For more than a year, U.S. Army forces in Europe have been experimenting with new counter-drone capabilities, as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures to go with them, under the umbrella of what is dubbed Project Flytrap. In doing so, the service has also been gaining valuable new insights into how uncrewed systems can help shape the battlefield for friendly forces. It is particularly interesting to hear how the Army envisions using uncrewed platforms to open up new avenues for deceiving opponents.
Army Col. Timothy Price, head of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, discussed the use of uncrewed platforms for deception and other operational concepts that have emerged in the course of Project Flytrap during a talk yesterday. Price’s remarks came at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention, at which TWZ is in attendance. 2nd Cavalry Regiment, based in Germany, is a brigade-sized mechanized formation equipped primarily with variants of the Stryker 8×8 light armored vehicle.
Price, by way of introduction, described modern battlefields full of uncrewed platforms in the air and on the ground as presenting new twists on long-standing problem sets. More specifically, he started by describing the typical approach to getting past a minefield or similar obstacle using an established framework called SOSRA, which stands for Suppress, Obscure, Secure, Reduce, Assault.
“If we were going to breach a mined wire obstacle, the first step of SOSRA – suppress – would be the utilization of indirect fires, to get the enemy’s head down, and direct fire systems, so they would not maneuver on you, fix them in place, and you can make a decision about how you’re going to approach the problem,” the 2nd Cavalry Regiment commander explained. “The next step would be to obscure it. In the historical sense, obscurations used is [sic] smoke, to mask your movement to the point of breach, so the enemy doesn’t know what you’re doing. And then, of course, secure would be to establish frontside security, [and] allow your engineers to come up within this local security bubble. They’ll utilize some kind of line charge to open the breach, reduce it – that’s the ‘R’ – and then bring on a follow-on force of assault through.”
“We were brought up around the old traditional mined wire obstacles that we had to physically breach. This is no different,” he added. “It’s just a multi-domain environment. So it’s built up of a combination of electronic warfare, kinetic UAS [uncrewed aerial systems] threats, and then counter-UAS threats, and then the network that holds [that all] together that forms the obstacle, which a unit has to maneuver through in order to maintain the offensive.”
Within this environment, Col. Price described the suppression step of SOSRA as having a different kind of probing dimension, particularly to feel out an enemy’s uncrewed capabilities, as well as those in the electromagnetic spectrum. He also noted that brigade-sized formations like this no longer necessarily have all the required tools organizationally to ‘service’ that aspect of the mission. This is in part because what has to be suppressed, including ground control stations for enemy drones, might now be miles behind the front line.
So, “what we have to do is allow the enemy to turn on their systems. How do I suppress them to allow division, or higher, to put an effect on them for suppression? It probably looks like flying small, attritable UAS [sic] into their security area” in the rear, he said. This, in turn, “cause[s] the enemy to do one of two things, either … go from passive to active with their EW [electronic warfare] systems, or to turn on radars to actually figure out what they’re seeing, which then forms the signature which higher headquarters can use to target.”
Though Col. Price did not describe it as such, there is already something of a deception aspect to this step in fooling enemy emitters to switch on and expose themselves. This, as a general tactic, is also hardly new. Stimulating air defenses, in particular, is a key part of operations to gather intelligence on those capabilities, as well as to suppress and destroy them. Once you have categorized and geolocated an emitter, it is a logical step to then target it. The ultimate goal, with data being passed along a more deeply networked kill chain, is for the time it takes for fires to be brought to bear to be almost instantaneous.
Regardless, deception comes far more into play in the obscure step, according to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment commander.
“Obscuration is different, as well. So instead of trying to hide behind smoke as we maneuver through it, what is the deception plan, right? How am I trying to show the enemy a signature that says I’m going to breach over here when I’m actually going to breach here, right?” he asked rhetorically. “So, that’s probably the implementation of UGVs [uncrewed ground vehicles] with some kind of decoy emitter on top of them to pull the enemy’s eyes, resources, and time to a point that allows me to focus my assets and resources on the point of breach.”
The use of uncrewed platforms as decoys is also not new, and even more complex concepts have emerged within the U.S. military in the past. Uncrewed systems have also been developed for military and other purposes over the years that are designed to mimic something else entirely, including for purposes of deception. This includes masquerading as birds and other animals.
