The US Navy F-35C Lightning II aircraft made its first-ever arrested landing and takeoff aboard its newest Ford-class aircraft carrier. This milestone marks a major step for the US jet that initially struggled with hook-related flaws that complicated landings during ground tests.

On 13 October, an F-35C from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 23 (“Salty Dogs,” NAS Patuxent River) made the first arrested landing aboard the Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) John F. Kennedy (CVN-79).

The aircraft reportedly used the unique EMALS and AAG electromagnetic launch-and-recovery systems to perform arrested launches and recoveries from CVN-79 as part of Aircraft Compatibility Testing (ACT).

ACT lets engineers examine how the ship’s equipment interacts with specific aircraft types while gathering data to confirm those systems function as intended.

The US Navy released photos of the event showing two F-35C aircraft with tail numbers 401 and 403—one landing on the carrier deck, and the other flying with an inert Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bomb carried externally. Later, another set of images and a video were posted on social media, showing the F-35C launching from the deck of the John F. Kennedy on the second day of ACT.

The US Navy took the preliminary acceptance of the carrier on 29 September 2026, after sea trials the previous month. Preliminary acceptance allows at-sea testing, training, and proficiency building before the carrier is commissioned and put into service.

This arrested landing and subsequent catapult launch marked the first time any F-35C had operated from a Ford-class ship, the largest and most advanced fleet of aircraft carriers in the American armory.

The lead ship, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), has never embarked the F-35C for sustained operations because the carrier was reportedly delivered without the full set of modifications needed to sustain stealth-fighter operations due to cost-saving measures.

Earlier in June 2019, former Navy spokesman Capt. Daniel Hernandez said that although Ford-class carriers were built to launch and recover the F-35C fighter jet, they still needed upgrades such as stronger jet blast deflectors to protect the deck from hot exhaust during launches, as well as designated areas for aircraft operations.

Instead of the F-35C, the USS Gerald R. Ford hosts air wings mainly equipped with F/A-18E/F and Growler variants for its current combat posture.

The US Navy has flown the F-35C only from its Nimitz-class carriers so far. The aircraft completed its initial at-sea testing aboard the USS Nimitz in November 2014. USS Carl Vinson was the first to deploy the jet operationally, and USS Abraham Lincoln was the first to use it in combat.

However, the House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee later ordered in FY2020 that the Navy must not accept the CVN-79 USS John F. Kennedy aircraft carrier until it can embark the F-35C. This makes the latest arrested landing and takeoff special.

This test is a key step in validating F-35C integration with the Ford class, especially because these carriers use electromagnetic catapults and advanced arresting equipment, replacing the Nimitz class’s steam-powered launch and conventional arresting systems.

Interestingly, however, this key milestone comes as US President Donald Trump has ordered the Pentagon to redesign a new aircraft carrier to replace electromagnetic catapults—designed for finer control, reduced airframe stress, higher sortie rates, and better support for a wider range of aircraft—with steam catapults.

In fact, the President signed a national security memorandum in August, giving the Pentagon leaders two months to come up with “a plan on the required measures to replace the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Weapons Elevators with steam and hydraulic systems for the construction of” the USS Doris Miller, also a Ford-class aircraft carrier.

Nonetheless, putting F-35C jets on USS John F. Kennedy is a major breakthrough for the US Navy’s upcoming combat posture as regional security threats multiply across theatres. The F-35C Lightning II brings stealth, advanced sensors, sensor fusion, and long-range strike capability that older fighters, such as the Super Hornet, lack.

The F-35C’s Leap is Admirable

More than a decade ago, the F-35C struggled with its arresting hook system (AHS), which had a well-documented design issue, as reports in 2012 noted, citing a leaked JSF Concurrency Quick Look Review dated 29 November, 2011.

The report noted that the stealth fighter couldn’t board a carrier because of these tailhook design issues.

It stated that the F-35C failed to engage the MK-7 arresting gear during particular tests at NAWC-AD (Naval Air Warfare Center – Aircraft Division) Lakehurst, with a poor score of 0 successes in 8 attempts.

This was despite testing at a regular airport, not a real carrier, where an aircraft may face inclement weather, a pitching deck, adjacent obstructions, low fuel, and no alternate airfields, among other challenges.

