El Niño, a naturally occurring climate pattern that involves unusually warm surface waters in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean can alter atmospheric circulation and significantly influence rainfall and temperatures patterns far beyond the ocean, according to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). The WMO, the United Nations’ weather agency, says this warming is already underway and getting stronger. In an Oct. 8 update, it put the chance of an El Niño continuing through February 2027 at nearly 100%. It expects the event to be strongest in December. Regional forecasters predict a 90% chance of heavier-than-usual rain in southern Ethiopia, central to southern Somalia and northeastern Kenya between October and December 2026. Excessive rainfall could cause flooding, destroy crops, spread disease and make health services inaccessible in some areas, depending on local conditions and the season. A National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) map illustrates typical seasonal rainfall shifts associated with El Niño, rather than a specific forecast for 2026. Graphic courtesy of NOAA. Action Against Hunger, an international aid organization, says families in southern Madagascar are enduring food shortages earlier than usual following a season of poor harvests. Its teams are treating children for malnourishment, as households continue to endure worsening food insecurity. Cuts in aid are also making help to tackle malnourishment harder to obtain. The United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported on Aug. 21 that 205 health and nutrition facilities in Somalia had closed because of funding cuts, forcing families to travel farther to find care.…This article was originally published on Mongabay
As the US turned 251, a familiar ritual repeated this year as American politicians lined up to toast the Navy with patriotic messages and, interestingly, images of Indian and Russian warships.
The US Navy celebrates its birthday every year on October 13, marking the day the Second Continental Congress authorized the outfitting of two armed vessels to intercept British supply ships during the American Revolution—the decision that created the Continental Navy, a force that eventually grew into the United States Navy.
As US Navy birthday wishes poured in on October 13, several US lawmakers joined the rush to pay their homage, resulting in a series of social media misfires.
For instance, Georgia Governor Brian P. Kemp posted a message with an image of three sleek gray warships steaming in formation.
At first glance, the post seems routine, but a closer look reveals the warships are Indian Navy vessels, as Dave Brown, the Deputy Washington Bureau Chief at The Wall Street Journal, and military observers pointed out.
The ships have since been identified as INS Godavari, INS Brahmaputra, and INS Beas, although a community note on Kemp’s post flags them as Kolkata-class guided-missile destroyers.
From the early days of our nation’s founding, the Navy has stood watch over our country and defended freedom across the seas. On its birthday, we salute the sailors whose service, sacrifice, and courage carry that legacy forward. Image by: Gov Kemp on X
Despite criticism, Kemp has not taken down the post.
Another lawmaker, Ohio State Representative Mike Dovilla, paid his respects on X, saying: “Happy Birthday, U.S. Navy. I am proud of my service in naval intelligence and grateful to all who serve our nation with honor, courage, and commitment. To our sailors, veterans, and their families, thank you.”
Interestingly, though, Dovilla used an image of a Russian warship instead of a US one, a move that drew scrutiny, given that the lawmaker is a Navy Reserve commander and has previously served as a lieutenant commander in the Navy.
Dovilla deleted the post after observers pointed out the error.
Meanwhile, San Diego Mayor Todd Gloria posted images of what has been identified as the Soviet-era cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov, now a museum ship based in Novorossiysk, Russia.
To make matters worse, Gloria wrote: “San Diego is a proud military town. Sailors and their families are a part of the fabric of our community. For 251 years, sailors have answered our nation’s call with courage,” further emphasizing his ignorance.
In another goof-up, the Republican-aligned think tank Freedom Caucus Foundation jumped on the bandwagon of errors by using a picture of the Indian Navy ship INS Trikand.
A Mistake That Keeps Repeating
In 2025, the US Navy’s SEAL Museum posted an image of a Russian missile cruiser to mark the US Navy’s 250th birthday. Meanwhile, several elected representatives and public accounts used images of Indian and Russian Navy warships to mark the service’s birthday.
Representative Kyle Donahue, Representative Arvind Venkat, and Representative Andy Harris used images of Indian warships in their posts, while Senator Jim Boyd used an image of a Russian battleship cruiser to pay tribute to the US Navy for its birthday.
