Last July, President Donald Trump imposed 50 percent tariffs on various Canadian goods, a list he subsequently expanded to include additional imports, some of which he banned outright. His legal justification was Section 338 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which Congress approved in 1930. Section 338 authorized tariffs in response to discriminatory trade practices. But in the 96 years since it was enacted, no president had ever used it to impose tariffs.

Why is that? According to a lawsuit that the Liberty Justice Center (LJC) filed on Tuesday in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), the answer is clear: Section 338 was superseded by subsequent legislation that likewise targeted discriminatory trade barriers, beginning with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and culminating in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Section 301, the current remedy, includes requirements that Trump apparently sought to dodge by invoking Section 338 instead.

That maneuver is illegal, the LJC argues. "Congress already gave the executive branch a tool for responding to unfair foreign trade practices: Section 301, which requires an investigation, public comment and other safeguards," says Jeffrey M. Schwab, the LJC's director of litigation. "The administration cannot skip those protections by reaching for a 1930 statute that no president had ever used to impose a tariff."

Why not? "Where provisions in two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one," the lawsuit says. "Where a later act covers the whole subject of an earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it operates similarly as a repeal. And a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute controls the construction of an earlier one even absent express amendment."

Even if Section 338 somehow survived congressional approval of contrary laws, the LJC adds, Trump's tariffs exceed the authority it grants. And if Trump's interpretation of Section 338 were correct, the lawsuit says, the provision would violate the nondelegation doctrine, which bars Congress from delegating its tariff power to the president without providing "an intelligible principle" to guide and constrain his exercise of it.

Trump's Section 338 tariffs, in short, are "the Administration's latest attempt to exercise, through a statute never designed for the purpose, the tariff power that the Constitution assigns to Congress." That pattern should be familiar by now.

Shortly after taking office in 2025, Trump claimed to have discovered a previously unnoticed delegation of extensive tariff authority in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a 1977 law that does not mention import taxes and had never been used to impose them. That claim was rejected by every court that considered it, and last February the Supreme Court ruled that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs at all.

Trump responded to that decision by immediately announcing similarly broad tariffs under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act, which addresses "fundamental international payments problems" caused by "serious United States balance-of-payments deficits." In May, the CIT ruled that the new tariffs were illegal because Trump had failed to "identify balance-of-payments deficits within the meaning of Section 122."

Trump then switched to Plan C, invoking Section 301 of the Trade Act, which authorizes tariffs in response to a foreign "act, policy, or practice" that is "unreasonable or discriminatory" and "burdens or restricts" U.S. commerce. He claimed that provision justified tariffs on 86 trading partners, accounting for nearly all U.S. imports, because they had failed to "impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor." The CIT is currently weighing challenges to those tariffs, including an LJC lawsuit.

Trump's Section 338 tariffs have now added to the CIT's caseload. The LJC represents Gellert Global Group, an importer that was hit hard by those taxes after Trump added cheese to the list of disfavored Canadian goods. The lawsuit asks the CIT to certify a class of importers, numbering in "the hundreds, if not the thousands," that likewise have been clobbered by Trump's 50 percent tariffs.

Since Trump obviously is aware of Section 301, why did he resort to a never-used, seemingly obsolete provision to justify the tariffs on imports from Canada? As the LJC notes, Section 301 requires an investigation by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "consultation with the foreign country concerned, notice, public comment, a hearing, and determinations within statutory deadlines." It also requires "that action be equivalent in value to the burden imposed, that duties be preferred over other import restrictions, and that actions terminate after four years absent a request for continuation and review."

Can Trump avoid those constraints by invoking Section 338 instead? The LJC thinks not: "Congress did not intend to leave in place a parallel authority that would allow the President to impose the same remedies, for the same conduct, free of every one of those safeguards."

Section 338 has been "impliedly repealed," the LJC argues. "At a minimum, Section 301 controls where, as here, the President seeks to respond to foreign practices within Section 301's scope, and the President may not impose duties in response to such practices while disregarding the procedures and limits Section 301 imposes. Because the President did not proceed under Section 301, the Section 338 Tariffs are unlawful whether or not Section 338 survives."

