“The European Union has decided that the textile and clothing sectors must become circular. But there is a gap – one that no one has yet measured – between the strategy set out in Brussels and the factory that has to implement it, and it is this gap that will determine whether or not the European textile and clothing industry will survive its own transition,” writes César Araújo, President of ANIVEC, the Portuguese Association of Clothing, Apparel and Fashion Industries, and Chair of the Executive Committee of the Lusitano Project Consortium.

The textile and clothing sectors are by no means minor players in the European industrial landscape. We are talking about a turnover of around 166 billion euros, nearly 1.2 million jobs and almost 200,000 companies – the overwhelming majority of which are micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. We are talking about an industrial sector which, according to the latest figures from EURATEX (the European confederation for the sector, of which ANIVEC is a member), exports €61 billion worth of goods and, in 2024 alone, invested a total of €5.3 billion in tangible assets.

This is an industry that has demonstrated truly exemplary resilience within the European Single Market, operating in a highly competitive and profoundly unequal environment; one that is open to all manner of external sources, whose requirements are applied relentlessly to domestic producers, but which, in practice, operates without any form of effective control or trade safeguards vis-à-vis external producers.

Without first rectifying the unfairness in the European Single Market, new requirements are now being imposed on the European textile and clothing industry, requiring it to absorb, simultaneously and within a short space of time, new eco-design rules, the introduction of the digital product passport and extended producer responsibility, amongst countless other demands.

The decision to move towards a circular economy is not in question. Indeed, this is probably the only way forward for an industry that Europe should wish to retain within its borders. The problem lies in the way this future is being shaped: with rules devised exclusively from the top down, aimed at a sector that continues to compete on a daily basis under conditions that no one else would tolerate. We are, moreover, well aware of the measures, support and initiatives from which the European automotive industry has benefited, precisely because it is now experiencing what the textile and clothing sectors have been facing for decades.

Let’s look at what happened a few weeks ago in Paris, on the fringes of Première Vision. The European textile and fashion federations have once again joined forces to denounce the competitive imbalance caused by fast fashion. The abolition of the customs exemption for low-value parcels and the introduction of a transitional customs duty of 3 euros were a first step. But that is just that: a first step. Now, the federations are calling for a more ambitious European handling fee, closer to 10 euros, capable of reflecting the real cost of customs control, market surveillance and the safety of the millions of products entering the EU every day. We continue to demand of compliant European brands what we do not demand of those who flood our market from outside. What is being called for is not protectionism; it is simply reciprocity.

That is why circularity cannot be treated as a mere exercise in documentary compliance. A factory that already complies with strict European environmental and social standards, operates under recognised certifications and ensures traceable supply chains, should embark on this transition with a real advantage. But this advantage will only translate into competitiveness if the EU is able to distinguish it – and reward it – from production that disregards circularity criteria and, consequently, does not internalise these costs in the final price of the product.

We have long known what needs to be done to ensure that, by 2030, we have sustainable and circular textiles and clothing in the EU. European industry is the right partner to drive the value chain forward, ensuring that products placed on the market are genuinely durable, repairable and recyclable; made largely from recycled fibres; free from hazardous substances; and produced with full respect for social rights.

However, whilst we must ensure fairness within the Single Market, the key question that remains to be answered in order to realise the 2030 vision is not a conceptual one, but a strictly operational one. Who collects? Who sorts? Who recycles? Who pays and on what scale? What is needed for textile recycling to move beyond the pilot project stage and truly become an industry?

It is to answer these questions, backed by data and practical experience, that ANIVEC, CENIT and the Lusitano Project are organising a meeting at the European Parliament in Brussels on 30 September. Under the patronage of MEPs Paulo Cunha (PT/EPP) and Bruno Gonçalves (PT/S&D) and under the theme “Making circular textiles work in Europe: Transparency, Recycling and Industrial Competitiveness” (https://shorturl.at/r8Ml4), the aim is clear: to bring together European institutions, industry and organisations that are already implementing circular solutions on the ground – with practical experience in extended producer responsibility and recycling – to discuss what is actually needed for textile circularity to work on a European scale.

At the end of the day, the question is not whether the European textile and clothing industry wants to be circular. The answer to that question is given in the affirmative, every single day, by our companies. The question on the table is whether Brussels wants to rely on the European textile and clothing industry as its chosen partner to make this circularity a reality within the European Single Market. To this end, it is imperative to ensure the industrial and commercial conditions that make circularity genuinely competitive. If the response continues to be regulation without reciprocity, we run the very real risk of being left with only the world’s most stringent standards whilst exporting whatever production we have left.

The European Commission unveiled its EU Kids Act on Thursday (17 September), proposing sweeping restrictions on children’s access to social media and new obligations on technology companies to address growing concerns over young people’s mental health and online safety.

The proposal would prevent children under 13 from accessing social media, while 13- and 14-year-olds could use restricted “mini accounts” under parental supervision. From the age of 15, teenagers would be able to open their own social media accounts. The legislation also requires platforms to prove their services are safe for minors, reversing the burden of proof from regulators to technology companies....

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney was greeted as a conquering hero by a parliament that had caved to Trump threats - albeit reluctantly - signing off on the Turnberry trade deal, which would subject the EU to 15% tariffs.

Without naming US President Donald Trump, Carney took aim at the use of tariffs, financial leverage and supply-chain dependencies to force countries into line.

“Today, it is hard to reconcile sovereignty and openness,” Carney told the European Parliament. “Economic integration is now being weaponized; tariffs being used to exert pressure. Financial mechanisms have been used for coercion. Supply chains constitute weak points to be exploited.”

His answer was a far-reaching EU-Canada alliance designed to ensure neither side can be held hostage by a dominant country or company.

“Canada and Europe should secure our strategic autonomy through deep cooperation” across critical minerals, defence, AI and computing, energy, space and payments, he said.

But Carney was careful to distinguish that project from creating another geopolitical superpower.

'Not a great power rival only with better manners'

“I'm not proposing a third bloc in order to become a great power rival only with better manners,” he said. “We do not seek power to dominate others.”

Instead, he said, the objective was resilience so that “no one can control our open markets, impair our sovereignty, threaten our territorial integrity, or undermine our freedoms, our democracies, our rule of law.”

