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35 US parts, a Chinese navigation unit, a Russian engine: what’s inside Russia’s Filin missile

Filin cruise missile

Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) published a 3D model and parts list of Russia’s new Filin cruise missile on 22 October. The breakdown names the Russian companies behind the missile and the foreign makers of its electronics.

HUR runs its War&Sanctions portal to trace such parts back to their makers. Its stated aim is to “deprive the aggressors of the ability to produce weapons for terror,” the portal says. Meanwhile, Russia is betting on cheap, fast cruise missiles, Serhii Beskrestnov, a freelance adviser to the president on technology, told Radio NV in mid-September. Naming the Banderol, Dan-T, Dan-M, and Gerbera-5, he warned they would soon outrun Ukraine’s jet-powered interceptors, so Ukraine needed its own cheap missiles to shoot them down.

Composite body, ground launch

JSC NPO Molniya, part of Russia’s Tactical Missiles Corporation, builds the Filin, HUR said. The agency called it part of a Russian defense-industry trend toward cheap jet-powered, ground-launched air-attack weapons. Russia began firing it at Ukraine in late summer 2026.

Filin cruise missile components.
Filin cruise missile components. Image: War&Sanctions

HUR’s data puts the carbon and fiberglass fuselage at 3.5 m, with a 3 m wingspan. Some parts are 3D-printed. Russia claims a top speed of 800 km/h. The range is 600–1,200 km, and the missile flies at ultra-low altitude or up to 6 km. Versions carry 50-kg or 100-kg warheads. A solid-fuel booster fires it from a ground launcher.

A firm tied to a Shahed-type drone

PLAZ LLC makes the onboard equipment, HUR said. The firm also helps produce the Garpiya, a version of Russia’s Shahed-type Geran-2 drone. Filin and Garpiya units share a similar layout and markings. Guidance combines a Chinese-made inertial navigation system with a 16-channel Kometa anti-jamming module from Russia’s VNIIR-Progress.

The electronics resemble those in other Russian missiles and drones but carry a larger share of Chinese parts. Of 81 components, 35 are American and 22 Chinese. The engine, however, is Russian: an R500 turbojet from Reynolds LLC. A similar engine earlier turned up in the S-71K Kover aviation cruise missile and S-71M Monokhrom, HUR said.

For comparison, Ukraine found more than 20 foreign components in a different cheap missile, the Banderol, in May 2025. They included 10 US microchips, and the Banderol flies on a Chinese jet engine.

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Kinzhal is 90% identical to Iskander-M: Ukraine’s intelligence identifies 58 companies in production chain

3D model of the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missile. Photo: Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence (HUR) released information on the components of Russia’s Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile and the companies involved in its production, according to a statement dated 12 October.

Russia has used Kinzhal missiles to strike targets across Ukraine since the start of its full-scale invasion. However, 22 of the 58 companies in Russia’s Kinzhal production network are not subject to sanctions, the intelligence agency noted.


Kinzhal missile: design, components, and production changes

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has published an interactive 3D model of the Russian Kinzhal missile on its War&Sanctions portal.

The 9-S-7760 missile, known as the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, uses solid fuel and has a single stage. This means the missile does not consist of multiple stages that separate sequentially during flight. About 90% of its components are identical to those used in the 9M723 ballistic missile of the Iskander-M system, HUR noted.

The Kinzhal is equipped with a radar homing seeker, an active jamming station, and a decoy deployment system, according to the statement. The homing seeker helps the missile determine the direction to its target, while decoys are designed to make interception by air defense systems more difficult.

The missile can carry one of two types of warheads: a penetrating high-explosive warhead or a nuclear warhead. Russia is also developing a version with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead that strikes targets through an explosion and fragments. HUR believes this development may be linked to problems with the missile’s accuracy.

In 2026, Russia significantly reduced its state procurement order for Kinzhal missiles and redirected some production resources, components, and raw materials towards manufacturing Iskander-M missiles, HUR noted. Another reason is the limited number of MiG-31I and MiG-31K aircraft used to launch Kinzhal missiles, the intelligence agency reported.

Ukraine intercepts Kinzhal missiles, but has limited resources to do so

Despite their high speed, Russian Kinzhal missiles can be intercepted using US-made Patriot surface-to-air missile systems. In particular, PAC-3 interceptor missiles are designed to destroy ballistic targets and can be used against threats such as the Kinzhal and Zircon, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense reported.


Ukraine is seeking additional Patriot interceptor missiles to defend against Russian ballistic attacks during the winter.

Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missile system.
The Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missile system. Photo: Swedish Ministry of Defense

Most of the approximately 1,000 missiles Kyiv has contracted for are not expected to arrive for several years, prompting Ukraine to ask its allies to supply missiles from their existing stockpiles, Defense News reported on 12 October 2026.