Even if you ignore subsequent legislation, the LJC argues, the Canadian policies that Trump cited when he announced the tariffs do not qualify as "discrimination" under Section 338. "Canada's motor vehicle surtax and its provinces' alcohol purchasing decisions are responses to tariffs that the United States imposed on Canada, not discrimination by Canada against the United States," it says. Trump also complained that Canada treats European cheese imports more favorably than U.S. cheese imports. But "when Congress enacted Section 338, a preference granted under a reciprocal agreement was not 'discrimination.'"

Section 338 "addresses discrimination: measures that single out United States commerce for worse treatment than the commerce of the world at large," the lawsuit says. "It is not a general authorization to impose tariffs whenever the President disagrees with a trading partner's policies, or whenever a trading partner responds to tariffs the United States has imposed on it."

Trump also was unfazed by Section 338's requirement that the president set duties to "offset" the costs imposed by discriminatory practices, which implies proportionality. Rather than attempt that, the LJC notes, Trump imposed "the statutory maximum rate of 50 percent without tying it to any measured burden."

As interpreted by Trump, the lawsuit warns, Section 338 authorizes the president to "impose tariffs of up to 50 percent on any products of any country that extends better treatment to any other country in any respect—including through any of the hundreds of preferential trade agreements to which the United States is not a party—or that responds to tariffs the United States has imposed on it." Yet Section 338 "contains no clear statement authorizing that power," contrary to the "major questions" doctrine, which applies to assertions of executive authority with "vast economic and political significance."

If Section 338 conferred the sort of unfettered authority that Trump is claiming, the LJC says, it "would supply no intelligible principle constraining the exercise of Congress's power to lay duties." His reading "would convert a narrow, fact-dependent provision into an effectively unrestricted delegation of Congress's tariff power," which would be "an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."

This case "is not about the president," says LJC CEO Sara Albrecht. "It is about the presidency. No president should have the power to pull a dormant statute off the shelf and use it to impose sweeping tariffs or import bans without the limits Congress required."

The post Trump's 50% Tariffs on Canadian Goods Illegally Rely on a Superseded Statute, a Lawsuit Argues appeared first on Reason Magazine.

On Monday, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced it would "make $8 billion available for one-time payments to American farmers this harvest season to provide relief during temporary market disruptions and increased input costs."

Using a formula derived from the USDA's production, yield, and price estimates, the Harvest Fuel Relief program will "provide simple, proportional support to producers." It will only cover a "portion of modeled losses during the 2026 crop year." The Farm Service Agency—an office within the USDA that administers credit and loan programs—will administer the $8 billion in one-time payments using funds from the Commodity Credit Corporation, a federal entity authorized to draw up to $30 billion from the U.S. Treasury to fund agricultural initiatives. Payment rates won't be released until November, and the USDA's notice leaves open the possibility of additional payments for "non-Title I commodities, including specialty crop growers and fishermen."

A fiscally questionable decision, the program comes at a time when farmers are feeling a significant price pinch. The dyed diesel American farmers and ranchers use is exempt from state and federal highway taxes, but that has done little to offset skyrocketing fuel prices. In September, the American Farm Bureau Federation projected that fuel expenses would reach $22 billion this year, up 29 percent from 2025. The Farm Bureau estimates that total production expenses will reach nearly $500 billion in 2026. According to its own predictions, the USDA doesn't expect the situation to improve anytime soon.

In its latest Commodity Costs and Returns report, released in June, the USDA projects farmers and ranchers will face record production costs in 2027—higher than during the COVID-19 supply chain disruptions—driven by higher prices for necessary inputs such as fuel, fertilizer, seeds, machinery, and labor. 

While the USDA has blamed "temporary market disruptions" for these cost hikes, the blame more accurately falls to President Donald Trump, thanks to his illegal war in Iran. As of Tuesday, Trump's war—and the subsequent shocks it has caused to the global diesel supply—have pushed the national average price in the U.S. up $2.70 per gallon from a year ago, a 74.6 percent increase, according to AAA data.