These are just a few of the many social media faux pas that were flagged last year.
Similarly, in 2023, Representative Cory Mills and Representative David Trone’s birthday greetings featured images of a Russian warship. On the other hand, the SEAL Legacy Foundation, which supports families of wounded and fallen United States Navy SEALs, used a Russian ship to mark the occasion, whereas the official X page of Homeland Security used the image depicting a Canadian frigate.
Things weren’t much different in 2021, when Senator Jim Risch published a heartfelt wish for the USN’s birthday, but used a photo of what was later identified as a Pattani-class offshore patrol vessel belonging to the Royal Thai Navy, potentially built by China.
While ship identification may not be a strong suit for many in the United States, it is not much different for combat aircraft.
In a major embarrassment last year, the Pentagon’s Joint Program Office(JPO) posted an image of the Chinese J-35A stealth fighter instead of the US F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in a Veterans Day homage post. “Today, and every day, we thank all Veterans and those currently serving for their service and sacrifice,” the Pentagon official’s post stated. However, the office took the post down as criticism mounted over the bizarre mistake.
The Pentagon’s F-35 Joint Program Office published China’s J-35 fighter on its poster for Veterans Day 2025 (Via X)
In 2023, Rep. Anna Paulina Luna—an Air Force (USAF) veteran herself—posted birthday graphics for the US Air Force (USAF) on X and Instagram that used silhouettes of Russian MiG-29 fighters. Air Force historians and defense analysts immediately flagged the image, after which the politician took it down and blamed a junior staffer for the error.
In 2021, Sen. Cindy Hyde-Smith of Mississippi made a similar error when she congratulated the US Air Force Reserve Command on its birthday with a graphic showing Russian Su-34 Fullback strike aircraft. “Happy 73rd Birthday to the @USAFReserve! Thankful for all the reservists who are constantly on the ready to serve our nation,” Hyde-Smith said on X, along with a graphic showing four Su-34 jets in flight.
Needless to say, she deleted the post after netizens mocked her for the error.
However, Dr. Rob Lee of King’s College in London, who specializes in war studies, joked at the time that Hyde-Smith’s post was part of the “national pastime of mistaking Russian weapons for our own” among Americans.
In an even more ridiculous mistake in 2021, the official Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) account posted a birthday graphic for the US Air Force that featured silhouettes of Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighter jets.
Meanwhile, one of the accounts connected to “Operation Inherent Resolve” posted a picture of two US Navy Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets with best wishes to the air force, creating another embarrassing situation.
Similarly, Donald Trump’s 2020 reelection campaign released a “Support Our Troops” advertisement accompanied by a photo of Russian MiG-29 fighter jets flying over troops with Kalashnikov-pattern rifles. Unsurprisingly, aviation experts widely mocked it, saying it clearly wasn’t American.
Defense analysts have long noted the mechanics behind these recurring errors. For example, modern warships and fighters share enough visual DNA- gray paint, angular superstructures, and similar radar masts- that non-specialists struggle to tell them apart at a glance.
Staffers working under deadline pressure rarely pause to verify hull numbers or distinctive features, making it a low-stakes but revealing ritual.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
Amid growing anxieties in Europe over “the Russian threat”, the US Air Force General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), has unveiled what he called the alliance’s “Theory of Victory”.
Though his Polish hosts did not seem fully satisfied, General Grynkewich assured, on October 12, at the “Warsaw Security Forum,” an annual international conference in the Polish capital, that the alliance is ready to defend itself.
Reassuring America’s reliability as an ally and Washington’s firm commitment to NATO’s Article 5, which envisages collective defense, he said that if an adversary is “foolish enough” to strike, the alliance is fully prepared to “fight tonight”.
During a panel discussion titled “Theory of Victory: How Do We Achieve Military Success Against Russia in Deterrence and Defense?” Grynkewich stated that NATO would destroy “anything and everything” that supports an attack on allied territory.
He asserted, “Should the adversary choose to press the attack or commit his reserves, we will break the warfighting system engaged against us.”