Carney reserved some of his toughest language for Big Tech, portraying technological dependence as another threat to democratic sovereignty.

“Tech platforms aspire to sovereignty,” he said. “They want to set access rules. They want to dictate the rules for regulation and even circumvent them. They want to control our data, spread disinformation, and steal our children's childhoods.”

“This combination is a ferocious storm. A single tree will come down in it. A forest will not.”

Carney laid out a substantial economic agenda for closer integration. On critical minerals, he pointed to Canada's deposits of more than 34 minerals and its position as a major producer of 10 considered essential to the energy transition. Europe could gain a more reliable source of raw materials, he argued, while Canada could gain access to European processing capacity and clean-energy technology. Canada could also supply LNG and hydrogen to bolster European energy security.

He called for “seamless digital trade” in non-agricultural goods and a wide range of services, alongside closer cooperation on AI standards and computing capacity.

Carney also floated a potentially significant step towards financial integration: “Canada and Europe should consider exploring an integrated market for financial services” to lower costs, increase consumer choice and improve companies’ access to capital.

Carney advocated allowing young Canadians and Europeans to work, study and live on either side of the Atlantic, with Canada joining Erasmus+ and participating in the next generation of the EU’s Horizon research programme.

The goal, Carney stressed, was not self-sufficiency, but collective resilience.

Photo: Formal sitting in the European Parliament with Mark Carney, Canadian Prime Minister. Photographer: Alexis Haulot © European Union

Enterprise security departments have typically been presented with one of two options: either the use of unified threat management systems (UTMs) to achieve a unified perimeter or an IDS solution that can offer greater insight into network activity. However, when considering solutions for enterprise environments running on Microsoft Windows-based products, it appears that both sides are focusing on the wrong issue. The argument from UTM vendors, who market their product as the "one-stop shop" for IT personnel with limited time resources, is that a UTM device provides all necessary functions (firewall, VPN, antivirus, etc.) within a single unit. On the other hand, the vendors of specialized IDS devices argue that the inclusion of these additional functionalities reduces the effectiveness of the IDS function. As such, organizations providing protection for Windows networks continue to be at increased risk due to this way of thinking.

Cybersecurity engineer Samuel Bemi investigated this gap through a controlled comparative evaluation of Snort, an open-source intrusion detection system, and pfSense, an open-source unified security platform, within a virtualised Windows 11 enterprise environment. His evaluation goes beyond the conventional question of whether a security control detects an attack, examining whether that detection remains operationally valuable once false positives, latency, throughput, and resource utilisation are taken into account.

Detection alone doesn't tell the whole story

The experiment simulated three of the most common attack patterns organisations face: ICMP flood attacks, port and service scanning, and denial-of-service traffic. Both Snort and pfSense were configured to defend a Windows 11 host inside an isolated network built specifically for testing.

The results were clarifying, not comforting. Snort detected 100 percent of ICMP flood attempts and 100 percent of denial-of-service traffic, and identified the large majority of port scanning attempts. Within the controlled test environment, Snort achieved strong detection performance against the traffic patterns tested. But the more important finding was that detection performance came with operational trade-offs.  Alongside that success sat a false positive rate high enough to be operationally significant, alongside a measurable increase in network latency and a meaningful drop in throughput once both systems were active.

Bemi's evaluation shifts the question from “which security control detects more attacks?” to a more consequential one: “does the security architecture remain effective when detection accuracy, false positives, and operational overhead are considered together?”  Rather than assessing IDS and UTM controls independently, Bemi's approach examines how detection accuracy, false positives, resource consumption, and network performance interact when the controls are deployed within the same enterprise environment. This perspective provides security teams with a more practical basis for designing defence-in-depth architectures, where protection is assessed not only by what threats a control detects, but also by how effectively it operates within the wider network.

"A 100 percent detection rate cannot be evaluated in isolation," Bemi says. "If achieving that result introduces significant false positives, latency or throughput degradation, the security control has to be assessed as an operational system rather than simply as a detection mechanism."

What UTM alone Mmisses

Bemi’s argument is that IDS will never replace or outperform UTM. Instead, he says both tools solve two different layers of the same issue. Layer one is Perimeter Enforcement (Firewalling, VPN termination, Traffic Shaping, Blocking Known-Bad traffic) as long as you have the correct settings with your UTM devices such as pfSense. The Layer Two that IDS addresses is what happens after you allow something past the first layer. This Layer two provides a level of detail that can't be replicated by UTM alone. In particular, this was very evident during Bemi's testing and evaluation based on Detection Capability and Operational Impact.

" A UTM determines whether traffic should be admitted into the Network," Bemi states. " An IDS answers a completely different Question; namely, now that it is inside the Network, does it appear to be anomalous?" Bemi stated enterprises who use only UTM are typically making only one determination regarding allowing traffic past the Firewall/VPN termination device. Then they are simply relying on anything that passes through to be safe."

Resource cost is a design input, not an afterthought

One of the study's most important findings is that defence-in-depth is not operationally free. Running both controls increased CPU and memory utilisation and introduced additional network latency, demonstrating that security architecture cannot be evaluated solely through detection effectiveness.

He argues the practical barrier to hybrid defence is often less about whether the controls can work together and more about whether organisations have planned for the capacity, tuning and monitoring they require. "Nobody disputes that defence-in-depth is the right architecture on a whiteboard," he says. "The resistance comes at implementation, when a smaller IT team realises that running both properly means capacity planning, rule tuning to bring false positives down, and ongoing log review. That is a resourcing conversation, not a technology conversation. But skipping it does not remove the risk; it just moves the risk from the network into the business."

The practical path forward

For organisations still treating this as a binary purchasing decision, the practical implication of Bemi's evaluation is not that every organisation should deploy both controls indiscriminately. Instead, security architects should treat UTM and IDS as complementary controls, evaluate their combined performance under realistic traffic conditions, and size infrastructure and monitoring capacity around the resulting operational overhead.

