Former President Rafael Correa (2007–2017) posted on X in the early hours of the morning in Ecuador that Luisa González, a two-time presidential candidate (2023 and 2025) for the Citizen Revolution (RC) party, had been arrested. “They arrested Luisa González. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH!” wrote the former progressive leader.

The National Police confirmed this to the media outlet PRIMICIAS. González was reportedly arrested on suspicion of money laundering. The National Prosecutor’s Office also confirmed this, reporting that the arrest is related to alleged irregularities in political financing and campaign spending in 2023.

González, who advanced to the runoff in both elections and lost both times to the current president, right-wing candidate Daniel Noboa, has repeatedly claimed that the legal proceedings against her are part of a broader campaign of political persecution targeting anyone who criticizes the current government.

A few hours after his arrest, González wrote on X: “We have reached an untenable situation. Noboa’s dictatorship has not only led our beloved country into economic disaster, with rampant violence and corruption, but attacks on civil liberties and political persecution are a constant reality. The dictatorship’s political prisoners are being mistreated and tortured.”

She added: “Today it is my turn to be arrested on an absurd charge. I will respond with the dignity of Ecuadorians who owe nothing and who are committed to securing Ecuador’s freedom and a better future for the country.” 

A flood of legal proceedings against González

In January 2026, the prosecutor’s office and the police raided Luisa González’s home as part of the case known as “Caja Chica,” which was investigating an alleged money laundering offense. The prosecutor’s office claimed there was evidence of money flowing in from Venezuela to fund González’s 2023 election campaign.

In August, González said she had been notified of a preliminary investigation into the alleged crime of demanding acts that entail receiving undue benefits.

In September, González was again notified by the Prosecutor’s Office of her inclusion in a preliminary investigation into an alleged crime of failure to report a crime due to her profession, position, or occupation – that is, for allegedly failing to report a crime in the course of her professional duties.

In all three cases, the former presidential candidate and leader of the largest opposition party has denounced these actions as political persecution carried out through the judicial system: “The harassment and persecution don’t stop, but neither does my hope for a better country. Giving up is not an option.”

Political persecution or enforcement of the law?

In addition, González, who intended to run for the office of prefect of Manabí in the upcoming regional elections in November, was unable to register her candidacy due to a refusal by the electoral oversight bodies, citing alleged mismanagement of administrative matters.

The RC once again denounced this obstacle as part of a broader campaign of political persecution aimed at preventing opposition candidates who might win their positions in the elections from participating, whether through administrative sanctions or criminal proceedings.

Thus, according to these allegations, the government has managed to co-opt several oversight institutions with the power to impose sanctions—such as the prosecutor’s office and the electoral courts – and is using them to persecute and prevent the participation of opposition politicians who have a chance of challenging the executive branch for power.

For his part, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa has repeatedly denied that his administration has been behind the accusations, sanctions, and arrests targeting his opponents, and he asserted that these are proceedings carried out by institutions independent of his government. “We do not target individuals; we have no interest in targeting individuals – we pursue criminals. There is no political persecution of any kind here,” the Ecuadorian president said in early 2026.

Despite these statements, the opposition remains steadfast in its accusations against the Ecuadorian president, especially following cases in which mayors of the country’s largest cities – Guayaquil, Cuenca, and Quito, the capital – have faced imprisonment, criminal proceedings, and ongoing judicial investigations.

The most notorious case in Ecuador involves the mayor of Guayaquil (the country’s most populous city), opposition figure Aquiles Álvarez, who was arrested and imprisoned in a maximum-security prison several months ago on charges of illegal hydrocarbon trafficking and organized crime.

Similarly, in June 2026, the then-mayor of Cuenca, Cristian Zamora (also a member of the opposition) was suspended by the Contentious-Electoral Court over an alleged case of political violence. For its part, the prosecutor’s office requested that charges be filed against him in September of that same year for an alleged crime of illicit enrichment.

And while there are other high-profile cases in Ecuador, the RC has stated that there is a concerted effort to prevent the current mayor of Quito, Pabel Muñoz (who is seeking reelection) from participating in the electoral process at all costs. Muñoz has so far managed to evade the sanctions and constant accusations against him, but on October 21, the prosecutor’s office and the police raided the mayor’s offices as part of an investigation into an alleged embezzlement offense.

This has led several politicians to believe that the raid is a new ploy to prevent Muñoz—who leads in the polls – from participating in the elections and, even more so, to imprison him, as was done with his party colleague, Aquiles Álvarez. This is what the Prefect of Pichincha, Paola Pabón, said: “People’s lives do not improve by imprisoning opponents; citizens’ circumstances change for the better when there is a political class committed to the common good.”

Last March, the US justice system reopened a case regarding the alleged responsibility of former Cuban President Raúl Castro in the shooting down of small planes belonging to the organization Brothers to the Rescue in 1996.

Cuba has categorically rejected the US accusations. The Caribbean nation argues that the accusation is a distortion of the truth, given that Brothers to the Rescue is considered an organization linked to acts of terrorism and provocation against the country’s government.

According to Havana, the aircraft were conducting illegal flights over Cuban airspace. They were reportedly asked repeatedly to refrain from entering Cuban airspace, but these requests were ignored, according to the Cuban justice system. Furthermore, according to the Cuban Foreign Ministry, Havana asked Washington on 25 occasions to prevent these illegal flights. Subsequently, with no response from Washington or Brothers to the Rescue, Cuba proceeded to fire upon the aircraft flying over its territory.

However, the US justice system denies Cuba’s version of events and has sought a conviction for these acts. That is how, on October 19, Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier succeeded in having his state issue an arrest warrant for Raúl Castro, then Cuba’s Minister of Defense.

“Raúl Castro ordered the cold-blooded murder of four Florida residents, and the state will never stop pursuing accountability for that communist conspiracy,” Uthmeier said regarding the arrest warrant.

But the Cuban government maintains that Brothers to the Rescue had a different mission than the one it claimed. Cuban Deputy Gerardo Hernández stated: “Although [Brothers to the Rescue] was founded to spot and report the location of rafters to the US Coast Guard in the 1990s, its role shifted toward provocations following the change in immigration policies agreed upon between Washington and Havana in 1995, with the intention of hindering any diplomatic rapprochement and normalization of relations between the two countries.”

For his part, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel condemned the Florida court’s decision: “The reprehensible action taken against the Army General this morning in a pathetic Miami circus, with an electoral agenda, has no legal basis whatsoever – nor will it ever have one – much less a practical one… In the face of every affront, [Raúl Castro] will always find the determination of a people to defend the Revolution.”

He added: “That maneuver, cloaked in legal pretense and orchestrated by anti-Cuban politicians against Raúl and against Cuba, deserves our firm condemnation. It is part of their aggressive agenda and a response to their failures in attempting to justify the Embargo and the collective punishment against our people.”

For its part, the Mexican government characterized the arrest warrant issued against one of the historic leaders of the 1959 Cuban Revolution as an “electoral maneuver.” This was explained by President Claudia Sheinbaum, who linked the judicial decision to the upcoming midterm elections: “The arrest warrant against Army General Raúl Castro, attributed to the Florida prosecutor’s office, seeks to win the support of segments of the US electorate.”

Russia also condemned the arrest warrant against Raúl Castro, calling it “baseless and false,” and linked it to a powerful political group in Florida: “[It is] revenge by the anti-Cuban lobby in Miami,” said the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The decision is part of a series of measures by the Trump administration against the revolutionary government in Havana, which the US president himself has said he would like to see fall and has on some occasions suggested he might launch a military attack on Cuba.

Trump has imposed economic and trade sanctions that add to the historic economic and trade embargo the United States has imposed on the island for more than 60 years – an embargo that has caused losses amounting to tens of billions of dollars for a country with a population of just 10 million.

Added to this is the recent oil embargo imposed by the United States on the Caribbean island. As a result, throughout 2026, only one oil tanker entered Cuba, which has brought much of the country’s production, transportation, and electricity generation to a standstill. This has led to an increase in mortality rates and reduced access to basic services for the civilian population.

On the opening day of its National Smallholder Farmers’ Conference and 31st Annual General Meeting (AGM), held from September 29 to October 1, MVIWATA, Tanzania’s national network of smallholder farmers’ groups, set aside time during a program on land, seed, and markets to state solidarity with the peoples of Palestine and Cuba, with the ambassadors of both countries present in the hall.

“We, the members of MVIWATA, who have convened in Morogoro for our 31st Annual General Meeting, wish to give a brief statement in support of the people of Palestine and the Cuban people,” read Theodora Pius, MVIWATA’s head of program, opening the statement. The organization said it was “extremely angered by the ongoing genocide of the Palestinian people” and “frustrated to see an open silence on war crimes that happen every day against the people of Palestine by the State of Israel and its allies.” It said its solidarity was with all of Palestine, “not only in the Gaza Strip.”

The statement then turned to Cuba, denouncing more than 60 years of US-imposed blockade, it said, imposed because Cubans exercised their freedom to choose their own political system, and went on to articulate what the blockade now means: “no electricity, no fuel, no medicines, no food.” Despite this, the statement said that the Cuban people have continued to send their expertise (doctors above all) to support life in other countries.

The Cuban Ambassador, Yordenis Despaigne Vera, thanked the smallholder farmers and described the current stage of the blockade as an energy war. United Nations agencies reinforce this characterization. By May, the Cuban people were living with daily blackouts of up to twenty hours, and more than 100,000 patients, including 11,000 children, were waiting for operations delayed by power cuts and shortages. Cuba’s own health ministry recorded infant mortality rising from 7.1 to 9.9 deaths per thousand live births between 2024 and 2025. The ambassador called the United States program “a silent genocide” and said Tanzania’s government and people had stood with Cuba throughout. A week earlier, at the UN General Assembly, Tanzania’s Vice-President had reaffirmed the country’s “unwavering solidarity with Cuba” against unilateral sanctions. Last October, the Assembly voted 165 to 7, with 12 abstentions, to demand an end to the blockade; Tanzania voted in favor.

