of democracy have great merit, and that - in much of the world - the most serious threats to liberty now come from the nationalist right, rather than the the political left. But we still differ on a few key points related to libertarianism and democracy.

The Nature of Libertarian Critiques of Democracy

Perhaps the most crucial disagreement is about the nature of libertarian critiques of democracy. Matt suggests that "[m]ost of what Ilya calls the libertarian critique of democracy is really a critique of big government." If so, libertarians can just focus on criticizing big government generally, while simultaneously extolling democracy.

There are indeed flaws of big government that arise regardless of whether it is democratic or authoritarian. But those outlined in my earlier Liberalism.Org article are in fact specific to democracy. They include tyranny of the majority, voter ignorance, and the tendency of democracy to create opportunities for illiberal forces to seize power and - in the worst case scenario - even destroy democracy itself.  Tyranny of the majority is obviously a problem distinctive to democracy. The same goes for rational voter ignorance, which arises from the perverse incentive structure  of individual voters, who have only an infinitesimally small chance of influencing electoral outcomes. And, while illiberal forces can and do seize power under authoritarian systems, the pathways democracies (usually involving the electoral process) create for them are distinctive.

Authoritarian systems have their own distinctive flaws, which are generally even worse. But the distinctive nature of democracy's flaws means they cannot simply be folded into a generic critique of big government. In addition, as noted in my response to Matt, these distinctive flaws of democracy are at the heart of many of today's most serious threats to liberty and justice in many democratic systems, including the threats posed by the nationalist right. Thus, it is important for libertarians to emphasize the nature and gravity of these weaknesses, and the value of our proposals for dealing them (which in many cases are different from and better than those advanced by other types of liberals). As emphasized in my earlier response, this is an area where libertarians often have a comparative advantage over other liberals. On the other hand, we generally do not have a comparative advantage when it comes to explaining why democracy is better than authoritarianism.

Along related lines, Matt suggests that libertarian critiques of the state aren't "an argument against democratic control of whatever the state does do." But once we recognize that democracy has significant distinctive flaws, there is actually a case for insulating some functions of government from democratic control. Obvious examples include the judiciary and monetary policy (unless we want to cut government out of the latter entirely, and adopt free banking). Indeed, even most non-libertarian liberals recognize that such insulation is desirable in some cases, most notably the courts.

The Problem of Libertarians Tempted by Authoritarianism

Matt argues that we should, nonetheless devote extensive energy to extolling democracy, because doing so is likely to have an impact on fellow libertarians who may otherwise be tempted to embrace authoritarianism. It is likely true that libertarians tempted in this way are more easily dissuaded by other libertarians than by non-libertarians. But such people are a tiny minority within an minority. Libertarians are a small group (probably around 5-10% of the US population or even less, depending on how you draw the line). Those sympathetic to authoritarianism are much fewer still. Thus, it makes little sense to devote more than a modest amount of time and effort to dealing with them, as opposed to addressing the much larger group of non-libertarian liberals who need to be more cognizant of the dangerous shortcomings of democracy.

Moreover, when we look at libertarians who have shifted to the "alt right" or otherwise become advocates of illiberal ideas, the problem in most cases is not excessive skepticism of democracy, but insufficient commitment to liberty - particularly, the liberty of people from different ethnic, racial, or religious backgrounds, that of migrants, and those with unconventional lifestyles. That is pretty obviously the case with Curtis Yarvin and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, both mentioned by Matt. The former's advocacy of a "post-liberal" ideology of repression (which is really based on pre-liberal models) is pretty obviously not the product of a man who thinks authoritarianism is a better way to protect liberty than democracy. Indeed, his concern is exactly the opposite (that democracy allows for way too much liberty). The same goes for Hoppe's advocacy of repression of immigrants, gays and lesbians, and people with various non-traditional lifestyles. Peter Thiel, the third case mentioned by Matt, is that of a person who has abandoned libertarianism for "national conservatism," an ideology focused on exalting the interests of ethnic and culture majorities and using the state to punish perceived "enemies." To the extent we want to focus on dissuading such people, it should be to reemphasize the value of liberty for all, not extolling the virtues of democracy. People who value democracy more than liberty are generally unlikely to become libertarians in the first place.

Two  Smaller Issues

Matt and I also have a modest disagreement over whether there can be situations where some form of authoritarianism can be a lesser evil compared to democracy. I think such cases are extremely rare, but not nonexistent. Matt's position is less clear, and perhaps I misunderstand him. But he does seem to want to deny this possibility. In response to my examples of the allied occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II, he seems to think these don't really count because "those occupations were run by democracies answerable to their own voters, and they ended." But they were still cases where non-democratic government was imposed on a population, and that population itself did not have control over when and if it would end.

In these cases, a non-democratic occupation government was a lesser evil than immediate establishment of democracy, because of the highly illiberal nature of German and Japanese majority public opinion at the time.  Similar circumstances can potentially arise in other countries. And, in some cases, a domestically generated authoritarian regime might still be a lesser evil than any democracy that is feasible at the time.

In some situations, the problem can be dealt with by limiting democracy, rather than abjuring it completely. For example, as noted in my earlier response, post-occupation West Germany long banned Nazis and communists from competing in elections, but otherwise committed to free electoral competition. But there could be situations where such constraints are not enough. Because such cases are highly unusual, this is not a particularly important disagreement. But it does have relevance in situations where we consider how to deal with a society where majority public opinion is deeply illiberal.

