The US Air Force’s next strategic bomber, the B-21 Raider, is moving from flight test to the flight line, and the industrial base is expanding to match that pace. As part of this effort, the Department of the Air Force and the manufacturer broke ground on a new bomber final assembly line at Plant 42 in Palmdale, California.

“It’s more than construction… we’re moving fast to build B-21s! The Department of the Air Force & @northropgrumman have broken ground in Palmdale, CA, on over 1M sq ft of new facilities that will be the final assembly line at Air Force Plant 42,” Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Troy E. Meink recently wrote in a post on  X.

The B-21 Raider is the USAF’s next-generation nuclear- and conventional-capable, long-range penetrating bomber optimized for highly contested environments.

The new assembly line likely supports an agreement signed in February 2026 to increase annual B-21 production capacity by 25% using $4.5 billion in funding from the fiscal year 2025 reconciliation legislation.

Separately, Northrop Grumman is investing approximately $2.5 billion of its own capital over several years in related facilities and capacity. In September 2026, the company also opened the East Gate 3 manufacturing campus in Layton, Utah, to produce key B-21 components.

The construction of an all-new assembly line shows that expansion at the B-21’s production facility has moved from planning and funding to active construction.

This expansion is meant to give the service extra manufacturing capacity as the B-21 advances through flight testing and into initial operational deliveries. 

The USAF plans to buy at least 100 B-21 bombers to replace the B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit and eventually complement the B-52 Stratofortress.

The B-21 Raider program remains in low-rate initial production, meaning Northrop Grumman is building a small number of aircraft to test and refine the production process before full-rate production begins.

At the same time, senior officials have said the Air Force may need more than the current minimum of 100.

In April, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believed “a lot more” B-21s were needed. Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo had earlier said he would favor a fleet of 200 for nuclear deterrence and penetrating strike.

A Mitchell Institute report has likewise argued that 100 is a raid force, not a campaign force. None of those comments changes the program of record, and the Palmdale construction is tied to the February capacity agreement, not to an approved increase in the buy.

Furthermore, a report by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies said the USAF’s current plans to purchase “at least” 100 B-21s match one-time operations into hostile airspace but are insufficient to maintain pressure in a larger conflict because they are “a raid force, not a campaign force.”

Meanwhile, the USAF has said the sixth-generation bomber—which currently has no analogs in the world—is “close” to entering service. In fact, it is expected to reach Ellsworth AFB in South Dakota, one of the three bases selected to host the Raider, in 2027.  

This bomber project has moved at a breakneck pace, going from the official public unveiling in December 2022 to the maiden flight in November 2023. In fact, an operational test pilot flew alongside a developmental test pilot, sharing the B-21 cockpit for the first time in June this year, underscoring the urgency of fielding the bomber.

The B-21 Raider’s rapid path from first flight to operational ramp at Ellsworth AFB in 2027 marks a striking acceleration in how the US fields a complex new strategic bomber.

Observers have lauded the speed, remarking that it has been unusually compressed for a program of this scale and sensitivity. This speed, however, was made possible because of a more fundamental shift: the B-21 was built virtually before it was ever built in metal.

B-21 Raider Rewrote Pentagon Acquisition Rules

For decades, major US defense programs followed the process, but aspirational designs fell behind schedule and prototypes revealed problems missed earlier, delaying programs and driving up costs. Northrop claims to be breaking away from this pattern.

Northrop states that it built the B-21 virtually first, using an extensive digital ecosystem and high-fidelity digital twins long before cutting metal. Succinctly put, unlike previous bombers that were primarily analog and later adapted for the digital era, the B-21 was built to function, endure, and evolve in the contemporary environment.

Developing and producing combat aircraft previously involved designing, building a prototype, testing it, discovering problems, and redesigning. However, Northrop essentially inverted this sequence, using a constantly changing digital model for the Raider.

This gave engineers, manufacturers, and operators a common reference point, enabling them to evaluate and implement design changes almost instantly.

This method enabled engineers to model aerodynamic performance, stealth features, structural loads, and systems integration long before components entered production.

This meant that design modifications that once required expensive rework could be assessed and verified virtually, often in a few hours rather than months. 

The team simulated and refined structural loads, stealth characteristics, flight dynamics, and systems integration in the virtual environment before committing to physical hardware.

As a result, the physical aircraft that emerged from this approach matched or even outperformed the models’ predictions, according to the manufacturer.

This, in turn, has allowed the program to compress testing timelines, accelerate production, and keep costs under tighter control.

Unsurprisingly, the result was an unusually mature aircraft when the first Raider took flight. Northrop earlier said, “Before the B-21 ever took to the sky, the flying test bed completed more than 200 test sorties totaling more than 1,000 flight hours, testing production hardware, software, and sensors in a dynamic environment and enabling teams to tackle discovery well in advance.”

The speed with which B-21 moved from production to testing and into an operational setting at a USAF airbase was best demonstrated by the approach the manufacturer and the Air Force took during flight testing. A major 180-day test cycle was reportedly completed in just 73 days, as revealed in May 2026.

Officials have even stated that the program is exceeding expectations, as test aircraft are achieving high “code one” rates, which is the rate at which the aircraft is ready to fly again with minimal issues

The Combined Test Force achieved half the originally planned missions in less than half the planned time, while supporting significant contract value.

This compression was not the product of rushed flying, and reflected fewer surprises, higher aircraft availability, real-time data analysis, and the ability to clear multiple test points on single sorties.

The advantage of building the aircraft digitally has reportedly extended to the production lines. “Where the digital environment meets the production floor, this digital technology expedites configuration management, facilitating communication between technicians and engineers during the build, in some areas already reducing manufacturing hours by roughly a third,” according to the Northrop Grumman newsroom.

Nonetheless, the B-21 is not without risk, though experts think careful digital engineering, precise digital twins, and a conscious move away from sequential physical prototypes can break the long-standing pattern of delays.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

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After hesitating for weeks amid a deteriorating security situation in the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Türkiye (Turkey) have finally agreed to activate “deterrence measures” under the mutual security agreement, the Makkah (Mecca) Pact.’

Under the agreement, Pakistan and Türkiye have agreed to “rapidly deploy forces” in Saudi Arabia to counter the attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

This is the first time that the ‘Mecca Pact,’ signed in August, has been invoked.

“The committee agreed to activate collective deterrence measures, within the framework of the Alliance, in response to the attacks and all those responsible for them,” Khalid bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, said.

The ‘Mecca Pact’ has a mutual defense clause, similar to NATO’s Article 5, that an armed attack against one country would be considered an attack on all three.

Under the agreement, Ankara could deploy its soldiers in the southern Arabian peninsula for the first time in over a century.

The last time Turkish soldiers served in Yemen was in 1919 under Ottoman rule. After the Ottomans’ defeat in the First World War, Ankara agreed to surrender garrisons outside Anatolia under the Armistice of Mudros.

After the Armistice, signed between the Ottomans and Allied nations in 1918, Ottoman garrisons in Yemen surrendered to the British forces one by one.

Therefore, activating the Mecca Pact could see Turkish forces return to the southern Arabian Peninsula after more than a century.

In fact, while the Mecca Pact was signed only in 2026, Turkey has been waiting for an opportunity to return to Yemen for over a decade.

In 2015, when Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Yemen against the Houthi rebels for the first time, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that “Depending on the course of events, we may consider providing logistical support.”

However, Ankara should not celebrate too soon, as history holds a sobering lesson for the Turks.

The mighty Ottoman Empire once ruled across the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe; controlled three of Islam’s holiest sites, including Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem; and controlled a huge territory in the European lands of the Balkans and southern Europe.

Ottomans, however, could never fully subjugate the Zaidi tribesmen of Yemen, the historical ancestors of today’s Houthi rebels.

Yemen, in fact, was frequently called the “graveyard of Anatolia” or the “graveyard of Ottoman soldiers”.

Yemen – The Graveyard of Turks (Ottomans)

Victoria Clark, in Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes (2010), writes that by the 1890s Yemen was already “renowned as the ‘graveyard of the Turks'” during Ahmed Feyzi Pasha’s campaigns.

She also quoted an Ottoman official: “Yemen has become now the graveyard of Muslims and money.”

Turkish journalist and author Mustafa Balbay titled his book ‘Türkler Mezarlığı Yemen,’ which means “Cemetery of the Turks”.

In fact, describing Yemen as a “graveyard of Turkish soldiers” is a recurring theme in Ottoman (Turkish) historical memory.

Yemen Türküsü is a famous Turkish folk song that serves as a tragic lament for Ottoman soldiers who marched off to fight in Yemen during World War I and never returned.

Another Turkish folk song remembers the difficulties faced by Ottoman soldiers in Yemen and pays homage to Turks who went to Yemen but never returned.

“There are no clouds in the sky, what is this smoke?
There is no death in the neighborhood, what is this commotion?
These lands of Yemen are so treacherous
Oh, Yemen, its rose is a meadow
Why do those who leave not return?”

Ayşe Hür, in her article “The largest Ottoman cemetery: Yemen,” recounts that the Ottoman rule in Yemen was fiercely opposed by Zaydis, the ancestors of Houthi rebels.

According to the Zaydis, the Ottomans were ‘turbaned infidels’.

In his work titled “My Lament,” Ahmet İzzet (Furgaç) Pasha, who was sent to Yemen in early 20th century to supress a Zaydi revolt against the Ottomans described the period of Ottoman struggle in Yemen (1635-1840) in following words: “After a century of conflict in Jabal, with internal revolts and constant wars against the Zaydi imams, which continued until the year 1045 AH (1635), the entire Yemen region fell under the rule of the Zaydi imams due to the siege and pressure exerted on Haydar Pasha, who was forgotten and left in Jabal by the central government.”

Ottoman sources do not specify how many people died in the wars with the Zaydis during these 100 years, merely stating that “thousands of people died.”

“Going to Yemen and not returning” has been the fate of Ottoman soldiers since the 16th century, Ayşe Hür wrote in her article.

In the article titled “The Situation in Yemen” in the 15th issue of the Ottoman Newspaper dated 1316 (1900), it was stated: “As a result of Ahmet Fevzi Pasha’s wrong policies, approximately 4,000 soldiers died every year.”

Ayşe Hür also quoted an Ottoman official in her article who said that 1,30,000 Ottoman soldiers were buried in the Hijaz and Yemen between 1871 and 1894.

Marshal Galip, who served as a captain in Yemen in the 19th century, wrote: “Since I worked under the General Staff, all the general staff records passed through my hands. In these records, I noticed a wide and terrible gap between the new soldiers joining the army and those who were replaced or disabled… Yemen was a permanent war zone at that time.

“I compared the number of those who joined their factions or were mobilized en masse and sent away due to rebellions with the number of those who survived and returned to their homeland. The conclusion I reached was this: In the 22 years that had passed, a total of 130,000 Anatolian youths had been buried in the deserts of Hejaz and Yemen.”

In 2011, then-Turkish President Abdullah Gül renovated and inaugurated a Turkish Memorial Cemetery (Yemen-Türk Şehitliği) in Sanaa to commemorate the Ottoman soldiers who died in Yemeni campaigns.

Just one year later, in 2012, Houthi rebels demolished part of the memorial.

For centuries, the memorial has symbolized the Ottoman presence in Yemen. The deliberate attack on this memorial serves as a reminder of how the Houthis recall Ottoman campaigns in Yemen.

It was also a clear message to Ankara that they would not accept any Turkish involvement in Yemen.

Writing in Politics Today, Ahd Yaseen Al-Tamimi said: “History textbooks, which were adopted after 1962, presented a positive view of the Ottoman Empire and its rule over Yemen. Nevertheless, this did not prevent Zaydi supporters from maintaining their strict and extremist position on the Ottoman Empire.”

Of course, Turkey is a strong military power, and its influence extends in Yemen as well.

It has achieved remarkable military success in Syria, Libya, and in combating Kurdish insurgents in Iraq. Its military support to Azerbaijan was perhaps the deciding factor in its war against Armenia.

However, Yemen is a different ballgame altogether.

And if history is anything to go by, then Yemen, often described as a “graveyard of the Ottomans,” could once again become a quagmire for Turkey.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Why Yemen Could be a Graveyard for Turkish & Mecca Pact Soldiers: History Has The Answers: OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Washington has sent two contradictory signals on Taiwan in the last few days. Whether these signals reflect strategic ambiguity or strategic confusion in the coming days has become a matter of debate among the strategic experts.

On the one hand, Trump is holding back a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan, pre-approved by the U.S. Congress, despite a bipartisan group of senators explicitly urging him to “formally notify . But the U.S. President has described his decision to pause as a “very good negotiating chip” for his talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Whether that worked in his summit meeting with Xi last week in Washington is not known. But Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo confirmed yesterday (October 6) that he has “not heard” of any new sale being cleared, even in smaller chunks.

On the other hand,  the Pentagon is seemingly doing the opposite of this pause.

According to reports, the U.S. Department of Defense will station two representatives on a long-term basis inside Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense headquarters in Taipei from 2026 to 2028.

One official will come from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD-Policy] — the office that writes U.S. national security and defense strategy. The second will come from the Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA] — a federally funded think tank that does mathematical modeling for war games and combat capability assessment.

The program is called the “Taiwan-US Defense Ministry Joint Cooperation Assessment,” with a total budget of NT$471 million [$14.8 million], including NT$152.5 million this year for personnel, consultancy, travel, data collection, and even interpretation for classified-level meetings.

If confirmed, this will be unprecedented.

This would mark the first time U.S. defense officials are permanently embedded inside Taiwan’s military headquarters, shifting cooperation away from traditional channels managed through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Washington’s de facto embassy.

The military relationship between the United States and Taiwan is highly integrated yet formally unofficial. It is governed by the legal framework of the “U.S. Taiwan Relations Act” (TRA), which Congress passed on April 10, 1979.

Congress enacted it immediately after the U.S. formally terminated its previous “Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan)” to officially recognize “the People’s Republic of China (PRC)” in Beijing.

Rather than abandoning Taiwan, Congress designed the TRA as a legal framework to ensure that “robust, unofficial security, commercial, and cultural ties” continue uninterrupted.

In short, the TRA provides a domestic legal workaround for treating Taiwan as a country without formal diplomatic recognition. However, under it, the U.S. is also obligated to maintain Taiwan’s capacity to resist force or coercion in general and the forcible annexation by the PRC in particular.

Over the years, U.S. personnel have served in Taiwan as trainers and advisers. Hundreds of active-duty U.S. military advisors—often colloquially referred to locally as “English teachers” to maintain a low profile—are routinely deployed across Taiwan.

U.S. military observers are present within Taiwan’s annual “Han Kuang live-fire military exercises”. They actively guide Taiwan’s defense strategy toward decentralized command, logistics, and real-world combat readiness.

Taiwanese fighter pilots undergo advanced combat training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona.

The US remains Taiwan’s primary foreign weapons supplier, with a total backlog of orders nearing $20 billion.

In fact, Taiwan received its first new batch of two advanced Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70 fighter jets on October 2.  This was part of an $8 billion deal approved in 2019 for 66 new-build F-16 Block 70 jets, with the remaining 64 aircraft scheduled for future delivery.  out of a 66-aircraft fleet on order.

However, all these coordination efforts between Washington and Taipei are usually routed through the AIT intermediary, as the U.S. adheres to its  One China” policy. In that sense, the new proposal to station Pentagon personnel directly inside the Taiwanese Defense Ministry represents a shift from this historical status quo.

The new arrangement puts Americans directly into the core of Taiwan’s defense policymaking, including policy coordination, Han Kuang exercise planning, asymmetric warfare doctrine, and major weapons procurement evaluations, it is said.

Of course, the U.S. routinely sends military and civilian defense officials to work directly inside the defense ministries of partner and allied nations. Established by the Pentagon in 2009, the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program specifically trains and deploys high-performing senior U.S. Department of Defense civilians.