Conclusion

The challenge for Windows enterprise security is not choosing between UTM and IDS, but designing an architecture in which both controls address different layers of the same threat landscape. Bemi’s evaluation demonstrates that detection rates alone do not determine security effectiveness; false positives, latency, throughput, resource consumption, and the effort required to operate the controls also matter. The industry therefore needs to move beyond product-versus-product comparisons and assess how security controls perform together under realistic enterprise conditions. In practice, UTM can provide the first layer of perimeter enforcement, while IDS adds deeper visibility into suspicious activity that may pass through that boundary. Organisations considering a hybrid approach should test the combined architecture against representative workloads and establish clear thresholds for performance, false positives, and resource utilisation before deployment. They should also plan for ongoing rule tuning, monitoring, capacity management, and analyst involvement rather than treating these as secondary operational concerns. Ultimately, effective defence-in-depth depends not simply on deploying more security tools, but on ensuring that complementary controls work together in a way that is measurable, sustainable, and aligned with the organisation’s operational needs.

On Wednesday (16 September) Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney had a good day at the EU Parliament in Strasbourg. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen indicated that she would like to work with Mr Carney “on opening the door for Canada to be the first associate member of the European Union", writes Dick Roche.

Prime Minister Carney was given a standing ovation by the Parliament’s Members. While it is not clear  what ‘associate EU Membership’ means, the offer from the Commission President and the welcome by MEPs was a plus, of sorts, for Mr Carney in his battle with President Trump.

A bumpy relationship

The relationship between Prime Minister Carney and President Trump was always destined to be a bumpy one. Days before President Trump was sworn in for his second term Justin Trudeau stepped down as Prime Minister of Canada. As Trudeau was leaving office the president-elect repeated comments that he had made during the 2024 US elections about Canada becoming the 51^st US State.

On 1 February 2025, as the contest to replace Mr Trudeau as the Liberal Party leader was getting underway President Trump, announced a 25% tariff on imports from Canada, Mexico and Canada: Canadian energy exports were subject to a 10% tariff. Trump explained the tariffs were intended to address the emergency related to fentanyl trafficking and illegal immigration.

Nine days later Trump announced a blanket 25% tariff on all imported steel and aluminium to “protect US industry and national security.” This hit Canada the biggest foreign supplier of steel and aluminium into the US market badly.

The pain for Canada did not stop there, on 26^th March Trump announced his 25% tariff on all automobile imports into the US. Again, another bad hit on - most Canadian vehicle production is destined for the US market. The impact on Canadian auto producers was somewhat ameliorated by the fact that the tariff applied only to non-US content vehicle imports from Canada.

The stream of tariff announcements from the US while hurting Canada played to Mark Carney’s advantage in the race for leadership of Canada’s Liberal Party. While a "political ingénue" never having held political office or been a Member of a Member of Canada’s Parliament Mr Carney brought deep economic experience to the contest. He won almost 87% of the votes cast in the leadership election.

Mr Carney was sworn in as Prime Minister of Canada on 14^th March 2025 - seven weeks into President Trump’s second term. Six weeks after his swearing in Mark Carney was elected to the Canadian House of Commons in the General Election of 28^th April 2025.  

Placating a cranky neighbour

From the outset  Prime Minister Mark Carney invested considerable effort in improving relations with President Trump. The two leaders met in the White House on 6^th May. The meeting, reportedly, went well.

Asked at the press briefing after the meeting about Trump’s suggestions that Canada should become the 51^st US state, Carney responded humorously. He recalled that during the recent elections he had met the owners of Canada. They were not he said interested in ‘selling the property’, something that Mr Trump as a property man would understand. Smiling President Trump responded ‘never say never.’

At the G7 meeting held in Kananaskis, Alberta, in June President Trump and Mr Carney had another cordial meeting.  

The cordiality  did not last long. At the end of June the first payments on Canada’s Digital Services Tax (DST) were due to be made.  The DST legislation enacted during the Trudeau Government, hit US tech companies causing fury in the White House. Trump called the tax a "direct and blatant attack on our country" and announced all trade talks with Canada would cease immediately.

Within days Carney announced that his administration would rescind the DST and halt the collection of the tax to advance negotiations with the US.

There was another flashpoint in January when President Trump reacted to reports that Canada and China were pursuing a comprehensive free trade deal. Prime Minister Carney defused the situation by explaining the talks with China were focused on adjusting existing arrangements.

While Carney faced criticism for ‘climbing down’ on the DST issue and for being too eager to placate the White House on China, his approach got US-Canada trade talks back underway.

By August 2025 there was some optimism that a breakthrough trade talks was close.  On August 18^th President Trump announced that a tentative understanding had been reached and as a result he was prepared to push back on the late August deadline for US tariff increases. 

The talks came to an abrupt halt three days later when Carney instructed Canada’s negotiating team to return to Ottawa.

That decision came as a surprise. Walking away risked incurring the wrath of President Trump. That was a risk that the Canadian PM had clearly calibrated.

When the US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer sought to blame Canada for the breakdown Carney responded that it was the US United States that made last-minute demands which Canada considered unacceptable, including efforts to introduce provisions that would impact Canada's trade autonomy and sovereignty.

President Trump  reacted immediately to Canada’s decision.  Using  a section of the Tariff Act 1930 that had never been used previously Trump imposed 50% tariffs across US$20 billion worth of Canadian products exported to the US.  

Carney announced that Canada would hit US exports to Canada with “dollar for dollar” retaliatory measures. These would come into  effect immediately after Labour Day 7^th September –the day when the starting gun for US mid-term elections is ‘fired’ to get into full swing.

Asked at the press conference whether Canada was starting a trade war with the United States, Mr. Carney responded: “you’re at war when you get attacked—we got attacked.”

In a televised address, Carney acknowledged that the steps he was taking  would come at a cost but argued that U.S. actions had left him with little alternative. He characterized the measures being taken by the United States as an attempt to hurt and divide Canadians. That, he suggested, was a miscalculation. Rather than weakening Canada, U.S. pressure would, he said, bring Canadians closer together.  

Backing Carney

All of indications suggest that Prime Minister Carney was correct in his assessment.

The leader of the Conservative Party Canada, Pierre Poilievre who previously accused Carney of being too willing to concede to Trump, strongly supported the decision to walk away from those trade talks.

Mr Poilievre  was not alone, with one exception the Premiers of Canadian Provinces publicly supported Prime Minister Carney’s stance.

The Premier of Ontario Canada’s most populous province, Doug Ford, an open critic of the US President, encouraged PM Carney to respond to Trump “tariff for tariff, dollar for dollar.”