The Palestinian ambassador, Salam Abu Sharar, addressed the room of farmers. Land, he said, is close to the hearts of the Palestinian people and of MVIWATA alike, and the question of Palestine “is not about religion; it is about land.” In a hall where the first working session opened with the words “land is life, land is not a commodity,” he spoke the delegates’ own language: the struggle of Tanzania’s peasants and the national liberation of Palestine are one struggle.

MVIWATA has been here before. Its AGM in Njombe in December 2023 condemned Israel’s genocide in Palestine. In July 2025, it hosted the youth of La Via Campesina in Morogoro, whose declaration ended with “Free Palestine!” Within days of that meeting’s close, Israeli forces bulldozed the seed multiplication unit of the Union of Agricultural Work Committees, the Palestinian farmers’ organization in Hebron, destroying more than seventy local varieties. The same year, MVIWATA and the International Association for Popular Cooperation ran an Africa Bioinputs School in Tanzania, with participants from thirteen countries, including Palestine, learning how farmers make their own fertilizers and pest controls.

On the conference’s final day, the Tanzanian farmers resolved to build their own bank of indigenous seed. In Hebron and in Morogoro, the seed is where the struggle over who feeds whom begins. MVIWATA Chairperson Apollo Chamwela told the ambassadors that the organization stood ready to do for Cuba what it had tried to do for Palestine: collect food if mechanisms for transporting it can be arranged.

MVIWATA is a membership organization of smallholder farmers, founded in 1993 and organized across mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. It was a meeting with a government minister as its guest of honor. Its statement on Palestine and Cuba came in the same breath as its demands for land, seed, and dignified prices for its members’ produce at home. For these farmers, sovereignty over food and sovereignty over territory are one question, whether the territory is a village in Kilosa or a hillside in Hebron.

The hall closed the statement with a call and response. “Long live Palestine! Long live!” “Viva Fidel! Viva!” “Viva the resistance of the people of Palestine! Viva!”

Jonis Ghedi-Alasow is the Coordinator of the Pan Africanism Today Secretariat. 

On October 14, tens of thousands of Colombians took to the streets to protest against the government of far-right leader Abelardo de la Espriella, who has been in office for just two months.

The protests demonstrated the opposition’s clear ability to mobilize its base and fill the streets of several Colombian cities, even though the new government is still in its early days.

Protesters – including members of labor unions, Indigenous organizations, opposition parties, and students – marched through the streets of the capital, Bogotá, as well as other major cities across the country, such as Cali, Medellín, Bucaramanga, Riohacha, and Pereira.

In an address to the nation, De la Espriella stated that 98% of the protests were peaceful, though he also warned the demonstrators: “From the very first day of my administration, I have issued a directive that leaves no room for interpretation: peaceful protest is respected, protected, and guaranteed. But violence, vandalism, and any attempt to violate the rights of others will have no place under my administration.”

He also added: “Here there is a state, here there is authority, and here there is a government that respects freedoms, enforces the law, and protects the millions of Colombians who get up early every day to work and build our nation.”

Criticism

The main criticisms leveled against the government focused on the executive branch’s neoliberal agenda and its security policy. According to the protesters, De la Espriella is failing to address the difficult labor, educational, economic, and territorial conditions faced by Colombians; on the contrary, his political agenda is making these circumstances worse.

Specifically, the protesters complained about cuts and adjustments to the budgets of public institutions, the lack of greater public investment in education, and the fear among several indigenous organizations that the government’s new measures will prevent them from freely exercising their right to protest.

In fact, one of the main catalysts for the protests has been the signing of a presidential decree that empowers state agents to intervene more directly against protesters – a move that has been criticized, according to the protesters, for its anti-democratic intent.

On this point, social organizations, such as the Cauca Regional Indigenous Council assert that, fearing a popular backlash like the one Iván Duque faced (which turned into what some called a “rebellion” by young people that lasted several weeks in 2021), De la Espriella signed Decree 1525, which modifies law enforcement protocols to give state forces greater leeway when dealing with protesters.

Among other measures, law enforcement can now take direct action in response to protests without the need for exhaustive dialogue, as previously required by the regulation. Several human rights organizations have expressed concern about the decree, stating that it could increase the risk of abuses and reduce mediation as the primary course of action, which already was barely used. During the 2021 national strike in Colombia, 46 people were killed in the context of the heavy police repression of the strike.

One of the people attending the demonstrations last week was former President Gustavo Petro, who optimistically stated that the protests reflect a popular response to the executive branch’s decisions: “The people can organize themselves, and two months into the start of a tyrannical and imposed government, this is the best wake-up call. The time has come for a Latin American day of popular mobilization.”

Petro, who has just resumed leadership of the Pacto Histórico – a coalition of movements that supported his political project – also said: “This is how we respond to adversity with dignity, with the determination to win again, without fear. Life is our companion, not death. The people won’t give up, damn it.”

The New York Times reported on Wednesday that the US government is preparing to send troops to Latin America under the pretext of combating drug trafficking in the region.

According to the US publication, 600 troops from the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY, have already begun deploying to the jungles of Panama to conduct exercises alongside the local military.

In addition, it was reported that members of this detachment will participate in operations in other countries in the future: “The troops will eventually train with local forces in Colombia and Honduras, and could also support US Special Operations troops advising militaries conducting raids against accused drug traffickers, the officials said.”

The peoples of the region, alongside anti-imperialist and progressive forces, have long denounced decades of US military intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean. Various experts and analysts have shown that “war on drugs” projects have never led to the elimination of these illicit businesses. On the contrary, US military involvement has coincided with an increase in violence, drug production, but most importantly: neoliberal reforms. These reforms involve the dismantling and reduction of the state, the privatization of all possible dimensions of social life, and the destruction of social organizations that oppose neoliberalism.

Read more: What else is behind the “fight” against drug trafficking in Latin America?

Historically, this process of material dispossession has been facilitated by an expansion of US military presence, under the pretext of the “war on drugs.”

The report stated: “The deployments and growing headquarters, which have not been previously reported, along with the Pentagon’s recent movement of several MQ-9 Reaper drones from Africa to Colombia and Ecuador, mark the latest widening of the Defense Department’s fight against drug traffickers in the region.”

Shield of the Americas

For several months now, US forces have been participating in intelligence activities and supporting military operations in Ecuador, whose government has entered into agreements with the US to allegedly fight organized crime. However, it was later revealed that these operations didn’t target drug traffickers at all. In at least one instance, The New York Times reported that the US and Ecuador bombed a dairy farm.

This collaboration is part of the new military and geopolitical strategy led by the Trump administration, embodied in the agreement known as “Shield of the Americas.” In recent meetings, several governments have committed to working with the United States so that their militaries can carry out joint operations in Latin American countries.

Regarding the possible itinerary of the soldiers who are expected to arrive in Panama, The New York Times reported: “The soldiers will move first into Panama, where they will take part in jungle training exercises, officials said. From there they will head to Colombia, where they will participate in what officials have called Southern Vanguard, an exercise scheduled to begin later this month. Other rotations will move into Honduras for training with local partners. Some of the troops could be used to provide additional security for US helicopters in the region, which have been providing support for US Special Operations forces.”

For about a year now, the United States has been conducting airstrikes on small boats in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean that Washington claims are linked to drug trafficking. Over 200 people have been killed in the strikes and the majority of the victims appear to be fishermen from Venezuela, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and other island nations. Victims’ families and survivors have vehemently denied any connection to criminal groups.

Washington claims the report is false

For its part, the US Embassy in Panama stated that The New York Times report regarding the deployment of several hundred US soldiers to the Caribbean nation is untrue: “The New York Times article alleging the deployment of 600 US soldiers to Panama is categorically false.”

The US Embassy reported that 120 US military personnel are currently participating in a training course in the Panamanian jungle, but that these troops will return to the United States on October 25 and therefore will not undertake the deployment announced by Colombia and Honduras. It did report that other US military personnel will participate in exercises in Peru.

“This is nothing new. The Jungle Operations Training Center has been operating for over a year as a school officially recognized by the US Army. US and Panamanian instructors jointly provide training in survival techniques and jungle operations,” the US Embassy in Panama said in its statement.

The controversy between The New York Times and US diplomatic officials over this report comes amid an evident increase in the US military presence in the region. In addition to operations in the Caribbean and the Pacific, there was the military incursion into Venezuela on January 3, 2026, which resulted in the capture of then-President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, as well as the deaths of more than 100 people in Venezuela. Furthermore, President Trump himself has suggested that he could attack Cuba and any other country if US security is compromised.

El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele announced on October 13 his intention to release nearly 50% of the prisoners accused of collaborating with gangs in the country. According to the president, the measure would involve early release, albeit conditional.

“We have a plan that would benefit roughly 50% (give or take) of the prisoners in El Salvador who have collaborated with gangs … In other words, early release – meaning they are guilty but are released conditionally. Released under supervision,” Bukele told the press.

In this regard, he said that his government would evaluate the situation of each detainee to keep the country free from the structural violence that has plagued it for decades: “Considering that we come from a country where violence was part of everyday life and gangs were the real government, the real dictatorship. These people lived under that yoke, but it is not the same to be among those who enforced it as it is to simply survive that reality.”

If we take into account the figure provided by the authorities (according to which nearly 100,000 people are currently detained on various charges) this could mean the release of tens of thousands of people.

Domestic criticism of El Salvador’s mass incarceration

Before Bukele took office, El Salvador was in the throes of a severe crisis of insecurity and violence. His administration imposed a perpetual state of emergency that began in 2022 and has led to the imprisonment of thousands of Salvadorans accused of belonging to gangs (or “maras”) that controlled large swaths of the Central American country.

And while the pacification of the streets has been celebrated by a significant portion of the population, the harsh actions of the government and its police and military forces have drawn criticism from various human rights organizations, which have accused the government of excessive use of force, mistreatment of prisoners, and the unjust detention of individuals who do not belong to gangs.