These advisors are embedded in partner-nation defense ministries to support institutional capacity building, strategy, financial management, and logistics.

The U.S. also actively deploys specialized defense consultants directly to the defense ministries of nations looking to transition away from historical adversaries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, and various Balkan nations looking to exit Moscow’s orbit.

The U.S. has a long history of embedding liaison officers in allied countries. For example, it has a Joint Political-Military Group in Israel that embeds officers in missile-defense cooperation for Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and now Iron Beam. But American officials do not operate inside the Kirya (Israel’s defense headquarters).

Similarly, despite 54,000 US personnel stationed in Japan, no U.S. officer sits inside Japan’s Ministry of Defense to assess combat capability.

Perhaps in NATO countries and South Korea, U.S. military officials are believed to sit together often.

There are also “Offices of Defense Cooperation” (ODC), or United States Military Groups, which are technically attached to the local U.S. Embassy for diplomatic protection. These teams provide security assistance and work in routine, day-to-day coordination with host ministry personnel.

However, what makes the proposed U.S. officials sitting directly within Taiwan’s military headquarters unique is that Taiwan is not an ally of America in the strict sense, as the U.S. lacks formal diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, and these officials will bypass the traditional AIT.

Of course, multiple reports in recent years have claimed that U.S. special forces are permanently stationed in Taiwan to assist its 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion special operations force, though Washington has officially denied it.  The same has been the case with the speculations about the coming and going of U.S. military personnel from the Army Special Operations Command base in Taoyuan.

How will Beijing React?

At the time of writing, Beijing had not issued an official reaction, possibly because Taiwanese media outlets only recently brought details of this long-term Pentagon deployment to light. It has not been declared officially.

But it goes without saying that Beijing would be “certain to protest” and could respond “with expanded exercises and intimidation”, according to  Zivon Wang, a military analyst at the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies in Taipei.

He expects U.S. personnel not to wear uniforms at the Ministry of National Defense because it could be interpreted as a more formalized US-Taiwan military relationship and might further provoke Beijing.

Incidentally, China has made more air and naval incursions across the median line in the Taiwan Strait since 2022. Although Chinese military aircraft had occasionally crossed the median line (established informally in 1954) in the past, the practice became significantly more frequent from 2022, particularly after Nancy Pelosi (then Speaker of the House of Representatives) visited Taiwan in August that year. What had once been an informal but largely respected buffer increasingly became a zone of routine Chinese military activity.

Therefore, it remains to be seen whether China will respond to the Pentagon’s proposed deployment with loud exercises.

It may also remain silent, as nothing is official yet and Trump has his “negotiating chip” of holding back Taiwan’s military package.

Trump’s admirers often see his unpredictability as useful in negotiations with an adversary, because the other side cannot be sure how far he is willing to go.

But his critics argue that his unpredictability becomes counterproductive when allies cannot distinguish a negotiating threat from a real change in American policy.

It remains to be seen who will prove to be right in the case of Taiwan.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Trump’s Big Taiwan Move: Despite $14B Arms Freeze, Permanent U.S. Military Officials May Sit at MND appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

US defense giant Lockheed Martin said the Royal Moroccan Air Force’s (RMAF) first F-16 Block 72 had completed its maiden flight, a test milestone as the fighter jet moves toward delivery.

The company said the Block 72 is the newest variant of the F-16 Fighting Falcon, with updated avionics, sensors and mission systems, and changes intended to improve safety and reliability. Morocco was the launch customer for the configuration when Washington approved the purchase in March 2019.

“This first flight reflects meaningful progress on Morocco’s F-16 Block 72 program and is a critical step in strengthening Morocco’s future airpower,” Mike Shoemaker, vice president and general manager of Lockheed Martin’s Integrated Fighter Group, said. “The F-16 remains a vital component of today’s and future air defense, and we’re proud of the role it will continue to play in supporting Morocco’s sovereignty and contributing to regional stability for decades to come.”

The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of two related sales on March 25, 2019.

One covered 25 new Block 72 aircraft, plus weapons, equipment and services, at an estimated $3.8 billion. The other, valued at more than $985 million, covered upgrades for Morocco’s 23 existing F-16C/D Block 52+ jets to the F-16V standard, which is broadly similar to the new Block 70/72 aircraft, along with related equipment and support.

If both go ahead, the Royal Moroccan Air Force’s F-16 fleet would roughly double and be built around a common, modernized standard.

“The purchase will improve interoperability with the United States and other regional allies and enhance Morocco’s ability to undertake coalition operations, as it has done in the past in flying sorties against ISIS in Syria and Iraq,” the agency said of the new-aircraft sale. “Morocco already operates an F-16 fleet and will have no difficulty absorbing this aircraft and services into its armed forces.”

The Block 70 and Block 72 differ mainly in the engine. The Block 70 uses General Electric’s F110-GE-129; the Block 72 uses Pratt & Whitney’s F100-PW-229. Morocco’s existing Block 52+ jets already use F100 engines, so the new aircraft fit the support setup already in place.

Morocco’s F-35 Bid

Morocco was looking to acquire U.S. F-35 fighter jets since 2020–22, after normalizing ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords and as Algeria reportedly moved to acquire Russia’s Su-57.

Israeli intelligence firm Jafaj said King Mohammed VI raised tensions with Algeria in a private meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz during his 2021 visit.

Algeria and Morocco have not had diplomatic ties since August 2021.

The firm, citing an unnamed European source, said Rabat wanted Israeli help tracking Algerian troops and militia deployments and was also seeking Israeli surveillance and strike drones.

Jafaj said Defense Minister Abdellatif Loudiyi told Gantz that Morocco needed more combat aircraft for a possible war with its neighbor, that the F-35 was the preferred choice, and that Israel’s help lobbying the Biden administration would be welcome.

An F-35 was displayed at the 2024 Marrakech Air Show.

In August 2026, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank, said there had been “little concrete progress” and described the F-35 purchase as hypothetical.

Meanwhile, Lockheed is again exhibiting at the Marrakech Airshow, which runs from Oct. 7 to 10.

Its stand includes an F-35 cockpit demonstrator, with demonstrations for invited guests, and scale models of the F-35A, F-16 and C-130J Super Hercules.

• By ET Online Desk
• Contact the author at admin (at) eurasiantimes.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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Russia appears to be preparing to revive and modernize its inventory of the Soviet-era Pechora S-125 short-to-medium-range surface-to-air missile system, in a move that the IAF leadership could well take note of.

S-125 is the same missile that was used to shoot down the US Air Force’s F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter-bomber over Serbia on March 27, 1999, during the Kosovo War.

The Pechora S-125 (SA-3 Goa) is a legacy Soviet static, short- to medium-range surface-to-air missile system developed to engage low- to medium-altitude air threats using command guidance.

The IAF also modernized its S-125 inventory to plug an operational gap that widened due to delays in procuring MRSAM and Akash air-defense systems. However, the IAF did not pursue modernization to the extent that the capability gains matched the more comprehensive modernization offered by the Russian Pechora-2M.

According to Militarnyi, a Ukrainian media outlet focused on military affairs, the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT) has signed a contract with Moscow-based JSC Oboronitelnye Sistemi to supply 30 specialized wheeled chassis that appear intended for components of the Pechora-2M system.

The Pechora-2M is a heavily modernized Pechora derivative with a self-propelled truck-mounted launcher, digital electronics, an extended engagement envelope, and day/night electro-optical tracking, giving the system much greater tactical mobility.

Under the terms of the contract, Russia would receive 20 MZKT-8021-021 chassis, as well as five each of the MZKT-8022-021 and MZKT-80211-021.

The MZKT-8021/8022 family of specialized chassis was developed specifically to accommodate components of the Pechora-2M air-defense missile system.

Pechora Revival

The delivery schedule extends to 2029, suggesting a planned multi-year acquisition rather than a one-off procurement to meet an immediate operational requirement.

More likely, Russia is seeking to expand its air-defense capacity in response to the heightened threat from the prolific use of drones and other low-cost aerial threats in modern warfare.

Drone warfare has increased the aerial threat severalfold, so it is logical for any nation to increase the density of its AD systems by a corresponding factor.

Russia appears to be increasing its reliance on legacy systems rather than simply discarding them.

Russian Modernisation

The modernized Pechora-2M system was developed as a deep modernization of the Soviet S-125, incorporating a self-propelled, highly mobile launcher and modernized electronics. The modernization transformed the legacy stationary S-125 into a rapidly deployable air-defense platform capable of shoot-and-scoot tactics, reducing its vulnerability to anti-radiation weapons and precision strikes.

The 2M replaces the legacy four-rail stationary ground launcher (5P73) with a twin-rail launcher mounted on a heavy 6×6 truck chassis. The reduction in launch rails was necessary to maintain launcher stability when mounted on a mobile chassis.

Rafale, Tejas & AMCA: IAF’s “Healthy Mix” of Fighter Jets Leaves Out The Aircraft That May Matter The Most

The legacy S-125 required considerable time to disassemble, pack onto trailers, move, and re-erect at a new site. In contrast, the Pechora-2M can reportedly be brought into action in roughly 20–25 minutes, facilitating shoot-and-scoot operations.

Besides the self-propelled launchers, the tracking/fire-control radar and other system components are also mounted on high-mobility truck chassis rather than being confined to towed equipment.

IAF Pechora Modernization

In 2016, the Indian MoD issued a $272-million tender to digitize 16 Pechora systems. The tender was restricted to Indian companies to support the government’s Make in India policy. The eventual contract, worth ₹591.3 crore, was awarded to Alpha Design Technologies Ltd (ADTL) in 2020.

Russia’s Almaz-Antey is the original equipment manufacturer of the Pechora system. At the time, Indian officials indicated that Russian defense companies preferred to work through Russian state-owned entities, limiting the scope for direct OEM participation by Indian companies.

The scope of the Indian Pechora upgrade was primarily the electronic and mechanical modernization of the existing system rather than a fundamental redesign of its architecture. It included refurbishment and digitization of the missile-guidance radar and integration of the system with the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS).

Alpha Design Technologies Ltd executed the upgrade, focusing on digitization and electronic modernization. It replaced vintage electronic components with modern semiconductor-based electronics and digital processing, while modernizing operator consoles and other system elements.

No Mobility

The system retained its original static, four-rail, ground-mounted configuration (5P73 launcher) and towed transport arrangement because the Indian upgrade scope did not include mobility.

Because it lacks mobility, the IAF has traditionally used the Pechora for point defense of fixed, high-value infrastructure such as air bases, radar stations, and other military installations.

A statically deployed AD system protecting a high-value asset made considerably more sense when precision-guided munitions were either unavailable or relatively uncommon. In contemporary warfare, where precision weapons can routinely achieve single-digit-meter accuracy, a static air-defense system defending a high-value asset can itself become a priority target.

Recall the failed PAF attempt to strike the S-400 system deployed to defend Aadampur air base during Op Sindoor. With foresight, and by leveraging the S-400’s mobility, IAF leadership relocated the system before the attack. The episode illustrates the importance of mobility and survivability for high-value air-defense assets.

A Still-Capable System

Despite its vintage, the Pechora remains a potentially useful AD system. Endowed with mobility and modern sensors and electronics, it would acquire significantly greater survivability and tactical utility.

One of its strengths is electro-optical tracking, which permits passive target tracking without radar emissions, reducing vulnerability to anti-radiation weapons. Both Russian and Indian modernization programs have improved the system’s electro-optical capability.

The Indian upgrade incorporates thermal-imaging-based fire-control equipment, while the Pechora-2M also incorporates TV and thermal/infrared electro-optical channels.

Thermal imaging provides a passive night-and-day detection and tracking capability and, unlike conventional television cameras, does not depend on visible light. However, adverse atmospheric conditions can degrade its effectiveness.

It is interesting to note that the IAF chose to upgrade its Pechora systems without fundamentally modifying the missile. Contemporary reporting on the original upgrade program indicated that the IAF considered the existing missile adequate and concentrated instead on digitization, radar, communications, networking, and other system improvements.

The 5V27 family missile has a substantial fragmentation warhead of around 70 kg and uses command guidance. Its continued availability is one possible reason why extending the life of the Pechora system remains attractive.

Russia may also be reviving and revitalizing Pechora-2M systems because it has a substantial existing inventory of 5V27-series missiles. If so, the approach illustrates an important principle of modern warfare: the value of an old weapon system can change when it is combined with modern sensors, electronics, mobility and networking.

F-35 Bid Stalls — But Morocco’s 1st F-16 Block 72 Fighter Jet Completes Maiden Flight

What the IAF Should Note

In the immediate future, the IAF will need to deploy many more AD systems than it currently does in order to field a robust air-defense capability spanning the entire gamut of aerodynamic threats—aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, guided bombs and drones.

Developing additional AD systems may prove more challenging and time-consuming than upgrading existing legacy systems such as the Pechora.

Upgrading the Pechora to add mobility, modern electro-optical sensors and improved networking should be well within Indian technological capability. Even locally manufacturing additional upgraded systems under an appropriate OEM arrangement could be a cost-effective way to augment India’s air-defense capability.

Russia’s apparent decision to extract additional combat value from an old missile system should therefore be viewed less as a revival of obsolete technology and more as an example of how legacy weapons can be adapted to the changing economics and character of air warfare.

• Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
• Views Personal of the Author
• Follow the author @vkthakur

The post The Missile That Shot Down U.S. Stealth Aircraft is Coming Back—Mobile. Why India Must Take Note of the Russian Move appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The confirmation came after Politico accessed internal German government documents that revealed the United Kingdom’s national armaments director, who oversees defense procurement, sought German participation in the next-generation fighter program. The document noted that London wants to discuss the terms of potential cooperation, such as Germany’s military capability requirements and industrial “workshare.”

The post Germany Holds ‘Exploratory Talks’ to Join Once Rival GCAP 6th-Gen Fighter Program After FCAS Collapse appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

France has test-fired its new M51.3 nuclear-capable ballistic missile for the first time from a submarine.

The missile, the third variant of the M51 sea-launched ballistic missile, was fired from the nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine Le Vigilant and impacted in the North Atlantic, “hundreds of kilometers from any coastline,” the defense ministry said.

President Emmanuel Macron watched from a French warship. The Direction générale de l’armement tracked the flight, including with the trials ship Monge.

“The launch was conducted without a nuclear warhead and in strict compliance with France’s international commitments,” the ministry said. It called the shot proof of “the excellence of the high-tech solutions employed by French industry in the field of nuclear deterrence.”

The M51.3, built by ArianeGroup, entered service on 24 October 2025.

An earlier flight, in November 2023, was from a land site.

À bord de la frégate multi-missions Auvergne, j'ai assisté au premier tir du nouveau missile balistique M51.3 depuis le sous-marin nucléaire lanceur d'engins Le Vigilant.

Très peu de nations disposent d'un tel savoir-faire.

Félicitations à tous les acteurs de cette réussite… pic.twitter.com/bElCe99hMd

— Emmanuel Macron (@EmmanuelMacron) October 6, 2026

French President Macron wrote on X (translated): Aboard the multi-mission frigate Auvergne, I witnessed the first firing of the new M51.3 ballistic missile from the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine Le Vigilant. Very few nations possess such expertise. Congratulations to all the players in this exceptional achievement: DGA, CEA, Ariane Group, Naval Group, and the French Navy.

Your professionalism, your rigor, and your technical mastery are the pride of France. This technical success is a new demonstration of the credibility of our deterrence, whose sustainability is assured. To be free, one must be feared. And to be feared, one must be powerful. To protect the French in the long term against threats, I launched the renewal of our capabilities for the decades to come as early as 2017. In ten years, the budget for our armed forces will have doubled.

Our future strategic submarines are currently under construction. This year, we launched the program for hypersonic and maneuverable strategic missiles, which will equip our airborne deterrence component. Our nuclear deterrence protects us and will continue to protect us. Long live the Republic, and long live France.