The Quebec Premier, Christine Fréchette, was particularly supportive  of Carney’s refusal to make concessions to Trump on Quebec’s cultural protections.

Other Premiers have encouraged Carney to “fight back,” praised “team Canada,” criticised US tariff threats as unjustified, promised “full support,” and urged that Canada not accept a ‘subordinate economic relationship’ to the US.  

The Premier of Alberta where a referendum on a range of questions including Alberta’s future within Canada is to be held on 19^th October was the lone outrider,  cautioning against celebrating retaliatory tariffs and expressed the hope that negotiations be resumed.

Public support in Canada for the position taken by Carney has been positive. Reuters referred to  the tariff dispute encouraging a ‘rally around Canada’ effect that will likely dampen support for Alberta separation from Canada.

Ten days after the Canadian negotiating team abandoned the trade talks in Washington Carney’s Liberal Party received a very tangible indication of voter support when it won three by-elections for seats in the Canadian House of Commons including a seat in Quebec that had previously been held by a Conservative Party Member.

Opinion polls since the Canadian team walked away from the negotiations also show strong support for the position taken the Carney government.  

An Ipsos poll taken on August 26-27 indicates support across party lines for Canada standing up to the US - even if it resulted in higher costs and job losses: 63% of those surveyed felt Canada was right to stand firm in the negotiations.  Just 18 per cent said Canada should have made additional sacrifices to get a deal.

An Angus Reid Institute poll taken on 22 and 23 August immediately after the talks were ended found that 76% supported the line taken by the Canadian government.

A third poll by Abacus Data one of Canada’s most cited polling firms found that 60% approved of how the Carney government had handled the dispute while  18% disapproved.

Negatives for Trump

In the US, unsurprisingly, positions on the trade war with Canada splits along party lines. Democrats overwhelmingly oppose the Trump’s position arguing that tariffs cost consumers and businesses.

On 9^th September a group of nine Democrat Senators from states with close business ties with Canada issued a joint statement attacking President Trump’s “senseless trade war” with a key trading partner, primary export market and most enduring defence partner, pointing out that the President’s actions would force Canada to “diversify away from the US and deepen trade ties with other countries including China.”

Republicans generally, but not universally, support Trump’s position, arguing that Trump’s tariff stance is ‘putting America first.’ Concerns have been flagged in the Republican ranks that the tariffs will be an issue in the November mid-terms, particularly in competitive Senate and House races.  

Senator Susan Collins of Maine, the US state most exposed to the tariff dispute with Canada, who is facing a tough re-election contest in November has labelled the tariffs on Canada ‘a mistake’ pointing out that Canadian retaliation could cost Maine up to $170 million in export losses.  The Republican governor of Vermont has also been openly critical.    

The position for President Trump is considerably less positive than that of Prime Minister Carney. The Canadian Prime Minister enjoys the public and political support that President Trump conspicuously lacks. As this week's appearance in the European Parliament demonstrated Mr Carney’s support is not confined to Canada; he has international support which, President Trump again conspicuously lacks.

At the moment there is no obvious ‘off ramp’ to facilitate  a return to the negotiating table. Politically and temperamentally it will be harder for President Trump to pull back from the position he has taken in the tariff war than it will be for Mark Carney. Mr Carney has more political support for his position, at home and internationally than President Trump. He has also  played an infinitely better game than Mr Trump. For the moment the ball is very much in Mark Carney’s court. 

Dick Roche is a former Irish Minister for European Affairs and former Minister for the Environment. 

How two fields that never talk to each other arrived at the same answer.

The same protocol, two fields

ACLS (Advanced Cardiovascular Life Support) and ATLS (Advanced Trauma Life Support) are the gold standard frameworks for managing physiological crise: systems built to keep trained professionals functional when every instinct says to react without thinking. Special Educational Needs support sits, professionally speaking, at the opposite end of healthcare, in the sustained work of accompanying children through dysregulation and meltdown, through the disorientation of a nervous system that won't reliably self-regulate. Different setting, different literature, different culture of practice.

But according to Dr. Adaugo Ijeoma Nwauwa, a physician who has instructed ACLS and ATLS and also worked directly supporting children with diverse learning and behavioural needs, the two fields are running the same protocol without knowing it.

Cognitive regulation, not just medicine

The claim is more precise than it first sounds. ACLS and ATLS are not, at bottom, medical protocols. They are cognitive regulation systems for the clinician, not only the patient. Under extreme stress, cognition degrades in predictable ways: attention narrows, sequencing collapses, and emotional reactivity overrides trained procedure. Resuscitation medicine doesn't assume a clinician's competence will survive that pressure intact; it's built around the assumption it won't.

The response is to remove the need for real-time judgement wherever possible: convert decisions into automatic sequences, spread cognitive load across a team, and give each person one narrow role so no single mind holds the entire crisis.

“This isn’t an accident of medical history,” Nwauwa says. “It’s applied psychology, and it works.”

Dysregulation is dysregulation

The same architecture, she argues, is needed and largely absent in SEN support because it's the same underlying problem. A child in sensory overload meltdown is not being difficult; the prefrontal cortex, the seat of language, reasoning, and sequence, has gone functionally offline, leaving the limbic system to run threat detection and fight-flight-freeze on its own. A trauma patient in haemorrhagic shock is a different system in a different kind of overwhelm, but the logic doesn't change: the environment has to supply, from the outside, what the person's own system currently cannot generate.

In both cases, the worst thing a responder can do is the thing that feels most natural under stress: escalate. Raise the voice. Add complexity to the demand. Let their own anxiety enter the room as a signal the other person's nervous system will pick up before any words do.

What works instead is almost boringly consistent: reduce arousal, impose sequence, communicate through calm rather than instruction, and wait for the window in which re-engagement becomes possible.

Calm Is a trained skill, not a trait

This is where the argument does its most useful work, not in the parallel itself, which is intuitive once stated, but in what she does with the word "calm". Calm, in her account, is not a personality trait or an emotional state the responder happens to be in. It's a trained physiological and behavioural posture, produced deliberately, that signals safety to everyone in the room regardless of what the responder actually feels.

Emergency medicine trains this explicitly and treats it as a technical skill worth simulating and rehearsing. SEN support demands the identical output, a support worker staying regulated through a full meltdown, with a fraction of the training infrastructure and almost none of the professional recognition that it is a skill at all rather than a personality quirk.