At the time, reports noted that the core issue was the short longitudinal distance—about 7 feet—between the main landing gear tires and the lowered tailhook point. Low-observability, or stealth, requirements drove this geometry, forcing the Arresting Hook System into a recessed bay with doors to preserve the aircraft’s outer mold line and minimize radar cross-section, according to the reports.

For comparison, the F/A-18 placed the main landing gear-to-tailhook distance at about 18.2 feet. Additionally, the tailhook point design had limited ability to scoop low-positioned cables.

A Lockheed Martin official later said the company traced the F-35C’s trouble catching a carrier’s arresting gear wires to the tailhook design. “The good news is that it’s fairly straightforward and isolated to the hook itself,” said Tom Burbage, the F-35 program manager at the time. “It doesn’t have secondary effects going into the rest of the airplane.”

Burbage said that the rest of the tailhook system design, including the bay and doors that hide the device and other auxiliary hardware, was sound. “What we are trying to do is make sure that we got the actual design of the hook is optimized so that it in fact repeatedly picks up the wire as long as the airplane puts itself in position to do that.”

He explained that the fundamental limitations of creating a stealth fighter also caused the hook issue, adding that the company faced the rare challenge of designing the first-ever naval stealth fighter jet with a tail-hook that had to be concealed when not in use.

He also noted that the tail hook had to be installed farther forward on the jet’s ventral surface than on other naval aircraft because it had to fit within the F-35’s outer mold line. As a result, the hook behaved differently than it did on previous fighters like the F/A-18.

The way the wires react as the jet passes over them is a dynamic factor in the F-35, and the wire responded in a sine wave pattern.

“The time differential between when the main gear rolls over the cable and the time the hook picks up the cable on a more conventional airplane is more time for that wave to damp out,” the spokesperson was quoted as saying. “In the case of the F-35, one of our design constraints is that the hook just has to be closer to the main landing gear than on a conventional aircraft because of the requirement to hide it inside the airplane,” he added at the time.

Later, engineering investigations identified three primary factors: the aircraft’s constrained geometry, a suboptimal hook-point shape, and inadequate hold-down performance. Additionally, it found that a faulty or inadequately validated wire-dynamics simulation model contributed to the original design assumptions.

The Joint Strike Fighter program addressed the issue by redesigning the hook point and improving the hold-down damper, along with other refinements such as improved upstroke damping and strength. The revised system underwent successful shore-based testing, including dozens of roll-in arrestments, enabling the first at-sea arrested landings on USS Nimitz in late 2014, followed by a rigorous testing regime.

Notably, Ford-class ships use the newer Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) rather than the legacy MK-7 hydraulic system. However, the successful trap and launch close the loop on more than a decade of work that began with the original hook’s total failure.

As the EurAsian Times previously explained, the F-35C offers significantly greater range over other F-35 variants, larger internal weapons bays, and superior endurance, making it ideal for long-range operations from the vast ocean.

These stealthy warplanes are nearly invisible to enemy radars and can penetrate even the most advanced air-defense systems. They have advanced sensor fusion to create a shared battlespace picture for the entire air wing and can conduct precision strikes or intercept threats, as demonstrated by the Iranian drone shootdown earlier this year.

The F-35C can carry over 5,000 pounds of internal weapons or over 18,000 pounds of combined internal and external weapons. This lets the US Navy use external armaments to increase lethality when needed or operate in stealth when required.

Not just that, the aircraft can also operate as an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) asset, sharing information with all networked ground, sea, and air assets in the battlespace

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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Barely weeks after rejecting Saudi Arabia’s request to join the air campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen, US President Donald Trump is rethinking his decision and has suggested that he may join the war against the Iran-backed Houthis.

The latest Houthi strikes on Saudi targets have revived a long-running American dilemma in Yemen — one that stretches back to the October 2000 bombing of the US Navy warship, which killed 17 U.S. sailors.

At least 25 people have been killed in Houthi drone and missile strikes on Saudi Arabia’s airports in recent weeks.

Separately, Houthis have occupied key port cities on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, threatening to choke the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, another key oil shipping route in the Middle East.

The rising Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, a key US ally in the Middle East, the threat of choking another global oil-supply route ahead of the US midterm elections, and the death of an American citizen have created a dilemma for President Trump on whether to open a new front in the Middle East.