Back in 2019, TWZ was the first to report in detail on a Navy effort to develop and field an entire networked, cooperative electronic warfare ecosystem, at that time referred to as the Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature against Integrated Sensors, or NEMESIS. This was also a drone-heavy cross-domain concept intended to make many types of sensors over vast areas believe they were ‘seeing’ the same false fleets of aircraft and/or ships, and deceive and confuse the enemy on a grand scale. This, in turn, represented a massive leap in electronic warfare capabilities.
There is also overlap here with reported sightings of what are now commonly called unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP), and that used to be called unidentified flying objects (UFO). As we have reported on repeatedly over the years, while some UAP sightings remain unexplained, many more have turned out to be drones. Adversaries have been using uncrewed capabilities for intelligence gathering and deception purposes against American interests at home and abroad, likely in part by exploiting UAP stigma for cover. We have talked in the past about how drones will be used in more and more exotic ways to confuse opponents.
I don’t know what this is, or if it’s legit BUT remember we are in a new age of misdirection, decoy and guile. Specifically using low end drone technology. There are more ways to stimulate an enemy air defense system, distract a populous, assess the flow of public info from a… https://t.co/wW7YVlbayB
— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) September 21, 2026
When it comes to UGVs, specifically, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, as well as units elsewhere across the U.S. Army, have been experimenting with various designs in recent years. The service has been trying for years to expand its operational use of UGVs, in general, but has faced repeated setbacks.
“It’s also spectral camouflage. So how are we controlling our heat and thermal signatures on our vehicles and our people?” Price continued. “It’s basic soldier discipline issues. It’s how we use our radios. It’s where we’re talking, where we’re not. But that’s what obscuration looks like.”
As a reminder, Project Flytrap’s primary focus has been on counter-drone capabilities, which come into play heavily during the secure stage.
“There’s multi-layered assets on top of that to allow that convergence for our success at the point of breach. I’m going to focus on our corner, our part of the battle, right?” he said. “So, I’m looking at active and passive electronic warfare systems – that can either, one, find [threats], let me know that I’ve got some kind of system flying or operating against me and, then, if it’s an active system, take some kind of effect to maybe cut a downlink and disrupt that system – all the way down to the individual soldier with a shotgun.”
As mentioned, the ‘obstacle’ to be ‘reduced’ at the end of this is not necessarily something as simple as a minefield surrounded by barbed wire anymore. Now it could be enemy one-way-attack drone capabilities preventing holding up an advance. Col. Price, in turn, described friendly kamikaze drones as part of the equation for breaching past those threats. Decoys and deception have a continued role to play in this phase.
“This is where, at the brigade level, we introduce one-way attack munitions to try to destroy the C2 [command and control] network that the enemy is using to operate this reconnaissance/strike complex” that is standing in the way, he explained. “There’s layers to it, right? Like they’ve got a close side to this that’s the local part of this reconnaissance/strike complex. They’ve probably got a theater level that the Corps [the U.S. Army’s command echelon above divisions] and higher is trying to target as we are forcing people to turn on systems to communicate. But at the regiment level, I’m looking at one-way attack munitions, focused on C2 nodes, headquarters, and ground control stations that [sic] I can disrupt their ability to put lethal effects on me as we begin to open the breach.”
The U.S. Army is in the process of fielding a variety of weaponized drones, including loitering munitions and designs capable of releasing grenades and other small bomblets.
During a question-and-answer session that followed his remarks, Col. Price was asked about whether lessons learned and other observations from Ukraine, and specifically that country’s recent Operation Vivaldi counteroffensive, had contributed to this evolving framework.
“In terms of Vivaldi, I’m not an expert, so I’m not going to make any kind of estimations on how that worked or why,” he said in response. “But I will say, if you look at the focus of that operation, you can probably make the assumption that there was convergence of efforts across the different headquarters to enable success. So that’s how I would relate to the two.”
“In order to be successful for a multi-domain breach, the tactical level requires my higher headquarters to be part of that solution to enable me with resources and capabilities that I don’t have in here at the brigade level,” he continued. “I would imagine it’s very similar in the other operational comparisons.”
Though certainly true, in broad strokes, this response in some ways underscores how the U.S. Army continues to lag behind global trends in the use of uncrewed systems, as now typified by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Army leaders have been open about this continued reality in the past, despite efforts to try to reverse it.