Finally - and least important - Matt differs with me about the use of the terms "libertarian" and "classical liberal," arguing that the former are more likely to be democracy-skeptics than the latter. We can, if we want, define the two terms in such a way that people we label with one are generally more suspicious of democracy than those we label with the other one. But that is not the way the terms are typically used. That said, different people use these terms in different ways. To my mind, they are mostly just alternative labels for the same general ideology. But I don't have much of a beef with people who prefer to use them differently than I do, so long as they make clear what they mean.

Ultimately, Matt and I agree on much more than we differ. But a few of the issues we differ have real significance. I am grateful for the opportunity to consider them.

The post Libertarianism and Democracy Revisited - A Rejoinder to Matt Zwolinski appeared first on Reason Magazine.

On October 4, I published a post on "Libertarianism and Democracy," critiquing political philosopher Matt Zwolinski's earlier Liberalism.Org article on the same topic. Matt has written a response to me, which I have agreed to post at this site. The remaining paragraphs of this post were written by Matt Zwolinski, not me (Ilya Somin). I have posted a rejoinder to Matt's thoughtful response here.

Who Should Defend Democracy?

A reply to Ilya Somin

My recent Liberalism.org essay, "Democracy Belongs on the List," made the case that classical liberals should count democracy among their core commitments, alongside private property, free markets, and the rule of law. And it belongs there for the same reason. Like property rights and markets, democracy is a crucial way of keeping power in check.

Ilya Somin has written a generous and thoughtful reply to that piece. And I think he actually agrees with me more than the framing of his post might suggest. Ilya grants that democracies are generally freer and more prosperous than the alternatives, that democracy is "a valuable check on power," that libertarians should arguably stress these points "more often," and that "in much of the world today, right-wing nationalists pose a greater threat to libertarian values and priorities than the political left does." What's left mainly comes down to two questions: what counts as a libertarian critique of democracy, and whose job it is to defend democracy.

Before turning to those substantive issues, though, there's one terminological matter that's worth clearing up. Ilya says that nothing of significance hinges on whether we call our view "libertarian" or "classical liberal." And on most questions I'd agree. On this one, though, I think the difference matters. In The Individualists, John Tomasi and I draw a distinction between strict libertarians and classical liberals. The former group tends to treat liberty as a moral absolute and to derive their politics from a single overarching principle like the non-aggression axiom. Think Murray Rothbard or Ayn Rand. The latter treat liberty as a strong but defeasible presumption and are more empiricist and pluralistic in their approach to politics. Think Friedrich Hayek or Richard Epstein.

My sense is that these two camps within the broader "liberty movement" have taken pretty different stances toward democracy, with strict libertarians being much more critical than their classical liberal brethren. Even back in the 19th century, you could find Benjamin Tucker insisting that voting is always a form of aggression, and Lysander Spooner arguing that women "have just as good a right to make laws as men have, and no better: AND THAT IS JUST NO RIGHT AT ALL." Herbert Spencer was even willing to walk back his support of women's suffrage once he decided that women would probably use their vote to support bigger government. That's a pretty different take than anything you're likely to find in Ludwig von Mises or Friedrich Hayek (more on whom later), let alone in John Stuart Mill.

That brings us to the first of the two substantive issues under dispute. Ilya argues that recent events have made libertarian critiques of democracy more important than ever, and that the libertarian solutions to democracy's flaws are "primarily to limit and decentralize government power." I'm with him on that, but I don't think this settles, or even really addresses, the debate about democracy. Limiting and decentralizing government power is a claim about the scope of the state, about how much government should do. It's a principle that would apply to any government, whether democratic or not. And, crucially, it isn't an argument against democratic control of whatever the state does do.

That distinction was at the heart of my essay. Following Jacob Levy, I argued that classical liberals have let a perfectly sound critique of too much government slide into a skepticism about democracy itself, treating democracy, in Levy's words, "as if the contrast to 'democratic' were 'economic' rather than 'autocratic.'" One can be a radical about reducing the scope of the state and still insist that its agents must be answerable to the people they govern. Most of what Ilya calls the libertarian critique of democracy is really a critique of big government. That's an argument I largely agree with, as far as it goes. The trouble comes when we file it under the wrong heading. When we ourselves blur the line between critiques of state power and critiques of democracy, we shouldn't be surprised when people come away thinking libertarians are against democracy.

That brings me to comparative advantage, which is where I think Ilya's argument is most interesting but also most mistaken. Libertarians are a small minority, he says, and "we have no comparative advantage when it comes to extolling the virtues of democracy relative to authoritarianism. Other types of liberals can do this work just as well as we can, perhaps better." So we should stick to what we do best, which is analyzing democracy's flaws.

This argument might make sense in some contexts. But as a general principle, I think it misfires, and it misfires most badly when the audience is classical liberals and libertarians themselves. That, after all, is where the turn against democracy has actually happened. Hans-Hermann Hoppe's Democracy: The God That Failed argued that monarchy was preferable to democracy, and complained that "habitual democrats" had been tolerated rather than "isolated, excluded and expelled from civilization." Curtis Yarvin, who came to neoreaction by way of libertarianism, credits Hoppe with opening "a kind of door to the pre-revolutionary world" for him. And in 2009, Peter Thiel wrote in a Cato Institute publication that "I no longer believe that freedom and democracy are compatible." None of this follows from the libertarian critique of voter ignorance, and nothing Ilya has written points in this direction. But it grew in a movement where, as Janet Bufton recently put it in Liberal Currents, "even liberal libertarians were taught arguments about why democracy fails," and hardly anyone was making the case for democracy on libertarian terms. Any old liberal can explain to the public why democracy beats dictatorship. But a libertarian drifting toward Hoppe or Yarvin isn't going to listen to them. Only libertarians can tell libertarians that democracy is theirs.