Following the strike on Riyadh airport, Trump suggested that the US might join the Saudi war against the Houthis. “We may. We’re gonna look at it … We’ll make a decision. We move very quickly,” Trump replied on October 12 when asked whether Washington is considering joining the Saudi War against the Houthis.

Notably, last month Trump rejected the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s request to join the Kingdom’s war against the Houthis.

However, the decision to open a new front against the Houthis will not be an easy one, as Trump realizes that the war in Yemen could become another quagmire for the US when it is already tied down in the Iran War since February this year.

Operation Decisive Storm to Operation Rough Rider

Trump launched Operation Rough Rider against the Houthis in March 2025, barely two months after taking the oath in January last year. The U.S. launched a major air and naval campaign after the Houthis resumed Red Sea attacks following the breakdown of a Gaza ceasefire.

Over the course of the next three months, the US struck over 1000 targets in Yemen, including radar systems, air defenses, missile and drone launch sites, manufacturing facilities, and some leadership targets.

However, the US abruptly ended the campaign in May, after agreeing to an Oman-brokered ceasefire. Houthis agreed to stop attacking U.S. vessels; the US halted strikes.

Trump later described the deal as Houthis “capitulating” under pressure; however, analysts disagreed as the ceasefire agreement did not cover Israel, the country that participated with Washington in bombing Houthi targets.

A New York Times investigation later revealed that Trump agreed to the ceasefire as the costs of the war exceeded $1 billion in munitions alone.

The US also lost three F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets and more than 15 MQ-9 Reaper drones in the campaign; however, it did not substantially weaken the Houthi position in Yemen.

However, the US involvement with Yemen goes much further back.

The USS Cole Bombing in Yemen

The US’s two-decade-long ‘War on Terror’ began after the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks in 2001.

However, that was not the first time that Osama bin Laden-led terrorist group had attacked Americans or U.S. interests.

Just one year earlier, on October 12, 2000, al-Qaeda carried out a suicide boat attack on the USS Cole, a US Navy guided-missile destroyer, while it was refueling in the port of Aden, Yemen.

The blast killed 17 American sailors and wounded nearly 40 others. It also tore a roughly 40-foot-wide hole in the ship’s hull near the waterline.

The crew’s damage-control efforts saved the vessel.

The US destroyer, en route to the Persian Gulf, was making a prearranged fuel stop at the port of Aden, Yemen, when the attack occurred.

Before al-Qaeda used civilian airliners to strike the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it used a small inflatable boat as a suicide bomb to strike the US Navy destroyer.

In fact, the USS Cole bombing was al-Qaeda’s second attempt to target a US Navy vessel near a Yemeni port.

The investigation revealed that the USS Cole bombing followed an unsuccessful attempt on January 3, 2000, to bomb another US Navy ship, the USS The Sullivans.

In this earlier incident, the terrorist boat sank before the explosives could be detonated; however, the boat and the explosives were salvaged. The Navy refitted the boat, tested the explosives, and reused them in the USS Cole attack.

The extensive FBI investigation ultimately determined that members of the al Qaeda terrorist network planned and carried out the bombing.

By the end of 2000, Yemeni authorities had arrested several suspects, including Jamal Muhammad Ahmad Al-Badawi and Fahad Muhammad Ahmad Al-Quso, two of the alleged masterminds of the USS The Sullivans and the USS Cole plots.

Al-Badawi and Al-Quso, known al Qaeda operatives who trained in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan during the 1990s, were later killed in separate U.S. airstrikes.

However, the US failed to anticipate that such suicide attacks could be replicated on a much grander scale by using aircraft to attack US buildings.

It also failed to infiltrate al-Qaeda ranks to uncover plans for further attacks on the US.

Less than a year after the USS Cole bombing, al-Qaeda struck again, this time on US soil, executing the deadliest terror attack inside the US in history.

The Cole attack was part of al-Qaeda’s escalating campaign against the US after the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.

It demonstrated al-Qaeda’s ability to strike a major U.S. military target overseas and served as a powerful propaganda victory.

The 9/11 Commission Report noted that the USS Cole attack “galvanized al-Qaeda’s recruitment efforts.”

Bin Laden ordered a propaganda video featuring a reenactment of the blast, training-camp footage, and calls to jihad.