Tuesday’s firing was the first from a submarine, and it closed Le Vigilant’s requalification after a long refit. A navigation warning had closed a box southwest of Penmarc’h from 5 to 21 October. Witnesses at Penmarc’h reported the missile leaving the water shortly after 09:10, with a contrail and a sustained rumble.

Open-source figures put the M51 at about 12 meters, 2.3 meters in diameter and roughly 52 tonnes, with three solid stages, an estimated range of 8,000 to 10,000 km and a speed near Mach 20.

The M51.3 carries the newer TNO-2 oceanic warhead. Analysts usually cite four to six independently targetable warheads of about 100 kilotons, plus penetration aids. Paris says the variant has better range, accuracy, and ability to defeat missile defenses. Exact figures remain classified.

The missile arms the four Triomphant-class submarines, one of which remains at sea as part of France’s continuous deterrent.

A follow-on, the M51.4, was contracted to ArianeGroup in September 2025. The next submarine class, SNLE 3G, had its first steel cut in March 2024, with the first boat aimed at the mid-2030s.

The test comes as Macron has warned of a change in “Russian aggression and threats” after a run of hybrid attacks blamed on Moscow, and has said those actions would “not go unanswered.” He has also offered European partners a role in France’s nuclear deterrent, the only one in the European Union.

Germany Holds ‘Exploratory Talks’ to Join Once Rival GCAP 6th-Gen Fighter Program After FCAS Collapse

M51

According to Ariane Group, the M51 sea–surface submarine-launched ballistic missile is a solid-propellant, three-stage launcher weighing over 50 metric tons and measuring 12 meters long. Each of the FOST’s SSBNs carries 16 missiles, capable of delivering their payload over intercontinental distances of several thousand kilometers.

Launched from a submarine, the M51 travels through the Earth’s atmosphere into space, reaching an altitude of more than 2,000 kilometers, well beyond low-Earth orbit.

It then re-enters the atmosphere at Mach 20. The M51 is a concentration of space technologies combining power, precision, and reliability. Because deterrence credibility depends on its permanent availability, the system must be fully ready at all times.

Commissioned at the end of 2010, the M51 is the fifth generation of French ballistic missiles.

The missile is developed in increments to respond effectively to changes in the geostrategic context and France’s requirements. This means ArianeGroup, Europe’s only company capable of designing and producing a strategic missile, must stay at the cutting edge of technology and maintain the highest performance.

The M51.2 is the current in-service version.

It will be succeeded by the M51.3 version, which successfully carried out its qualification flight without a nuclear warhead.

With AFP Inputs

The post France Fires Nuclear-Capable M51.3 Sub-Launched Ballistic Missile For The First Time Amid Russian Threats appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Recently, during the 5^th Halla Bolle Conclave held at the Radisson Collection in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, the same separatist discourse once again found space.

The conclave brought together mainstream political leaders and a former separatist figure, with discussions focusing on issues such as restoring statehood, Article 370, autonomy, political rights, governance, youth aspirations, reconciliation, and India-Pakistan relations.

Many of the questions asked and answers given reflected narratives that have long been nurtured in the Valley and closely resemble Pakistan’s longstanding propaganda on Kashmir.

The participation of mainstream political leaders alongside former separatist figures also showed how some of these old narratives still find space in Kashmir’s contemporary political discourse.

Selective Politics of Kashmir’s Mainstream Leaders

Aga Syed Ruhullah Mehdi, the National Conference Member of Parliament (MP) representing the Srinagar Lok Sabha constituency, who behaves like some philosopher-king, is systematically promoting Pakistan’s propaganda and narratives.

He tries his best to hurt India whenever he gets the chance.

For instance, when asked to state his position on the situation in Muzaffarabad and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), he said that he would not talk about it until people in the Valley were ‘empowered’, deflecting by declaring, ‘Return our dignity & we will talk about Muzaffarabad’. He then went on to claim that Kashmiris face the status of ‘second-class citizens’ in the Valley, asserting that ‘our reality is that we are disenfranchised as second-class citizens.’

This is exactly the problem. He avoids questions concerning PoJK but remains extremely vocal when criticizing India.

He is actually misusing his constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression and using Indian democracy as a shield while promoting narratives that are completely in line with Pakistan’s interests. He actually doesn’t want to hurt his masters sitting in Rawalpindi.

He also claims that there is no freedom of speech, frequently protesting that, “as a Kashmiri Muslim voice, I was denied the opportunity to speak.” Yet his actions contradict this narrative. He himself makes the most noise, using every available platform to speak publicly, give interviews, address gatherings, speak in Parliament, and criticize India regularly.

If he is supposedly not allowed to speak, then how is he able to constantly and systematically spread venom and engage in anti-India propaganda repeatedly?

There is a clear difference between legitimate democratic criticism of a government and repeatedly using the democratic space available in India to promote narratives that portray India itself as the source of Kashmir’s problems while giving Pakistan a free pass for its sponsorship of cross-border terrorism and the killing of innocent civilians in J&K and the rest of the country.

Then, an audience member asked National Conference president Farooq Abdullah why Kashmir had aligned with ‘Hindu-majority India’ in 1947. The very framing of the phrase ‘Hindu-majority India’ exposes the toxic ideology behind the question.

However, those who push such narratives desperately need to look at what actually happened to the regions that joined Pakistan in 1947, as well as those parts of the subcontinent that were forcibly taken by Pakistan, and the misery their people endure today.

Look at Balochistan. Look at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Look at the political and institutional failures that ultimately led to the secession of Bangladesh, demonstrating that a shared religious identity alone could not keep Pakistan united. Most importantly, look at the disaster that is Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) today.

For years, the people of PoJK have taken to the streets to protest Islamabad over basic political, economic, and social rights. The recent protests have faced deadly crackdowns, reportedly leaving more than 150 people killed, while the brutal authorities have even gone so far as to restrict the supply of essential goods, including food, flour, medicines, and fuel, during periods of unrest.

When Pakistan’s Failures Are Blamed on India

Yet Pakistan’s propaganda machinery has repeatedly played its cards well in Kashmir. Its influence remains deeply entrenched in the Valley, allowing narratives about Pakistan and India to persist regardless of what happens inside Pakistan.

Pakistan can have Imran Khan in jail, political repression, a deeply constrained democratic system, and an army that continues to exercise enormous influence over the country’s politics, elections, government formation, policymaking, and even the broader political system, yet people in Kashmir are repeatedly told that Pakistan’s problems are somehow the result of an Indian conspiracy.

Even when Pakistan itself is burning, its failures are deflected towards India rather than examined as the consequences of its own political and institutional failures.

This should force Indian authorities to rethink their approach and ask why such narratives continue to resonate in the Valley. Simply dismissing them as propaganda will not be enough. There needs to be a serious effort to understand the channels through which they spread, the political actors who amplify them, and the reasons they continue to influence public discourse.

Certain mainstream political parties and leaders in Jammu and Kashmir have also played a major role in keeping this discourse alive. They have repeatedly used the blood and suffering of Kashmiris for their own political objectives. Rather than challenging narratives promoted by Pakistan, they have often sustained and magnified them.

Take PDP chief Mehbooba Mufti, for example. She has advocated opening the Line of Control in Kashmir so that trade can take place with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and other regions, invoking the old Silk Route and China’s connectivity. One has to ask: what world is she living in?

Does she not understand the region’s geopolitics? Does she not understand the cross-border terrorism and terrorist infrastructure operating from Pakistan-occupied territory? Does she not understand the India-Pakistan dispute over PoJK? Does she not understand China’s illegal territorial claims against India in Jammu and Kashmir, the Shaksgam Valley territory ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, the recent Galwan clashes, and China’s broader geostrategic interests in the region?

It is not simply a matter of opening India’s borders and assuming that will solve everything. Other players have their own interests and nefarious designs, and they too have agency. Besides, extra-regional powers have their own interests. The region is not operating in a geopolitical vacuum.

The problem with Kashmir’s political leadership is that they rarely talk about the issues that actually matter to the people, for which they were elected, and instead think that by playing separatist politics, they can secure their votes and political future.

They rarely talk about how to improve the living standards of common people, eliminate corruption, generate employment, improve infrastructure, attract investment, or make governance more accountable and responsive.

Instead, they have often tried to frame the relationship between the people of Kashmir and the central government in colonial terms, as a master-slave relationship. They repeatedly use words such as “Delhi,” while saying that Kashmiris have to “fight Delhi.” They rarely speak about constructive engagement with the central government.

They now say that Kashmiris have been “disempowered” after the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019. But what happened before 2019? Were Kashmiris not being described as “alienated” and “disempowered” before 2019 as well? Were these same political leaders not making exactly the same arguments then?

If they were making the same arguments before 2019, then what exactly did they do for the people of Kashmir when they had the political power they now claim to have lost?

This is something that needs to be asked.

Need to Move Beyond the Politics of Alienation and Victimhood

Moreover, the words “alienation” and “disempowerment” are not being used accidentally. They carry a specific political meaning and fit into a particular narrative. The problem is that these leaders have never really looked at the relationship between Jammu and Kashmir and the central government in the same way that political leaders in other parts of India look at their relationship with the Center.

The current noise over statehood also needs to be understood in this context. They present the demand for statehood as though it is entirely about the interests of the common people. But is it?

Of course, statehood is important, and people can legitimately demand its restoration. But it also involves political interests. These political parties want more political power and greater control over the administration.

After losing statehood, they feel they lost a significant part of their political authority. They also want statehood because it would give them greater political control and a shield from the scrutiny and accountability they currently face from different agencies and institutions. In this sense, the demand for statehood is also about restoring their own political power and reducing accountability.

But the common people have other priorities. They want good governance. They want corruption to be eliminated. They want development, employment, better infrastructure, better public services, and an improved standard of living.

The question is: when there was statehood before 2019, what did they do to improve the lives of common people?

If the mainstream political parties in Jammu and Kashmir had pursued positive, constructive, forward-looking, and pragmatic politics instead of sustaining and magnifying narratives that have served Pakistan’s interests, the Valley could have been very different.

Political parties have every right to criticize the government. They have every right to demand statehood, greater powers, development, and political representation. But when criticism of India becomes constant while questions concerning Pakistan are systematically avoided, and when every issue is presented through the prism of alienation and disempowerment, it becomes necessary to ask whose interests this politics is ultimately serving.

The mainstream political leadership in Jammu and Kashmir needs to understand that the people of Kashmir cannot be kept permanently trapped in the politics of grievance, alienation, and victimhood. The people deserve politics that focuses on their future, not politics that continuously recycles past narratives.

• Views Personal of the Author
• The author is a prominent journalist from Jammu & Kashmir and wishes to keep his identity concealed for security reasons.
• For any feedback on the story, email us at editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

The post Kashmir’s ‘Halla Bolle’ Conclave: Old Script, New Venue. Venom Against India But Mum on Pakistan: OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

After years of lobbying by Riyadh, the United States recently greenlit a potential sale of F-35 fighters to Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Turkey is looking to rejoin the F-35 program and is aggressively pursuing the Trump administration to approve the sale of stealth jets. 

Another interesting case is India, which is hosting Exercise Tarang Shakti, where six F-35 jets are participating. Indian experts call it a unique opportunity for the IAF to evaluate US stealth jets and see how Indian ground and airborne radars detect them.

Notably, this is the first time F-35s are participating in drills with Indian jets on Indian soil.

Many see this as an historic opportunity to train alongside arguably the world’s best jets and give real-time exposure to the IAF’s Rafale, Su-30MKI and Tejas aircraft. Even IAF critics who don’t favor a potential F-35 sale to India see this as a historic opportunity.

Earlier, a EurAsian Times report said the US State Department announced the proposed sale of F-35 Lightning II and related equipment to Saudi Arabia on September 17, 2026. The proposed sale is expected to cover  48 F-35 aircraft and 49 Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines, along with communications gear, training, spare parts, and other support as requested by Riyadh.

The approval followed years of lobbying by the Saudi kingdom to procure the highly sought-after stealth fighters. Earlier, the Obama administration explicitly ruled it out in late 2015, stating that Israel would remain the sole F-35 recipient in the region to preserve its qualitative military edge (QME).

Later, the Biden administration explored linking a potential F-35 deal to Saudi-Israeli normalization, but talks stalled after the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel.

The US State Department’s proposed sale still requires congressional approval, and analysts believe Saudi’s purchase of the F-35 could hit a roadblock amid concerns about Riyadh’s ties with China and Israel’s opposition to the deal.

Despite being a founding member of the F-35 program and making a significant financial investment, the US expelled Turkey from the consortium and sanctioned it under CAATSA for purchasing the S-400 despite repeated warnings.

Ankara has been actively pursuing a strategy to divest itself of its Russian-made S-400 and sell it off to a potential third-party buyer.

Earlier, the US President similarly responded to questions about lifting CAATSA sanctions on Turkey by saying, “I’ll always speak to President Erdogan. He is a friend of mine, as you know. And I’ll always make him happy.”

As Trump & Xi Talk — U.S. and China’s Nuclear Submarines Race For Dominance in the Indo-Pacific

For now, Turkey’s path to obtaining the F-35s is still full of hurdles that both Washington and Ankara may find hard to remove, including Israel’s stiff opposition, as the EurAsian Times has explained before.

Like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, several countries have made unsuccessful attempts to obtain the F-35, widely regarded as the leading fifth-generation multirole fighter thanks to its advanced low-observable stealth and groundbreaking sensor fusion.

Functioning as a highly networked airborne command node—often described as the “quarterback of the skies”—it shares data seamlessly across friendly platforms. In fact, analysts believe that it is the most capable fifth-generation fighter in service anywhere in the world.

Despite this, India — a country that faces the dual threat of China and Pakistan along its borders — has been somewhat indifferent to what many consider the world’s best jets.

US Pitch for F-35s

Donald Trump unofficially pitched the F-35 to India during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in February 2025. “Starting this year, we will be increasing military sales to India by many billions of dollars. We are also paving the way to provide India with the F-35 stealth fighters ultimately,”  he said at the time.

The F-35s were also displayed at Aero India 2025 the same month, where they met the Russian Su-57 on the tarmac for the first time.

During his April 2025 visit to India, US Vice President J.D. Vance appeared to reiterate the offer.

“We, of course, want to collaborate more. We want to work together more. And we want your nation to buy more of our military equipment, which we believe is the best in class. American fifth-generation F-35s, for example, would give the Indian Air Force the ability to defend your airspace and protect your people like never before,” he said, making a more direct appeal.

Although the US never made an official offer, the verbal F-35 pitch and the prospect of acquiring a cutting-edge stealth fighter looked great on paper, particularly since China operates two fifth-generation aircraft (the J-20 and J-35A) and is allegedly exporting the J-35A to Pakistan.

Rafale, Tejas & AMCA: IAF’s “Healthy Mix” of Fighter Jets Leaves Out The Aircraft That May Matter The Most

However, India’s defense community and Indian Air Force (IAF) veterans seemed unimpressed by the F-35 offer despite acknowledging the aircraft’s potent capabilities, a stance recently reiterated as six F-35s made their debut in India-hosted “Exercise Tarang Shakti 2026” in Jodhpur, Rajasthan.

Seven Reasons Why IAF Veterans Oppose F-35

First, Indian analysts and experts believe that buying an expensive stealth fighter off the shelf from the United States would be a liability, since it would do nothing for the Indian defense manufacturing sector and come with an enormous price tag.

Each F-35 is expected to cost $80 to $120 million, with even higher life cycle costs. Therefore, a fleet of F-35s would impose a heavy financial burden that the Indian Air Force would rather allocate to indigenous programs and more flexible and diverse acquisitions.

Second, analysts and veterans have argued that the US would never part with its technology, eliminating domestic manufacturing. They reckon the F-35 procurement would run counter to the “Make in India” and “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” policies.

Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retd), the former Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS), earlier stressed that even with approval of limited technology transfer and local manufacturing, significant challenges would remain. At the time, he highlighted production risks arising from the F-35’s complex global supply chain, noting that Lockheed Martin sources components from multiple countries. He cautioned that any disruption or delay in delivering these parts could halt the entire manufacturing process.