“We’re behind. I’ll just be candid. I think we know we’re behind,” Army Lt. Gen. Charles Costanza said during a panel discussion at AUSA last year, in response to a direct question at the panel from our Howard Altman. Costanza was talking about both the employment of drones and counter-drone capabilities, and highlighted work being done then under Project Flytrap, as you can read more about here.
Costanza was head of V Corps, a key component of the U.S. Army presence in Europe, at the time. He was removed from that post abruptly in August for reasons that remain unclear, but were reportedly tied to disputes between top Army leadership and Secretary Pete Hegseth. Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll resigned last month, amid reports of months of friction with Hegseth about various policies.
The Pentagon under Hegseth has launched a number of initiatives to accelerate the fielding of new uncrewed capabilities across the U.S. military, especially within smaller ground units. This now includes plans for a new Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM) unveiled last month.
For units like the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, new drone-centric concepts of operations are already taking shape. Beyond using them for surveillance and as one-way-attack munitions, there is also a clear focus emerging on employing expanding uncrewed capabilities to deceive opponents and prevent them from making the best use of their own resources.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post Drones Are Creating New Opportunities For The U.S. Army To Deceive Its Enemies appeared first on TWZ.
Airbus and Kratos Defense & Security Solutions have completed the first flight of the U740 Valkyrie uncrewed combat aircraft, a Europeanized version of the XQ-58A Valkyrie, advancing their bid to deliver a combat-ready system to Germany by 2029. The flight comes as the German Air Force, or Luftwaffe, moves toward acquiring a new class of jet-powered combat drones, in what could become a major shift in the country’s traditionally limited armed-uncrewed-aircraft capabilities.
The ride of the Valkyrie
— Airbus Defence (@AirbusDefence) October 12, 2026
With the successful first flight of the Airbus U740 Valkyrie in Europe, we are one step closer to introducing an operational uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) to the German and other European Armed Forces.
The flight achieved all… pic.twitter.com/S2sFrtdmGA
The flight took place at an unnamed test facility in northern Europe, Airbus announced on October 12. The aircraft conducted a rocket-assisted takeoff, maneuvers at different altitudes, and flight at speeds of up to Mach 0.8. The test also included in-flight mission adjustments, with Airbus reporting that all objectives were met.
The next phase will introduce Airbus’ Multi-platform Autonomous Reconfigurable and Secure (MARS) mission system, which is intended to provide the aircraft’s European-controlled software and mission-management architecture. Airbus says MARS will support autonomous operations and coordination between multiple uncrewed aircraft while retaining human oversight of critical decisions.
The U740 is based on Kratos’ American-developed XQ-58A, an uncrewed aircraft designed as a relatively affordable combat platform. Airbus is adapting the aircraft with its MARS mission system and presenting the combination as a way to provide Germany with a sovereign European capability without waiting for an entirely new airframe to mature.
Published performance figures for the U740 include a maximum takeoff weight of around 3,000 kilograms (6,600 pounds). Airbus lists a range exceeding 5,000 kilometers (3,100 miles) and a service ceiling of 45,000 feet. It has an internal weapons bay and external payload stations beneath its wings.
One distinctive feature is the U740’s rocket-assisted launch capability, which reduces its dependence on conventional runways. The original Valkyrie design is primarily recovered by parachute, but newer versions can take off with rocket assistance and land on a runway, offering greater flexibility in how and where they operate. That could help the Luftwaffe disperse operations or launch aircraft from locations where established airfields are unavailable or under threat. The XQ-58 family has also shown some potential for scaling to different requirements, as detailed in these earlier reports on runway launch and recovery and further platform development. In particular, the U.S. Marine Corps has been exploring ways to expand the XQ-58’s flexibility, including further development of the Valkyrie to meet its own mission requirements.
If adopted, the rocket-assisted launch capability would provide an intriguing throwback to practical German studies during the Cold War, in which F-104G Starfighter fighter-bombers used the Zero-Length Launch (ZELL) system to take off from dispersed locations.
Airbus says the U740 will be able to operate autonomously or under the direction of crewed fighters such as the Eurofighter. The company sees it as a means of increasing the reach, firepower, and survivability of existing combat aircraft, with uncrewed platforms undertaking higher-risk missions.