The 9/11 Commission Report also noted that the planning for both the USS Cole attack and the 9/11 attacks took place during al-Qaeda’s summit in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.

In retrospect, it’s clear that the USS Cole bombing was al-Qaeda’s warning to the US that more such attacks are coming; however, Washington failed to read the warning.

Yemen, in fact, was a major base for al-Qaeda before the rise of the Ansar Allah movement (precursor to the Houthis) in the early 2000s.

Osama bin Laden’s family also came from Yemen’s Hadhramaut region, and he saw the country as strategically important because of its weak central authority, remote tribal areas, and geography.

Al-Qaeda in Yemen was also responsible for the 1992 Aden hotel bombings targeting hotels used by US Marines en route to Somalia.

Aden hotel bombings were one of the first al-Qaeda terrorist attacks against the US.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, it was al-Qaeda in Yemen, and now it’s the Houthis; Yemen has been serving as a base for anti-US activities in the Middle East for over three decades now.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post As Trump Weighs Joining War on Houthis, A Throwback To Yemen Bombing That Shook U.S. Navy!  appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

As hostilities continue to escalate between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis (Ansar Allah), the Yemen-based group has claimed to have hit a Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet of the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). 

On the night of October 14, the Houthis- claimed that they had managed to hit an RSAF fighter jet over the northern Yemeni province of Saada, which shares a border with Saudi Arabia.

“By the grace of God, our armed forces were recently able to target a Saudi warplane of the “Typhoon” type that took off from Taif Air Base. It was targeted in the airspace of Saada Governorate with a surface-to-air missile, struck directly, and is now at risk of crashing,” the military spokesperson of the group, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, wrote on X.

In addition, low-quality, night-time footage of a distant aerial engagement also surfaced on social media and was posted by some popular media outlets. However, the video does not conclusively prove the purported engagement involved a fighter jet, as it was shot in near-total darkness.

The claims come amid a sharp escalation in conflict between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition since last month, when the Houthis seized territory along the Red Sea coast, including Mokha and areas overlooking the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which had been crucial for Saudi energy exports after the closure of the Hormuz Strait.

Earlier this month, Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government launched a counteroffensive to reclaim Red Sea coast territory and declared full-scale war efforts, which have led to intensified missile and drone attack responses by the Houthis on Saudi cities and civilian targets, including in the capital, Riyadh. 

Before claiming to have hit the Eurofighter, the Houthis stated that they had struck King Khalid International Airport in the Saudi capital Riyadh with a ballistic missile.

The group also announced that it targeted an administrative building belonging to Saudi Arabia’s Aramco in the eastern city of Dhahran, in retaliation for Saudi strikes on an oil facility in the al-Sabah area of the capital Sanaa, controlled by the Houthis.

Saudi Arabia, on its part, launches regular airstrikes on Houthi positions, backing Yemeni government-aligned forces as they try to reoccupy territory.

Eurofighter Downed After F-15?

Saudi aircraft, including F-15SA and Eurofighter Typhoons, have been operating from bases such as Taif and Khamis Mushait to launch regular airstrikes across Houthi-controlled areas.

The latest claim of hitting a Eurofighter Typhoon comes nearly a month after the Houthis managed to down an F-15SA, scoring their first kill of a Saudi fighter since the fresh hostilities broke out between the two sides. The aircraft was reportedly downed on September 16, near Marib, using a locally-made surface-to-air missile (SAM), when it was allegedly conducting air strikes in support of the Yemeni troops.

The group published images of the wreckage of the Saudi fighter and the Ansar Allah personnel posing with it, although the fate of the pilots who probably ejected after being hit remains unknown to this day, as the EurAsian Times had also discussed in the past.

Unlike the F-15SA incident, there is currently no evidence the RSAF Eurofighter Typhoon was hit or crashed after taking the alleged hit.

Notably, advanced 4.5th-generation fighters like the Eurofighter are designed to absorb certain damage. Thus, a hit may not automatically mean a confirmed kill.

If we hypothetically assume the Eurofighter was hit, whether the Typhoon could make it back to the base depends on where it was allegedly struck, how far it was from a friendly base, and how severe the hit was.