Air Marshal Khosla further noted that India’s continued reliance on foreign suppliers would constrain genuine localization, and the IAF would struggle to manage such disruptions.

Notably, this concern takes on greater significance as delivery of Tejas Mk-1A fighter jets to the Indian Air Force has been delayed due to delays in delivery of F404-IN20 turbofan engines, affecting the service’s preparedness.

Third, there is concern that diverting resources to acquiring the F-35 would inevitably affect India’s own fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), which aims to deliver a fifth-generation platform with advanced sensors, electronic warfare systems, and networked combat features while fostering a domestic aerospace industrial base.

Experts have urged the IAF to focus on its indigenous programs rather than getting trapped in another round of imports.

Fourth, analysts have also cited logistical challenges and operational incompatibility with India’s diverse air force fleet comprising a mix of Russian Su-30MKIs, French Rafales and Mirage 2000, and Tejas. They believe that adding another fighter type would further complicate maintenance, training, and logistics for an already varied inventory.

France Fires Nuclear-Capable M51.3 Sub-Launched Ballistic Missile For The First Time Amid Russian Threats

Fifth, India operates Russian-supplied S-400 systems, which previously caused friction between the US and Turkey.

“An F-35A deal would likely come with strings attached—most notably, a U.S. demand that India abandon its Russian S-400 air defense systems in favor of the American THAAD,” IAF veteran and commentator Squadron Leader Vijainder K. Thakur earlier stated.

The S-400 is deeply embedded in India’s layered air defense network, and New Delhi has been considering an additional order, meaning it would inevitably become a point of contention in any potential deal.

Sixth, the US has been flagged as an unreliable partner.

“Putting too many military aviation eggs in the unreliable US basket will also be an issue. Americans can be “very unreliable” when it comes to putting sanctions and freezing spares and maintenance support,” IAF veteran and aviation analyst, Air Marshal Anil Chopra (retd), earlier wrote in a detailed EurAsian Times article.

Adding the repeated threat of sanctions by the US and a rapidly changing geopolitical scenario further complicates the purchase.

Seventh, the F-35 is embedded in the US-controlled networks, including the Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN), which sends information back to American servers. Indian experts view this as a breach of operational independence.

Furthermore, they have cautioned that the US imposes stringent operational restrictions on its system and could try to limit the F-35’s use in combat, particularly against Pakistan.

Critics worldwide have also stressed that an unpredictable US administration could restrict free F-35 operations by limiting hardware and software supplies, commonly referred to as a kill switch. In fact, this is the reason why countries like Canada and Portugal decided to look for an alternative to the American stealth fighter.

Indian strategic discussions generally prioritize accelerating Tejas production, advancing the AMCA, and exploring local manufacturing options for platforms such as the Rafale. If a foreign fifth-generation fighter is ultimately considered, many experts have indicated a preference for the Russian Su-57 because of the technology transfer, local production, and twin-seat variant.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

The post Saudi & Turkey Chase F-35 Jets, Heavy Skepticism in India. Why IAF Veterans are Not Too Keen on F-35s? appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Nearly six years after the COVID outbreak, there are fears of another health emergency after reports of the death of a Russian researcher in a suspected case of plague, which has prompted authorities to quarantine over 200 people in the remote Siberian region and enforce strict mask mandates.

Notably, reports suggest that the suspected plague bacteria might have originated from a Russian Anti-Plague Institute, bringing attention to Russia’s secretive biological weapons research programs and bringing back memories of the deadly 1979 Anthrax outbreak in the Soviet Union, which also originated from a research facility.

Authorities have acknowledged the death of a researcher due to a “suspected case of a particularly dangerous infection,” described as “pneumonia of unknown etiology.” However, federal authorities deny any lab release and say tests found no work-related pathogens.

However, concerns remain that Russia is hiding crucial details about the outbreak that could hinder an effective response.

The 28-year-old lab technician Darya Shipilova died on October 2 after reportedly breaking a test tube with live Yersinia pestis at an Anti-Plague Institute on September 25 while handling samples.

According to Russia’s national public health agency, Rospotrebnadzor, the researcher worked at the Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute of Siberia and the Far East in Shelekhov.

Meanwhile, independent regional outlet Liudi Baikala reported that the death of the lab technician has prompted authorities to place nearly 200 people under observation at a hospital and enforce strict mask mandates in the region.

Igor Kobzev, the governor of Irkutsk, noted on Telegram that this was in response to a “suspected case of a particularly dangerous infection.”

Alexey Tsydenov, the head of the neighboring region of Buryatia, said the woman “may have died of the plague.”

Meanwhile, US media outlet Axios reported that the White House is monitoring reports of a suspected plague case and related quarantines in Russia.

Russian health authorities, however, are trying to downplay the incident, saying the situation is under control and rejecting reports of a lab leak.

In a statement issued on October 4, Rospotrebnadzor said the “sanitary and epidemiological situation” in Irkutsk and Shelekhov was “stable,” Forbes reported.

The agency further said it conducted extensive testing and found no pathogens linked to the deceased patient’s laboratory work in her sample.

It added that testing of hundreds of people in primary or secondary contact with the deceased researcher has detected no new infections.

According to the World Health Organization, Plague is caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis, a zoonotic bacterium usually found in small mammals and their fleas. People infected with Y. pestis often develop symptoms after an incubation period of one to seven days.

Bubonic plague is the most common clinical form.

Plague is transmitted between animals and humans through bites from infected fleas, direct contact with infected tissues, and inhalation of infected respiratory particles.

Plague can be a very severe disease in people, with a case-fatality ratio of 30% to 60% for the bubonic type, and it is always fatal for the pneumonic and septicemic kinds when left untreated.

Pneumonic plague is especially contagious and can trigger severe epidemics through person-to-person transmission via respiratory particles.

Historically, plague caused widespread pandemics with high mortality. It was known as the “Black Death” during the fourteenth century, causing more than 50 million deaths in Europe.

According to some estimates, Black Death wiped out one-third to one-half of the European population between 1347 and 1353.

Today, however, antibacterial medicines have greatly reduced plague fatality rates.

According to the WHO, during 2019–2025, most plague cases reported to the WHO occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Madagascar.

While Russian authorities are rejecting the lab-leak theory, saying there are no links to the lab technician’s death and her research work at the Anti-Plague Institute, Moscow’s previous record in handling such lab-leak incidents and hiding crucial information has prompted fears that it is hiding more information than it is sharing.

Notably, the lab-leak theory has brought back the painful memories of the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax leak, which, according to the official Soviet Union version, led to the death of 66 people, but according to independent researchers, caused the death of over a hundred people.

The 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Leak In The Soviet Union

In April 1979, a missing or improperly reinstalled exhaust filter at Compound 19, a military microbiology facility involved in the Soviet biological-weapons program, released aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores.

Over the next few hours, wind carried the plume over the city. People in the plume developed inhalation anthrax over the following days; livestock in the area were also affected.

The Soviet authorities initially suggested the bacteria spread through “contaminated meat.”

However, hospital records, autopsy and epidemiologic evidence, victim interviews, independent research, and Russia’s own investigation in 1992 showed that the pathology was inhalation anthrax, not the gastrointestinal form claimed in the official “contaminated meat” story, and that most of the infections clustered geographically along the wind direction from the facility, and the strain matched material worked on at the site, establishing the lab leak theory.

Boris Yeltsin, the regional Communist Party official at the time who later became Russian president, publicly acknowledged in 1992 that the outbreak came from the military facility.

A 1994 investigation led by Matthew Meselson, which had access to official records and used wind data, victim locations, and strain comparisons, confirmed an accidental airborne release of a laboratory strain.

In 2016, researchers finally sequenced the genome of the bacteria behind the deaths, confirming it was a strain of the anthrax-causing bacterium Bacillus anthracis that Soviet scientists had modified.

It was one of the largest inhalation anthrax outbreaks in history and irrefutable evidence of the Soviet Union’s secret dabbling in offensive bioweapons research.

The event is sometimes called “Biological Chernobyl.”

Notably, the Soviet Union’s Compound 19 biological weapons research facility violated the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which the USSR had signed.

According to reports, the Soviets did similar tinkering with plague bacteria (Yersinia pestis); Francisella tularensis, the bacterium that causes tularemia; and Legionella bacteria, which cause Legionnaires’ disease.

There are also reports of similar leaks of deadly viruses and bacteria from Soviet biological weapons labs in the past.

For instance, in 1971, a young scientist reportedly fell ill after a research vessel, the Lev Berg, strayed too close to Vozrozhdeniya Island in Uzbekistan, where Soviets ran a secretive biological weapons research lab. Days later, the scientist was diagnosed with smallpox.

A year later, the corpses of two missing fishermen were found nearby, drifting in their boat. It’s thought that they had caught the plague.

Clearly, the Soviets continued working on offensive biological weapons even after signing the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

There are fears that Russia continued such research even after the Soviet Union collapsed.

In fact, dangerous viruses and bacteria have leaked from labs not just in Russia, but in other countries too.

For instance, after the natural SARS epidemic ended, the virus reappeared only through laboratory accidents.

For instance, in 2003, a 27-year-old researcher was infected when West Nile virus samples were cross-contaminated with live SARS coronavirus in a BSL-3 lab in Singapore.

Similarly, after natural smallpox transmission had largely ended in the UK, accredited labs were the source of outbreaks.

In 1973, a laboratory technician at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine was infected after observing open-bench harvesting of smallpox virus. She transmitted it in the hospital before isolation; two visitors died, and a nurse was infected.

In 1978, a medical photographer, Janet Parker, whose workplace was above a smallpox laboratory in Birmingham, contracted the disease and died.

In 2015, CDC labs potentially exposed dozens of staff to live anthrax after incomplete inactivation. Separately, Dugway Proving Ground shipped inactivated anthrax spores that remained viable to nearly 200 laboratories in the US and several other countries.

In fact, researchers in the US have cataloged thousands of overt laboratory-associated infections in the 20th century alone.

According to the National Library of Medicine, “analysis of the available information revealed that only 18% of the infections were due to known accidents; 42% were caused by bacteria; 27% by viruses; 15% by rickettsiae; 9% by fungi; 3% by chlamydiae; and 3% by parasites.”

A Lancet study on ‘Laboratory-acquired infections and pathogen escapes worldwide between 2000 and 2021’ identified 309 published lab-acquired infections – eight fatal, including plague, meningococcus, Ebola, and one prion case – and 16 pathogen-escape events beyond the immediate worker, among them the Lanzhou Brucella outbreak, multiple anthrax and SARS incidents, poliovirus, and foot-and-mouth virus.

Clearly, lab leaks of viruses, bacteria, and pathogens are neither rare nor unprecedented.

However, the risks associated with such leaks increase manifold when the country of origin hides information and tries to mislead the world community to avoid responsibility.

At this stage, we can only sincerely hope that that is not the case with the death of a young Russian researcher in Siberia.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
• Story with Updated Headlines

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The US has pulled out all its B-1B Lancer bombers from RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom, a key forward operating location used for long-range missions against Iran. 

The abrupt move appears to be an attempt by the US to safeguard its long-range strategic bombers from the fate suffered by other military aircraft destroyed by Iranian attacks in the Middle East.

The B-1B bombers arrived at RAF Fairford in March 2026 as part of Operation Epic Fury. Although the US and Iran agreed to a ceasefire in April 2026, the B-1Bs remained stationed at Fairford amid sustained hostilities.

However, the US hastily withdrew all 12 B-1B Lancers from the base on October 4, 2026, amid renewed threats of an Iran-backed plot against the facility.  The Pentagon confirmed the bombers have returned to their home bases.

“While operational security precluded us from ​confirming the movement of our assets and forces ​in real-time, ‌we can acknowledge now that all US bombers that were deployed to RAF Fairford have re-deployed to their home ‌stations in the United States,” a Pentagon spokesman reportedly said ‌in ​a statement.

The pullout was extremely unusual since such actions are rarely taken so swiftly from an allied air base thousands of kilometers away from the combat zone. In fact, some of the bombers and their flight crews left RAF Fairford even as aerial refueling aircraft were still being rushed to support the missions to the United States, the New York Times reported.

These claims point towards an uncanny sense of urgency, although the US military has not officially cited a reason for this rushed exodus of bombers from RAF Fairford.

Nonetheless, the move comes days after five British men in their early 20s were arrested near RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire after reports of three suspicious vans approaching the base hosting the US bombers.

They were held on suspicion of Explosives Act offenses and preparing a terrorist act, but were released on police bail with strict conditions the next day. However, a sixth man—identified as a 25-year-old dual UK-Iranian national—was later arrested in London on suspicion of preparing terrorist acts. He was later released on bail.

An investigation into what was believed to be a sabotage operation is now underway. However, both the United States and the United Kingdom have since hinted that Iran has links to the potential attack or sabotage operation.

US President Donald Trump said the suspects had been looking to ‌do “big damage” whereas Secretary of State Marco Rubio said it involved the “hands of a foreign actor,” without directly naming Tehran. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham said there are “strong indications” that Iran played a role in the security incident at a crucial base that hosts US assets and troops.

Iran dismissed the allegations and has denied any link to the suspected security incident.

“PM Burnham says the UK Government ‘can confirm our belief that we believe Iran to have played a part’ in the RAF Fairford incident,” Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote on X last week. “I can confirm Iran’s belief that releasing supposed terrorists working for foreign states really says it all. You’re barking up the wrong tree.”

Iranian Threats Triggered A Pullout?

The US military has not given any information on the urgent threat, whether it was an imminent strike or a sabotage- or terror-related incident. However, the threats issued by the Islamic Republic and its forces in the past may have influenced the decision to withdraw the bombers.

As the hostilities resumed between the US and Iran in July this year, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) claimed that the US was launching bomber sorties from RAF Fairford to attack Iranian cities, adding that any base used to carry out such strikes would be a legitimate target.

“The American aggressor army, which used to launch cruise missiles from its vessels in the Indian Ocean in its aggression after the official resumption of the war, with the end of the missile reserves of the aforementioned vessels, yesterday switched to using B1 planes flying from Fairford Air Base, England,” Tasnim News Agency quoted the IRGC as saying on July 23. “As the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated, any base that is used to invade Iran’s territory is our legitimate goal.”

In March 2026, Araghchi told the UK Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, that Iran views the UK’s decision to let the US use British bases as “participation in aggression.” Later, it fired two mid-range ballistic missiles at Diego Garcia, the Indian Ocean military outpost jointly operated by the US and the UK.  Although none of the missiles reached their designated targets, the attack was launched after the UK approved the US use of its bases as launchpads for attacks on Iranian sites targeting the Strait of Hormuz.

RAF Fairford, for one, has been a key hub for US heavy bombers—including the B-1B and the B-52—conducting missions against Iranian missile infrastructure. Although Washington could fly long-range bombers to attack Iran from its own soil, using RAF Fairford has been significant because it enables long-range strikes and reduces flight times to Iranian targets by over 50% compared to US-based launches, allowing higher sortie rates.

According to media reports, a proxy sabotage or terror operation by Iran on RAF Fairford remains a major possibility. In the past, the United Kingdom has accused Iran of conducting cyberattacks and employing criminal networks and proxies to strike at its critics and dissidents on British soil for years.

Apart from a terror plot, it is hard to say whether Iran has the capability to strike RAF Fairford, or any other base in the United Kingdom. Iran has long claimed a self-imposed limit of about 2,000 kilometers for its ballistic missiles. However, its March 2026 attempted strike on the US-UK base at Diego Garcia demonstrated a much longer reach, and analysts have said it could potentially strike parts of the United Kingdom.

The US currently has about 45 operational B-1B bombers in its inventory, and many are aging airframes with very low readiness rates.