Read more: CECOT: Bukele’s mega prison where “the only way out is in a coffin”

Another criticism has been leveled at the practice of mass trials, which charge and convict a large number of people at the same time. Rights groups say this has led to countless errors in the treatment of individual defendants. Added to this are allegations of arbitrary detentions, crimes against humanity, and disappearances.

International outrage at 252 Venezuelans detained in El Salvador

The prison system implemented by Bukele in El Salvador has also faced international criticism. The Central American country became a focal point of controversy when hundreds of people deported from the United States were detained in the Salvadoran prison system, which drew widespread criticism of the Bukele government.

Bukele, however, had defended the decision and reaffirmed his alliance with the Donald Trump administration and his participation in the Washington-led geopolitical and military initiative known as Shield of the Americas.

Read more: Maduro gov’t negotiates return of 252 Venezuelans detained by US in El Salvador

The news of the possible release of tens of thousands of detainees sparked even more intrigue, considering that Bukele’s announcement came immediately after his conversation with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in which they discussed combating “malign foreign influence.” However, it remains unclear how the two issues are linked, according to El País.

The approval of Constitutional Amendment Proposal (PEC) 221 of 2019 by the Federal Senate establishes the most profound alteration in the organization of the Brazilian work schedule since the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution. The text eliminates the model of six days of work followed by one day of rest and sets a maximum work week of 40 hours with two paid weekly rest days, without salary reduction.

Because it is a constitutional amendment, the text does not depend on the sanction or veto of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT). Promulgation is the responsibility of the presiding officers of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in a joint session of the National Congress. Once promulgated and published in the Official Gazette of the Union (DOU), the amendment enters into force in a phased manner, with specific adaptation periods for companies, professional categories, and the public sector.

Transition timeline

The transition from the 44-hour work week to the definitive model of 40 hours per week and five working days followed by two days off (5×2 schedule) will occur in two main stages:

First stage (60 days after publication): Two months after the amendment is published, workers become entitled to two paid days off per week, preferably on Sundays. At the same time, the weekly working hours limit is reduced from 44 to 42 hours.

Second stage (14 months after publication): after 12 months from the implementation of the first stage, totaling 14 months from the official publication, the maximum weekly workload is definitively reduced to 40 hours, with a limit of eight hours per day.

During the 12-month period in which the 42-hour weekly limit will be in effect, employers must distribute the two extra hours across the weekdays. If distributed evenly across the five working days, the daily work schedule becomes 8 hours and 24 minutes.

Collective labor agreements and conventions may authorize daily work schedules exceeding eight hours during this transitional period to accommodate the 42-hour schedule, provided that the two weekly days off are strictly maintained.

Once the 14-month transition period is complete, any activity exceeding eight hours per day or 40 hours per week will require the payment of overtime or compensation through a time bank, mechanisms that remain permitted under labor law.

Special schedules and shifts

The new constitutional guidelines do not impose a single work schedule format for the entire market and safeguard the operation of continuous activities and essential services. Uninterrupted services, such as hospitals and health units, public safety, public transportation, urban cleaning, and surveillance, may adopt specific models for organizing and compensating working hours through collective bargaining agreements or conventions.

In these areas, the traditional 12-hour work shift followed by 36 hours of rest (12×36 shift) is not automatically eliminated by the PEC, but will need to be adapted at the negotiating table between employers’ and workers’ unions.

The reorganization of shifts must take into account the reduction of the weekly workload and the minimum rest and meal periods stipulated in the Constitution. The text also refers to future specific laws for the complementary regulation of conditions for categories with their own operational characteristics.

In the case of workers subjected to prolonged confinement, such as on offshore oil platforms, amendments proposing prior exceptions in the constitutional text were rejected by rapporteur Omar Aziz. The parliamentarian pointed out that the work regime for offshore oil workers should be subject to subsequent legal regulation.

Compensation and average monthly days off

The proposed amendment allows companies and unions to establish, exceptionally and through collective agreement or convention, work schedule compensation regimes with shifts different from the 5×2 format, including enabling the eventual continuation of the 6×1 shift schedule.

For this flexibility to be valid before the Labor Court, the proposal requires compliance with two mandatory criteria: the worked days off must be fully compensated within the same calendar month; and the worker is entitled to at least one day of rest within a maximum period of one week of service, and must reach, at the end of the month, an average of two paid days off per week.

The three express exceptions

The text approved by Congress establishes differentiated rules and specific conditions for three groups of workers and economic sectors:

Outsourced public administration workers: To safeguard the continuity of essential public services and preserve the economic and financial balance of administrative contracts, outsourced companies providing services to the State will have up to 12 months after the enactment to adjust their work schedules, instead of the general 60-day period. Contracts amended after 60 days from the publication must already comply with the new schedule. If the public authority and the service providers do not formalize an addendum within one year, the reduction in working hours for outsourced workers will automatically take effect, without a reduction in salary.

Professionals with a university degree and salaries starting at R$ 21,100: the so-called “highly qualified workers,” who are employees with a university degree and a monthly salary equal to or greater than 2.5 times the ceiling of Social Security benefits (currently R$ 21,188.87), are exempt from general daily working hour limits and timekeeping. These professionals can negotiate their schedules directly with the company, but retain the constitutional right to two days of paid weekly rest. This exception does not apply to public employees.

Brazilian labor law already provides for situations where there is no traditional control of working hours, such as in the case of employees who hold positions of trust or who work outside the company in activities where it is not possible to control their hours.

Individual micro-entrepreneurs and small businesses: the proposed constitutional amendment (PEC) stipulates that a subsequent complementary law will create transitional measures for mitigation and fiscal or credit support for individual micro-entrepreneurs, micro-enterprises, and small businesses. The granting of these benefits will be expressly conditional upon maintaining jobs and employment levels in these establishments.

Current contracts and old agreements

The application of the new work schedule to existing employment contracts is direct and immediate, requiring no formal re-hiring or termination of employment. The Constitution guarantees the principle of non-reduction of wages, prohibiting any nominal cut or proportional reduction in employee salaries or in the minimum wages of professional categories.

For workers who already work 40 hours a week or less, the amendment does not create a further reduction in weekly working hours. However, these employees will now have a guaranteed right to two paid days of weekly rest.

In the labor union sphere, clauses in previously agreed collective bargaining agreements and conventions that address working hours or weekly rest periods and are incompatible with the new constitutional parameters will lose all legal validity 60 days after the amendment is published.

Impact on the labor market

The shift to a new work schedule affects tens of millions of workers in operational, customer service, and ongoing production roles across the country.

A technical survey prepared by the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (Dieese), based on the Continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), indicates that the measure will directly benefit 26.8 million workers.

The contingent consists of 22 million employees with formal contracts in the formal sector (equivalent to 54% of the country’s formal workers) and approximately 4.8 million informal workers who register weekly work schedules exceeding 40 hours.

Data from the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) indicates that 14.8 million formal workers were directly subject to the 6×1 work schedule in 2025, while another 29.7 million were already working on the 5×2 schedule.

The scope of the change is also reflected in the profile of contracted work schedules in Brazil. Studies by the National Confederation of Commerce of Goods, Services and Tourism (CNC), structured from the Annual Social Information Report (Rais), reveal that 35.7 million workers under the CLT (Consolidation of Labor Laws), about 62% of the formal Brazilian workforce, currently work schedules ranging between 40 and 44 hours per week.

On October 10, thousands of Ecuadorians took to the streets to protest against the government of right-wing President Daniel Noboa. The demonstration was organized by the Autonomous Front of Organized Resistance (FARO) under the slogan “Government vs. People.”

Saturday’s demonstration followed a protest on October 8, organized by labor unions also in Quito, to protest the security, energy, health, and employment crises facing the country. They also protested government cuts to education and health care, as well as alleged mistreatment of workers, according to Edwin Bedoya, president of the United Workers’ Front (FUT).

For its part, the October 10 demonstration – which consisted mainly of high school and college students – set out from the Central University and marched through Quito. Slogans such as “If the people have no peace, neither does the government” and “Out with Noboa, out with him!” were heard along the streets occupied by the demonstrators.

The president of the Catholic University Student Federation, Jatari Ulcuango, told protesters: “Four years ago, this government promised us electricity; two years ago, too – and now the blackouts have returned. Two months ago, the government told us it would provide us with medicine, and yet we’re only receiving 60% of the supply. They’re taking us for fools.”

He added: “We’re dying outside the hospitals. Criminals are kidnapping us, murdering us, and robbing us. That’s why we’ve come out this morning. They plan to dismantle public institutions to force us to hire private security. Who has gotten rich off the health crisis? The private healthcare sector, while the people are getting poorer and poorer.”

The peaceful march headed back to the Central University, where the students gathered. Later, the students reported on social media that they had been harassed and repressed by the police, who had accompanied the entire march.

Likewise, several media outlets reported that the police were aggressive toward them. This was reported by the outlet La Barra Espaciadora, which released a video showing police officers pushing journalists.

TeleSur journalist Elena Rodríguez also reported that law enforcement officers broke the microphone she was using and struck her on the head: “I’m sick and tired of having to recount, time and time again, police attacks against the press. Today, while I was trying to document the violence with which officers were beating young protesters, I was struck on the head from behind with a baton. I turned around, showed my Telesur microphone to identify myself as a journalist, and the response was another baton strike that ended up breaking it.”

She added: “If they think that by beating me up they’re going to get me to stop documenting police brutality, to put my microphone away, or to back off several blocks so I can report from a place where I won’t be a nuisance, they’re wrong. It is not we journalists who should distance ourselves from the events. It is the police who must stop attacking us. The right to report cannot be negotiated at the point of a baton.”

The protests are taking place against the backdrop of a widespread crisis in the country, which includes the worst security crisis in its history (tens of thousands of deaths due to violence between drug trafficking gangs), a very serious health crisis (a lack of supplies and medicines in the public health system), and other major crises such as those in education, public investment, and employment.