So if democracy is a libertarian value, what kind of libertarian value is it? Ilya argues that democracy shouldn't be "a first-order libertarian priority, on par with liberty, constraining coercion, property rights, and increasing human happiness," because its value is instrumental rather than intrinsic. I agree that the value of democracy is instrumental. In that way, it's in precisely the same position as a number of items on the classical liberal list. Free trade, federalism, judicial review, and the rule of law are instrumental too. What I want to resist is the claim that because democracy is only instrumentally valuable it's therefore dispensable – something that can be traded away whenever we can imagine something better. What we can imagine, though, is a poor guide to what works. The better question, as David Schmidtz argues, is what has "an observable history of leading self-interested agents to act in ways that are useful and agreeable to the people around them," and by that test democracy has very few rivals.

Which leaves us with Hayek. Ilya defends Hayek's preference for "a liberal dictator to a democratic government lacking liberalism" as a claim about rare hypothetical cases, and suggests that transitional non-democratic rule "may be necessary" in places like Russia and China, citing the Allied occupations of Germany and Japan. But those occupations were run by democracies answerable to their own voters, and they ended. Russia and China, in contrast, have no outside power that could impose a transition and then hand power back. The only realistic candidate for transitional power in those countries is a domestic strongman, which is exactly the case Hayek had in front of him. Hayek wasn't musing about hypotheticals; he was talking about Chile.

Ultimately, Ilya and I want the same thing. We both advocate a form of libertarianism that resists concentrated power wherever it appears, including when it arrives through the ballot box. Where we differ is on the need to say out loud that democracy is one of the ways we resist it. I think we should, and I think libertarians are better placed to say it than anyone, since the people who most need to hear it are our own.

The post Who Should Defend Democracy? appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Read in English here

Las elecciones generales de Brasil del 4 de octubre representaron una severa advertencia para la izquierda. Flávio Bolsonaro, el candidato presidencial del Partido Liberal (PL), superó al presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, con aproximadamente un 47% frente a un 45%. Ninguno de los dos obtuvo la mayoría, lo que los llevará a una segunda vuelta el 25 de octubre. Más preocupante que este estrecho margen presidencial fue el avance del bolsonarismo en el Congreso. Las elecciones han fortalecido un movimiento político cuyas ambiciones van más allá de derrotar a Lula para llegar a remodelar las instituciones que obstaculizan su ejercicio del poder.

El encarcelamiento (arresto domiciliario) y la exclusión electoral de Jair Bolsonaro no han disuelto su movimiento. Su hijo Flávio lleva su estandarte presidencial, mientras que otros miembros de la familia han obtenido escaños en el Congreso. Michelle Bolsonaro, esposa de Jair, y Carlos Bolsonaro, su hijo, ingresan al Senado; Jair Renan, otro de sus hijos, y Renato, hermano de Jair, ingresan a la Cámara de Diputados. Nepobolsonarismo es un nombre apropiado para la expansión de esta familia a través del Estado. Sin embargo, la familia es solo la expresión más visible de un proyecto más amplio, arraigado en poderosos intereses económicos y en una política reaccionaria profundamente organizada.

Una contienda presidencial con implicaciones continentales

Lula sigue siendo el principal obstáculo para el regreso de este proyecto a la presidencia. Su derrota afectaría a los trabajadores y campesinos de todo Brasil, pero también a las posibilidades de cooperación regional y de una política exterior latinoamericana independiente. El tamaño de Brasil, su capacidad industrial, sus minerales en bruto (como los minerales críticos), sus recursos agrícolas y su alcance diplomático otorgan a su orientación política una importancia continental. Un gobierno que subordine estos activos a las prioridades de Washington debilitaría el espacio disponible para los países vecinos que buscan sus propios caminos de desarrollo.

La distribución geográfica de la primera vuelta pone de manifiesto tanto la fortaleza de Lula como sus dificultades. Mantuvo una posición dominante en el Noreste, mientras que Flávio lideró en las otras cuatro regiones. El enorme electorado de São Paulo proporcionó una ventaja particularmente importante a la derecha. Estas divisiones no pueden explicarse mediante una oposición entre una población ilustrada y otra ignorante. Requieren un análisis de las diferentes condiciones laborales, la organización de la vida política y la capacidad de los movimientos rivales para interpretar las frustraciones de la gente.

Lula llega a la segunda vuelta con un historial social sustancial. El desempleo cayó al 5,3% en el trimestre que finalizó en agosto, la tasa más baja para ese período en la serie estadística que comienza en 2012. Estas mejoras son de enorme importancia para las familias para quienes un salario regular supone un alivio frente a la incertidumbre cotidiana. Sin embargo, un indicador nacional mejorado no zanja la discusión política. El empleo puede coexistir con desplazamientos agotadores, viviendas costosas, servicios públicos inadecuados y la inseguridad que genera la deuda. La brecha entre la mejora estadística y la experiencia vivida sigue siendo un terreno en el que opera la derecha.