Therefore, losing even a single bomber would remove a scarce, high-payload platform that cannot be rapidly replaced, particularly while the B-21 Raider remains in the early stages of introduction. Additionally, a successful Iranian strike on a high-value asset at a known forward location would also carry symbolic weight, demonstrating an ability to impose costs far from the primary theater.

Moreover, the US military has already faced a trial by fire in the Middle East during the course of this war and lost several military aircraft, many of them on the ground, a fate that it may not wish to befall its highly potent but limited bomber fleet.

On March 27, 2026, for instance, an Iranian drone struck an E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft during a strike at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Photos published after the strike showed that the rear fuselage of E-3 #81-0005 was completely burned out and destroyed, with debris scattered around the aircraft.

On March 2, CENTCOM reported that three F-15Es were shot down and destroyed by friendly fire over Kuwait; all six aircrew ejected safely and were recovered. The fourth F-15E was shot down by Iran during combat operations over Iran on April 5; both aircrew were safely recovered during separate search-and-rescue operations.

On March 14, media reports stated that five additional KC-135s were damaged on the ground at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia during an Iranian strike.

Later, Iran managed to damage an F-35A fighter jet over Iranian airspace. A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report stated that replacing/repairing the aircraft would cost $120 million, without saying whether it would be written off or repaired.

On April 5, the US forces were forced to destroy two MC-130J Commando II special operations aircraft inside Iran after the planes became stuck and immobilized while supporting combat search-and-rescue efforts for a downed F-15E aircrew. Meanwhile, the US lost an HH-60W Jolly Green II combat search-and-rescue helicopter after it took damage from small-arms fire during the same operation.

In addition to these manned aircraft, the US lost several unmanned aerial vehicles, including MQ-9 Reapers and MQ-1C Tritons. The US has now lost more than 30 Reapers in the conflict with Iran, several destroyed on the ground by Iran across Middle East bases.

If Washington is preparing another round of strikes on Iran, and Tehran answers as it did against US bases in the Middle East, then RAF Fairford could be in the firing line. The IRGC has already called the base a legitimate target. The Pentagon has not said the B-1Bs left because of that threat. Moving all 12 in a day, while tankers were still being scrambled, suggests commanders were not willing to leave a scarce bomber fleet on a base they could no longer treat as safe.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

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During his interaction with the press ahead of Air Force Day on October 8, 2026, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) stated that, in the near future, the Indian Air Force would have a “healthy mix” of LCA Tejas Mk 1A, LCA Mk 2, the French Rafale and the indigenous fifth-generation AMCA.

On the face of it, there is little to quarrel with what the CAS stated.

These aircraft will undoubtedly constitute important elements of the IAF’s future fighter fleet. However, the projection has some infirmities that are difficult to overlook.

The first question is what the CAS meant by the “near future”.

If the statement is intended to describe the fighter fleet that the IAF will field over the next decade or so, the mix is understandable. But if it projects the force structure into the 2040s—and beyond—it raises a more fundamental question.

How far into the future was the CAS extrapolating current procurement plans to arrive at the projected “healthy mix”?

Based on the past record of Indian fighter aircraft development projects, I would think at least 15 years from now, well into the 2040s.

By then, Tejas Mk 1A, Tejas Mk 2, Rafale and AMCA could indeed form the backbone of the IAF’s manned combat-aircraft fleet. But describing that combination alone as a “healthy mix” ignores a major transformation already underway in air warfare.

The manned fighter is no longer the whole equation

There is little doubt that the IAF will continue to depend predominantly on the 4th-generation fighters named by the CAS, quite possibly for the next 20 to 30 years. Fighter aircraft have long service lives, and India’s continuing dependence on legacy and contemporary 4th-generation platforms is therefore likely to persist well into the 2040s and perhaps beyond.

But the fighter force of the 2040s cannot be assessed merely by counting manned fighters across different generations.

The changing character of air warfare will demand a mix of manned and unmanned platforms, with different levels of survivability, autonomy and weapons heft.

This matters because the most dangerous missions in a future conflict will likely involve penetrating increasingly dense and sophisticated air-defense networks. A manned 4th-generation fighter, however capable, is not necessarily the most appropriate platform for every such mission.

The Unmanned Component

The IAF’s future force structure will therefore need an increasing proportion of unmanned combat aircraft.

At one end of the spectrum would be relatively inexpensive unmanned systems able to perform reconnaissance, electronic warfare, decoy and weapons-truck functions. At the other end would be sophisticated unmanned combat aircraft capable of operating alongside manned fighters as loyal wingmen.

The latter could substantially increase the effectiveness of a manned fighter formation. An unmanned aircraft could carry additional weapons, extend the formation’s sensor coverage, perform electronic attack or act as a decoy, while exposing no pilot to the risk of a mission in heavily defended airspace.

There is also an important economic dimension. An unmanned platform does not necessarily have to replicate the capabilities, complexity, or cost of a manned fighter. A future air force could therefore field far more expendable or attritable unmanned combat aircraft than it could afford to field manned fighters.

This would fundamentally alter the arithmetic of air combat.

Why describe only the present procurement mix?

The “healthy mix” the CAS referred to was therefore, in my view, probably intended primarily for mainstream media consumption.

That is not necessarily a criticism of the CAS.

Mainstream reporting tends to operate at shallow depths and gravitates towards readily understood narratives. In India’s case, the Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) narrative is particularly attractive.

Tejas Mk 1A, Tejas Mk 2 and AMCA fit neatly into that narrative, while Rafale provides the foreign component of the mix.

But the full spectrum of capabilities that the IAF will require in the 2040s is considerably more complicated.

It would include manned 4th-generation fighters, 4.5-generation fighters, 5th-generation VLO aircraft and an expanding family of unmanned combat aircraft ranging from relatively inexpensive attritable systems to sophisticated loyal wingmen.

The Uncomfortable Technological Reality

I suspect that the IAF leadership understands this reality.

India’s indigenous technological capability in unmanned combat aircraft is still far short of what it would take to develop and field the full range of systems a future air force will need.

The problem is not simply the airframe. Autonomous operation, artificial intelligence, manned-unmanned teaming, secure communications, distributed sensing, electronic warfare and the ability to operate in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment all present formidable challenges.

MoD bureaucrats are unlikely to be unaware of these limitations either.

Under the circumstances, articulating the full range of what a truly “healthy mix” would entail would perhaps serve little purpose in a public interaction with the media.

But that does not make the issue any less important.

The Real Challenge

The real challenge is not recognizing that India needs a mix of manned and unmanned combat aircraft. It is developing the technologies and industrial ecosystem needed to field them in meaningful numbers.

The IAF of the 2040s will almost certainly still contain large numbers of 4th-generation fighters. There is nothing inherently wrong with that. The question is what surrounds them.

If the future force consists predominantly of today’s manned fighter concepts, supplemented by a relatively small number of AMCA aircraft, it may represent a healthy mix of India’s current procurement programs.

It may not, however, be a healthy mix for the wars India could have to fight in the 2040s and beyond.

The distinction is important. A force structure should not be called “healthy” merely because it contains a balanced selection of aircraft India can build or procure today.

It should be judged against the operational environment in which that force will actually have to fight.

• Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
• Views Personal of the Author
• Follow the author @vkthakur

The post Rafale, Tejas & AMCA: IAF’s “Healthy Mix” of Fighter Jets Leaves Out The Aircraft That May Matter The Most appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

OPED by Mahendra Ved  

Indian High Commissioner Dinesh Trivedi has conveyed a few home truths to his host country, Bangladesh.

They seem to have been forgotten while demanding that ousted former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina be returned: on August 5, 2024, she was “not brought by the Indian Air Force or the Indian Army.”

India had “hardly any choice” and was “unprepared” when she arrived.

Now a diplomat, the politician avoided stating the obvious: she was brought from Dhaka to India on a Bangladesh Air Force aircraft.

Another reminder: “At that point in time, Hasina was still the prime minister of Bangladesh.”

He said that legal procedures were ‘underway’ for her extradition, and that they take time.

Of course, he didn’t mention Hasina’s repeated announcement in December that she would return of her own discretion.

How times have changed! Once considered the ‘friendliest’ in South Asia, India’s relations with Bangladesh have become complex, even delicate.

Sheikh Hasina’s exile in India and her proposed return have added another layer of complexity to an already extraordinarily complicated relationship.

Addressing the media and her Awami League cadres through audio calls, she has repeated that she will return home, despite knowing that arrest and prosecution await her.

Seeking international support from lawmakers and human rights organizations, she has addressed seminars in London and Geneva via audio.

Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s government expressed ‘outrage’ at her audio address in Delhi and has banned domestic media from reporting it. It did not respond to India’s twin invitations, one bilateral and the other for the BRICS summit in New Delhi.

A brief update is essential.

Following Hasina’s ouster, an interim government led by Muhammad Yunus sustained itself on anti-Hasina and, since she was in India, anti-India sentiment.

Since this year’s February elections, a party with a history of problematic relations with India has been in power. The elections also brought to power an opposition force of Jamaat-e-Islami and students who worked to oust Hasina and see India as an adversary.

As India tries to rebuild bilateral ties under totally changed circumstances, hosting Hasina has complicated them. Rahman’s possible visit in November has been discussed at different levels, but exploring dates and announcing final dates are different.

To anyone unversed in India-Bangladesh ties, the two issues—Hasina’s return and Tarique’s visit—may appear separate. In reality, they are closely intertwined.

The government in Dhaka wants Hasina back, convicted of serious crimes and sentenced to death. Since it involves a bilateral extradition treaty, India cannot simply hand her over.

As Rahman faces pressure, especially from the opposition, he must weigh in on Hasina’s presence while visiting India. His government’s grievance, also used as leverage, affects ties with Delhi.

Delhi, meanwhile, has a larger strategic interest: building a workable relationship with the government in Dhaka, whoever leads it. Bangladesh is too important to India to let the relationship remain permanently hostage to a former prime minister’s fate.

That is why the proposed Tarique visit matters. But it is also why it is difficult. There is a certain diplomatic stalemate.

Dhaka cannot easily separate Hasina’s presence in India from its own domestic politics. It wants Delhi to accept the new political reality. Yet the Hasina question remains the most emotionally and politically charged issue between them.

Both neighbors want a relationship based on mutual interests and reciprocity. But neither wants to be seen conceding on Hasina to facilitate Rahman’s visit. Any ‘understanding’ with India on this would expose Rahman at home to the charge of having surrendered.

This explains why Rahman’s visit in November is possible, but not certain.

Because after November comes December.

Assuming Hasina returns, another question becomes unavoidable: what happens to her safety?

If the Rahman government arrests and prosecutes her, it is also duty-bound to protect her.

It may regard her as responsible for grave political and human-rights abuses. It may even seek to establish her responsibility through courts. But it cannot allow her fate to be decided by an assassin, a mob or an extremist organization.

With several past attempts on her life, Hasina herself has acknowledged that she could face death if she returns. The Bangladesh government has responded by saying that she would receive full security and legal protection.

The world witnessed the assassination of another former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, in 2007. It reminds us that government protection does not make an extremist threat disappear. A politically prominent person can remain a target even when the state has formally undertaken to protect her.

One would not like to push the Benazir angle too far. Nothing so far suggests a conspiracy or that Hasina is destined to meet the same fate. But religious extremism has deep roots in Bangladesh. It also witnessed killings of people in jail in 1975. Hence, the threat to Hasina’s life cannot be dismissed.

That creates a paradox for Rahman’s government. It is not just a political gesture to an adversary; Hasina’s protection is a state obligation.

Indeed, this matters because Hasina is not merely another former prime minister. She is the daughter of Sheik Mujibur Rahman and has been at the center of Bangladesh’s political life for decades. To her supporters, she represents a political tradition that is now under assault. To her opponents, she represents a period of authoritarian rule for which she must answer.

If she returns and faces trial, Bangladesh will certainly be under an international microscope. If the proceedings are conducted peacefully and in accordance with the law, the government can argue that the country has chosen the judicial route.

If she is imprisoned, the government will have to show that imprisonment is not an excuse for political revenge.

And if, despite state protection, she were killed by extremists, the political consequences could be enormous—even if the government itself had nothing to do with the assassination.

Hasina could become a martyr. The now-banned Awami League could acquire a powerful new symbol. The new government’s credibility could be damaged. And Bangladesh’s already polarised politics could become even more dangerous.

Both must consider the wider strategic considerations.

India cannot build its Bangladesh policy entirely around Hasina.

Her nearly 16-year rule created a close relationship between New Delhi and Dhaka, particularly on security and connectivity. But governments change. India has to deal with the Bangladesh that exists, not simply the Bangladesh it would prefer to see.

That means engaging Tarique Rahman’s government. It means rebuilding political contacts and restoring economic and commercial links. It means addressing border security, connectivity, water, the Northeast, and China’s growing influence. It means recognizing that the new Bangladesh will have its own political priorities.

But normalization does not require India to forget Hasina. Nor does it require Bangladesh to abandon its demand for justice.

Perhaps the two countries can eventually learn to separate these questions.

Tarique Rahman can visit India.

• OPED by Mahendra Ved
• President (2016-2022), Commonwealth Journalists Association (CJA)

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China has displayed a full-scale J-10CE mock-up in Azerbaijani markings at the sixth Azerbaijan International Defense Exhibition (ADEX-2026), which opened at the Baku Expo Center on September 30.

China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC), which represents Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), made its debut at ADEX this year by bringing a range of advanced aviation equipment, including the J-10CE fighter jet, L-15A advanced trainer aircraft, Y-20 transport aircraft, Z-20 helicopter, and Wing Loong drones.

Notably, this comes days after photos of a full-scale J-10CE (Vigorous Dragons) mock-up displayed at ADEX 2026 surfaced on social media, showing Azerbaijan’s national flag markings.

Whether this display leads to a sale of J-10C jets remains to be seen, but analysts see it as a potential pathway.

Azerbaijan has not hinted whether it wants to buy the J-10CE. However, reports of its interest in the aircraft have circulated since the Azerbaijani Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Namig Islamzade, was photographed examining the aircraft during the Zhuhai Air Show in China in November 2024, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

Azerbaijan Air Force already operates the JF-17 Block III fighter produced jointly by China and Pakistan. If Azerbaijan goes ahead and acquires the aircraft, it would become the third country to acquire the J-10C after Pakistan and Uzbekistan, and the second country in the world to operate both the JF-17 and the J-10C after Pakistan.

China, for one, has been pushing the J-10CE in the export market by emphasizing that the aircraft has been tested in combat. Pakistan deployed the J-10CE against India during the May 2025 conflict and claimed to have downed multiple Indian Air Force aircraft, including the Rafale, using the long-range PL-15 air-to-air missiles.

IAF called them “Manohar Kahaniya” or Pulp Fiction tales and, in turn, claimed downing nearly a dozen PAF warplanes, including F-16s and JF-17s.

China has positioned itself as a reliable non-Western arms supplier to countries looking to modernize their militaries while reducing reliance on Russia.

Azerbaijan’s existing experience with Chinese avionics, sensors and weapons systems—gained through its JF-17 Block III fleet—could make the J-10CE an attractive option. Chinese experts have presented the more capable J-10CE as a natural high-end complement in a high-low mix, better suited to complex missions than the lighter JF-17.

Coupled with Azerbaijan’s recent acquisition of the Chinese HQ-9BE long-range air-defense system, a J-10CE purchase would integrate Chinese platforms into a cohesive combat architecture for Baku’s forces.

Baku has been considering replacing aging Soviet-era MiG-29s and Su-25s and bolstering its overall military posture to counter Armenia. This could potentially create a perfect opportunity for China’s state export machinery.

Armenia, an arch-nemesis of Azerbaijan, meanwhile, maintains a very limited fighter jet inventory. The bulk of the Armenian Air Force consists of a small number of Su-25 Frogfoots, many of which it lost in the war with Azerbaijan in 2020. It also has older Su-25s and just four Su-30SMs.