Local elections will be held in November, which will reveal the extent of support – or lack thereof – for President Noboa and his neoliberal government agenda, which aligns with the hemispheric security strategy led by the Trump administration.

On October 25, Brazilians will return to the polls to choose between President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for his role in an attempted coup. The first round gave Flávio 47% of valid votes against Lula’s 45%, revealing the enduring strength of the far right four years after its electoral defeat. The runoff takes place as Donald Trump seeks to restore US domination over Latin America, with Brazil emerging as a consequential battleground in Washington’s campaign to contain China’s growing relations with the region.

Read more: Why did Brazil’s far right win the first round?

Over the past two decades, Brazil and China have built a political partnership that has expanded the space for independent action among countries of the Global South. Under Lula and Xi Jinping, this relationship has deepened through cooperation in industrial development, infrastructure, science, and technology. The election will determine whether this project advances or Brazil’s international orientation is subordinated to Washington’s renewed Monroe Doctrine as part of the continent’s rightward shift.

Read more: Brazil’s angry tide and the struggles ahead

Since Lula’s return to the presidency in 2023, the two governments have connected Chinese cooperation with Brazil’s development programs, including Nova Indústria Brasil, the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), and the Ecological Transformation Plan. Lula’s May 2025 visit to Beijing produced 36 agreements covering infrastructure, finance, artificial intelligence, public health, and industrial cooperation. Behind these agreements is a long-standing challenge: overcoming Brazil’s dependent position in the international division of labor, where commodity exports continue to outweigh advanced industrial and technological development.

This cooperation has also reached Brazilian popular movements. Through the International Association for Popular Cooperation (Baobab), Brazil’s Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST) and other organizations have worked with Chinese institutions on agricultural mechanization, bioinputs, and digital technologies for family farming. These initiatives include the Digital Family Farming and Agroecology Laboratory and IARAA, an artificial intelligence project for agroecology and agrarian reform developed by Brazilian popular movements using Chinese open-source models. In a countryside marked by extreme concentrations of land, machinery, and capital, such cooperation offers new tools to peasant organizations fighting for agrarian reform and the production of healthy food.

Brazil’s relationship with China also reveals the different class interests at work in the country, with contradictions particularly visible in the countryside. Massive exports of soybeans, meat, and minerals have continued under both Bolsonaro and Lula, but their governments have pursued very different political relationships with Beijing. While Jair Bolsonaro attacked China and aligned himself with Washington, Lula has sought to deepen strategic cooperation, including in industrial development, technology, and agrarian reform. Flávio Bolsonaro now promises an “economically pragmatic” relationship with China while cultivating close ties with Trump. For sectors of Brazil’s ruling classes that profit from commodity exports, continuing to sell to China while embracing Washington’s political agenda presents little contradiction. For Brazil’s efforts to rebuild its industry and develop technological sovereignty, the consequences are far greater.

The return of the Monroe Doctrine

Washington’s ambitions were made explicit in its November 2025 National Security Strategy, which announced a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, seeking to restore US pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere and deny outside powers control over strategic resources and infrastructure. Five days later, China published its third Latin America policy paper, reaffirming sovereignty, non-interference, regional integration, technological cooperation, and support for the region as a Zone of Peace. The two documents reveal fundamentally different approaches to the political future of the continent.

Brazil’s position is decisive. As Latin America’s largest economy, a founding BRICS member, and a leading participant in Mercosur, it possesses industrial, scientific, and political capacities that could strengthen independent development across Latin America and beyond.

The emergence of a new technological era makes this struggle particularly consequential. Brazil is among the few countries of the Global South capable of pursuing digital and technological sovereignty that could benefit its neighbors and parts of Africa. Its roughly 23% share of global rare earth reserves is an important starting point, but control over minerals alone is insufficient. The greater challenge is developing the capacity to process them, manufacture advanced components, and build the digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence systems, and technologies that will shape future production.

Flávio has made his orientation clear. Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in the United States in March 2026, he offered Brazil as the “solution” to Washington’s dependence on China for critical minerals, explicitly linking rare earths to artificial intelligence and US military superiority. Chinese economic reporting has also described proposals from his team to exclude China from rare-earth supply chains. Rather than using Brazil’s resources to develop its own industrial and technological capacities, this agenda would place them at the service of US technological and military power.

The same political orientation extends to digital sovereignty. In July 2026, Flávio’s campaign submitted proposals to US trade authorities that included preventing Brazil’s Pix payment system from connecting to non-Western international payment networks and loosening commitments within Mercosur. These proposals converge with a wider US campaign involving tariffs, digital regulation, strategic minerals, and attempts to influence Brazil’s electoral process. Meanwhile, Washington’s January 2026 bombing on Venezuela and kidnapping of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores demonstrated how far it is prepared to go to impose its will on the continent.

BRICS and the struggle for an independent foreign policy

Brazil, particularly under Lula, has helped build institutions through which countries of the Global South can reduce their dependence on Western-dominated structures. At the July 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, the group advanced cooperation on development finance, local-currency transactions, and international institutional reform. The New Development Bank, headed by former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, is an important expression of this effort.

The BRICS cannot automatically overcome economic dependency or guarantee sovereignty for working people. Yet its expansion offers greater room for independent development, provided that participating governments have the political commitment to use these possibilities.

Brazil’s history reveals how difficult that independence has been to defend. In 1961, vice-president João Goulart became the first high-ranking representative of a Latin American government to visit the People’s Republic of China, meeting Mao Zedong when revolutionary China remained diplomatically isolated and subjected to US sanctions. Three years later, Goulart was overthrown in a US-backed civil-military coup that inaugurated a 21-year dictatorship. The early history of China–Brazil friendship was inseparable from struggles over national sovereignty, agrarian reform, and the forces determined to suppress them.

The international material conditions for South–South cooperation are considerably more favorable today, but political direction remains decisive. Jair Bolsonaro hosted the 2019 BRICS summit in Brasília while pursuing close alignment with Washington. A government can weaken institutions from within by abandoning the commitments that give them political substance.

The far right’s resurgence also reflects the enduring power of Brazil’s own ruling classes. Bolsonarismo has a domestic base among sections of agribusiness, finance, the security apparatus, militias, conservative religious networks, and major media. These forces, whose electoral and institutional advances have continued, were strengthened by the 2016 parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff and the judicial persecution of Lula. They possess their own organizations, material interests, and sources of power, which do not disappear when an election is lost. Their economic dependence on Chinese markets has not prevented their support for Washington’s political agenda.

Beyond the election

Beijing has followed the Brazilian election closely, reflecting the importance of the political relationship built between Lula and Xi over years of cooperation. In July, Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Brazil against external interference during a conversation with Lula, which also covered cooperation in artificial intelligence, satellites, mineral processing, and relations between China and Mercosur. In September, Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Lula’s adviser and former foreign minister Celso Amorim in Beijing, reaffirming the bilateral strategic partnership.

China’s principle of non-interference means that the choice of Brazil’s government belongs to the Brazilian people, but Beijing’s diplomatic restraint should not be confused with an absence of political interests or an assumption that all governments would pursue the same relationship. Chinese analysts have described the possible outlook under Flávio as one of “cold politics, hot economics”: commodity trade would likely continue, but the political relationship and cooperation in strategic sectors could deteriorate. The experience of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency has already shown the limits of commercial interests in sustaining a broader political partnership.

For the Brazilian people, the consequences extend well beyond foreign policy. The election will also shape the struggles over labor rights, public services, agrarian reform, and the defence of democratic space. Brazil’s renewed role in South–South cooperation under Lula has opened possibilities for a development project that responds to the needs of its working people, but realizing those possibilities depends on the political and social forces capable of carrying it forward.

The Brazilian people have fought through dictatorship, neoliberal restructuring, parliamentary coups, and the rise of the far right to defend their political and social gains. This election is another moment in that longer struggle, now unfolding amid renewed US imperial intervention and a transformation of the world’s technological foundations. The future of China–Brazil cooperation will depend on the capacity of organized popular forces to build a sovereign national project and turn international cooperation into lasting changes in people’s lives.

Tings Chak 翟庭君 is the Asia Co-Coordinator of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Researchand an editor of the international edition of Wenhua Zongheng: A Journal of Contemporary Chinese Thought.

An Ecuadorian judge ordered the immediate release of nearly 30 fishermen whose two boats were destroyed by the US military in the Pacific Ocean. The Ecuadorian prosecutor’s office had charged them with alleged illegal activities.

The sequence of events is telling.

In two separate instances between late August and early September, the fishing boats Conquista II and María Candelaria were boarded by US military forces while on the high seas. The US forces, after transferring the fishermen to other vessels, destroyed and sank their boats.

The fishermen’s families quickly reported that they had lost communication with their loved ones. Only after prolonged uncertainty were the crew members handed over at Ecuadorian ports and placed under the control of Ecuadorian authorities.

In other words, the crew members were not charged with any crime before their vessels were destroyed, but rather afterward. This move has drawn heavy criticism from criminal defense attorneys (who argue that these actions violate due process) and caused anxiety among Ecuadorian fishermen, who have expressed their fear of fishing on the high seas and suffering the same fate as their compatriots. Several other boats have been intercepted and sunk in the Pacific by US forces in recent months, only increasing fears about transiting there at all.

The US military, for its part, claims that the destroyed vessels serve as fuel refueling points for other boats involved in drug trafficking. Under this strategy, US Southern Command intercepted at least eight Ecuadorian vessels between August and September 2026.

Foreign military actions on Ecuadorian soil have been defended by the government of right-wing President Daniel Noboa, who has aligned himself with Donald Trump’s hemispheric security policy embodied in the Shield of the Americas. During a recent visit to the South American country, Marco Rubio defended the military operations as necessary to dismantle drug trafficking routes.

But why destroy a vessel that has already been evacuated of its crew? 