“A support worker who stays regulated while a child is in full meltdown isn't 'being patient',"  she says. “They’re performing a skilled intervention.”

The distinction matters practically: naming it as a technical skill is what makes it teachable through simulation, scenario repetition, and deliberate practice under controlled stress, the same methods that already work in resuscitation training.

The shared failure mode

The two fields also share a failure mode, the same one emergency medicine spent decades designing its protocols around: skipping assessment in favour of immediate action. Faced with visible distress, the instinct is to do something. ACLS treats that instinct as dangerous enough to override by rule: assessment before intervention, every time, no exceptions for how urgent the moment feels, because acting on a wrong read during a cardiac arrest kills the patient.

The stakes in a classroom are different, but the mechanism is identical. A worker who responds to visible distress without first identifying its source — sensory overload, pain, an unmet need, a communication breakdown — will frequently intervene in ways that escalate the very thing they're trying to calm.

“The assessment step isn’t a delay,” she says. “It is the intervention.”

The missing cross-pollination

What she finds most frustrating is not that the parallel exists but that almost nobody has acted on it. The literature on acute crisis intervention and the literature on neurodiverse behavioural support don't cite each other, don't share conferences, and largely don't share a vocabulary, despite, in her assessment, running on the same underlying mechanism.

The traffic could move in both directions: emergency medicine has the deeper evidence base and decades of simulation science to offer SEN training, while SEN support has made real advances in co-regulation and trauma-informed practice with obvious, unexplored applications in the emergency room, where patients in crisis are often just as dysregulated, just as unreachable by instruction, as a child mid-meltdown.

Training programmes that treat physiological crisis response and behavioural dysregulation as categorically separate disciplines, she argues, are training people for a version of the nervous system that doesn’t exist. It doesn't draw that line. Neither, she'd argue, should the curriculum.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) will provide a long-term loan of up to 102 billion tenge (US$224.2 million) to Alatau Zharyk Company (AZhC) to modernize its electricity distribution infrastructure and expand digitalization, writes Dana Omirgazy.

The financing will help AZhC, a regional electricity distribution company supplying around 4 million people and around 50,000 commercial consumers in Almaty and the region, procure automated metering and telemechanic equipment and upgrade its low- and medium-voltage electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure, the bank’s press service reported on Sept. 7.  The project is part of Kazakhstan’s National Project for the Modernization of Energy and Utility Sectors (MEKS), a government-led program to modernize heat, electricity, water supply and sewerage networks and facilities.

The EBRD-supported investment will further digitize AZhC by installing smart meters at substations and piloting smart grid technologies. It will also strengthen the company’s cybersecurity and support related efforts at Samruk-Energy, AZhC’s parent company. The modernization is expected to generate annual electricity savings of approximately 22 gigawatt-hours (GWh) and reduce annual CO2 emissions by around 12,000 tons. It is also expected to support renewable energy growth in the Almaty Region.

As part of the five-year enhanced partnership framework between Kazakhstan and the EBRD, the project will also support Alatau city’s development by reconstructing the Zhetygen electricity substation and an associated 110-kilovolt (kV) transmission line. The EBRD has invested almost $13.6 billion in Kazakhstan through 358 projects, making the country the largest and longest-running recipient of EBRD investment in Central Asia.

Over recent decades, herrings in the Gulf of Bothnia have grown more slowly. Several factors could be behind these changes, but a clearer understanding of the actual causes is needed. Closing this knowledge gap is the aim of ImproFish.

Every year, scientists carry out research surveys in the Gulf of Bothnia to monitor the status of one of the most valuable fish species in the northern Baltic Sea: herring. Together with sprat, it forms the backbone of the region’s fishing industry, supports coastal communities and provides food for seals, seabirds and predatory fish higher up the food chain.

But despite this close monitoring, several knowledge gaps remain. Over recent decades, herrings in the Gulf of Bothnia have grown more slowly, reached maturity earlier and shown variations in weight and abundance. The research survey struggles with accurately understanding this fluctuation. 

Several factors could be behind these changes, from modifications in the food web to the fishery itself. But without a clearer understanding of the actual causes of these changes, it becomes harder to manage the fishery in a way that the stock becomes and then remains healthy over the long term, and fisheries managers are left trying to steer a stock that keeps changing shape beneath them.

Closing this knowledge gap is the aim of ImproFish. Coordinated by the Natural Resources Institute Finland (Luke) together with the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU), and co-funded by the EU through the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF), the project runs from May 2024 to October 2026. Its goal is to provide a stronger scientific basis for assessing the herring stock in the Gulf of Bothnia, so that fisheries advice can finally catch up with what is actually happening in the sea.

As Laura Uusitalo, the project coordinator from Luke, explained:

“Healthy herring stocks are important for both marine ecosystems and coastal livelihoods. We believe that the new knowledge and methods developed in this project can improve the reliability of stock assessments and support better-informed quota setting for years to come.”

Three scientific advances for a healthier stock

Despite yearly combined acoustic and trawl survey, as well as extensive catch sampling, the assessment of the Gulf of Bothnia herring stock has remained uncertain for a long time. Stock Synthesis 3, a newer stock assessment model used since 2021, has improved stability, but significant gaps remain, especially regarding the abundance of young fish.

 ImproFish addresses this through three recommendations:

• improving the fishery-independent abundance indices by extending the acoustic survey closer to the coast and taking into account oceanographic conditions such as temperature and wind-driven water mixing
• deepening the understanding of what drives the growth and size of fish, in order to sharpen the reference points used in fisheries management 
• identifying potential sub-populations, since early genetic findings point to a more complex population structure than previously assumed, with locally adapted groups 

Together, these improvements would make the stock assessment more biologically realistic and better aligned with ecosystem-based management, while still remaining achievable with a moderate research investment.

EU funding bringing two countries’ science together

Through ImproFish, EU funding is allowing Finland and Sweden to combine their analyses on the acoustic survey, herring catch sampling and genetic analyses across the Gulf of Bothnia, instead of each country conducting research on the shared stock on its own.

For fishing that spans the water of both countries, this joint effort finally makes it possible to study the stock with a more comprehensive data coverage, and bring the assessment and advice closer to ecosystem-based management.