El bolsonarismo, o la extrema derecha brasileña de un tipo especial, traduce estas frustraciones en resentimiento contra la izquierda, todas las instituciones públicas y los sectores vulnerables de la sociedad. Su promesa de orden ofrece un lenguaje inmediato para el miedo, al tiempo que oculta los mecanismos económicos que generan inseguridad.

La izquierda no puede responder a esto simplemente promocionando los logros del gobierno. Debe vincular esos logros a un programa creíble para cambiar la vida cotidiana y explicar qué intereses impiden nuevos avances. Un trabajador que lucha contra las deudas necesita algo más que la seguridad de que la economía va bien. Este ha sido el problema de Lula, cuyo programa para el futuro no parece prometer más de lo que se ha logrado hasta ahora.

El Senado: una lucha por el poder institucional

Las elecciones al Senado son particularmente trascendentales porque se disputaron 54 de sus 81 escaños. Los senadores tienen mandatos de ocho años, por lo que los resultados marcarán la política nacional mucho más allá de la próxima administración presidencial. El PL obtuvo 19 escaños y contará con 28 en el nuevo Senado, lo que lo convierte en el partido más grande. El PT tendrá nueve. Los bolsonaristas han establecido, por lo tanto, una posición formidable, aunque el propio PL sigue sin alcanzar la mayoría y deberá negociar con otros partidos.

Michelle Bolsonaro y Bia Kicis obtuvieron los dos escaños del Distrito Federal, mientras que Carlos Bolsonaro y Carol de Toni ganaron los dos escaños de Santa Catarina. Estas victorias demuestran la capacidad del movimiento para organizar campañas coordinadas y concentrar el apoyo en torno a sus candidatos. Hubo éxitos importantes para la izquierda: Rui Costa y Jaques Wagner ganaron en Bahía, Humberto Costa conservó su representación en Pernambuco y Marília Campos ganó en Minas Gerais. Estos resultados preservan puntos de resistencia dentro de una cámara cada vez más hostil. La importancia del Senado va más allá de la legislación ordinaria. Los bolsonaristas han convertido su enfrentamiento con la Corte Suprema Federal en un objetivo político central, lo que incluye demandas para destituir a sus magistrados. Su representación reforzada aumenta su capacidad para llevar adelante ese enfrentamiento e influir en la elección del presidente del Senado. Las predicciones de una mayoría automática a favor del juicio político deben tomarse con cautela: la afiliación partidaria, las declaraciones de campaña y los votos en un procedimiento específico son cosas distintas. No obstante, el peligro de utilizar el poder legislativo para intimidar al poder judicial ha aumentado claramente.

Esto forma parte de una lucha por las condiciones bajo las cuales la extrema derecha puede gobernar. Los procesos judiciales contra Jair Bolsonaro no han eliminado a las fuerzas sociales que lo respaldan. Esas fuerzas buscan ahora una mayor influencia sobre las instituciones capaces de frenarlas. Para la izquierda, la defensa del espacio democrático debe, por lo tanto, ir de la mano de la lucha por ampliar los derechos sociales. Las organizaciones de trabajadores no pueden permitirse perder las libertades a través de las cuales se organizan, educan y se enfrentan al capital.

Diputados federales: la derecha avanza, la izquierda encuentra oportunidades

Este año se renovaron los 513 escaños de la Cámara de Diputados. El PL obtuvo 121, consolidando su posición como el partido más grande tanto en esta cámara como en el Senado. La federación del Partido de los Trabajadores, el Partido Comunista de Brasil y el Partido Verde ganó 88 escaños, de los cuales el propio PT obtuvo 70. El crecimiento de la federación es significativo, pero deja a los aliados de Lula lejos de alcanzar la mayoría. Los partidos de la derecha cuentan con 303 escaños, mientras que la izquierda parlamentaria en sentido amplio tiene 124.

El resultado fortalece a una extrema derecha de carácter particular dentro de una legislatura ya dominada por intereses conservadores. También debilita a algunos intermediarios tradicionales del poder parlamentario, como el centrão, la coalición de partidos que intercambia apoyo legislativo por influencia en los nombramientos y los recursos públicos, aunque sigue siendo indispensable para la formación de mayorías. Las negociaciones que se lleven a cabo dentro del centrão ahora se desarrollarán junto a un PL más grande y más asertivo. Si Lula gana en la segunda vuelta, se enfrentará a una resistencia sustancial en el Congreso; pero si gana Flávio, ese mismo Congreso podría facilitar un programa reaccionario.

Sin embargo, la elección también llevó a la Cámara a importantes representantes de una izquierda combativa. Jones Manoel, el historiador comunista elegido por el PSOL en Pernambuco, obtuvo 249.077 votos y quedó en primer lugar en Recife. Elias Jabbour, el geógrafo comunista, fue elegido por el PCdoB en Río de Janeiro. Sus victorias sugieren que existe un público receptivo a la educación política y a los argumentos socialistas, incluso en medio del avance de la derecha. Ofrecen recursos para reconstruir la confianza entre las personas que se han impacientado ante las ambiciones cada vez más limitadas de la política parlamentaria.