Previous reports indicated that Armenia has been in talks with India to acquire 8–12 Su-30MKI multirole fighter jets, in a package variously estimated at $2.5–3 billion, though neither government has confirmed a contract.

Meanwhile, Armenia has emerged as one of the most important buyers of Indian arms, having acquired the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher, the Akash surface-to-air missile system, Swathi weapon-locating radars, ATAGS 155 mm towed howitzers, and the MArG 155 wheeled artillery system.

J-10C

The J-10C is a single-engine, 4.5-generation delta-canard multirole fighter. Its export version, the J-10CE, uses the indigenous Shenyang WS-10 turbofan and carries an AESA radar and an infrared search-and-track sensor. It can be armed with the PL-10, a short-range missile with an imaging-infrared seeker, and the longer-range PL-15.

It also has a glass cockpit, an electronic-warfare suite, beyond-visual-range engagement and precision strike, with in-flight refueling on configured aircraft. A targeting pod supports laser- and satellite-guided munitions. Chinese media often liken it to later F-16s; like the F-16, it uses fly-by-wire to control an unstable airframe.

Chinese state media say the J-10CE will continue to be upgraded for export. Designer Li Jun told China Daily it can be tailored for air superiority or strike, with optional payloads, and that its AESA radar and network-centric systems outperform older mechanically scanned setups. Claims of gallium-nitride radar upgrades, radar-absorbing coatings and engine changes remain unverified.

“The J-10CE can adapt to customers’ needs, including air superiority and strike against ground targets, and can be customized based on the environments and mission requirements of different users. We can also offer optional payload packages to clients,” Li said, making a direct appeal to countries looking to upgrade their fleets.

“The aircraft’s avionics system has received a generational upgrade. Its Active Electronically Scanned Array radar system can rapidly detect and track targets, far outperforming traditional mechanically scanned radars,” Li stated. “The jet boasts powerful features, including network-centric cooperative combat, beyond visual range multiple target engagement in intense electromagnetic scenarios, and multimodal precision strikes. It can also prevail in medium- and low-altitude dogfights,” he added.

However, these reports could not be independently verified.

Despite a coordinated export campaign, the J-10CE has had limited success in the export market.

Countries like Bangladesh and Indonesia have both expressed interest in the jet, but it has not culminated in a deal. Moreover, Egypt recently decided to procure additional Rafale jets (it was also pitched the J-10C).

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

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Amid nuclear threats to NATO and warnings of a “very short war”, the Russian military has struck another major bridge in Kyiv as German chancellor Friedrich Merz arrived in the Ukrainian capital.

Zelensky told Merz that people were suffering “terrible nights and days” from the relentless Russian attacks, and called Ukraine’s adversaries “absolute barbarians”.

“We can see the entire pointlessness of this war at this place,” noted Merz. “These barbarous attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine must stop. These are war crimes that are being committed daily here.”

Merz said Ukraine “needs all our support in the coming weeks”. “If Russia is not stopped, its war machine will sooner or later turn against us,” he added.

Meanwhile, Russia’s defense ministry has pledged to accelerate strikes on “military and military-industrial facilities” and “related infrastructure in Kyiv” and elsewhere after Zelensky said Ukraine would intensify its attacks against Russian oil facilities.

On Saturday, Moscow had alerted foreigners and diplomats to leave Kyiv, saying “massive” new airstrikes would hit the city.

“The EU Delegation is staying. Threatening us will not stop Europe’s support for Ukraine. It only reminds us why that support matters!” EU ambassador Katarina Mathernova wrote on X on Sunday.

Earlier, Russia cautioned NATO it would be ready to resort to nuclear weapons if the Western alliance tried ​to cut off Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave that borders the Baltic Sea.

In a document sent to NATO, Moscow accused the alliance of ‌a “dangerous and reckless course” that entailed “high risks of the outbreak of a direct armed conflict”.

According to the document, this included the possibility of “Russian strikes against decision-making centers in the alliance’s member states right from the outset”.

“Russia will be ready to use the entire arsenal of forces and capabilities at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in order to defend its territory should NATO countries undertake any attempt aimed at isolating the Kaliningrad Region from the ​rest of the country,” the diplomatic note said.

“If Europe attacks Russia, it will be a completely different sort of war – ​a very short war, ” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova wrote. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said the alliance had responded to Russia’s message by declaring: “We are a defensive alliance. And stop the nuclear threats. This is absolutely not called for and not helpful.”

Russia’s Red Line?

Earlier attacks on a Russian oil refinery in Moscow angered powerful Russians, including members of the State Duma, who urged radical change in military strategy.

The First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, Alexei Zhuravlyov, was quoted saying: “There is only one way out of this situation, and it is quite simple: the destruction of the terrorist Kyiv regime”.

He called for the elimination of all logistics, bridges, tunnels, and bomb railway stations — “it’s finally time to begin fighting seriously”.

Konstantin Malofeev, founder of Tsargrad media, questioned why Russia isn’t “fighting for real” and asked why Moscow was not using Nukes: “What else has to happen before we start fighting for real?” and “Why aren’t we using the nuclear weapons that our ancestors created and stockpiled… precisely for moments like this?”

State Duma deputy Andrey Gurulyov, a retired lieutenant general, has called upon Russia to “strike the enemy mercilessly, without hesitation” or “without overthinking it.”

The big question is: what would Russia attack, and what would the repercussions be?

Potential use of Russian nukes will result in widespread destruction and heavy loss of life. It would significantly reduce Ukraine’s chances of surviving as a neutral buffer state that actually contributes to Russia’s security, ex-IAF pilot and expert on the Russian military Vijainder K Thakur argues.

Instead, it would give US-led NATO an opportunity to indefinitely extend sanctions and bleed Russia to the point where it could be dismembered, Thakur adds.

If the Ukraine war continues for another four years, NATO could be in a position to enter a full-scale conventional war with Russia under the pretext of liberating Ukrainian territory. As long as the war in Ukraine remains conventional, NATO’s relative strength will continue to grow over time, and Russia’s chances of ending the conflict will fade away, Thakur believes.

Russia’s choice today is whether to fight NATO now, while it is still relatively weak, or to act decisively to end the conflict in its favor, letting NATO decide how to respond to Russia’s decisive action, whatever it may be, Thakur says.

• Mail us at: editor (at) eurasiantimes.com
• This is a News + Opinion Article
• With AFP Inputs

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The recent summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping may have projected an image of renewed engagement; however, while two Presidents negotiated above the surface, their navies were preparing for a contest in which nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) could play a decisive role.

The strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing seems to be moving on a very different track—especially under the waters of the Indo-Pacific.

At the moment, the United States may have a substantial lead in the number of SSNs, technology, and operational experience, but China is rapidly catching up by expanding its undersea capabilities.

In its quest to narrow the gap with the US, China has entered a race for undersea advantage across the Indo-Pacific, which could shape deterrence, sea control, and the strategic balance of power for decades to come.

For maritime domination, both SSNs and SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) play critical roles.

SSBNs primarily provide nuclear deterrence by ensuring a credible second-strike capability, whereas SSNs are essentially designed to conduct hunter-killer missions, including tracking and, if necessary, engaging adversary SSBNs, as well as escorting carrier strike groups (CSGs) for sea control missions.

As Korean scholar Dongkeun Lee points out, in the context of the Indo-Pacific, SSN operations can be broadly classified into two primary missions: (1) countering SSBN capabilities and (2) escorting CSGs. The former is closely associated with nuclear deterrence, whereas the latter reflects the traditional sea power function of controlling and protecting key sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

Both missions are particularly important in this part of the world as its principal flashpoints, including the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait, are all maritime domains. Maintaining credible naval capabilities, therefore,  is essential to advancing both deterrence and broader strategic objectives in the region.

Incidentally, around one-third of global shipping traverses the South China Sea. The maritime gateways here are critical not only for China but also for Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.

American CSGs continue to play a major role in controlling and protecting these critical SLOCs. Consequently, SSNs play an equally crucial role in escorting CSGs. By providing lethal undersea capabilities that can silently target threats across multiple domains, including surface and subsurface targets, SSNs can effectively eliminate threats to aircraft carriers.

The United States permanently deploys an aircraft carrier to the Seventh Fleet, based in Yokosuka, Japan, and it is common for more than one CSG to be present in this region at any given time. SSNs’ presence here serves both to protect US carrier groups and to create the possibility of threatening Chinese nuclear submarines.

Likewise, the PRC is rapidly developing its own CSG capability to counterbalance that of the United States in the South China Sea. China’s Yulin naval base on Hainan Island is an important center for its nuclear submarine forces.

Until recently, the undersea dominance tilted heavily in favor of the US. But the alignments are fast changing.

Though the US Navy still leads with an all-nuclear fleet of 71 active submarines (including 51–53 SSNs/SSGNs), China has now surpassed Russia to command the world’s second-largest nuclear submarine fleet with an estimated 9 to 12 SSNs (such as the Type 093 and Type 093A/093B Shang-class) and 6 SSBNs (Jin-class Type 094), totaling roughly 32 active nuclear submarines across its entire naval forces that operate primarily in the Indo-Pacific region.

In a recent IISS assessment, China launched 10 nuclear-powered submarines between 2021 and 2025, totaling 79,000 tonnes, against America’s 7 boats at 55,000 tonnes. For the first time, China out-built the US in both numbers and tonnage in a five-year window, it is argued.

“Most significantly, this includes the seventh and eighth Type 094 (Jin) nuclear-armed ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), which come as part of the emergence of Beijing’s nuclear triad,” the IISS study says.

It noted that commercially available satellite imagery taken in early 2026 showed six Type 094s in total, spread between the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co (BSHIC) shipyard in Huludao, the 1st Submarine Base at Jianggezhuang, the Xiaopingdao test facility and the 2nd Submarine Base at Yalong Bay on Hainan Island.

“Allowing for additional boats either on deterrence patrol or under cover for refit during this period, it is almost certainly the case that China has launched a seventh and eighth Type-094 in 2024 and 2025, respectively,” the IIISS study concludes.

In addition to the Type 094s, Bohai is also producing nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN) for the People’s Liberation Army, with the study suggesting that nine Type 093B (Shang III) boats have been launched between 2022 and this year, based on commercial satellite imagery of the facility and US government assessments.

Incidentally, in March this year,  the US Navy’s intelligence chief, Rear Admiral Mike Brookes, testified before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) that China is undertaking a major shift toward building an all-nuclear submarine fleet as part of a broader effort to strengthen its undersea warfare capabilities and expand blue-water naval power.

According to Brookes, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which operates more than 60 submarines in total, including roughly 50 conventional diesel-electric boats (SSK) and a smaller number of SSNs and SSBNs, is transitioning away from conventional submarines toward a predominantly nuclear construction program to support sustained operations, strategic deterrence and sea-lane interdiction.

Brookes also pointed out that China had expanded submarine production infrastructure across three major shipyards, tripling construction hall capacity and more than doubling production capability to sustain higher output of advanced nuclear boats through the 2030s.

By 2027, China’s submarine force is projected to reach roughly 70 submarines, adding up to six SSGNs, three smaller-class SSNs, and two SSBNs while retiring older Chinese and Russian-built submarines. By 2035, continued expansion could yield up to 80 submarines, with about half nuclear-powered—a major shift in force composition—and projections for the early 2040s include around 20-30 new-class SSGNs and SSBNs.

These platforms will be designed from the keel up for blue-water operations and persistent presence beyond the first island chain, representing an evolution in PLA Navy undersea operational capabilities. China will likely field a more survivable and numerous ballistic missile submarine force equipped with longer-range, more accurate SLBMs, enabling patrols in bastions closer to home waters while holding the US homeland at risk.

Broader deployment of long-range, potentially hypersonic anti-ship and land-attack missiles from undersea platforms is anticipated, along with more sophisticated torpedoes and unmanned vehicles for ISR, mine warfare, and strike missions. Substantial investments in seabed sensors, undersea cables, and unmanned systems will enhance China’s situational awareness while creating vulnerabilities for the US and allies in crisis or conflict.

The Indo-Pacific will remain the PLA Navy’s primary focus, but by 2040 routine submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, Arctic approaches, and possibly the Atlantic are likely, Brookes cautions.

However, as noted above, the US Navy currently has superior acoustic quieting, combat experience, and highly advanced Virginia-class SSNs. But as the EurAsian Times once explained, the US has a backlog of 12 Virginia-class submarines, in addition to three Columbia-class ballistic submarines.

Its production rate of 1.2 per year falls far short of the required 2.33 per year to meet its own needs and those of its allies (under the AUKUS pact, it is supposed to provide at least three Virginia-class submarines to Australia in the early 2030s).

Only three US shipyards can build nuclear-powered attack submarines (Groton, Connecticut; Quonset Point, Rhode Island; and Newport, Virginia). Only two of them are functional at the moment.

While the US defense industrial base is severely strained, China’s naval shipyards are said to be outperforming. With about 9 older Shang I/II boats plus an estimated 16 Type 093B hulls in service, in trials, or under construction, China is said to have the largest SSN series under construction anywhere.

The 093B reportedly features a vertical launch system for 24 YJ-12/YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles and six torpedo tubes, shifting China from torpedo brawls to long-range strike.

In the Indo-Pacific, the undersea race seems to change three fundamentals.

First, the era of uncontested US undersea dominance is over. US SSNs have long hunted Chinese SSBNs inside their bastion, keeping Beijing’s deterrent vulnerable. But now, China can sustain continuous at-sea deterrence patrols from Hainan’s Yalong Bay, protected by surface fleet and seabed sensors. That forces US SSNs to operate closer to Chinese waters, at higher risk, stretching ASW resources thin.

Second, the proliferation of quiet Chinese SSNs with VLS—at least six SSGN hulls launched in the past five years with vertical launch systems that could fire high-speed anti-ship missiles displayed in Beijing—means every US carrier entering the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea now faces a multi-axis underwater missile threat. The carrier’s sanctuary beyond the first island chain, once assumed, is no longer safe.

Third, China’s rapid maritime expansion has fundamentally altered the Indo-Pacific security landscape, prompting Australia and Japan to aggressively build strategic counterweights. Rather than acting in isolation, Canberra and Tokyo have pivoted toward minilateral security alliances, military modernization, and supply chain diversification to offset Beijing’s growing naval dominance.

Australia and Japan, alongside the United States and the Philippines, have formalized a security grouping explicitly designed to counter Beijing’s aggressive maneuvers in the South and East China Seas. This alliance focuses on joint maritime patrols, intelligence sharing, and military interoperability to safeguard freedom of navigation under international law.

Driven by the need to project power across its vast northern approaches, Australia has fundamentally reshaped its defense posture. This is anchored by the AUKUS pact—enabling Australia to acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines—positioning the nation as a formidable southern anchor against Chinese naval projection.

For India, which has no SSNs in service (it previously leased from Russia and now plans indigenous production) and operates only three SSBNs (Arihant, Arighaat, and Aridhaman), the implications are significant.

Against India’s slow naval expansion, Chinese nuclear submarines, including intelligence-gathering vessels, now regularly traverse the Indian Ocean.

Overall, one could say that “the silent service” in the Indo-Pacific is becoming loud.

During the Cold War, the submarine race was primarily fought in the Atlantic. Now, it is shifting to the Indo-Pacific, raising uncertainties over whether it will remain free and open.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post As Trump & Xi Talk — U.S. and China’s Nuclear Submarines Race For Dominance in the Indo-Pacific appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

As India hosts Tarang Shakti 2026 multinational drills, one learns not only from large-force engagements or one-on-one combat debriefs, but also from peculiar approaches, mannerisms, body language, and professional conduct.

The Americans have long followed the dictum of stating capabilities as they evolved, and in a way intimidating and making the opponent subservient with their larger-than-life persona.

Americans have led and driven military technologies and used never-ending conflicts to test weapons and doctrines. This gave them confidence and sometimes overconfidence in their approach.