This also contributes to the priority of the European Ocean Pact of protecting and restoring ocean health, while supporting a fishing sector that stays sustainable and economically viable for the communities who depend on it.

A fishery worth understanding better

Reaching this point requires as much work on the water as in the laboratory: acoustic surveys, genetic analyses, catch data from commercial fleets and growth data collected on research vessels like R/V Aranda directly feed into the improvements that ImproFish develops.

Most of these benefits will take shape over the medium and long term, but their reach may extend even further: since herring share many traits with other fish, the methods developed here could help scientists elsewhere in Europe facing similar uncertainties, well beyond the Gulf of Bothnia itself.

If you need further information, check the project website. Project website https://fisheries-rcg.eu/improfish/

Funding

• Funding programme European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) (2021/2027)

Stakeholders

Coordinators

Natural Resources Institute Finland (LUKE), Finland

Website https://www.luke.fi/en

Participants

Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences / Department of Aquatic Resources (SLU), Sweden

Website https://www.slu.se/en/

A new study shows that in‑cash child benefits play a vital role in reducing child poverty in the EU. On average, these benefits lower the risk of poverty among children by 10.6 percentage points.

The impact of in‑cash child benefits varies across EU countries. Austria sees the strongest effect, with child poverty reduced by 16.6 percentage points. Spain shows the smallest reduction, at 4.6 percentage points. These differences suggest there is room for EU countries to learn from each other and achieve higher social standards.

Key findings

• Child benefits can do more to reduce poverty: large differences between EU countries show room to make cash benefits more effective and help reach the 2030 poverty reduction target.
• Better targeting and wider access could make a difference: in around one third of EU countries, disadvantaged families receive less financial support than better-off families.
• Benefits in kind also support families: by making essential goods and services more affordable, they can reduce the financial pressure on families.
• More children in early childhood education and care (ECEC) could support parents in work: increasing participation could raise maternal employment by up to 5 percentage points, making it easier to combine work and care.
• Investing in children pays off in the long term: analysis shows benefits for education, employment and health. Overall, for every €1 invested in quality benefits in kind for children, the estimated return is €5.26.
  

Progress towards the 2030 child poverty target

The EU has committed to reducing the number of children in poverty by at least 5 million by 2030. Progress towards this target has stalled, so efforts need to be stepped up and policies improved.

The new study underlines that in‑cash child benefits are a key tool to support families and lower child poverty. Its findings will contribute to the preparation of the forthcoming Commission Recommendation on child‑related benefits. This Recommendation was announced in the Communication Breaking the cycle of child poverty – strengthening the European Child Guarantee, which is part of the wider Anti‑Poverty Strategy.

Report on the effectiveness of child benefits in the EU

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“What stands in the way becomes the way,” Marcus Aurelius writes in Meditations. Nearly two millennia later, the idea captures Pakistan’s strategic dilemma with remarkable precision. Islamabad must convince Saudi Arabia that its defence commitment carries real weight without being drawn into another Middle Eastern war or rupturing its relationship with Tehran. That obstacle may itself have become Pakistan’s most useful instrument: strategic ambiguity, writes Dimitra Staikou.

On 10 September 2026, following Houthi attacks against Saudi targets, Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Sajjad Haider Khan said there was no discussion of an immediate military response under the new defence agreement. Yet only a day earlier, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif had warned that continued aggression against Saudi Arabia could make the pact operational.

The contradiction may be more calculated than accidental. On 13 September, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif expressed Pakistan’s complete solidarity with Mohammed bin Salman. Two days later, fresh missile and drone attacks against Saudi targets brought the question of collective defence closer to reality. Pakistan is trying to reassure Riyadh that it will not stand alone while avoiding any clear definition of when political solidarity becomes military involvement. At the same time, Islamabad is keeping channels with Tehran open and leaving Saudi Arabia’s adversaries uncertain about where Pakistan’s real red line lies. But September’s events suggest that the space for such ambiguity is narrowing. The central question is no longer whether Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are security partners, but how far Islamabad is actually prepared to go when deterrence is tested.

That question has become more urgent because the relationship has changed institutionally. On 7 August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, declaring that an armed attack against any one of the three would be regarded as an attack against all. On 31 August, their foreign and defence ministers and military chiefs met in Istanbul to begin institutionalising the arrangement, agreeing to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and deepen joint defence-industry cooperation, technology development and production. This is therefore more than another declaration of political solidarity. The Makkah Alliance is beginning to acquire the machinery designed to make collective deterrence credible.

The military relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia itself stretches back decades. Pakistani officers have trained Saudi forces, Pakistani troops have periodically been deployed in the Kingdom, and Riyadh has reciprocated with economic and political support. Yet the most important episode for understanding the limits of this relationship came in 2015. When Saudi Arabia assembled its coalition for the intervention in Yemen, Riyadh sought Pakistani military support. On 10 April, Pakistan’s parliament unanimously backed neutrality, effectively rejecting direct participation while pledging to defend Saudi Arabia if its territorial integrity were threatened. The distinction was crucial: Islamabad was prepared to defend the Kingdom, but not automatically to participate in its wars. In 2026, that very red line is being tested.

The Riyadh-Islamabad rapprochement does not mean that Saudi Arabia is abandoning the United States. It does, however, demonstrate that the Kingdom no longer wants its security to depend exclusively on Washington. The limited US response following the attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in 2019, followed by Washington’s 2021 decision to end support for offensive operations in Yemen, had already exposed the limits of American protection. That uncertainty resurfaced this September. Mohammed bin Salman sought military assistance from Donald Trump against the Houthis, but the US president declined to authorise direct American strikes, with Washington instead offering intelligence-sharing and targeting support. On 12 September, Trump said Iran was probably responsible for the attack on Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and described Mohammed bin Salman as a “good friend”. The United States remains an indispensable Saudi partner, but not always a willing combatant. Pakistan gains importance in precisely this space: not as a replacement for America, but as an additional regional pillar of Saudi security.