Defense Minister Giancarlo Loffredo, who defends US military operations against Ecuadorian fishermen based on alleged “prior intelligence,” said that destroying a vessel that has already been evacuated of its crew is justified because it is too risky to tow the vessels to shore. He also said that seizing the fuel on board is dangerous.

However, the minister’s justifications have not convinced everyone. Human Rights Watch stated that both the United States and Ecuador must present evidence justifying the destruction of the vessels: “Of the detained crew members, 90 are facing criminal investigations in Ecuador, 56 were released because Ecuadorian judges ruled that their detention was illegal, and another 14 were not brought before a judge.”

In addition, Juanita Goebertus, director of the Americas division at Human Rights Watch, said: “Intercepting fuel trafficking at sea can be an important step in stopping criminal groups, but that does not give security forces the right to detain people without evidence, destroy their boats, and commit abuses.”

The fact is that the Ecuadorian fishermen deny any involvement in the crimes of which they are accused. For now, the Ecuadorian courts have ruled in favor of nearly 30 fishermen from the Montecristi and the Don Rufo, stating that the prosecution failed to present evidence to support its accusations. With them, the total number of acquitted crew members stands at 56. Another 32 fishermen are on probation while investigations into alleged criminal association continue.

Lee en español aquí

Brazil’s general election on October 4 delivered a severe warning to the left. Flávio Bolsonaro, the presidential candidate of the Liberal Party (PL), finished ahead of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, with approximately 47% against 45%. Neither secured a majority, sending them into a runoff on October 25. More troubling than this narrow presidential gap was the advance of bolsonarismo through Congress. The election has strengthened a political movement whose ambitions extend beyond defeating Lula to reshaping the institutions that obstruct its exercise of power.

The imprisonment (house arrest) and electoral exclusion of Jair Bolsonaro have not dissolved his movement. His son Flávio carries its presidential banner, while other members of the family have won seats in Congress. Michelle Bolsonaro, Jair’s wife, and Carlos Bolsonaro, his son, enter the Senate; Jair Renan, another son, and Renato, Jair’s brother, enter the Chamber of Deputies. Nepobolsonarismo is an appropriate name for this family’s expansion through the state. Yet the family is only the most visible expression of a broader project, rooted in powerful economic interests and a deeply organized reactionary politics.

A presidential contest with continental stakes

Lula remains the principal obstacle to the return of this project to the presidency. His defeat would affect workers and peasants throughout Brazil, but also the possibilities for regional cooperation and an independent Latin American foreign policy. Brazil’s size, industrial capacity, raw minerals (such as critical minerals), agricultural resources, and diplomatic reach give its political direction continental significance. A government that subordinates these assets to Washington’s priorities would weaken the space available to neighboring countries seeking their own paths of development.

The first-round geography demonstrates both Lula’s strength and his difficulties. He retained a commanding position in the Northeast, while Flávio led across the other four regions. São Paulo’s enormous electorate provided a particularly important advantage to the right. These divisions cannot be explained by an opposition between an enlightened population and an ignorant one. They require an examination of the different conditions of work, the organization of political life, and the capacity of competing movements to interpret people’s frustrations.

Lula approaches the runoff with a substantial social record. Unemployment fell to 5.3% in the quarter ending in August, the lowest rate for that period in the statistical series beginning in 2012. Such improvements matter enormously to families for whom a regular wage brings relief from daily uncertainty. But an improved national indicator does not settle the political argument. Employment can coexist with exhausting journeys, expensive housing, inadequate public services, and the insecurity of debt. The distance between statistical improvement and lived experience remains terrain on which the right operates.

Bolsonarismo, or Brazil’s far right of a special type, translates these frustrations into resentment against the left, all public institutions, and vulnerable sections of society. Its promise of order offers an immediate language for fear, while concealing the economic arrangements that produce insecurity. The left cannot answer this merely by advertising government achievements. It must connect those achievements to a credible program for changing everyday life, and explain which interests prevent further advances. A worker struggling with debt needs more than reassurance that the economy is performing well. This has been the problem for Lula, whose program for the future does not seem to promise more than what has been delivered till now.

The senate: a struggle over institutional power

The Senate election is particularly consequential because 54 of its 81 seats were contested. Senators serve eight-year terms, so the results will shape national politics well beyond the next presidential administration. The PL won 19 seats and will hold 28 in the new Senate, making it the largest party. The PT will have nine. The bolsonaristas have therefore established a formidable position, although the PL itself remains short of a majority and must bargain with other parties.

Michelle Bolsonaro and Bia Kicis took both seats in the Federal District, while Carlos Bolsonaro and Carol de Toni won the two seats in Santa Catarina. These victories show the movement’s ability to organize coordinated campaigns and concentrate support behind its candidates. There were important successes for the left: Rui Costa and Jaques Wagner won in Bahia, Humberto Costa retained representation in Pernambuco, and Marília Campos won in Minas Gerais. These results preserve points of resistance within an increasingly hostile chamber. The Senate’s significance extends beyond ordinary legislation. The bolsonaristas have made their confrontation with the Supreme Federal Court a central political objective, including demands to impeach its ministers. Their strengthened representation increases their capacity to pursue that confrontation and to influence the election of the Senate president. Predictions of an automatic majority for impeachment should be treated cautiously: party affiliation, campaign declarations, and votes in a specific proceeding are different things. Nevertheless, the danger of using legislative power to intimidate the judiciary has plainly grown.

This is part of a struggle over the conditions under which the far right can govern. The judicial proceedings against Jair Bolsonaro did not remove the social forces supporting him. Those forces now seek greater leverage over institutions capable of restraining them. For the left, defending democratic space must therefore accompany the struggle to expand social rights. Workers’ organizations cannot afford to lose the freedoms through which they organize, educate, and confront capital.

Federal deputies: the right advances, the left finds openings

All 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies were up for election this year. The PL secured 121, consolidating its position as the largest party in this chamber as well as in the Senate. The federation of the Workers’ Party, Communist Party of Brazil, and Green Party won 88 seats, with the PT itself taking 70. The federation’s growth is significant, but it leaves Lula’s allies far from a majority. Parties of the right hold 303 seats, while the broader parliamentary left holds 124.

The outcome strengthens the far right of a special type within a legislature already dominated by conservative interests. It also weakens some established brokers of parliamentary power, such as the centrão, the collection of parties that trades legislative support for influence over appointments and public resources, although it remains indispensable for majority building. What bargaining will take place within the centrão will now take place alongside a larger and more assertive PL. If Lula wins in the second round, he will confront substantial congressional resistance, but if Flávio wins, the same Congress could facilitate a reactionary program.

Yet the election also brought important representatives of a fighting Left into the Chamber. Jones Manoel, the communist historian elected through PSOL in Pernambuco, received 249,077 votes and finished first in Recife. Elias Jabbour, the communist geographer, was elected for the PCdoB in Rio de Janeiro. Their victories suggest an audience for political education and socialist arguments, even amid the right’s advance. They offer resources for rebuilding confidence among people who have grown impatient with the narrowing ambitions of parliamentary politics. Jones Manoel has already offered to assist Lula’s runoff campaign, including its digital communication, while proposing stronger attention to demands such as free public transport. This is a useful example of political clarity: criticism of the government’s limitations can coexist with active mobilization against the far right of a special type. Such unity does not require workers to abandon their demands. It becomes stronger when those demands supply the campaign’s energy and direction.

The task before October 25

The runoff cannot be won through negotiations among party leaders alone. It requires organized activity in workplaces, neighborhoods, universities, and rural communities, with a program people can recognize in their own lives. Transport, wages, housing, debt, public healthcare, and the time consumed by work must become the substance of a democratic campaign. Defense of sovereignty becomes tangible when it is connected to the ability to use Brazil’s wealth for the needs of its people.

The angry tide has advanced, but it has not carried away the millions who still seek another Brazil. The new communist deputies, the surviving mass organizations (especially the landless workers of the MST), and Lula’s enormous electoral base provide foundations for resistance. The immediate task is to defeat Flávio Bolsonaro. The longer task is to build a popular power strong enough to prevent the oligarchy from deciding, election after election, how little change the majority will be allowed.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa. He is the executive director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, the chief correspondent for Globetrotter, and the chief editor of LeftWord Books (New Delhi). He also appeared in the films Shadow World (2016) and Two Meetings (2017).

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

October 9 will be the last day that the well-known newspaper Expreso, one of Ecuador’s most important newspapers, is distributed in print. The newspaper, which has historically maintained a center-right editorial line, according to its statement, will limit its operations to its website, which will result in the layoff of dozens of employees.

The company that owns the newspaper, Gráficos Nacionales (Granasa), states that it is not bankrupt but will have to sell several assets to pay debts owed to its employees: “At stake is not only the rights of the shareholders but, above all, those of each and every employee who gave their all to this publishing house.”

And while the company has been reluctant to mention the reasons behind this decision in its most recent publications, several civil society actors have stated it plainly: pressure from the current right-wing government of Daniel Noboa.

One of them was the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), which called on the government to cease “state harassment against critical media outlets and journalists.” The demand is based on complaints, dismissals, and investigations reported by the newspaper in recent months. “We regret that a newspaper with more than five decades of history is ceasing print publication. Beyond business decisions that are the sole responsibility of its owners, it is impossible to ignore the context of sustained pressure that has surrounded Granasa.”

Likewise, the Observatory for Rights and Justice (ODJ) stated: “We express our deep concern over the announcement of the discontinuation of the print edition of Diario Expreso. After several months of enduring administrative and judicial harassment, and facing government attempts at corporate takeover and censorship against its columnists and representatives, the publication has decided to stop printing copies.”

For its part, the Noboa administration has categorically denied that it took any steps to provoke the crisis at Diario Expreso, and has instead defended the actions of the relevant institutions in investigating alleged crimes “regardless of where they come from” by independent bodies such as the prosecutor’s office and the SRI.