In what the experts describe as an unprecedented move to project an absolute ironclad assurance of security to the one billion citizens living under the NATO umbrella, and to send an unmistakable warning of devastating consequences to adversaries, particularly Moscow ( though he did not mention it explicitly), General Grynkewich then went on to clearly articulate key elements of what was hitherto classified as NATO’s “Theory of Victory”.
NATO had developed a well-known “Theory of Victory,” but its elements were not well understood. General Grynkewich revealed them as part of a rigorous three-phase strategic framework: “Block, Blunt, and Break”.
This triad dictates the sequential escalation and synchronization of Allied multi-domain power from the very first moments of aggression.
While Grynkewich did not explicitly mention Russia during his address, his comments clearly targeted Moscow, especially in light of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, which identifies Russia as the most significant and direct threat to allied security.
“My theory of victory is simple: we will block the initial attack. If the attack persists, we will blunt it and prevent enemy advance,” he expla ned. “And if required, we will break the enemy’s forces and the operational warfighting system that is arrayed against us.”
Based on his elaboration, Phase One of Block is the first line of defense. It focuses on an immediate, unyielding denial of territory. If an adversary breaches an allied border, NATO’s forward land forces are trained to deploy instantaneously to halt the invading army directly at the point of contact.
Rather than letting an adversary establish a foothold or capture territory for political leverage, the “Block” phase aims to isolate the initial push. This relies on integrated multi-domain operations, using localized ground units heavily supported by air superiority, naval assets, space surveillance, and active cyber capabilities to immediately close the operational window on the attacker.
If an offensive survives the initial blocking force and persists, NATO transitions to the “Blunt” phase.
The goal shifts from containment to actively stripping the enemy of operational momentum and initiative. To achieve this, the alliance leverages highly advanced technological systems. Grynkewich highlighted the deployment of massive sensor networks, autonomous combat systems, and AI-driven multi-domain targeting to completely suppress the enemy’s ability to coordinate large-scale maneuvers or advance deeper into allied territory.
The final, most severe component of the strategy is the mandate to “Break” the adversary. If an aggressor refuses to cease hostilities or attempts to mobilize its strategic reserves, NATO will launch massive, far-reaching retaliatory actions. Grynkewich explicitly stated that this phase extends far beyond the physical front lines of the immediate conflict. NATO will target and destroy the entire overarching warfighting framework arrayed against it.
This means systematically dismantling command-and-control centers; physical supply and logistics networks; replenishment warehouses; communications arrays; and anything else sustaining the offensive force.
However, Grynkewich carefully balanced aggressive deterrence with diplomatic clarity, noting that NATO did not view a direct military conflict with Russia as imminent or inevitable. Instead, he stressed that the most effective tool for preserving peace is maintaining absolute readiness for war while keeping communication channels open to prevent miscalculations.
This updated strategy appears to draw directly on critical lessons from contemporary battlefields in Ukraine and the Middle East. It explicitly moves away from relying solely on hyper-expensive, exquisite military hardware. Instead, NATO is prioritizing a hybrid mix of technological enablers that pairs high-end precision weapons with large numbers of cheaper, scalable systems like attritable drones and counter-UAS platforms to overwhelm an adversary’s defenses effectively.
General Grynkewich reportedly emphasized three things in this regard:
First is the “Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative (EFD),” which serves as the deployment vehicle for a vast network of low-cost, expendable drones and minimally crewed or fully autonomous reconnaissance and strike systems.
Second is “AI-Powered Targeting,” which uses artificial intelligence to sift through vast data streams generated by advanced sensors, satellite arrays, and cyber intelligence. By shortening the sensor-to-shooter loop, AI-enabled networks identify, categorize, and assign targets to artillery, missile systems, or loitering munitions in real time, long before human staff could process the raw coordinates.
Third is the “System Layering” strategy, which does not replace heavy conventional hardware such as main battle tanks or fifth-generation fighter jets but rather insulates them. Cheap, modular drone walls absorb the weight of initial saturation attacks, counter enemy mass, and clear pathways, preserving high-end kinetic platforms for decisive operations against hardened infrastructure.