If the American position explains why Riyadh is seeking more strategic options, China points towards the direction in which the wider security system may be moving. Beijing is one of Islamabad’s most important strategic and military partners, while simultaneously developing an increasingly close relationship with Saudi Arabia. In April 2026, Xi Jinping told Mohammed bin Salman that China wanted to deepen “mutual strategic trust” with the Kingdom. On 2 September, Xi argued that regional states should work towards “a new security architecture for the Middle East” and hold their future in their own hands. His remarks were not about the Makkah Agreement and should not be interpreted as Chinese endorsement of it. They do, however, reflect a broader shift: a Riyadh seeking greater strategic autonomy, an Islamabad deeply connected to Beijing, and a China seeking a greater role in shaping the regional order. The issue is not a secret trilateral alliance, but the potential convergence of Saudi capital, Pakistani military power and Chinese technological and strategic support.

There is also an unavoidable nuclear dimension. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Saudi Arabia is not a nuclear weapons state. Nothing publicly released about the Makkah Agreement establishes a Pakistani nuclear guarantee to Riyadh, and there is no evidence that Islamabad intends to deploy nuclear weapons on Saudi territory. Yet that absence of clarity is itself strategically significant. Pakistan’s nuclear capability sits behind a collective-defence commitment whose public language does not specify where conventional deterrence ends and strategic deterrence begins. For Iran, Israel, Washington and European capitals, the question is therefore not whether Saudi Arabia has suddenly acquired a Pakistani nuclear umbrella — it has not — but whether potential adversaries may now have to calculate against that possibility in an extreme crisis. Deterrence often depends as much on uncertainty as on declared doctrine.

For Europe, this shift is anything but distant. On 9 September, France expressed full solidarity with Riyadh following the Houthi attacks. In Berlin, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul assured his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan of Germany’s solidarity, while on 11 September the German Foreign Office warned that growing Houthi pressure around Bab al-Mandab could restrict oil and LNG supplies, with consequences for global markets. In Brussels, Kaja Kallas had already put “freedom of navigation” in the Red Sea on the European agenda, asking publicly what more Europe could do. These concerns are tangible: energy security, maritime trade routes and regional stability are becoming intertwined in the same crisis. The attacks of 15 September have made the danger even clearer, with renewed strikes against Saudi targets adding to pressure on energy markets and further threatening the routes connecting the Gulf, the Red Sea and Europe.

There is another reason Europe cannot treat the Makkah Alliance as a distant development: Türkiye. Ankara is simultaneously a party to the new collective-defence architecture and a member of NATO. That does not mean the Makkah Agreement automatically engages NATO obligations, nor that the two systems are inherently incompatible. But it does create questions that European allies should address before, rather than during, a major crisis. What happens if Türkiye is asked to participate in collective action under the Makkah Agreement? How would Ankara manage parallel commitments if escalation involved Iran or another regional actor? And how much strategic consultation should occur within NATO before such a scenario materialises?

Brussels cannot afford to wait for the agreement to be activated for the first time before deciding how to respond. Europe needs deeper dialogue with Riyadh and Islamabad on non-proliferation and missile technologies, stronger protection for navigation in the Red Sea and a clear discussion within NATO about Ankara’s new defence commitments. It does not need to treat the emerging security architecture as hostile. But it does need to understand what happens when that architecture moves from declarations to action.

The real test of the Makkah Alliance will come when Riyadh asks Islamabad to demonstrate what it means for an attack on one to be treated as an attack on all. At that moment, the strategic ambiguity that today gives Pakistan room to manoeuvre may become the problem itself. And the question — whether Pakistan is genuinely prepared to fight for Saudi Arabia — will no longer concern Riyadh and Islamabad alone. The answer could reshape the security balance from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea all the way to Europe.

The head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen (pictured), says AI has the “potential to benefit humanity”.

Her comments came on Wednesday in her landmark “state of the union” address to MEPs.

A speech touched on numerous areas and they included AI which has rocketed up the political agenda in recent times.

In her address to Euro members at their monthly plenary in Strasbourg, she referred to AI as a “tipping point of our times.”

The commission president declared, “AI is fast becoming a foundational layer for our economy and security. Europe's stance is clear. We want to make the most of AI to improve our society, our quality of life and our productivity.

“I am an optimist that AI has the potential to benefit humanity – if we get it right. But, as with any powerful new technology, AI comes with a balance of possibilities and risks. Without addressing these risks, we will never be able to unlock AI's possibilities.”

The former German defence minister noted, “As the frontier models become more capable, these risks have come more sharply into focus.

“Models being developed will allow hacking on a level we never thought possible. And they will soon be in the hands of adversaries who see the world very differently from us.”

She told deputies, “At the same time, the dangers of self-improving models are becoming ever more apparent.

“Incidents of AI agents escaping their environment or inserting malicious code are a mere glimpse. After the HuggingFace incident, developers are ringing the alarm. And CEOs of the most advanced companies tell us that it is time to slow down on the self-recursive models. To pace the frontier.”

Von der Leyen added, “If the people developing the technology are clear, then we should be too. The AI Act is of course a crucial piece to putting guardrails in place. 

"And it puts Europe in the position to shape global efforts on how to tackle this.”

In her comments on AI she said, “So, we will step up together with our like-minded partners like Canada, the United Kingdom and others. We want to team up on model evaluation, verification, early warning, AI security and much more.

“And I will invite the main frontier labs for a discussion on how we can support ongoing industry efforts to pace the frontier,” she said.

The circular economy is no longer an aspiration—it is becoming a necessity. As industries seek to reduce their environmental footprint while preserving valuable resources, extending the life of products through refurbishment has emerged as one of the most effective strategies available, writes Julien Morganti, General Manager of P.E.P. ecopassport®.

Across the electrical, electronic and HVAC sectors, demand for refurbished equipment is growing rapidly. Customers are increasingly looking for solutions that combine environmental responsibility with economic value, while manufacturers and service providers are investing in refurbishment capabilities to meet these expectations. Yet one major challenge has remained: how can we assess the environmental performance of refurbished products in a way that is both robust and transparent?

For new products, environmental declarations have become an established tool for measuring and communicating environmental performance. Refurbished products, however, have lacked a common methodology capable of reflecting their specific characteristics while ensuring consistency and credibility across the market.

This is precisely the challenge that P.E.P. ecopassport® has sought to address through the publication of a new methodological guide dedicated to refurbished equipment—the first initiative of its kind in France and, to our knowledge, across Europe for electrical, electronic and HVAC equipment.