Unfortunately, the war in Iran is just one of several Trump administration policies making life more expensive for everyone, including the nation's farmers and ranchers. Tariffs on imported fertilizer, which began in 2020 during the first Trump administration, have made it difficult for American farmers to afford what they need. By the Farm Bureau's estimates, fertilizer costs for 2026 are projected to reach a record $40 billion, up 15 percent from the previous year.

The $8 billion program is part of a windfall of taxpayer money the Trump administration has sent to farmers as relief for harms caused by the president's actions. Last December, the USDA sent $11 billion in one-time bridge payments to more than half a million farmers nationwide. Earlier this month, the USDA announced it would provide a record $13.8 billion in gross payments to agricultural producers to cover revenue losses. 

In a speech in Kansas touting the program, Trump claimed that the state's residents would see a "plunge" in prices once the war ends. That's likely an exaggeration, given the host of questionable economic policies he seems hell-bent on implementing. 

Still, that shouldn't discredit the president's suggestion. Ending the war would benefit farmers, ranchers, and consumers, without doling out billions in another government bailout for a favored industry.

The post Trump's $8 Billion Diesel Bailout Pays Farmers for a Problem He Created appeared first on Reason Magazine.

O ministro Adjunto e da Reforma do Estado, Gonçalo Matias, afirmou, esta terça-feira, 20 de outubro, que o Governo está interessado em alargar e melhorar a medição dos resultados das reformas legislativas e que vai discutir o uso de Inteligência Artificial com o antigo primeiro-ministro britânico Tony Blair.

Matias tem planeada uma visita na quarta-feira em Londres ao Instituto Tony Blair para a Mudança Global, que trabalha com a inteligência artificial em matérias de governação.

O ministro recordou que durante os Executivos de Blair foram criadas ‘delivery units’, estruturas de apoio ao primeiro-ministro destinadas a acompanhar a execução das prioridades governativas em áreas como a saúde, educação ou criminalidade, e medir se foram cumpridas.

“Para a reforma de estado é fundamental medir o ponto de partida e o ponto de chegada e saber exatamente o que é que uma reforma produziu”, sublinhou o ministro à Agência Lusa, explicando que o sucesso de uma reforma se avalia comparando a situação antes e depois da sua implementação.

Segundo Matias, “mais importante do que apresentar os códigos [legislativos] é garantir que são implementados, que produzem efeitos e que esses efeitos chegam realmente às pessoas”.

Gonçalo Matias referiu que já existem unidades de medição e avaliação no centro do Governo português, como é o caso da Planapp na Secretaria-Geral e do comité da OCDE que está a monitorizar a reforma do Ministério da Educação.

Também na quarta-feira, o ministro vai encontrar-se com o secretário Parlamentar do Gabinete do Governo britânico, Mark Ferguson, com o qual pretende trocar experiências sobre o desenvolvimento da inteligência artificial.

Do programa da visita de três dias à capital britânica fizeram parte contactos no serviço digital do Governo britânico e no Open Data Institute, uma organização sem fins lucrativos fundada pelo “inventor da Internet, Tim-Berners-Lee.

Sobre esta última, considerou a reunião “muito interessante” para antecipar dificuldades práticas na execução da futura Lei da Interoperabilidade, em apreciação no Parlamento português e com parecer favorável da Comissão Nacional de Proteção de Dados.

A lei visa permitir a partilha de documentos de cidadãos e empresas entre diferentes serviços do Estado, medida implicará passar de 124 entidades atualmente ligadas à plataforma de interoperabilidade para cerca de cinco mil.

«Reconheceram que o nosso projeto era ambicioso e que tínhamos os mecanismos certos, mas alertaram para dificuldades práticas, muitas vezes relacionadas com a resistência dos serviços que detêm a informação», referiu o ministro, sublinhando que a partilha de experiência permite preparar melhor a implementação.