A right-wing newspaper critical of Noboa in crisis: pressure or mismanagement?

One of the most surprising aspects of the case is that Expreso has historically maintained an editorial stance closer to the right. It was one of the newspapers most opposed to the progressive government of Rafael Correa (2007–2017), and many of its editorial writers even went so far as to endorse the recently inaugurated Noboa administration.

However, as the months went by, criticism of Noboa’s administration began to appear in the newspaper’s pages, which, according to some allegations, did not sit well with the central government.

According to these allegations, the Internal Revenue Service – the agency responsible for collecting taxes – as well as the Attorney General’s Office, began to “pressure” Expreso’s major financial backers through investigations, which reportedly led those backers to withdraw their contributions to the newspaper, which has been in circulation in Ecuador for more than half a century.

Added to this is a warning issued by the newspaper’s parent company itself, stating that the Ecuadorian Superintendency of Companies intervened in the company with the alleged aim of “monitoring its financial performance and facilitating the correction of the irregularities identified.”

Likewise, Granasa President Galo Martínez told the SIP that the government was “harassing” the newspaper’s clients who advertised their products and services in its pages, a move seen as a tactic to drive the company into bankruptcy, as it relies on sponsors to operate.

According to an investigation by Ecuavisa, the newspaper Expreso lost nearly 70% of its advertising revenue over the months of government pressure. “The cowardice of a large segment of the business community that prefers to pull its ads – whether due to calls from those in power, which have indeed occurred, or simply out of a desire to look good,” said Martín Pallares, editor-in-chief of Expreso.

The truth is that this pressure is nothing new. Several months ago, one of the country’s leading editorial writers, Roberto Andrade, who worked at the newspaper, resigned from the publication, alleging that members of the Noboa administration had requested his departure.

Pallares also spoke about this alleged government pressure in a recent interview with Ecuavisa: “The newspaper had received a message stating that the government would stop its harassment if three people were handed over: Roberto Aguilar, Eduardo Carmigniani, and myself. The newspaper placed its trust in us; it chose to stand by us rather than give in to the pressure.”

Pallares stated about this alleged government pressure in a recent interview with Ecuavisa: “The newspaper had received a message stating that the government would stop its harassment if three people were handed over: Roberto Aguilar, Eduardo Carmigniani, and myself. The newspaper placed its trust in us; it chose to stand by us rather than give in to the pressure.”

In addition, Pallares, one of the country’s most well-known right-wing journalists, said: “Critical voices bother those in power – this kind of narcissistic power where the official truth cannot be questioned. Take the Progen case [the failed sale of power generators]; it’s crystal clear. If it weren’t for the troublesome media outlets that dig up information, data, and publish chats they manage to obtain, that issue would have already been buried.”

This is not the first instance of conflict between the Noboa administration and the press. Early in his term, journalist Alondra Santiago was deported; later, the program Irreverentes was canceled following harsh criticism of the government; journalists Fausto Yépez, Hernán Higuera, and María Sol Borja reported government pressure due to their investigations; attacks against journalists were reported during the 2025 National Strike; the high-profile case of Gisella Bayona, who alleged that the government was investigating her husband because she had reported a shortage of supplies in the public health system – a situation that has triggered one of the most significant crises in the country’s healthcare history; among other incidents.

Criticism from the right: a dispute among the ruling classes?

Other right-wing journalists have also criticized the government for allegedly having a low tolerance for criticism and taking actions that, they claim, are leading to a loss of freedom of expression.

One of them is journalist and political scientist Carlos Rojas, who stated in an op-ed: “What is happening with the newspaper Expreso is a very serious sign that Ecuador’s democratic health is in poor shape. It’s getting worse … a dangerous clash is reigniting between the current government – which is intolerant of criticism and oversight – and the independent press, a pillar of any liberal democracy.”

For his part, Ugo Stornaiolo wrote about new forms of censorship in Ecuador: “Journalistic oversight is undergoing a transformation that places press freedom at a crossroads. There are no shutdowns of radio stations, no buyouts of opposition media outlets, and no physical attacks. Investigative journalism faces sophisticated mechanisms of coercion: fiscal harassment, the manipulation of state entities, and reprisals against family members and coworkers to silence critical voices regarding President Noboa’s administration.”

According to several analysts, there is clear tension not only between centrist and left-wing movements and parties and the Noboa administration (which is clearly aligned with the right and follows the dictates of the Washington Consensus) but also between the Noboa administration (which belongs to the country’s most powerful family) and the critical positions coming from sectors of the right and a segment of the business community. This would demonstrate clear contradictions within the country’s most powerful economic classes.

The most recent case involved the leader of the business association, María Paz Jervis, who stated at a public event (in reference to the Diario Expreso case) that “Rarely in my life have I seen a business sector so afraid. I had never felt such hopelessness and resignation. I am convinced that there is much that needs to change in our country, and saying that there are things that need to change does not make us anyone’s enemies.” 

Following these statements, Jervis resigned from her position without specifying the reasons for her decision.

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On October 4, over 150 million Brazilians were called to the polls to elect their president, deputies, and governors, and to replace the majority of senators. The elections, for many, brought a major surprise. Although polls indicated a lead for the incumbent president, progressive Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, far-right Senator Flávio Bolsonaro clinched first place. Flávio is the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro who is currently serving a 27-year sentence for his involvement in an attempted coup against Lula in 2022.

According to the final tally, Bolsonaro received 47.03% of the vote (56 million votes) while Lula received 45.16%, nearly 54 million votes. Thus, Bolsonaro’s lead amounts to just over 2 million votes. In third place is Augusto Cury, with 2.89%. He is followed by Renan Santos and Ronaldo Caiado, with 2.24% and 2.18%, respectively. The remaining candidates received less than 0.3%.

A look at how the different regions of the country voted, a clear political divide between the north and the south of the country becomes apparent. The north (including states such as Amazonas, Pará, Amapá, Maranhão, Piauí, Bahia, Sergipe, Alagoas, Pernambuco, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Norte) supported the continued presence of the state and the welfare policies proposed by Lula.

For its part, including the northern state of Roraima, the south of the country clearly backed Bolsonaro’s neoliberal and pro-Trump agenda: Acre, Rondônia, Mato Grosso, Tocantins, Goiás, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul voted for Bolsonaro.

On his X account, the far-right senator from the Liberal Party (PL) said: “Together, we’re going to build a new Brazil. A Brazil of prosperity! Tomorrow, you’ll stand before the ballot box and choose the future of our country, the future of our children, of this generation and the next. Change is in your hands. Brazil is going to win!”

For his part, the president and candidate of the Workers’ Party (PT) said: “The result is often unexpected. You never get everything you want.” Yet, Lula, who has fought dozens of political battles, said: “[The runoff] is the time to show the true picture of Brazil today and of the Brazil we want.”

To secure victory, Bolsonaro hopes to win over the votes of the candidates who finished behind the finalists – the majority of whom undoubtedly hold right-wing ideologies. Lula, however, can still turn the situation around if he manages to form the right alliances and win over voters who cast invalid ballots (about 3%), as well as those who abstained, who account for 21.08% of the total electorate.

Senate, house of representatives, and governors

And while Lula has expressed optimism about the possibility of turning the tide in the presidential runoff to be held on October 25, the political reality in Brazil has changed. Bolsonaro’s PL party has managed to double its number of senators: it won 19 of the 54 seats up for election out of a total of 81 senators. Among them, immediate family members of the former president, such as Michelle Bolsonaro and Carlos Bolsonaro, won seats. In total, the PL will hold more than a third of the Senate, while Lula’s PT will hold 9.

This institution is particularly important because it approves or rejects the judges of the Federal Supreme Court (the country’s highest court) who are nominated by the president. This gives Bolsonaro significant ideological leverage, as he claims his father is being held in custody due to a conspiracy between political powers and a biased judicial system.

In the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, which has 513 seats, the Bolsonaro camp also secured a significant victory. With 100% of the votes counted, the PL won 121 seats, while the Brazil of Hope Federation coalition (which includes Lula’s PT, the Green Party, and the Communist Party) won 88 seats.

However, due to the method of seat allocation, Brazil favors a Chamber of Deputies with representation from many political forces. This is how the Progressive Union secured 87 seats, the Social Democratic Party 43, the Republicans 41, the Brazilian Democratic Movement 36, Podemos 27, the PSOL 15, as well as the Brazilian Socialist Party, among others.

Thus, while the right has the numbers to secure a numerical advantage in the Chamber of Deputies, it will have to contend with deep-seated and historic internal contradictions that could complicate a potential Bolsonaro presidency. Similarly, if Lula manages to prevail in the runoff, he will face a highly complex Senate and Chamber of Deputies that could potentially oppose him.

In the gubernatorial elections, the PL is also the biggest winner. Of 27 states, the Liberal Party has won six so far, while the PT, the Social Democratic Party, the PP, and the Republicans have each won three. Other states will have to elect their governors in a runoff election.

The most talked-about result is the decisive victory in São Paulo by Tarcísio de Freitas, Jair Bolsonaro’s former Minister of Infrastructure, who defeated Fernando Haddad, Lula’s right-hand man. São Paulo is Brazil’s most populous state (46 million people) and home to the South American country’s most powerful economic hubs.

A political future in doubt

It has been repeatedly emphasized that, due to its economic and geopolitical importance, the elections in Brazil are of enormous significance for the future of Latin America. It is no coincidence that former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (who promoted a series of dictatorships in the region) said: “Whichever way Brazil leans, Latin America will lean that way.”

The South American far right, which has enjoyed unprecedented electoral success in recent years, knows that without Brazil, its poker hand will always be incomplete. Uruguay indeed remains the only country in the region that does not share the views of Milei in Argentina, Kast in Chile, or De la Espriella in Colombia, but Brazil alone accounts for more than 50% of the region’s total GDP.