With the MARS system, Airbus intends to give European customers control over mission applications, data, and key software functions, while enabling autonomous mission execution and coordination between aircraft. This is particularly relevant for Germany, which will likely want to integrate national weapons, sensors, and operational requirements without becoming dependent on a foreign-controlled mission architecture.
Since the underlying airframe is American, the degree of sovereignty Germany ultimately obtains will depend on the practical ability to control and modify software, integrate national systems, and support the aircraft throughout its service life.
The European flight is an important step for the Valkyrie program, but substantial work remains before it can be considered combat-ready. Mission-system integration, further testing, and the demonstration of effective cooperation with crewed aircraft will be central to meeting the companies’ 2029 target.
The effort is also unfolding as Germany develops its requirements for what has been described in press reports as a Jagdbomberdrohne, or fighter-bomber drone. The precise operational concept has yet to emerge publicly, including whether the Luftwaffe primarily wants an uncrewed aircraft to accompany crewed fighters or a platform capable of conducting independent long-range strike missions.
Germany has historically lagged behind several other major military powers in fielding armed uncrewed aircraft. Previous attempts to acquire larger reconnaissance drones encountered major technical and procurement difficulties, while political resistance to armed drones delayed the development of a strike capability for years.
The Luftwaffe’s current larger uncrewed aircraft fleet remains limited to five leased Israeli-made Heron TP medium-altitude, long-endurance drones. Germany is also participating in the Eurodrone program, while uncrewed systems were expected to form part of the wider Future Combat Air System (FCAS), before that Franco-German-led effort hit the buffers earlier this year.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and Germany’s subsequent military buildup have intensified pressure to address these gaps. Berlin has set a goal of being ready for war by 2029, and reports indicate that the Luftwaffe wants a new combat-drone capability on a similarly ambitious timeline.
As well as Airbus and Kratos, the emerging competition reportedly includes Anduril, General Atomics partnered with Germany’s INTEC, as well as Lockheed Martin. Boeing and Rheinmetall are meanwhile pitching the larger, Block 3 version of the Australian-developed MQ-28 Ghost Bat, while Helsing and Hensoldt are pursuing the homegrown CA-1 Europa.
The various proposals reflect a broader shift toward uncrewed aircraft that can deliver additional weapons, sensors, and electronic warfare capabilities without putting a pilot at risk. But Germany’s terminology raises an important question about the intended role.
A conventional collaborative combat aircraft, or CCA, would be designed to work alongside crewed fighters, extending their reach and providing additional combat mass. A platform intended to operate independently against targets deep inside enemy territory would place greater emphasis on range and survivability. These roles are not mutually exclusive, but the Luftwaffe’s final requirements will shape the aircraft it chooses.
Germany may not be looking for a single drone to do everything. One option might be a split high-low approach that could pair more capable, longer-range systems for deep-strike missions with cheaper, attritable collaborative combat aircraft that can fly alongside crewed fighters. At this point, it should also be noted that CCAs could also give older fourth-generation fighters a new lease on life, boosting their lethality and survivability by extending their sensor reach, adding weapons capacity, and allowing uncrewed aircraft to take on more dangerous tasks.
Meanwhile, Airbus is also working on its larger U760 Ravenstorm, intended for service in the early 2030s. The Ravenstorm gives Airbus a longer-term path toward a more advanced European-designed uncrewed combat aircraft as it pursues the nearer-term Valkyrie effort.
In the short term, the Luftwaffe will need to determine which capabilities must be available in an initial operational fleet and which can be introduced later. Even an aircraft based on an established design requires substantial integration, testing, training, and infrastructure before it can be employed effectively in combat.
Germany’s 2029 target leaves little time for a program that still has to integrate its mission system and demonstrate how the aircraft will be used operationally. That is a particular challenge for the Luftwaffe, which has little experience operating large uncrewed aircraft, let alone jet-powered systems intended for combat.
The European flight gives Airbus and Kratos a head start in testing the U740 for German requirements, but the next major milestone will be flying it with the MARS mission system. How quickly that work progresses will help determine whether the Valkyrie can meet the Luftwaffe’s timetable.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post European U740 Variant Of The XQ-58A Valkyrie Has Flown appeared first on TWZ.
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