Jones Manoel ya se ha ofrecido a colaborar en la campaña de la segunda vuelta de Lula, incluida su comunicación digital, al tiempo que propone prestar mayor atención a demandas como el transporte público gratuito. Este es un ejemplo útil de claridad política: la crítica a las limitaciones del gobierno puede coexistir con una movilización activa contra una extrema derecha de un tipo especial. Dicha unidad no requiere que los trabajadores renuncien a sus demandas. Se fortalece cuando esas demandas aportan energía y dirección a la campaña.

La tarea antes del 25 de octubre

La segunda vuelta no se puede ganar únicamente mediante negociaciones entre los líderes de los partidos. Requiere una actividad organizada en los lugares de trabajo, los barrios, las universidades y las comunidades rurales, con un programa que la gente pueda reconocer en sus propias vidas. El transporte, los salarios, la vivienda, la deuda, la salud pública y el tiempo dedicado al trabajo deben convertirse en la esencia de una campaña democrática. La defensa de la soberanía se vuelve tangible cuando se vincula con la capacidad de utilizar la riqueza de Brasil para satisfacer las necesidades de su pueblo.

La marea furiosa ha avanzado, pero no ha arrastrado a los millones de personas que aún buscan otro Brasil. Los nuevos diputados comunistas, las organizaciones de masas que han sobrevivido (especialmente los trabajadores sin tierra del MST) y la enorme base electoral de Lula constituyen los cimientos de la resistencia. La tarea inmediata es derrotar a Flávio Bolsonaro. La tarea a más largo plazo es construir un poder popular lo suficientemente fuerte como para impedir que la oligarquía decida, elección tras elección, qué tan poco cambio se le permitirá a la mayoría.

Tens of thousands of students took to the streets of Chile on Thursday, October 1, to demand that the government of the ultra-conservative José Antonio Kast not cut the education budget. More than 30 civil society organizations joined the call issued by the Chilean Student Confederation (CONFECHA) in support of the “national strike.”

Among the supporters were the United Workers’ Union (CUT), the Chilean Teachers’ Association, the High School Students’ Assembly, the 8M Feminist Coordinating Committee, the National Federation of Education Workers, and the National Association of Kindergartens, among others.

“We see that on September 30, the government presented a new bill to Congress, and the only certainties we have are the precedents set by this government in its first six months – which are cuts: cuts for working families, cuts for students in the areas of health, in education, housing, and social security,” said Laura Mlynarz, spokesperson for CONFECHA and president of the Chilean Student Federation.

She added: “In the face of that, we respond with social unity, we respond with organization, we respond with mobilization – especially in the face of an authoritarian government that refuses to listen to its citizens and refuses to create spaces for dialogue.”

The slogan “Not a single peso less for education” was chanted by thousands of people who filled Alameda Avenue, one of the main streets in the capital, Santiago. Kast, true to his neoliberal orthodoxy, announced budget cuts to Chile’s public education system.

In a presidential address, Kast announced the 2027 Budget Law, which calls for an investment of 17.3 trillion pesos in education – a figure lower than the 17.4 trillion allocated in 2026. While this may not seem like much, when inflation and other factors are taken into account, it may prove more alarming than it appears at first glance.

“These figures are insufficient and, I would say, misleading; they don’t even make up for a year’s loss in purchasing power,” said Mario Aguilar, president of the Chilean Teachers’ Association.

However, according to the president, the measure was taken to safeguard other social services: “We hope you understand that in the budget we have done everything possible to uphold social rights and that the issues of pensions and free education are covered. But when you protest, you also have to respect those who think differently.”

Kast is referring to the clashes between the police (Carabineros) and students that, according to some reports, resulted in at least 31 arrests.

But the student movement rejects Kast’s statements, which clearly place the blame for the clashes on the students. Laura Mlynarz said the government is seeking to silence the students through repression.

“This government criminalizes the student movement, and we are the ones who are most concerned about moving toward an equitable Chile – toward fair, dignified, and solidarity-based development,” said Mlynarz. Regarding Education Minister Aria Paz Arzola, she said: “The minister doesn’t want to listen to us; the minister doesn’t want to meet with us; and the precarious state of public education just keeps getting worse.”

The first incidents of violent repression were reported just a few minutes after the rally began. The police fired tear gas canisters, while students with their faces covered threw the tear gas canisters back and hurled other objects. The police also used water cannons, a move described as “brutal repression” by some media outlets.

Clashes were also reported between the protesting students and groups of right-wing students from private universities who, in support of Kast’s far-right government, asserted that “We don’t want a paralyzed Chile; we want a Chile that prospers.”

In this way, the Chilean student movement once again made its presence felt in the South American country and demonstrated that it still retains a significant portion of its capacity to mobilize in the face of attempts to radicalize the neoliberal model, as has happened in past years.

In 2019, tens of thousands of Chilean students launched a full-scale social uprising demanding profound changes in one of the key countries where neoliberalism was institutionalized thanks to the bloody Pinochet dictatorship (1973–1990), which left thousands dead and missing. The protests led to calls for a Constituent Assembly.

For now, Kast has attempted to implement his neoliberal agenda (which includes cuts to education and other social services) cautiously, mindful of the recent past and fearful of a new outbreak of unrest.

Suppressing debate about English ethnicity, and labelling those who claim to be ethnically English 'fascists', doesn’t prevent resentment – it fuels it. Konstantin Kisin is right and Rishi Sunak is wrong.