Overall, the emphasis on sensors, autonomous systems, precision weapons, and integrated land, air, sea, space, and cyber capabilities recognizes that contemporary combat depends as much on information, networks, and logistics as on troop numbers.
The idea is that NATO must exploit technological advantages while producing affordable systems in sufficient quantities.
NATO has periodically revised its strategies, keeping technological developments and threat environments in mind.
US President Donald Trump meets Ukraine’s President (not pictured) on the sidelines of the NATO Summit at the Beshtepe Presidential Compound in Ankara on July 8, 2026. The summit comes at a fraught time for the 77-year-old transatlantic alliance, as the US President demands members honor a pledge to ramp up defense spending while Washington steps back from Europe. (Photo by SAUL LOEB / AFP)
During the Cold War, the alliance relied primarily on what it called “forward defense” and “flexible response.” The forward defense strategy supposedly committed NATO to hold the inner-German border and assumed a possible retreat across deep defensive lines before counter-attacking.
The Flexible Response strategy relied heavily on the explicit threat of nuclear escalation in the theater to offset Warsaw Pact forces’ conventional numerical superiority.
After the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO was said to have adopted an expeditionary, crisis-management model. In this model, deterrence was linked to political goodwill, and force structures were optimized for out-of-area counter-insurgency campaigns.
This resulted in a lean force model with thin ammunition reserves and a lack of the rapid forward mobilization needed for high-intensity, continent-scale conventional combat.
Against this background, the “Theory of Victory” is said to address post-Cold War vulnerabilities by institutionalizing a modern denial posture. It replaces reliance on early tactical nuclear escalation with conventional, technology-driven mass.
Apparently, it abandons the concept of “liberation after occupation,” acknowledging that the civilian cost and physical destruction associated with liberating occupied territory are strategically unacceptable in the modern geopolitical environment.
Instead, it shows the capacity to neutralize an incursion early and convince potential adversaries that the cost of an attack will always outweigh any conceivable strategic gain.
Finally, by linking it to Article 5, NATO’s latest concept displays elements of calculated “strategic ambiguity”; it is id. NATO will not publicly define the exact point at which an attack would trigger its collective-defense clause, as doing so would help adversaries calculate how far they can escalate without provoking an allied response.
The ambiguity is designed to complicate enemy calculations, ensuring that hybrid operations, gray-zone provocations, or minor border incursions carry the unpredictable risk of drawing a full, multi-domain response from the alliance.
While the reactions of America’s major European NATO allies to General Grynkewich were not available at the time of writing, it is fair to guess they were reassured that Washington is prepared to fight if attacked.
However, erstwhile Warsaw Pact member and now Russia’s biggest critic, Poland, which has joined NATO, does not seem fully satisfied. Reports quoting the Polish weekly “Polityka” question the fundamental premise of NATO’s military strategy: preventing an adversary from achieving its goals, rather than launching an offensive campaign to destroy a foreign military power fully.
This perspective, detailed by defense analyst Marek Świerczyński, unpacks the structural reality behind General Alexus Grynkewich’s “Theory of Victory” speech.
He argues that beyond NATO’s institutional focus on calculated deterrence, escalation control, and defending its current borders, the alliance should fight deep inside Russia, without crossing the border, to crush the Russian military as a whole (through missile and drone firepower).
But then, this is a limited view. Overall, General Grynkewich seems to reflect that current NATO thinking is to de-escalate with Russia, not to defeat it strategically or to change its regime. The core objective of the Theory of Victory strategy is strictly containment, deterrence, and risk management.
In that sense, the name of the theory may be a little misleading.
Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
Rutte gets asked “is Russia foolish enough to consider attacking any of Nato countries?”
He says “we don’t think so” and that there is “no imminent threat against Nato territory,” but stresses that “if we see a build up, we will react to it.”
“We will never, ever mount a attack towards anyone else because that is not in our interest. We are a defensive alliance.”
“But here’s the main thing: we are stronger. Russia is not in a good place. These hybrid attacks, whatever it is, are a sign of weakness. What they allow us to do is to talk about it the whole day and to be rattled and to have press conferences on it. We’re not going to do that. We will react where we need to react.”
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