Also, after the end of the Cold War, they chose to be global policemen and thought they would dictate all geopolitical outcomes, although they burned their fingers in most cases, at great cost to American lives and the exchequer.

The Soviet Union invested heavily in military, space, and nuclear power in the four decades after WW II and was a major competitor to the USA and the West. But the Soviet communist economy was otherwise hollow, and geopolitical power ultimately became unsustainable.

For long, the Russians, and their Soviet predecessors, believed in secrecy that kept the opponents guessing, and often being unsure, were frightened of the unknown capabilities.

The French have long worried about a possible Soviet juggernaut overwhelming and running over Europe, and have traditionally not trusted the Americans for their security. They just chose to have their own independent aircraft industry.

Indian military aviation gained valuable experience in WW II and, immediately after independence, began seeing air combat action that continued as recently as Op Sindoor. India benefited from exposure to British, Russian, American, and French aerial platforms and learned operational employment concepts from each.

It is worth understanding each one’s peculiarities.

American Air Operations Approach

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) operations approach has traditionally focused on integrating airpower across all domains to deter, compete, and win in contested environments. They believe in the “Competition Continuum” and view operations through a continuous framework of cooperation, competition, and conflict as part of their core operational concepts.

They believe that you are either with them or against them.

USA has long tried to use its technological edge to overwhelm its opponents. But that did not always work. American air power achieved tactical and operational successes in Vietnam, but it ultimately failed to accomplish its primary strategic and political objectives.

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The strategic bombing campaigns, such as “Operation Rolling Thunder” (1965–1968), failed to break the resolve of the North Vietnamese leadership or stop the continuous flow of men and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Political constraints of employment prevented air power from delivering a decisive blow. Heavy conventional bombing can be counterproductive against an asymmetric, rural insurgency, as was the case in Vietnam, often alienating the local population instead of winning “hearts and minds”.

US air power worked well in uncontested campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, but failed to achieve worthwhile political objectives. More recently, in “Operation Epic Fury” against Iran, the massive air campaign combined high-altitude dominance with sustained heavy bomber strikes against Iranian infrastructure.

They used stealth platforms (B-2 and F-35) and heavy bombers (B-52) to strike command centers, air defenses, and missile sites simultaneously across Iran. The B-52 missions were meant to target deeply buried, fortified military installations.

The US air power largely achieved its technical objectives, degrading conventional Iranian military production, force projection, and air defense networks. But the air dominance failed to force an unconditional surrender or collapse the regime.

Iran adapted by ceding high skies and shifting focus downward to the lower airspace over the Strait of Hormuz using low-cost drones and missiles, disrupting global shipping and raising transit costs for the U.S. Navy. Iranian missile and drone counter-attacks successfully struck regional forward bases in countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait, damaging U.S. ground infrastructure and support aircraft.

The U.S. has been focusing on Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), synchronizing air, space, cyberspace, land, and maritime capabilities seamlessly across services. NATO has shifted to Agile Combat Employment (ACE), moving operations away from large, centralized bases to dispersed, makeshift locations to increase survivability.

New approach to “Point Defense” requires integrated systems to protect critical base infrastructure from drone and missile threats. USAF is now preparing for “Force Generation” by restructuring how combat-ready forces are presented, trained, and sustained for high-end peer conflicts with China in the Indo-Pacific.

USAF continues to prepare for global vigilance, global reach, and global power. US air warriors are highly professional and focused on leading the world in technology employment, doctrine, and tactical concept development.

Russian Approach to Air Operations

Russia fields the world’s second-ranked military power. Russia possesses the largest nuclear weapons stockpile globally, estimated at over 5,400 warheads.

Russia operates the world’s third-strongest air force, backed by a massive total inventory of over 4,000 military aircraft. Production lines for key tactical aircraft like the Su-34 strike fighter and Su-35 air superiority jet have continued, helping offset operational attrition.

The integration of ultra-long-range air-to-air armaments, such as the R-37M missile, allows Russian jets to threaten targets at extended stand-off ranges.

Advanced 4.5-generation aircraft like the Sukhoi Su-35S feature thrust-vectoring engines for high maneuverability, powerful phased-array radars, and robust electronic warfare suites, alongside early-production fifth-generation Su-57 stealth fighters. Large stockpiles of cruise and ballistic missiles allow for persistent strategic and tactical bombardment.

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Russian forces maintain advanced, dense electronic warfare systems that can disrupt enemy communications and neutralize incoming drones. The highly sophisticated integrated air defense systems feature long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) platforms like the S-400 and S-500.

During the Cold War, the Soviet air arm was designed for long-range, high-altitude interceptions under close ground control. Aircraft were supplemented with long-range air-defense missiles.

Aircrews train extensively in extreme post-stall maneuvers such as the “Cobra,” using vectored engine thrust to maintain control at near-zero airspeeds. For long, Russia treated airpower as an army-centric, ground-support extension, or flying artillery, rather than an independent offensive strike force.

The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) was not designed to execute independent, deep-penetration air campaigns like NATO doctrine. Russia lacks comprehensive suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capabilities for wide offensive dominance.

Russia prioritizes layered defense against adversary aerospace threats using advanced mobile SAMs integrated closely with fighter aviation. Lessons from Ukraine have made them switch to stand-off attacks.

Fighters like the Sukhoi Su-34 release glide bombs from 35 to 50 kilometers away to mitigate the risk of entering dense adversary air defenses. They are switching to high-volume usage of tactical and long-range attack drones, along with synchronized cruise missile strikes.

Integration of domestic and foreign-supplied drone technology has expanded real-time reconnaissance and strike coordination on the front lines.

French Approach to Air Operations

The French approach to air operations relies on centralized command and control, rapid global power projection, and a strategic doctrine focused on using precise, minimal necessary force. France has combined air and space into a single force, as the domains are considered contiguous.

The National Air Operations Center (CNOA) at Lyon-Mont Verdun acts as the core command node. This setup allows France to control domestic airspace defense and international expeditions simultaneously.

The French Air and Space Force (FASF) emphasizes rapid responses. French aircraft are designed for agile response. They can project global power, such as deploying multiple Rafale fighters and multi-role tanker transports within hours.

FASF believes in “precision over mass,” using high-tech advanced sensors and specialized platforms like the Rafale. By maintaining very small fleets, they can handle technological upgrades and logistics better.

France favors swift, lethal, targeted actions over extended, nation-sapping campaigns. France is also actively pushing for longer-range air-to-air missiles to counter advanced peer competitors.

The FASF is participating in joint global deployments like Mission Pégase and multinational exercises like Tarang Shakti in India. They also regularly study partner experiences and the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) operational insights to refine modern combat tactics.

France is one of the few countries that builds entire aircraft domestically, reducing dependence and arm-twisting from larger powers like the USA.

French aircrews are heavily trained in dynamic, austere tactical approaches designed to operate in high-threat or completely unprepared environments.

French transport aircrews regularly qualify for tactical approaches onto unprepared surfaces like grass, dirt, and raw Arctic sea ice. French tactical air traffic controllers work alongside aircrews to coordinate stealthy, steep tactical descent profiles to avoid ground fire.

During transits, crews do not fly standard civilian airline tracks, instead simulate full tactical engagements, utilizing low-altitude terrain masking, defensive manoeuvring, and variable cockpit configurations.

The French take some of the most intensive approaches to joint crew mission debriefs, structured around a meticulous three-pronged framework: a specialized learning mode, learning structure, and learning culture. The goal is to seamlessly blend individual pilot progression with overall collective squadron performance, capitalizing directly on individual tactical mistakes to systematically update institutional knowledge.

The “Pégase” doctrine trains to rely less on massive permanent foreign bases and to demonstrate its aircrews’ ability to deploy multi-role Rafale fighters, A330 MRTT tankers, and A400M transports anywhere in a short time. FASF prioritizes decentralized command and empowering junior aircrew leaders with high autonomy to execute missions quickly inside an adversary’s OODA loop without waiting for centralized approvals.

Indian Aircrew and Dynamic Operations

From years of real combat experience and exercises with major global air forces, the Indian approach to air operations has fundamentally transformed, evolving from a traditional tactical army-support instrument into a highly lethal, multi-domain, strategic aerospace power.

Documented across successive IAF doctrines, India’s operational philosophy is dictated by unique regional geopolitics, primarily the two-front challenge of Pakistan and China, both with nuclear arms.

The IAF operates on a refined Western-style command philosophy tailored for high-tempo operations. IAF believes in centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution. While headquarters handle macro-level operational decision-making and resource allocation, local commanders retain execution autonomy to ensure flexibility, agility, and rapid responsiveness in highly dynamic environments.

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Historically restrained, India’s modern operational blueprint emphasizes strategic coercion and escalation dominance through its “No-War-No-Peace” strategy. The IAF acknowledges a grey-zone interregnum between total peace and overt war. India mandates using air power as a deterrent instrument of statecraft, with selective tactical application to manage cross-border crises, without inevitably triggering full-scale escalations.

Unlike Western concepts that envision protracted air campaigns, the Indian leadership focuses on intense, precise, and swift achievement of objectives to decisively penalize an aggressor before international political pressures force a ceasefire. A clear plan for quick action and conflict termination.

Faced with advanced missile networks and drone saturation, India has fused its defensive and offensive architectures. IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) is the backbone of India’s air operations. IACCS aggregates data from satellites, AWACS, ground radars, and fighter sensors into a single, real-time digital picture. Systems like the indigenously developed Akashteer (Army) seamlessly mesh with the IAF’s IACCS.

This enables autonomous low-level airspace tracking and swift coordination between ground-based systems (like the S-400 and Akash missiles) and interceptor aircraft.

Air operations depend heavily on space for targeting, navigation, and early warning. This evolution has driven an official push to rename the service the Indian Air and Space Force (IASF) to solidify its cross-domain mandate.

Through large multilateral exercises like Exercise Tarang Shakti, the IAF tests its ability to plan and communicate alongside global air assets (such as the F-35, Rafale, and Su-30MKI), building the plug-and-play capability needed for coalition frameworks.

Driven by the national Make in India initiative, India is transitioning from “threat-based” procurement to a “capability-demanded” force structure. Operational planning actively favors indigenously produced platforms (like the Tejas fighter, Light Combat Helicopter, and SkyStriker loitering munitions) alongside advanced electronics, AI-driven sorting algorithms, and electronic warfare suites to ensure technological self-reliance during a prolonged crisis.

Indian aircrew balance high-stakes strategic execution with advanced technological adaptation across diverse geographical environments. Indian military aircrews operate in some of the world’s most unforgiving geographies, requiring specialized tactical approaches. Modern aircrew treat the air and space domains as a single continuum. Crew maintains readiness for both kinetic, punitive precision strikes and non-kinetic shaping operations.

Aircrew train for complete tri-service integration and multi-domain synergy. IAF and Army Aviation crews continuously practice high-tempo combined maneuvers, such as combat para-drops, fast-roping troops from Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH Dhruv), and deploying heavy underslung artillery via Chinook helicopters. Exercises like Yudh Abhyas and tri-service operations (Kargil, Operation Sindoor) train crews to blend air assets seamlessly with ground-based precision weapons, air defense grids, and electronic warfare units.

Indian crews train in agile combat employment, practicing approaches, controlled landings, and rapid departures from dual-use public infrastructure, such as national highway emergency landing strips. India’s aircrew approach leans heavily on simulation and advanced technical upgrades. Indian military crews have traditionally excelled in international air exercises and earned wide recognition.

US vs Russian vs French Networking Traits

The American personal and professional networking culture relies heavily on a mix of proactive communication, authenticity, and a “give-first” mindset.

They listen more than they speak, following a two-ears-to-one-mouth ratio to understand others’ needs.

They are sincere and unpretentious, avoid feigned interest, and build trust quickly. Successful professionals share resources, insights, and introductions freely without keeping an immediate score. They exhibit an upbeat, approachable demeanor and act as a social magnet.

They turn brief chats into long-lasting bonds. Once friendly, they enjoy drinks and laughs.

Russian networking culture relies heavily on deep, trusted inner circles and the traditional exchange of mutual favors, contrasting sharply with more superficial or transactional Western networking styles.

Initially, Russians are naturally suspicious or reserved toward strangers and people outside their immediate circle. Trust is not given automatically. It must be earned over time through repeated, honest interactions.

Once you are accepted into a Russian’s inner circle, the relationship becomes a deeply loyal, enduring bond marked by mutual support and strong personal generosity.

Russians value blunt honesty, clarity, and directness over polite small talk or excessive smiling, which they may view as insincere. They are open to leveraging personal connections to bypass bureaucratic hurdles or solve complex problems.

They love Indians and have watched portrayals of the underprivileged’s carefree, happy-go-lucky demeanor in Hindi movies from the 1950s to the 1980s. They will dance over shots of vodka, singing Hindi songs. Long “Hindi-Russi Bhai Bhai” speeches are always punctuated with shots of neat Vodka.

French personal networking relies on building deep, long-term trust, intellectual engagement, and strict boundaries between professional and personal life.

So don’t expect to be invited to someone’s home or meet their family until you’ve built a deep, multi-year relationship.

Unlike the transactional and rapid-fire approach often seen in Anglo-Saxon business cultures, the French value quality over quantity. First impressions are heavily anchored in respect and hierarchy.

The French value critical thinking and logic. Conversations with the French often turn into a discussion about industry trends, philosophy, or culture. Politely challenging ideas is not seen as rude.

The French love long lunches, paired with wine and cheese. They have a subtle sense of humor. With Indian aviators, they find common ground in the Mirage-2000 and Rafale.

Indians befriend everyone quickly. They can be loud. But they are great hosts and may overdo gifting.

A hug is a very natural way of greeting in India. Handshakes can be firm.

Finally, aviation has its own language. Aviators can get together and drive each other crazy with jokes, fun, laughter and mirth. In a bar, one can see all aviators ending up scissoring and locking their arms into combat maneuvers. Socializing is no less exciting than the air combat they did earlier in the day.

Tarang Shakti is about all this and more.

• Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retired) is an Indian Air Force veteran fighter test pilot and former director-general of the Center for Air Power Studies. He is currently the strategic advisor (aerospace) at SIDM. 
• He tweets @Chopsyturvey 
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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The Pentagon recently announced a whopping US$24.4 billion contract to defense giant Raytheon to speed up the production of “three-in-one” SM-6 missiles.

The Pentagon called the SM-6 “a critical anti-air and anti-surface warfare munition.” It said the five-year agreement, with two additional option years, “will drive faster production, increase manufacturing throughput, and deliver significant cost savings.”

The deal “provides the defense industry with the long-term predictability needed to expand workforce capacity and secure critical supply chains,” the Pentagon added.

The award lands after a year in which interceptor stocks were burned down. The US Defense Department’s inspector general reported last month that acquisition officials said: “the munitions expenditure on Operation Epic Fury has resulted in strategic inventory shortfalls and revealed industrial base bottlenecks for munitions resupply.”

A September 15 Congressional Budget Office assessment said the United States has probably used between one-half and two-thirds of its stocks of certain missile-defense interceptors since June 2025, naming the SM-6 alongside Patriot, THAAD and the SM-3.

Rebuilding those inventories would take at least five years even if production rose, the agency said, and would leave the Pentagon with fewer interceptors for a possible clash with China.

The CBO put the cost of a Patriot or an SM-6 at about $4 million a round, compared with about $12 million for a THAAD interceptor and $28 million for an SM-3. It said the weapons were used in large numbers defending Israel and then during Operation Epic Fury.

Outside estimates run higher: a table compiled by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and carried by the Financial Times in April put the SM-6 at $5.3 million a round, with a pre-war stock of about 1,160 and wartime use of 190 to 370.

The Pentagon has not published an SM-6 round count for the war.

Raytheon confirmed in a statement that its SM-6 “has been successfully fired from various US Navy ship-based platforms and launchers on land,” calling it a “combat-proven weapon.”