The post The Quickest Way to Fuel an English Ethnonationalist Movement is to Deny that English Ethnicity Exists appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

A little over a month into his term, far-right President Abelardo de la Espriella continues to advance a security agenda that often conflicts with certain rights historically won by Colombians.

This time, De la Espriella has signed a decree allowing police access to university campuses. In several Latin American countries, the prohibition of police access to universities has been established through student struggle to prevent abuses by authorities against student movements.

Thus, universities have historically become places where students seek refuge from repression, arrest, and regroup during times of intense social mobilization.

This was evident during the 2021 protests, known as the “National Strike,” in which students, workers, left-wing political parties, young people, and others took to the streets to protest against the right-wing government of Iván Duque. The mobilization, which lasted several months, was considered a true “social upheaval,” and many experts have seen in it the consolidation of a democratic alternative (the government of Gustavo Petro) to decades and decades of right-wing rule.

During these protests, universities became hubs of popular mobilization, driven primarily by the youngest members of society. On university campuses, protesters were able to regroup, defend themselves against police repression, and coordinate new demonstrations – among other things – always protected by the fact that police are barred from entering university grounds.

De la Espriella calls popular protests “terrorism”

Clearly, De la Espriella seeks to nip this possibility in the bud – that is, to prevent universities from once again becoming coordination centers for the protests. Many have speculated that the president is signing this decree precisely because he knows that his radical neoliberal agenda could spark major protests, and in this way, he hopes to proactively undermine the protest movement.

Read more: One month of De la Espriella’s administration in Colombia

Whether or not this is De la Espriella’s primary intention, only time will tell. What is certain is that the president views university autonomy as an obstacle to the implementation of his security agenda, which also includes curtailing the ability of informal opposition political groups to participate in public life.

“Under no circumstances will I allow public universities to continue to be sanctuaries of violence. I respect and guarantee peaceful protest, but I will not allow universities to continue to be used as sanctuaries of vandalism and crime,” said De la Espriella on X.

Furthermore, true to his combative rhetoric, he compared social protests to terrorism – a common trope in the historical discourse of the Colombian right: “University autonomy is not a blank check for impunity: I have issued precise instructions for a national protocol of action that allows us to distinguish between the legitimate exercise of protest and acts of violence, flagrant offenses, danger, or extraordinary disturbances of public order that require intervention by the authorities. The university is for knowledge and ideas, not to serve as a refuge for violence and terrorism.”

A violation of the Constitution

However, the opposition has viewed this decision as a serious attack on university autonomy. Ana Erazo, a member of the House of Representatives from Valle del Cauca, wrote: “It is an ATTACK ON UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY and a direct threat to the young people at the country’s public universities. With this, Mr. Abelardo de la Espriella is beginning to reveal what could become a BRUTAL RETALIATION against the student movement, against its ability to organize and mobilize, and against thousands of young people who historically have not supported his political agenda.”

Some universities have joined in this criticism. One of them is the National Pedagogical University, whose academic council stated that in the past, “the serious consequences of resolving conflicts within public universities through militarization have been demonstrated on repeated occasions.” Furthermore, the council stated that university autonomy is one of the pillars of Colombian democracy, along with freedom of thought and research, among other things. Losing autonomy means jeopardizing these values of the republic, it stated.

For his part, former presidential candidate Iván Cepeda said that De la Espriella’s measure contradicts Article 69 of the Constitution, which guarantees university autonomy. Regarding the announcement, Cepeda also said: “Such an announcement is not only an affront to university autonomy. It also demonstrates, once again, the authoritarian and despotic nature of De la Espriella, who seeks to stigmatize, persecute, and violate the rights of Colombian youth and the university community. Colombia has not forgotten the victims of police abuse during the National Strike, nor the history of security forces intervening on university campuses, resulting in student deaths. Young people cannot once again be persecuted or treated as an internal enemy and an enemy of the state.”

Right-wing and far-right governments in Latin America have adopted a very similar discourse regarding insecurity. The leaders share a narrative that describes how in the 1980s and 1990s, a sort of neoliberal panacea reigned supreme, but then, as if speaking of a biblical plague, the progressive governments of the early 21st century arrived. Then, their story goes, through rampant corruption, they destroyed paradise on earth and brought about various evils such as insecurity, migration, and the destruction of traditional values.

Thus, several of these new – and not-so-new – right-wing governments have won the presidency, almost always in elections where they prevailed by a narrow margin, asserting that the solution to the “disaster” is to return to radical neoliberalism and implement a security policy that restores an order which, they claim, existed before the “original sin.” This “salvation,” no doubt, will come hand in hand with military, intelligence, and operational oversight from Washington – an ally that, they say, was alienated by regional center-left governments. The most serious consequence of this distance was the infiltration of drug trafficking into all strata of society.

It matters little or not at all to these new governments that during the era of progressivism, the region enjoyed a certain positive level of security, as argued by critics of the far right. In the case of Ecuador, this supposedly only happened due to an alleged peace pact between the center-left governments and criminal groups. So that peace was, in reality, merely the prelude to what would later erupt.

A US-backed regional security program

In light of this, the region’s security policy appears to be nearly identical across all countries governed by the Latin American right and far right: 

• Expand the executive branch’s power to declare states of emergency and prolong them over time (sometimes for years, as has happened in El Salvador and Ecuador, with the consequent erosion of individuals’ constitutional guarantees); 
• Sign security agreements with the United States and become part of its hemispheric military and security policy (such as the well-known “Shield of the Americas”); 
• Attempt to facilitate US military and intelligence operations within each country’s territory (whether or not there are military bases on the ground); 
• Promote extradition proceedings to the United States; 
• Increase security spending while cutting spending in other areas such as health care, education, and housing; 
• And various other measures.