Foram construídas de raiz 155 casas, o que, dividindo por 10 anos, não chega a 17 construções novas por ano.

Executivo acredita que manifestantes não têm apoio transversal e que portugueses não querem exageros nas ruas. Tenta lembrar medidas que já adotou e frisar culpas do PS, mas vai sendo abafado.

© OLIVIER HOSLET/EPA

A combination of maritime fuel blockades, power grid collapses, and legal indictments deepens economic hardship across the island nation.

Since the beginning of Donald Trump’s second administration, the United States’ relentless hostility toward Cuba has been on the rise. This friction has centered on unilateral sanctions, trade restrictions, and direct legal actions against former Cuban government leaders.

RELATED:
Russia Condemns U.S. Arrest Warrant for Raul Castro

2026 brought to Cuba a series of severe economic challenges, particularly regarding its energy sector. U.S. executive orders and maritime monitoring actions aimed at restricting oil shipments to state-owned Cuban entities contributed directly to fuel shortages across the island. These restrictions affected power generation, agricultural transport, municipal services, and health sector logistics.

In May, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed a federal jury indictment in Miami charging former Cuban President Raúl Castro and five co-defendants with conspiracy and murder related to a 1996 aerial shootdown.

Cuba Fuel Restrictions and the Energy Infrastructure Crisis

On January 29, Trump issued an executive order stating that the U.S. would impose tariffs on any country that sent oil to Cuba. The U.S. government authorized certain fuel shipments exclusively to private commercial entities, while blocking access to state-managed refineries and power facilities.

This policy created severe fuel deficits for public utilities responsible for national electricity generation. A deficit that led to recurring shutdowns across the National Electrical System. On March 16, 2026, the national grid suffered a complete collapse after a major boiler leak occurred at the Antonio Guiteras Thermoelectric Power Plant in Matanzas. By October 2026, another mechanical breakdown left up to 75 percent of the country without power.

The energy deficits extended beyond residential electricity. In February 2026, fuel shortages forced Cuban aviation authorities to suspend refuel operations for foreign air carriers. Consequently, airlines such as Air Canada, Rossiya, and Nordwind suspended flights to the island. International tourist arrivals dropped by approximately 58 percent by June 2026 compared to prior operational benchmarks.

Public sanitation and healthcare systems reported operational disruptions due to the fuel deficit. In Havana, local authorities reported that only 44 of 106 municipal collection trucks were operational in early 2026 due to empty fuel tanks.

In June 2026, United Nations human rights monitors showed a 60 percent decline in agricultural production caused by fuel shortages for farming equipment and transport vehicles.

🇨🇺 96,000 Cubans are waiting for surgery as a result of lack of fuel and lack of energy. Among them, 11,000 children.

The U.S. is denying oil to Cuba through a fuel blockade, despite that it’s perfectly legal for any country to export fuel to Cuba. @CarlosFdeCossio pic.twitter.com/DnHW2TONJ5

— Kawsachun News (@KawsachunNews) March 22, 2026

Hybrid Operations and International Diplomatic Positions

Throughout 2026, the U.S. diplomatic campaign was accompanied by increased military surveillance, intelligence monitoring, and diplomatic warnings. Reports documented an increase in U.S. military reconnaissance flights operating over international airspace near the Cuban coastline.

Cuban defense officials countered that the frequency of these flights constituted deliberate psychological pressure and surveillance of national infrastructure.

In parallel with maritime and aerial activities, U.S. diplomats engaged with governments in Latin America and Europe to restrict economic partnerships with Havana.

The U.S. State Department urged partner nations to terminate bilateral agreements involving Cuban medical professionals. Several governments, including Guatemala, Honduras, and several Caribbean nations, subsequently reduced or phased out participation in Cuban medical exchange programs.

In August 2026, UN human rights rapporteurs released a joint statement concluding that unilateral fuel restrictions and financial blockades exacerbated severe shortages of basic goods, medicine, and food.