The weapons-maker also acknowledged increased efforts to meet demand. “By continuously investing in our operations and facilities, we are removing constraints and boosting capacity to ensure we deliver this critical capability our sailors depend on,” Raytheon President Phil Jasper said.

SM-6 Missile

The SM-6 missile was created for extended-range anti-air warfare (ER-AAW), including defense against UAVs, military aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles, and terminal ballistic missile defense. It also acts as a high-velocity anti-ship missile.

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The SM-6 is based on the earlier SM-2ER Block IV (RIM-156A) missile airframe, with the AIM-120C AMRAAM active radar-homing seeker replacing the former design’s semi-active seeker.

The official designation is RIM-174 Standard Extended Range Active Missile, or ERAM. It is fired from the Mk 41 vertical launching system already fitted on US and allied destroyers and cruisers, so a ship does not need a new launcher to carry it.

What makes the SM-6 different from the older Standard missiles is that it does not have to rely only on the firing ship’s radar. Through Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air, or NIFC-CA, it can take targeting data from an E-2D Hawkeye, another ship, or a fighter such as the F-35, and engage a target beyond the horizon of the ship that launches it.

The active seeker then finishes the intercept on its own. In plain terms, the missile can be cued by a sensor the target cannot see, and still home in the last miles.

Raytheon describes the SM-6 missile as “three missiles in one,” and says it is the only weapon that can perform anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, and ballistic missile defense or sea-based terminal missions.

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The Block IA and IB updates improve the seeker and guidance against harder, complex targets, while the Block IB adds a larger rocket motor for more range and speed against high-end air threats. Its exact range remains classified, but it is widely believed that it could reach over 200 nautical miles and fly at roughly Mach 3.5.

That spread of roles is also why the missile is expensive, and why magazines matter. A destroyer that fills its cells with SM-6s gains reach, but it burns through a scarce inventory if it uses the same missile for aircraft, cruise missiles, ships, and terminal ballistic shots.

China has reportedly been wary of the missile because of its capabilities. US allies in the region, including Japan, Australia, and South Korea, are lined up to acquire it.

The SM-6 on the Typhon Mid-Range Capability launcher is a ship missile adapted for strikes against land and sea targets. The Army has described the battery as a “strategic” weapon system to be used against higher-value targets such as air defense facilities and command and control centers — an important weapon given the region’s prevailing tensions.

In that ground-launched form, it sits alongside the Tomahawk, giving land forces a strike option that once belonged only to ships.

The US has also developed an air-launched variant of the SM-6, known as the AIM-174B, mounted on a US Navy Super Hornet, which broke cover during RIMPAC 2024. Fired from altitude and speed, it pushes an air-to-air engagement far outside the range of a carrier group’s older missiles.

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The US military lost three military aircraft during peacetime in September 2026 alone, highlighting that accidents continue to hit even the world’s most advanced air force. These incidents also reminded us of the mid-air collision between a KC-130J and an F-35B in September 2020 that ended in one of modern aviation’s most remarkable saves.

On September 28, 2026, two naval aviators ejected from an EA-18G Growler assigned to Electronic Attack Squadron 130 after an arresting gear failed during recovery on the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier.

Both aircrew were recovered safely. It is currently unknown whether the aircraft was lost or escaped with some damage, and an investigation is underway to determine the cause of the accident.

Earlier in the month, two F-16 Fighting Falcons were destroyed in separate training accidents.

On September 17, an F-16 from the Texas Air National Guard’s 149th Fighter Wing went down in rural Michigan during training from Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center, and on September 22, a US Air Force F-16 from the 52nd Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, crashed on approach after a routine training sortie.

In both cases, the pilot was able to eject, but the aircraft was fully destroyed.

While September was particularly painful for the US military and its prized military aircraft, it also reminds us of the time six years ago when a mid-air collision over California nearly claimed the lives of eight Marines aboard a KC-130J.

When A KC-130 Collided With an F-35B

On the afternoon of September 29, 2020, a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II, call sign “Bolt 93,” and a KC-130J Super Hercules tanker, call sign “Raider 50,” collided at around 4:00 p.m. while conducting air-to-air refueling operations in the Kane West Military Operations Area near the Salton Sea in Southern California.

The aircraft were participating in Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course 1-21, which is a demanding seven-week advanced training program conducted by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona. The course reportedly emphasized integrating Marine aviation into Marine Air-Ground Task Force operations under realistic, high-tempo conditions.

The Raider, assigned to Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352, had already refueled one F-35B and was orbiting to tank the second. The F-35B approached the hose and drogue extended from the refueling pod on the tanker’s right wing and struck the underside of that wing.

As expected, the F-35B arrived for aerial refueling. However, as it approached, the hose and drogue extended from the tanker’s right wing, and it struck the underside of the right wing.

The impact was so massive and violent that it sheared off all propeller blades on the tanker’s two right-side engines, damaged the right fuel tank and refueling pod, and caused severe structural damage, including to the landing gear compartment.

Immediately after, fuel began leaking, raising concerns about a potential onboard fire.

The F-35B that collided with the massive refueller aircraft was critically damaged, forcing the pilot to eject. The aircraft crashed in the Ocotillo Wells area near Salton City, according to reports from the time. However, the KC-130J—piloted by Capt. Michael Wolff and co-pilot Maj. Cory Jones—had a gargantuan task ahead of them. They had to land.

“It was a really violent collision,” Wolff later recalled, adding that everything happened within “1.2 seconds or something. Not enough time to really react and do anything.” Days after the incident, he said the collision was so violent it sent everything flying inside the aircraft. “It was pretty violent… I got my headset back on, grabbed the yoke, and I got the plane back under control,” the pilot of the unfortunate aircraft told USNI News.

After the impact, the crew discovered the collision had left a hole in the aircraft, letting in a blast of outside air as they braved glaring lights and blaring alarms in the cockpit, while the displays lit up with cascading caution and warning messages.

The collision wiped out both engines on the KC-130J’s right (starboard) side. Yet “the impact did not damage our ailerons, elevators or rudder, so we still have all of our primary flight control surfaces,” Wolff later recalled in his interaction with USNI. “At that point, I’m like, OK, let’s get figuring out what’s going on and the best course of action.” “That’s when – it’s kind of cliché – the training kicks in,” he added.

The crew drew on their deep familiarity with the KC-130J, forged through countless flight hours and simulator sessions rehearsing emergency procedures in the air and on the ground. Aircrews are well known for their rigorous adherence to detailed checklists, along with the almost automatic responses and ingrained knowledge that come from repeated practice. “We start running through everything,” Wolff told USNI News later, “and figuring out where to go and communicating to the crew and then outside” to air traffic control. 

The KC-130J crew declared an emergency to Los Angeles Center, reporting a mid-air collision, damage to two engines, a fuel leak, a possible fire, and an emergency descent, as later revealed in the emergency call recording. “We are declaring an emergency. We still have partial control of the aircraft,” Wolff was heard saying in a rather calm manner.

Thick black smoke streamed behind Raider 50 as flames roared from its burning fuel tanks, and the rear crew members confirmed the severity of the damage to engines No. 3 and No. 4. The crew then focused on keeping control of the aircraft and getting it safely back to the ground. “I can see the far right engine – the #4 – from my seat, but I can’t see the #3,” Wolff said. Crew members in the rear of the aircraft “gave me confirmation that [the] thing was toast, and we pulled the fire handle and [made] sure nothing got worse.”

He needed constant updates on whether the fire was dying down or if fuel was still leaking from the wing, stressing that “that communication from the back [crew] is extremely vital to get down safely.”

The crew aboard the aircraft on that fateful day had practiced for an emergency with two engines out, but never for multiple emergencies.

With the tanker still heavy with fuel and only five parachutes available for eight Marines, bailout was not a practical option. The crew committed to landing.

Determined to land safely, the pilots surveyed the surrounding terrain and found Thermal Airport—officially Jacqueline Cochran Regional Airport—a viable landing site. “We had a lot of open space between where we were and there – the Salton Sea and a lot of farmland – and we’re not worried about populated areas,” Wolff said.

However, their troubles were far from over.

Just as the crew lined up for a runway landing, the aircraft began drifting right because of the ongoing malfunctions and the distance involved.

With only five parachutes for eight crew members and the aircraft still partially controllable on the remaining engines, they committed to a forced landing rather than a bailout. 

After roughly 12–13 minutes of fighting for control—facing multiple system failures, an uncommanded right turn after dipping below minimum control airspeed, and other issues—they executed a gear-up or belly landing in a farm field near Jacqueline Cochran Regional Airport in Thermal, California.

The aircraft skidded several hundred yards and came to rest with extensive damage but intact enough for the entire crew to walk away with only mild injuries.

“It wasn’t quite like the movies where you see you have like a 747 that plows through … We came to a stop pretty quickly,” Wolf said.

Pilot sure earned that DFC

September 29, 2020: a US Marines KC-130 and an F-35 collide during mid-air refueling over California (US). Fighter crashes, pilot ejects safely, KC-130 crash-lands in a carrot field, all 8 aboard survive.

The KC-130 pilot was later awarded the… pic.twitter.com/Xu46wipUUP

— Francisco Cunha – Aviation et al (@OnDisasters) September 29, 2026

The collision, resulting fire damage, and emergency landing meant the aircraft had to be written off. After investigators finished examining the wreckage, Marine Corps teams spent roughly a week removing it from the field. They recovered the rear stabilizers and the aircraft’s tail section, set them up outside the squadron, and painted them in the unit’s distinctive Raider black as a permanent display and reminder.

For their actions, both Capt. Michael Wolff and Maj. Cory Jones received the Distinguished Flying Cross, the highest award in flying and the fourth highest award for bravery. The award recognized the skill, discipline, and crew coordination.

The collision, engine failure, and safe landing marked one of the rare incidents in which every crew member survived, including the F-35 B pilot.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
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As nations worldwide race to bolster air defenses against missiles and one-way attack drones, India’s indigenous Akash surface-to-air missile system—proven in combat against Pakistan during Operation Sindoor in May 2025—is rapidly gaining popularity in the export market. 

India’s Defense Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh recently disclosed that the Akash air defense system has been exported to three countries.

Although Armenia’s purchase of the system is already known, this is the first time a high-ranking Indian official has revealed that the AD system has been acquired by two other countries in Central Asia: Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.

“The first customer was Armenia, which has taken multiple batteries. Thereafter, we’ve also exported it to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Production has stabilized. We have additional orders for our own services, and I’m sure there will be many more from various parts of the world, including some of the areas that you mentioned,” the Defense Secretary told ANI on Oct 1, 2026, in an exclusive interaction.

Describing Akash as a milestone in self-reliance, Singh said, “Akash, I would say that it is one of our success stories. It shows the maturing of our indigenous missile design and production system. It is effective in dealing with high-velocity aerial targets.”

He also noted that production of the Akash missile system has stabilized, and orders from other nations are growing even as procurement for the Indian Armed Forces continues.

A mobile short-to-medium-range surface-to-air missile system developed by the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), Akash provides area air defense against multifarious air threats to mobile, semi-mobile, and static vulnerable forces and areas. The missile has a range of 25–30 kilometers, can intercept targets at altitudes of about 18–20 kilometers, and carries a 60 kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead.

“The real-time multi-sensor data processing and threat evaluation enables simultaneous engagement of multiple targets from any direction. The entire system is flexible, upscalable, and can be operated in group and autonomous modes. It employs command guidance and relies on phased array guidance radar to guide the missile till intercept,” states BEL, the manufacturer of the system.

With this export, India appears to have gained a foothold in Central Asia, where the countries have historically relied on Russian arms, but are now diversifying arms supplies as Moscow remains embroiled in a protracted conflict with Ukraine.

Notably, China has emerged as the biggest beneficiary of this vacuum left by Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine, as previously explained in depth by the EurAsian Times. In fact, both Turkmenistan and Tajikistan already operate a host of air defenses sourced from Beijing, making India’s Akash purchase an even more noteworthy development. 

The decision to acquire Akash possibly stems from its strong combat performance during the conflict with Pakistan as part of Operation Sindoor.

Earlier, former DRDO scientist Ravi Kumar Gupta told EurAsian Times: Akash’s versatility gives it an edge over other systems. He said that unlike other surface-to-air missiles that work only at particular altitudes and in specific climates, Akash’s biggest advantage is that it can work “all places.”

“The systems are developed for diverse conditions and can withstand extreme conditions anywhere in the world, which makes them ‘most reliable and sturdy.’ Since the system is fully indigenous, India can fine-tune it to any buyer’s requirements cost-effectively with a high degree of effectiveness against the adversary,” Gupta told EurAsian Times.

Akash: Sky in the Limit

On May 7, 2025, the  Indian Air Force (IAF) launched attacks on terror sites located deep within Pakistan as part of  “Operation Sindoor.” Pakistan retaliated with “Operation Bunyan al-Marsus.”

Following the first round of strikes by the IAF, Pakistan started to attack India’s western sector with waves of drones, including Chinese and Turkish-origin drones, missiles, rockets, and other aerial threats targeting Indian military installations and civilian areas. At one point, more than 600 drones were fired simultaneously across India’s western front. 

The Akash AD—part of a layered air defense network that also included S-400, Barak-8/MRSAM, older systems like Pechora and OSA-AK, counter-UAS grids, and the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) or Akashteer—showcased resilience in the face of these attacks, ensuring that none of the Pakistani drones and missiles hit any targets.

At the official press briefing on Operation Sindoor, Air Marshal A.K. Bharti, the Director General of Air Operations (DGMO) of the Indian Air Force, specifically praised the Akash AD for thwarting Pakistani attacks.

“Another highlight has been the stellar performance of the indigenous air defense weapon system like the Akash system,” he stated. The sentiment was echoed uniformly across the board, with Lt Gen Rajiv Ghai, who later became the Deputy Army Chief, saying, “BrahMos, Akash and many other homegrown platforms and weapons played a decisive role in Operation Sindoor.”

Notably, small drones made up the majority of Pakistan’s projectiles during the conflict, which were mainly used to scan Indian defenses and overwhelm the air defense network, although a few kamikaze drones, missiles, and aircraft-launched munitions were also used.

Akash operated as a key hard-kill layer against these low-to-medium altitude threats, as its indigenous design, mobility, multi-target capability, and cost-effectiveness suited it well for the threats that characterized much of Pakistan’s response.

According to reports from the time, the Akash intercepted multiple drones and loitering munitions, disrupted swarm attempts, and even helped down guided missiles mid-flight at low altitude.

Akash interceptors helped protect higher-value, longer-range assets by keeping drone-saturation attacks out of the S-400 envelope. However, defense officials cited by Indian media said Akash, which has an interception range of 25 kilometers, played a major role in countering all kinds of threats, including aircraft, armed attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the Turkish Byker Yiha III kamikaze drones. 

“It has been very effective against aircraft and other systems. This is the first time we saw it in active conflict. We hear that Akash has been used, and it has brought down a couple of aircraft. The whole team of scientists who have worked on the project is very, very happy. A great moment for all of them,” former DRDO chairman, Dr. G. Satheesh Reddy, said in an interview with NDTV days after the ceasefire was announced on May 10, 2025.

The most compelling commentary on Akash came from Gaddamanugu Chandramouli, the former Akash project director and DRDO scientist, who spent his entire career developing the system.

“Akash, which was indigenously built from scratch, was used in a combat zone for the first time and has proved to be robust and effective. The automated missile system caught the other countries by surprise,” Chandramouli told The Hindu in May 2025.

The Akash Weapon System can simultaneously engage Multiple Targets in Group Mode or Autonomous Mode. It has built-in Electronic Countermeasures features. The entire weapon system is mounted on mobile platforms. It can effectively engage helicopters, jets, and UAVs at ranges of 4-25 kilometers. It is fully automatic and has a quick response time from target detection to kill.

DRDO claims it is the first system in the world capable of engaging four aerial targets simultaneously at a range of 25 kilometers by command guidance using a single firing unit.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
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