However, with the exception of El Salvador and, to some extent, Chile, the results these governments promise – to reduce organized crime and insecurity in the region through the quasi-militarization of daily life and security agreements with Washington (which many accuse of undermining sovereignty) – have not materialized.

Read more: Shield of the Americas, military operations, and decorations: Rubio’s fruitful visit to South America

Ecuador, which is facing the most serious security crisis in its history, has failed to reduce violence as promised by the executive branch, even though the country is currently under a nearly permanent state of emergency and foreign military operations are underway. According to some experts, 2026 could become the second most violent year in the country’s history, with nearly 5,000 homicides in just six months. The Noboa administration says that positive results take time and that better days are ahead. The local elections at the end of the year will surely provide a better gauge of the government’s credibility than any speculation.

In Chile, Kast managed to rally support to win the election by focusing on his security policy, which asserts that the rise in insecurity in Chile is largely due to migration from other South American countries. In response, he promised to build various infrastructure projects that would prevent new migrants from entering the country, similar to the US border wall. For now, the government is celebrating a reduction in certain crime rates, although several polls indicate that the public still feels concerned.

In Colombia, the recently inaugurated government of Abelardo de la Espriella has declared that the time for peace talks with certain insurgent groups is over and has resumed the country’s long-standing policy of waging war against insurgent and drug-trafficking groups. So far, there have already been several dozen deaths, with the bodies displayed as war trophies that the president showcases in his addresses to the nation. It is still too early to tell whether De la Espriella’s war will have a direct impact on reducing insecurity, which, according to the executive branch, spiked during Petro’s administration – a claim that Petro categorically denies.

For now, Washington has expressed its support both verbally and by providing funds to many of these countries to bolster their security, while also carrying out actions in the region, such as those already mentioned in Ecuador or operations in the Caribbean Sea. Furthermore, during a recent visit by Rubio to Peru, the secretary of state stated that US forces will act wherever invited by local governments, which foreshadows new military operations in South America.

Read more: The ugliness of Latin America’s angry tide

Without a doubt, the growth of US influence and presence in South America is undeniable. But it would be a mistake to think that this is something new. The history of Latin America in the 20th century has shown how Washington has managed to steadily increase its military presence in the region by invoking various justifications that have proven very effective in winning public support, especially those concerning the security of the population.

Decades of US intervention in Latin America

During World War II, the United States significantly increased its military presence in the region under the pretext of defense against potential military actions by the Axis powers, specifically Japan and Germany. Thus, the United States and its powerful fleet established several military bases in South America and succeeded in getting virtually all governments to align themselves with Washington’s geopolitical interests.

Shortly thereafter, Washington justified increasing its military presence in the region to halt the dangerous “communism” that, they claimed, would sweep through the region and had become a cause for concern not only for US security but also for the internal security of each country, where “dangerous” revolutionaries would destroy the social foundations of each nation. Thus, the United States and a large portion of the Latin American militaries carried out joint intelligence and other operations to promote, by any means necessary, the destruction of leftist political movements in the region – which meant killing thousands of Latin American revolutionaries through various methods, such as the imposition of bloody military dictatorships (such as those in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia, etc.) and/or boycott and conspiracy operations against anti-imperialist governments, such as Castro’s Cuba, Allende’s Chile, or so many other political movements violently aborted through the active participation of US and local forces.

However, the socialist bloc collapsed in the 1990s and brought on a crisis within the revolutionary left. Right-wing governments, incidentally, took advantage of these events to promote ultraliberal economic policies, but began to lack a new justification for expanding military and police forces, and the US presence in the region. 

One exception to this was Colombia, where the internal war served as a justification for the establishment of several US bases during the 21st century.

Read more: The ‘War on Drugs’ has always been more about war than drugs

Now that drug trafficking has become the region’s primary security threat, Latin American right-wing forces, alongside Washington, have once again raised the alarm about the threat of insecurity to promote securitist policies and an increased US military presence. Nazis, communists, and now narco-terrorists seem to be the lineage of a political strategy designed not only to promote a greater military presence in social life but also to advance neoliberal policies that are often accompanied by the aggressive influx of international capital, which typically appropriates the economic resources of this part of the Third World. 

For we must not forget that every cycle of increased security-oriented policies has been followed by lucrative and substantial profits for the wealthiest in Latin America and around the world.

Abelardo de la Espriella has now been in office for one month. The far-right president won the election by a narrow margin over leftist Iván Cepeda (less than 1% of valid votes), despite allegations of irregularities made by then-President Gustavo Petro.

However, De la Espriella dismissed the allegations of irregularities and began his administration by attempting to demonstrate military strength, an overt religious faith (for which he had to issue a public apology), and a clear alignment with Washington’s political doctrine.

The earthquake and the return to a state policy of war

However, just three days after he took office, a powerful earthquake struck the western part of the country, leaving more than 300 dead and nearly 5,000 injured. The government’s actions drew controversy. His supporters applauded the government’s response, while critics accused the administration of exploiting the tragedy to boost his public image and giving certain countries – such as Israel – priority in search-and-rescue efforts, while denying entry to rescue teams from other countries.