Developing this methodology required answering a fundamental question: how should the environmental impacts and benefits associated with refurbishment be allocated? Inspection, repair, component replacement and testing all generate environmental impacts, yet refurbishment also avoids the production of an entirely new product and extends the useful life of existing equipment.

Finding the right balance was only possible through close collaboration between manufacturers, industry associations and technical experts. The resulting methodology recognises the environmental contribution of both the refurbished product and the original product designed with refurbishment in mind. Rather than focusing solely on carbon emissions, it evaluates the full range of Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) indicators, including material and resource consumption, providing a far more comprehensive picture of environmental performance.

This broader perspective matters because the transition to a circular economy cannot be measured by greenhouse gas emissions alone. Conserving raw materials, reducing resource depletion and maximising product longevity are equally critical objectives if we are to build truly sustainable industrial systems.

Importantly, this guide is not intended to be the final word. It provides a shared foundation that the industry can build upon as experience grows. As more refurbished products are assessed, the methodology will continue to evolve and, ultimately, become integrated into the

programme's Product Category Rules (PCRs) and Product Specific Rules (PSRs), where applicable.

Standardised environmental assessment is about more than technical consistency. It creates confidence. Manufacturers gain a recognised framework for communicating the environmental value of refurbished products. Specifiers and purchasers receive comparable, reliable information to support procurement decisions. Ultimately, the entire market benefits from greater transparency.

The transition towards circularity requires more than innovation in products—it also requires innovation in the way environmental performance is measured. By establishing a common methodology for refurbished equipment, we hope to remove one of the barriers that has limited wider adoption and provide the market with the confidence needed to accelerate the circular economy.

Because if refurbishment is to become a mainstream component of sustainable industry, it must be supported by environmental assessment methods that are as rigorous, credible and forward-looking as the products themselves.

About the P.E.P Association

Founded in 2009, the P.E.P Association is a non-profit organization whose purpose is to help reduce the environmental impact of electrical, electronic, and digital products by facilitating the dissemination of reliable, transparent, and verified information across the entire value chain.

In compliance with ISO 14025, its mission is to define governance rules, develop, verify, and publish Product Environmental Profiles (PEP) or Environmental Product Declarations (EPD), while adhering to principles of transparency and ethics. It also aims to bring together industry stakeholders to promote these practices.

Recognized as a leading operator in the sector at the international level, the P.E.P Association contributes to national and European standardization and works toward harmonizing programs across countries.

On 18 August, Israel launched eight airstrikes against the Abu al-Duhur air base in northwestern Syria, located approximately 70 kilometres from the Turkish border. Israel also reportedly informed the United States that Turkey might be preparing to deploy radar systems and air defense equipment at the base, a move that could significantly alter the regional balance of power. Turkey is expected to respond to the Israeli strikes, raising the prospect of direct military confrontation between the two countries inside Syria,

As it stands, Turkey's growing tensions with Israel over issues including Gaza, Iran, and Lebanon are increasingly difficult to ignore. Turkey also possesses substantial military capabilities, which were originally intended in large part to strengthen NATO's ability to counter Russia but are now increasingly being used to pursue Ankara's own strategic interests, including those that are not aligned with the geopolitical preferences of the U.S. and Israel. Turkey is therefore demonstrating a degree of strategic autonomy that increasingly extends beyond the traditional constraints of the NATO framework. This development is a clear example of the broader process of regional polarization.

Regional polarization, in fact, creates the conditions for the emergence of regional hegemony. It reflects a tendency for countries within a particular region to gravitate toward a dominant power. That power, in turn, simultaneously expands its influence and seeks to establish a new regional order. Regional hegemony does not emerge out of nowhere. Instead, it develops gradually through a process of regional polarization.

Turkey is a prominent example of this process. Israel can also be viewed through the same lens, as can Saudi Arabia, which has been working steadily to strengthen its position and influence in the region. Beyond the Middle East, India and Japan are also moving in this direction. Iran, meanwhile, remains an important regional power despite currently being consumed by war.

Against this broader trend of regional polarization, China presents a particularly unique case. China's current strategic direction appears to differ substantially from the logic of regional polarization. Instead, Beijing continues to place considerable emphasis on building relationships among major powers at the global level. In this context, the idea of a G2 remains an attractive strategic concept for China, while U.S. President Donald Trump also appears to be seeking to leverage this possibility in developing a special relationship with China.

In Asia, India is already an unmistakable example of a country pursuing greater regional strategic autonomy. Japan is another crucial case. The election of Sanae Takaichi can be interpreted as an indication that Japan's own process of regional polarization is beginning to take shape. However, because of its security treaty with the U.S. and continuing domestic political opposition, Japan remains reluctant to openly acknowledge such a trajectory.

Nevertheless, Japan is likely to move progressively toward greater regional strategic autonomy. This would mean that Tokyo increasingly seeks to exercise influence in Asia regardless of whether Washington fully supports such a development. As a result, contradictions between Japan and the U.S. could become more pronounced across economic, financial, and political spheres. Japan's ability to say "no" to the U.S. may gradually become a practical reality.

Once Japan gains greater freedom to articulate and pursue an independent strategic position, it may also seek to improve relations with China. In this sense, Japan's increasing regional autonomy could ultimately prove beneficial to Japan-China bilateral relations over the longer term.

Perhaps the most important feature of regional polarization is that conflict among countries is inevitable. Such conflicts are not necessarily an anomaly. Rather, they are a natural expression of the polarization process. No country is willing to readily acknowledge another as the principal power or dominant pole within a region. Regional leadership therefore has to be established through competition, strategic maneuvering, and, at times, confrontation.

This dynamic applies to Japan, China, India, Turkey, and other emerging regional powers. As a result, international disputes are likely to become increasingly intense. The underlying reason is the growing competition for regional influence amid the erosion of the existing global order.

First, countries increasingly perceive an opportunity to become the dominant pole within their respective regions. Second, no major regional power is willing to accept another country's unquestioned leadership or submit to its influence. Confrontation, friction, and strategic rivalry therefore become increasingly difficult to avoid.

Ultimately, the countries that possess sufficient resources, strategic capabilities, and the ability to respond effectively to changing circumstances will have the greatest chance of emerging as regional hegemons. The struggle for regional dominance is therefore not merely a contest of military strength. This is also a test of economic resources, political resilience, strategic judgment, and the ability to shape a new regional order.