Similarly, the left and the center know that a potential victory for Lula would be one of the last battles to be fought against the formidable advance of a right wing aligned with the foreign policies of Trump and Israel, with the most orthodox neoliberalism, and with the economic interests of capital magnates, including the big tech companies. And if Lula manages to recover from this defeat, it would mark a major shift in course for the legendary union leader – not only for Brazil but for the entire region.

As Lula said, “now a different kind of campaign begins.” Both candidates will pull out all the stops to win control of South America’s most populous and powerful country. It certainly won’t be a “clean” campaign, but if one pays attention to the finalists’ statements, every means at their disposal will be used to achieve the coveted goal.

US influence on the elections

Political analysts have expressed concerns about alleged foreign interference in the elections. In July 2025, Trump had imposed 50% tariffs on Brazil over what he considered an unfair ruling against Jair Bolsonaro – whom the US president calls “his friend”.

In August 2026, the United States revoked the visa of Brazil’s ambassador to Washington, a move denounced by Brasília as a violation of international law. 

Just last week, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio ordered the closure of the US embassy in Brazil during the elections due to alleged “threats,” a move viewed by some political commentators as a tactic to create tension during the elections.

During the first round of the presidential campaign, Trump did not make any direct statements of support for Flávio Bolsonaro. However, once the results were known, the US president told the press: “It’s a great victory – a close one, but a very, very great, incredible victory.”

In this regard, it remains to be seen whether Trump will make some kind of direct statement in support of Bolsonaro’s candidacy – as he has done in past elections in Colombia, Argentina, Honduras, and elsewhere – in favor of far-right candidates who support his agenda. Or, even more importantly, whether he will make any kind of promise to the Brazilian people if Bolsonaro wins – or, worse yet, threaten them if they vote for Lula.

Tens of thousands of students took to the streets of Chile on Thursday, October 1, to demand that the government of the ultra-conservative José Antonio Kast not cut the education budget. More than 30 civil society organizations joined the call issued by the Chilean Student Confederation (CONFECHA) in support of the “national strike.”

Among the supporters were the United Workers’ Union (CUT), the Chilean Teachers’ Association, the High School Students’ Assembly, the 8M Feminist Coordinating Committee, the National Federation of Education Workers, and the National Association of Kindergartens, among others.

“We see that on September 30, the government presented a new bill to Congress, and the only certainties we have are the precedents set by this government in its first six months – which are cuts: cuts for working families, cuts for students in the areas of health, in education, housing, and social security,” said Laura Mlynarz, spokesperson for CONFECHA and president of the Chilean Student Federation.

She added: “In the face of that, we respond with social unity, we respond with organization, we respond with mobilization – especially in the face of an authoritarian government that refuses to listen to its citizens and refuses to create spaces for dialogue.”

The slogan “Not a single peso less for education” was chanted by thousands of people who filled Alameda Avenue, one of the main streets in the capital, Santiago. Kast, true to his neoliberal orthodoxy, announced budget cuts to Chile’s public education system.

In a presidential address, Kast announced the 2027 Budget Law, which calls for an investment of 17.3 trillion pesos in education – a figure lower than the 17.4 trillion allocated in 2026. While this may not seem like much, when inflation and other factors are taken into account, it may prove more alarming than it appears at first glance.

“These figures are insufficient and, I would say, misleading; they don’t even make up for a year’s loss in purchasing power,” said Mario Aguilar, president of the Chilean Teachers’ Association.

However, according to the president, the measure was taken to safeguard other social services: “We hope you understand that in the budget we have done everything possible to uphold social rights and that the issues of pensions and free education are covered. But when you protest, you also have to respect those who think differently.”

Kast is referring to the clashes between the police (Carabineros) and students that, according to some reports, resulted in at least 31 arrests.

But the student movement rejects Kast’s statements, which clearly place the blame for the clashes on the students. Laura Mlynarz said the government is seeking to silence the students through repression.

“This government criminalizes the student movement, and we are the ones who are most concerned about moving toward an equitable Chile – toward fair, dignified, and solidarity-based development,” said Mlynarz. Regarding Education Minister Aria Paz Arzola, she said: “The minister doesn’t want to listen to us; the minister doesn’t want to meet with us; and the precarious state of public education just keeps getting worse.”

The first incidents of violent repression were reported just a few minutes after the rally began. The police fired tear gas canisters, while students with their faces covered threw the tear gas canisters back and hurled other objects. The police also used water cannons, a move described as “brutal repression” by some media outlets.

Clashes were also reported between the protesting students and groups of right-wing students from private universities who, in support of Kast’s far-right government, asserted that “We don’t want a paralyzed Chile; we want a Chile that prospers.”

In this way, the Chilean student movement once again made its presence felt in the South American country and demonstrated that it still retains a significant portion of its capacity to mobilize in the face of attempts to radicalize the neoliberal model, as has happened in past years.

In 2019, tens of thousands of Chilean students launched a full-scale social uprising demanding profound changes in one of the key countries where neoliberalism was institutionalized thanks to the bloody Pinochet dictatorship (1973–1990), which left thousands dead and missing. The protests led to calls for a Constituent Assembly.

For now, Kast has attempted to implement his neoliberal agenda (which includes cuts to education and other social services) cautiously, mindful of the recent past and fearful of a new outbreak of unrest.

Brazil’s presidential elections are sparking reactions across the region. The economic (and, by extension, geopolitical) importance of this South American giant leaves no regional politician or social organization indifferent, as they know that much of the continent’s future is at stake at the Brazilian polls.

Support for Bolsonaro from Washington and Milei

Flávio Bolsonaro, son of the far-right former president Jair Bolsonaro (who is in prison for conspiring to carry out a coup d’état against Lula da Silva), has received explicit support from Argentine President Javier Milei – a move that cost Buenos Aires a diplomatic crisis with Brasília due to the Argentine leader’s anti-Lula statements made on Brazilian soil.

Likewise, Flávio Bolsonaro enjoys the direct support of President Donald Trump. The US president has maintained a recent tradition (heavily criticized by many) of publicly expressing support for this or that far-right Latin American candidate who, upon winning the election, fully aligns their country with Washington’s foreign policy and joins the US-led military alliance known as the Shield of the Americas.

Trump has also imposed direct trade sanctions on Brazil over the conviction of Jair Bolsonaro, whom Trump calls a “friend.” In addition, the United States sanctioned the judge who convicted Bolsonaro, Alexandre de Moraes, sending a clear message of condemnation against the Brazilian justice system – a move that some political analysts have called foreign “interference” in the Brazilian judicial system.

Unions and the Latin American Left support Lula

Lula has also received support from another very important female leader in the region: Claudia Sheinbaum. In recent weeks, the president of Mexico has repeatedly highlighted the positive aspects of Lula’s administration: “I believe that President Lula has been a very good president … He has done an extraordinary job leading Brazil, and the indicators show it.” The endorsement of his candidacy has clearly been indirect, but given Mexico’s geopolitical importance, many in Lula’s Workers’ Party surely appreciate it.

Lula has also received support from neighboring countries to the south. In Uruguay, the ruling coalition, the Frente Amplio (FA), has shown direct and militant support for Lula’s campaign. Fernando Pereira, president of the FA, stated that the electoral battle in Brazil “is between democracy and barbarism.” He also warned against US interference in the elections: “Brazil will not accept U.S. interference in the election.”

Former Argentine Foreign Minister Santiago Cafiero, who is currently a member of Congress, also expressed his support for Lula: “If Lula wins, he will create a countercurrent to what has been taking hold in the region and demonstrate that there is resistance to these right-wing winds.”

On the evening of Wednesday, September 30, Bolivian police arrested Attorney General Roger Mariaca and raided the Attorney General’s Office in Sucre and Santa Cruz. The police action comes just days after the US State Department sanctioned and revoked the visas of Mariaca and 21 other Bolivians.

Analysts suggest that the timing of the US sanctions, Mariaca’s arrest, and the raids, are no coincidence, calling it “political pressure” related to a high-profile case.

Mariaca is leading the investigation into Argentine political consultant Fernando Cerimedo. The influential political advisor to Latin America’s far right allegedly influenced elections through social media bot farms, may be involved in drug trafficking, and was accused of ordering an assassination attempt on his ex-partner, Nadia Beller. She was shot three times but survived after undergoing emergency surgery.

Cerimedo has been in custody in Bolivia after attempting to leave the country by plane following the attack on Beller. Messages were found on his cell phone that, according to the prosecution, directly link him to the attempt on her life. Despite the emerging evidence against him, not only in ordering the hit on Beller, but also in crimes of corruption and drug trafficking, Cerimedo seems to have friends in high places, both in the Bolivian president’s office, and in the United States, that may have set the stage for the arrest of his investigator, Attorney General Roger Mariaca.

Read more: Attempted murder accusations, troll farms, and presidential connections: the notorious case of Fernando Cerimedo

Argentine outlet Página 12, reported that, according to Beller, the sanctions against Mariaca were “a move by Donald Trump’s team to protect Cerimedo. As the Washington Post noted this week: ‘Cerimedo is the MAGA (Make America Great Again, Trump’s slogan) man across the entire continent.’”

In the report, Beller is quoted as saying: “Is this decision by the United States part of the fight for the Shield of the Americas or is it about protecting the MAGA network?…If the reason is corruption and drug trafficking, then they need to explain why the visa is being revoked for the attorney general who is investigating a network of that nature. Are they going after the investigator, or are they protecting part of the network?”

As evidence mounts against Cerimedo, the US instead accused his investigator, Mariaca, of allegedly soliciting and accepting bribes to facilitate drug trafficking and helping people involved in violent crimes escape justice.

After news broke of the US actions against him, Roger Mariaca had said he will not back down and will continue the investigations until the end: “[I received the news] with great surprise … I will not back down even one centimeter from the investigations that fall under my jurisdiction.”

He highlighted that while it is clear that the Cerimedo case has generated international intrigue, “no political pressure, whether national or international, can become an impediment to clarifying the facts which must be investigated.”

He was arrested two days later.

Involvement in the drug trade?