The Legal Prosecution of Raul Castro and the 1996 Case

On May 20, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed a federal indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida charging former Cuban President Raúl Castro and five co-defendants with conspiracy, destruction of aircraft, and four counts of murder.

The legal push escalated further on October 19, 2026, when Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier announced that the Office of Statewide Prosecution and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement secured a state arrest warrant for Castro, charging him with conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.

Both prosecutions center on an incident that took place on February 24, 1996, when Cuban military MiG fighter jets intercepted and shot down two civilian Cessna 337 aircraft. The planes were operated by Brothers to the Rescue (Hermanos al Rescate), a Miami-based organization founded by José Basulto.

The group initially focused on search-and-rescue operations for Cuban migrants in the Florida Straits, but later expanded its activities to include dropping political leaflets directly over Havana.

The 1996 aerial interception resulted in the deaths of four crew members: Carlos Costa, Armando Alejandre Jr., Mario de la Peña, and Pablo Morales. U.S. federal and state authorities asserted that the civilian planes were destroyed over international waters without legal justification.

Florida state prosecutors cited military chain-of-command statements from the period in which Castro, then Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, authorized commanders to shoot down unauthorized aircraft over the sea without prior consultation.

In response, the Cuban government stated that the civilian aircraft had repeatedly violated Cuban sovereign airspace despite official diplomatic warnings issued to the U.S. State Department prior to the incident.

Cuban authorities and foreign affairs analysts characterized the revival of thirty-year-old charges as a coordinated exercise of extraterritorial judicial power. Officials in Havana rejected the dual legal actions as politically motivated efforts to criminalize Cuba’s historical leadership and create legal grounds for continuing trade and financial sanctions.

U.S. state of Florida's Attorney General James Uthmeier on Monday issued an arrest warrant for Cuban Revolution leader Raul Castro on charges of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder linked to the 1996 downing of two civilian aircraft. https://t.co/FyQMk8L6E6 pic.twitter.com/TDb95dNOk8

— China Xinhua News (@XHNews) October 19, 2026

Domestic Mobilization and Sovereign Defense

The Cuban government and civic organizations responded to the rising external pressures through formal diplomatic rejections, official government statements, and public mobilizations.

Following the unsealing of the May 2026 U.S. indictment against former President Raúl Castro, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla rejected the legal action in an address to international media and diplomats.

Rodríguez Parrilla characterized the indictment as a politically motivated maneuver designed to justify economic sanctions and interfere with Cuban domestic jurisdiction. President Miguel Díaz-Canel reiterated this position, stating that national sovereignty and historical decisions regarding territorial air defense remain non-negotiable under international law.

In urban centers across Cuba, including Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and Matanzas, civil organizations and neighborhood committees organized rallies opposing external interference and economic restrictions.

At the same time, state ministries implemented emergency measures to manage reduced fuel supplies and maintain essential public services. Municipal governments established scheduled electricity rotations, prioritized available diesel fuel for medical facilities and water distribution pumps, and expanded the use of draft animals and non-motorized transport in agricultural regions.

On the international stage, Havana received diplomatic backing from several multilateral organizations and regional governments. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA-TCP) issued a joint declaration condemning unilateral coercive measures against Cuba’s energy sector.

During the United Nations General Assembly in September 2026, representatives from non-aligned nations called for an immediate end to the trade embargo, citing its negative impact on civilian health, infrastructure, and human development.

🇧🇧 Prime Minister @miaamormottley of Barbados condemns the US embargo and fuel blockade of Cuba 🇨🇺 at #UNGA81 pic.twitter.com/SzIXGvGYfa

— Michael Galant (@michael_galant) September 24, 2026

Analysis of Coercive Strategies and Long-Term Impacts

The events of 2026 reflect an intensification of U.S. policy toward Cuba through a combination of trade restrictions, infrastructural pressure, and legal mechanisms targeting state leadership.

The strategic focus on restricting fuel imports significantly affected Cuba’s national power grid, agricultural logistics, and public transportation. Simultaneously, the unsealing of a thirty-year-old indictment against Raúl Castro added a significant legal dimension to bilateral relations.