Sanctions loopholes allow Russia to obtain foreign components for Kinzhal missiles

Russia continues to use foreign components in missile production despite sanctions. For instance, the US-made Texas Instruments processors were found again in a newer version of the Kinzhal missile, Ukrainian presidential commissioner for sanctions policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk said in September, Interfax reported. According to him, foreign electronics continue to reach Russia through various supply channels.

Earlier, Ukraine had provided its partners with information on more than 100 Russian companies involved in ballistic missile production and urged them to impose sanctions on those entities, according to the President's Office.

On 12 October, the EU Council imposed sanctions on 1,569 individuals and entities linked to Russia’s military-industrial complex, including 826 Russian companies and 743 company CEOs.

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Two Latvian Nationals Arrested at RAF Base Housing US and NATO Intelligence Operations

British counter-terrorism police are investigating a security breach at RAF Molesworth in Cambridgeshire after two Latvian nationals were found inside the military installation. The arrests come amid heightened security concerns following a separate suspected terrorist plot targeting RAF Fairford, which prompted the withdrawal of American bombers.

Two Latvian nationals have been arrested in Britain on suspicion of entering a restricted military installation for purposes potentially harmful to national security. The men were discovered inside RAF Molesworth, a sensitive military facility in Cambridgeshire that houses American and NATO intelligence operations, during the early hours of Thursday, 8 October.

The suspects, aged 36 and 32, are both Latvian citizens residing in the United Kingdom. According to an official statement issued by the Metropolitan Police, they were initially detained on suspicion of trespassing and criminal damage before being arrested under the National Security Act 2023.

The incident follows a separate investigation into a suspected terrorist plot near RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire, where American strategic bombers had been deployed. British counter-terrorism officers have emphasised that there is currently no evidence connecting the two cases.

Security breach discovered during routine patrol

The investigation began at approximately 10pm on Wednesday, 7 October, when Ministry of Defence Police officers patrolling RAF Molesworth discovered an abandoned vehicle near the installation’s perimeter.

Officers from Cambridgeshire Constabulary joined the search and subsequently identified a small breach in the security fence. At approximately 2am on Thursday, the two men were located inside the restricted area and taken into custody.

The suspects were initially questioned over alleged trespassing and criminal damage. However, investigators subsequently invoked Section 4 of the National Security Act 2023, which covers entering, approaching or inspecting prohibited locations for purposes prejudicial to Britain’s safety or interests.

The legislation carries a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment upon conviction. Neither man has been publicly identified, and police have not disclosed evidence establishing their alleged intentions or any connection with a foreign intelligence service.

Officers have also searched two addresses in the Peterborough area. The abandoned vehicle was recovered and examined by specialist explosive ordnance disposal personnel after concerns arose during initial inspections.

As a precaution, police established a cordon affecting roads around Glatton, including part of the A1. Specialists subsequently found nothing of concern, allowing the restrictions to be lifted.

Intelligence facility serving American and NATO operations

RAF Molesworth is not an ordinary operational airfield. Although designated as a Royal Air Force station, the installation accommodates intelligence facilities supporting American military operations and NATO.

Among the organisations associated with the site is the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre, which contributes to intelligence collection, assessment and information-sharing between allied military authorities. The installation also supports American military intelligence activities relating to operations in Europe and Africa.

The presence of these facilities makes Molesworth a sensitive location, where unauthorised access raises questions extending beyond conventional trespassing. Investigators will seek to establish how the men entered the compound, why they were there and whether they attempted to approach or examine restricted equipment or infrastructure.

Separate investigation at RAF Fairford

The arrests come less than two weeks after British police detained seven men in connection with a suspected terrorist plot involving RAF Fairford, another British installation used by the United States Air Force.

The Fairford investigation began on 27 September after suspicious activity was reported near the base. Police subsequently investigated possible offences involving explosives and preparations for terrorist acts. Those arrested in connection with that investigation have since been released on bail.

The incident was followed by the withdrawal of American bombers from Fairford. President Donald Trump subsequently referred to security threats affecting the installation, raising further questions about the protection of American military assets stationed in Britain.

Commander Helen Flanagan, head of Counter Terrorism Policing London, which is leading the Molesworth investigation, cautioned against drawing conclusions about the relationship between the two cases.

She said investigators had found nothing so far suggesting a connection with the Fairford incident and were continuing to examine possible motives.

British authorities have not publicly identified a foreign state or organisation as being responsible for the Molesworth breach.

The two Latvian nationals remain in police custody while investigators continue examining the circumstances surrounding their presence at the installation. The inquiry involves Counter Terrorism Policing, the Ministry of Defence Police and Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

The investigation is taking place against a wider background of security concerns involving European military facilities. Latvia itself reported an armed border provocation and sabotage of surveillance infrastructure near Belarus earlier this week, although there is no evidence linking that incident to the arrests in Britain.

For British investigators, the immediate task remains establishing whether the Molesworth intrusion was an isolated security breach or involved an intention to compromise military operations or intelligence infrastructure.

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