The Eurofighter has two EJ200 engines—if one is damaged or fails after a hit, the other could provide enough thrust to keep the aircraft flying with some adjustments, allowing the pilot to land at a nearby safe base. Moreover, the jet features multiple flight-control computers, hydraulic systems, and electrical backups that could keep it controllable even after it loses parts of the airframe, control surfaces, or one of the two engines.

But most importantly, the damage may depend on whether the missile warhead detonated properly or was a near-miss that caused fragmentation.

For now, these crucial details about the alleged hit and damage remain unclear.

While independent verification of the alleged hit is pending and the RSAF has not officially acknowledged any such hit, previous reports suggest that the Houthis had earlier claimed downing a Saudi Eurofighter in October 2017 with a surface-to-air missile over Nihm. 

“Yemen’s air defense unit told the country’s Arabic-language al-Masirah television network that the aircraft had been targeted with a surface-to-air missile as it was flying in the skies over Nihm district east of the Yemeni capital city of Sana’a on Friday evening,” Yemen Press had reported. However, no independent source verified the hit at the time.

Earlier this year, Italian Eurofighters sustained some damage during an Iranian strike on a Saudi base, as the EurAsian Times had earlier reported.

However, no combat shoot-down of a Eurofighter Typhoon—built by a consortium of the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain—has occurred anywhere in the world. 

This means that if Ansar Allah’s claims are verified and the Eurofighter has indeed been hit and crashed, it would be the first incident involving the type.

It would boost the credibility of the Houthis’ surface-to-air missiles, which they market as “locally manufactured.”  For the Houthis, successfully downing a modern, high-performance jet like the Typhoon, with advanced electronic warfare, missile-warning systems, and high-speed or high-altitude performance, would be akin to an endorsement that their air defenses can threaten one of the most capable Western fighters in the Saudi inventory, not just older aircraft.

Saudi Arabia currently operates about 71 Eurofighter Typhoons, so a single loss would not dramatically alter its combat capability or affect operations. However, with tensions running high between the two sides, it would be a major propaganda win for the Houthis and could lead to further escalation if Saudi Arabia launches a stern response.

For now, the EurAsian Times awaits further details about the initial claims.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

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In another boost for Turkey’s aerospace industry, Spain has reportedly decided to acquire additional Turkish Hurjet aircraft, bringing the total purchase to about 45 units. Meanwhile, India’s LCA Tejas and AMCA are trying to catch up with Turkish aircraft.

Mehmet Demiroglu, CEO of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), which produces the Hurjet, said Spain plans to buy 15 additional Hurjet trainer aircraft, in addition to the 30 supersonic jets already ordered in December 2025, Turkey’s state-run Anadolu Agency reported.

“Before we even started deliveries to our Air Force, Spain said, ‘I like it, I want to buy 30,’ and bought them. We signed the agreement,” he was quoted as saying during an event in Türkiye’s northern province of Kastamonu. “We are working toward deliveries in 2028. It is planning to buy another 15,” the CEO added.

Earlier, Spain approved the purchase of 45 Hürjet jet trainers in September 2025 in a €3.68 billion deal led by Airbus Defense and Space España. Under the agreement, the first units are scheduled for delivery by 2028.

The Hürjet is a single-engine, tandem-seat advanced jet trainer and light combat aircraft intended to provide modern combat pilot training, bridging basic trainers and front-line fighters.

It is designed primarily to replace the Turkish Air Force’s aging Northrop T-38M Talon advanced trainers and the Northrop F-5s flown by the Turkish Stars aerobatic team, although the aircraft also supports fighter transition training, aggressor roles, and light combat or close air support missions.

Spain, for its part, is acquiring it primarily as a trainer within a complete integrated training ecosystem, rather than as a pure combat aircraft.

In recent years, the Turkish defense industry has made major strides toward indigenization and expanded its export potential, including the Hürjet, the Hürkuş, and the KAAN.

TAI previously said Spain was considering acquiring the KAAN stealth fighter after the collapse of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program the country was pursuing with France and Germany, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

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Separately, Indonesia has already signed a deal to acquire 48 KAAN fighters, along with provisions for extensive collaboration in manufacturing, technology transfer, and engineering, among other things.

Demiroglu added that Hurkus deliveries have begun and will continue in the coming years, citing Azerbaijan as an export market and expressing hopes of additional international sales. Azerbaijan signed a contract at the ADEX 2026 defense exhibition in Baku for 14 HÜRKUŞ-II trainer aircraft, although countries like Niger, Chad, and Libya have already ordered the aircraft, according to publicly available information.