Economic data, energy assessments, and reports from international monitors demonstrate that the primary burden of fuel deficits and infrastructure instability falls directly on the civilian population. The disruptions to medical supplies, food distribution, and municipal sanitation illustrate the direct impact of unilateral economic sanctions on daily life.

Despite persistent resource constraints and structural deficits, the Cuban government has maintained state operations and institutional control through domestic conservation strategies and international partnerships.

#Russia | Moscow condemned a US arrest warrant against Raul Castro over the 1996 downing of two civilian aircraft, calling the charges politically motivated.
Russia warned that escalating pressure on Cuba could destabilize Latin America and the Caribbean.#RaulCastro #Cuba… pic.twitter.com/PhmRslPWFq

— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) October 20, 2026

Sources:  Granma – Juventud Rebelde – Cuba Debate – Cubavisión – CiberCuba – EcuRed – TeleSUR – BBC – CNN – The Guardian – La Radio del Sur

Os manifestantes sublinham que a a falta de habitação ou os preços altos dos arrendamentos e de compra são transversais a toda a sociedade. Pede-se Câmara que dê especial atenção aos estudantes.

© PAULO NOVAIS/LUSA

Homem de 71 anos foi transportado ao hospital por suspeita de desidratação. Autoridades detetaram entulho, bilhas de gás e risco de incêndio no espaço da Tapada das Mercês.

© JOÃO PORFÍRIO/OBSERVADOR

Cerca de 50 polícias manifestaram-se na Praça do Município. Acordo com o Governo assinado há dois anos e meio está parcialmente por cumprir.

© INÊS LACERDA/OBSERVADOR

Manifestação contou com uma assembleia popular. Em Évora, há pessoas de 50 e 60 anos a dividir casa com estudantes. O presidente da Câmara marcou presença para mostrar compreensão.

© NUNO VEIGA/LUSA

O movimento "Algarve em Resistência" mobilizou a manifestação em solidariedade com os protestos que ocorrem noutras cidades do país.

© LUIS FORRA/LUSA

Ministro da Administração interna elogiou "calma e profissionalismo" na atuação da polícia. E avisou manifestantes para não permitirem que "extremistas" se infiltrem.

© TIAGO PETINGA/LUSA

Consulte os números e as estrelas.

O protesto em Faro reuniu cerca de seis dezenas de pessoas junto à CCDR Algarve. Manifestantes denunciaram o peso das rendas e do custo de vida.

O conteúdo Seis dezenas manifestam-se em Faro contra custo das casas aparece primeiro em Barlavento.

Na Baixa de Coimbra, promotores ou não da iniciativa empunhavam vários cartazes, onde se podiam ler frases como "Violência policial é o primeiro sinal", "Deixem o Luís especular" ou "Existo logo habito".

Várias centenas de pessoas estão concentradas tanto no Porto como em Lisboa a esta hora, depois das intervenções policiais que aconteceram esta manhã.

Os manifestantes da acampada de Lisboa, reunidos em assembleia popular na Praça do Rossio, decidiram esta terça-feira, pelas 20:38, voltar a ocupar aquele espaço com tendas a partir de quarta-feira. Os organizadores da acampada de Lisboa tinham pedido a votação em assembleia popular sobre o regresso das tendas à praça na quarta-feira, depois de um período de microfone aberto para intervenções livres.

Largas centenas de pessoas reuniram-se hoje às 19:00 na Praça do Rossio, em Lisboa, para exigir mais habitação e melhores condições de vida, tendo decidido Ao mesmo tempo, as mais de mil pessoas que se juntaram esta terça-feira ao movimento pela habitação na Praça D. João I, no Porto, deslocaram-se desse local até à frente da Câmara Municipal, ocupando a rua entre os dois espaços.