Added to this is the rhetoric of a return to all-out war against subversive armed groups and criminal organizations that De la Espriella already put forward during his election campaign. But this has not been merely a matter of rhetoric. Since taking office, the executive branch has ordered a series of attacks against positions held by these groups, some of which were engaged in peace talks aimed at their demobilization.

In fact, De la Espriella canceled the peace negotiations, which had been resumed by the Petro administration as part of his “total peace” policy.

Read more: President De la Espriella cancels peace talks in Colombia

In addition, the government’s death-defying political communication strategy has caused quite a stir. In some videos, the president can be seen walking among the bodies of alleged “bandits and terrorists” (as the government calls them), which, according to the Executive Branch, number 40, in addition to the capture of nine people allegedly linked to illegal organizations.

But the bombings have also drawn significant domestic criticism. In the Guaviare Department, three minors were reported killed following the bombings ordered by the president, which were part of a series of attacks that left a total of about ten people dead. And while De la Espriella said that armed groups are responsible for the deaths of the minors, he has not been able to escape criticism from human rights organizations that view indiscriminate bombing as a dangerous threat to innocent people and the civilian population.

A return to neoliberalism

Ultimately, the contrast between Petro’s and De la Espriella’s administrations seems so evident that many wonder whether it is precisely this political distancing that serves as the compass guiding the new government – or whether Colombia is, in fact, attempting to establish a new form of state.

To understand this transformation, BreakThrough News spoke with Danilo Urrea, philosopher at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, who sees in this first month a clear shift toward a return to a state policy of war – one that had previously been implemented with negative results: “In Colombia, this was historically known as the era called ‘La Violencia,’ which was one of the worst periods the country has ever experienced in terms of the barbarity it generated.”

“The president presents the killing of people to the country as a success,” he added. “But he also does so with an aesthetic and a semiotics that portray death, murder, and the like as a possibility for the country. And in a context like Colombia’s – where we have the highest death toll on the entire continent, surpassing even the combined death tolls of all the region’s dictatorships – this shows us that it is a step backward in terms of the possibility of building a country based on dialogue and reconciliation.”

Urrea also says the current government is trying to push the idea that the country it has inherited is in a disastrous financial situation, which is why it must promote a radical neoliberal policy: “We’ve identified efforts to promote a supposed economic turnaround for the country through old formulas that have already been tried and proved disastrous for social cohesion, for the territories, and for the relationship between humans and nature – with negative impacts on the communities living in the very places where this return to an extractive economy is once again being proposed.”

Furthermore, he warns that in the short time De la Espriella has been in office, there has been a setback in environmental and labor matters: “He has also come under attack during this first month, as he has begun to dismantle the gains made in terms of wages, recovery, overtime pay, and certain labor protections … which had been restored under President Petro’s administration through reforms and which this administration is now once again rapidly undoing with the stroke of a pen, supposedly to improve economic conditions. That, in very general terms, is what we’re seeing and what’s projected: the deregulation of all social benefits, of all the hard-won gains; the complete dismantling of all reforms; and the surrender of the country – in the areas of health, education, food, and all fundamental rights – to privatization processes primarily for the profit of transnational corporations.”

A new (old) geopolitical doctrine

Following the Petro administration’s attempts to defend the Palestinian people against Israel’s onslaught, as well as its various clashes with Washington’s hemispheric geopolitical agenda, Urrea asserts that Colombia has joined a regional strategy of control orchestrated by Washington: “The rise of the far right, which is well known … Through this administration, Colombia has become yet another outpost of U.S. imperialism’s advance across the region. And obviously, this has far-reaching consequences for the geopolitics of Latin America and the Caribbean in particular.”

WATCH: Colombia’s new president declares ‘colonial allegiance’ to US & Israel

Furthermore, Urrea highlights the historical importance Colombia – a country with access to both the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea – has held in the United States’ geopolitical strategy to control natural resources: “From a geopolitical standpoint, conditions are being created for Colombia to once again become one of the countries that facilitates U.S. military control – but above all, control over the natural resources and assets that are so coveted in this era of challenges for the United States in terms of its economic capacity, its dispute with China, and everything related to critical minerals.”

What is the opposition doing?

Urrea notes that, for now, the opposition parties have not managed to formulate a clear response to De la Espriella’s project. First, he points to a certain caution regarding a state policy that promotes violence and war: “There is obviously a great deal of fear regarding the actions I mentioned earlier – this language of violence, death, and murder. And obviously, in a country like Colombia, this has repercussions for the ability of those opposed to the current regime to act. Furthermore, because there has been an increase in the targeted killings of social leaders in various parts of the country, especially in areas most affected by geopolitical disputes as well as conflicts over economic and commercial control, illegal economies, and so on.”

However, Urrea notes that a coordinated opposition to the popular sectors could emerge, and the people might offer a peaceful and better-coordinated response: “We should consider an opposition that stems more from the popular sector, and there, I believe, there is also fear about how to react in the face of a violent scenario, a dangerous scenario, and manipulation. But I believe that organizations are now focusing on analyzing what the main peaceful and strategic causes might be to address the current situation. It seems to me that one of these fundamental aspects will undoubtedly be, and is already taking shape in the country through popular organization and mobilization, the defense of the environment, the defense of territories that are already being targeted for the control and exploitation of natural resources by transnational corporations, and the issue of fracking.”