Nonetheless, Hürjet’s export success is strategically more significant than it might first appears. This is mainly because Hürkuş is a relatively simple turboprop basic trainer whose exports matter but are less technologically advanced, whereas the KAAN is far more advanced and prestigious, but its full operational capability and export readiness are years away.

Therefore, the Hürjet sits in the middle: an indigenous trainer or light combat aircraft, and selling it to a sophisticated NATO country proves Turkey can design, certify, produce, and support a high-performance jet aircraft that meets Western standards.

Turkey Takes A Lead Over India 

Hürjet benefited from a relatively clean-sheet design optimized for the trainer or light-attack role, a strong political and industrial focus, and a partnership model that made entry into Europe easier.

Turkey began developing the Hurjet in 2017 as an advanced jet trainer with a light combat role. It first flew in 2023, and Ankara is now ramping up serial production, while increasing its local structural content.

By contrast, India’s Tejas program began in the 1980s. The aircraft took its first flight in 2001, but the program remained mired in delays, and induction came much later, in 2016.

Although the Indian Air Force (IAF) has finally received all Tejas Mk1 aircraft after a grueling wait, delivery of the more capable Mk1A, with AESA radar and other upgrades, has yet to begin because of delays in delivering GE-404 engines.

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Despite marketing efforts and interest from several countries over the years, Tejas has not secured a major export order. India’s state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has said it prioritizes fulfilling IAF commitments before aggressively pursuing foreign sales.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s defense industry has enjoyed continual high-level prioritization, faster decisions on aircraft variants, and a strategy of securing an early Western reference customer.

The gap is also visible at the fifth-generation level.

Both Turkey’s KAAN and India’s AMCA are twin-engine multirole fighters currently under development. However, Turkey appears to be ahed in the race despite India starting early.

KAAN made its first flight in February 2024, and multiple prototypes have since been flying. The Turkish Air Force has ordered the first 20 Block 10 aircraft, with deliveries to start in 2028. Furthermore, Ankara is steadily advancing development of an indigenous engine for later KAAN jets.

Meanwhile, India’s AMCA is in its industry selection and prototype development phase, with the first flight targeted for September 2028 and service induction planned for 2034–2035. Most IAF experts talking to EurAsian Times have privately doubted this ambitious timeline.

Turkey moved relatively quickly from design to a flying demonstrator and is already iterating with multiple airframes, whereas India has spent longer in the detailed design and industrial-partner selection phase. Moreover, Turkey has maintained a visible, sustained, high-level focus, combined with lessons from parallel programs such as Hürjet and a host of other UAV development programs that helped compress timelines.

Turkey’s success over India in aircraft development programs comes from its experience. In the late 1980s and 1990s, TAI produced 232 Block 30/40/50 F-16s under license for the Turkish Air Force, plus 46 Block 40s for Egypt and later 30 Block 50s. It license-produced the CN-235 transport and maritime-patrol aircraft, Cougar utility helicopters, and SF.260 trainers.

TAI also performed extensive F-16 electronic-warfare and structural upgrades for Turkey, Jordan, and Pakistan; converted Boeing 737s into AEW&C platforms; participated in the A400M program; and developed the Anka UAV family.

Additionally, the country has also fielded the T129 ATAK attack helicopter and, in 2023, flew the heavier twin-engine T929 ATAK 2, while producing light and medium utility helicopters.

These programs, along with a political drive to become a major arms supplier and the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation’s institutional role in the defense industry, have accelerated progress.

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“Their desire to lead the Islamic world as its most powerful nation and become a major arms supplier has taken Turkey forward in defense production. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation holds a large shareholding in military industries, and it has its own dynamics,” Air Marshal Anil Chopra (retd) argued in a previous EurAsian Times article, referring to Turkey’s achievements.

“India has to learn from Turkey’s successes in unmanned platforms. They are also ahead in helicopters and transport aircraft. Turkey is clearly way ahead in the fifth-generation fighter program,” Chopra further noted.

As for Turkey, Hürjet’s NATO export breakthrough and faster KAAN development demonstrate that Turkey has established a measurable lead over India in the pace and export conversion of combat-aircraft development in recent years.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

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