Entre as milhares de pessoas na Praça do Rossio, a Lusa constatou que estão a ex-vereadora pela Habitação na Câmara de Lisboa Helena Roseta, o ex-líder do Bloco de Esquerda (BE) Francisco Louçã, o atual coordenador do BE, José Manuel Pureza, o historiador e deputado do Livre, Rui Tavares, e o dirigente do Livre Jorge Pinto. A manifestação contou também com a presença dos artistas Vitorino e Tim, da banda Xutos e Pontapés, que fizeram um concerto improvisado.

Ao mesmo tempo, no Porto, mais de mil pessoas responderam ao apelo à concentração pelas 19:00 na Praça D. João I e mudaram-se para a frente da Câmara do Porto.

Na praça, ladeada por forte aparato policial após esta terça-feira de manhã terem ordenado a desmontagem da acampada, tinha decorrido um concerto de Clã, seguindo-se esta marcha. No topo da Avenida dos Aliados, a polícia tinha já cortado a passagem ao trânsito.

Por seu lado, em Coimbra, na Praça 8 de Maio, juntaram-se mais de 400 pessoas junto à Câmara e ao Mosteiro de Santa Cruz, para reivindicarem soluções para a crise habitacional, enquanto em Évora cerca de 100 pessoas concentraram-se em frente ao edifício da Câmara Municipal, algumas ‘munidas’ de cartazes, para exigir habitação digna para a população.

Paralelamente, cerca de seis dezenas de pessoas manifestaram-se em Faro em solidariedade com as acampadas de Lisboa e Porto e em protesto contra o preço elevado das casas, que estão cada vez mais fora do seu alcance.

Os atuais protestos pelo direito à habitação e o custo de vida em Portugal tiveram início na cidade do Porto, no dia 10 deste mês, com cerca de 1.500 manifestantes a juntarem-se na Praça D. João I e a pernoitarem no local em tendas de campismo.

Nesse dia, a plataforma cívica “Não dá mais para viver assim” promoveu protestos também em Aveiro, Braga e Lisboa reivindicando o controlo dos preços dos bens essenciais e dos combustíveis, impostos sobre os lucros extraordinários das grandes empresas do setor bancário, energético e da distribuição.

No dia 15, o movimento que protestava no Porto, já no formato de uma acampada, denunciou uma carga policial violenta durante a madrugada que causou ferimentos em 39 dos participantes, dois dos quais ficaram em estado grave, e num polícia, e à noite cerca de três mil pessoas juntaram-se aos manifestantes iniciais, mas acabaram por dispersar.

As tendas voltaram ao local no sábado e a acampada alastrou nesse dia à cidade de Lisboa. Hoje de madrugada, enquanto o protesto da cidade nortenha foi terminado perante os avisos de intervenção policial, as autoridades removeram dezenas de tendas na capital e detiveram 55 pessoas por desobediência, entretanto libertadas que serão ouvidas na quarta-feira por um juiz.

(Notícia atualizada às 21h25 com mais informação)

Organizadores propuseram a votação do regresso das tendas ao Rossio.

O Presidente da República, António José Seguro, promulgou o diploma que altera o código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares (IRS) e que reduz as taxas aplicáveis aos primeiros seis escalões de rendimento.

“O Presidente da República promulgou como Lei o Decreto da Assembleia da República n.º 113/XVII, que autoriza o Governo a alterar o Código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares, procedendo à redução das taxas gerais aplicáveis aos primeiros seis escalões de rendimento coletável”, segundo uma nota hoje publicada.

A proposta do Governo para baixar o IRS em 2026 através da redução das taxas dos primeiros seis escalões de rendimento, entre 0,3 e 0,5 pontos percentuais, foi aprovada no parlamento, no início do mês.

Com um primeiro prémio no valor de 59 milhões de euros, decorreu esta terça-feira mais um sorteio do Euromilhões. O valor do jackpot subiu depois de não ter havido vencedores do primeiro prémio no sorteio anterior.

Veja a chave vencedora do sorteio desta terça-feira, dia 20 de outubro.

Números: 9, 15, 16, 37 e 43

Estrelas: 7 e 10