In addition to Cerimedo’s well-documented ties to high profile right-wing politicians across Latin America, including in Bolivia, recent revelations from ex-partner Beller, suggest that the powerful political consultant may have also been involved in the drug trade. In a leaked audio message, Cerimedo is allegedly speaking with a woman with whom he is arranging payment so that several flights can operate without excessive pressure from the authorities. Cerimedo mentions a man named Cabrera, whom the Bolivian media suspect is Franz Cabrera, the former head of the Special Force to Fight Against Drug Trafficking (FELCN), who was recently dismissed.

According to the investigations, they allegedly “were paid” for nearly 45 flights, amounting to $700,000, raising significant suspicions about the source of the funds that the political consultant is said to have handled.

The timing of the sanctions against Mariaca and his arrest have raised questions about US interference in the Bolivian justice system. But, as pressure escalates over the investigation into Cerimedo, the case is also revealing a far deeper web of political connection and influence than was initially known, placing it under renewed scrutiny. Wether the investigation is further disrupted or allowed to proceed, what happens next could expose even more about Cerimedo and the network of the Latin American far right.

The election campaign in Brazil is at its peak. Candidates are stepping up their speeches, campaign ads are airing more frequently, and attacks on opponents are the order of the day. Brazilian political life has found its focal point, and that is the contest – as it is being portrayed – between two titans.

On one side is the country’s current president, the legendary labor union leader and head of the Workers’ Party, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva – a representative of progressivism and Brazil’s center-left – who has stated that he has chosen to run for reelection to prevent the far right from conquering one of the last countries to have resisted the new wave of far-right politics in South America.

Leading the charge is Flávio Bolsonaro, a senator from São Paulo who has stepped into the long shadow of his father, the neoliberal and ultra-conservative former president Jair Bolsonaro (a close friend of Trump’s) who is currently in custody, according to Brazilian authorities, for his role in an attempted coup d’état aimed at preventing the swearing-in of the current president, Lula.

The latest polls

For now, polls predict a potential runoff election (October 25) to determine the president, as neither candidate is expected to reach the 50% needed to win in a single round.

According to the polling firm Quaest, Lula continues to hold a slight 5% lead over Bolsonaro. Thus, the center-left candidate would reach 39% and Bolsonaro 34%. Meanwhile, the polling firm BTG Pactual/Nexus reports that Lula has 42% and Bolsonaro 37%.

The remaining candidates would not receive more than 4%, while undecided voters account for 5%. About 10% of those surveyed said they would cast a blank or invalid vote.

In a potential runoff, the race is much closer. Quaest reports that Lula and Bolsonaro would be tied in a future runoff, each with 42%. Nexus, on the other hand, gives Lula a lead in the runoff with 46%, compared to Bolsonaro’s 44%.

Two models, one possible path

From a media and strategic perspective, portraying the South American giant’s current situation as a crossroads can sometimes be a bit misleading. Both candidates advocate capitalism as the only viable economic system, and both are open to international cooperation with necessary trading partners.

However, the major differences – and the significant possibilities that accompany them – undoubtedly point to two distinct paths the country could take. Bolsonaro advocates for a radical reduction of the state and the full opening of the country to international capital, which has once again turned its attention with great interest to South America’s immense natural resources. Minerals, gold, oil, and Brazil’s enormous hydroelectric potential are fundamental to the new material distribution of the imperialist economy.

And while Lula is by no means an isolationist (in fact, he promotes investment) he is not a politician willing to hand over those resources at any cost without a significant state presence and without promoting the economic interests of Brazilian capital. Furthermore, Lula has based his campaign, among other things, on the country’s sovereignist rhetoric.

This issue is probably the most important in geopolitical terms. Lula is not part of Trump’s political-military coalition known as the Shield of the Americas, the true operational arm of Washington’s hemispheric strategy – namely, securing Latin America as its zone of control and influence.

Flávio Bolsonaro, on the other hand, asserts that during his potential presidency, the United States will be not only his main political partner but also his security partner (a relationship that has historically held over the past few decades).

And Trump, of course, has not been a bystander in this dispute – even from a personal standpoint. When he learned of Jair Bolsonaro’s conviction for an alleged coup attempt, he stated that he would impose sanctions on the Brazilian economy for having imprisoned the man he called “his friend.”

In response, Lula has played a game that carries high economic costs but maintains a firm diplomatic stance. Whenever tariffs have been raised, Lula has ordered a similar response, which has put him in direct conflict with the Trump administration.

This issue is likely of much greater significance than it appears, given that Brazil alone accounts for nearly 50% of the region’s total GDP. Therefore, what is at stake in Brazil’s upcoming elections is more than just a presidential election; it is also the continuation of a right-wing wave in the region or a halt to it – one that, given Brazil’s economic and territorial importance, could mean more than just a statistical anomaly.

Costa Rica’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manuel Tovar, was dismissed from his post last week by the country’s president Laura Fernández. Tovar was considered one of the “heavyweights” of the country’s dominant political faction, having previously served as Minister of Commerce under President Rodrigo Chávez.

The decision was made by Fernández on September 24, because, according to a statement, her foreign minister failed to inform her of an invitation to a meeting held in New York City aimed at strengthening the so-called Shield of the Americas.

Shield of the Americas is a political-military alliance led by Donald Trump that seeks to secure Washington’s geopolitical leadership in the region, and which right-wing and far-right Latin American governments have joined enthusiastically.

Right-wing President Fernández said that failing to report such an important meeting constituted an act of negligence on Tovar’s part. The Costa Rican president also said that Shield of the Americas is a “fundamental platform in the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime.”

The president did not travel to the United States to deliver her speech at the UN General Assembly because she was on an official visit to Colombia with her counterpart, the far-right Abelardo de la Espriella.

The Costa Rican presidency reported that the invitation – which was not extended to her – came from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio himself. Several heads of state from Shield of the Americas member states participated, including Javier Milei of Argentina, José Antonio Kast of Chile, Rodrigo Paz of Bolivia, Daniel Noboa of Ecuador, Irfaan Ali of Guyana, Nasry Asfura of Honduras, Santiago Peña of Paraguay, Luis Abinader of the Dominican Republic, and Keiko Fujimori of Peru, among others.

In this regard, Fernández publicly apologized to the US ambassador to the Central American country, Melinda Hildebrand: “I reiterate to your country my firm and resolute commitment to continue supporting the Shield of the Americas alliance… I regret my absence… The failure to forward that invitation from your government to me did not go unnoticed, and today the foreign minister of the Republic was dismissed,” which clearly demonstrates the enormous importance San José attaches to an invitation from Washington.

Tovar’s dismissal comes on the heels of a series of dismissals of key ministers in Fernández’s government, a development the opposition has used to highlight a certain instability in the very young administration.

“We are concerned about serious foreign policy mistakes that need to be corrected… Second, we are concerned about the stability of the cabinet: in less than five months, five senior officials – including ministers and deputy ministers – have already been dismissed. That instability is not in her best interest, nor in that of her government or Costa Rica,” said the leader of the National Liberation Party caucus.

For his part, the former foreign minister did not explain the reasons behind his decision not to inform Fernández about the invitation. In a post on X, he said briefly: “I thank Laura Fernández for the opportunity to serve the Costa Rican people from the Casa Amarilla, and I wish her every success as President of the Republic for the good of the country. Finally, I would like to commend the team at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the passion and dedication with which they undertake every mission on behalf of the country. To them, I offer my eternal gratitude. I accept this moment with great peace of mind. I will always stand by the just causes of the Costa Rican people and the international community.”

The reasons behind Tovar’s decision remain unknown, although several sectors of the opposition have raised suspicions about an alleged ulterior motive on Fernández’s part for not attending the Shield of the Americas meeting – which, if true, could reveal political and diplomatic contradictions deeper than they might appear at first glance.

Militants and supporters of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva participated, this Sunday, September 27, in demonstrations as part of the national mobilization “Let’s go, Lula,” held a week before the first round of elections. In Rio de Janeiro, “CarnaLula 2026” spanned the length of Copacabana beach.

With a microphone, PT Senate candidate Benedita da Silva spoke about the importance of Carnival as an expression of popular culture and called on those present to also vote for a progressive bloc in the Rio de Janeiro Legislative Assembly and the Federal Chamber of Deputies. She reinforced the discourse that, in this election, not only democracy is at stake, but also national sovereignty. “We will not be anyone’s backyard,” she repeated Lula’s phrase.

Read more: Brazil’s presidential campaign heats up

In São Paulo, the event began with Carnival parades, circus performances, and bike rides on Paulista Avenue, where candidates gave speeches in defense of democracy. “Denialism will not prevail,” said Senate candidate Simone Tebet. Federal deputy Erika Hilton echoed Tebet, speaking about the importance of electing candidates who will steer Brazil away from fascism and who are in favor of the working class, as well as defending the end of the 6×1 work schedule. Also present at the event, actor Humberto Carrão told Brasil de Fato that he urged voters to decide the presidential election in the first round.

The capital of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, was one of the cities with the largest number of activities in support of Lula’s re-election. Among them was a flag-waving demonstration in the city center, where hundreds of activists unfurled a banner that read “Lula of Brazil.” In a review of the event, Pedro Martins, a member of the Alvorada collective, one of the organizers of the action, spoke of the need to occupy the streets. “It was a spectacular event, with all the social movements gathered. This week was an important week, showing that we need to go to the streets, and only in this way can we turn the vote around and achieve victory,” he told Brasil de Fato.

In Florianópolis and Curitiba, supporters held a bike ride carrying flags in defense of Lula’s candidacy. In Brasília, the gathering was on the Eixão, a fast road that connects the Plano Piloto from north to south.

Lula’s campaign reported that the day’s events were organized in a decentralized manner, with more than 500 activities planned across the 27 state capitals and hundreds of municipalities. The program included walks, motorcades, leaflet distribution, and cultural performances.

First published by Brasil de Fato in Portuguese.